Mali

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Last updated: 19 June 2019

Summary: State Party Mali ratified the convention on 30 June 2010. It has participated several meetings of the convention, but not since 2014. Mali voted in favor of a key UN resolution promoting the convention in December 2018.

Mali provided an initial transparency report for the convention in May 2016, which confirms it never produced cluster munitions and possesses no stockpiles, including for research or training. Mali states that it has never used or transferred cluster munitions.

Policy

The Republic of Malisigned the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008, ratified on 30 June 2010, and the convention entered into force for the country on 1 December 2010.

Mali has not enacted specific national implementation legislation to enforce the convention’s provisions. [1]

Mali provided its initial Article 7 transparency report for the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 May 2016, covering calendar year 2015. It has not submitted annual updated reports, which are due by 30 April.

Mali actively participated in the Oslo Process that created the convention and advocated for a total ban on cluster munitions without exception and with immediate effect. [2]

Mali attended several meetings of the convention, but not since 2014. [3]

In December 2018, Mali voted in favor of a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution promoting implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. [4] It has voted in favor of the annual UNGA resolution promoting the convention since it was first introduced in 2015.

During the treaty negotiations, Mali argued against including Article 21 on interoperability (relations with states not party). [5] It has not elaborated its views on other important issues regarding interpretation and implementation of the convention, such as the prohibition on foreign stockpiling and transit of cluster munitions, and the prohibition on investment in cluster munition production.

Mali is party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

In May 2016, Mali confirmed that it has never produced cluster munitions and does not possess any stocks, including for research and training. [6] Mali has stated on several occasions that it has never transferred or used cluster munitions. [7]



 [1] Mali did not complete Form A (national implementation measures) in the Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report submitted on 3 May 2016. In 2011, Mali expressed an interest in pursuing implementing legislation for the convention, but it has not taken any steps towards this goal since then. Statement of Mali, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Session on Victim Assistance, Geneva, 28 June 2011. Notes by the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC).

 [2] For details on Mali’s cluster munition policy and practice through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 115–116.

 [3] Mali participated in the convention’s Meetings of States Parties until 2014 and the intersessional meetings in 2011. It did not attend the First Review Conference in September 2015. It has participated regional workshops, most recently in Lome, Togo in May 2013.

 [4]Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 73/54, 5 December 2018.

 [5] Statement of Mali, Committee of the Whole on Article 1, Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions, 27 May 2008. Notes by Landmine Action.

 [7] Statement of Mali, Lomé Regional Seminar on the Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Lomé, Togo, 22 May 2013. Notes by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV); statement of Mali, Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Meeting of States Parties, Oslo, 12 September 2012; and statement of Mali, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Meeting of States Parties, Vientiane, 10 November 2010. Notes by the CMC.


Mine Ban Policy

Last updated: 18 December 2019

Policy

The Republic of Mali signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified on 2 June 1998, and became a State Party on 1 March 1999. National implementation measures adopted in 2000 include penal sanctions and fines.[1]

Mali occasionally attends meetings of the treaty, most recently the Third Review Conference in Maputo in June 2014 and, prior to that, the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in Cambodia in November–December 2011. Mali last submitted an Article 7 transparency report in 2005.

Mali is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on explosive remnants of war. It is also party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

Mali has never produced or exported antipersonnel landmines. Mali initially declared that it had possessed stockpiles of antipersonnel mines since 1974, the majority supplied by the former Soviet Union.[2] In 1998, it destroyed a stockpile of 7,127 antipersonnel mines, together with 5,131 antivehicle mines.[3] In 2003, Mali reported that it retained 600 antipersonnel mines for training purposes, but it has never reported any use of these mines.[4]

Use

Mali stated in 2001 that it had never used antipersonnel mines and that there had been no reports of use by government forces or Tuareg rebels.[5]

In January 2012, an armed conflict began in the north of the country between the Malian government and its allies versus armed opposition groups allied with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In January 2013, the French military began operations in cooperation with the government of Mali to help to re-take areas in the north of the country. Military personnel from African Union states deployed as part of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali, while the UN deployed the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.

In 2013 and 2014, there were several reports indicating the use of either antivehicle mines or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by armed opposition groups participating in the armed conflict. Between November 2013 and July 2014, there were several antivehicle mines incidents that caused civilian casualties, including aid workers and UN peacekeepers.[6] According to GICHD-SIPRI data, the number of antivehicle mine incidents that caused civilian casualties has increased significantly in recent years, due to mines laid by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in Mali.

In 2018, Mali topped the list of countries with the highest number of casualties from antivehicle mines, at 254. This shows a dramatic increase in casualties from 76 in 2015. GICHD-SIPRI also noted that the locations of the incidents were no longer contained to the northern regions of Mali; in 2018, 44% of antivehicle mine incidents occurred in the central regions.[7] In 2019, there were several antivehicle mine incidents resulting in UN peacekeeper casualties: on 25 January two UN peacekeepers were killed and six injured in Mopti region.[8] On 20 April, one peacekeeper was killed and four were wounded in Timbuktu.[9] On 5 October, one peacekeeper was killed and four wounded in northern Mali.[10]

In July 2012, a NSAGs called the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa claimed it had laid antipersonnel mines near the city of Gao. After several apparent landmine casualties near Gao in early 2013, Mali’s Minister of Foreign Affairs accused AQIM of using antipersonnel mines.[11] The ICBL described the reported landmine use as “disturbing.”[12] However, no antipersonnel mines were ever recovered from the area.



[1] Two legal texts, an ordinance, and a decree prohibit the development, manufacturing, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, offer, import, export, transfer, and use of antipersonnel mines. Breach of the legislation is punishable with a maximum of life imprisonment and a fine of between CFA500,000 and CFA3 million (approximately US$1,150 to $6,900). Ordinance No. 049/P-RM on the Implementation of the Convention, adopted on 27 September 2000; and Decree No. 569/P-RM on the Application of the Ordinance, adopted on 15 November 2000. An interministerial National Commission for a Total Ban on Landmines was established in June 2002 to take responsibility for the mine issue. See, Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 341.

[2] Anonymous Malian sources.

[3] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form B, 17 May 2001.

[4] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form D, 31 July 2003. Mali initially reported in 2001 that it retained 2,000 antipersonnel and 1,000 antivehicle mines for training purposes. In 2003, it reported having consumed 1,400 antipersonnel mines and 700 antivehicle mines during training activities.

[5] Statement by the Ministry of Defense, Seminar on the Universalization and Implementation of the Ottawa Convention in Africa, Bamako, 16 February 2001.

[6] See, for example: “Officials: 4 people killed in landmine explosion in northern Mali,” The Washington Post, 5 November 2013; “Land mine injures 5 Chadian peacekeepers patrolling in northern Mali,” Fox News, 20 January 2014; “Two aid workers injured in landmine explosion in Mali,” World Bulletin, 27 February 2014; and “Land mine kills UN peacekeeper in northern Mali,” Grand Island Independent, 1 July 2014.

[8] Joanne Stocker, “UN peacekeepers in Mali killed by mine near Douentza,” Defense Post, 25 January 2019.

[11] Jeffery Schaffer, “AP Interview: Mali Wants Help Against Land Mines,” Associated Press, 4 February 2013. For example, on 4 February 2013 the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) stated that two civilians had died in an explosion involving a landmine or an IED on the road between Kidal, Anefis, and North Darane. “UN: 2 civilians killed by land mines in north Mali,” Associated Press (Timbuktu), 4 February 2013.

[12] ICBL Press Release, “Landmine Use in Malian Conflict Disturbing,” 12 February 2013.


Mine Action

Last updated: 28 November 2013

Contamination and Impact

Mines

The Republic of Mali has a problem with antivehicle mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in the north of the country but (as of March 2013) no reports had confirmed the presence of antipersonnel mines.[1]Mali has not submitted a Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report since 2005 and at that time declared that there were no areas containing antipersonnel mines on its territory.[2]

In September 2009, Mali reported the presence of 80 mined areas in the regions of Tombouctou and Kidal, particularly along the roads between Tinza and Abubaza,[3] and it repeated this information in September 2010, suggesting limited progress in demining; however, the extent of the threat is not known.[4]

The upsurge in conflicts in Mali in 2012 resulted in reports of mine laying around the northern town of Gao by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and an offshoot, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO).[5] The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) said in March 2013 that it had received reports of antivehicle mines in the Kidal region being cleared towards Tin and Zaotene, and could only provide evidence of antivehicle mines.[6]

Cluster munition remnants and other explosive remnants of war

Mali has significant explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination obstructing the delivery of humanitarian aid, freedom of movement, and efforts to stabilize and rebuild the economy in the aftermath of its civil war. Aerial attacks, artillery bombardments, and ground fighting in central and northern Mali left extensive unexploded and abandoned explosive ordnance ranging from grenades, mortars, and rockets to artillery shells and aircraft bombs. The towns of Diabaly, Douentza, Konna, and Gao were reportedly among the worst affected.[7]

Handicap International (HI) conducted a rapid assessment of the area around Segou and Mopti in January 2013 and concluded there was three to four months of work for approximately four explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams.[8]

As of March 2013, there was no evidence of contamination involving cluster munitions, but the UN reported multiple threats from IEDs.[9]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

Body

Situation on 1 January 2013

National Mine Action Authority

None

Mine action center

None

International demining operators

HI, Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB)

National demining operators

Malian Armed Forces

Mali set up the National Commission for the Total Ban of Antipersonnel Mines (Commission Nationale pour l’Interdiction Totale des Mines Antipersonnel, CNITMA) in June 2002 with the participation of three ministries (Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Security) to serve as the national mine action authority.[10] By the start of 2013, it did not appear to be functioning.

UNMAS established a presence in Mali in November 2012 to coordinate international mine action operators and by the end of March 2013 had five international and two national staff. Sweden’s MSB provided support in the form of an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) and two EOD teams. Other operators were preparing to deploy survey and clearance teams.[11]

Land release

Demining in Mali has been carried out by the army’s two engineering teams using manual clearance methods and their own standing operating procedures. It has not reported in any detail on clearance in recent years and no data was available for clearance in 2012.

In the first quarter of 2013, UNMAS provided EOD training to International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) Level 2 for 14 army engineers and 16 personnel from other Malian national security organizations.[12]

Compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Mali was required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2009. Mali has never declared a problem with antipersonnel mines and did not request an extension to its Article 5 deadline.

 



[1] Email from Charles Frisby, UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), Mali Programme Manager, 29 March 2013.

[2] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for the period 1 May 2004 to 1 May 2005), Form C.

[3] Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), “Mali: Overview of information on mine action and ERW including submunitions,” Second African Francophone Seminar on Mine and ERW Action, Dakar, Senegal, 2–4 November 2009.

[4] GICHD, “Mali: Overview of information on mine action and ERW including submunitions,” Third African Francophone Seminar on Mine and ERW Action, Nouakchott, Mauritania, 27–30 September 2010.

[5]Al Qaeda has mined access to key northern town: Tuareg rebels,” Agence France Presse, 2 July 2012.

[6] Email from Charles Frisby, UNMAS, 29 March 2013.

[7]Abandoned munitions endanger lives in Mali,” IRIN, 19 March 2013; and “Malians return to deadly ground,” Handicap International (HI), 31 July 2013.

[8] Email from Charles Frisby, UNMAS, 29 March 2013.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Presentation of Mali, “Lutte anti mines au Mali” (“Fight against mines in Mali”), Seminar of African Francophone Actors of Mine and ERW Action, Contonou, Benin, 20–22 October 2008.

[11] Email from Charles Frisby, UNMAS, 29 March 2013.

[12] Ibid.


Support for Mine Action

Last updated: 07 October 2013

Recent and ongoing armed conflict in the Republic of Mali has created a problem of contamination by weapons and explosives. At the request of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) deployed mine action staff to Mali in January 2013 in order to conduct an emergency assessment of the situation with regards to explosive threats and in support of Security Council Resolution 2085 (2012).[1]

In 2012, four donors contributed US$7,681,063 to Mali to begin a mine action program. Japan, France, and the United Kingdom (UK) provided funding through UNMAS while Sweden provided the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency with SEK10.6 million ($1.56 million) to train the Malian Defense and Security Forces in explosive ordnance disposal.[2]

International contributions: 2012[3]

Donor

Sector

National currency

Amount ($)

Japan

Various

¥478,920,000

6,000,000

Sweden

Clearance

SEK10,600,000

1,565,246

France

Various

€50,000

64,295

UK

Clearance

£32,500

51,522

Total

 

 

7,681,063

 

 



[1] UNMAS website, programs, “About UNMAS in Mali.”

[2] Ibid.

[3] Japan, Convention on Conventional Weapons Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, 28 March 2013; Sweden, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 25 March 2013; response to Monitor questionnaire by Richard Bolden, Policy Analyst Mine Action, Arms Exports and ATT, DD, 7 May 2013; France, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2013; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2013. Average exchange rate for 2012: ¥79.82=US$1; SEK6.7721=US$1; €1=US$1.2859; and £1=US$1.5853. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2013.


Casualties

Last updated: 10 October 2018

 

Casualties[1]

All known casualties (between 2006 and 2017)

714 mine/unexploded remnants of war (ERW) casualties: 174 killed; 540 injured

Casualties in 2017 

Annual total

133

16% increase from
114 in 2016

Survival outcome

30 killed; 103 injured

Device type causing casualties

61 antivehicle mine; 27 improvised mine; 24 ERW; 20 unspecified mines; 1 unknown device

Civilian status

55 civilian; 78 military

21 unknown

Age and gender

95 adults
3 women; 24 men; 68 unknown

17 children
16 boys; 1 girl

 

Casualties in 2017—details

As in 2016, the majority of mine ERW casualties in 2017 occurred in incidents in the in the regions of Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu in the Republic of Mali.

Of the 78 military casualties, 31 were Malian military personnel, and nine were international military personnel, including two French. Twenty-five were United Nations peacekeepers from the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), of which eight were reported to be Chadian.

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) of many types have been widely used in Mali, and it is possible that media reporting does not distinguish with accuracy whether incidents were caused by antivehicle mines, radio-initiated IEDs, pressure-plate IEDs (types of victim-activated improvised mines) or any combination of these in a single device. The Monitor does not include casualties reported to be caused by remotely detonated explosive devices in its records.

The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported 12 casualties caused by antivehicle mines, however, they were also described in their database as caused by “mine/IEDs.” These include items newly used/emplaced in 2017.[2] The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) also recorded casualties caused by antivehicle mines. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) reported 20 casualties caused by unspecified mines. It also reported 27 casualties caused by “mines/IEDs,” which the Monitor has included in the annual dataset for Mali as improvised mines. Numerous other casualties recorded by ACLED as caused only by IEDs have not been included in Monitor data, as it is not clear if they were remotely detonated. Humanity & Inclusion (HI, formerly Handicap International) reported casualties caused by ERW and unknown devices.

Improvised mines (also known as victim-activated IEDs) causing casualties in Mali sometimes include manufactured mines as components. The improvised mines used in Mali are understood to act as improvised antivehicle mines or other such artisanal devices, rather than as antipersonnel mines by nature. Although it cannot be excluded that the detonating switch could act as an antipersonnel device given the artisanal nature of the pressure plate, there have not been confirmed reports of people detonating such mines without vehicles in Mali. To date, the means of activation has been driving on the devices with vehicles such as cars, buses, and military vehicles, sometimes those in convoys. In 2017–2018, carts were also reported to have activated devices.[3]

Although it has not been recorded to have occurred, the existing improvised mine varieties, when equipped with improvised pressure plates as a firing switch, could potentially be activated by the weight of a person stepping on them. Those improvised mines with such sensitivity of fusing can be regarded as improvised mines that are by their design and nature antipersonnel mines, although they are emplaced so as to cause casualties in vehicles.



[1] Unless otherwise indicated, casualty data for 2017 is based on: emails from Aida Ariño-Fernández, Acting Senior Programme Officer, UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), 26 February 2018; and from Maddalena Malgarini, Technical Protection Coordinator, HI-Mali, 19 June 2018; Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)-Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) antivehicle mine database provided by email from Ursign Hofmann, Policy Advisor, GICHD, 22 February 2018; and the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) data for Mali, January to December 2017.

[2] UNMAS noted they classify incidents according to the UNMAS IED Lexicon and do not register incidents as “improvised mines” in their database but provided only those casualties under the mine category. Victim-operated IEDs (VOIEDs) have not been included in the reporting. Email from Aida Ariño-Fernández, UNMAS, 26 February 2018.

[3] Emails from Maddalena Malgarini, HI-Mali, 26 September 2017; 19 June 2018; and 13 July 2018.


Victim Assistance

Last updated: 16 March 2018

The Republic of Mali is responsible for survivors of landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) and has made commitments to provide victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty.

Mali ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 7 April 2008.

Assessing needs

In 2016, Humanity and Inclusion (HI, formerly Handicap International) established a mechanism to collect and share information on mine/ERW survivors. Community-based focal points are identified and trained on the identification and registration process of victims, and local commissions are set up to approve and follow-up on mine/ERW survivors’ action plans.[1] HI also assessed the needs of persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors in areas where it operates, resulting in the provision of assistance to 70 mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities in 2016 and into 2017. During the assessment, HI referred 19 mine/ERW victims to the ICRC and Médecins Sans Frontiers (MSF) for medical and physical rehabilitation support.[2]

Coordination

There was no national coordination of victim assistance in Mali. Victim assistance was included on the agenda of the monthly mine action coordination meetings in 2016, under the auspices of UNMAS.[3] In 2017, UNMAS was planning to conduct an assessment of the situation of and support provided to the mine/ERW survivors registered on the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.[4]

The Ministry of Social Development and Solidarity Economy is responsible for victim assistance, however it does not have a victim assistance policy.[5] The Ministry of Solidarity, Humanitarian Action, and the Reconstruction of the North is responsible for the protection of the rights of persons with disabilities.[6] Other key actors related to victim assistance activities includes: the Ministry of Health, the Civil Protection Central Service, the National Orthopedic Center of Mali (Centre National d'Appareillage Orthopédique, CNAOM), the Regional Orthopedic and Functional Rehabilitation Centers (Centres Régionaux d'Appareillage Orthopédique et de Rééducation Fonctionnelle, CRAORFs), and disabled people’s organizations (DPOs).[7] Persons with disabilities have access to basic healthcare, however protecting the rights of persons with disabilities was not a priority and few resources were available.[8]

In 2017, Mali did not submit its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report for calendar year 2016, nor its Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report for calendar year 2016.

HI, with the support of UNMAS, has been implementing a project since 2014 to assist survivors of incidents caused by explosive weapons, as well as other persons with disabilities, in the regions of Gao and Timbuktu, which are heavily affected by explosive weapons, including mines/ERW.[9] Although HI extended its activities to the Kidal region in 2016 and into 2017, the number of beneficiaries decreased over the same time period.[10]

Medical care

As of 2016, access to medical care in the north remained very limited, due to a lack of medical staff and supplies as well as the security situation.[11] The ICRC provided free medical care to mine/ERW survivors in areas where it operated.[12] The ICRC opened its delegation in Mali in 2013 in response to conflict and other situations of violence.[13] The Gao regional hospital and the Kidal referral center were providing good quality medical care, including to weapon-wounded people, with the support of two ICRC surgical teams.[14]

Following three security incidents in 2016, the ICRC temporarily restricted staff travel outside of towns in the north, which delayed the implementation of some of its activities, as was also the case in 2015.[15]

Rehabilitation, including prosthetics

The volatile security situation in Mali, often prevented persons with disabilities from accessing rehabilitation services.[16] In areas where most survivors live, medical and physical rehabilitation services were barely functional.[17] There are only eight rehabilitation centers in Mali, including two in Bamako, with just 15 prosthetic and orthotic specialists for a total population of 17 million.[18] Four of the eight rehabilitation centers received ICRC’s support in 2016.[19] The state provides support to military mine/ERW survivors, but does not provide support to civilian survivors, who can only rely on the support provided by international and national NGOs.[20] The ICRC identified the major obstacles in the physical rehabilitation sector to be: a lack of qualified personnel, insufficient government funding, and inability of the government to support rehabilitation centers.[21]

In 2016, there was an increase in the number of people who received rehabilitation services at ICRC-supported rehabilitation centers, compared to 2015. In particular, the number of amputees receiving services increased by 12%, and there was also a slight increase in the number of assistive devices delivered by ICRC-supported centers.[22] The ICRC continued to subsidize physical rehabilitation services for persons with disabilities.[23] To improve accessibility to rehabilitation services, the ICRC and the Ministry of Solidarity plan to build a rehabilitation center by January 2020 in Mopti, northern Mali.[24]

Advocacy activities by the ICRC for greater government involvement in the physical rehabilitation sector in Mali resulted in the development and formal approval in 2016 of a national strategy for developing the physical rehabilitation sector.[25]

In 2016 and 2017, HI was no longer providing physical rehabilitation services in Mali.[26]

Social and economic inclusion

HI implemented several inclusive education projects, in Sikasso, Timbuktu, and Gao. In 2017, the government added inclusive education to the national training curriculum of school teachers.[27]

In 2016 and through 2017, HI supported 70 beneficiaries through income-generating activities. Beneficiaries were selected according to their level of vulnerability, with special consideration of the needs of women and children. This was, however, a sharp decrease from 160 beneficiaries in 2015, due to reduced funding. Thirty-one beneficiaries received psychosocial support. With children, HI focused on play activities rather than counselling sessions, in order to respond to their specific needs.[28]

In 2016, the ICRC provided support to the Disability Sports Association.[29]

Laws and policies

There was no specific legislation protecting the rights of persons with disabilities or mandating physical accessibility to public buildings.[30] In June 2016, an advocate for the rights of women with disabilities in Mali reported that Malian women with disabilities often face multiple forms of discrimination due to their gender and being persons with disabilities. Poverty, illiteracy, high unemployment, a high probability of gender-based violence, psychological issues, and stigma were highlighted as serious problems. According to the reporting, Mali needed effective national laws and implement legislation and programs in order to address the rights of all persons with disabilities, and specifically for women and girls.[31]



[1] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Myriam Abord-Hugon, Program Director, HI Mali, 3 August 2017.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Email from Myriam Abord-Hugon, HI Mali, 3 August 2017.

[5] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Myriam Abord-Hugon, HI Mali, 3 August 2017.

[6] United States (US) Department of State, “Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2016: Mali,” Washington, DC, March 2017, p. 25.

[8] US Department of State, “Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2016: Mali,” Washington, DC, March 2017, p. 25.

[10] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Myriam Abord-Hugon, HI Mali, 3 August 2017.

[11] MSF, “Mali: Activities in 2016,” undated.

[12] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Myriam Abord-Hugon, HI Mali, 3 August 2017.

[13] ICRC, “Annual Report 2015,” Geneva, 2016, pp. 168–169.

[14] ICRC, “Annual Report 2016,” Geneva, May 2017, p. 160.

[15] Ibid., p. 158.

[16] ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme: Annual Report 2016,” Geneva, November 2017, p. 27.

[17] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Myriam Abord-Hugon, HI Mali, 3 August 2017.

[18] ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme: Annual Report 2016,” Geneva, November 2017, p. 27.

[19] ICRC, “Annual Report 2016,” Geneva, May 2017, p. 160.

[20] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Myriam Abord-Hugon, HI Mali, 3 August 2017.

[21] ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme: Annual Report 2016,” Geneva, November 2017, p. 28.

[22] Ibid., pp. 27 and 28.

[23] Ibid., p. 27.

[24] Ibid., p. 28; and Kingdom of Belgium, “Belgium makes the choice of an innovative humanitarian approach in Mali,” 28 November 2017; and ICRC, “Mali: People with disabilities brave the odds,” 7 February 2018.

[25] ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme: Annual Report 2016,” Geneva, November 2017, p. 11.

[26] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Myriam Abord-Hugon, HI Mali, 3 August 2017.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid.

[29] ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme: Annual Report 2016,” Geneva, November 2017, p. 28.

[30] US Department of State, “Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2016: Mali,” Washington, DC, March 2017, pp. 24–25.

[31] Gender and Mine Action Program (GMAP), “Persons with Disabilities living in a conflict: Mali,” 20 July 2016.