Ten-Year Review: Non-signatory South Korea has acknowledged humanitarian concerns raised by cluster munitions, but has not taken any steps to join the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It has participated in only one meeting of the convention, in 2016. South Korea abstained from voting on a key United Nations (UN) resolution promoting the convention in December 2019.

South Korea has not used cluster munitions, but it has produced and exported them. It possesses cluster munitions, but has not shared information on the types and quantities stockpiled.

Policy

The Republic of Korea (South Korea) has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

South Korea has acknowledged the humanitarian concerns raised by cluster munitions, but has not taken any steps to join the convention. At the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in November 2019, South Korea reiterated that it “fully shares the concerns of the international community about the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions” and supports “efforts to address the humanitarian problems arising from their use,” but cannot join the convention “owing to the security situation on the Korean peninsula.”[1]

A 2008 Ministry of Defense directive on cluster munitions requires South Korea to only acquire cluster munitions equipped with “safety activation devices that will not result in more than a one per cent failure rate” and to work towards “the development of an alternative weapon system that could replace cluster munitions over the long term.”[2]

South Korea did not participate in any meetings of the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[3] United States (US) Department of State cables show that US officials met with South Korean representatives to discuss cluster munitions during the process.[4] South Korea attended the Oslo Signing Conference in December 2008 as an observer, where it made a statement explaining that it could not sign the convention.

South Korea participated in the convention’s Sixth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in 2016 as an observer. This remains its first, and to date, only participation in a meeting of the convention. South Korea was invited, but did not attend, the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2019.

In December 2019, South Korea abstained from voting on a key UNGA resolution that urged states outside the convention to “join as soon as possible.”[5] It has abstained from voting on the annual UNGA resolution promoting the convention since it was first introduced in 2015. South Korea has explained its vote each year, always citing the security situation on the Korean Peninsula as the reason for its abstention.[6]

South Korea has voted in favor of UNGA resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, most recently in December 2019.[7] South Korea voted in favor of a similar Human Rights Council resolution in June 2020.[8]

South Korea also voted in favor of a 2015 UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution expressing concern at the use of cluster munitions in Sudan, as well as a 2014 UNSC resolution expressing concern at the use of cluster munitions in South Sudan.[9]

South Korea is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

South Korea is a State Party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and supported efforts to conclude a new CCW protocol on cluster munitions, which failed in 2011. This effectively ended CCW deliberations on cluster munitions, leaving the Convention on Cluster Munitions as the sole multilateral instrument to specifically address the weapon. South Korea has not proposed any further CCW work on cluster munitions since 2011.

Use

South Korea has stated on several occasions that it has never used cluster munitions.[10]

Production and export

South Korea has produced and exported cluster munitions, including rockets, bombs, and projectiles. South Korea licensed the production of cluster munitions from Pakistan and the US.

It is unclear if cluster munitions are still produced in South Korea. Previously, South Korea said that no cluster munitions were manufactured or exported during 2016.[11] In 2014, South Korea said it was producing artillery-delivered cluster munitions.[12]

The Ministry of National Defense said in 2005 that South Korea had stopped production of “old types” of cluster munitions and planned to only produce cluster munitions with self-destruct features.[13]

Two South Korean companies have produced cluster munitions:[14]

• Hanwha has produced M261 Multi-Purpose Submunition rockets for the Hydra-70 air-to-ground rocket system, as well as KCBU-58B cluster bombs.[15] In 2012, South Korea said that Hanwha produced 42,800 Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM) extended-range (base bleed) 155mm artillery projectiles in 2011.[16]
• Poongsan has advertised a 155mm projectile containing 88 submunitions designated DPICM TP, and another 155mm projectile with submunitions designated DPICM K305.[17] In 2009, Poongsan listed two types of 155mm artillery projectiles that contain submunitions: K308 DPICM TP, containing 88 K224 submunitions; and K310 DPICM B/B, containing 49 K221 submunitions.[18]

Both companies have ties to Pakistan:

• Hanwha exported an unknown quantity of M261 rockets (each containing nine M73 submunitions) to Pakistan in 2008.[19]
• Poongsan entered into a licensed production agreement with Pakistan Ordnance Factories in 2004 to co-produce K310 155mm DPICM projectiles in Pakistan.[20]

Local company, LIG Nex1, advertised a missile system designated Haeseong II—also known as Sea Dragon—for the Republic of Korea Navy, at a military trade exhibition in Busan in October 2017. The missile is reportedly equipped with a submunition warhead, but it is not clear which company produces the submunitions used in this weapons system.[21]

The US concluded a licensing agreement with South Korea in 2001 for production of DPICM submunitions for M26 rockets used with the M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS).[22]

South Korea has not established a moratorium policy in response to calls to formally commit to stop exporting cluster munitions.[23]

Imports

A Ministry of Defense policy directive issued in 2008 requires that South Korea only acquire cluster munitions equipped with self-deactivation devices that would not result in more than a 1% failure rate.

Under a US sale announced in June 2012, South Korea purchased 367 CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons at an estimated cost of US$325 million, including associated parts, equipment, and logistical support.[24] In 2014, the US Department of Defense concluded a contract to be completed by 2016 for US company Textron Defense Systems to provide 361 cluster bomb units for foreign military sale to South Korea.[25] The CBU-105 is prohibited by the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

South Korea has imported several types of cluster munitions from the US in the past, including M26 rockets, M26A1 extended-range rockets, and ATACMS missiles for its MLRS launchers. Between 1993 and 1999, the US provided 393 M26A1 extended-range rocket pods, 271 M26 rocket pods, 111 ATACMS (Block-1) missiles, and 111 ATACMS (Block-1A) missiles.[26] South Korea also has received US-made artillery projectiles containing DPICM submunitions (M483A1, M864, and M509A1).[27] In 2001, the US supplied South Korea with 16 of each of the following cluster bombs: CBU-87, CBU-97, CBU-103, and CBU-105.[28] Jane’s Information Group lists South Korea as possessing CBU-87 and Rockeye cluster bombs.[29]

Stockpiling and destruction

South Korea has not shared information on the types and quantities of its stockpiled cluster munitions.

According to a US Department of State cable, a senior Ministry of National Defense official told the US in 2007 that “more than 90 percent” of South Korea’s stockpiled cluster munitions lacked self-destruct features and described the cost of retrofitting them as “prohibitive.”[30]

Policy

The Republic of Korea (South Korea) has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty.

In November 2019, South Korea stated that it “supports the objectives and purposes of the Ottawa Convention,” but that, “due to the security situation on the Korean peninsula, we are currently not a party to the convention.”[1] However, in another statement in October 2017, South Korea for the first time noted, “The Republic of Korea is fully committed to the objectives and purposes of this convention.”[2]

On 12 December 2019, South Korea abstained from voting on the annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 74/61, which calls for the universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. South Korea has also abstained in previous years. South Korea has stated consistently that the security situation on the Korean Peninsula prohibits it from acceding to the treaty.[3]

In July 2020, an observer from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attended the virtual intersessional meetings. In May 2019, South Korea attended the intersessional meetings where it reiterated that it is “fully committed to the objectives and purposes” of the convention, but cannot accede due to the “unique security situation on the Korean Peninsula.”[4] Previously, South Korea had never sent an observer delegation to a meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, and also did not attend the convention’s Fourth Review Conference in Oslo in November 2019.

On 24 September 2019, South Korean President Moon Jae-in requested international cooperation on mine clearance in the demilitarized zone (DMZ).[5] An April 2018 inter-Korean summit pledged to recommence road and rail connections in the east of the Korean peninsula.[6] Mine clearance to facilitate these connections halted in 2002.[7] In September 2018, the South Korean army called for the establishment of an agency dedicated to removing border landmines as part of efforts to implement the April inter-Korean summit agreement.[8] At the September 2018 inter-Korean summit, leaders from both sides agreed to begin removal of landmines from a jointly controlled village on the DMZ.[9] In October 2019, the South Korean Ministry of Defense announced its intention to remove all mines from military installations south of the DMZ by 2021 and began the clearance task in April 2020.[10]

In November 2019, South Korea’s international development agency, the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), convened a meeting of representatives of mine clearance efforts that KOICA financially supports in Southeast Asia in order to determine what lessons could be learned from those programs to inform mine clearance in South Korea.[11]

In November 2018, the Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines/Peace Sharing Association (KCBL/PSA) organized an International Symposium on the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for Mine Clearance in the DMZ in cooperation with and on the campus of Yonsei University in Seoul. The symposium was launched in support of the demining initiative undertaken in the DMZ by North and South Korea, and brought together representatives of several government departments and the military with international organizations involved in mine clearance and victim assistance.[12] Subsequently, in January 2019, the United Nations Command (UNC) organized a first seminar on mine action in the DMZ.[13]

In September 2019, KCBL/PSA, at the request of the South Korean Ministry of Defense, began the translation of the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) into Korean for use by the South Korean armed forces. This translation was completed and delivered in December 2019, and is now being used by the Ministry of Defense to prepare Korean Mine Action Standards.[14] Also in September 2019, the KCBL/PSA, in cooperation with the provincial government of Gyeoggi province, launched a survey of mine/unexploded ordinance (UXO) civilian victims and a non-technical survey of the province.[15] In late 2015, the KCBL/PSA published a report entitled “Civilian Mine Victims in Gangwon Province, Korea.” The report provided the most comprehensive picture of the status of the landmine problem in one of the two provinces that border the DMZ. The report provides the only public accounting of mined areas in the country, a listing of the casualties in Gangwon province since 2000, and data regarding mined areas that have been scheduled for removal by the Ministry of National Defense.[16] During 2019, KCBL/PSA undertook a survey of the other province bordering the DMZ, Gyeoggi province, which reported 291 antipersonnel mine victims and 346 victims of other UXO.[17]

After a 15-year struggle by the KCBL/PSA, the National Assembly passed the Special Act on Landmine Victim Assistance in September 2014. The Special Act stipulates that those who fall victim to landmines and the family members of those killed by the weapon and designated as their heirs will receive compensation. The KCBL coordinator is Chairperson for the Sub-committee of the Mine Victim Support Deliberation Committee at the Ministry of Defense in Seoul.

It is unknown what percentage of mines in the areas to be cleared were laid by United States (US) forces when the area was under US control. The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) does not allow the South Korea to make any claims of the US forces, including records of where US forces may have laid mines. The issue of US forces is extremely sensitive in South Korea, where the country currently pays for 100% of the US military presence.

Previously, in April 2011, Prince Mired Raad Al Hussein, the Special Envoy on Universalization for the Mine Ban Treaty, visited South Korea where he met with the Deputy Minister for Policy of the Ministry of National Defense, the Deputy Minister of Multilateral and Global Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Chief of the High Court of the Republic of Korea Armed Forces to explore ways that South Korea may wish to engage in the work of the treaty.[18]

In September 2014, South Korea’s key military ally, the US, announced a new policy committing not to use antipersonnel landmines outside of the Korean Peninsula. Additionally, then-US President Barack Obama commented, “We’re going to continue to work to find ways that would allow us to ultimately comply fully and accede to the Ottawa Convention.” In September 2017, during a Memorial Day ceremony, South Korean President Moon Jae-in stated that he intended to take the right of Wartime Operation Control away from the US Army as soon as possible. When this occurs, there will no longer be any obstacle from South Korea for the US to join the Mine Ban Treaty.[19] However, in January 2020, the US Department of Defense announced a new policy permitting planning for, and use of, antipersonnel mines in conflicts, either within or outside of the Korean Peninsula.[20]

South Korea is not a party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines.[21]

Use

In August 2019, South Korea informed the ICBL that it has not emplaced any new mined areas since 2000.[22] South Korea maintains that it has not used mines in many years. In September 2018, a Ministry of National Defense official stated that no new mines were placed, or replaced, in calendar year 2017 or until August 2018.[23] In May 2017, South Korean authorities stated that the country did not place, or replace, any antipersonnel mines during calendar years 2015 and 2016.[24]

South Korea alleged that in August 2015, two South Korean soldiers on patrol on the South Korean side of the DMZ at Yeonchon, in Gyeonggi province, were injured by newly laid antipersonnel mines. Initial news reports quoting South Korean military sources stated that the mines were not of North Korean origin.[25] The type of mine was later stated by the South Korean military to be North Korean wooden box mines (PMD-6 type).[26]

North Korea issued a denial of use, stating it only used mines in self-defense.[27] At a press conference in New York on 21 August 2015, the North Korean ambassador to the UN asserted that the South Korean military had identified the mine as an M14 on 4 August and then changed it to a North Korean box mine on 10 August for political purposes.[28]

The US-led UN Command deployed a Special Investigation Team from the Military Armistice Commission to examine the area after the incident. The team included military officers of four countries and was observed by Swiss and Swedish members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. The investigation concluded “that the North Korean People’s Army violated paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the Armistice Agreement by emplacing wooden box land mines along a known Republic of Korea patrol route in the southern half of the Demilitarized Zone, injuring two Republic of Korea soldiers. Additionally, the investigation determined that the devices were recently emplaced, and ruled out the possibility that these were legacy landmines which had drifted from their original placements due to rain or shifting soil.”[29] North Korean wooden box antipersonnel mines are regularly reported to float into South Korean territory, including in 2017.[30]

Production and Transfer

In August 2019, South Korea informed the ICBL that it had not produced any antipersonnel landmines in the previous five years.[31] Until South Korea renounces future mine production, it will remain listed by the Monitor as a producer of antipersonnel mines.

In May 2017, South Korea responded to an ICBL information request that it had not produced any antipersonnel mines without a self-destruction mechanism during 2016.[32] In 2011, a private South Korean company, Hanwha Corporation, produced 4,000 KM74 antipersonnel mines.[33] In 2007, the Hanwha Corporation produced about 10,000 self-destructing antipersonnel mines, as well as an unknown number of Claymore directional fragmentation mines.[34]

In both 2011 and 2012, Foreign Ministry officials stated that the government commissioned the development of remotely-controlled mines, which will replace antipersonnel mines, and that the newly developed mines will meet the requirements set out in Amended Protocol II of the CCW.[35]

South Korea has stated on several occasions that it has “faithfully enforced an indefinite extension of the moratorium on the export of [antipersonnel] mines since 1997.”[36]

Stockpiling

The precise size and composition of South Korea’s antipersonnel mine stockpile is not publicly known.[37] However, South Korea said in 2006 and 2008 that its stockpile consisted of 407,800 antipersonnel mines.[38] In the past, the government stated that it held a stockpile of about two million antipersonnel mines.[39]

In September 2018, in response to a request for information, the South Korean Ministry of National Defense stated that the army had destroyed 186 tons of non-usable antipersonnel landmines that had been in storage between 1 January 2017 and 1 August 2018.[40] In May 2017, in response to a request for information, the South Korean government wrote that it had destroyed 19,662 M16 and 1,647 M14 mines during calendar years 2015 and 2016.[41] South Korea previously reported in 2011 that it had destroyed 18,464 antipersonnel mines (5,132 M14, 12,086 M16, and 1,246 M18) in the ammunition units where they were stored during 2010. The date(s) of the destruction and reason for this action were not specified.[42]

The US military keeps a substantial number of remotely-delivered, self-destructing antipersonnel mines in South Korea. In 2005, the South Korean government reported that the US held 40,000 GATOR, 10,000 Volcano, and an unknown number of MOPMS mines.[43]

For many years, the US military also stockpiled about 1.1 million M14 and M16 non-self-destructing antipersonnel mines for use in any future war in Korea, with about half of the total kept in South Korea and half in the continental US.[44] Most of the US-owned mines located in South Korea have been part of the more extensive War Reserve Stocks for Allies, Korea (WRSA-K). On 30 December 2005, the US enacted a law authorizing the sale of items in the WRSA-K to South Korea during a three-year period, after which the WRSA-K program would be terminated, which occurred at the end of 2008.[45] In June 2009, the South Korean government told the Monitor, “AP [antipersonnel] mines were not included in the list of items for sale or transfer in the WRSA-K negotiations, and therefore, no AP-mines were bought or obtained.”[46] In June 2011, a Foreign Ministry official stated that South Korea safeguards a stockpile of antipersonnel mines that belongs to the US military on its territory as part of the WRSA-K program. These mines are planned to be gradually transferred out of South Korea.[47] In June 2012, a Foreign Ministry official stated that the antipersonnel mines are in ammunition storage within secure areas of the US Forces Korea.[48]

The law ending the program states that any items remaining in the WRSA-K at the time of termination “shall be removed, disposed of, or both by the Department of Defense.”[49] Moreover, US policy has prohibited the use of non-self-destructing antipersonnel mines in South Korea since 2010. According to documents released under a Freedom of Information Act request by the Monitor in 2013, the WRSA-K stockpile included 480,267 M-14 antipersonnel mines and 83,319 M-16 antipersonnel mines.[50] In May 2017, South Korean authorities refused to divulge any information regarding WRSA-K stocks of antipersonnel mines.[51] The US has previously destroyed all non-self-destructing mines not dedicated for potential use on the Korean Peninsula. As of October 2015, the Monitor could not determine whether the US indeed maintained non-self-destructing antipersonnel mines in South Korea.

Contamination

The Korean War left mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) in the Republic of South Korea, and because of a security threat, South Korea laid barrier minefields along the DMZ separating it from North Korea.

The DMZ and the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ), immediately adjoining the southern boundary of the DMZ, remain among the most heavily mined areas in the world due to extensive mine-laying during the Korean War and in the 1960s, in 1978, and in 1988. In 2006, South Korea indicated that about 970,000 mines were emplaced in the southern part of the DMZ, about 30,000 mines in the CCZ, and about 8,000 mines in 25 military sites that cover an area of about 3km² in the northern parts of Gyeonggi-do and Gangwon provinces, below the CCZ.[1] Previously, a report by the National Defense Committee in 2010 said that South Korea had about 1,100 “planned” mined areas covering 20km² and some 209 unconfirmed mined areas covering 97.82km².[2]

South Korea has also had to contend periodically with wooden box mines carried by flood water from North Korea during the rainy season. An incident was reported in July 2017, when a wooden mine was found and destroyed on a small island along the maritime border by the South Korean navy during a sweep for displaced box mines after heavy rains.[3] In June 2016, South Korean military officials reported that close to 260 North Korean wooden box mines had washed up along the border region in 2010–2015.[4]

In 2016, as in the previous year, South Korea reported serious allegations of new antipersonnel mine use by North Korea. (See the North Korea’s profile for further details.)

Program Management

There is no national mine action authority or mine action center in South Korea. Demining is conducted by the South Korean army, which has undertaken limited clearance of the DMZ and CCZ, and has concentrated mostly on demining military bases in rear areas. In September 2018, it was reported that the South Korean army had called for the establishment of an agency dedicated to removing landmines in the DMZ. The agency would be tasked with planning and executing the removal process.[5]

In 2013, the Ministry of Defense said it had submitted a bill on mines to the parliament to allow civilian organizations to remove mines laid during the Korean War, in order to facilitate ongoing military clearance. “The bill is aimed at making legal grounds and a process to allow both the military and civilians to remove mines so as to protect lives and the property of people,” the ministry said in a press release.[6] As of September 2017, South Korea’s National Assembly had not passed the bill.

Land Release

In its latest Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Article 13 transparency report for calendar year 2017, South Korea reported that 462 military deminers had cleared a total of 102,828m² and destroyed 142 mines, at a cost of US$1.12 million.[7] For 2016, South Korea had reported clearing 191,019m² and destroyed 134 mines.[8]

In April 2018, the North Korean Leader, Kim Jong-un, and the South Korean President, Moon Jae-in, met and issued a statement promising to bring “lasting peace” to the peninsula with a commitment to denuclearization and to ending hostilities, turning the DMZ into a peace zone.[9] In June 2018, President Moon called for an inter-Korean operation to excavate the remains of soldiers in the DMZ killed in the 1950–1953 Korean War.[10] In September 2018, the North Korean and South Korean ministers of defense signed a military agreement, the Panmunjom Declaration, which mandates that North Korea, South Korea and the United Nations Command (UNC) “will remove all mines in the Joint Security Area (of the DMZ) in Panmunjom within 20 days, beginning on October 1, 2018.”[11] South Korean officials confirmed on 22 October 2018 that clearance of the Joint Security Area in Panmunjom by North and South Korea had been completed.[12] North Korea were reported to have cleared five mines while South Korea found none.[13] Mine clearance will also take place from 1 October 2018 in Cheolwon, Gangwon province, to enable joint recovery of the bodily remains of soldiers, and to enable the establishment of an inter-Korean road within the joint recovery site.[14]

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and shared all its country-level landmine reports (from “Clearing the Mines 2018”) and country-level cluster munition reports (from “Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2018”) with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.

In 2019, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) contributed approximately US$1.7 million to mine action through the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF) and ITF Enhancing Human Security.

Contributions by recipient: 2019[1]

Note: UNMAS=United Nations Mine Action Service.

Since 2015, South Korea’s contribution has ranged from an annual low of $300,000 in 2017, to a high of $2.5 million in 2016.

Summary of contributions: 2015–2019[2]

Note: N/A=not applicable.

Casualties Overview

The Monitor identified four new mine casualties in the Republic of Korea (South Korea) in 2016. All were civilian adult men, one was a Kazakh national.[1]

The total number of mine/ERW casualties is unknown, but the Korea Research Institute for Mine Clearance stated in March 2009 that there were at least 500 civilian survivors.[2] In 2009, the media reported that there were at least 1,000 civilian casualties; the Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines (KCBL) estimated there were 2,000 to 3,000 military casualties.[3] The Monitor identified 92 mine casualties between 1999 and 2016 (18 killed, 73 injured, and one unknown). At least 25 of these casualties were military personnel, including one American soldier injured in 2001. Figures are likely incomplete as there is no comprehensive official data on mine casualties in South Korea.[4]

Casualties

Casualties Overview

The Monitor identified two new mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties in the Republic of Korea (South Korea) in 2015. In August, two South Korean soldiers on patrol on the South Korean side of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) at Yeonchon, in Gyeonggi Province, were injured by antipersonnel mines that were alleged to have been newly laid by the North Korean military.[1]

In 2014, the Monitor identified eight new mine/ERW casualties in South Korea. On 6 October 2014, two civilian forestry workers from Daejong were killed and six of their colleagues were injured in a mine incident. The incident took place near a military area but outside the marked mined area.[2] A report released in late 2015 indicated one civilian was killed in Gyeonggi-do and one soldier injured in Gangwon-do in 2013.[3] In 2012, one civilian antipersonnel mine casualty was identified in the province of Gyeonggi,[4] as well as two military casualties on a military base on Baekryeong Island.[5]

In the first half of 2016, there were three new mine casualties in South Korea. Two Korean civilians and farm worker from Kazakhstan were injured by mines near the DMZ.[6]

The total number of mine/ERW casualties is unknown, but the Korea Research Institute for Mine Clearance stated in March 2009 that there were at least 500 civilian survivors.[7] In 2009, the media reported that there were at least 1,000 civilian casualties; the Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines (KCBL) estimated there were 2,000 to 3,000 military casualties.[8] The Monitor identified 86 mine casualties between 1999 and 2015 (11 killed, 75 injured). At least 25 of these casualties were military personnel, including one American soldier injured in 2001. Figures are likely incomplete as there is no comprehensive official data on mine casualties in South Korea.[9]

Victim Assistance

There have been at least 128 survivors identified in South Korea, though reasonable estimates indicate that the number is between 1,000 and 2,000, with both civilian and military survivors.[10]

No efforts were identified to assess the needs of mine/ERW victims in 2015. Following the mine victim survey conducted in 2011 by the Korean Peace Sharing Association (PSA) in Gangwon province, there were plans to conduct a similar survey inGyeonggi province, also bordering the DMZ, in 2013. However, these plans were stalled due to the unwillingness of provincial authorities to participate until the National Assembly passed a compensation law for mine victims.[11]

An English language report on the results from the 2011 survey was published in 2015. The survey conducted interviews related to a total of 228 landmine casualties (including 117 survivors along with information about 111 people killed) from the 1950s until 2011. The vast majority of casualties identified in this survey were male (83%). The survey highlighted the need for economic inclusion and livelihood support to mine survivors and their families.[12]

Using the results of the 2011 mine victim survey, the PSA/KCBL provided basic assistance to 64 identified mine victims in Gangwon-do province with funding from CitiBank.[13] In 2013 and 2014, PSA/KCBL continued to provide assistance to affected communities of the most impacted areas.[14] In addition, in 2013 and 2014, the organization focused on advocacy and awareness-raising on the issue of antipersonnel mines, as well as the difficulties faced by survivors.[15]

The 2011 mine victim survey also informed a program to provide medical assistance to civilian victims in Gangwon province, implemented by local authorities and the Korean Red Cross with funding from the Samsung Cooperate Citizenship Program. From January 2012 to March 2014, medical assistance, including rehabilitative surgery, prosthetics, and healthcare, was provided to 75 landmine and ERW survivors. Thirty-three survivors were provided with powered-assistive devices, including scooters and wheelchairs.[16]

Victim assistance coordination

South Korea has no victim assistance coordination mechanism; the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Family Affairs (MIHWAF) is the lead ministry responsible for persons with disabilities.[17]

KCBL/PSA focused its efforts on the formation of the Compensation Committee that will determine eligibility for compensation under the Special Act on Compensation for Civilian Landmine Victims (2014). According to plans, the committee will be institutionally housed at the Ministry for National Defense, although it will be chaired by a civilian, and civil society members may be permitted.[18]

The committee will determine if applicants are eligible for compensation and what amount of compensation would be received. The inclusion of language in the legislation relating to the need to “determine if the injured person was also partly responsible for his/her injuries, and, if so, determine how much he or she contributed to their own incident.”[19] This is likely to be inconsistent with the non-discrimination principles of victim assistance.

While South Korea has a national healthcare system, mine victims were frequently not eligible for assistance due to the fact that their disability was considered conflict-related and/or self-inflicted.[20] Victims were deemed ineligible for assistance if they had signed a written memo assuming all responsibility for death or injury when they entered or lived in the Civilian Control Zone near the DMZ. Thirty of the casualties identified in the 2011 survey of mine victims in Gangwon province had signed a memo prior to their injury.[21]

Soldiers injured on duty, including those injured by mines, receive free medical services and a monthly pension that depends on the degree of disability—estimated, for example, to be about US$1,000 for a partial limb amputation.[22] Prior to the passage of the Special Support Law for Civilian Landmine Victims, civilian mine survivors could apply for government compensation through the Ministry of National Defense Special Compensation Commission, but few claims were successful.[23] Through to the end of 2013, the government operated rehabilitation hospitals in six regions, plus a national rehabilitation research center to increase opportunities and access for persons with disabilities.[24] The national health system covered up to 80% of the costs for domestic prosthetics, however the PSA needs assessment notes that even 20% of the cost of a prosthetic was out of reach for many survivors who were living in poverty.[25]

The PSA needs assessment found that 88% of victims identified in Gangwon province (survivors and the family members of people killed by mines) did not seek compensation following the mine incident, in most cases because they were not aware that a state compensation program existed. Others did not seek compensation, either because they lacked money for legal assistance or because they feared reporting their incident to the government.[26]

In July 2014, the bill for the Special Support Law for Civilian Landmine Victims was reviewed by the plenary assembly of the parliament. The bill was passed by the National Assembly on 30 September 2014 and the law came into effect on 30 March 2015.[27]

The Special Support Law for Civilian Landmine Victims provides for compensation to landmine survivors and the families of the deceased and support for medical expenses. The bill also authorizes the government to provide funds to non-profit associations or organizations working to improve the livelihoods or well-being of landmine survivors or families of those people killed. It also covers research, public relations, and risk education.[28]

South Korean legislation prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, education, air travel and other transportation, access to healthcare, or the provision of other state services. In 2015, the government effectively enforced the law, although many local government ordinances and regulations still directly discriminate against persons with disabilities.[29] In 2009, an act was adopted with the aim of preventing discrimination against persons with disabilities and providing remedies for those suffering from such discrimination.[30] Legislation, passed in 2014 and to be implemented in 2016, increased support for persons with disabilities and their families, and created a task-force of prosecutors and police specially trained to work with persons with disabilities.[31]

South Korea ratified the Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 11 December 2008.