Notes: ERW = explosive remnants of war; IEDs = improvised explosive devices.

Mine Contamination

Ukraine is contaminated by antipersonnel mines as a result of the ongoing conflict which broke out in 2014. In the first half of 2014, armed violence erupted between Ukrainian government forces and Russian-backed separatists in the Crimean peninsula and in the east of the country in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions (oblasts). Firm evidence exists that mines have been used in the resultant armed conflicts,[1] including by Ukrainian armed forces, though the full nature and extent of contamination is likely to remain unclear until an effective cessation of hostilities. A December 2017 report from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), covering 16 August to 15 September 2017, stated that, “The parties to the conflict continued the practice of placement of IEDs and antipersonnel mines in populated areas and near objects of civilian infrastructure.”[2] They have also made this statement in previous reports.[3] (See Ukraine’s mine ban profile for further details.)

Ukraine’s 2018 request for an extended mine clearance deadline states that “preliminary estimates show that about 8% of the lands (totaling to 7,000km²), which were liberated from the occupying authorities in Donetsk and Luhansk regions contain or suspected to contain [antipersonnel mines], unexploded ordnance (UXO) and explosive remnants of war (ERW).” This contamination includes IEDs.[4] This estimate was also given at the Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings in June 2017.[5] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense accepts that this is a “rough” estimate.[6] It is further suggested that 15–20% of the contamination is from mines, while the rest is from ERW.[7]

Ukraine cannot reliably estimate the overall extent of mine contamination until surveys have been completed.[8] The heaviest mine and ERW contamination is believed to be inside the 15km buffer zone between the warring parties, but access to this area for survey and clearance operations is severely limited.[9]

In its latest Article 7 transparency report (for 2017), Ukraine reported that exact information on the number and types of mines was not available, but noted that non-technical survey by NGOs identified mined areas in Lemans, Slavyansk, and Volnovansky districts in the Donetsk region, and Popasnyansky district, in Lugansk region.[10]

Since 2015, numerous antipersonnel and antivehicle mines have been identified in Ukraine, including the following types: OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mines that can function as antipersonnel mines depending on the type of fuze used, MON (50, 90, 100, and 200) directional antipersonnel mines, TM62 antivehicle mines, PDM-1M anti-handling mines equipped with fuzes capable of being activated by the unintentional act of a person, and POM2 antipersonnel mines.[11] In an April 2015 Technical Briefing Note, Human Rights Watch reported the presence of at least two types of blast antipersonnel mines, three types of MON-series directional fragmentation mines, and OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mines.[12] Booby-trapped ERW, mainly tripwire-initiated systems connected to conventional munitions, have also been found.[13] (See Mine Ban Policy profile for further details).

On 20 April 2018, the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Ukraine reported that explosive hazard contamination in eastern Ukraine is impacting 1.9 million people, including around 200,000 children.[14]The presence or suspicion of mines and ERW inhibits freedom of movement, posing a serious threat to people crossing the contact line at the five checkpoints where one million crossings occur each month.[15] Access to some villages near the contact line is also restricted as roads are contaminated by mines and ERW, cutting people off from essential services.[16] Civilians living along the contact line are unable to engage in agricultural activities, severely affecting their access to food and livelihoods.[17] At the same time, they are ineligible for social assistance and still have to pay land tax, because they are deemed to own land plots with which they should be able to feed themselves.[18] Access to basic utilities such as water, electricity, and gas is frequently interrupted, and maintenance and repair of these utilities is impeded or made impossible by the presence of mines and ERW.[19] To heat homes in the winter, people go into the forest, facing significant risk from explosive ordnance as a result. This is said to have resulted in many fatalities and injuries.[20]In addition, explosive ordnance poses a humanitarian risk to internally displaced and returning refugees, especially in areas fought over previously and which are now away from the front line.[21]

Prior to the current conflicts, Ukraine was affected by residual contamination of mines and other ordnance, mostly as a result of heavy fighting between German and Soviet forces in World War II, but also from combat in the First World War. Ministry of Defense engineering units partially cleared affected areas in the mid-1970s, suggesting that a problem may remain, but the location and extent of any mine threat is not known. In February 2016, Ukraine reported that 32 former military firing ranges and the many other areas contaminated with explosive items from past wars covered 1,500km².[22] These figures are the same as those put forward in April 2015.[23]

Cluster Munition Contamination

The extent of contamination from cluster munition remnants in Ukraine is not known. Amid the violence that erupted in 2014, evidence suggests that both government and anti-government forces used cluster munitions. These have included surface-fired Smerch (Tornado) and Uragan (Hurricane) cluster munition rockets, which deliver 9N210 and 9N235 antipersonnel fragmentation submunitions.[24] (See Ukraine’s 2017 Cluster Munition Ban Policy profilefor details.)

Ukraine has reported that many unexploded submunitions contaminate the Donetsk and Luhansk regions,[25] with the most intensive use of cluster munitions in and around the city of Debalcevo in Donetsk oblast.[26]

Program Management

In 2013, the Ministry of Defense’s Department of Environmental Safety and Mine Action was tasked with coordinating demining nationally and serving as the secretariat to the national mine action authority in Ukraine.[27]

While all areas of mine action in the Donetsk and Luhansk region, including humanitarian demining operations, are planned, coordinated, and controlled by the Ministry of Defense,[28] several other ministries are also involved in the sector, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs (under which sits the State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU), formerly known as the Ministry of Emergency Situations); the Security Services; the Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and Internally Displaced Persons; the State Special Transport Services of the Ministry of Defense; the National Police; and the State Border Service.[29]

The Ministry of Defense has organizational control of humanitarian demining while SESU is generally responsible for clearance. It established a “Special Humanitarian Demining Center” in 2015 in Kiev. The center’s remit includes coordination of SESU pyrotechnical teams (akin to rapid-response EOD teams) involved in technical and non-technical survey, demining, internal quality control of SESU units, information management, and handover of land cleared by SESU to local authorities, as well as risk education.[30]

The demining center of the Ukrainian armed forces, in Kamyanets-Podilsky, focuses on building the military’s capacity for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), including training and testing of methods and equipment, quality assurance (QA), and provision of EOD, counter-IED, and demining specialists.[31] Experts from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) provide training and advice at the center.[32]

In addition, SESU has a training center near Merefa, in the Kharkiv region, and the Special Transport Service has a center in Chernihiv, both of which are focused largely on EOD and battle area clearance (BAC).[33] SESU has begun to build a Regional Center for Humanitarian Demining, based in Lysychansk in Luhansk region. The new center will deploy trained SESU deminers to affected areas in Donetsk and Luhansk that are under Ukrainian control.[34]

The Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and Internally Displaced Persons was established by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine in its Resolution 376, adopted on 8 June 2016. The Ministry’s tasks include implementation of a set of measures aimed at reducing the social, economic, and environmental impact of explosive devices; and coordination of the implementation of mine action activities aimed at reducing harm to civilians from the use of explosive objects (including cluster munition remnants and mines).[35] In December 2017, Decree. 1071 issued by the Cabinet of Ministers designated the Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and Internally Displaced Persons as responsible for coordinating certain mine action measures in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. In the main, these are related to increasing demining operators’ technical capacity, risk education/awareness, and promoting the protection of the rights of persons affected by mines and ERW.[36]

In 2016–2018, the OSCE Project-Coordinator (PCU), with GICHD assistance, was providing policy and legal support to Ukraine, including for the establishment of a national mine action program overseen by a national mine action authority and center and underpinned by national standards.[37] Planned capacity development by OSCE PCU of mine action training centers has been put on hold due to delays in the adoption of mine action legislation.[38] Instead the OSCE PCU has focused on activities such as training of Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) operators and national instructors, and equipment procurement.[39] The donors have agreed to an extension of the project until the end of 2018 due to the delays in the adoption of the mine action law.[40]

Strategic planning

Following an order from the Prime Minister of Ukraine on 30 November 2015, the Department of Environmental Protection and Mine Action developed a draft order for the Cabinet of Ministers to approve the State Program for Mine Action in Ukraine for 2017–2021. Announced by the Ministry of Defense in February 2016,[41] as of May 2018, the program was on hold pending progress with the mine action law.[42]

Resolution 1071 of 13 December 2017, issued by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, approved the State Program for Restoration and Development of Peace in Eastern Regions of Ukraine for 2017–2021. One section of this foresees the implementation of humanitarian demining of territories and water areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, comprising of survey and clearance of antipersonnel mines and ERW. The plan covers 7000km² at a cost of 251.2 million hryvnas.[43]

In October 2016, the GICHD organized the first workshop on strategic planning, in partnership with the OSCE Project Coordinator and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).[44] As of September 2018, next steps in strategic planning were under consideration, but were dependent on progress in the draft mine action law.

Ukraine has developed a plan for humanitarian demining in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, in areas it can access safely. The main goals for 2015 were demining of populated areas; security during rehabilitation of infrastructure; and clearance of UXO from agricultural areas.[45] These remained Ukraine’s goals for 2016 and 2017, while, in addition, local government authorities have been helping to prioritize clearance tasks based on humanitarian criteria.[46]

Ukraine’s extension request makes reference to an “Action plan for humanitarian demining in liberated areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions for 2018.”[47] However, the action plan was not submitted with the extension request.

The Ministry of Defense planned to focus on demining civilian territories and water pipe and gas pipe infrastructure in 2018, along with continued non-technical and technical survey, risk education, and victim assistance.[48]

Legislation

As of November 2018, Ukraine was still in a lengthy process of developing mine action legislation that would identify the executive bodies involved in mine action in Ukraine, “regulate” the national mine action authority, and mandate the development of a priority action plan.[49]

In November 2018, it was announced that the mine action bill (no. 9080-1) had passed its first reading. The draft law establishes that Ukraine shall have national mine action standards, based on International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), that a national mine action authority will be established, and that operations are subject to democratic civic control. It also defines victim assistance services.[50]

Previously, two draft bills submitted to the parliament’s Council for National Security and Defense were rejected in June 2017.[51]

Some of the demining operators in Ukraine have been consulted as part of the legislative process towards the establishment of mine action institutions in Ukraine.[52] HALO Trust and Danish Demining Group (DDG) reported that they have actively participated in roundtables and public hearings on mine action legislation.[53]

Standards

Draft national mine action standards (NMAS) were finalized in September 2018. They must be approved by the National Standardization Authority and the Ministry of Defense expects that they will be adopted by the end of October 2018.They were developed with the support of GICHD and OSCE PCU.[54] The full implementation of the NMAS does, however, depend on the successful passing of the mine action law.[55]

Ukraine adopted IMAS as “trial national regulatory acts” on 1 September 2016, under National Standardization Authority Order 230 of 8 August 2016.[56]

Quality management

Quality management (QM) of government clearance operations is overseen by the demining center of the Ukrainian armed forces.[57] Both DDG and HALO Trust conduct internal QM.[58]

Janus Global Operations (JGO) carried out a two-month project for HALO Trust in 2017, during which it trained 12 members of the demining center of the Ukrainian armed forces in Kamianets-Podilsky on QM techniques.[59] HALO Trust also hosted a visit from the Ministry of Defense Demining Center who were undergoing an accreditation process in 2018 to become the body responsible for accrediting other demining organizations and, if successful, will also conduct external QA.[60]

Information management

There are two functioning IMSMA databases, one managed by SESU and the other by the Ministry of Defense, which collect and analyze contamination and land release data from national operators and NGOs.[61] As of July 2018, data on mine accidents, risk education, and victim assistance were not being collected.[62] The databases are reportedly complementary, as they are separated based on region, thematic area, and operational purpose.[63] Consolidation of the SESU and Ministry of Defense databases to crease a central national IMSMA database is planned once Ukraine has adopted mine action legislation.[64]

The GICHD provided IMSMA training to staff from the various government ministries and agencies and international NGOs.[65] HALO Trust has also been supporting the OSCE PCU to set up IMSMA, and in 2017 it supported the OSCE in developing technical and structural recommendations for an IMSMA system. HALO continues to work with the Ministry of Defense and other mine action stakeholders to develop standardized IMSMA-compatible reporting templates.[66] In May 2018, the OSCE PCU organized training for 88 staff from the Ministry of Defense, SESU, SSTS, HALO Trust, DDG, and the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD). In cooperation with the GICHD, the OSCE PCU also sent four staff members from the Ministry of Defense and SESU to Spiez, Switzerland, to be trained as Level 2 administrators.[67]

Operators

While the Ministry of Defense is the central coordinating body for demining in Ukraine, a number of other ministries continue to deploy units that undertake clearance and destruction of mines and ERW, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs (through SESU), the Security Service, the National Police, the State Special Transport Service, and the State Border Service.[68]In 2017, three international humanitarian organizations conducted mine action operations: DDG, FSD, and HALO Trust. One national organization, Demining Team of Ukraine, was also active.

In addition to overall coordination of humanitarian demining in the Donetsk and Luhansk region, the Ministry of Defense is also responsible for all areas where the military are permanently stationed as well as for the Joint Forces Operation in Donbass. The Ministry’s Engineering Division conducts UXO spot clearance. The State Border Service conducts demining in areas under its control on land and in the sea. The Ministry of Defense’s Special Transportation Service is responsible for demining national infrastructure (e.g. railways and roads). The Ministry of Internal Affairs has an engineering department that conducts EOD, in particular of IEDs.[69]

A Commission on Humanitarian Demining within SESU coordinates the activities of SESU pyrotechnic teams and determines SESU’s priorities.[70] The main task of the SESU is humanitarian demining of territories in Donetsk and Luhansk regions outside of combat areas. Units of the SESU are part of the Joint Forces Operations, and take part in demining activities to restore vital infrastructure and provide for the security functions of the OSCE SMM and international organizations, near combat areas and the “grey zone.”[71]

As of June 2018, the Ukrainian authorities were deploying 55 demining teams (totaling 259 personnel), of which 37 teams were deployed by the Ministry of Defense.[72] All Ukrainian Armed Forces engineering units are involved in demining in eastern Ukraine and not solely EOD spot tasks. The units are also responsible for destroying all ERW and mines detected by SESU and clearance NGOs.[73]

DDG began risk education in late 2014 in Donbass and in February 2016 it began to conduct non-technical survey in government-controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. It received formal approval from the authorities to conduct survey at the beginning of April 2017.[74] DDG Ukraine runs its operations out of offices in Severodonetsk and an operation base in Lysychank, with its head office in Kiev.[75] DDG completed limited non-technical survey of conflict-affected communities in Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts during 2017.[76] In April 2017, DDG provided EOD training to two staff from SESU and two from the Special Transport Service.[77] As of mid-2018, DDG signed a deed of commitment with SESU after securing funding for an integrated project involving the provision of equipment, targeted training and ongoing support in the field for SESU’s humanitarian demining efforts.[78] As of May 2018, DDG was deploying two manual demining teams which are also able to conduct BAC.[79]

HALO Trust launched its program in November 2015.[80] In early 2016, it began conducting non-technical survey, mine clearance, and BAC in government-controlled areas of Luhansk and Donetsk regions, more than 15km from the contact line.[81] As of September 2018, HALO Trust increased its staff to 360.[82] All HALO teams are trained and equipped for both mine clearance and BAC, and for all expected threats in the conflict zone, as non-technical survey has yet to determine the proportion of different types of hazard.[83] Since the first quarter of 2017, HALO has recruited women who have subsequently begun working as the first female deminers in Ukraine.[84]

In July 2018, HALO deployed its first mechanical clearance asset, an unarmored front-loader, which was armored in-country. As of September 2018, a second armored loader was undergoing customs clearance in Kyiv.[85]

HALO Trust has been conducting survey in Volnovaskyi, Marinskyi, Yasynuvatskyi, Slovianskyi, Nikolskyi, Pokrovskyi, Bakhmutskyi, Kostantynivskyi, Dobropilskyi, Oleksandrivskyi, and Lymanskyi districts in the Donestk region, and Stanychno-Luhanskyi, Novoaidarskyi, and Milovskyi districts in the Luhansk region. HALO Trust’s survey operations may take place less than 1km from the Line of Contact. As of June 2018, HALO’s nearest clearance task was situated 3km from the Line of Contact.[86]

FSD started operations in Ukraine in early 2015 with risk education. Since early 2017, it has had survey and clearance teams operating in eastern Ukraine. FSD works closely with regional security forces to clear explosive ordnance from conflict-affected areas.[87] The training for FSD’s clearance team was conducted at the Ukrainian armed forces Demining Center at Kamianets-Podilsky in April 2017 and clearance operations began in May 2017. A further training course was conducted from March to April 2018 for additional clearance personnel and a non-technical survey team. FSD now employs female clearance personnel and they have appointed a female team leader to the non-technical survey team.[88]

In addition, a Ukrainian organization, “Demining Team of Ukraine” is active in demining in eastern Ukraine.[89]

As of July 2018, humanitarian demining organizations in Ukraine did not have access to explosives to destroy ordnance and, as such, cannot conduct demolitions. This is severely hampering progress within the sector.[90] HALO Trust EOD callouts involve handing over ammunition to state authorities. In 2017, it handed over five landmines as a result of EOD callouts.[91] FSD is investigating the use of non-explosive methods to destroy ordnance while HALO Trust continues to explore avenues for the granting of a license to use explosives.[92] The lack of a fully functioning mine action authority means that there is no clear route for humanitarian organizations to receive such a license.[93]

Ukroboronservice, a state enterprise whose activities include arms manufacture, also has a “humanitarian demining” section.[94] As of June 2018, Ukroboronservice was conducting commercial clearance outside Ukraine.[95]

Land Release (mines)

Since the outbreak of fighting in eastern Ukraine, clearance of mines and ERW has been undertaken by both Ukrainian government authorities and separatist groups,[96] and international clearance operators have subsequently begun clearance in government-controlled areas.

In February 2016, SESU claimed that, since the beginning of fighting in 2014, it had “cleared” around 140km² across the whole country, and disposed of more than 202,000 explosive objects.[97]

Land release results are only available for international operators. In 2017, HALO Trust and DDG confirmed 41 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) as contaminated with antipersonnel mines covering a total of 3.37km². HALO Trust and FSD reduced a total of 16,090m² by technical survey. HALO Trust also conducted clearance of 18 mined areas covering 0.22km².

Survey in 2017 (mines)

In 2017, HALO Trust conducted survey in Andriivka village, Slovianskyi district; Harasymivka, Kolesnykivka, Krasna Talivka and Shyrokyi villages, Stanychno-Luhanskyi district; Hnutove village, Mariupolska district; Lebedynske, Sopyne and Volnovakha villages, Volnovaskyi district; Novoluhanske village, Bakhmutskyi district; Yampil village, Lymanskyi district; and Niznebarannikivka village, Bilovodskyi district. HALO Trust confirmed 34 SHAs as contaminated with antipersonnel mines covering a total of 1,915,295m². In Niznebarannikivka village, Bilovodskyi district, HALO Trust reduced 7,039m² through technical survey.[98]

In 2017, DDG conducted survey in Myrna Dolyna village, Popasnianskyi district, confirming seven SHAs as contaminated with antivehicle mines and antipersonnel fragmentation mines covering a total of 1.45km².[99]

As of May 2018, DDG was conducting limited non-technical survey in Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts the most recent of which was conducted at the beginning of 2018. Non-technical survey is usually carried out by DDG both outside and inside the 15km zone from the front line and access is requested via Civil-Military Cooperation Armed Forces of Ukraine (CIMIC).[100]

In 2017, FSD reduced 9,051m² through technical survey in Kotoviski district although no antipersonnel mines were found.[101]

Clearance in 2017 (mines)

In 2017, HALO Trust cleared 18 mined areas covering a total of 220,887m² and destroyed a total of five antipersonnel mines, 38 antivehicle mines, and 49 items of UXO.[102]

HALO Trust mine clearance in 2017[103]

Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle.

HALO began mine clearance and battle area clearance (BAC) in March 2016. HALO Trust’s prioritization of clearance is based primarily on casualty reduction. Antipersonnel minefields are prioritized according to their proximity to a population center, mine accident history, intensity of land use (i.e. how often land is used or will be used following clearance) and density of mine contamination. HALO endeavors to react quickly to high-impact areas. However, due to improved access in 2017 to areas near the line of contact, high-impact areas are arising much more frequently. As HALO’s capacity to respond is limited, priority is given to finishing clearance at high-impact tasks over responding to new ones.[104]

In 2017, DDG did not conduct any clearance of antipersonnel mines, only antivehicle mines and UXO. DDG has its own prioritization matrix, which takes the type of contamination, the density, and the proximity to inhabited areas into account. DDG’s current clearance capacity is small (two teams) and so they are limited in their ability to respond quickly as both teams are currently engaged in clearance activities.[105]

In 2017, FSD did not conduct any clearance of mined areas. As of July 2018, FSD was operating in the Donetsk oblast approximately 35km from the contact line. FSD receives tasks from the Ministry of Defesce who have their own system of prioritization. If an area is classified as high priority, then it is dealt with urgently by FSD.[106]

HALO Trust received additional access to areas within the buffer zone during 2017 and as of July 2018 was conducting survey operations up to 1km from the line of contact.[107] Items discovered by HALO Trust are destroyed by the Ministry of Defense, as only the Ukrainian Armed Forces have access to explosives.[108] In 2017, HALO handed over five antipersonnel mines as a result of EOD callouts (two tripwire-initiated F1 fragmentation grenades, one MON-50, one MON-90, and one POMZ-2).[109] HALO Trust’s demining in Ukraine is conducted in coordination with the Ukrainian authorities and international organizations.[110]

Land Release (cluster munition remnants)

Land release results are only available for international operators.

Survey in 2017 (cluster munition remnants)

In 2017, HALO Trust confirmed through survey as cluster munition contaminated four hazardous areas in Svatove village, in Svativskyi district of Luhansk oblast, totaling an estimated area of 431,537m².[111]

In 2017, the FSD reduced one site by technical survey in the city of Kotovsk, Odessa Oblast. No cluster munition remnants were found during the survey.[112]

In 2017, DDG confirmed 1.45km² as contaminated with mines/ERW in the Myrna Dolyna village, Popasnianskyi district, Luhansk region. A total of seven areas were confirmed as contaminated by non-technical survey.[113] No cluster munition remnants were found during the survey.[114]

Clearance in 2017 (cluster munition remnants)

HALO Trust cleared four areas in 2017 in Svatove village in Luhansk oblast totaling 50,432m². This clearance was of an ammunition storage area that exploded in 2015. No cluster munition remnants were found during clearance.[115]

FSD began BAC operations in May 2017 and by the end of the year two sites had been cleared, while a third task was suspended in early December 2017 because of poor weather. No cluster munition remnants were found during clearance.[116]

DDG did not conduct BAC in 2017.[117]

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Ukraine was required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 June 2016. On 1 November 2018, Ukraine submitted its first, long overdue, extension request to its Article 5 deadline, seeking until 1 December 2021. Until the extension request is approved by States Parties, Ukraine is in violation of Article 5 for missing its 1 June 2016 clearance deadline.

At the Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties in 2015, Ukraine reported that it did not have access to some mined areas. According to the final report of the meeting, “Ukraine emphasized that it was fully aware of the need for strict compliance with the obligations under the Convention and notified its intention to seek an extension of the period of Ukraine’s implementation of Article 5. The official, duly compiled, request would be soon submitted to the States Parties for their consideration.”[118]

On 30 March 2016, though, Ukraine deposited an official communication to the other Mine Ban Treaty States Parties via the UN Secretary-General, noting that it did not have full control over parts of its territory—namely the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol, and certain districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine.[119] However, Article 5 specifies that a State Party is responsible for clearing mined areas under its jurisdiction or control. Therefore, suspected or confirmed mined areas that are under Ukraine’s control or under Ukraine’s jurisdiction (even if it does not have control or physical access to those areas), should all be covered in an extension request. Furthermore, Ukraine’s obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty still fully apply, including with regard to Article 5, irrespective of the fact that Ukraine continues to be engaged in an armed conflict.

At the Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties in 2016, Ukraine reiterated its commitment to implement its obligations under the convention, including Article 5. It stated, “We are looking forward to closely engaging with the Article 5 Committee and the ISU in the beginning of 2017 in order to elaborate a way forward and find an appropriate solution to the unique situation and security challenges that Ukraine has been facing since February 2014.”[120]

At the Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings (on 8–9 June 2017), Ukraine expressed that it believed it to be unfair that other states had a 10-year deadline under Article 5, but Ukraine only had a two-year deadline (i.e. from the date of the new contamination in February 2014 until June 2016). Ukraine reiterated that it was demining areas under its control, but could not identify all areas where mines are known to be emplaced. Ukraine stated that it could submit an Article 5 extension request, but any such decision should acknowledge that February 2014 was the date when mine contamination appeared; that Russian aggression is indicated as the reason; and that Ukraine will start implementing Article 5 once the integrity of the whole territory is restored.[121] Ukraine also reported that to fill the gap in the convention, it had prepared a draft rational response for states where contamination appears after entry into forces but before the Article 5 clearance deadline.[122]

At the Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2017, Ukraine stated that it remained open to discussions with partners about submitting its extension request and reiterated the need to acknowledge the points it made at the intersessional meetings in June 2017.[123] On 1 June 2018, Ukraine sent a letter to the UN Secretary-General stating that until Ukraine has complete control over its territory the obligations under Article 5 as applied to the occupied territories are “limited and not guaranteed.”[124] In its statement at the June 2018 intersessional meetings, Ukraine stated that they were ready for consultation on a draft paper that they had prepared on the “rational response to the discovery of previously unknown or newly appointed mined areas.”[125]

In November 2018, Ukraine submitted an extension to its Article 5 deadline, seeking a five-and-a-half-year period (although the request says five years) until 1 December 2021, for consideration at the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties.

In its first extension request, Ukraine stated that the circumstances that impede its ability to meet its Article 5 obligations are that, “Ukraine doesn’t have control over the temporary occupied parts in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as over the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. At the same time, the ongoing military standoff in eastern Ukraine and continuous hostilities cause further contaminations of the territories along the contact line. The irregularity and non-selectivity of the use of antipersonnel mines by the armed groups of the occupying authority of the Russian Federation in Donetsk and Luhansk regions do not allow to [estimate] the scale of contamination with antipersonnel mines and identify all mined areas. Thus, it is impossible to arrange relevant national programs for their demining, to determine the required resources and to carry out demining works in full. Moreover, the Russian Federation refuses to provide any information regarding blasting booms in the Crimean Isthmus and in the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.”[126]

Russia is not a State Party or signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty. Nonetheless, Russia has obligations under international human rights law to clear mines as soon as possible, in particular by virtue of its duty to protect the right to life of every person under its jurisdiction, in any areas of Ukraine over which it exercises effective control.[127]

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and shared all its country-level landmine reports (from“Clearing the Mines 2018”) and country-level cluster munition reports (from “Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2018”) with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.