Nagorno-Karabakh

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Last updated: 26 June 2018

Summary: Nagorno-Karabakh is not recognized by any United Nations (UN) member state and thus is not eligible to accede to, or attend meetings of, the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In May 2017, a representative told the Monitor that Nagorno-Karabakh does not possess cluster munitions and claimed there has been no use, production, or transfer of cluster munitions on its territory. Cluster munition rockets were fired into Nagorno-Karabakh in April 2016.

Policy

Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the parliament of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Province voted in 1988 to secede from the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) and join the Armenian SSR, which resulted in armed conflict from 1988 to 1994. The region declared independence as the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in 1991.

In May 2012, Nagorno-Karabakh’s acting Minister of Foreign Affairs Vasiliy Atajanyan expressed support for the ban on cluster munitions: “Realizing what a deadly [sic] to civilians are cluster munitions, and assuming that the suffering of civilians caused by cluster munitions outweigh the potential military benefits of using this weapon, the authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic fully support the Convention on Cluster Munitions.” However, he said, “the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic is not in a position to join the Convention, in view of the fact the conflict with Azerbaijan is not yet resolved.”[1]

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

In May 2017, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Karen Mirzoyanprovided a statement in response to the Monitor’s request for an update on cluster munitions that states the “Republic Artsakh [the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic] does not possess cluster munitions and there has been no use, production or transfer of cluster munitions on the territory of the Republic.”[2]

Previously, in May 2012, the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs Atajanyan stated that “the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic does not produce, export, stockpile or use cluster munitions and does not intend to do so.”

Previous use

In May 2017, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nagorno-Karabakh provided to the Monitor with evidence of cluster munition use on its territory in April 2016, stating: “During the 4-day aggression against Republic of Artsakh in April 2016, Azerbaijan has employed two types of ground-launched cluster munition rockets (LAR 160 and Smerch) in the north of the Republic (Martakert region) and in the southeast (Hadrut region).” The information, including photographs of cluster submunition remnants and rockets, was sourced by the Artsakh Ministry of Defense, the State Service for Emergency Situations, the Prosecutor General’s office, and HALO Trust. Subsequently, the Artsakh State Service for Emergency Situations and HALO cleared more than 200 unexploded cluster submunitions from the two locations.[3]

Cluster Munition Monitor was not able to conduct an independent investigation to make a conclusive determination about responsibility for this cluster munition use. During fighting across the line of contact separating local Armenian-backed separatists and Azerbaijani forces, Azerbaijan launched artillery and rockets more than 10 kilometers into Nagorno-Karabakh from 1 April until 5 April 2016, when a ceasefire went into effect at 12:00 local time.[4]

Within 10 days, emergency clearance operations by HALO destroyed approximately 200 unexploded M095 DPICM-type submunitions near the villages of Nerkin Horatagh and Mokhratagh, close to the town of Martakert in northeast Nagorno-Karabakh.[5] HALO also cleared remnants of Israeli-produced LAR-160 surface-fired rockets, which deliver the M095 DPICM submunitions.[6] The cluster munitions were reportedly fired from Azerbaijan.[7]

Azerbaijan and Armenia have both denied using cluster munitions in the brief conflict and accused the other side of using the weapon against civilians. Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed on 28 April 2016 that “cluster munitions used by the Armenian troops against the civilian Azerbaijani population living densely along the line of contact…do not bear any military goal and serve solely to perpetrate mass killings among the civilians.”[8] Armenia’s Ministry of Defense issued photographs on 6 April 2016 showing the remnants of Smerch rockets that it claimed Azerbaijan fired into Nagorno-Karabakh.[9]

Unknown quantities of air-dropped RBK-series cluster bombs were used in Nagorno-Karabakh during the 1988–1994 conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the territory. In June 2016, HALO destroyed an unexploded PTAB-1M submunition found by a farmer on agricultural land near the village of Mugalny.[10]



[1] Letter from Vasiliy Atajanyan, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Ministry of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, in response to Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor inquiry, 12 May 2012.

[2] Letter from Karen Mirzoyan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, 29 May 2017.

[3] Ibid.

[4] HALO Trust, “HALO Begins Emergency Clearance in Karabakh,” 19 April 2016; and HALO NagornoKarabakh (@HALO_NK), “NK’s Emergency Situations Service & HALO have destroyed 200+ ‪#clustermunitionssince clearance resumed in ‪#Karabakh,” 9:14am, 20 April 2016, Tweet.

[5] HALO NagornoKarabakh (@HALO_NK), “HALO's assessment of new ‪#clustermunitioncontamination is underway near Mokhratagh village, Martakert, ‪#Karabakh,” 6:39am, 14 April 2016, Tweet; and HALO NagornoKarabakh (@HALO_NK), “Rapid assessment of new ‪#clustermunitionstrikes in ‪#Karabakhhas allowed HALO to establish the footprint (extent),” 8:19am, 6 May 2016, Tweet.

[6] HALO NagornoKarabakh (@HALO_NK), “HALO starts emergency clearance of ‪#clustermunition(s) in Nerkin Horatagh village, Martakert, ‪#Karabakh,” 6:19am, 12 April 2016, Tweet.

[7] Roberto Travan, “Nagorno-Karabakh, A 25-Year Border War Reignites With Religion,” La Stampa, republished in English by World Crunch, 11 June 2016.

[9] The article stated that Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh “do not possess weaponry of this kind.“Armenian MOD provides factual proof of prohibited cluster missile use by Azerbaijani army,” ArmenPress, 6 April 2016.

[10] HALO NagornoKarabakh (@HALO_NK), “Thanks to Aleksey Saradjanov for reporting this PTAB cluster munition found on his farm near Mugalny vil. ‪#Karabakh,” 5:40am, 1 June 2016, Tweet.


Mine Ban Policy

Last updated: 28 November 2013

Policy

Nagorno-Karabakh is not recognized by any UN member state. Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the parliament of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Province voted in 1988 to secede from the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) and join the Armenian SSR, which resulted in armed conflict from 1988 to 1994. The region declared independence as the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in 1991.

Authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh have not taken any unilateral steps to ban antipersonnel mines. Nagorno-Karabakh’s political and military leaders have stated their support for an eventual ban on antipersonnel mines but have indicated that, even if eligible to do so, Nagorno-Karabakh would not join the Mine Ban Treaty until the conflict with Azerbaijan is resolved and all states in the region support a ban on antipersonnel mines.[1]

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

Nagorno-Karabakh has stated that it has never produced or exported mines, and has not purchased new mines since 1995. Its antipersonnel mine stockpile consists of mines left over from the Soviet Union (OZM-72, PMN-2, and POMZ-2 mines).

In July 2013, Nagorno-Karabakh’s military chief, General Movses Hakobian, was reported by the media to state that “his forces have placed more anti-personnel landmines this year along the Armenian-Azerbaijani ‘line of contact’ east and north of the disputed territory.”[2] General Hakobian said the use was aimed at preventing sabotage attacks by Azerbaijani troops.

In a 4 September 2013 response to a letter by the ICBL to authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh seeking clarification, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nagorno-Karabakh did not deny the allegations and confirmed that “due to the ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan…today we are not in a position to refrain from using AP [antipersonnel] mines for defensive purposes along the line of contact.” He also wrote, “these mines are neither aimed at the civilian population nor at the extermination of the adversary but for limiting its advances and ceasing any possible military aggression against us.”[3]

 



[1] Meetings between Naira Melkoumian, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Masis Mailian, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Nagorno-Karabakh Committee of the ICBL, Stepanakert, 1–2 February 2002; and interview with Irina Beglaryan, Head of Political Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stepanakert, 3 February 2006.

[2]  Lusine Musayelian, “Karabakh Enhances Defense Capabilities,” Asbarez (Stepanakert), 26 July 2013, asbarez.com/112014/karabakh-enhances-defense-capabilities/.

[3] “ICBL gravely concerned about use of antipersonnel mines by Nagorno-Karabakh,” ICBL (Geneva), 20 September 2013, www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Library/News/Nagorno-Karabakh.


Mine Action

Last updated: 15 November 2018

 

Treaty status

Mine Ban Treaty

Cannot accede to the Mine Ban Treaty due to its political status

Convention on Cluster Munitions

Cannot accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions due to its political status

Mine action management

National mine action management actors

Nagorno-Karabakh Mine Action Center (NKMAC)
A mine action coordination committee liaises between the local authorities and the operator, HALO Trust

Mine action standards

No national standards exist. The only operator, HALO Trust, follows its own standard operating procedures

Operators in 2017

International:
HALO Trust

Extent of contamination as of end 2017

Landmines

3.6km2 CHA
Extent of contamination: light

Cluster munition remnants

71.62km2
Extent of contamination: heavy

Other ERW contamination

Contaminated by other ERW

Land release in 2017

Landmines

0.29km2 cleared, 0.27km2 reduced by technical survey and 0.29km2 cancelled by non-technical survey. A further 0.13km2cancelled in the database
0.22km2 confirmed
226 antipersonnel mines and 19 antivehicle mines destroyed

Cluster munition remnants

1.1km2 cleared, and 0.26km2reduced by technical survey
52 submunitions destroyed during planned clearance and spot tasks
1.5km2 of contamination confirmed

Other ERW

26 other items of UXO destroyed during mine clearance

Progress

Landmines

HALO Trust expects to complete clearance of minefields in Soviet-era Nagorno-Karabakh by 2019. However, it is difficult to secure funding for clearance in areas outside the Soviet-era boundaries of Nagorno-Karabakh, where the bulk of remaining mine contamination lies
Mined areas also remain along the line of contact with Azerbaijan, but are inaccessible for clearance

Cluster munition remnants

Donors prioritize the release of mined areas over cluster munition clearance. Therefore, cluster munition clearance is conducted on an ad hocbasis when adverse weather or other conditions do not permit safe mine clearance

Note: CHA = confirmed hazardous area; ERW = explosive remnants of war; UXO = unexploded ordnance.

Contamination

In 1988, a decision by the parliament of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Province to secede from Azerbaijan and join Armenia resulted in armed conflict in 1988–1994 between Armeniaand Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence in 1991, but this has not been internationally recognized.

All regions of Nagorno-Karabakh have been affected by mines and submunitions as a result of the 1988–1994 conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and new mine contamination was added in 2013.

Mine contamination

Mines were laid by both the Azeri and pro-Karabakh forces during the war, with a relatively high proportion of antivehicle mines being used in some regions, as well as antipersonnel mines throughout.[1] The mines were of Soviet design and manufacture, and due to the nature of the conflict certain areas were mined several times.[2]

New contamination was added in 2013. In July 2013, Nagorno-Karabakh’s military chief, General Movses Hakobian, reportedly stated that “his forces have placed more antipersonnel landmines this year along the Armenian-Azerbaijani ‘line of contact’ east and north of the disputed territory.”[3] (See the Mine Ban profilefor further details.) As of the end of 2017, antipersonnel mine contamination throughout the whole of Nagorno-Karabakh, including both within the Soviet-era boundaries and in the adjacent territories, was estimated to cover over 3.5km2across 73 mined areas (see table below).[4] This is down from 4.41km2 across 75 mined areas as at the end of 2016.[5] The difference in total mine contamination between the end of 2016 and end of 2017, cannot be explained or reconciled by the total area released.

Antipersonnel and antivehicle mine contamination covered a total of 86 areas over 5.1km2 as of the end of 2017. As of beginning of September 2018, antipersonnel mine contamination had fallen slightly to just over 3.42km2 across 73 mined areas.[6]

Antipersonnel mine contamination by province (at end 2017)[7]

Region

CHAs

Area (km2)

Askeran

8

0.29

Hadrut

21

1.86

Lachin

19

0.55

Martakert

18

0.52

Martuni

3

0.17

Shaumyan

4

0.17

Total

73

3.56

 

As of April 2017, 88% of mined areas across the whole of Nagorno-Karabakh had been cleared, including 97% of all known minefields in Soviet-era Nagorno-Karabakh.[8] Of the remaining mined area, 82% is in “green areas” (areas between the traditional Soviet boundary of the autonomous oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh, the militarized line of contact with Azerbaijan, and other international borders), and the remaining 18% is within the traditional Soviet-era boundaries.[9] Mined areas remain along the line of contact with Azerbaijan, but are inaccessible for clearance as this remains a conflict zone.[10] Minefields in Nagorno-Karabakh are prioritized by two main factors: the density and type of minelaying, and their impact (including proximity to population and economic impact). HALO Trust has traditionally given highest priority to agricultural areas. Minefields with a higher number of direct beneficiaries have also been prioritized.[11] The vast majority of designated high-priority minefields have now been cleared.[12] Limiting factors, such as climate and donor priorities, mean that, during this process, clearance is not necessarily always conducted according to a simple prioritization matrix.[13]

Most people living in mine-affected areas in Nagorno-Karabakh are dependent on the land for their livelihoods.[14] Mines impede use of land, roads, and other areas, and affect the rural population in particular, whose main income is from herding animals and farming.[15] The bulk of the remaining antipersonnel mine threat in Nagorno-Karabakh is located in wooded hillsides between former Armenian and Azerbaijani military positions. As such, the most vulnerable group of Karabakhis are adult men who are engaged in woodcutting, hunting, and foraging (though women and children often engage in the latter activity as well). A 2017 study from the University of Southern California (USC) into the effects of landmines on livelihoods shows a direct relationship between mines and economic development. According to the analysis of survey data gathered by HALO from over 200 rural households, “the presence of landmines causes, on average, a 45% decrease in overall household economic welfare among the rural population of Nagorno Karabakh.”[16]

Cluster munition contamination

The exact extent of contamination from cluster munition remnants in Nagorno-Karabakh is not known, but it is significant and widespread.[17] At the end of 2017, cluster munition contamination (both surface and subsurface) was estimated to be 71.62km2 across 212 CHAs, in seven of a total of eight districts (see table below).[18] This represents a small increase in cluster munition contamination of 0.18km2 from 2016[19] to 2017, despite clearance in 2017, following confirmation of three suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) totaling 1.5km2 in the Askeran district.

Cluster munition contamination by district (at end 2017)[20]

District

CHAs

Area (km2)

Askeran

56

21.29

Hadrut

28

10.54

Lachin

17

8.50

Martakert

45

11.70

Martuni

57

15.09

Shushi

8

4.00

Stepanakert

1

0.50

Total

212

71.62

 

In 1988, a decision by the parliament of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Province to secede from Azerbaijan and join Armenia resulted in armed conflict from 1988 to 1994 between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Large numbers of cluster munitions were dropped from the air during the conflict. Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence in 1991 but this has not been internationally recognized.

On 1 April 2016, intense fighting broke out in Nagorno-Karabakh along the front line between Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh forces and the armed forces of Azerbaijan. While ground fighting was confined to areas close to the line of contact, artillery fire penetrated more than 10km into Nagorno-Karabakh, and included use of cluster munitions. A ceasefire was agreed on 5 April 2016.[21] HALO Trust estimated the four days of hostilities added 2.4km2 of cluster munition contamination.[22]

More than two-thirds of remaining contamination is in Askeran, Martakert, and Martuni. Most of the remaining cluster munition remnants are located in woods and hillsides, where the threat endangers the lives of woodcutters, foragers, and domestic livestock grazing in common areas around rural settlements.[23]

Program Management

A mine action coordination committee is responsible for liaising between the local authorities and HALO Trust.[24] Regular coordination committee meetingsare held between the local authorities, HALO, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).[25]

In 2000, HALO established the Nagorno-Karabakh Mine Action Center (NKMAC), which consolidates all mine-action-related information and responds to requests from the government ministries, other NGOs, and local communities.[26]

Legislation and standards

No national standards exist in Nagorno-Karabakh and HALO follows its own standard operating procedures (SOPs).[27]

Quality management

HALO uses its own quality management systems, with quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) applied by four levels of management.[28]

Information management

The NKMAC maintains maps and a database of all suspected hazardous areas surveyed, all areas cleared of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), locations of all mine- and ERW-related incidents, and a record of all risk education given.[29]

Operators

Since 2000, HALO Trust has been the sole organization conducting land release in Nagorno-Karabakh. Operations cover both mine and cluster munition remnants clearance, and HALO does not field separate teams dedicated solely to either. Operational staff are trained and experienced for both.[30]

At the peak of its clearance activities in 2017, HALO had 153 staff in demining and survey roles, an increase over the 142 personnel employed the previous year. Between January and December 2016, its total capacity for mine and cluster munition operations grew from nine operational teams to 15.[31] As of August 2017, HALO was employing 21 manual demining teams, two mechanical demining teams, and two survey/explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams. In August 2018, HALO had increased its manual demining teams to 28.[32] In 2017, it employed one manual team to complete clearance of the cluster munition strikes from the April 2016 fighting.[33] HALO then employed two teams for occasional cluster munition clearance between April and October 2017.[34]

HALO deployed two armored front loaders in 2017, as it did in previous years. Machines are predominantly deployed in clearance of roads with a plastic TM62P antivehicle mine threat, and on ground where it is more cost effective for antipersonnel and antivehicle mine clearance due, in most cases, to high levels of metal contamination.[35]

While survey and clearance are ultimately conducted by HALO alone, the Nagorno-Karabakh Rescue Service is involved in various stages of the broader process. For example, the Rescue Service often receives information from local communities about mine contamination, which it shares with HALO. The Rescue Service is also part of the QA process through its participation in the handover ceremony when HALO officially returns formerly mined areas back to local communities for safe and productive use.[36]

Land Release (mines)

Just over 0.29km2 was released by clearance in 2017 while 0.29km2 of mined area was cancelled by non-technical survey and 0.27km2 was reduced by technical survey. An additional 0.13km2 was reported by HALO Trust as cancelled, due to overly large polygons. This compares to the 0.12km2 of mined area that was cleared, 0.28km2 reduced by technical survey, and 0.36km2 cancelled by non-technical survey in 2016.[37] A further 0.22km2 was confirmed as containing antipersonnel mines in 2017.

Survey in 2017 (mines)

In 2017, two mined areas in Hadrut totaling 555,849m2 were released through survey, of this 285,747m2 was cancelled by non-technical survey and 270,102m2 was reduced by technical survey.[38] Five suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) were confirmed as containing antipersonnel mines in Askeran, Lachin, and Martakert covering 219,355m2.[39]

In addition, HALO Trust also cancelled 132,024m2 due to overly large polygons following clearance of mined areas in Lachin, Martakert, and Martuni.[40]

In 2016, HALO trialed the use of special detection dogs (SDDs), provided by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), for the reduction of SHAs and CHAs in Nagorno-Karabakh.[41] HALO Trust has not used SDDs since the 2016 trial ended and a report will be published once follow-up clearance behind the SDDs clearance has been completed.[42]

As of August 2018, HALO was conducting survey to quantify the remaining landmine contamination in Nagorno-Karabakh, working in areas that had not been surveyed in the past. This process will continue through to the end of 2018 and into 2019.[43]

Clearance in 2017(mines)

In 2017, a total of 28 mined areas covering 292,176m2 were released by clearance along with the destruction of 88 antipersonnel mines, 19 antivehicle mines, and 36 items of UXO.[44] In addition to planned clearance, HALO destroyed 38 antipersonnel mines during EOD spot tasks in 2017.[45]

Clearance and EOD spot tasks in 2017

Activity

Areas cleared

Area cleared (m2)

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

Clearance

28

292,176

188

19

36

EOD spot tasks

0

0

38

0

0

Total

28

292,176

226

19

36

Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle.

 

During 2017, HALO found one mine for every 1,974m2 of land cleared during antipersonnel mine clearance tasks. HALO also cleared two minefields (one antipersonnel and one mixed antipersonnel/antivehicle) without finding any mines. This is largely because the majority of more densely mined areas have already been cleared.[46]

Land Release (Cluster Munition Remnants)

A total of some 1.1km2 of area contaminated with cluster munition remnants was released by clearance in 2017,[47] compared with 3.3km2in 2016.[48] A total of 0.26km2 was released by survey in 2017.

Survey in 2017 (cluster munition remnants)

In 2017, HALO reduced 2,659m2 of land by technical survey in the Martakert region and 260,000m2 of land by technical survey in the Martuni region. HALO also confirmed three areas totaling 1.5km2 in the Askeran region as cluster munition-contaminated.[49]

Clearance in 2017 (cluster munition remnants)

HALO cleared 1.06km2 of area containing cluster munition remnants and other unexploded ordnance (UXO) in 2017, during which seven submunitions and one other item of UXO were destroyed. Three areas were released by clearance and one other, in the Askeran district, was suspended at the end of the demining season.[50]

Clearance of cluster munition-contaminated areas in 2017

District

Areas cleared

Area cleared (m²)

Submunitions destroyed

Other UXO destroyed

Askeran

1

814,700

5

1

Martakert

1

171,300

0

0

Martuni

1

70,000

2

0

Total

3

1,056,000

7

1

 

In 2017, HALO completed clearance of cluster munition remnants in the villages of Nerkin Horatagh and Mokhratagh in the northeast Martakert region, which resulted from the April 2016 fighting.[51] Between 10 August 2016 and 28 February 2017, HALO cleared 723,130m2 of land through sub-surface clearance and a further 50,000m2 through surface clearance, of which 171,300m2 of sub-surface clearance was completed in 2017.[52] Overall, HALO found and destroyed 17 submunitions through this clearance, though none was found in 2017.[53]

In addition to planned clearance, HALO destroyed 45 submunitions during EOD spot tasks in 2017.[54]

The clearance output in 2017 decreased from the previous year. In 2016, clearance output was high due to the emergency clearance of the April 2016 contamination.[55] HALO’s cluster munition clearance operations continue to remain a “secondary” activity, as per the donors’ request to prioritize mine clearance.[56] Submunition clearance is conducted on days when minefields cannot be accessed safely due to adverse conditions.[57]

The average per square meter cost of cluster munition clearance has been gradually increasing year on year, which may partly be accounted for by the increase in sub-surface BAC in recent years.[58] In 2017, one manual team cleared 13,654m2 per day, with 15% of the total being sub-surface clearance. This compares to 28,182m2 per day in 2012, with 5% of the total being sub-surface clearance.[59]

Progress towards completion of antipersonnel mine clearance

Progress in mine clearance has fluctuated over the last five years, as shown in the table below, but with clearance output averaging below 0.5km2 annually.

Mine clearance in 2013–2017[60]

Year

Area cleared (km2)*

2017

0.29

2016

0.12

2015

0.21

2014

0.54

2013

0.31

Total

1.47

* Includes antivehicle and antipersonnel mines.

HALO Trust has received a commitment from the United States government to complete clearance of all known remaining minefields within Soviet-era boundaries.[61]

One of HALO’s greatest challenges for mine clearance in Nagorno-Karabakh, however, is the reluctance of bilateral donors to fund clearance in areas outside the Soviet-era boundaries of Nagorno-Karabakh. The bulk of the remaining mine problem, however, lies in these surrounding territories. There are also several minefields close to the line of contact that HALO is unable to safely survey or clear, due to ongoing tension between the two sides.[62]

HALO increased its capacity in April and May 2017, principally as a result of an anonymous donor committing funding for manual clearance teams and matched-funding for clearance of “green areas” outside of the traditional Soviet oblast boundary.[63]

In 2018, HALO reported that full clearance of minefields in Soviet-era Nagorno-Karabakh could be achieved by 2019.[64] Previously, in 2014, it reported that full clearance of minefields in Soviet-era Nagorno-Karabakh could be achieved within three years if sufficient funding were available.[65] As of 2014, 95% of mine contamination in Soviet-era Nagorno-Karabakh had been addressed, and this figure had risen to 97% by April 2017.[66]

The majority of remaining mined areas are only accessible during the dry summer months of May to October, and HALO planned to expand its clearance capacity through training and to deploy more teams over this period. As of April 2017, clearance in the “green areas” was focused on high- and medium-priority tasks in the Lachin corridor and Martuni region, with private funding; with clearance of the remaining minefields within the traditional Soviet oblast boundary, conducted with USAID funding.[67]

Progress towards completion of cluster munition clearance

Progress in clearance of cluster munition remnants has fluctuated over the last five years, as shown in the table below. HALO is currently prioritizing clearance of mines, as part of its efforts to complete clearance of all accessible mined areas by 2020, and it deploys teams to conduct BAC only in a reserve capacity.[68]

Clearance of cluster munition-contaminated area in 2013–2017

Year

Area cleared (km2)

2017

1.06

2016

3.28

2015

2.91

2014

13.01

2013

4.65

Total

24.91

 

While surface clearance of legacy cluster munition contamination within the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) boundaries of Nagorno-Karabakh could potentially be completed within a few years, this would still leave subsurface contamination within the NKAO boundaries of Nagorno-Karabakh, in addition to cluster munition contamination in areas outside the NKAO that are under the control of the Nagorno-Karabakh forces. No target date exists for completion of cluster munition clearance.[69]

As of May 2018, HALO was planning to continue to prioritize clearance of mines over cluster munition remnants, and as such has not included cluster munition survey or clearance in its workplan for 2018.[70] Survey and clearance of cluster munition remnants will continue on an ad hocbasis whenever adverse weather or other conditions do not permit safe mine clearance.[71]



The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and shared all its country-level landmine reports (from “Clearing the Mines 2018”) and country-level cluster munition reports (from “Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2018”) with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.



[1] United States Agency for International Development (USAID), “De-mining Needs Assessment in Nagorno-Karabakh,” September 2013, p. 2.

[2] HALO Trust, “Nagorno-Karabakh: The Problem,” undated.

[3] L. Musayelian, “Karabakh Enhances Defense Capabilities,” Asbarez(Stepanakert), 26 July 2013.

[4] Email from Amasia Zargarian, Programme Support Officer, HALO Trust, 21 September 2018.

[5] Email from Ash Boddy, Regional Director Nagorno-Karabakh, HALO Trust, 3 April 2017.

[6] Email from Amasia Zargarian, HALO Trust, 21 September 2018.

[7] Ibid., 4 May 2018. The difference between reported contamination in 2016 and 2017 (0.71km2) is less than the amount of land released, also taking into account land that was confirmed as contaminated (0.29km2 + 0.56km+ 0.13km– 0.22km= 0.76km2).

[8] Email from Ash Boddy, HALO Trust, 3 April 2017.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Email from Andrew Moore, Caucasus and Balkans Desk Officer, HALO Trust, 1 October 2016.

[11] Email from Amasia Zargarian, HALO Trust, 4 May 2018.

[12] Email from Ash Boddy, HALO Trust, 3 April 2017.

[13] Email from Amasia Zargarian, HALO Trust, 4 May 2018.

[14] HALO Trust, “Where we work,” undated.

[15] USAID, “De-mining Needs Assessment in Nagorno-Karabakh,” September 2013, p. 3.

[16] Email from Amasia Zargarian, HALO Trust, 4 May 2018; and HALO Trust, “The Economic Impact of Landmines In Nagorno-Karabakh: Estimating Causal Effects Using Instrumental Variables,” July 2017.

[17] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 29 May 2015.

[18] Email from Amasia Zargarian, HALO Trust, 4 May 2018.

[19] The amount of cluster munition contamination at the end of 2016 was revised to 71.5km2 as the figure reported in the 2017 profile did not include clearance of suspended areas.

[20] Email from Amasia Zargarian, HALO Trust, 4 May 2018.

[21] HALO Trust, “HALO Trust begins emergency clearance in Karabakh,” 19 April 2016.

[22] Email from Amasia Zargarian, HALO Trust, 4 May 2018.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 28 June 2013.

[25] Ibid., 26 May 2016.

[26] Ibid., 28 June 2013.

[27] Ibid., 26 May 2016.

[28] Ibid.

[29] USAID, “De-mining Needs Assessment in Nagorno-Karabakh,” September 2013, p. vii.

[30] Response to questionnaire by Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 22 May 2015.

[31] Emails from Ash Boddy, HALO Trust, 27 and 29 April 2017.

[32] Email from Amasia Zargarian, HALO Trust, 31 August 2018.

[33] Ibid., 4 May 2018.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Email from Ash Boddy, HALO Trust, 28 September 2017.

[38] Email from Amasia Zargarian, HALO Trust, 21 September 2018.

[39] Ibid., 4 May 2018.

[40] Ibid., 21 September 2018.

[41] Ibid.; and from Darvin Lisica, NPA Regional Programme Manager, 2 October 2016.

[42] Email from Amasia Zargarian, HALO Trust, 4 May 2018.

[43] Ibid., 31 August 2018.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid., and 21 September 2018.

[46] Email from Amasia Zargarian, HALO Trust, 4 May 2018.

[47] Ibid., and 19 June 2018.

[48] Email from Ash Boddy, HALO Trust, 13 April 2017.

[49] Email from Amasia Zargarian, HALO Trust, 4 May 2018.

[50] Ibid., 1 June 2018.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 7 June 2016.

[56] Email from Amasia Zargarian, HALO Trust, 4 May 2018.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Ibid., and 19 June 2018.

[60] See Landmine Monitor and Mine Action Review reports on Nagorno- Karabakh covering 2012–2015.

[61] Email from Amasia Zargarian, HALO Trust, 4 May 2018.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Email from Ash Boddy, HALO Trust, 3 April 2017.

[64] Email from Amasia Zargarian, HALO Trust, 31 August 2018.

[65] Emails from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 19 March 2014, and 11 June 2015.

[66] Email from Ash Boddy, HALO Trust, 3 April 2017.

[67] Ibid., 28 September 2017.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Emails from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 26 May 2016; and from Ash Boddy, HALO Trust, 14 April 2017.

[70] Email from Amasia Zargarian, HALO Trust, 4 May 2018.

[71] Ibid., and 19 June 2018.


Support for Mine Action

Last updated: 07 October 2013

In 2012, the Armenia office of the United States Aid for International Development (USAID) provided US$940,000 to HALO Trust for mine clearance in Nagorno-Karabakh.[1]

Despite HALO’s report that there were 143 confirmed mined areas covering 7km2 and 241 cluster strike locations covering 88km2 remaining to be cleared as of 31 December 2012, funding has declined 65% since 2008 and 38% from 2011.[2]

Summary of contributions: 2008–2012[3]

Year

Donor

Amount ($)

2012

United States (US)

940,000

2011

US, private

1,523,000

2010

US, United Kingdom (UK), private

2,036,694

2009

US, UK, Netherlands, private

2,169,944

2008

US, UK, Netherlands, private

2,697,526

Total

 

9,367,164

 

 



[1] Email from Andrew Moore, Caucasus and Balkans Desk Officer, HALO, 31 August 2012.

[2] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Andrew Moore, HALO, 15 April 2013.


Casualties

Last updated: 26 June 2018

 

Casualties[1]

All known casualties (between 1995 and 2017)

371 mine/unexploded remnants of war (ERW) casualties: 77 killed; 262 injured; 32 unknown

Casualties in 2017

Annual total

4

1 in 2016

Survival outcome

4 injured

Device type causing casualties

3 antivehicle mine; 1 unexploded submunition

Civilian status

4 civilian

Age and gender

4 adults:
0 women; 4 men

0 children

 

Casualties in 2017—details

In addition to the four civilian casualties reported for 2017, there have been reports of military casualties from mines along the line of contact. However, HALO Trust does not collate information on military casualties.[2]

After 2002, antivehicle mines caused the majority of annual mine/ERW incidents.[3] Mine incidents in Nagorno-Karabakhoften occur in areas outside the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of the Soviet period.[4]

Cluster munition casualties

One unexploded cluster submunition casualty was reported in 2017. Unexploded submunition casualties caused at least 18 casualties between 1995 and 2017.[5]



[1] Unless otherwise indicated, casualty data for 2017 is based on an email from Michael Newton, Programme Manager, Nagorno-Karabakh, HALO Trust, 23 February 2018. The Nagorno-Karabakh total includes five casualties previously recorded in data provided by HALO, that were not in data in 2018.

[2] Email from Michael Newton, HALO Trust, 23 February 2018.

[3] Monitor analysis of casualty data.

[4] Clearance is largely restricted to areas within the boundary of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of the Soviet period due to donor funding constraints and the casualties occurring in areas that HALO did not have resources to clear.

[5] Casualty data provided by email from Michael Newton, HALO Trust, 23 February 2018.


Casualties and Victim Assistance

Last updated: 23 July 2015

Casualties

Casualties Overview

All known casualties by end 2014

At least 351 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties (76 killed; 275injured)

Casualties in 2014

9 (2013: 3)

2014 casualties by outcome

2 killed; 7 injured (2013: 3 injured)

2014 casualties by device type

7 antivehicle mine; 2 antipersonnel mine

 

HALO Trust reported nine landmine casualties in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2014. All casualties were adults, one was a woman. Another two landmine detonations were reported when vehicles carrying out roadworks were struck, but in each case the occupants were not injured although the machines were damaged.[1] The casualty total for 2014 represented an increase from the three casualties HALO reported in Nagorno-Karabakh for 2013.[2] HALO reported five casualties in Nagorno-Karabakh for 2012.[3] In 2014, all mine incidents that occurred in Nagorno-Karabakh happened in areas outside the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of the Soviet period.[4]

HALO has reported 351 mine/ERW casualties (of which 76 people were killed) in Nagorno-Karabakh between 1995 and the end of 2014. Over a quarter of the total recorded casualties (90) were children, mostly boys. Most casualties were civilians; 37 were military and another nine were deminers. After 2002, antivehicle mines caused the majority of annual mine/ERW incidents.[5] HALO has noted that Nagorno-Karabakh region has an estimated population of less than 150,000, and therefore, that the annual casualty figure is likely to be one of the highest in the world rate per capita.

Cluster munition casualties

Unexploded submunitions caused at least 16 casualties between 1995 and 2014.[6] No new submunition casualties were reported for 2014, however a submunition casualty was reported in 2013.

Victim Assistance

In Nagorno-Karabakh, at least 268 people have been injured by mines and ERW, including cluster munition remnants, in addition to an unknown number of war veterans injured by mines during the conflict.[7] There is no specific victim assistance coordination body, plan, or focal point. Mine/ERW survivors received the same services as other persons with disabilities.[8] The Ministry of Social Welfare is responsible for coordinating and providing prosthetic, psychosocial, and employment services for persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors.[9]

In 2014, the ICRC collected data on the needs of mine/ERW survivors and family members and encouraged the Nagorno-Karabakh Ministry of Social Welfare to input the data into the Information Managment System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database. In parallel with these activities, the ICRC provided support for economic inclusion of mine/ERW survivors.[10]



[1] Email from Andrew Moore, Caucasus & Balkans Desk Officer, HALO, 13 March 2015.

[2] Ibid., 8 July 2014.

[3] Ibid., 25 June 2013.

[4] Clearance is largely restricted to areas within the boundary of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of the Soviet period due to donor funding constraints and the casualties occurring in areas that HALO did not have resources to clear.

[5] Emails from Andrew Moore, HALO, 8 July 2014, 25 June 2013, 6 April 2011, and 25 February 2010; from Nick Smart, HALO, 10 April 2012; from Matthew Hovell, Caucasus and Balkans Desk Officer, HALO, 8 July 2009; and from Valon Kumnova, Program Manager, HALO, 6 April 2007. In 2014, it was also reported that since the signing of the ceasefire, 365 civilians, including 91 children, had been casualties of mines/ERW. Caucasian Knot, “HALO Trust: at least 13 people fell victim to mine explosions in NKR in 2014,” 7 January 2015; and Landmine Free Artsakh, “Victims, 2014 Accidents.”

[6] Emails from Nick Smart, HALO, 10 April 2012; from Andrew Moore, HALO, 25 February 2010, and 6 April 2011; from Matthew Hovell, HALO, 8 July 2009; and from Valon Kumnova, HALO, 6 April 2007.

[7] Based on data provided in emails from HALO (see footnote 3); and email from Andrew Moore, HALO, 25 June 2013.

[8] ICBL-CMC, “Area Profile: Nagorno-Karabakh,” 21 July 2010.

[9] Government of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, “Statute of the Ministry of Social Welfare,” undated.

[10] Email from Herbi Elmazi, ICRC, 25 July 2014.