Russian Federation

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Last updated: 27 August 2019

Summary: Non-signatory Russia has acknowledged the humanitarian risks associated with cluster munitions, but sees military utility in the weapons and has not taken any steps to accede to the convention. Russia has participated as an observer in meetings of the convention, but not since 2012. Russia abstained from the vote on a key annual United Nations (UN) resolution promoting the convention in December 2018.

Russia—and the Soviet Union before it—is a major producer, stockpiler, and exporter of cluster munitions. Russia has participated in a joint military operation with the Syrian government since September 2015, which has seen the widespread use of cluster munitions. Russia has not explicitly denied its involvement in the use of cluster munitions in Syria, but claims that cluster munitions are used in accordance with international humanitarian law and not indiscriminately.

Policy

The Russian Federation has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Russia is one of the biggest critics of the convention and has not taken any steps to accede as it sees military utility in cluster munitions. In December 2016, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov responded to a letter from Human Rights Watch (HRW) on the use of cluster munitions in Syria.[1] He also provided a three-page paper entitled, “Russia’s Position on the Use of Cluster Munitions in Syria” that states: “our country strictly complies with its commitments, including with regard to cluster munitions (CMs) that Russia views as a legal means of warfare.”[1]

Russia has commented more often on the convention since 2015, when it voted against a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that calls on states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”[2] In October 2017, Russia said its assessment of the Convention on Cluster Munitions “has not changed” and described the treaty as “a politicized document that tailors the very definition of CMs [cluster munitions] to the interests of individual states which are trying to preserve their one-sided military and technical advantages.”[3]

In 2015–2017, Russia and Zimbabwe were the only countries to vote against a UN General Assembly resolution that urges states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.” However, Russia changed its position to abstain from the vote on the UNGA resolution in December 2018.[4]

Russia never participated in the Oslo Process that produced the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[5] When the convention opened for signature in December 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed Russia’s opposition to “unjustified restrictions and bans on cluster munitions,” which it defended as “a legitimate type of weapon that is not banned by international humanitarian law and plays a significant role in the defense interests of Russia.”[6]

Russia participated as an observer in a few meetings of the convention, but not since 2012.[7] It did not make any statements at these meetings.

Russia has expressed selective concern at new use of cluster munitions. It criticized and expressed “serious concern” at the use of cluster munitions “against civilian population” in eastern Ukraine in 2014.[8] However, Russia has not acknowledged or taken any measures to address the use of cluster munitions by Russian-backed armed opposition groups in eastern Ukraine (see Use section below).

Russia voted in favor of a 2015 UN Security Council resolution that expressed concern at evidence of cluster munition use in Darfur, Sudan.[9] It also voted in favor of a 2014 Security Council resolution that expressed concern at the “indiscriminate” use of cluster munitions in South Sudan.[10] Russia has not condemned the use of cluster munitions in Syria or Yemen.

Russia is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Russia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and, after opposing CCW discussions on cluster munitions for years, changed its position in 2011 to support an effort led by the United States (US) to conclude a new CCW protocol on cluster munitions.[11] That initiative failed in November 2011, effectively ending the CCW’s deliberations on cluster munitions and leaving the Convention on Cluster Munitions as the sole international instrument specifically dedicated to ending the suffering caused by cluster munitions. Russia has not proposed any CCW work on cluster munitions since then.

Production and transfer

Russia, and historically the Soviet Union, is a major producer and exporter of cluster munitions. Additionally, several states inherited stocks of cluster munitions when the Soviet Union dissolved. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Our records on the production, usage, and export of cluster munitions…are confidential and will not be publicized.”[12]

According to international technical reference materials, three state-owned Russian companies have produced cluster munitions:

  • Bazalt State Research and Production Enterprise (air-dropped bombs);
  • Mechanical Engineering Research Institute (120mm, 152mm, and 203mm artillery projectiles); and
  • Splav State Research and Production Enterprise Rocket (122mm, 220mm, and 300mm rockets).

Russia began testing in 2018 the “Drel” PBK-500U gliding cluster bomb, a new cluster munition developed by Bazalt State Research and Production Enterprise, according to the company.[13]

Cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin have been reported in the stockpiles of at least 36 states, including 20 that are not yet States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions:[14] Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia,[15] India,[16] Iran, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Kuwait,[17] Libya,[18] Mongolia, Poland,[19] Romania, Sudan,[20] Syria, Turkmenistan, Ukraine,[21] Uzbekistan, and Yemen.[22] RBK series bombs containing various submunition types appear to account for the vast majority of cluster munitions used in Syria by the Syrian government and Russian forces.[23]

A total of 10 States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions have stockpiled cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin have formally declared the stocks, providing types and quantities, as listed in the following table:

Stockpiled Soviet/Russian cluster munitions declared by States Parties[24]

Type of cluster munition

Cluster munition

Submunition

States that declared stockpiles (quantity of cluster munitions)

Bomb

RBK-250 PTAB-2.5M

PTAB-2.5M

Bulgaria (488), Croatia (9), Cuba (663), Moldova (14), Hungary (17), Mozambique (199), Peru (657), Slovakia (20)

RBK-250-275 AO-1SCh

AO-1SCh

Bulgaria (238), Croatia (5), Cuba (282), Moldova (24), Côte d’Ivoire (68), Mozambique (9), Peru (388)

RBK-500 AO-2.5RT

AO2.5RT

Bulgaria (201), Moldova (16), Peru (198), Czech Republic (191), Slovakia (50)

RBK-500 ShOAB-0.5M

SHOAB-0.5M

Bulgaria (36)

RBK-500-255 PTAB-10.5

PTAB-10.5

Moldova (8), Slovakia (23)

RBK-500-255 PTAB-2.5

PTAB-2.5

Moldova (16)

RBK-500-355 AO-10

AO-10

Slovakia (22)

Dispenser

BKF AO-2.5RT

AO-2.5RT

Bulgaria (3,086), Cuba (336), Hungary (247), Slovakia (63)

BKF PTAB-2.5

PTAB-2.5

Bulgaria (1,957), Cuba (382), FYR Macedonia (1,438), Slovakia (72)

BKF PTAB-2.5KO

PTAB-2.5KO

Hungary (23)

Projectile

3-O-13

O-16

Moldova (834)

Missile

9N123K

9N24

Bulgaria (8)

Rocket

9M27K

9N210

Moldova (473)

Stockpiling

Russia has acknowledged possessing a “large” stockpile of cluster munitions “stored throughout the state,” and has stated that disposing of a wide range of obsolete cluster munitions would be time-consuming and “a significant financial expenditure.”[25] At the CCW in November 2011, Russia stated that the size of its cluster munitions stockpile is similar to that of the US, which had reported 5.5 million cluster munitions.[26]

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The quantity and types of cluster munitions stockpiled in the Russian Ministry of Defence are confidential and will not be publicized.”[27] The following list of types stockpiled is based on a wide variety of publicly available sources.

Cluster munitions stockpiled by the Russian Federation[28]

Type

Caliber

Carrier name

Number of submunitions

Submunition type

Projectile

120mm

(unknown)

30

Dual-purpose

152mm

3-O-23

42

Dual-purpose

152mm

3-O-13

8

Dual-purpose

203mm

3-O-14

24

Fragmentation

240mm

3-O-8

14

Fragmentation

Dispenser

BKF ODS 35

8

FAE

BKF AO-2.5RT

96

Fragmentation

BKF PTAB-1M

248

HE/AT

BKF PTAB-2.5

96

HE/AT

Bomb

PROSAB-250

90

HE

RBK-250 ZAB 2.5

48

Incendiary

RBK-250 PTAB-2.5M

42

HE/AT

RBK 250-275 AO-2.5RT

60

Fragmentation

RBK 250-275 AO-2.5RTM

60

Fragmentation

RBK 250-275 AO-1SCh

150

Fragmentation

RBK 250-275 PTAB 2.5M

30

HE/AT

RBK-500 AO-2.5RT

126

Fragmentation

RBK-500-255 PTAB-10.5A

30

HE/AT

RBK-500-375 AO-10

30

HE/AT

RBK-500 AO-2.5RTM

108

Fragmentation

RBK-500 PTAB-1M

268

HE/AT

RBK-500 PTAB 2.5

75

HE/AT

RBK-500 PTAB 2.5M

268

HE/AT

RBK-500 ShOAB-0.5

565

Fragmentation

RBK-500 SPBE

15

SFW

RBK-500 SPBE-D

15

SFW

RBK-500 SPBE-K

15

SFW

RBK-500 OFAB-50UD

10

Fragmentation

Rocket

122mm

Grad (9M218)

45

3-O-33 Dual-purpose

122mm

Grad (9M217)

2

SFW

220mm

Uragan (9M27K)

30

9N210 Fragmentation

220mm

Uragan (9M27K1)

30

9N235 Fragmentation

300mm

Smerch (9M55K)

72

9N235 Fragmentation

300mm

Smerch (9M55K1)

5

SFW

300mm

Smerch (9M55K5)

600

Dual-purpose

Missile

9K52 Luna-M with 9N18K

42

9N22 Fragmentation

9M79 Tochka with 9N123K

50

9N24 Fragmentation

Note: FAE = fuel air explosive; HE/AT = high explosive antitank; SFW = sensor-fuzed weapon.

Use

Use in Syria

There is strong evidence that Russia stockpiles cluster munitions at its airbase at Hmeymim, southeast of Latakia city, and that it is using cluster munitions or, at a minimum, directly participating together with Syrian government forces in attacks that have used cluster munitions on opposition-held areas of governorates. There was a significant increase in the use of cluster munitions in Syria after Russia initiated a joint operation with Syrian government forces on 30 September 2015, but the overall number of reported attacks decreased in Syria in the year to July 2018.[29] The Russian Ministry of Defense appeared to acknowledge responsibility for a June 2016 attack on coalition-backed armed opposition forces near the Syrian al-Tanf border crossing with Iraq, which the United Kingdom (UK) and US said used RBK-500 AO-2.5RT/RTM cluster munitions.[30]

Russian and Syrian government forces use many of the same aircraft and weapons and frequently carry out offensives together. However, Russia is the only force in Syria to operate Sukhoi SU-25 and SU-34 fighter-ground attack jets used to deliver RBK-series cluster bombs. HRW, Amnesty International, and others have compiled credible evidence, including videos and photographs, documenting SU-25 and SU-34 near or involved in attacks near sites when cluster munitions were used.[31]

All except two types of the cluster munitions used in Syria since 2012 were manufactured by the Soviet Union/Russia.[32] When the Syrian government began its air campaign on rebel-held areas it used RBK-series air-dropped cluster bombs containing AO-1SCh and PTAB-2.5M bomblets emerged in mid-2012.[33] It has used air-dropped cluster bombs since then, including RBK-500 cluster bombs containing ShOAB-0.5 submunitions and AO-2.5RT and PTAB-2.5KO submunitions.[34] At the beginning of 2014, Syrian government forces first started to use Smerch 9M55K and Uragan 9M27K-series surface-to-surface rockets containing 9N235 submunitions fitted with self-destruct mechanisms.[35] Syrian government forces have also used Tochka 9M79-series ballistic missiles.

More advanced RBK-500 SPBE bombs containing SPBE sensor fuzed submunitions and a ground-fired 240mm 3-O-8 rocket-assisted mortar projectile have only been used in Syria since Russia entered into its joint operation with Syrian government forces at the end of September 2015.[36]

Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has not explicitly denied Russia’s involvement in using cluster munitions in Syria, but rather claims that cluster munitions have been used in accordance with international humanitarian law and not indiscriminately.[37] In December 2016, Russia issued a three-page position paper on the use of cluster munitions in Syria that claimed “no cases of indiscriminate use of air weapons have been registered so far in the course of the counter-terrorist operation in Syria,” and concluded that “the question of the involvement of the Russian military personnel in the cases of indiscriminate CMs [cluster munition] use in Syria [is] totally inappropriate.”[38] In December 2015, the Russian Defense Ministry stated that “Russian aviation does not use [cluster munitions]” and that “there are no such munitions at the Russian air base in Syria.”[39]

The civilian harm caused by the use of cluster munitions in Syria has attracted widespread media coverage, public outcry, and condemnations from more than 145 states.[40] In September 2017, States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions adopted a report that “expressed their strong concern regarding recent incidents and evidence of use of cluster munitions in different parts of the world and condemned any use by any actor, in conformity with article 21.” [41] During the course of the meeting, approximately 20 countries and the European Union publicly condemned or expressed grave concern over new use of cluster munitions, with most citing Syria as the key country of concern.[42]

Previous use

In eastern Ukraine, Russian-backed insurgents used cluster munition rockets in 2014 and 2015, impacting villages in government-controlled areas.[43] Ukrainian government forces were also responsible for cluster munition rocket attacks.[44] Russia expressed concern at Ukrainian government use of cluster munitions, but has not commented on cluster munition attacks by opposition forces.[45] There has been no evidence or allegations of new use of cluster munitions in eastern Ukraine by any party since a February 2015 ceasefire went into effect.[46]

During an August 2008 conflict with Georgia, Russia used cluster munitions including RBK AO-2.5RTM cluster bombs and Uragan ground-fired rockets containing 9N210 submunitions. Russia used cluster munitions in or near nine towns and villages in the Gori-Tskhinvali corridor south of the South Ossetian administrative border.[47] Russia has denied using cluster munitions in Georgia.[48] The Netherlands has sought accountability and an investigation into the death of Dutch journalist Stan Storimans, who was killed by a Russian cluster munition strike in Georgia in August 2008.[49]

Russian forces also used cluster munitions in Chechnya from 1994–1996 and again in 1999.[50]

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, cluster munitions were also used by various forces in several conflicts in Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Tajikistan. The extent of involvement of Russian forces in this use of cluster munitions is not known, but cannot be discounted.

The Soviet Union used cluster munitions from 1979–1989 in Afghanistan and first used cluster munitions during World War II against German armed forces in 1943.[51]



[1] HRW, “Letter to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov Regarding Cluster Munitions in Syria,” 10 August 2016; and “Russia’s Position on the Use of Cluster Munitions in Syria,” Position Paper annexed to letter to HRW, from Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 9 December 2016.

[2]Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 70/54, 7 December 2015: “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 72/54, 4 December 2017; and “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 71/45, 5 December 2016.

[3] Russia expressed “concern about the humanitarian impact of the arbitrary use of cluster munitions,” but called the convention “a very poor example of how to reach agreement on arms control” that “is a cynical attempt to repartition [sic] the market for cluster munitions.” “Statement of the Russian Federation,” UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 20 October 2017.

[4]Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 73/54, 5 December 2018.

[5] Russia attended a regional meeting held during the Oslo Process as an observer (in Brussels in October 2007). For details on Russia’s policy and practice regarding cluster munitions through 2009, see HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 230–235.

[6] “Russia explains refusal to join cluster bombs convention,” Interfax: Russia & CIS Military Newswire, 8 December 2008. Similar language was used in a September 2009 letter to the CMC. See, letter from Sergey Ryabkov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the CMC, 18 September 2009. Unofficial translation by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[7] Russia participated as an observer in the convention’s Meetings of States Parties in 2010 and 2011, as well as an intersessional meeting in 2012.

[8] Statement of Russia, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, 23 October 2014. The next day Russia told a UN Security Council debate on the situation in Ukraine that “there is an alarming and growing number of civilian victims, including children, as the result of…prohibited munitions, including cluster bombs.” Provisional report of the 7287th meeting of the UN Security Council, S/PV.7287, 24 October 2014.

[9] The five permanent members of the UN Security Council voted in favor of the resolution in addition to non-permanent members Angola, Chad, Chile, Jordan, Lithuania, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Spain, and Venezuela.

[10] The resolution noted “with serious concern reports of the indiscriminate use of cluster munitions” and called for “all parties to refrain from similar such use in the future.” UN Security Council, “Security Council, Adopting Resolution 2155 (2014), Extends Mandate of Mission In South Sudan, Bolstering Its Strength to Quell Surging Violence,” SC11414, 27 May 2014.

[11] At the CCW’s Third Review Conference in 2006, Russia stated, “We cannot accept the logic of restrictions or even bans on ammunition artificially and groundlessly declared as the most ‘dangerous weapons.’ This path would lead us to a stalemate. It could only result in a split and weaken the [CCW] and its Protocols.” Statement by Anatoly I. Antonov, Director, Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CCW Third Review Conference, Geneva, 7 November 2006.

[12] Letter from Sergey Ryabkov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to HRW, 20 March 2009.

[13] Piotr Butowsky, “Russia set to finalise PBK-500U glide bomb evaluation,” Jane’s 360, 9 January 2018; and Michael Peck, “Cluster Bombs Are Back—and America and Russia Can’t Get Enough,” The National Interest, 21 April 2018.

[14] Unless otherwise footnoted with supplementary information, the source is Jane’s Information Group.

[15] In 2013, Georgia destroyed 844 RBK-series cluster bombs and 320,375 submunitions as part of a project to destroy obsolete weapons.

[16] In 2006, India bought 28 launch units for the 300mm Smerch multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) fitted with dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) and sensor-fuzed submunitions. “India, Russia sign $500mn [sic]rocket systems deal,” Indo-Asian News Service (New Delhi), 9 February 2006.

[17] In 1995, Kuwait was the first export customer for the Russian produced 300mm Smerch MLRS fitted with DPCIM and sensor-fuzed submunitions, buying 27 launch units. “Kuwait to get smart submunitions for Smerch MRL,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 21 April 1995.

[18] HRW observed PTAB submunitions at the abandoned ammunitions storage depot at Mizdah during a visit in March 2012. See, HRW, “Statement on Explosive Remnants of War in Libya and Implementation of CCW Protocol V,” 25 April 2012. In addition, deminers from the Mines Advisory Group encountered dud PTAB submunitions about 20 miles from Ajdjabiya. See, CJ Chivers, “More Evidence of Cluster-Bomb Use Discovered in Libya,” New York Times – At War blog, 13 February 2012.

[19] The Polish Air Force possesses “BKF expendable unit loader with anti-tank, incendiary and fragmentation bomblets, imported from USSR.” Letter from Adam Kobieracki, Director, Security Policy Department, Poland Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to HRW, 10 March 2009.

[20] Various Russian cluster munitions including RBK-500 AO-2.5RT cluster bombs have been used in Sudan, although the government of Sudan has denied stockpiling cluster munitions. For example, see, HRW, “Sudan: Cluster Bomb Found in Conflict Zone,” 25 May 2012.

[21] Presentation of Ukraine, “Impact of the CCW Draft Protocol VI (current version),” on Ukraine’s Defense Capacity, CCW Group of Governmental Experts on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 30 March 2011.

[22] The Houthi Administration in Saada governorate provided VICE News with still photographs showing remnants of Soviet-made RBK-250-275 AO-1SCh cluster bombs with its associated antipersonnel fragmentation submunitions. Multiple emails from Ben Anderson, Correspondent and Producer, VICE News, May 2014.

[24] All information in this table is taken from Article 7 reports submitted by States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and available here.

[25] Statement of the Russian Federation, CCW Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 12 November 2009. Notes by Landmine Action.

[26] Statement of the Russian Federation, CCW Fourth Review Conference, Geneva, 18 November 2011. Notes by HRW. An October 2004 report to the US Congress by the US Department of Defense disclosed a stockpile of 5.5 million cluster munitions containing about 728.5 million submunitions.

[27] Letter from Sergey Ryabkov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to HRW, 20 March 2009.

[28] The data in this table comes from the following sources: Publishing House “Arms and Technologies,” undated; and Information Centre of Defence Technologies and Safety, “The XXI Century Encyclopedia, ‘Russia’s Arms and Technologies,’ Volume 12: Ordnance and Munitions,” CD Version, 2006; Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air–Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2004), pp. 414–415, and 422–432; Leland S. Ness and Anthony G. Williams, eds., Jane’s Ammunition Handbook 2007–2008 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2007), pp. 572, 597–598, 683, 703–706, 715–716, and 722–723; US Defense Intelligence Agency, “Improved Conventional Munitions and Selected Controlled-Fragmentation Munitions (Current and Projected),” partially declassified and made available to HRW under a Freedom of Information Act request; and “Russia’s Arms Catalog: Volume IV, Precision Guided Weapons and Ammunition, 1996–1997,” Military Parade: Moscow, 1997, pp. 138–139, 148–152, 373–392, 504, and 515–516. This research has been supplemented by information found on the Splav State Research and Production Enterprise corporate website.

[29] See the Syria country profile.

[30] Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “On June 18 Russia and US held teleconference on implementing the Memorandum on preventing aerial incidents in Syria,” 19 June 2016. See also, The New Syrian Army (@NSyA_Official), “Russians are lying with E-conference & more updates on our FB page.” ‪http://facebook.com/The.NSAy.Official/posts/255901281444601…‪#NSyA ‪#RuAF #لسنا_وحدنا,” 1:18pm, 19 June 2016, Tweet  (no longer accessible as of August 2018).

[31] Amnesty International, “Syria: Russia’s shameful failure to acknowledge civilian killings,” 23 December 2015; and HRW, “Russia/Syria: Daily Cluster Munition Attacks,” 8 February 2016.

[32] Cluster munition rockets manufactured in Egypt have also been used in Syria, while Islamic State (IS) has used cluster munitions rockets of unknown origin containing a DPICM-type submunition called “ZP-39” in Syria.

[33] The 250-kilogram class RBK-series cluster bombs can be delivered by jet aircraft as well as rotary wing aircraft, such as Mi-24 and Mi-8 series helicopters. Brown Moses Blog, “Evidence of cluster bombs being deployed in Syria,” 10 July 2012; and HRW press release, “Syria: Evidence of Cluster Munitions Use by Syrian Forces,” 12 July 2012.

[34] AO-2.5RT and PTAB-2.5KO submunitions are capable of being loaded into BKF cartridges and dispersed by KMG-U dispensers. The AO-2.5RT submunition can also be delivered by the RBK-500 cluster bomb.

[35] Armament Research Services, “9M27K Series Cargo Rockets in Syria,” 22 February 2014; and HRW press release, “Syria: New Deadly Cluster Munition Attacks,” 19 February 2014.

[37]Russia’s Position on the Use of Cluster Munitions in Syria,” Position Paper annexed to letter to HRW from Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 9 December 2016.

[38]Russia’s Position on the Use of Cluster Munitions in Syria,” Position Paper annexed to letter to HRW from Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 9 December 2016. In the cover letter Lavrov states, “I expect our paper to be taken into account during the preparation of future Human Rights Watch reports on the activities of the Russian military personnel in the fight against terrorism in Syria.”

[39] Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Russian Defence Ministry commented on briefing of Amnesty International,” 23 December 2015.

[40] More than 145 countries have condemned the use of cluster munitions in Syria via national statements and/or by endorsing resolutions or joint statements. They include 95 States Parties and signatories (Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia FYR, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, the UK, and Uruguay) and 51 non-signatories (Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Dominica, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Greece, Israel, Jordan, Kiribati, South Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Turkey, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, the US, Vanuatu, and Yemen).

[41] See, Final Report, Convention on Cluster Munitions Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 25 September 2017, para. 27.

[42] Belgium, China, Cuba, Croatia, France, Germany, Ghana, Holy See, Iraq, Ireland, Madagascar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey.

[44] HRW, “Ukraine: Widespread Use of Cluster Munitions,” 20 October 2014.

[45] Statement of Russia, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, 23 October 2014.

[46]Russia’s Position on the Use of Cluster Munitions in Syria,” Position Paper annexed to letter to HRW from Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 9 December 2016.

[48] Ibid.; and HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 232–233.

[49] The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided Russian authorities with a report by an independent commission that investigated the incident and concluded that a Russian cluster munition strike killed Storimans. “Verslag onderzoeksmissie Storimans” (“Storimans commission of inquiry report”), 24 October 2008.

[50] Mennonite Central Committee, “Clusters of Death: The Mennonite Central Committee Cluster Bomb Report,” July 2000, ch. 3.