Note: CHAs = confirmed hazardous areas; SHAs = suspected hazardous areas; ERW = explosive remnants of war; IEDs = improvised explosive devices.

(See separate mine action profile for Somaliland).

Mine Contamination

As a result of the Ethiopian-Somali wars in 1964 and 1977–1978 (also known as the Ogaden war), and more than 20 years of internal conflict, the Somali Republic is significantly contaminated with mines and ERW. According to the United Nations (UN), antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were laid as recently as 2012 in the disputed regions of Sool and Sanaag.[1]

Contamination from mines and ERW exists across Somalia’s three major regions: southcentral Somalia, including the capital Mogadishu; Puntland; and Somaliland, a self-proclaimed, though unrecognized, state that operates autonomously in the northwest. (See separate mine action profile for Somaliland.) Landmines along the border with Ethiopia, mainly as a result of legacy minefields, also continued to affect civilians in south-central Somalia.[2]

As of mid-2018, no recent national baseline of mine and ERW contamination had been established, primarily due to a lack of national capacity and a lack of access to many al-Shabaab-controlled territories.[3] In 2017, survey teams were for the first time to be deployed within all states of Somalia, adding to a better understanding of overall contamination. However, operators reported that the number of survey teams was limited and their movements at times hindered by insecurity. As such, state-wide surveys were expected to continue in 2018–2019, provided funding can be secured.[4]

In July 2018, SEMA reported that it was reclassifying contamination according to a new country structure in its national International Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, consisting of the following seven states: Banaadir, Hirshabelle, Galmudug, Jubaland, Puntland, South West, and Somaliland. It noted that data had yet to be incorporated from Somaliland, along with additional missing information from Banaadir, Jubaland, and Puntland states, but as of December 2017, it reported that a total of 107 CHAs containing mine contamination and five SHAs had been recorded in the national database.[5]

According to Somalia’s Article 7 report for 2017, at the end of the year, a total of 352 areas containing a mix of explosive hazards with a total size of nearly 18.6km² had been registered in the IMSMA database.[6] Of these, the following was reported in relation to areas suspected or confirmed to contain mines:

Mine/ERW contamination (as of December 2017)[7]

Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle; CMR = cluster munition remnant.

While no comprehensive estimates yet exist of mine and ERW contamination in Somalia, surveys completed in 2008 in Bakol, Bay, and Hiraan regions revealed that, of a total of 718 communities, around one in 10 was contaminated by mines and/or ERW.[8] Other contaminated areas lie along the border with Ethiopia, in Galguduud, Gedo, and Hiraan regions.[9] Non-technical survey initiated in 2015 identified more than 6km² of mined area and found that 74 of 191 communities were impacted by mines and ERW, of which 13 reported an antipersonnel mine threat.[10]

In mid-2018, HALO Trust reported that it had identified 19 mined areas containing a mix of antipersonnel and antivehicle mine contamination with a size of just over 6.8km² remaining to be addressed in southcentral Somalia.[11] In the Puntland state administration, mine and ERW contamination was assessed during Phase 2 of a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), implemented by the Survey Action Centre (SAC) and the Puntland Mine Action Centre (PMAC) in the regions of Bari, Nugaal, and the northern part of Mudug.[12] The LIS was conducted from February to April 2005 and identified 35 communities affected by a total of 47 SHAs. The LIS estimated that about 151,000 people—around 6% of the population of some 2.5 million—live in mine-affected communities.[13]

Insecure and poorly managed stockpiles of weapons and ammunition, as well as use of IEDs and mines of an improvised nature by non-state armed groups, have a serious humanitarian impact. The extent of the threat is not well known, except in Puntland and Somaliland where a range of surveys have been carried out over the past decade.[14]

In 2018, UNMAS reported that mine and ERW contamination in Somalia continued to restrict community access to basic services and economic opportunities and remained an impediment to stability, security, and ultimately, recovery, and development.[15] HALO Trust reported that threats of minefields constrained pastoral herders from moving their flocks freely and accessing important water sources, which in a harsh desert climate plagued by famine and drought, are essential for community survival.[16]

Cluster Munition Contamination

The extent of cluster munition contamination in the Somali Republic is unknown. In 2013, dozens of PTAB-2.5M submunitions and several AO-1SCh submunitions were found within a 30km radius of the town of Dolow on the Somali-Ethiopian border in southcentral Somalia.[17] Cluster munitions were also identified around the town of Galdogob in the north-central Mudug province of Puntland, further north on the border with Ethiopia.[18] More contamination was expected to be found in southcentral Somalia’s Lower and Upper Juba regions.[19]

According to UNMAS, eight reports were submitted in September 2015 from Rabdhure, in Bakool region of South West state, showing empty RBK-250-275 cluster bomb containers, which can contain both AO-1Sch and PTAB-2.5M submunitions.[20]

Three additional reports of the identification of cluster munition remnants were made in 2016. In January 2016, several BL755 submunitions were reportedly found near Bu’ale, Middle Juba region. In March 2016, a modified BL755 submunition was found in Bardera (Baardheere), Gedo region, and in September 2016, one PTAB-2.5M submunition was reportedly found in Dinsoor, Bay region.[21] On 24 January 2016, Somali media reports circulated photos alleging that BL755 cluster munitions had been used by the Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) during an intensive bombing campaign in Gedo region, an allegation that Kenya denied.[22] There were subsequent reports by local residents that non-state armed group al-Shabaab had discovered unexploded submunitions near Bu’ale around the same time. A UN Monitoring Group investigation later determined that unexploded submunitions of the same BL755 type were used in the manufacture of components of IEDs found in a cache of materials seized by anti-al-Shabaab forces in Bardera, reported on 7 March 2016.[23] (See Somalia’s cluster munition ban policy profile for further details.)

UNMAS reported that in 2017 it was shown two photos of the body of a BL-755 submunition being used in what it assessed to be an IED in Kismayo, Lower Juba region.[24]

The Ethiopian National Defense Forces and the Somali National Armed Forces are thought to have used cluster munitions in clashes along the Somali-Ethiopian border during the 1977–1978 Ogaden War.[25] The Soviet Union supplied both Ethiopia and Somalia with weapons during the conflict. PTAB-2.5 and AO-1Sch submunitions were produced by the Soviet Union on a large scale.[26]

While the extent of cluster munition contamination along the Somali border with Ethiopia is not known, in 2014, Somalia claimed it posed an ongoing threat to the lives of nomadic people and their animals.[27]

Program Management

SEMA maintains a presence across Somalia through its five federal state members: the SEMA Puntland State Office, SEMA Galmudug State Office, SEMA Hirshabelle State Office, SEMA South West State Office, and SEMA Jubaland Office.[28] Under each of the five members is an independent consortium of national NGOs, which implement mine action activities.

SEMA was established in 2013 as the mine action center for southern Somalia, replacing the Somalia National Mine Action Authority (SNMAA) created
two years earlier.[29] SEMA’s goal was to assume full responsibility for all explosive hazard coordination, regulation, and management by December 2015.[30] However, SEMA’s legislative framework was not approved by the Federal Parliament in 2016 as expected, and was further stalled by elections held in February 2017 that resulted in a period of government paralysis.[31] Due to this lack of parliamentary approval, SEMA has not received funding from the government or UNMAS since the expiry of its grant in 2015.[32] In 2017, SEMA reported that it was lobbying to get legislation passed in parliament and confirmed that once approved, SEMA will have a dedicated budget line included in the annual government budget.[33]

UNMAS coordinates humanitarian mine action activities under the umbrella of the Global Protection Cluster within the UN Country Team. Since 2015, it reports that it has supported the development of civilian-led clearance efforts along the Somali border with Ethiopia.[34]

Puntland

The SEMA Puntland State Office, formerly known as PMAC, was established in Garowe with UNDP support in 1999. Since then, on behalf of the regional government, the SEMA Puntland State Office has coordinated mine action with local and international partners, including Danish Demining Group (DDG) and Mines Advisory Group (MAG).[35] It runs the only police EOD team in Puntland, which is responsible for collecting and destroying explosive ordnance.[36]

Strategic planning

In late 2017, a National Mine Action Strategic Plan for 2017–2020 was developed with input from SEMA, UNMAS, international operators, national NGO consortia, and international institutions. The process was supported by NPA with funding from the United Kingdom (UK) Department for International Development (DFID).[37] As of September 2018, the draft strategic plan was awaiting endorsement from Somali Minister of Internal Security.[38]

The plan focuses on setting achievable goals over the next three-year period, taking into account the challenges faced by the Somali national mine action program. Five strategic goals are elaborated, along with corresponding strategic objectives and action plans. The critical need to improve information management is highlighted as underpinning many of the challenges the program faces at every level. According to SEMA, the strategy will be reviewed every six months.[39]

The strategy notes Somalia’s status as a State Party to both the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions and its reporting obligations and commitments to complying with the conventions. The strategy’s five strategic goals, identified by SEMA, are as follows:

• To enhance the capacity and capability of SEMA to lead, direct, and enable effective and efficient mine action and explosives management in Somalia.
• To develop the Somali mine action consortia into a wholly national capacity delivering appropriate mine action support to all member states, safely, efficiently and in accordance with national and international standards, expectations, and requirements.
• To engage with stakeholders in order to understand, and better respond to, their needs and expectations in relation to the impact of mine/ERW contamination in Somalia.
• To reduce the risks faced by the people of Somalia to a level that allows them to go about their lives free from the impacts of mines and ERW.
• To comply, as much as practicable, with the obligations of those treaties to which Somalia is a signatory and which are relevant to the mine and explosives management program.

In 2017, the recently elected Somali government approved the Somalia National Development Plan 2017–2019, outlining priorities for recovery and development. Mine and ERW contamination is recognized as a hindrance to socio-economic development and a security concern for sustainable development initiatives, and identifies mine and ERW clearance as a crucial part of stabilization efforts in the national development process.[40]

In 2015, Somalia’s Ministry of Internal Security and SEMA developed a national strategy document, the “Badbaado Plan for Multi-Year Explosive Hazard Management,” in coordination with federal state members, the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), and UNMAS. An updated second “phase” of the five-year plan for the implementation of Somalia’s Article 5 obligations was officially launched in Geneva in February 2018. The new National Mine Action Strategic Plan notes that the Badbaado plan “remains extant and identifies a range of locations and tasks consistent with the goals and objectives” of the strategic plan.[41]

Legislation and standards

There is no national mine action legislation in Somalia. UNMAS developed National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) for Somalia in 2012–2013.[42] The NTSGs are also not specific to the Somali context, and do not include specific guidance for cluster munition survey.[43] In September 2018, it was reported that SEMA was in the process of revising the NTSGs with| the aim of new, fully nationally-owned standards to be finalized by early 2019.[44]

Quality management

Operators reported that no external quality assurance/quality control (QA/QC) was carried out in 2017 due to limited capacity and resources for SEMA.

Information management

In 2017, ownership of the national IMSMA database was fully transferred from UNMAS to SEMA, with support and capacity-building from NPA.[45] SEMA reported that it assumed full ownership of the IMSMA database on 2 October 2017 and that a process to update the information in the database according to a new country structure consisting of seven states (Banaadir, Hirshabelle, Galmudug, Jubaland, Puntland, South West, and Somaliland), and four levels (federal state, province, district, and village) was underway, along with a process to verify historical UNMAS data. SEMA noted that data from Somaliland had yet to be integrated into the database, but said that it had initiated a coordination process and communications were continuing to ensure that data is shared and available for Somalia’s next transparency report.[46] Data from Banaadir, Jubaland, and Puntland states was also lacking, it reported.[47] NPA stated that reporting forms were standardized throughout the mine action sector during the year, ensuring that all operators were using the same reporting forms.[48]

Somalia’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan for 2017–2020 places considerable emphasis on remedying shortcomings in information management. It also sets objectives for SEMA to build on improvements in information management to enable a focus on improving its prioritization of tasks based on better knowledge of humanitarian needs of affected communities, operational capacities, and the changing needs of internally displaced persons.[49] According to the plan, a specific national mine action standard on information management will be developed.[50]

In Somaliland, HALO Trust reported continuing regular checks of its information management system to ensure accuracy of reporting and stated that it transfers all data to SMAC, which then inputs it into its IMSMA database.[51]

Operators

In 2017, DDG focused operations on EOD and risk education in Sool and Gurieel regions of Somaliland and southcentral Somalia. By the end of 2017, DDG was deploying a single four-strong EOD team and nine two-person risk education teams.[52]

HALO Trust continued operations in southcentral Somalia in 2017.[53] HALO reported employing an average of approximately 175 staff, but in the last quarter of 2017 it had to scale back four manual mine clearance teams as a result of a local security issue.[54]

In 2017, NPA decided to expand its operations. In February, training of one manual clearance team and two survey teams was finalized and NPA began survey and clearance in Toghdeer and Sool, in the disputed areas between Puntland and Somaliland. The two survey teams were merged to form a demining team at the end of 2017, making a total of two demining teams with 12 deminers.[55]

In May, NPA began training five survey teams to be deployed across all five states in southcentral Somalia. Each team consisted of two NPA deminers and three additional members from local consortia NGOs. The survey teams, which also carried out risk education activities, became operational in September, making it the first time that mine action survey teams were deployed in all states in Somalia.[56] In 2017, under a DFID-funded partnership project, NPA continued to provide capacity development for SEMA on managing the IMSMA database, conducting non-technical and technical survey, and trainings for SEMA management staff.[57]

UNMAS contracted Ukroboronservice to carry out mine action activities in 2017 with a capacity of four eight-person multi-task teams to conduct ERW clearance, 56 community liaison officers to deliver risk education and liaison activities, and two 18-person manual demining teams. Operations began in December 2017.[58]

Land Release (landmines)

Just over 0.93km² of land was released in total in Somalia and Somaliland in 2017, including just under 0.9km² through mine clearance and close to 0.04km² reduced by technical survey. Planned operations resulted in the destruction of 91 antipersonnel mines, nine antivehicle mines, and 56 items of UXO. A further 2.4km² of mined area was confirmed as containing antipersonnel mines across Somalia and Somaliland during the year.[59]

This compared to 2016, when just over 1.2km² of land was released in total in Somalia and Somaliland, including less than 0.04km² through mine clearance in Somalia, and close to 1.2km² of mined area through survey and clearance in Somaliland. No antipersonnel mines were cleared in Somalia in 2016, though 5.3km² was confirmed as mined through survey.[60]

(See Somaliland profile for details of land release there.)

Survey in 2017 (landmines)

As stated, no comprehensive overview of SHAs exists in Somalia, and as of the end of 2017, no nationwide survey had been conducted, mainly due to the security situation.[61] To this end, however, operators HALO Trust and NPA reported confirming a total of 104 areas with a size of over 2.4km² in southcentral Somalia and Somaliland (see Somaliland profile for details).[62]

HALO Trust confirmed three areas with a total size of just under 0.9km², two in Galmudug state (total 765,760m²) and one in Hirshabelle state (120,830m²) in southcentral Somalia in 2017.[63]

NPA, which began mine action operations in southcentral Somalia in March 2017, confirmed a total of 41 areas with a total size of nearly 418,500m² in southcentral Somalia.[64]

Mined area survey in 2017[65]

Note: TS = technical survey.

Clearance in 2017 (landmines)

In 2017, HALO Trust reported clearing two areas in southcentral Somalia with a total size of just over 76,660m² with the destruction of four antipersonnel mines, two antivehicle mines, and 13 items of UXO. Additionally, 35 antipersonnel mines were destroyed in EOD spot tasks in southcentral Somalia during the year.[66] This compared to 2016, when HALO Trust initiated clearance activities in southcentral Somalia in the last quarter of the year, and reported clearing three mined areas covering just over 40,000m²: one in Hirshabelle state with a size of 5,169m² and two in Galmudug state covering 34,860m², however no mines or UXO were found.[67]

As noted above, NPA began demining in southcentral Somalia in March 2017.[68] It did not, however, undertake any mine clearance there as operations focused on survey.[69] Previously, during 2016, it operated three battle area clearance (BAC) teams for surface ERW clearance in Mogadishu and on its outskirts in southcentral Somalia.[70]

Mine clearance in 2017[71]

Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle.

Land Release (Cluster Munition Remnants)

Survey in 2017 (cluster munition remnants)

No overview of areas suspected to contain cluster munition remnants exists in southcentral Somalia, and in 2017, no national cluster munition survey had been conducted, mainly due to the security situation.[72]

NPA, which deployed five survey and mine risk education teams to each of Somalia’s five federal states in 2017, did not report encountering any cluster munitions in its operations.[73]

Clearance in 2017 (cluster munition remnants)

No cluster munition clearance occurred in southcentral Somalia in 2017, as in the previous year.[74] No formal land release occurred in Puntland in 2017.[75]

HALO carried out one BAC task in 2017 in the Galguduud region, near Dhuusamareeb, clearing an area of 91,430m² and destroying 881 items of UXO and 246 rounds of small arms ammunition.[76] NPA discontinued BAC operations at the end of 2016 and did not encounter any cluster munition remnants in its survey and mine clearance operations in 2017.[77]

UNMAS reported that Ukroboronservice teams destroyed 530 items of abandoned and/or unexploded ordnance and 57 pieces of small arms ammunition.[78]

Deminer safety

In August 2017, three HALO Trust staff members from its community outreach team (COT) were abducted by Al-Shabaab. The team had been conducting work near Fer-fer when al-Shabaab took control of the town. The three COT members were abducted and the team leader was shot although he survived and has since made a full recovery. After several weeks of negotiations between the families of the abducted staff and al-Shabaab, all three employees were released.[79]

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Somalia is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 October 2022. It is not on track to meet this deadline.

In seeking to meet its treaty deadline, Somalia must confront a number of challenges, not least of which is the security situation in much of the country. It does not effectively control mine action operations in Somaliland. In 2018, HALO and NPA stated that it was highly improbable that Somalia could meet its 2022 Article 5 deadline, primarily due to a lack of access to areas due to conflict and insecurity, an overall lack of resources for survey and clearance, and a lack of capacity of the national authority.[80] While the development of the new National Mine Action Strategic Plan for 2017–2020 is a significant step forward, if the current capacity of the national mine action program is not increased, the goals of the strategy are likely overly ambitious.[81]

The National Mine Action Strategic Plan for 2017–2020 further elaborates the following as key challenges impeding progress in mine action and towards meeting its Article 5 deadline: strained relations between mine action stakeholders and SEMA and a lack of clarity of respective roles in the sector; pressures of operating in a volatile conflict zone, including lack of access; significant political challenges relating to complex structures of localized power-holders, along with navigating political conflict at the clan, state, and federal levels; a lack of capacity for oversight and quality management; and challenges to formalize the status of local NGO mine action consortia and to move beyond the provision of mine risk education to implement survey and clearance operations under this model.[82] Additional risks identified included donor fatigue from international donors and the government; poor coordination, communication, and policy setting within the program; and poor management at the implementer level.[83]

SEMA did not receive any government funding for its staff salary costs or to carry out any mine action activities again in 2017.[84] As reported above, UNMAS stopped its funding for SEMA at the start of 2016, in the expectation that its legislative framework was due to be approved by the Federal Parliament
and that funding for SEMA would be allocated from the national budget.[85] However, due to claims that it lacks parliamentary approval, SEMA has not received funding from the government.[86] In July 2018, SEMA reported that it was working hard and lobbying to get the necessary legislation passed in parliament, and that once approved, SEMA will have a dedicated budget line included in the annual budget.[87]

GICHD and NPA in their capacity-building activities recommended that greater clarity on SEMA’s role and cohesion between SEMA and its five federal state offices, as well as national consortiums, would facilitate communication between stakeholders and more efficient implementation of mine action activities.[88] Notably, a strong commitment is elaborated in the 2017–2020 National Mine Action Strategic Plan that SEMA will work to reduce the effects of barriers, obstacles, and inefficiencies for the implementation of operations, while at the same time setting out clearer expectations on how organizations should coordinate and cooperate to achieve the national program’s strategic and operational objectives.[89]

In 2018, NPA reported that it had increased its capacity from two to three manual demining teams and was continuing its survey capacity throughout southcentral Somalia, with five teams. It was piloting a project to introduce the use of mine detection dogs (MDD) in clearance operations during the year and add an MDD team to its capacity and improving the efficiency of land release methodology.[90] NPA continued its capacity-building efforts with SEMA in 2017.[91]

In 2018, HALO Trust stated its priorities were to continue steady clearance and build capacity for increasing its operations in southcentral Somalia, in particular to expand its operations in Galmudug state. It reported that its operational costs had increased slightly due to an operational withdrawal from hard to reach areas along the Ethiopian border due to security concerns for wellbeing and safety of staff.[92]

Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 Compliance

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Somalia is required to destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2026.

It is too soon to say whether Somalia is on track to meet its Article 4 deadline, although in June 2016, SEMA had claimed to be optimistic that with adequate resources, Somalia would meet the deadline in time.[93] It highlighted the need for international assistance; greater transparency on bilaterally funded projects; better coordination and information sharing between operators, SEMA, and its Federal State member offices; and ensuring sufficient capacity to conduct independent QA/QC activities as key areas of concern.[94]

Somalia’s new National Mine Action Strategic Plan stipulates the submission of annual transparency reports for the Convention on Cluster Munitions, along with the Mine Ban Treaty. It had not, however, submitted any Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 transparency reports as of June 2018, despite the initial report being due on 31 August 2016.

No clearance of cluster munition remnants was reported in the last five years.

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and shared all its country-level landmine reports (from “Clearing the Mines 2018”) and country-level cluster munition reports (from “Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2018”) with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.