Summary: Non-signatory Turkey acknowledges the humanitarian concerns raised by cluster munitions, but has not taken any steps to join the convention. Turkey has participated as an observer in every meeting of the convention. It abstained from voting on a key United Nations (UN) resolution promoting the convention in December 2018.

Turkey has imported cluster munitions and possesses a stockpile. Turkey states that it last produced cluster munitions in 2005 and has never used or exported them.

Policy

The Republic of Turkey has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Turkey acknowledges the humanitarian concerns raised by cluster munitions, but has not taken any steps to accede to the convention. [1]

Turkey attended several of the diplomatic conferences of the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions. However, it participated only as an observer in the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008 and did not sign at the Oslo Signing Conference in December 2008. [2]

Turkey has participated as an observer in every meeting of the convention, most recently the Eighth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2018. [3]

In December 2018, Turkey abstained from the vote on a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution, which urges states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.” [4] Turkey has not explained why it has abstained from voting on the UNGA resolution promoting the convention since it was first introduced in 2015.

Turkey has condemned the use of cluster munitions on several occasions. [5] It has voted in favor of UNGA resolutions expressing outrage at the use of cluster munitions in Syria, most recently in December 2018. [6]

Turkey is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).

Use

Turkey informed the Monitor in 2009 that it was “not making use of cluster munitions.” [7] Since then, officials continued to affirm that Turkey has not and does not use cluster munitions. [8]

A United States (US) Department of State cable from February 2008 made public by Wikileaks in May 2011, states that “there exists a de facto moratorium on the use of cluster munitions by the Turkish armed forces [but] Turkey’s military doctrine continues to call for the use of cluster munitions in the event of an ‘all-out war.’” [9]

There is some evidence to indicate cluster munitions were used at least once in the past, in 1994. [10]

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

In the past, Turkey produced, exported, and imported cluster munitions. It possesses cluster munitions but has not disclosed information on the types or quantities stockpiled.

In 2010, Turkey informed the Monitor that it “does not use, transfer, produce or import cluster munitions.” [11] Officials continue to state that Turkey “no longer produces, transfers, exports or imports cluster munitions; has not produced cluster munitions since 2005; and has never used cluster munitions in the past.” [12]

At least two Turkish companies have produced ground-delivered cluster munitions:

• Makina ve Kimya Endüstrisi Kurumu (MKEK) has produced an extended range M396 155mm artillery projectile containing self-destructing M85 dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions. [13] It has also produced M483A1 155mm artillery projectiles with DPICM submunitions, under license from the US. [14]
• Roketsan has produced the TRK-122 122mm rocket, which contains 56 M85 DPICM submunitions. [15]

Turkey sold 3,020 TRK-122 122mm rockets to the United Arab Emirates in 2006–2007. [16]

The US supplied Turkey with 3,304 Rockeye cluster bombs, each containing 247 submunitions, at some point between 1970 and 1995. [17] In 1995, the US announced that it would provide Turkey with 120 ATACMS missiles with submunitions for its M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) launchers. [18] Turkey also possesses US-supplied M26 rockets, each with 644 submunitions, for its MLRS. In 2004, the US announced its intent to transfer to Turkey two CBU-103 Combined Effects Munitions cluster bombs, each with 202 submunitions, and two AGM-154 Joint Stand-Off Weapons (JSOW), each with 145 submunitions. [19] In 2005, it announced the proposed sale of another 50 CBU-103 and 50 JSOW. [20]

States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions have reported transferring cluster munitions to Turkey in the past, before they joined the convention. Slovakia reported a transfer of 380 AGAT 122mm rockets, each containing 56 submunitions, to Turkey in 2007. [21] Chile’s Ministry of National Defense has provided the Monitor with a document detailing the export of four CB-250 cluster bombs to Turkey in 1996. [22]

Policy

The Republic of Turkey acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 25 September 2003, becoming a State Party on 1 March 2004. Turkey has not enacted domestic implementation legislation but has indicated that its constitution and criminal code, as well as directives from Turkish Armed Forces General Staff, give legal effect to the treaty’s provisions.[1]

Turkey has attended most meetings of the treaty, most recently the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2018, where it made statements on victim assistance and support for mine clearance.[2] Turkey also provided an update on its Article 5 obligations.[3] Turkey also attended the intersessional meetings in May 2019. It served on the Committee on the Enhancement of Cooperation and Assistance in 2018–2019.

Turkey is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines.

Production and transfer

Turkey halted production of antipersonnel mines concurrently with a moratorium on the transfer of mines in January 1996. Its production facilities were then closed.[4] Turkey is not known to have exported antipersonnel mines. It has imported mines from Germany and the United States (US).

Use

Turkish Armed Forces

Even prior to joining the Mine Ban Treaty, the chief of the Turkish General Staff issued a directive banning the use of antipersonnel mines by the Turkish Armed Forces on 26 January 1998.[5] However, there have been serious allegations of at least two instances of use by members of the Turkish Armed Forces in southeastern Turkey near the border with Iraq, in Sirnak province (April 2009) and Hakkari province (May 2009).

In the first incident, the Turkish newspaper Taraf published a document allegedly belonging to the 23^rd Gendarmerie Division Command that indicated that on 9 April 2009 members of the Turkish Armed Forces emplaced M2A4 antipersonnel mines in Sirnak province.[6] Turkey did not announce that an investigation into this incident was underway until May 2012.[7] In May 2013, Turkey informed States Parties that “A detailed investigation comprising a consequent administrative legal scrutiny were [sic] undertaken. Let me share with you, for the record, that there has not been an explosion. Moreover the registry of Turkish Armed Forces shows that the mine allegedly in question was destroyed before the end of 2009, together with the stockpiled ones.”[8] It remains unclear if further mines from this alleged mined area remain in the ground as Turkey’s report only indicated the destruction of one mine.

The second case relates to seven Turkish soldiers who were killed and eight wounded by an antipersonnel mine near Cukurca on 27 May 2009.[9] The Turkish army initially alleged that the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) planted the mine, but in June 2009 the Turkish media reported that the mine was in fact laid by Turkish forces not long before the detonation.[10] An investigation by the chief prosecutor in Van determined that the mine belonged to the Turkish military and was planted on the orders of a Turkish commander.[11] The case was forwarded to the Turkish General Staff military prosecutor’s office.[12]

According to media accounts, a report on the incident in September 2010 provided to the Military’s prosecutor’s office found that the device used was an “anti-personnel landmine.” Brigadier General Zeki Es, who allegedly ordered the placement of the mine, was arrested in November 2010 and a case was opened in the Turkish martial court.[13] General Es was released in February 2011 after several soldiers recanted their previous testimony.[14] In October 2011, according to a media account, an expert report prepared at the request of the military court found that commanders were responsible for the deaths due to negligence and poor planning.[15] In February 2012, the Turkish General Staff’s martial court continued hearing the case against two generals and four other officers.[16] In May 2013, Turkey informed States Parties that “The most recent hearing of the trial was held by this Military Court on April 19, 2013. The court rendered its verdict and sentenced a Turkish Brigadier General to 6 years and 8 months of imprisonment due to “causing death and injury by negligence.” Turkey informed States Parties that this was an initial verdict, not a final decision, and that “the work on producing the reasoning of this decision is still underway.”[17] No mention was made of a violation of the ban on antipersonnel mines in the court’s proceedings, findings, or judgment.

Under the Mine Ban Treaty, Turkey must take every measure to prevent the use of antipersonnel mines, including the application of penal sanctions. The ICBL has previously called on Turkey to thoroughly investigate the use allegations, to report to States Parties on its findings, and undertake measures to prevent further use.[18] It has also emphasized the need to establish the origin of the mines used, which could have been lifted from the ground and re-laid or could have been taken from stocks retained for training purposes, and to clarify what specific law or laws had applied during the trial.[19] Several States Parties and the ICRC have expressed their deep concern about these allegations of mine use since they were reported in 2010.

PKK/Kongra Gel

Turkish officials have previously accused the PKK/Kurdistan People’s Congress (Kongra Gel) of use of antipersonnel mines.[20]

In the past, the Turkish General Staff published information on mines recovered without specifying the types and locations of the mines.[21] The Turkish General Staff no longer lists this information on its website. Turkey did not specifically report on recovered mines and their disposition in previous Article 7 reports.

The Monitor was not able to obtain from Turkey specific dates and locations, or other concrete details, of the allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by the PKK/Kongra Gel or of specific incidents that led to casualties from antipersonnel mines.

The PKK/Kongra Gel have admitted to the use of command-detonated mines, but denied any use of mines or other explosive devices that can be activated by a person or a vehicle.[22] In July 2006, the NGO Geneva Call reported that the PKK had unilaterally halted antipersonnel mine use by signing the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment.

Stockpiling and destruction

Turkey announced in December 2011 that its stockpile destruction program was completed on 21 June 2011. It had missed its 1 March 2008 treaty-mandated deadline for stockpile destruction, and was in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty for over three years. Turkey had previously reported that its munitions disposal facility had not been officially inaugurated until 8 November 2007.[23]

Turkey stated that in 2004, when it became a State Party, it had a stockpile of 2,973,481 antipersonnel mines. In early 2006, Turkey indicated it had a stock of 2,866,818 antipersonnel mines to destroy. In its Article 7 report issued after the announcement of the completion of the destruction program, Turkey stated that 2,938,060 mines had been destroyed in total.[24]

In the past, Turkey also reported possession of 18,236 M18 Claymore mines, but in 2007 it reported that M18 mines were removed from its stockpile destruction list due to their “specific technical features” and “will not be used as victim activated.”[25] In 2008, officials said that the tripwires for M18s had been destroyed.

Mines retained for research and training

On becoming a State Party in 2004, Turkey initially retained 16,000 antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes.[26] In its Article 7 report submitted in 2019, Turkey reported 9,259 mines retained for training and research.[27]

Turkey retains the fourth-largest number of antipersonnel mines among States Parties. In December 2012, it repeated that the “large size, as well as the different types of mine action units, necessitate the Turkish Armed Forces to retain a certain number of APLMs [antipersonnel landmines] for training purposes.”[28] In December 2012, Turkey defended its large number of retained mines by stating, “Article 3 recognizes the specific and different needs of States Parties by not fixing numbers or ceilings for mines retained for training purposes.”

In December 2012, Turkey repeated that it is “considering reassessing the number of mines retained for permitted purposes.”[29] It made similar statements in 2010.[30] Similarly, in May 2006, it stated that “after covering some more ground in mine clearance, Turkey may review the number of mines retained for training purposes.”[31] In June 2005, Turkey said, “This figure [16,000 mines] may be reassessed as the process of downsizing the armed forces progresses.”[32]

Notes: CHA = confirmed hazardous area; SHA = suspected hazardous area; ERW = explosive remnants of war; IEDs = improvised explosive devices; UXO = unexploded ordnance.

Contamination

The Republic of Turkey is contaminated with antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, as well as improvised explosive devices (IEDs), with more than 164km² of confirmed mined area across 3,061 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs), as summarized in the table below. A further 701 areas are suspected to be mined, but the area they cover and the number of mines that may lie within them remain to be qualified,[1] therefore the total contaminated area is likely to be significantly larger.

This is a reduction in baseline contamination compared to the end of 2016, when 177km²of mine contamination was reported across 3,080 CHAs.[2] The suspected mined area at the end of 2017 was unchanged from a year earlier.

The great majority of antipersonnel mines in Turkey are found alongits borders. The mines were laid in 1955–1959 all along the border with Syria, as well as on some sections of the border with Armenia, Iran, and Iraq in 1992–1995,[3] and with Azerbaijan.[4] According to Turkey, its western borders with Bulgaria and Greece, as well as the border with Georgia, are mine-free.[5] Mines were also laid around military installations.[6]

Contamination by region (as of end 2017)[7]

Note: AP = antipersonnel mine; AV = antivehicle mine.
* A section of mined area also intersects with the Azerbaijan border.

Government forces emplaced landmines during the 1984–1999 conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) in the southeast of the country. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, these mines have been progressively cleared since 1998.[8] In addition to mines laid by Turkish security forces, non-state armed groups have also emplaced mines and IEDs, rendering the clearance process more complex.[9]

The number of mined areas along the Iraqi border, as well as part of the Iranian border, is an estimate, as, according to Turkey, precise calculation is hampered by terrorist activities and the presence of unconfirmed mined areas. In addition, fewer mines are expected along the Syrian border than indicated because of detonations by smugglers and as a result of wildfires.[10]

Mine contamination in Turkey has both a humanitarian and economic impact. Up to 80% of mined areas along the Syrian border are on arable land, which cannot be used. The risk to livestock is widespread, especially where fencing is damaged. Mined areas have also prevented access for development activities.[11]

Northern Cyprus

Turkey’s original Article 5 clearance deadline was 1 March 2014. In 2013, States Parties granted Turkey an eight-year extension until 1 March 2022, for clearance of mines in Turkey, but Turkey did not request additional time for clearance of the areas it controls in northern Cyprus[12] (see the Cyprus Mine Action profile for further information).

Program Management

In January 2015, Law No. 6586 on the “Establishment
of a National Mine Action Centre and Amendment of Some Other Laws” was adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly; the law entered into force on 3 February 2015. The law aims to define the modalities
and identify the functions, jurisdictions, and responsibilities of the national mine action center (NMAC), which will carry out clearance of mines and/or unexploded ordnance (UXO) to humanitarian standards in Turkey.[13] The law entitles the NMAC to elaborate policies for this clearance; to plan and steer related activities and monitor their implementation; and to carry out the necessary coordination and cooperation with domestic and foreign institutions.[14]

The NMAC was established on 3 February 2015 under the Ministry of National Defense, and called the Turkish Mine Action Center (TURMAC).[15] A director was appointed in August of the same year.[16] By February 2016, core staff had been recruited and the center was in the initial stages of becoming operational.[17] However, there has been a high level of turnaround in senior-level positions at TURMAC, including the directorship. Under Law 694 of 15 August 2017, TURMAC reports directly to the Undersecretary of the Ministry of National Defense.[18]

TURMAC’s capacity-development efforts are being implemented in partnership with the UNDP and the GICHD, as well as other national partners.[19] A capacity needs assessment conducted by the UNDP and the GICHD in October 2016 highlighted several capacity gaps for TURMAC.[20] Responding to the findings of the assessment, Turkey subsequently reported significant progress in improving the structure of TURMAC, taking steps to better coordinate with other state institutions, and conducting recruitment of qualified personnel and intensive training to strengthen capacity.[21] Development of standing operating procedures (SOPs) and “other organizational arrangements” are still underway.[22]

Strategic planning

Turkey does not have a national strategic mine action plan in place. Delays in developing a plan were attributed to the general elections in November 2015 and the attempted coup in July 2016. As of June 2017, a national strategic mine action plan for 2017–2019 had been drafted and Turkey reported it expected the strategy to be adopted by the end of 2017.[23] However, in December 2017, Turkey reported that a draft national strategic mine action plan for 2018–2020 was expected to be adopted by the Council of Ministers before the end of 2018.[24] Subsequently, Turkey declared in its latest Article 7 transparency report that a national strategic mine action plan for 2019–2021 was drafted and was expected to be approved and published in the Official Gazette in 2018.[25] The three-year plan reportedly covers national capacity development, survey and clearance of mined areas, provision of mine risk education, and assistance to mine victims.[26] It includes plans for survey of SHA and CHA on the southeastern/Iraqi border, the Syrian border, and non-border areas.[27]

Turkey’s workplan is divided into planned survey and clearance per region and will be finalized after TURMAC has adopted its national mine action strategic plan. Further revisions were probable due to ongoing investigation and survey of mined areas in the border regions.[28]

Syrian border

The Syrian border is estimated to account for two-thirds of the mines and close to 90% of the remaining mined area in the country. Officials observed it is also the easiest border to clear because the terrain is flat and there has been minimal displacement of mines as a result of factors such as land erosion.[29] Minefields in this region are clearly mapped, marked, fenced, and reported to be well known to the local population.[30]

Clearance has been delayed due to armed conflict in Syria.[31] This is with the exception of the demining being conducted to enable safe construction of a Border Security Surveillance System along Turkey’s border with Syria, which commenced in 2016.[32] According to online media sources, the three-meter-high wall is being built behind minefields and deep ditches, and is reinforced with barbed wire and steel fences, and there are also watch towers and around the clock military patrols.[33] Demining efforts in support of the construction of the surveillance system also include survey and clearance of areas suspected or confirmed to contain mines of an improvised natureand other explosive devices deployed by non-state armed groups.[34] As of December 2017, TURMAC expected that the Border Security Surveillance System would be completed in May 2018. Once completed, the Border Security Surveillance System will reportedly allow for planned demining of the Syrian border to commence.[35]

Eastern borders

In May 2015, an Integrated Border Management Project was launched, under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior in a joint project with the UNDP. The project, which is funded by the EU, Turkey, and the UN, aims to address the humanitarian and border management challenges posed by mine contamination, and to contribute to social and economic development through demining and more secure borders in eastern Turkey.[36] Under the project, the UNDP is managing the demining operations and quality assurance along the eastern border and supporting the capacity development of TURMAC.[37]

Clearance operations for Phase 1 of the project began in June 2016, and were completed by the end of 2017.[38] The demining component was implemented by Denel MECHEM (MECHEM), as part of a consortium in which national operators were sub-contracted by MECHEM.[39] A total of almost 3.3km² of mined area was released (637,685m² cleared, 75,445m²reduced, and 2,583,110m² cancelled) and more than 24,000 mines were destroyed in 2016 and 2017.[40] This was considerably less than the expected results of clearance of 223 mined areas over an area of just less than 11.67km² and the destruction of 189,863 antipersonnel mines.[41]

Phase 2 of the project, which was expected to start in May 2018, was planned to result in the release at least 1.2km².[42]

Areas currently being cleared as part of the EU Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project will remain as restricted areas (due to their location) even after completion of mine clearance. TURMAC reported that survey and clearance is conducted geographically from north to south in order to improve cost, time, and labor efficiency; but that clearance of other areas was prioritized according to impact.[43]

Southeastern/Iraqi border

Under the draft strategic mine action plan for 2017–2019, survey is planned of suspected mined area in Sirnak province (in parts of the province bordering Iraq) in 2018 and of confirmed mined area in this province in 2019; and of suspected mined area in Hakkari province in 2019.[44] Clearance along the southeastern/Iraqi border was not scheduled to commence until 2019, after completion of Phase 2 of the Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project,[45] and because of the conflict in Syria.[46] Clearance of the 969 mined areas, totaling just over 2.86km², was scheduled to take place in 2019–2021, with the destruction of 79,017 antipersonnel mines. This represents all known mine contamination in this region.[47]

Non-border areas

The draft national mine action plan for 2017–2019 reportedly includes plans for survey of suspected mined area in interior areas of Mardin, Siirt, and Sirnak provinces in 2018, and Hakkari province in 2019; and survey of confirmed mined area in Diyarbakir and Siirt in 2019.[48]

Turkey reported at the Mine Ban Treaty Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2017 and in its Article 7 report for 2017 that demining activities will soon commence in the non-border areas, which account for less than 2% of all contaminated areas in Turkey, and that non-technical survey is planned for 2018.[49]

Legislation and standards

As noted above, national mine action legislation was adopted in January 2015.

To date, demining has proceeded on the basis of provisional standards, using the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) as a template.[50]

The UNDP and the GICHD are assisting TURMAC to formulate new national mine action standards based upon IMAS and the provisional standards elaborated for the EU eastern border clearance projects.[51] Turkey reported that it had developed a land release policy relating to the Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project, which will allow for efficient land release.

In April 2017, a set of National Mine Action Standards, including a land release policy, were sent to the National Standards Institute of Turkey for approval; this was expected to occur in the course of 2018.[52] The first meeting of the National Standard Review Board was due to be held in the first half of 2018 and twice a year thereafter, attended by the relevant agencies.[53]

In its latest Article 7 transparency report, Turkey reported that development of SOPs was still underway.[54]

Quality management

Following an international competitive tender process, the UNDP awarded a contract for quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) services to RPS-Explosive Engineering Services in March 2016. In April 2016, the UNDP and TURMAC completed the accreditation of RPS-Explosive Engineering Services, and the company then began the accreditation process for the mine clearance contractor, MECHEM, under the Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project.[55]

In addition, TURMAC oversees on-site operations and regularly attends operational working group meetings in the field.[56]

In 2017, TURMAC personnel were given training in ISO 9001 quality management system (a total of 12 courses), as well as mine action quality management training by the GICHD. The quality management of military demining troops will be conducted by TURMAC personnel.[57]

Information management

The UNDP and the GICHD are supporting TURMAC for the establishment of a functioning information management system.[58] The UNDP maintained a project database to record all operational data related to Phase 1 of the Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project, until a national mine action database could be established in TURMAC.[59]

In 2017, the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) was established[60] and was expected to become fully operational in 2018.[61] A significant number of personnel both from TURMAC and military demining troops have been trained on IMSMA. In addition to military demining troops, IMSMA will also be used in Phase 2 of the Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project.[62]

Due to national security concerns, much of the minefield data remains classified, presenting a challenge to mine action information management in Turkey.[63]

Operators

In 2017, mine clearance operations in Turkey were conducted by MECHEM, under the Eastern Border Mine Clearance project, and by the Turkish armed forces along the Syria border, to support construction of the Border Security Surveillance System.[64]

MECHEM, a South African company, which is partnering with national sub-contractor Altay, was awarded the tender for mine clearance under Phase 1 of the EU Eastern Border Mine Clearance project by the UNDP in December 2015.[65] MECHEM was subsequently accredited in Turkey, and as of June 2017, was employing 140 deminers. Accreditation for mine detection dogs (MDDs) was granted in 2017, and as of June 2017, 30 MDDs were being deployed by MECHEM, along with one MineWolf machine.[66] As noted above, RPS, a United Kingdom-based company, was contracted for QA and QC.[67]

Military demining troops were accredited for their manual demining capacity in 2017.[68] As of June 2017, demining units of the Turkish armed forces had a total operational capacity of 85 deminers, six MDDs, and four machines.[69] In December 2017, Turkey reported that it planned to triple the number of military demining units in 2018,[70] and in its latest Article 7 report, Turkey reported that the establishment of five new demining companies had been approved by the Ministry of National Defense. The procurement of equipment, including demining equipment, for the new demining companies was reported to be underway and was planned to be finalized before the end of 2018. Three of the five new teams were planned to be operational by the end of 2018 and the remaining two teams in 2019.[71]

Land Release

In 2017, Turkey reported a total of more than 0.82km² of clearance, during which 26,381 antipersonnel mines and 29 antivehicle mines were destroyed.[72] In addition, Turkey released a further 0.07km² through technical survey and cancelled more than 7.5km² through non-technical survey.

However, survey and clearance data reported by Turkey in its Article 7 report for 2017 includes the amount of land (in square meters) released by Turkish armed forces for both 2016 and 2017, which was not formally reported previously. The clearance results for 2016 for the armed forces, previously provided by the TURMAC and reported in Turkey’s mine action profile for 2017, appear to be incorrect. The survey output (in square meters) reported for MECHEM for 2017, also includes 2016 output.[73]

Survey in 2017

In 2016 and 2017, Turkey cancelled more than 7.5km² of mined area (2.58km² on the Iran border and 5km² on the Syria border) and reduced over 75,000m² through technical survey (see table below).[74] Results of a comprehensive desk assessment of minefield records of the eastern and Syrian Borders conducted in 2016 were not reported in Turkey’s transparency report for 2016,[75] and were instead included in the latest reporting for 2017.[76]

Antipersonnel mine survey in 2016 and 2017[77]

Note: TS = technical survey.

On the Syrian Border, non-technical survey was conducted in Hatay region, where it was found that the areas registered as suspected had been used as agricultural land for many decades and the area has been mine-free. Consequently, approximately 5km² of SHA has been cancelled.[78]

In addition, with respect to non-border areas, Turkey reported that non-technical survey had been conducted at a previously used military range (2.5km²) in Eskişehir province, where the Trans-Anatolia Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) project will be built. The area “was determined as safe and delivered to the relevant authorities.”[79] This area was not included in Turkey’s cancellation figures for 2017, and it is unclear whether or not this area was recorded as a suspected mined area in the first instance.

Clearance in 2017

In its Article 7 transparency report for 2017, more than 0.82km² was reported as cleared: over 0.57km² on the eastern border with Iran and 0.25km² on the Syrian border (see table below). The area of land cleared on the Syrian border, however, relates to clearance in both 2016 and 2017.

Antipersonnel mine clearance in 2016 and 2017[80]

Note: AP = antipersonnel mine; AV = antivehicle mine.
*A section of mined area also intersects with the Azerbaijan border. Demining operations in this area were initiated in 2017. The work along the Azerbaijani border segment is planned to be completed in 2018.

On the eastern border with Iran, MECHEM, with sub-contracting partner Altay, cleared 514,921m² in 2017, under Phase 1 of the EU Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project. In addition, military Demining Troops cleared a further 59,195m² of land on the Iran border, which “accounts for approximately 1 million m² of suspected hazardous area in Iğdır province and Doğubeyazıtz district of Agri province.” Turkey also reported that, “The land will be released in 2018 after verification. Additional minefields which accounts for 603,710m²of contaminated area will also be released.” During these operations, “IMSMA has been used and quality control is assured.”[81]

Turkey also reported clearance of 250,000m²by military demining units in Karkamış and Elbeyli regions on the Syrian border, with the destruction of 25 antipersonnel mines and 29 antivehicle mines.[82] However, this relates to land released through clearance for both 2016 and 2017.

Clearance on the Syrian border was conducted as part of demining efforts in support of the construction of the Border Security Surveillance System, with the released land delivered to the relevant authorities to be used as customs areas.[83] While Turkey did report destruction of 414 antipersonnel mines in its Article 7 report for 2016, as part of this Syria border project, it did not formally report the corresponding area cleared (in square meters), as QA/QC procedures had not yet been completed, and the Turkish armed forces demining units were not yet accredited operationally at that time.[84] The TURMAC previously reported that more than 3.3km² had been cleared long the Syria border in 2016.[85] Based on the 250,000m² clearance subsequently reported by Turkey in its most recent Article 7 report, it appears that the 3.3km² reported previously by the TURMAC was inaccurate and included a significant proportion of cancelled area, not just clearance output.

No mine clearance was conducted in 2016 or 2017 along the southeastern/Iraqi border or in non-border areas.[86]

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the eight-year extension granted by States Parties in 2013), Turkey is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2022. Turkey will not meet this deadline.

Turkey’s original Article 5 deadline was 1 March 2014. In 2012, Turkey acknowledged to the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties that it would seek an extension to its deadline.[87] In March 2013, Turkey submitted a request for an eight-year extension to its deadline until 2022 to complete clearance of all mined areas. Turkey stated that the envisaged timeframe was subject to revision pending progress with tenders and clearance activities on the ground.[88]

In its 2013 extension request, Turkey cited a number of circumstances that had impeded it from carryingout mine clearance, including: delays in
the establishment of an NMAA and NMAC that
will supervise clearance activities; adverse weather conditions allowing clearance to be conducted for only five or six months a year; security problems posed by the continuation of the terrorist threat; mined territory contaminated with metal residue resulting from the fight against terrorism; uncertainties about the mine-free status of some areas due to the irregular completion
of registration forms; and topographical challenges. According to Turkey, the eastern and southeastern borders and non-border areas are the most complicated to address due to topographical difficulties.[89]

In granting the 2013 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties recalled the number of efforts to be carried out during 2013–2014, crucial to the success of the implementation of Turkey’s plan, and requested that Turkey report to the Third Review Conference in June 2014 on: the tendering processes for clearance along Turkey’s border with Syria and the results of any related demining efforts and annual milestones of expected progress; the tendering processes for the clearance of areas along Turkey’s eastern borders; developments in the establishment of the NMAA and NMAC; and process in clearance of mined areas in non-border areas.[90] Turkey did not provide an update on clearance progress at the Third Review Conference, but did subsequently submit a workplan in March 2015.[91]

Turkey revealed in its 2013 extension request that since 1998 it had only cleared a total of 1.15km² of mined area, close to three-quarters of which took place in one year (2011), with destruction of 760 antipersonnel mines and 974 antivehicle mines. In addition, military teams had cleared 24,287 mines, but only to allow safe movement of troops, not to release a contaminated area.[92]

Turkey’s total mine clearance to date only amounts to a tiny fraction of its overall mine contamination, and more than 14 years after becoming a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty, Turkey has only made marginal progress in addressing mine contamination. While mine clearance has subsequently also taken place in 2014, 2016, and 2017, little more than 1.1km²of mined area has been cleared in total over the last five years (see table below).

Phase 1 of the EU Eastern Borders Mine Clearance Project (in the provinces of Ardahan, Kars, Igdir, and Agri) commenced in June 2016 was completed by the end of 2017. Phase 2 was due to begin in 2018.

Mine clearance in 2013–2017[93]

Based on the current rate of clearance, Turkey will not complete implementation of Article 5 by its deadline in 2022. While TURMAC reported in 2017 that Turkey was planning to meet its Article 5 deadline it also recognized potential obstacles, including: the possibility that the demining contractor for the EU Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project will not meet its deadline for Phase 1; potential delays for Phase 2; the fact that political uncertainties in Syria and Iraq may hinder survey and clearance activities on these borders, in addition to non-state armed groups hindering demining operations in other areas; and weather conditions limiting clearance to no more than seven months a year.[95]

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and shared all its country-level landmine reports (from“Clearing the Mines 2018”) and country-level cluster munition reports (from “Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2018”) with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.

In 2017, the Republic of Turkey provided US$10,000 through the ITF (International Trust Fund) Enhancing Human Security for victim assistance activities in Lebanon.[1]

Turkey is also affected by antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, as well as improvised explosive devices (IEDs).[2] Between 1998–2012, Turkey reported contributing approximately 68.7 million Turkish Lira (approximately $30 million) to its own mine clearance efforts.[3] Turkey has not reported the amounts contributed since then.

In 2014, the European Union (EU) contributed €19,800,000 ($26,328,060) for clearance activities in the eastern border regions, as part of an integrated border management project.[4] Turkey did not receive international funding in 2015, 2016, and 2017.

Casualties in 2017–details

The Monitor identified at least 42 new mine/ERW casualties in 2017 in the Republic of Turkey. Media reports collected by the Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey (IMFT)included 38 casualties, including 37 civilian casualties and one military personnel. The majority of civilian casualties were children (23).[2] Four deminer casualties were also included among other casualties in Turkey’s Article 7 report.[3] The 2017 total represents a decrease from the 57 new mine/ERW casualties in 2016, but an increase from the 34 new mine/ERW casualties in 2015.[4]

Turkey reported that there were 23 civilian antipersonnel mine casualties in 2017, including nine people killed, and seven children among the injured. In a marked change from previous years, Turkey reported on civilian casualties and deminer casualties and excluded military personnel from its casualty reporting.[5]

Total casualties, details*

The total number of mine/improvised explosive device (IED)/ERW casualties in Turkey is unknown. Turkey had reported 4,602 mine/ERW casualties, including 919 people killed and 3,683 injured, as of the end of 2015.[6] However, according to a media report in April 2010, the Ministry of Internal Affairs had recorded 6,360 mine casualties since 1984; 1,269 people killed (625 security personnel; 644 civilians) and another 5,091 people injured (with the number of civilians compared to security personnel injured not reported) in mine incidents.[7] In 2007, a demining specialist reported at least 10,000 mine casualties (mostly civilians) along the Turkish-Syrian border since the 1950s (more than 3,000 killed and 7,000 injured).[8]

In its Article 5 deadline Extension Request of March 2013, Turkey provided information on antipersonnel mine casualties occurring between 2004 and the end of 2012: 882 military personnel (260 killed; 622 injured) and 168 civilians (56 killed; 112 injured). Turkey also included disaggregated information on the age and sex of civilian casualties for a similar time period (10 years); of the total civilian casualties reported, 15 were female and 50 were children.[9] In contrast, Monitor reporting, which included IMFT data for the period from 2004 to the end of 2012, counted more than twice the number of civilian mine/ERW casualties; 377 civilian casualties of 979 casualties recorded in total.

Victim assistance action points

• Increase coordination of victim assistance obligations with the input of the General Directorate of Services for the Disabled and Elderly in the Ministry of Family and Social Policies.
• Develop a plan and coordinate implementation of victim assistance in accordance with Mine Ban Treaty Maputo Action Plan commitments.
• Make adequate prosthetic and rehabilitation facilities a priority in the mine-affected regions.

Victim assistance planning and coordination

International commitments and obligations

Laws and policies

In the Republic of Turkey, the law prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities and the constitution permits “positive discrimination” favoring them. NGOs that advocate for the rights of persons with disabilities reported that the laws were not enforced effectively.[5]

Accessibility of public services and buildings for persons with disabilities remained extremely limited.[6]

The Ministry of Family and Social Policies operated social service centers assisting vulnerable individuals, including persons with disabilities.[7] All public schools are required by law to accommodate students with disabilities, although disability rights activists reported that a large number of school-age children with disabilities did not receive adequate access to education.[8] Turkey had no mental health laws.[9]

The public sector’s employment rate for persons with disabilities remained well below its commitments 3% commitment.[10]

Major Developments in 2017–2018

In the context of the ongoing conflict in Syria, the influx of refugees coming into Turkey has continued to strain the national healthcare system,[11] especially in the provinces hosting the largest number of refugees: Șanliıurfa, Gaziantep, Hatay, Istanbul, Mersin, and Adana.[12]

A new data collection mechanism was established for victims of mine/ERW incidents who are taken to hospital with the Ministry of Health’s module for civilian casualties, the “Health Management System.” The system was designed for improved monitoring and assistance to mine victims.[13]

Needs assessment

National NGO the Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey (IMFT) continued to collect information available on survivors and persons killed through media scanning and crosschecking with other organizations and local sources.

Turkey reported that efforts were being made to create a “shared database specifically designed for mine victims.”[14] Since 2016, the Ministry of Interior, through the gendarmerie and national police, updates TURMAC on the details of incidents and casualties in the areas under their responsibilitywithin a month of each mine/ERW incident, while the General Staff, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Family and Social Policies and other relevant ministries and bodies report quarterly on changes to personal data and health status of mine victims. Persons considered official mine victims according to the legislation were to be assisted to attain their legal rights in coordination with the other relevant bodies.[15]

Medical care and rehabilitation

Generally, healthcare facilities in towns in the mine-affected regions (other than the largest cities) have been underfunded, had inadequate staffing levels and equipment, and often were not able to address survivors’ emergencies or ongoing medical needs.[16] Emergency services are free-of-charge for all citizens in both public and private hospitals.[17] Access to healthcare services remained challenging for persons with disabilities.[18]

Mine/ERW victims who are unable to perform daily activities without assistance receive support for obtaining medicine and medical equipment at no additional cost.[19]

All persons with disabilities have the right to access the free first-aid services at public and private healthcare centers. According to the General Health Insurance system, payment of premiums based on income-level is required. General Health Insurance premiums for people in need are covered by state funding.[20]

There was a significant need for prosthetics and rehabilitation services to be established in other mine/ERW-affected provinces. The General Health Insurance system provides orthosis, prosthetics, and wheelchairs; however, the provision of these assistive devices is time-bound and limited to one new fitting every five years.[21]

Socio-economic and psychosocial inclusion

No specific economic inclusion or work programs existed for mine/ERW victims, however, some broader services exist that provide mine/ERW survivors and affected families with monthly payments, employment opportunities, enterprising grant, free job counselling, and courses according to their specific needs.[22]

Mine survivors took part in activities organized by the Sports Federation for the Disabled and the Veterans Physical Treatment, Education and Research Center.[23]

There is a lack of quantitative and aggregated data on the participation of persons with disabilities in economic and social life.[24]

Cross-cutting

In 2017, the Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH) opened three High Technology Prosthetic Orthotics Centers in Istanbul, Şanlıurfa, and Hatay. The centers provided physical rehabilitation services to Syrian refugees, free of charge.[25] As of June 2018, 275 prostheses were provided by the centers.[26] The centers also provided psychological support to patients.[27]

The World Health Organization (WHO) supported Turkish health authorities providing access to health services to Syrian refugees.[28] The WHO trained Syrian refugees in providing health services to fellow Syrian refugees in Turkey.[29] It also trained Turkish and Syrian health workers in mental health and psychosocial support to serve refugees and host communities.[30]

Victim assistance providers and activities