China

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Last updated: 19 November 2020

Ten-Year Review: Non-signatory China acknowledges the humanitarian concerns over cluster munitions but has not taken any steps to join the convention. China has participated as an observer in all of the convention’s meetings. It has abstained from voting on key annual United Nations (UN) resolutions promoting the convention, most recently in December 2019.

China has acknowledged that it produces, exports, and stockpiles cluster munitions, but says it has never used them.

Policy

The People’s Republic of China has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

At the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2019, China made a statement praising the convention as “an important effort of the international community to advance humanitarian concerns” and welcomed the “significant progress” made especially in domestic legislation and transparency measures.[1] Since 2014, China has reiterated that it “ascribes to the goal and principles” of the convention.[2] China has also repeatedly stated that it “cannot join the convention at the moment…due to our national defence needs.”[3]

China has regularly expressed its desire to establish the principle that “the users of cluster munitions, particularly those who massively used cluster munitions on other countries’ territory, shall effectively shoulder the responsibility for their clearance.”[4] China has long objected to how the convention was negotiated outside of UN auspices.[5]

China did not participate in the Oslo Process that produced the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[6] When the convention opened for signature in Oslo in December 2008, China issued a statement committing to work for an “early and proper solution on the humanitarian problems arising from cluster bombs.”[7]

China has participated as an observer in every Meeting of States Parties of the convention as well as the First Review Conference in Dubrovnik, Croatia in 2015 and intersessional meetings in Geneva in 2011–2014. China’s representatives have readily met with Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) representatives and Monitor researchers to discuss the government’s views on cluster munitions and position on joining the convention.

In December 2019, China abstained from the vote on a key UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that called on states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”[8] China has never explained why it has abstained from voting on the annual UNGA resolution promoting the convention since it was first introduced in 2015.

China voted in favor of a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution expressing concern at evidence of cluster munition use by Sudan in 2015.[9]

China is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

China is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). China previously viewed existing international humanitarian law as sufficient to deal with the harm associated with cluster munitions, but in 2008, it supported efforts to create a new CCW protocol on cluster munitions. China has not proposed any new CCW work on cluster munitions since 2011, when states failed to agree to a draft CCW protocol on cluster munitions. This has left the Convention on Cluster Munitions as the sole instrument dedicated to ending human suffering caused by these weapons.

Use

China has repeatedly stated that it has never used cluster munitions anywhere in the world.[10] In September 2019, China told States Parties that it “has never deployed cluster munitions beyond its borders.”[11] Previously, in September 2018, China told States Parties that it “never uses” cluster munitions.[12]

Production and stockpiling

China has acknowledged to the Monitor that it produces, stockpiles, and exports cluster munitions.

State-owned company China Northern Industries (NORINCO) produces a range of conventional air-dropped and ground-launched cluster munitions including bombs, artillery projectiles, and rockets, most recently the Tianlei 500. China’s state broadcaster CCTV reported the Tianlei 500 is a 500kg air-to-surface cluster munition capable of dispensing 240 submunitions at a range of 60km from the launching point.[13] The Sichuan Aerospace Industry Corporation, a subsidiary of state-owned China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASIC), produces and markets 302mm (WS-1, WS-1B, and WS-1E) and 320mm (WS-2) unguided multiple-launch surface-to-surface artillery rockets. Among the warheads available for these rockets are “armor-defeating and killing double use cluster,” “comprehensive effect cluster,” and “sensor fused cluster.”[14] In 2012, China’s Baicheng Weapon Test Center provided information on a terminal sensing sub-projectile cluster munition rocket.[15] Additionally, several of China’s ballistic missile systems are reported to have warheads that contain conventional explosive submunitions, but few details are available.[16]

Cluster munitions produced in China[17]

Type

Caliber

Carrier Name

Number

Submunition Type

Projectiles

120mm

Type W01

30

DPICM

122mm

Type-83

30

Type-81 DPICM

130mm

Type-59

35

Type-81 DPICM

152mm

Type-62

63

Type-81 DPICM

152mm

Type-66

63

Type-81 DPICM

155mm

Unknown

72

Type-81 DPICM

203mm

Unknown

100

DPICM

Bombs

 

Anti-runway

12

Unknown

Antitank

16

Unknown

BL-755 clone

340 Kg

147

189

Unknown

Unknown

Type 2

Type 2

Type 2

42

26

28

AP bomblets

AT bomblets

APAM

Rockets

107mm

122mm

122mm

273mm

302mm

320mm

Type-63

Type-81

Type-90A

WM-80

WS-1, -1B, -1E

WS-2

16

39

39

320

Type-81 DPICM

Type-90 DPICM

DPICM

DPICM

DPICM, CEM, SFW

DPICM, CEM, SFW

Note: DPICM = dual-purpose improved conventional munitions; AP = antipersonnel; AT = antitank; APAM = antipersonnel/antimateriel; CEM = combined effects munition; SFW = sensor fuzed weapon.

State-owned CASIC has developed the SY300 and SY400, 300mm and 400mm munitions, respectively, with dual-purpose submunitions and blast fragmentation warhead options.[18] The China Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation promoted the SY300, SY400, and P12 systems at the IDEX 2015 fair in Abu Dhabi.[19] In 2016, China’s military TV channel reportedly broadcast footage of a CASIC DF-16B medium-range ballistic missile capable of delivering a cluster munition warhead over 800–1,000km.[20]

Transfers

There is no transparency on China’s exports and transfers of cluster munitions. In September 2019, China told States Parties that it has “a prudent and responsible attitude” regarding exports of cluster munitions, stating “We do not export military products to countries under Security Council embargoes and sanctions and do not provide weapons to non-state actors or individuals.”[21] In 2012, a government official said that China’s “strict policy on exporting weapons” applies to cluster munition transfers.[22]

Cluster munition remnants of Chinese origin have been found in Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, and Sudan:

  • Deminers in Iraq cleared unexploded Type-81 DPICM submunitions in 2003.[23] The United States (US) military’s unexploded ordnance identification guide also identifies the Chinese 250kg Type-2 dispenser as being present in Iraq.[24]
  • Hezbollah fired more than 100 Chinese Type-81 122mm rockets containing Type-90 (also called MZD-2) DPICM-type submunitions into northern Israel in July–August 2006.[25]
  • Deminers in southern Lebanon have also found MZD-2 DPICM submunitions fired from 122mm rockets.
  • A Rockeye-type cluster bomb with Chinese language external markings was documented in Yei, Sudan in 2006.

[1] Statement of China, Convention on Cluster Munitions Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 September 2019. China made a similar statement in 2018. See, Statement of China, Convention on Cluster Munitions Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 3 September 2018.

[2] Statement of China, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fifth Meeting of States Parties, San Jose, Costa Rica, 2 September 2014.

[3] Statement of China, Convention on Cluster Munitions Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 September 2017; statement of China, Convention on Cluster Munitions Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 3 September 2018; and Statement of China, Convention on Cluster Munitions Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 September 2019.

[4] Statement of China, Convention on Cluster Munitions Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 September 2017.

[5] Statement of China, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, Zambia, 10 September 2013; statement of China, Convention on Cluster Munitions Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 September 2017; statement of China, Convention on Cluster Munitions, Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 3 September 2018; and Statement of China, Convention on Cluster Munitions Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 September 2019.

[6] For details on China’s policy and practice regarding cluster munitions through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 195–196.

[7] Wang Hongjiang, “Ministry: China supports int’l efforts to ban cluster bombs,” Chinese Government’s Official Web Portal, 2 December 2008.

[8]Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 74/62, 12 December 2019.

[9] UN Security Council Resolution 2228 (2015), Renewing Mandate of Darfur Mission until 30 June 2016, 29 June 2015. China also voted in favor of a 2014 UNSC resolution expressing concern at the use of cluster munitions in South Sudan. UNSC, “Security Council, Adopting Resolution 2155 (2014), Extends Mandate of Mission In South Sudan, Bolstering Its Strength to Quell Surging Violence,” SC11414, 27 May 2014.

[10] Statement of China, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, Dubrovnik, Croatia, 7 September 2015; statement of China, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, Lebanon, 13 September 2011; and statement of China, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Meeting of States Parties, Vientiane, Lao PDR, 10 November 2010. Notes by the CMC. At CCW meetings in Geneva in April 2010 and February 2011, China stated that it has “never used cluster munitions outside its territories.” Statement by Amb. Wang Qun, CCW Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 12 April 2010; and statement of China, CCW GGE on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 21 February 2011. Notes by the CMC.

[11] Statement of China, Convention on Cluster Munitions Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 September 2019.

[12] Statement of China, Convention on Cluster Munitions Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 3 September 2018.

[13] CCTV-7 (China Central Television) as reported in: Kristin Huang, “Details of the Tianlei 500 were released on state broadcaster CCTV,” South China Morning Post, 17 August 2020.

[14] Sichuan Aerospace Industry Corporation, “Our Products,” undated.

[15] “Significant breakthrough made in PLA’s terminal sensing ammunition technology,” PLA Daily, 9 April 2012.

[16] Chinese ballistic missile systems reported to be capable of delivering conventional explosive submunitions among the warhead options include the DF-11, DF-15, DF-21, and M-7 (Project 8610). For details see Duncan Lennox, Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, Issue 46 (Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, January 2007).

[17] The primary sources for information on China’s cluster munitions are: Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, 2004), p. 837; and Leland S. Ness and Anthony G. Williams, eds., Jane’s Ammunition Handbook 2007–2008, 15 January 2008 (Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, 2007). This table is supplemented with information from United States (US) Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, “Improved Conventional Munitions and Selected Controlled-Fragmentation Munitions (Current and Projected) DST-1160S-020-90,” 8 June 1990, partially declassified and made available to HRW under a Freedom of Information Act request.

[18] The larger SY-400 mod version carries a 300kg payload capable of delivering a 660 cluster-bomblet warhead. The company’s short-range P-12 missile is also capable of carrying an anti-armour submunitions warhead.

[20] R.D. Fisher Jr., “PLA flaunts strategic missiles of its Rocket Force,” IHS Janes Defence Weekly, 16 February 2016. See also, J. Lin and Peter W. Singer, “New Chinese Ballistic Missile Crashes the Battlefield Party With Cluster Munitions,” Popular Science, 19 February 2016.

[21] Statement of China, Convention on Cluster Munitions Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 September 2019. China had previously made similar statements. See, Statement of China, Convention on Cluster Munitions Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 September 2017; and statement of China, Convention on Cluster Munitions, Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 3 September 2018.

[22] The officials said that the “Export of such weapons should not go against China’s relevant laws and regulations, and that without export license issued by the competent authorities [sic] is also not allowed.” Email from Lai Haiyang, Attaché, Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 March 2012.

[23] Colin King, ed., Jane’s Explosive Ordnance Disposal 2007–2008, CD-edition, 15 January 2008 (Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, 2008).

[24] US Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical Division, “Iraq Ordnance Identification Guide, Dispenser, Cluster and Launcher-2,” undated.