Cluster Munition Monitor 2020

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Jump to a specific section of the chapter:

Introduction | Universalization | Use | Production | Transfer | Stockpiles | Retention | Transparency Reporting | National Implemenation Legislation | Interpretive Issues

 

Introduction

In 2020, the entire planet faces an array of serious challenges, from the COVID-19 pandemic to worsening climate change to an economic downturn.[1] This is changing, but not replacing, the collaborative work underway to push the Convention on Cluster Munitions onwards to its goal of eradicating the human suffering caused by these explosive weapons.

The convention has come a long way since it was adopted in Dublin, Ireland, on 30 May 2008.[2] 2020 marks 10 years since it took effect on 1 August 2010, becoming binding international law. It is also the year of the convention’s milestone Second Review Conference, which Switzerland will convene in Lausanne this November.

Thus, this is an appropriate time for Cluster Munition Monitor to review highlights from the past year and, where appropriate, the past 10 years. This introduction also takes stock of some factors and forces that have contributed to the convention’s successes over the past decade.

First and foremost is the political interest and goodwill that drove the fast-track Oslo Process to create the convention. States still “remain seized” of this concern, driven by a strong desire to tackle humanitarian concerns raised by the unacceptable harm caused by cluster munitions, both at the time of attack and from explosive remnants left behind.

Indeed, when the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Maldives, Abdulla Shahid, deposited his country’s accession to the convention at the United Nations (UN) last September, he said he was “proud” to do so and reiterated, “We will support global efforts to ban the use of this horrible weapon, which leaves a lasting legacy of untold human suffering.”[3]

Another example of political will can be seen in the speed at which nations raced to ratify the convention, resulting in its entry into force 19 months after it was opened for signature in December 2008.[4] However, just one signatory ratified in the reporting period— São Tomé and Príncipe in January 2020—and the 13 remaining signatories made little progress towards completing ratification.

There are now 110 States Parties to the convention, including 36 that have destroyed all of their stockpiled cluster munitions, collectively destroying nearly 1.5 million cluster munitions and more than 178 million submunitions. This represents 99% of all cluster munitions that States Parties have reported stockpiling.

A second factor behind the convention’s success is the dedicated support provided by a close-knit community of states, UN agencies, institutions such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). These actors meet regularly in Geneva between annual meetings of the convention to follow up on activities and are led by a rotating annual president and backed by a small, but productive implementation support unit.

Over the past decade, the convention’s community has created an intricate web of innovative mechanisms and practices aimed at guiding implementation, facilitating coordination, and addressing compliance concerns in a cooperative manner. This work relies heavily on actors working at the national level to help address concerns and follow-up on outstanding obligations.

Such measures include regional awareness-raising workshops, guidance on domestic legislative measures to enforce the convention’s provisions, follow-up to ensure timely transparency reporting, and the provision of financial and technical assistance to states facing challenges in meeting clearance and stockpile destruction obligations.

The end result is an impressive compliance record for the Convention on Cluster Munitions. There have never been any instances, or even allegations, of any State Party using or producing cluster munitions. Such adherence is reinforced by specific implementation legislation that 32 States Parties have enacted to enforce the convention’s provisions with penal and fiscal sanctions. 

More than 90% of States Parties have submitted their initial transparency reports for the convention, detailing actions taken to implement and promote it. However, dedicated efforts are needed to ensure that all States Parties meet their legal obligations under the convention. 

There is disappointment that Bulgaria and Peru are testing the convention’s excellent compliance record for stockpile destruction with their deadline extension requests.

A third and final factor in the convention’s sustained appeal is the growing stigma that it attaches to any use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of cluster munitions by any actor in any circumstances. More than half of the 74 non-signatories to the convention possess stockpiled cluster munitions, but virtually all are in de facto compliance with the convention’s prohibition on use, production, and transfer.

However, a handful of states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions oppose the rapidly emerging international norm it is creating, most notably the Russian Federation and Syrian Arab Republic.

Since 2012, Syrian government forces have used cluster munitions on their own people with devastating consequences for the country. The use of banned weapons has set a poor example across the region as parties to conflicts in other non-signatories Libya, Sudan, and Yemen have harmed civilians by resorting to the use of cluster munitions during the past decade.

Since 2015, Russia has actively supported the use of these internationally-banned weapons by Syrian government forces and has not denied its direct involvement. Indeed, Russian cluster bombs were on full display at a Moscow exhibition in 2019 commemorating the government’s participation in the joint military operation in Syria. 

In 2020, Russian state-owned arms manufacturer NPO Splav displayed its next generation of “advanced” cluster munition rockets during a media event at its refurbished factory south of Moscow and encouraged visitors to handle the newly-made submunitions. Russia was also the only country to vote against the annual UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution promoting the convention in December 2019, after declining to join China, Israel, the United States (US), and others in abstaining from the vote.

As yet, other states not party to the convention have refrained from showing such shocking disregard for the convention. A 2017 Trump administration roll-back of US policy restrictions on cluster munitions has yet to result in a return to US use or production of the weapon. Countries continue to join the convention, although the pace of universalization has slowed significantly over the past decade and especially since 2015.

This ban overview covers activities during the second half of 2019 and the first half of 2020, with updates through to September 2020, where possible. The findings are drawn from detailed country profiles available on the Monitor website.[5]

Universalization

The Convention on Cluster Munitions requires its States Parties to encourage other states to ratify, accept, approve, or accede to it, with the goal of attracting adherence by all.[6] 

Accessions

During the reporting period, three countries acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions: Saint Lucia on 15 September 2020, Niue on 6 August 2020, and the Maldives on 27 September 2019.[7]

There were several positive developments concerning accessions to the convention during the reporting period, most notably in the Asia-Pacific region.

Vanuatu’s Department of Foreign Affairs said in April 2020 that a Cabinet paper recommending Vanuatu’s accession to the convention would shortly be shared with the newly-elected government’s Council of Ministers for consideration and approval.[8] Authorities in Papua New Guinea appear to be actively considering the country’s possible accession to the convention.[9] This follows their participation in regional workshops hosted by the Philippines in June 2019 and New Zealand in February 2018.

In September 2019, Bangladesh told States Parties that it is “actively considering signing the ban treaty on cluster munitions following required protocol in due course of time.”[10]

Zimbabwe said in September 2019 that “internal processes are underway” to prepare for its accession to the convention.[11] South Sudan provided a voluntary transparency report for the convention in April 2020 that confirms its parliament is still considering a proposal for South Sudan to ratify the convention.[12]

However, several non-signatories reiterated their largely negative views on the convention. For example, in September 2019, Argentina told States Parties that the convention is “not sufficiently ambitious” and called it “contrary to the objective of the total prohibition and the principle of non-discrimination.”[13]

Ten-year review

Since the convention entered into force in August 2010, states can no longer sign it but must join through a process known as accession.[14] A total of nine states acceded to the convention between August 2010 and the First Review Conference in September 2015, while six more states have acceded in the five years since.[15] Of the 15 states to have acceded to the convention, seven came from Latin America (including five Caribbean states), three from Asia-Pacific, two from Africa, two from Europe and one from the Middle East.

Accessions to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Year of accession

State

2011

Eswatini

Grenada

Trinidad and Tobago

2013

Andorra

Saint Kitts and Nevis

2014

Belize

Guyana

2015

Mauritius

Palestine

Slovakia

2016

Cuba

2018

Sri Lanka

2019

Maldives

2020

Niue

Saint Lucia 

 

Prior to its entry into force, 14 states signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions after its Oslo Signing Conference in December 2008: five from the Caribbean, six from Sub-Sahran Africa, one from Europe, and two from the Middle East and North Africa region.[16] 

This record shows how nearly two-thirds of United Nations (UN) member states have joined the convention. All except seven North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states have joined it.[17] Of the 27 European Union (EU) member states, all except six have joined the convention.[18] In the Americas region, all except eight countries have signed or ratified the convention, while all except seven countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have done so.

The 74 states that remain outside the convention include three members of the UN Security Council: China, Russia, and the United States (US), and 13 more states that also produce cluster munitions.

When it comes to countries joining the convention, the pace of universalization has slowed over the past decade and especially since 2015. 

Ratifications

During the reporting period, one signatory has ratified the convention: São Tomé and Príncipe on 27 January 2020.

Of the 13 signatories still to ratify the convention, nine are in Sub-Saharan Africa, while two are from the Caribbean, one is from Europe, and one is from the Asia-Pacific region.[19]

Signatories yet to ratify the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Angola

Central African Republic

Cyprus

DRC

Djibouti

Haiti

Indonesia

Jamaica

Kenya

Liberia

Nigeria

Tanzania

Uganda

 

Haiti and Nigeria confirmed in September 2019 that their respective parliaments are undertaking processes to approve ratification of the convention.[20] Tanzania told States Parties in September 2019 that its ratification process is “ongoing,” but did not provide further details or an estimated timeframe for completion.[21]

Cyprus remains the last EU state to have signed but not ratified the convention and has not taken any steps to ratify it since 2013, when its parliament put the matter “on hold.”[22] The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has made no progress towards ratifying the convention since 2013, when its Senate passed legislation approving ratification.

The eight other signatories still do not appear to have referred requests to ratify the convention to their respective parliaments for consideration and approval.[23]

Ten-year review

A total of 40 states ratified the convention before it entered into force on 1 August 2010, whilst 46 ratified between then and the First Review Conference in September 2015. Ten more states have ratified the convention in the five years since then, as of 31 August 2020.

 

Convention on Cluster Munitions ratifications by year[24]

Year

Number of ratifications

2008

4

2009

22

2010

23

2011

15

2012

10

2013

5

2014

2

2015

7

2016

1

2017

2

2018

2

2019

2

2020

1

Total

96

 

In total, 88% of the convention’s signatories have ratified and become fully bound by its provisions which shows how the vast majority of signatories ultimately followed through on their pledges to ratify. 

Meetings and actions on cluster munitions

The Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the UN in Geneva, Ambassador Aliyar Lebbe Abdul Azeez, served as president of the convention’s Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva on 2–4 September 2019. A total of 84 countries attended the meeting—58 States Parties, six signatories, and 20 non-signatories—as well as UN agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC).States Parties reaffirmed their commitment to the convention and condemned “any use of cluster munitions by any actor.”[25]

Grenada hosted a regional workshop on the convention in St. George’s on 3–4 March 2020, which representatives from 11 Caribbean Community (CARICOM) states attended.[26] The Philippines hosted a regional workshop on the convention, organized jointly with New Zealand, in Manila on 18–19 June 2019, which representatives from seven non-signatories to the convention attended.[27]

Switzerland’s Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva, Ambassador Félix Baumann, is serving as president of the convention’s Second Review Conference to be held in Lausanne on 23–27 November 2020.[28] The UN appears to have received sufficient funds to convene the meeting, but States Parties owed the convention US$135,300 as of 30 April 2020.[29]

On 29 June and 4 September 2020, Ambassador Baumann convened meetings at the UN in Geneva to prepare for the convention’s Second Review Conference.[30] As the first multilateral disarmament meetings to be held during the COVID-19 pandemic, each delegation was restricted to one representative to ensure adequate physical distancing. In a significant “first” for the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the meetings were also broadcast live on the UN website. 

Online workshops and events show how the pandemic is changing practices. In July 2020, the Philippines convened a virtual roundtable on the convention on the sidelines of an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defense Ministers Meeting.[31]

The CMC continues its advocacy work in support of the convention’s universalization and implementation. In 2020, the CMC has written letters to every state not party to the convention to urge them to ratify or accede to the convention by the Second Review Conference in November. The CMC has undertaken global actions aimed at condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria and at promoting the universalization of the convention. The CMC continues to work in close collaboration with the convention’s presidency and States Parties as well as the Implementation Support Unit to advance universalization and implementation of the convention.

During the reporting period, the CMC provided small grants to campaigners in 47 countries to support advocacy for the convention’s universalization and implementation. CMC member Mines Action Canada (MAC) provided small grants to youth campaigners to assist with universalization and implementation efforts in 10 countries.[32]

No state formally proposed that cluster munitions be added back on to the program of work of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) at its Meeting of High Contracting Parties in Geneva in November 2019.[33] The 2011 failure to adopt a draft CCW protocol on cluster munitions has left the Convention on Cluster Munitions as the sole international instrument dedicated to ending the suffering caused by cluster munitions.

UN General Assembly Resolution 74/62

Since Croatia first introduced the UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution promoting the Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2015, in its capacity as president of the convention’s First Review Conference, the annual resolution has become a widely accepted barometer for gauging interest in and support for the convention.

The 2019 UNGA resolution highlighted how 2020 is the tenth anniversary of the convention’s entry into force and urged states to make progress on the implementation and universalization of the convention ahead of the Second Review Conference.[34] 

A total of 144 states voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 74/62 on 12 December 2019, including 29 non-signatories to the convention.[35] Russia was the only country that voted against it, after abstaining in 2018.[36]

All 38 states to abstain from the 2019 UNGA resolution are non-signatories to the convention, except signatory Cyprus, which also did not vote in favour of the resolution in 2015–2018.[37] 

UNGA Resolution on the Convention on Cluster Munitions[38]

Year

Resolution

In Favour

Against

Abstained

2015

70/54

139

2

39

2016

71/45

141

2

39

2017

72/54

142

2

36

2018

73/54

144

1

38

2019

74/62

144

1

38

 

As in previous years, several states not party—including Argentina, Brazil, China, Egypt, Iran, Myanmar, Singapore, South Korea, and the US—explained their vote on the 2019 UNGA resolution, using the occasion to repeat long-held concerns over the convention as well as list their various reasons for not joining it.[39]

Notably, there was no group statement at the 2019 UNGA from Estonia, Finland, Greece, Poland, and Romania explaining their vote and lack of accession to the convention, after the group made a joint statement every year from 2015 to 2018.

Use Of Cluster Munitions

 Global overview 

Since the end of World War II, at least 21 governments have used cluster munitions in 40 countries and four other areas. Almost every region of the world has experienced cluster munition use at some point over the past 70 years, including Southeast Asia, Southeast Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean.

 Past Use of Cluster Munitions[40]

User state

Locations used

Colombia

Colombia

Eritrea

Ethiopia

Ethiopia

Eritrea

France

Chad, Iraq, Kuwait

Georgia

Georgia, possibly Abkhazia

Iraq

Iran, Iraq

Israel

Egypt, Syria, Lebanon

Libya

Chad, Libya

Morocco

Western Sahara, Mauritania

Netherlands

Former Yugoslavia (Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia)

Nigeria

Sierra Leone

Russia

Chechnya, Afghanistan (as USSR), Georgia, Syria

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia, Yemen

South Africa

Admitted past use, but did not specify where

Sudan

Sudan

Syria

Syria

Thailand

Cambodia

Ukraine

Ukraine

United Kingdom

Falklands/Malvinas, Iraq, Kuwait, former Yugoslavia (Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia)

United States

Afghanistan, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Grenada, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Vietnam, former Yugoslavia (Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia), Yemen

Yugoslavia (former Socialist Republic of)

Albania, BiH, Croatia, Kosovo

Note: Other areas are indicated in italics; USSR= Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

 

Most states that have not joined the convention have never used cluster munitions. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, only Israel, Russia, and the United States (US) are known to be major users and producers of cluster munitions.[41]

Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions contains the convention’s core preventive measures designed to eliminate future humanitarian problems, most crucially the absolute ban on the use of cluster munitions. Several past users of cluster munitions, such as France, the Netherlands, South Africa, and the United Kingdom (UK), are States Parties to the convention and have committed to never use cluster munitions under any circumstances.

There have been no confirmed reports or allegations of new use of cluster munitions by any State Party since the convention was adopted in 2008.[42]

Cluster munitions have been used in seven non-signatories since the convention entered into force in August 2010: Cambodia (2011), Libya (2011, 2015, and 2019–2020), South Sudan (2014), Sudan (2012 and 2015), Syria (2012–present), Ukraine (2014–2015), and Yemen (2015–2017).[43]

New use

Cluster munitions were used in Libya and Syria during the reporting period (July 2019–July 2020).

Use in Syria

Research continues to show that Syrian government forces are primarily responsible for using cluster munitions in the country. There have been at least 686 cluster munition attacks in Syria since July 2012, including at least 11 cluster munition attacks between 1 August 2019 and 31 July 2020. The Monitor reviewed evidence, but could not independently confirm at least two dozen other possible cluster munition attacks in the same period.

Previously, Cluster Munition Monitor 2019 recorded 38 attacks between July 2018 and July 2019.

During 2019 and the first half of 2020, most cluster munition attacks were recorded in the governorate of Idlib, while a few were recorded in Aleppo governorate. The Syria Network for Human Rights identified four cluster munition attacks in Hama and Idlib governorates during the first half of 2020.[44] All 14 of the country’s governorates, except Tartus, have experienced the use of cluster munitions since 2012.

Human Rights Watch (HRW) investigated a cluster munition attack with a ballistic missile using 9N24 submunitions on 1 January 2020 that hit a school in Sarmin, Idlib that killed civilians, including children.[45] HRW also documented attacks on two schools in Idlib city on 25 February 2020 involving the use of 220mm 9M27K-series Uragan cluster munition rockets.[46] 

There is strong evidence that Russia stockpiles cluster munitions in Syria at its airbase at Hmeymim, southeast of Latakia city. There is also evidence that Russia has used cluster munitions in Syria since October 2015. At a minimum, Russia has directly participated in supporting Syrian government attacks using cluster munitions on opposition-held areas.[47] is  Russia has not explicitly denied its involvement in using cluster munitions in Syria, but claims that cluster munitions have been used in accordance with international humanitarian law and not indiscriminately.[48]

There is no evidence to indicate that the US or its partners have used cluster munitions in the coalition Operation Inherent Resolve against the non-state armed group Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, which began in 2014.[49]

With two exceptions, all the cluster munitions used in Syria since 2012 were manufactured by the Soviet Union or its successor Russia.[50]

 

Types of Cluster Munitions used in Syria[51]

Type

Cluster munition name

Number of submunitions

Producer

Bomb

RBK-250 PTAB-2.5M

42

USSR

RBK 250-275 AO-1SCh

150

USSR

RBK-500 AO-2.5RT/RTM

108

Russia/USSR

RBK-500 PTAB-1M

268

USSR

RBK-500 ShOAB-0.5

565

USSR

RBK-500 SPBE

15

Russia

Rocket

Uragan (9M27K-series)

30

Russia

Smerch (9M55K)

72

Russia

SAKR

56 or 72

Egypt

Missile

9M79 Tochka ballistic missile with 9N123K warhead containing 9N24submunitions

50

Russia/USSR

Projectile

3-O-8

14

Russia/USSR

Dispenser

BKF AO-2.5RT

96

USSR

BKF PTAB-2.5KO

12

USSR

Note: USSR= Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Syrian military has denied possessing or using cluster munitions, but rarely responds to or comments on new use of cluster munitions.[52] Russia has not explicitly denied its stockpiling of cluster munitions in Syria nor its involvement in use.[53]

The civilian harm caused by the use of cluster munitions in Syria has attracted widespread media coverage, public outcry, and condemnations from more than 145 countries.[54] At the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva, in September 2019, States Parties to the convention “expressed their strong concern regarding recent incidents and evidence of use of cluster munitions in different parts of the world and condemned any use by any actor, in conformity with article 21.” [55] During the course of the meeting, at least nine countries and the European Union (EU) publicly condemned or expressed grave concern over new use of cluster munitions, with most citing Syria as the key country of concern.[56] 

Since May 2013, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) has adopted eight resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, including Resolution 74/169 on 18 December 2019, which received 106 votes in favor, 15 against and 57 abstentions.[57] Since 2014, states have adopted more than 15 Human Rights Council (HRC) resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, while the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria has issued numerous reports detailing cluster munition attacks.[58] 

Use in Libya

During 2019, there were several instances or allegations of cluster munition use in Libya by forces affiliated with the Libyan National Army (LNA). According to HRW, LNA forces used cluster munitions in an airstrike on Tripoli on or around 2 December 2019.[59]

An investigation by the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) into a 15–16 August 2019 attack on Zuwarah Airport, that caused two casualties, found RBK-500 cluster munition remnants at the site. LNA forces loyal to General Khalifa Haftar took responsibility for conducting the strike and possess RBK-500 cluster bombs.[60] 

Previously, LNA forces were accused of using cluster bombs in May 2019 in attacks in and around Tripoli.[61] In 2015–2018, there were allegations and some evidence of new use of cluster munitions in Libya but the Monitor was not able to conclusively attribute responsibility to LNA forces.[62]

Allegations of use

There were two allegations of new use during the reporting period, one involving the Saudi Arabia-led coalition in Yemen in June 2020 and the other regarding the contested region of Kashmir on the India-Pakistan border. Cluster Munition Monitor could not conclusively determine if cluster munitions were used in either case. None of these countries have joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Pakistan alleged that India used cluster munitions in the contested region of Kashmir on 30–31 July 2019 during an attack that reportedly killed two civilians, including a four-year-old boy, and wounded 11 others.[63] The Pakistan army released photographs showing DPICM-type submunitions from artillery-delivered cluster munitions, while Pakistan’s president, foreign minister, and other high-ranking officials condemned the alleged cluster munition use for violating international law.[64]

India denied using cluster munitions in the attack. The Indian army issued a statement asserting that “Allegations of firing of cluster bombs by India is yet another Pakistan's lie and deception.”[65]

Yemen’s Ministry of Human Rights issued a statement condemning a Saudi Arabia-led military coalition for allegedly using cluster bombs in Sana’a governorate in June 2020, reportedly injuring civilians.[66] Previously, in 2015–2017, the Saudi Arabia-led coalition conducting a military operation against Ansar Allah forces, known as the Houthi armed group in Yemen, used air- and ground-delivered cluster munitions, causing civilian harm.[67] There is no evidence that the Saudi coalition has used cluster munitions in Yemen since then, but, additional cluster munition attacks may have gone unrecorded.

Such allegations and denials demonstrate the growing power of the stigma against cluster munitions, which the convention is creating. The 2019 UNGA resolution 74/62 expressed strong concern regarding the number of allegations, reports, or documented evidence of the use of cluster munitions in different parts of the world, related civilian casualties, and other consequences that impede the achievement of sustainable development. 

Use by non-state armed groups

Due to the relative complexity of cluster munitions and their delivery systems, very few non-state armed groups have used them. In the past, use of cluster munitions by non-state armed groups has been recorded in Afghanistan (by the Northern Alliance), Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) (by Croat and Serb militias), Croatia (by a Serb militia), Israel (by Hezbollah), Syria (by Islamic State), and Ukraine (by Russian-backed separatists). 

Unilateral restrictions on use

Several states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions have imposed certain restrictions on using cluster munitions in the future.

The US maintains that cluster munitions have military utility, but it has not used them since 2003 in Iraq, with the exception of a single attack in Yemen in 2009. However, in 2017, the US revoked a decade-old Department of Defense directive requiring it to no longer use cluster munitions that result in more than 1% unexploded ordnance (UXO) after 2018. 

Estonia, Finland, Poland, and Romania have committed not to use cluster munitions outside of their own territory. Thailand claims to have removed cluster munitions from its operational stocks.

Production of Cluster Munitions

Historically, at least 34 states developed or produced more than 200 types of cluster munitions, of which 18 countries ceased manufacturing them prior to or upon joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[68] 

Producers 

There were no changes during the reporting period to the list of 16 countries that produce cluster munitions and have yet to commit to never produce them in the future, as listed in the following table. None of these states are party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

 

Cluster munition producers

Brazil

Korea, South

China

Pakistan

Egypt

Poland

Greece

Romania

India

Russia

Iran

Singapore

Israel

Turkey

Korea, North

United States

 

It is unclear if all these countries produced cluster munitions in 2019 and/or the first half of 2020 because of a lack of transparency and available data. However, evidence shows that China and Russia are actively researching and developing new types of cluster munitions in 2020:

  • On 17 August 2020, China's state broadcaster, China Central Television (CCTV), reported on the latest cluster munition in development.[69] Tianlei 500, which translates as Sky Thunder, is a 500kg air-to-surface cluster munition capable of dispensing 240 submunitions at a range of 60km from the launching point. The China North Industries Group (Norinco) has reportedly “designed and made” the Tianlei 500, which a senior engineer at the company told CCTV can carry six different types of submunitions “to attack different targets.”
  • In July 2020, NPO Splav, which is part of Russian state-owned arms company Rostec, displayed a new generation of multi-barrel rocket launchers at its refurbished rocket assembly facility in Tula, south of Moscow.[70] Photographs from the event show 9M55K 300mm cluster munition rockets as well as dignitaries handling 9N235 fragmentation submunitions made for the Tornado-S system, a modernized version of the BM-30 Smerch rocket.[71]

Singapore’s only cluster munition manufacturer, Singapore Technologies Engineering, announced in 2015 that it no longer produces cluster munitions, stating: “As a responsible military technology manufacturer we do not design, produce and sell anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions and any related key components.”[72]

Greece, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Turkey, and the United States (US) have indicated no active production, but the Monitor will continue to list them as producers until they commit to never produce cluster munitions in the future.[73]

Former producers

Under Article 1(1)(b) of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties undertake to never develop, produce, or acquire cluster munitions. Since the convention took effect in August 2010, there have been no confirmed instances of new production of cluster munitions by any State Party. 

Eighteen states have ceased the production of cluster munitions, as shown in the following table. There were no changes to this list during the reporting period. All former producers are now States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions except non-signatory Argentina, which has committed not to produce cluster munitions in the future.

Former producers of cluster munitions

Argentina

Italy

Australia

Japan

Belgium

Netherlands

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Slovakia

Chile

South Africa

Croatia

Spain

France

Sweden

Germany

Switzerland

Iraq

United Kingdom

 

Several States Parties have provided information on the conversion or decommissioning of production facilities in their Article 7 transparency reports, including Croatia, France, Japan, Slovakia, Sweden, and Switzerland.[74]

In South Africa, Rheinmetall Denel Munition has not responded to Cluster Munition Monitor’s 2018 request to clarify if it produced cluster munitions in 2008–2012.[75] The Monitor sought comment after South Africa’s initial transparency report stated in regard to the decommissioning of production facilities: “None. Production ceased in 2012 at Rheinmetall, denel.”[76]

Transfer of Cluster Munitions

Since joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions, no State Party is known to have transferred cluster munitions other than for the purposes of stockpile destruction or to retain them for the purposes of research and training in the detection and clearance of cluster munition remnants, as permitted by the convention.[77]

There were no recorded exports or imports of cluster munitions by any states during the reporting period.

The true scope of the global trade in cluster munitions is difficult to ascertain due to the overall lack of transparency on arms transfers. Despite this challenge, the Monitor has identified at least 15 countries that have in the past transferred more than 50 types of cluster munitions to at least 60 other countries.[78]

While the historical record is incomplete and there are large variations in publicly available information, the United States (US) was probably the world’s leading exporter because it transferred hundreds of thousands of cluster munitions containing tens of millions of submunitions to at least 30 countries and other areas.[79]

Cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin are reported to be in the stockpiles of at least 36 states, including countries that inherited stocks after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.[80] The full extent of China’s exports of cluster munitions is not known, but unexploded submunitions of Chinese origin have been found in Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, and Sudan. 

Non-signatories Brazil, Israel, South Korea, Turkey, and the US are known to have exported cluster munitions since 2000. Non-signatories Georgia, India, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have imported cluster munitions since 2005.

At least two non-signatories have enacted a partial or complete export moratorium: Singapore and the US.

Stockpiles of Cluster Munitions and their Destruction 

Global stockpiles 

The Monitor estimates that prior to the start of the global effort to ban cluster munitions, 94 countries stockpiled millions of cluster munitions containing more than one billion submunitions, as shown in the following table.[81]

 

Countries that stockpiled cluster munitions[82]

States Parties

Signatories

Non-signatories

Afghanistan

Austria

Belgium

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Botswana

Bulgaria

Cameroon

Canada

Chile

Colombia

Congo, Rep. of

Côte d’Ivoire

Croatia

Cuba

Czech Republic

Denmark

Ecuador

France

Germany

Guinea

Guinea-Bissau

Honduras

Hungary

Iraq

Italy

Japan

Moldova

Montenegro

Mozambique

Netherlands

North Macedonia

Norway

Peru

Philippines

Portugal

Slovakia

Slovenia

South Africa

Spain

Sweden

Switzerland

United Kingdom

Angola

Cent. African Rep.

Cyprus

Indonesia

Nigeria

Algeria

Argentina

Azerbaijan

Bahrain

Belarus

Brazil

Cambodia

China

Egypt

Eritrea

Estonia

Ethiopia

Finland

Georgia

Greece

India

Iran

Israel

Jordan

Kazakhstan

Korea, North

Korea, South

Kuwait

Libya

Mongolia

Morocco

Oman

Pakistan

Poland

Qatar

Romania

Russia

Saudi Arabia

Serbia

Singapore

Sudan

Syria

Thailand

Turkey

Turkmenistan

Ukraine

UAE

United States

Uzbekistan

Venezuela

Yemen

Zimbabwe

42 (6 current)

5 (3 current)

47 (46 current)

Note: Countries in bold still possess stockpiles.

 

The Monitor has added the Philippines to its list of former stockpilers after the country reported in October 2019 that its small stockpile of cluster munitions was destroyed in 2011.[83]

Stockpiles possessed by States Parties 

In the past, the convention’s States Parties stockpiled nearly 1.5 million cluster munitions containing more than 179 million submunitions. At least 39 countries—36 States Parties, two signatories, and one non-signatory—that once possessed cluster munitions stocks have now destroyed them, as detailed in the following section on stockpile destruction.

Four States Parties have reported a collective total of 11,274 stockpiled cluster munitions and 733,243 submunitions that they are in the process of destroying, as listed in the following table.

 

Cluster munitions held by States Parties still to complete stockpile destruction (as of 31 December 2019)[84]

State Party (deadline)

Quantity of cluster munitions

Quantity of submunitions

Bulgaria (April 2021)

6,862

190,566

Peru (March 2021)

1,847

152,215

Slovakia (January 2024)

1,080

290,997

South Africa (November 2023)

1,485

99,465

Total

11,274

733,243

 

The status of cluster munition stocks held by Guinea and Guinea-Bissau is unclear:

  • Guinea has imported cluster munitions in the past and may possess them, but still has not provided its transparency report for the convention, which was due in September 2015.[85] Its stockpile destruction deadline is 1 April 2023.
  • Guinea-Bissau has reported that it possesses cluster munitions, but a January 2020 review of storage facilities by technical experts did not identify any stocks.[86] Its stockpile destruction deadline was 1 May 2019.

Guinea and Guinea-Bissau must clarify if they knowingly possess cluster munitions.

Stockpiles possessed by signatories 

At least three signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions stockpile cluster munitions:

  • Cyprus transferred 3,760 4.2-inch OF projectiles containing 2,559 M20G submunitions to Bulgaria in 2014 for the purposes of destruction, according to Bulgaria’s 2017 transparency report for the convention.[87] In 2018, private company EXPAL Bulgaria destroyed 2,416 of the projectiles, while the rest (1,344 4.2-inch OF projectiles) were destroyed in August 2019.[88] It is unclear if this means Cyprus has completed the destruction of all its stockpiled cluster munitions as it has never made a public statement on the matter nor provided a voluntary transparency report for the convention.
  • Indonesia has acknowledged that it possesses cluster munitions, but has not shared any information on the types and quantities stockpiled or indicated if it has a plan to destroy them.
  • Nigeria has not disclosed the quantity of its stockpiled cluster munitions, but said in 2012 that its armed forces possess UK-made BL755 cluster bombs.[89] Nigeria has made several appeals for “cooperation and assistance” to destroy the stockpile.[90]

Two signatories possessed cluster munitions in the past:

  • Angola stated in 2017 that the process of compiling its draft transparency report allowed it to confirm that stockpiled cluster munitions were all destroyed in or by 2012.[91]
  • The Central African Republic stated in 2011 that it had destroyed a “considerable” stockpile of cluster munitions and no longer had stocks on its territory.[92]

Stockpiles possessed by non-signatories

It is not possible to provide a global estimate of the quantity of cluster munitions held by non-signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, as few have publicly shared information on the types and quantities in their possession.

The US said in 2011 that its stockpile was comprised of “more than 6 million cluster munitions.”[93] However, the US appears to have made significant progress since then to remove cluster munitions from its active inventory and place them in the demilitarization inventory for destruction.

Georgia destroyed 844 RBK-series cluster bombs containing 320,375 submunitions in 2013.[94] Venezuela destroyed an unspecified quantity of cluster munitions belonging to its air force in 2011, including Israeli-made AS TAL-1 cluster bombs.[95] Greece and Ukraine have disclosed partial figures on their stockpiled cluster munitions.[96]

Stockpile destruction 

Under Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, each State Party is required to declare and destroy all stockpiled cluster munitions under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but no later than eight years after entry into force for that State Party. 

No State Party with the first stockpile destruction deadline of 1 August 2018 failed to destroy its stocks in time. 

However, two States Parties have requested extensions to their destruction deadlines:

  • In April 2020, Bulgaria provided a request to extend its stockpile destruction deadline to 1 October 2022.[97] Previously, in September 2019, States Parties approved Bulgaria’s first request to extend its stockpile destruction deadline to 1 April 2021 from the original date of 1 October 2019.
  • In March and June 2020, Peru requested an extension to its stockpile destruction deadline from 1 March 2021 to April 2024.[98] Peru had previously pledged to destroy its stocks by the deadline.[99]

Additionally, Guinea-Bissau may have missed its 1 May 2019 stockpile destruction deadline, but must clarify if it still knowingly possesses cluster munition stocks.

States Parties that have completed stockpile destruction

Of the 41 States Parties that have stockpiled cluster munitions, at least 36 have now completed destruction of those stocks, collectively destroying nearly 1.5 million cluster munitions containing 178 million submunitions. This represents 99% of all cluster munitions that States Parties have reported stockpiling.

Switzerland was the last State Party to complete stockpile destruction under the convention, in March 2019. 

No State Party completed the destruction of their cluster munition stocks in the second half of 2019 or first half of 2020. However, the Monitor added the Philippines to its list of States Parties that have completed stockpile destruction after the Philippines reported in October 2019 that it destroyed its cluster munitions in 2011.[100]

 

States Parties that have completed stockpile destruction[101]

State Party (year of completion)

Quantity of cluster munitions

Quantity of submunitions

Austria (2010)

12,672

798,336

Belgium (2010)

115,210

10,138,480

Bosnia and Herzegovina (2011)

445

148,059

Botswana (2018)

510

14,400

Cameroon (2017)

6

906

Canada (2014)

13,623

1,361,958

Chile (2013)

249

25,896

Colombia (2009)

72

10,832

Côte d’Ivoire (2013)

68

10,200

Croatia (2018)

7,235

178,318

Cuba (2017)

1,856

0

Czech Republic (2010)

480

16,400

Denmark (2014)

42,176

2,440,940

Ecuador (2004)

117

17,199

France (2016)

34,876

14,916,881

Germany (2015)

573,700

62,923,935

Hungary (2011)

287

3,954

Italy (2015)

4,963

2,849,979

Japan (2015)

14,011

2,027,907

Moldova (2010)

1,385

27,050

Montenegro (2010)

353

51,891

Mozambique (2015)

293

12,804

Netherlands (2012)

193,643

25,867,510

North Macedonia (2013)

2,426

39,980

Norway (2010)

52,190

3,087,910

Philippines (2011)

114

0

Portugal (2011)

11

1,617

Slovenia (2017)

1,080

52,920

Spain (2018)

6,837

293,652

Sweden (2015)

370

20,595

Switzerland (2019)

206,061

12,211,950

United Kingdom (2013)

190,828

38,758,898

Total

1,478,147

178,311,357

 

Four States Parties that once stockpiled cluster munitions are not listed in the table above due to insufficient information on the quantities destroyed:

  • Afghanistan and Iraq have reported the completion of stockpile destruction, but neither provided a specific date of completion or information on types and quantities destroyed. Both countries have reported the discovery and destruction of cluster munitions that the Monitor understands were found in abandoned arms caches.
  • The Republic of the Congo has stated that it has no stockpiles of cluster munitions on its territory, but it must provide a transparency report to formally confirm that it does not possess stocks.[102]
  • Honduras provided its transparency report in 2017, but did not declare any cluster munitions because it destroyed the stockpile long before the convention’s entry into force.[103]

Destruction underway

During 2019, three States Parties destroyed a total of 212 cluster munitions and more than 14,954 submunitions, as shown in the following table. 

Cluster munitions destroyed by States Parties in 2019

State Party

Cluster munitions destroyed

Submunitions destroyed

Bulgaria

35

4,127

Peru

22

2,640

Slovakia

155

8,190

Total

212

14,954

 

Slovakia has committed to destroy its stockpile by the 1 January 2024 deadline “using its own capacities.”[104] It had destroyed 65% of its total declared stocks of cluster munitions and 11% of the submunitions by the end of 2019.

South Africa destroyed 139 cluster munitions and 78,994 submunitions before September 2012, but has not destroyed any cluster munitions since then and its stockpile destruction deadline is 1 November 2023.

The total number of cluster munitions destroyed by States Parties each year has fallen steadily since 2011, as those with this obligation to complete stockpile destruction.

 

Stockpile destruction by year since entry into force

Year

States Parties

Cluster munitions destroyed

Submunitions (millions) destroyed

2011

11

107,000

17.6

2012

9

174,112

27

2013

10

130,380

24

2014

8

121,585

16.4

2015

9

79,184

8.7

2016

3

56,171

2.8

2017

7

33,551

1.8

2018

5

1,079

0.05

2019

3

212

0.0002

 

Retention

Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions permits the retention of cluster munitions and submunitions for the development of training in detection, clearance, and destruction techniques, and for the development of counter-measures such as armor to protect troops and equipment from the weapons. 

Most States Parties see no need or reason to retain and use live cluster munitions for such purposes, including 27 States Parties that once stockpiled cluster munitions.[105] However, 13 States Parties have chosen to retain cluster munitions for training and research purposes.

 

Cluster munitions retained for training (as of 31 December 2019)[106]

State Party

Quantity of cluster munitions (submunitions)

Date first reported

Retained in 2019

Consumed in 2019

Initially retained

Germany

208 (18,233)

164 (11,284)

685 (62,580)

2011

Belgium

186 (16,368)

17 (1,496)

276 (24,288)

2011

Netherlands

74 (5,280)

200 (17,636)

272 (23,545)

2011

Switzerland

46 (2,321)

6 (294)

138 (7,346)

2013

Bulgaria

7 (350)

1(50)

8 (400)

2017

Cameroon

6 (906)

0 (0)

6 (906)

2014

Slovakia

5 (3,220)

0 (0)

5 (3,220)

2015

Spain

4 (550)

1 (28)

711 (16,652)

2011

France

3 (189)

0 (0)

55 (10,284)

2011

Denmark

0 (2,816)

(530)

170 (-)

2011

Sweden

0 (117)

0 (8)

0 (125)

2013

BiH

0 (30)

0 (0)

0 (30)

2013

Czech Rep.

0 (6)

0 (6)

0 (796)

2011

 

Germany still retains the largest number of cluster munitions, followed by Belgium and the Netherlands. However, Germany and the Netherlands both significantly reduced the number of cluster munitions retained for research and training purposes during 2019, while Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Sweden, and Switzerland also reduced the number of retained cluster munitions. The number of cluster munitions retained by Denmark increased by 100 DM1348 submunitions in 2019.[107] 

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Cameroon have not destroyed any cluster munitions and/or submunitions since reporting they would retain them for research and training purposes.

Most States Parties retaining cluster munitions for training have significantly reduced the number retained since making their initial declarations. This shows how the initial amounts retained were likely too high. It is still unclear if current holdings by States Parties constitute the “minimum number absolutely necessary” as required by the convention for the permitted purposes.

States Parties Australia, Italy, and the United Kingdom (UK) initially retained cluster munitions that they subsequently destroyed and did not replace. States Parties Chile, Croatia, and Moldova have declared retaining inert items or those rendered free from explosives, which no longer qualify as cluster munitions or submunitions under the convention.

Transparency Reporting

Under Article 7 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are obliged to submit an initial transparency report within 180 days of the convention taking effect for that country. An updated report is due by 30 April each year thereafter, covering activities in the previous calendar year. 

As of 31 August 2020, 100 States Parties have submitted an initial transparency report for the convention, including eight States Parties that have turned in initial reports during the reporting period (since July 2019): the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Iceland, the Maldives, Namibia, the Philippines, and Somalia.[108]

This represents 93% of the States Parties for which the obligation applied at the time, which is the highest compliance rate recorded to date, while compliance with the annual reporting requirement is far less impressive.[109]

 

States Parties with initial Article 7 reporting deadlines

State Party

Date due

Cape Verde

28 September 2011

Comoros

30 June 2011

Republic of the Congo

28 August 2015

Guinea

19 April 2015

Madagascar

30 April 2018

Niue

28 August 2021

Rwanda

31 July 2016

Saint Lucia

28 August 2021

São Tomé and Príncipe

20 December 2020

Togo

29 May 2013

 

As of 16 September 2020, 10 States Parties still had to provide an initial transparency report, of which seven have missed their submission deadline. Cape Verde and Comoros are nearly a decade late in submitting their initial reports. Timely submission of the report is a legal obligation.[110]

After providing an initial transparency report, States Parties must submit an updated report by 30 April each year. Of the States Parties for which the obligation applied at the time, only 63 provided the annual updated report due by 30 April 2020, covering activities in 2019.[111] This 60% reporting rate is similar to previous years.

Some States Parties have never turned in an annual updated report. Cluster munition stockpiler South Africa submitted an initial Article 7 transparency report for the convention on 8 September 2017, but has not provided an annual updated report since then. South Africa told States Parties in September 2019 that it was preparing the outstanding transparency reports.[112]

In April 2020, non-signatories Brunei and South Sudan each provided a voluntary transparency report for the convention. Previously, signatory Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) turned in voluntary transparency reports in 2011, 2012, and 2014. Canada and Palau also provided voluntary transparency reports prior to ratifying the convention.

Only a few states have used voluntary Form J to report on actions to promote universalization and discourage the use of cluster munitions, to provide details on cooperation and assistance support, or to report on other important matters such as their position on interpretive issues.[113]

The Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) continues to encourage states to submit their transparency reports by the deadline and provide complete information, including definitive statements.[114]

National Implementation Legislation

According to Article 9 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are required to take “all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to implement this Convention, including the imposition of penal sanctions.” The Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) urges all States Parties to enact comprehensive national legislation to enforce the convention’s provisions and provide binding, enduring, and unequivocal rules.

A total of 32 States Parties have enacted specific implementing legislation for the convention. Prior to the convention’s August 2010 entry into force, 11 states enacted implementing legislation, while 21 states have done so since then.

 

States Parties with implementing legislation for the Convention on Cluster Munitions

State Party (year enacted)

Afghanistan (2018)

Australia (2012)

Austria (2008)

Belgium (2006)

Bulgaria (2015)

Cameroon (2016)

Canada (2014)

Colombia (2012)

Cook Islands (2011)

Czech Republic (2011)

Ecuador (2010)

France (2010)

Germany (2009)

Guatemala (2012)

Hungary (2012)

Iceland (2015)

Ireland (2008)

Italy (2011)

Japan (2009)

Liechtenstein (2013)

Luxembourg (2009)

Mauritius (2016)

Namibia (2019)

New Zealand (2009)

Norway (2008)

Saint Kitts and Nevis (2014)

Samoa (2012)

Spain (2015)

Sweden (2012)

Switzerland (2012)

Togo (2015)

UK (2010)

 

Namibia reported in August 2019 that it had amended the Arms and Ammunition Act to account for its obligations under the convention and said it was in the process of repealing the Explosives Act.[115]

No State Party adopted specific implementing legislation for the convention in the first half of 2020.

Another 20 States Parties have indicated they are planning or in the process of drafting, reviewing, or adopting specific legislative measures to implement the convention.[116] Guinea-Bissau reported in January 2020 that it is drafting implementing legislation for the convention.[117] Somalia reported in October 2019 that it plans to enact national implementing legislation to guide and enforce the convention’s provisions.[118]

Another 43 States Parties have indicated that they regard existing legislation and regulations as sufficient to enforce their adherence to the convention.[119] Benin reported in June 2019 that it has not enacted specific implementing legislation for the convention.[120] Guyana reported in January 2020 that it does not intend to enact implementing legislation for the convention as the provisions requiring penal sanctions are already covered by the Criminal Law (Offenses) Act of Guyana.”[121]

At least eight States Parties are considering if they need specific implementation legislation for the convention. In 2019, Palestine, the Gambia, and Sri Lanka reported that they were respectively reviewing their existing laws and regulations to determine if implementing legislation is needed.[122] The Philippines reported in October 2019 that its armed forces have issued a directive prohibiting cluster munitions from being included in operational planning requirements.”[123] New States Parties Niue, the Maldives, Saint Lucia, and São Tomé and Príncipe have yet to indicate if they plan to enact implementing legislation for the convention. 

In seven States Parties the status of national implementation measures is unknown or unclear.[124]

While progress on national implementation legislation has slowed, there are now several models to guide the preparation of strong laws. Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic have identified key components of comprehensive legislation, while the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has proposed a model law for common law states and New Zealand has prepared a model law for small states that do not possess cluster munitions and are not contaminated by their remnants.[125]

Interpretive Issues

During the Oslo Process and the final negotiations in Dublin, where the Convention on Cluster Munitions was adopted on 30 May 2008, it appeared that there was not a uniform view on certain important issues relating to states’ interpretation and implementation of the convention. The Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) encourages States Parties and signatories that have not yet done so to express their views on three key issues of concern:

  1. The prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with states not party that may use cluster munitions (“interoperability”);
  2. The prohibitions on transit and foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions; and,
  3. The prohibition on investment in production of cluster munitions.

Several States Parties and signatories have elaborated their views on these issues, including through Article 7 transparency reports, statements at meetings, parliamentary debates, and direct communications with the CMC and the Monitor. Several strong implementation laws provide useful models for how to implement certain provisions of the convention. Yet, as of 20 August 2020, more than three dozen States Parties had not articulated their views on even one of these interpretive issues, and there were no new statements during the reporting period.[126] Please refer to previous Cluster Munition Monitor reports, in addition to country profiles, for detailed positions on key interpretive issues. 

More than 400 United States (US) Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks in 2010–2011 demonstrate how the US—despite not participating in the Oslo Process—made numerous attempts to influence its allies, partners, and other states on the content of the draft Convention on Cluster Munitions, particularly with respect to interoperability, US stocks and foreign stockpiling.[127]

Interoperability and the prohibition on assistance

Article 1 of the convention obliges States Parties “never under any circumstances to…assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.” Yet during the Oslo Process, some states expressed concern about the application of the prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with countries that have not joined the convention. In response to these “interoperability” concerns, Article 21 on “Relations with States not Party to this Convention” was included in the convention. The CMC has strongly criticized Article 21 for being politically motivated and for leaving a degree of ambiguity about how the prohibition on assistance would be applied in joint military operations.

Article 21 states that States Parties “may engage in military cooperation and operations with States not party to this Convention that might engage in activities prohibited to a State Party.” It does not, however, negate a State Party’s obligations under Article 1 to “never under any circumstances” assist with prohibited acts. The article also requires States Parties to discourage use of cluster munitions by those not party, and to encourage them to join the convention. Together, Article 1 and Article 21 should have a unified and coherent purpose, as the convention cannot both require States Parties to discourage the use of cluster munitions and, by implication, allow them to encourage it. Furthermore, to interpret Article 21 as qualifying Article 1 would run counter to the object and purpose of the convention, which is to eliminate cluster munitions and the harm they cause to civilians.

The CMC’s position is therefore that States Parties must not intentionally or deliberately assist, induce, or encourage any activity prohibited under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, even when engaging in joint operations with states not party.

At least 38 States Parties and signatories have agreed that the convention’s Article 21 provision on interoperability should not be read as allowing states to avoid their specific obligation under Article 1 to prohibit assistance with prohibited acts.[128]

States Parties Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom (UK) have indicated their support for the contrary view that the convention’s Article 1 prohibition on assistance with prohibited acts may be overridden by the interoperability provisions contained in Article 21.

States Parties France, the Netherlands, and Spain have provided the view that Article 21 allows for military cooperation in joint operations, but have not indicated the forms of assistance allowed.

Transit and foreign stockpiling

The CMC has stated that the injunction not to provide any form of direct or indirect assistance with prohibited acts contained in Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions should be seen as banning the transit of cluster munitions across or through the national territory, airspace, or waters of a State Party. The convention should also be seen as banning the stockpiling of cluster munitions by a state not party on the territory of a State Party.

At least 35 States Parties and signatories have declared that transit and foreign stockpiling are prohibited by the convention.[129]

States Parties Australia, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the UK have indicated support for the opposite view—that transit and foreign stockpiling are not prohibited by the convention.

US stockpiling and transit

States Parties Norway and the UK have confirmed that the US removed its stockpiled cluster munitions from their respective territories during 2010.

The US Department of State cables released by Wikileaks show that the US has stockpiled and therefore may still store cluster munitions in States Parties Afghanistan, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain, as well as in non-signatories Israel, Qatar, and possibly Kuwait. 

Disinvestment

Several States Parties, as well as the CMC, view the convention’s Article 1 ban on assistance with prohibited acts as constituting a prohibition on investment in the production of cluster munitions. The Dubrovnik Action Plan adopted by States Parties at the convention’s First Review Conference in 2015 encourages the adoption of national legislation prohibiting investments in producers of cluster munitions.[130] 

Since 2007, 11 States Parties have enacted legislation that explicitly prohibits investment in cluster munitions, as shown in the table below.[131]

Disinvestment laws on cluster munitions

State Party

Year enacted

Belgium

2007

Ireland

2008

Italy

2011

Liechtenstein

2013

Luxembourg

2009

Netherlands

2013

New Zealand

2009

Saint Kitts and Nevis

2014

Samoa

2012

Spain

2015

Switzerland

2013

 

No country enacted legislation relating to cluster munitions disinvestment in 2019 or the first half of 2020.

At least 38 States Parties and signatories to the convention have stated that they regard investments in cluster munition production as a form of assistance that is prohibited by the convention.[132] Chile and Ecuador were added to this list since publication of Cluster Munition Monitor 2019. In September 2019, Chile stated that “we join the call to not invest nor finance production of cluster munitions, because it is contrary to the convention and its humanitarian aims.”[133] Ecuador said in October 2019 that “We reiterate our firm commitment to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and…call for a definitive stop to financing and investing in companies that produce cluster munitions, as it is a weapon of particular cruelty that especially affects the most vulnerable groups.”[134]

A few States Parties to the convention have expressed the contrary view that the convention does not prohibit investment in cluster munition production, including Germany, Japan, and Sweden.

Government pension funds in Australia, Ireland, France, New Zealand, Norway, Luxembourg, and Sweden have either fully or partially withdrawn investments, or banned investments, in cluster munition producers.

Financial institutions have acted to stop investment in cluster munition producers and promote socially responsible investment in States Parties Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.

At least three companies in non-signatories have ceased production of cluster munitions, in part due to inquiries from numerous investors: Singapore Technologies Engineering and US companies Lockheed Martin, Textron Systems and Orbital ATK.

CMC co-founder and member PAX continues to lead advocacy and research to encourage governments to legislate against investment in cluster munition producers and provide clear guidance to financial institutions and investors.[135]



[1] See, for example, this open letter endorsed by the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) and other global campaigns as well as more than 250 non-governmental organizations: “Humanitarian Disarmament (HD) and COVID-19”, June 2020, bit.ly/2Covid19HDOpenLetter.

[2] Only 16 of the 107 governments that participated in the Dublin negotiations and adopted the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 30 May 2008 have not joined the convention: Argentina, Bahrain, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Estonia, Finland, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Morocco, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Serbia, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Vanuatu, and Venezuela. Adoption does not carry any legal obligations.

[3] Shahid, Abdulla (abdulla_shahid), “Proud to submit the instrument of ratification for the Convention on Cluster Munitions #CCM on behalf of #Maldives today. We will support global efforts to ban the use of this horrible weapon, which leaves a lasting legacy of untold human suffering for innocent civilians.” 27 September 2019, 10:21 UTC. Tweet. bit.ly/AbdullaShahid27Sept2019.

[4] When the convention entered into force, 108 states had signed it, of which 38 were States Parties legally bound by its provisions.

[5] See, ICBL-CMC, Country Profiles, www.the-monitor.org/cp.

[6] Accession, ratification, and other methods of joining the convention usually require parliamentary approval, typically in the form of legislation.

[7] The convention takes effect for each individual state on the first day of the sixth month after their deposit of the instrument of accession or ratification with the UN in New York. However, the Monitor lists a country as a State Party as soon as the deposit occurs.

[8] Email from Majorie Wells, Desk Officer, Treaties and Conventions Division, Vanuatu Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and External Trade, 27 April 2020.

[9] According to a government official, two internal meetings were convened in 2019 to discuss possible accession to the convention. Email fromPeter Mirino, Director, Border and Security Division, Papua New Guinea Customs Services, 15 May 2020.

[10] Statement of Bangladesh, Convention on Cluster Munitions Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 September 2019, bit.ly/BangladeshStatement2019. This marked the first time that Bangladesh elaborated its views on the convention, but officials had previously discussed the country’s views with the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) on many occasions.

[11] Statement of Zimbabwe, Convention on Cluster Munitions Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 September 2019, bit.ly/ZimbabweStatement2019. Zimbabwe said the lack of accession could be “largely attributed to logistical and technical capacity.”

[12] South Sudan Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (voluntary), 30 April 2020, bit.ly/SouthSudanArticle7Report2020.

[13] Statement of Argentina, Convention on Cluster Munitions Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 September 2019, bit.ly/ArgentinaStatement2019.

[14] Accession is essentially a process that combines signature and ratification into a single step.

[15] A total of nine states acceded to the convention between August 2010 and the First Review Conference in September 2015: Andorra, Belize, Eswatini, Grenada, Guyana, Palestine, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Slovakia, and Trinidad and Tobago. In the five years since then, six states have acceded to the convention, as of 16 September 2020: Cuba, Maldives, Mauritius, Niue, Saint Lucia and Sri Lanka.

[16] Ten states signed the convention in 2009 (Cameroon, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Dominican Republic, Haiti, Iraq, Jamaica, Nigeria, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia), while four did so in 2010 (Antigua and Barbuda, Djibouti, Mauritania, and Seychelles).

[17] The NATO member states that have not signed or ratified the convention are: Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Turkey, and the United States (US).

[18] The non-signatories from the EU are: Estonia, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Poland, and Romania.

[19] Signatories are bound by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties not to engage in acts that “would defeat the object and purpose” of any treaty they have signed. The Vienna Convention is considered customary international law and binding on all countries.

[20] Haiti said in September 2019 that a draft decree of ratification is pending before the Haitian Parliament. Statement of Haiti, Convention on Cluster Munitions Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 September 2019, bit.ly/HaitiStatement2019. Unofficial translation by the Monitor. In September 2019, Nigeria informed States Parties that “the Convention is currently before the National Assembly receiving necessary attention as stipulated by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and would be ratified as soon as the legislative processes are completed.” Statement of Nigeria, Convention on Cluster Munitions Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 September 2019, bit.ly/NigeriaStatement2019.

[21] Statement of Tanzania, Convention on Cluster Munitions Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 September 2019, bit.ly/TanzaniaStatement2019.

[22] Letter from Basil Polemitis, Security Policy Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Mary Wareham, Advocacy Director, Arms Division, Human Rights Watch (HRW), 24 April 2013.

[23] Angola, Central African Republic, Djibouti, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Liberia, and Uganda.

[24] Prior to entry into force, four states ratified upon signing the convention in December 2008: Holy See, Ireland, Norway, and Sierra Leone, while 22 ratified in 2009 and 12 did so in 2010 before 1 August.

[25] See, Final Report of the Convention on Cluster Munitions Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, September 2019, bit.ly/MSPGeneva2019FinalReport. Signatories Angola, DRC, Haiti, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Tanzania attended the meeting, while the following non-signatories also participated as observers: Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, Finland, Maldives, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, South Sudan, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, Vanuatu, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe.

[26] Representatives from non-signatories the Bahamas and Barbados, as well as Saint Lucia attended, which acceded to the convention six months later. Signatories Haiti and Jamaica also attended as did States Parties Antigua and Barbuda, Canada, Guyana, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Switzerland, and Trinidad and Tobago.

[27] Representatives from non-signatories Bhutan, Mongolia, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Vietnam attended the meeting as did States Parties Japan, Lao PDR, Switzerland, and the co-hosts.

[28] See, Final Report of the Convention on Cluster Munitions Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 18 September 2019, bit.ly/MSPGeneva2019FinalReport. The first meetings of the Convention on Cluster Munitions were held in States Parties contaminated by cluster munition remnants, such as Lao PDR in 2010, Lebanon in 2011, and Croatia in 2015.

[29] A total of 54 countries owed funds to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. See, UN Finance Office, Status of Contributions of BWC, CCW, CCM, OTW as of 30 April 2020, bit.ly/UNStatusOfContributionsApril2020.

[30] The June preparatory meeting was attended by 60 States Parties, signatories Cyprus and Nigeria, and eight non-signatories (Argentina, Finland, Kazakhstan, Libya, Myanmar, Serbia, Thailand, and Zimbabwe), in addition to UN agencies, the ICRC, and the CMC. According to the provisional list of participants, 48 States Parties attended the September preparatory meeting as well as two signatories (Cyprus and Nigeria), and eight non-signatories.

[31] Military officers participated from six non-signatories to the convention (Cambodia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) and signatory Indonesia, as well as State Party Lao PDR.

[32] States Parties Afghanistan and Colombia, signatories DRC and Uganda, and non-signatories Algeria, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, and Zimbabwe.

[33] Final Report of the CCW Fifth Review Conference, Geneva, 23 December 2016, bit.ly/CCW5ReviewFinalReport; and Final Report of the CCW Meeting of High Contracting Parties, Geneva, 15 November 2019, bit.ly/CCWMeetingOfParties2019Report.

[34] “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 74/62, 12 December 2019, www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/74/62.

[35] The non-signatories that voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 74/62 were Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sudan, Suriname, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Yemen as well as Saint Lucia, which went on to join the convention in 2020.

[36] Russia abstained from the annual UNGA resolution promoting the convention in 2018, after voting against it in 2015–2017. Previously, Zimbabwe voted against the annual UNGA resolution in 2015–2018, but abstained from the vote on the 2019 resolution.

[37] The 38 states that abstained from the vote are: Argentina, Armenia, Bahrain, Belarus, Brazil, China, Cyprus, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Greece, India, Iran, Israel, Kuwait, Latvia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United States, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe. In November 2019, Cyprus reiterated that it would not ratify the convention until “the abnormal security situation on the island” is resolved. Statement of Cyprus, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 5 November 2019, bit.ly/CyprusStatementUNGA2019.

[38] See: “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 74/62, 12 December 2019, www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/74/62; “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 73/54, 5 December 2018, www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/73/PV.45; “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 72/54, 4 December 2017, www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/72/54; “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 71/45, 5 December 2016, bit.ly/UNGAResolution71-45; and “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 70/54, 7 December 2015, bit.ly/UNGAResolution70-54.

[39] Signatory Cyprus also spoke. See, Explanation of vote on draft Resolution A/C.1/L.46, “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 5 November 2019, bit.ly/Nov2019FirstCommitteeUNGA.

[40] This accounting of states using cluster munitions is incomplete as cluster munitions have been used in other countries, but the party responsible for the use is not clear. This includes use in Angola, Azerbaijan, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mozambique, Myanmar, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Uganda, and Zambia, as well as in areas such as Nagorno-Karabakh. The Monitor is reviewing an old allegation of use in Liberia in the 1990s.

[41] Nine non-signatories that produce cluster munitions have stated that they have never used cluster munitions (Brazil, China, Egypt, Greece, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, South Korea, and Turkey), while the Monitor has not verified any use of cluster munitions by four other producers (India, Iran, North Korea, and Singapore), which leaves Israel, Russia, and the US as the only countries that both produce and use cluster munitions.

[42] However, State Party Lebanon reports that it has experienced the use of cluster munitions from the conflict in Syria. According to its clearance deadline extension request, northeast Lebanon became contaminated by cluster munitions used when fighting in Syria spilled over the border into Lebanon between 2014 and 2017. Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 Extension Request, December 2019, bit.ly/LebanonArt4ExtRequestCCMDec2019.

[43] There was also an allegation that a weapon which appeared to meet the criteria of a cluster munition was used in non-signatory Myanmar in early 2013.

[44] Syria Network for Human Rights, “Notable human rights violations in Syria in the first half of 2019: Nearly 43 cluster munition attacks,” 3 July 2020, www.sn4hr.org/blog/2020/07/03/55155/.

[45] HRW, “Syria: Cluster Munition Attack on School,” 22 January 2020, www.hrw.org/news/2020/01/22/syria-cluster-munition-attack-school.

[46] Forthcoming HRW report.

[47] Russian and Syrian government forces use many of the same aircraft and weapons and frequently carry out attacks jointly. However, Russia is the only force in Syria to operate Sukhoi SU-25 and SU-34 fighter-ground attack jets that deliver RBK-series cluster bombs. HRW, Amnesty International, and others have compiled credible evidence, including videos and photographs, documenting SU-25 and SU-34 jets near or involved in attacks near sites when cluster munitions were used. Amnesty International, “Syria: Russia’s shameful failure to acknowledge civilian killings,” 23 December 2015, bit.ly/AmnestyInternationalDec2015; and HRW, “Russia/Syria: Daily Cluster Munition Attacks,” 8 February 2016, www.hrw.org/news/2016/02/08/russia/syria-daily-cluster-munition-attacks.

[48] In 2016, Russia provided HRW with a three-page position paper on the use of cluster munitions in Syria that claimed “no cases of indiscriminate use of air weapons have been registered so far in the course of the counter-terrorist operation in Syria,” and concluded that “the question of the involvement of the Russian military personnel in the cases of indiscriminate CMs [cluster munition] use in Syria [is] totally inappropriate.” “Russia’s Position on the Use of Cluster Munitions in Syria,” Position Paper annexed to letter to HRW from Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 9 December 2016, bit.ly/RussiaLetterToHRW2016. In the cover letter Lavrov states, “I expect our paper to be taken into account during the preparation of future Human Rights Watch reports on the activities of the Russian military personnel in the fight against terrorism in Syria.”

[49] In September 2015, the US Department of Defense listed eight Operation Inherent Resolve coalition members conducting US-led airstrikes in Iraq: Convention on Cluster Munitions non-signatory Jordan, and States Parties Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. It listed nine coalition nations participating in US-led airstrikes in Syria: Convention on Cluster Munitions non-signatories Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, as well as States Parties Australia, Canada, and France. Department of Defense, “Airstrikes Hit ISIL Terrorists in Syria, Iraq,” 30 September 2015, bit.ly/USDefenseDept30Sept2015. In 2016, a spokesperson for the US Air Force’s Central Command told the Washington Post, “We have not employed cluster munitions in Operation Inherent Resolve. This includes both U.S. and coalition aircraft.” Email from Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Writer, Washington Post, 27 July 2016. See also, Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Despite denial, ‘growing evidence’ Russia is using cluster bombs in Syria, report says,” Washington Post, 28 July 2016, bit.ly/WashingtonPost28July2016.

[50] Cluster munition rockets manufactured in Egypt have also been used in Syria, while the Islamic State has used cluster munitions rockets of unknown origin containing a DPICM-type submunition called “ZP-39” in Syria.

[51] At the outset in 2012, markings on cluster munitions used indicated they were produced in the 1970s and 1980s; while since September 2015, most of the cluster munitions used in Syria bear production dates from 1989 into the early 1990s. Most RBK-500 SPBE cluster bombs were manufactured in 1990 and 1991.

[52] According to the state-run Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), “the General Command of the Army and the Armed Forces stressed on [15 October 2012] that the misleading media outlets have recently published untrue news claiming the Syrian Arab Army has been using cluster bombs against terrorists.” According to SANA, “the General [in] Command said the Syrian Army does not possess such bombs.” “Syria denies using cluster bombs,” CNN, 16 October 2012, www.edition.cnn.com/2012/10/15/world/meast/syria-civil-war/. In March 2013, Syrian diplomatic representatives denied the evidence of Syrian cluster bomb use. Letter from Firas al Rashidi, Charge d’affairs ad interim, Embassy of the Syrian Arab Republic to Japan, to the Japanese Campaign to Ban Landmines, 7 March 2013.

[53] “Russia’s Position on the Use of Cluster Munitions in Syria,” Position Paper annexed to letter to HRW from Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 9 December 2016, bit.ly/RussiaLetterToHRW2016.

[54] More than 145 countries including 53 non-signatories to the convention have condemned the use of cluster munitions in Syria via national statements and/or by endorsing resolutions or joint statements.

[55] See, Final Report of the Convention on Cluster Munitions Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 18 September 2019, para. 27, bit.ly/MSPGeneva2019FinalReport.

[56] Australia, Belgium, Chile, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Slovenia, and Sweden.

[57] “Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution 74/169, 18 December 2019, www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/74/169.

[58] “Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,” HRC Report 43/57, 28 January 2020, www.undocs.org/A/HRC/43/57. See also, “They have erased the dreams of my children: children’s rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” HRC Report 43/CRP.6, 13 January 2020, bit.ly/SyriaChildRightsHRC13Jan2020; “The siege and recapture of eastern Ghouta,” HRC Report 38/CRP.3, 20 June 2018, bit.ly/EasternGhoutaHRC20June2018.

[59] HRW visited the site of the attack in December 2019 and found remnants of two RBK-250 PTAB 2.5M cluster bombs, apparently used in the attack. There were no reports of casualties and the area was not known to be contaminated by cluster munitions before the attack. HRW, “Libya: Banned Cluster Munitions Used in Tripoli,” 20 February 2020, www.hrw.org/news/2020/02/13/libya-banned-cluster-munitions-used-tripoli.

[60] UN Security Council (UNSC), “Final report of the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1973 (2011)”,S/2019/914, 9 December 2019, Annex 17, www.undocs.org/S/2019/914.

[61] According to a 19 June 2019 press briefing by the Faiez Serraj-aligned Volcano of Rage operations room (Burkan Alghadab), which coordinates the fight against the Haftar forces. Sami Zaptia, “Tripoli forces claim successes and accuse Hafter of using cluster bombs and internationally banned phosphorus bombs,” Libya Herald, 20 June 2019, bit.ly/LibyaHerald20June2019.

[62] Arnaud Delalande, “Libyan CBU monitoring,” AeroHistory blog, undated, www.aerohisto.blogspot.com/p/libyan-cbu.html.

[63] Pakistan Armed Forces press release, “Indian Army uses cluster ammunition along LOC deliberately targeting Civilian population,” 3 August 2019, www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail.php?id=5387.

[64] Pakistan’s President Imran Khan condemned India’s “use of cluster munitions in violation of int humanitarian law” via Twitter: see Khan, Imran (ImranKhanPTI), “I condemn India's attack across LOC on innocent civilians & it's use of cluster munitions in violation of int humanitarian law and it's own commitments under the 1983 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. UNSC must take note of this international threat to peace & security,” 4 August 2019, 11:34 UTC, Tweet, bit.ly/ImranKhanPTI4August2019. Pakistan's Minister of Foreign Affairs Shah Mehmood Qureshi tweeted photographs of alleged cluster munition victims, see Qureshi, Shah Mehmood (SMQureshiPTI), ‘‘Strongly condemn the blatant use of cluster ammunition by Indian Security Forces targeting innocent civilians along the Line Of Control. This is clear violation of the Geneva Convention & International Laws,” 3 August 2019, 12:30 UTC, Tweet, bit.ly/SMQureshiPTI3August2019. The chief spokesman for Pakistan's armed forces, General Asif Ghafoor, also tweeted: see spokesperson of Pakistan Armed Forces (OfficialDGISPR), “Use of cluster bombs by Indian Army violating international conventions is condemnable. No weapon can suppress determination of Kashmiris to get their right of self determination. Kashmir runs in blood of every Pakistani. Indigenous freedom struggle of Kashmiris shall succeed,IA,” 3 August 2019, 12:36 UTC, Tweet, bit.ly/OfficialGDISPR3August2019.

[65] “Indian Army rejects Pakistan's allegations of using cluster bombs along LoC,” India Today, 3 August 2019, bit.ly/IndiaToday3August2019.

[66] “Yemen Denounces Saudi-Led Coalition’s Use of Cluster Bombs in Sana’a,” Tasmin News Agency (Tehran), 11 June 2020, bit.ly/TasminNewsAgency11June2020.

[67] The last recorded cluster munition use in Yemen was in February 2017, when the Saudi-led coalition fired Brazilian-made ASTROS II cluster munition rockets in Saada governorate on at least three locations, according to investigations by human rights organizations. See HRW, “Yemen: Brazil-Made Cluster Munitions Harm Civilians,” 23 December 2016, www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/23/yemen-brazil-made-cluster-munitions-harm-civilians; Amnesty International, “Yemen: Saudi Arabia-led coalition uses banned Brazilian cluster munitions on residential areas,” 9 March 2017, bit.ly/AmnestyYemen9Mar2017; and HRW, “Yemen: Cluster Munitions Wound Children,” 17 March 2017, www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/17/yemen-cluster-munitions-wound-children.

[68] The loading, assembling, and packaging of submunitions and carrier munitions into a condition suitable for storage or use in combat is considered production of cluster munitions. Modifying the original manufacturers’ delivery configuration for improved combat performance is also considered a form of production.

[69] CCTV-7, reported in: Kristin Huang, “Details of the Tianlei 500 were released on state broadcaster CCTV,” South China Morning Post, 17 August 2020, bit.ly/SouthChinaMorningPost17August2020.

[70] “Sergey Chemezov and Alexey Dyumin visited a new workshop at NPO Splav,” TulaNews, 24 July 2020, www.newstula.ru/fn_587460.html; and “Russia cluster munition production – questions + media coverage JULY 2020,” TulaTV, 25 July 2020, bit.ly/TulaTV25July2020.

[71] According to Rostec, President Vladimir Putin reportedly set an objective in 2016 for the company to use only Russian components in the modernized multi-launch rocket systems. Rostec, “The New Rocket System Passes Official Tests,” 25 January 2017, www.rostec.ru/en/news/4519813/.

[72] See Singapore Technologies Engineering website, www.stengg.com/en; see also, PAX, “Singapore Technologies Engineering stops production of cluster munitions,” 19 November 2015, bit.ly/StopExplosiveSTE2015; and Local Authority Pension Fund Forum, “ST Engineering Quits Cluster Munitions,” 18 November 2015. The company’s president said the decision came about in part because “we often get asked by the investment community [about] our stand on cluster munitions.” Letter to PAX from Tan Pheng Hock, President and Chief Executive Officer, Singapore Technologies Engineering Ltd, 11 November 2015.

[73] For example, Greece has not formally committed to never produce cluster munitions, but, in 2011, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official claimed “the last production of cluster munitions in Greece was in 2001.” Email from Yannis Mallikourtis, Permanent Mission of Greece to the UN in Geneva, 14 June 2011.

[74] Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK did not report on the conversion or decommissioning of production facilities, most likely because production of cluster munitions ceased before they became States Parties to the convention. BiH, which inherited some of the production capacity of the former Yugoslavia, has declared, “There are no production facilities for [cluster munitions] in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” BiH Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form E, 20 August 2011, bit.ly/BiHCCMArticle7Report2011.

[75] Letter from Cluster Munition Monitor to Rheinmetall Denel Munition (Pty) Ltd., 6 July 2018. German company Rheinmetall Defence acquired four Denel divisions in 2008 and is the majority owner of Rheinmetall Denel Munition (Pty) Ltd. in South Africa.

[76] South Africa Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form E, 8 September 2017, bit.ly/SouthAfricaCCMArticle7Report2017.

[77] States Parties Chile, France, Germany, Moldova, Slovakia, Spain, and the UK exported cluster munitions before they adopted the Convention on Cluster Munitions. At least 11 States Parties have transferred cluster munition stocks to other countries for the purposes of destruction, including Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.

[78] There is no comprehensive accounting available of global transfers of cluster munitions, but at least seven States Parties exported them in the past (Chile, France, Germany, Moldova, Slovakia, Spain, and the UK), in addition to exports by non-signatories Brazil, Egypt, Israel, Russia, South Korea, Turkey, the US, and then-Yugoslavia.

[79] Recipients of US exports include Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Egypt, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, the UAE, and the UK, as well as Taiwan.

[80] Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, Georgia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, India, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Moldova, Mongolia, Mozambique, North Korea, North Macedonia, Peru, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Syria, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. In addition, Soviet cluster munition remnants have been identified in South Sudan and Sudan.

[81] The number of countries that have stockpiled cluster munitions has increased significantly since 2002, when HRW provided the first list identifying 56 states that stockpiled cluster munitions. This is largely due to new information disclosed by States Parties under the Convention on Cluster Munitions. HRW, “Memorandum to CCW Delegates: A Global Overview of Explosive Submunitions,” 20 May 2002.

[82] This information is drawn from Cluster Munition Monitor ban policy country profiles, which in turn use information provided by states in their Article 7 transparency reports as well as statements and other sources.

[83] The Philippines reported that it destroyed 114 “81mm cluster bombs” by open detonation at a location in Cebu on 7 May 2011. Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, Part II (2 and 4), 5 December 2019, bit.ly/PhilippinesCCMArticle7Report2019.

[84] This table reflects the total amount of cluster munitions declared by these States Parties, while a subsequent table details the amount of cluster munitions they have destroyed to date.

[85] Moldova has reported that it transferred 860 9M27K cluster munition rockets, each containing 30 fragmentation submunitions, to Guinea in the year 2000 for use in its 220mm Uragan multi-barrel rocket launchers. Submission of the Republic of Moldova, UN Register of Conventional Arms, Report for calendar year 2000, 30 May 2001.

[86] A January 2020 assessment visit by ammunition management experts from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) reported that their inspection of storage facilities did not identify any cluster munitions. GICHD Report, Project Number 91023, “To assist the Guinea-Bissau authorities in the identification of suspected cluster munitions,” 11–17 January 2020.

[87] Bulgaria Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 29 June 2017, bit.ly/BulgariaCCMArticle7Report2017.

[88] Bulgaria Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 30 April 2019, bit.ly/BulgariaCCMArticle7Report2019; and Bulgaria Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 25 April 2020, bit.ly/BulgariaCCMArticle7Report2020. The Greek-made GRM-20 4.2-inch (107mm) mortar system uses these projectiles, each of which contain 20 submunitions.

[89] Statement of Nigeria, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18 April 2012, bit.ly/CCMNigeria18April2012. Jane’s Information Group has reported that the Nigeria Air Force possesses British-made BL755 cluster bombs. Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, 2004), p. 843.

[90] See, for example, “Croatia Progress Report,” CCM/CONF/2015/6, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 6 October 2015, bit.ly/CroatiaProgressReportCCM2015.

[91] Statement of Angola, Convention on Cluster Munitions Seventh Meeting of States Party, Geneva, 4 September 2017, bit.ly/CCMStatementAngola4Sep2017.

[92] Statement of the Central African Republic, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 14 September 2011, bit.ly/CCMCAR14Sep2011.

[93] Statement of the US, Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Fourth Review Conference, Geneva, 14 November 2011, bit.ly/CCWUS14Nov2011. The types of cluster munitions included in this figure were listed on a slide projected during an informal briefing to CCW delegates by a member of the US delegation. Several of the types (such as CBU-58, CBU-55B, and M509A1) were not listed in the “active” or “total” inventory by the US Department of Defense in a report to Congress in late 2004.

[94] “Time schedule for cluster bomb disposal: Attachment 1.4,” undated. The document was provided by the press office of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Secretariat, 7 May 2014.

[95] “El Ministerio de la Defensa de Venezuela destruye bombas de racimo” (“The Ministry of Defense of Venezuela destroys cluster bombs”), Infodefensa.com, 26 August 2011, bit.ly/VenezuelaDestroysClusterBombs.

[96] Email from Yannis Mallikourtis, Permanent Mission of Greece to the UN in Geneva, 14 June 2011; and presentation of Ukraine, “Impact of the CCW Draft Protocol VI (current version) on Ukraine’s Defense Capability,” slide 2, Geneva, 1 April 2011.

[97] Bulgaria Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 3 Extension Request, March 2020, bit.ly/BulgariaCCMArticle3ExtensionRequest2020.

[98] Peru Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 3 Extension Request, March 2020, bit.ly/PeruCCMArt3ExtensionRequest2020; and Peru Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 3 updated Extension Request, May 2020, bit.ly/PeruCCMArt3ExtensionRequest2020Updated.

[99] Statement of Peru, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 11 September 2015, www.clusterconvention.org/files/2015/09/Peru_high-level-segment.pdf. Previously, in April 2014, Peru had expressed its commitment to destroy its stockpile by the convention’s deadline and said it had requested international cooperation and assistance to do so. Statement of Peru, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 7 April 2014, www.clusterconvention.org/files/2014/04/Peru.pdf.

[100] The Philippines reported that it destroyed 114 “81mm cluster bombs” by open detonation at a location in Cebu on 7 May 2011, after it adopted and signed the convention. Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 5 December 2019, bit.ly/PhilippinesCCMArticle7Report2019. The specific type of cluster munition referred to by the Philippines is unclear.

[101] See the relevant Monitor country profiles for more information. Some quantities of cluster munitions and/or submunitions have changed since previous reports due to revisions based on adjusted information provided in Article 7 transparency reports for the convention. In addition, before the convention took effect, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK destroyed a total of 712,977 cluster munitions containing more than 78 million submunitions. Note that Cameroon did not destroy its stockpiled cluster munitions, but instead retained them all for research and training. Cuba reported the total number of cluster munitions destroyed, but not the quantity of submunitions destroyed.

[102] In September 2011, the Republic of the Congo stated that it had no stockpiles of cluster munitions on its territory. In May 2013, Congo reported that it had destroyed its remaining 372 antipersonnel mines held for training and research purposes following the massive explosions in a weapons depot in Brazzaville in March 2012, and said it was now a country fully free of landmines and cluster munitions. Statement of the Republic of the Congo, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 15 September 2011, www.clusterconvention.org/files/2011/09/cl_congo.pdf; statement by Col. Nkoua, National Focal Point of the Struggle Against Mines, Seminar to mark the 20th Anniversary of the ICBL hosted by the Congolese Campaign to Ban Landmines and Cluster Bombs, Kinshasa, 19 December 2012; and statement of the Republic of the Congo, Lomé Regional Seminar on the Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Lomé, 22 May 2013. Notes by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV).

[103] According to officials, the stockpile of air-dropped Rockeye cluster bombs and an unidentified type of artillery-delivered cluster munitions were destroyed before 2007. HRW meetings with Honduran officials, in San José, 5 September 2007; and in Vienna, 3–5 December 2007.

[104] Letter No. 590.7564/2015-OKOZ, from Karol Mistrik, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic, to Mary Wareham, Arms Division, HRW, 16 April 2015.

[105] Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, BiH, Botswana, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Ecuador, Honduras, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Moldova, Montenegro, Mozambique, North Macedonia, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Slovenia, South Africa and the UK.

[106] For more information on retention, including the specific types of cluster munitions retained by each country, see ICBL-CMC, Country Profiles, www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/our-research/country-profiles.aspx; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 transparency reports database, bit.ly/CCMArt7database. The quantity totals may include individual submunitions retained, which are not contained in a delivery container.

[107] Denmark Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form D, 1 July 2020, bit.ly/DenmarkCCMArticle7Report2020. According to an official, “for unknown reasons, the Danish holdings of DM1348 had not been reported at earlier occasions.” Email from Julie Worsøe Andersen, Security Policy Unit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 17 September 2020.

[108] Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Benin, BiH, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eswatini (formerly Swaziland), Fiji, France, the Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Portugal, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, the UK, Uruguay, and Zambia. See, UN’s Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 database, bit.ly/CCMArt7database.

[109] Previously, Cluster Munition Monitor 2019 reported an 89% compliance rate for the submission of initial transparency reports. Cluster Munition Monitor 2018 reported an 87% compliance rate. Cluster Munition Monitor 2017 and Cluster Munition Monitor 2016 reported an 82% compliance rate. Cluster Munition Monitor 2015 reported an 80% compliance rate. Cluster Munition Monitor 2014 reported a 77% compliance rate. The compliance rate was reported as “three-quarters” of states in Cluster Munition Monitor 2012 and Cluster Munition Monitor 2013.

[110] The transparency report should be emailed to the UN Secretary-General via the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs at ccm@un.org. For more information, see: www.clusterconvention.org/documents/transparency-reports/.

[111] Afghanistan, Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Belgium, BiH, Bulgaria, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Germany, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Montenegro, Mozambique, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, North Macedonia, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Saint Kitts and Nevis, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, the UK, Uruguay, and Zambia.

[112] Statement of South Africa, Convention on Cluster Munitions Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 September 2019, bit.ly/SouthAfricaStatementMSP2019.

[113] For example, Austria, Belgium, Colombia, DRC, France, Guatemala, Ireland, Japan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, New Zealand, Norway, Slovakia, Spain, and Zambia utilized Form J in their initial Article 7 transparency reports.

[114] Often states do not provide definitive statements throughout their reports. Notably, some simply submit “not applicable.” States should, for example, include a short narrative statement on Form E on conversion of production facilities, i.e., “Country X never produced cluster munitions,” instead of simply putting “N/A” on the form. In addition, only a small number of states used voluntary Form J.

[115] Namibia did not detail how these laws may guide and enforce its implementation of the convention. Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 27 August 2019, bit.ly/NamibiaCCMArticle7Report2019.

[116] Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Zambia.

[117] Guinea-Bissau Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 1 January 2020, bit.ly/GuineaBissauCCMArticle7Report2020. Previously, an official said the country’s Penal Code provides sanctions for any violations of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Statement of Guinea-Bissau, Lomé Regional Seminar on the Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Lomé, 23 May 2013.

[118] Somalia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 11 October 2019, bit.ly/SomaliaCCMArticle7Report2019.

[119] Albania, Andorra, Benin, BiH, Bolivia, Chad, Chile, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Denmark, El Salvador, Fiji, Guyana, Holy See, Honduras, Iraq, Lithuania, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Nauru, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, North Macedonia, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, San Marino, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Uruguay.

[120] The report states “not applicable” under national implementation measures required by Article 9. Benin Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 20 June 2019, bit.ly/BeninCCMArticle7Report2019.

[121] According to Section 155 of the Criminal Law (Offenses) Act, “Everyone who makes or knowingly has in his possession any explosive substance, or any dangerous, or noxious thing, or any machine, engine, instrument or other thing, with intent thereby, or by means thereof, to commit, or for the purpose of enabling any other to commit, an indictable offense whatsoever, shall be guilty of a felony and liable to imprisonment for ten years.” Guyana Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 16 January 2020, bit.ly/GuyanaCCMArticle7Report2020. Guyana also reported other relevant existing laws relating to explosives, customs, firearms, disability rights, and social security.

[122] The Gambia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 21 November 2019, bit.ly/GambiaCCMArticle7Report2019; Palestine, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 29 April 2019, bit.ly/PalestineCCMArticle7Report2019; and Sri Lanka, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 26 February 2019, bit.ly/SriLankaCCMArticle7Report2019.

[123] Memorandum to the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, on the Prohibition of Cluster Munitions in the Armed Forces of the Philippines Operational Requirements by the Department of National Defense, 13 December 2017. Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 11 October 2019, bit.ly/PhilippinesCCMArticle7Report2019.

[124] Cape Verde, Comoros, Dominican Republic, Guinea, Madagascar, Rwanda, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

[125] For recommendations of best practice in this field, see HRW and Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic, “Staying Strong: Key Components and Positive Precedent for Convention on Cluster Munitions Legislation,” September 2014, bit.ly/StayingStrong2014; ICRC, “Model Law, Convention on Cluster Munitions: Legislation for Common Law States on the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions,” 2013, bit.ly/ICRCModelLawCCM; and see also, this document prepared by New Zealand for small states not possessing cluster munitions and not contaminated by them: “Model Legislation: Cluster Munitions Act 2011,” bit.ly/ModelLegislationNZ2011.

[126] The States Parties that have yet to publicly elaborate a view on any of these interpretive issues include: Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Cape Verde, Cook Islands, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Eswatini, Fiji, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Iraq, Lesotho, Lithuania, Maldives, Mauritania, Moldova, Monaco, Mozambique, Nauru, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, São Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Uruguay.

[127] As of July 2012, Wikileaks had made public a total of 428 cables relating to cluster munitions that originated from 100 locations in the 2003–2010 period.

[128] At least 38 States Parties and signatories have previously stated their agreement with this view: Austria, Belgium, BiH, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, DRC, Ecuador, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Montenegro, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Portugal, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Senegal, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and Togo. See, CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2012 (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, August 2012), pp. 34–35; CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2011 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2011), pp. 25–27; ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 20–21; and HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 25–26. See also, HRW and Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic, “Staying Strong,” 2014, pp. 19–23, bit.ly/StayingStrong2014.

[129] Austria, Belgium, BiH, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, DRC, Ecuador, France, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Ireland, Lao PDR, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Senegal, Slovenia, Spain, and Zambia. See CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2011 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2011), pp. 27–29; ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 20–21; and HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 25–26.

[130] Dubrovnik Action Plan, First Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Croatia, 10 September 2015, bit.ly/DubrovnikActionPlan.

[131] Italy’s Law No. 95 bans financial assistance to anyone for any act prohibited by the convention, a provision that supports a ban on investment in the production of cluster munitions. However, the Italian Campaign to Ban Landmines has advocated for a separate, more detailed law.

[132] Australia, BiH, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Republic of the Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, DRC, Ecuador, France, the Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Montenegro, Niger, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Slovenia, Trinidad & Tobago, the UK, and Zambia.

[133] Statement of Chile, Convention on Cluster Munitions Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 September 2019, https://www.clusterconvention.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Ireland-NIM.pdf.

[134] Statement of Ecuador,UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 25 October 2019.

[135] PAX, Worldwide Investments in Cluster Munitions: a shared responsibility (Utrecht: PAX, December 2018), bit.ly/PAXReportDecember2018.