Sudan

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Last updated: 23 November 2020

Ten-Year Review: Non-signatory Sudan has expressed interest in the Convention on Cluster Munitions but has not taken any steps to accede to it. Sudan has participated as an observer in several meetings of the convention, most recently in September 2018. It voted in favor of a key United Nations (UN) resolution on the convention in December 2019.

There is no evidence to indicate that Sudan has produced or exported cluster munitions, but it has imported and stockpiled them. Sudan sporadically used cluster bombs in Southern Kordofan province in 2012–2015, but the government and military officials deny that the country possesses or uses cluster munitions. The Monitor is unaware of any new reports or allegations of cluster munition use.

Policy

The Republic of Sudan has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Sudan has expressed interest in the convention, but has not taken any steps to accede.[1] Government officials have indicated that Sudan may only join “if bordering countries follow suit.”[2] In 2016, an official described “the regional security situation” as “unfavorable” for joining the convention.[3]

Sudan participated in the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and joined in the consensus adoption of the convention in Dublin in May 2008.[4] At the convention’s Oslo Signing Conference in December 2008, Sudan pledged to sign as soon as it completed the internal process to do so.[5]

Sudan has participated as an observer at meetings of the convention, most recently at the Eighth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2018.[6] Sudan was invited, but did not attend, the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2019.

In December 2019, Sudan voted in favor of a key UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that called on states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”[7] Sudan has voted in favor of the annual UNGA resolution promoting the convention since it was first introduced in 2015.

Sudan is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty and a signatory to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). It signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 22 July 2020.

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

There is no evidence that Sudan has produced or exported cluster munitions. However, Sudan has imported them and possesses a stockpile.[8]

In 2016, a UN Panel of Experts reported “clear evidence” of “current possession by the Sudanese Air Force of cluster munitions.”[9] In 2014, a UN Panel of Experts published photographs showing RBK-500 series cluster bombs at El Fasher Airport in North Darfur state, where Sudan’s armed forces has a forward operating base.[10]

Jane’s Information Group reports that KMGU dispensers, which deploy submunitions, are also in service with the Sudanese Air Force.[11] Sudan also possesses Grad, Egyptian-produced Sakr, and Chinese-produced Type-81 122mm surface-to-surface rockets, but it is not known if these include versions with submunition payloads.[12]

Use

There were no reports or allegations of Sudanese government forces using cluster munitions in 2019 or the first half of 2020. The last recorded use of cluster munitions by Sudan was in 2015.

Previous use in 2012–2015

Sudan has repeatedly denied using cluster munitions in the past, but there is strong evidence that it used them in 2012–2015 in Southern Kordofan province bordering South Sudan, during fighting with the Sudan People’s Liberation Army-North (SPLM-N).[13] Several cluster munition incidents were recorded in Southern Kordofan in 2012–2015:

  • At least 23 cluster bombs were dropped in Delami, Umdorein, and Alburam (Tobo) counties in 2015 according to Sudan Consortium, a civil society monitoring project.[14]
  • Remnants of RBK-500 cluster bombs containing AO-2.5 RT submunitions can be seen in a video taken after a government air attack on Kauda on 27 May 2015.[15]
  • RBK-500 cluster bombs containing AO-2.5 RT submunitions were used in Sudanese Air Force attacks on Tongoli village in Delami county on 6 March 2015, and Rajeefi village in Um Durein county in late February 2015, according to Human Rights Watch (HRW).[16]
  • At least two RBK-500 cluster bombs were used by the Sudanese Air Force in Karigiyati in June or July 2014, according to the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS).[17]
  • Two cluster bombs were reportedly use in a Sudanese government aircraft attack on the village of Lado on 18 April 2013, according to Nuba Reports.[18]
  • An RBK-500 cluster bomb containing unexploded AO-2.5RT submunitions was sighted in Ongolo in the aftermath of Sudanese government air strikes on 15 April 2012, according to The Independent.[19]
  • Chinese-made Type-81 Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM) were fired during a Sudanese government attack on Troji village on 29 February 2012.[20]

At meetings of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Sudan has repeatedly denied evidence that its forces used cluster munitions.[21] Sudanese military officials have also denied evidence of use.[22] The government’s diplomatic representatives in Geneva have also vehemently denied Sudan’s use of cluster munitions.[23]

This use of cluster munitions in Sudan has been widely condemned.[24] In June 2015, a resolution unanimously adopted by the UN Security Council (UNSC) expressed concern “at evidence of possible government use of two cluster bombs near Kirigiyati in North Darfur.”[25]

Previous use before 2010

Between 1995 and 2000, Sudanese government forces sporadically used air-dropped cluster munitions in southern Sudan, including Chilean-made PM-1 submunitions, according to numerous independent sources that documented cluster munition remnants.[26] Landmine Action photographed a Rockeye-type cluster bomb with Chinese language external markings in Yei in October 2006. Additionally, clearance operators in Sudan have cleared various submunitions, including the Spanish-manufactured HESPIN 21, United States-produced M42 DPICM and Mk-118 (Rockeye), and Soviet-manufactured PTAB-1.5.[27]



[1] In August 2010, State Minister to the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Dr. Mutrif Siddiq, expressed Sudan’s intention to join the convention ahead of its First Meeting of States Parties in November 2010. See, “Sudan Joins Enforcement of Convention on Cluster Munitions,” Sudan Vision, 3 August 2010. In April 2010, the Chief of Staff of the Sudanese Armed Forces, Gen. Mohamed Abd al-Qadir, stated that Sudan was ready to join the convention. See, statement by Gen. Abd al-Qadir, Sudanese Armed Forces, Sudan Mine Action Day Celebration, Khartoum, 1 April 2010.

[2] CMC meeting with Dr. Ahmed E Yousif, Victim Assistance Officer, National Mine Action Office, in Geneva, 8 April 2014. Previously, in 2012, an official said that the government of Sudan was consulting internally as well as with neighboring countries on the matter of joining the convention. See, statement of Sudan, Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings, Geneva, 19 April 2012.

[3] ICBL-CMC meeting with Gamal Omer Mohamed, Head of Delegation of Sudan to the Convention on Cluster Munitions Sixth Meeting of States Parties, in Geneva, 5 September 2016.

[4] For details on Sudan’s policy and practice regarding cluster munitions through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 243–244.

[5] Statement of Sudan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference, Oslo, 3 December 2008. Notes by Landmine Action. Officials told the CMC that Sudan intended to sign, but the Minister of Foreign Affairs was unexpectedly unable to come and no one else had authorization to sign.

[6] Sudan participated in the convention’s meetings of States Parties in 2010–2017, the First Review Conference in Dubrovnik in September 2015, and intersessional meetings in 2011–2015.

[7]Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 74/62, 12 December 2019.

[8] A mine action official reiterated in 2014 that Sudan does not produce, stockpile, or use cluster munitions. CMC meeting with Dr. Yousif, National Mine Action Office, in Geneva, 8 April 2014.

[9] The report states that the UN panel “is certain that at least four RBK-500 cluster bombs were deployed on the weapon loading area at the Nyala forward operating base of the Air Force” in April 2015. UN Security Council, “Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005),” S/2016/805, 22 September 2016, pp. 3 and 194.

[10] The panel reported that it “observed fluctuating stock levels at the ammunition storage area, indicative of the routine use (for either operations or training) and resupply of ammunition into Darfur by the national armed forces.’’ The report stated that the “Panel has evidence of previous use of cluster munitions in Darfur. Render-safe operations have taken place on such munitions as recently as 2012. The Panel does not, however, have evidence of the exact dates of use of the munitions. It continues to investigate.” UN Security Council (UNSC), “Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005),” S/2014/87, 11 February 2014, pp. 23 and 147.

[11] Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, 2004), p. 846; and Colin King, ed., Jane’s Explosive Ordnance Disposal 2007–2008, CD-edition, 10 January 2008 (Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, 2008).

[12] International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2011 (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 443.

[13] In 2010, the Ministry of Defense stated that Sudan does not possess any stockpiles of cluster munitions, does not produce the weapon, and has “never used cluster munitions, not even in the wars that have occurred in the south and east of the country and in Darfur.” Statement of Sudan, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Meeting of States Parties, Vientiane, 10 November 2010. Notes by the CMC. In April 2010, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Sudan stated that Sudan does not possess cluster munitions. Statement by Gen. al-Qadir, Armed Forces of Sudan, Sudan Mine Action Day Celebration, Khartoum, 1 April 2010. See also, “Sudan armed forces deny possession of cluster bombs,” BBC Monitoring Middle East (English), 2 April 2010, citing original source as Akhir Lahzah (Khartoum newspaper in Arabic), 2 April 2010. In May 2012, a spokesperson for Sudan’s armed forces, Col. al-Sawarmi Khalid Sa‘ad, was quoted in the local media stating with respect to cluster munitions: “We never use them in our military operations and we don’t have them to begin with.” See, “Sudan’s army denies using cluster munitions in South Kordofan,” Sudan Tribune, 28 May 2012.

[15] Nuba Reports is a network of local journalists in the Nuba Mountains where Southern Kordofan is located. Its report described Kauda as “the rebel capital” and base for the SPLM-N, the political opposition movement in Southern Kordofan. According to Nuba Reports, the Sudanese Air Force dropped four cluster bombs on Kauda at around 07:30 on 27 May 2015, but none exploded on impact, leaving failed munitions and unexploded submunitions. Two days later, SPLM-N soldiers removed and “rolled the bomblets into a hole, covered them with dirt, and marked them with thorn bushes.” See, “Cluster bombs hit homes in May,” Nuba Reports, 15 June 2015.

[16] HRW documented remnants of the RBK-500 cluster bombs containing AO-2.5 RT submunitions, which also failed to function as intended. HRW press release, “Sudan: Cluster Bombs Used in Nuba Mountain,” 15 April 2015.

[18] According to a report by a network of citizen journalists: “some of the internal explosives in the cluster bombs did not explode” and were scattered in the village. Nuba Reports, 22 April 2013.

[20] HRW press release, “Sudan: Cluster Bomb Found in Conflict Zone,” 25 May 2012.

[21] At the convention’s First Review Conference in 2015, Sudan described evidence of use as inconclusive “accusations” and “false information that is biased against Sudan.” Statement of Sudan, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 7 September 2015.

[22] In 2015, army spokesperson Col. Alswarmy Khalid denied responsibility for reported cluster munition use and described evidence as “fabricated and baseless.” See, Mohammed Amin, “Sudan denies using cluster bombs in war areas,” Anaduka Agency, 17 April 2015; and Bassem Abo Alabass Mohammed, “Sudan Used Cluster Bombs in Rebel-Held Mountains, Group Says,” Bloomberg News, 16 April 2015.

[23] CMC meeting with Khalid Musa Dafalla, Minister Plenipotentiary, Permanent Mission of Sudan to the UN in Geneva, 26 May 2015. In an April 2015 letter, the CMC called on Sudan to stop using cluster munitions and accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Letter from the CMC, to President Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir of Sudan, 17 April 2015.

[24] At the convention’s intersessional meetings in June 2015, more than two dozen states expressed concern at or condemned the new use of cluster munitions in Sudan, including Austria, Burundi, Canada, Costa Rica, Croatia, Ecuador, Ireland, New Zealand, and Norway. The UN, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the CMC also condemned the use of cluster munitions in Sudan.

[25] The five permanent members of the UNSC voted for the resolution as did non-permanent members Angola, Chad, Chile, Jordan, Lithuania, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Spain, and Venezuela. UNSC Resolution 2228, 29 June 2015.

[26] Virgil Wiebe and Titus Peachey, “Clusters of Death: The Mennonite Central Committee Cluster Bomb Report,” Ch. 4, July 2000.

[27] Handicap International, Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities (Brussels: HI, May 2007), p. 55.


Impact

Last updated: 21 April 2021

Jump to a specific section of the profile:

Treaty Status | Management & Coordination | Impact (contamination & casualties) | Addressing the Impact (land release, risk education, victim assistance)

Country Summary

Sudan is contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) primarily as a result of more than 20 years of civil war between the Sudanese government forces and non-state armed groups in the south, mainly the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army. A Comprehensive Peace Agreement was reached in 2005 and South Sudan gained independence in July 2011.

A landmine impact survey was completed in 16 Sudanese states in June 2009, with the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) estimating that the total residual contamination covered 107km². Since then, Sudan has made significant progress to address its remaining mine and ERW contamination. As of April 2018, three eastern states, Gadaref, Kassala, and Red Sea, were declared free of mines and ERW. As of the end of December 2019, only three of Sudan’s 18 states remained contaminated with antipersonnel mines. Blue Nile and South Kordofan states are the most heavily affected with the West Kordofan least affected. Demining operations continued to be limited in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states due to insecurity.

Some limited cluster munition contamination is believed to exist, but the areas are not under government control.

Risk education in Sudan is prioritized according to the categorization of communities as high, medium or low impact. Children are considered to be the most at-risk, and the National Mine Action Center (NMAC) and the Ministry of Education incorporated risk education into the school curriculum at primary and secondary levels.

Challenges remain with shortages of funding, particularly for victim assistance. Funding to victim assistance stopped to areas declared to be cleared from mines/ERW, including the eastern states of Sudan.

Treaty status

Treaty status overview

Mine Ban Treaty

State Party

Article 5 clearance deadline: 1 April 2023 (second extension)

Convention on Cluster Munitions

Non-signatory

Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)

State Party

 

On 28 March 2018, Sudan submitted a second request for an extension of its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 clearance deadline for a period of four years until 1 April 2023. The request was granted at the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties. The plan under the extension request depends on the assumption that there would be an improvement in the security situation in all the regions contaminated by mines and ERW and that the required funds would be secured to implement the program activities. The other factors that may hamper the implementation include conflicts, population movements, the discovery of new hazards, high metallic content in the minefields, and the rainy season.[1]

On 30 April 2020, Sudan submitted an updated work plan for the implementation of Article 5 of the treaty, for the period 2020 to 2023.[2] Sudan has stated that it was on target to meet its deadline.[3]

Sudan is not a signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and has not adopted a specific clearance deadline for cluster munition remnants.

Management and coordination

Mine action management and coordination

Mine action management and coordination overview[4]

Mine action commenced

2002

National mine action management actors

Sudan National Mine Action Authority (NMAA)

Sudan National Mine Action Center (NMAC)

United Nations Agencies

United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

In Darfur, under the umbrella of the African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), UNMAS works under the name of the Ordnance Disposal Office (ODO)

Other actors

Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

Mine action legislation

  • Presidential Decree No. 299, December 2005: established the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA)
  • Presidential Decree No. 283, August 2006: endorsed the National Mine Action Strategic Framework 2006–2011 prepared by the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and national authorities
  • Presidential Decree No. 51, March 2010: adoption of the Sudan Mine Action Bill

Mine action strategic and operational plans

  • National Mine Action Strategic Framework 2006–2011
  • National Mine Action Plan for 2016–2019
  • Mine Action Multiyear Operational Plan 2020–2023

Mine action standards

In 2019, NMAC reported that a review of Sudan’s National Mine Action Standards had been completed and the revised standards were still awaiting endorsement as of November 2020

 

NMAC has been responsible for the management and coordination of the mine action program in Sudan since completion of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) mandate in 2011.[5]

In 2015, UNMAS resumed its advisory and support role in Sudan following an invitation from the Sudanese government. UNMAS supports NMAC building institutional capacity to meet its Article 5 obligations. It also manages land release, risk education, and victim assistance activities in coordination with NMAC and provides technical advice and training for the mine action center and national NGOs.[6]

Strategies and policies

The national mine action program is entirely nationally owned, managed, and coordinated by the Sudanese National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and NMAC.

Legislation and standards

In 2019, NMAC reported that a review of the National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) had been completed and were awaiting endorsement. As of November 2020, these were still awaiting endorsement.[7]The work of preparing, reviewing, and revising of the standards was conducted by a technical committee, consisting of NMAC, UNMAS, National Units for Mine Action and Development (NUMAD), The Development Initiative, JASMAR Human Security Organization (JASMAR) (previously the Sudanese Association for Combating Landmines), and the Friends of Peace and Development Organization (FPDO), with the support of the Ordnance Disposal Office (ODO) of the UN-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).[8]

Information management

Since January 2013 a data clean-up has been ongoing, its objective is to better utilize and improve the quality of data on hazardous areas.[9] In March 2018, NMAC reported that a process of upgrading the software of its Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database to a newer version, IMSMA New Generation (NG), was in progress with the assistance of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).[10]

In 2019, NMAC’s information management system was in the process of migrating data from IMSMA Legacy to IMSMA-NG.[11] Reporting tools have been developed with IMSMA-NG and standard IMSMA reporting forms for non-technical survey (NTS), technical survey, clearance, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), risk education, casualty data, victim assistance and impact assessment were being used.[12]

Gender and diversity

Sudan states that gender is considered in recruitment processes for key departments in NMAC and across the mine action pillars.[13]

Risk education management and coordination

Risk education management and coordination[14]

Government focal points

NMAC

 

Coordination mechanisms

NMAC is responsible for risk education coordination by national and international NGOs, accreditation of risk education teams, and awareness campaigns.

Coordination outcomes

The risk education technical working group led by NMAC meets on a monthly basis. NMAC also holds a coordination workshop at a regional level on an annual basis

Risk education standards

National standards for risk education

 

Coordination

Risk education teams are accredited in Blue Nile, Darfur, and South Kordofan states by NMAC. Monthly coordination meetings were held in 2019 with UNMAS, risk education implementing organizations and other relevant stakeholders.[15]

National Standards and guidelines

There is no standalone strategy for risk education,[16] but within its Operational Plan 2020–2023, Sudan has four objectives related to risk education. The objectives are: to integrate risk education activities with wider humanitarian, development, protection and education efforts as well as with survey, clearance, and victim assistance work; to provide context specific risk education; to prioritize people most at-risk by basing risk education interventions on casualty data analysis; and to build national capacity to deliver risk education.[17]

Victim assistance management and coordination

Victim assistance management and coordination[18]

Government focal points

NMAC

In Darfur: NMAC and Ministry of Social Affairs

Coordination mechanisms

National Council of Persons with Disabilities of Sudan (NCPD)

Coordination regularity and outcomes

NMAC auspices and organizes the monthly victims assistance coordination meetings

Plans/strategies

The Operational Plan 2020–2023 includes victim assistance objectives on: policies, plans, and legal frameworks, coordination, database management, victim assistance pillars, and national humanitarian response and preparedness plans

Victim assistance standards

National Mine Action Standards, NMAS 09.02

Disability sector integration

 

Ministry of Health, Ministry of Social Welfare, Supreme Council for Disabled Persons and Prosthetic Center work in coordination with NMAC

Survivor inclusion and participation

As part of the multiyear operational plan, Sudan committed to ensure the full, equal, and effective participation of survivors

 

NMAC held monthly victims assistance coordination with relevant ministries, national and international organizations and UNMAS, and also held a victim assistance department workshop on guidelines for the implantation of victim assistance projects including the National Council of the Disabled Persons (NCDP); national prosthetic centers, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and UN agencies.[19] Within the framework of the national-wide coordination, NMAC maintains ongoing coordination with the NCPD and other victims’ assistance entities in the country.[20]

Laws and policies

The 2017 Sudan Act for Persons with Disabilities was adopted by Sudan’s National Assembly in January 2017 and signed by the president in February 2017. In total, 14 out of 18 states also had state disability acts consistent with the newly adopted federal disability act.[21] An informal coalition of Sudanese disabled people’s organizations (DPOs) and civil society organizations submitted an alternative report to the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities for Sudan that provided an assessment of the implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).[22]

Impact

Contamination

Contamination overview (as of December 2019) [23]

Landmines

13.27km² (CHA: 2.4km² CHA, SHA: 10.87km²)

Extent of contamination: Medium

Cluster munition remnants

Unknown but limited

Other ERW contamination*

4.31km²

* It is expected that this amount would increase following non-technical survey operations planned in 2019–2021.

Note: CHA=confirmed hazardous area; ERW=explosive remnants of war; and SHA=suspected hazardous area.

 

Landmine contamination

At the end of 2019, Sudan reported 13.27km2 of mine contaminated land, with 43 CHAs and 52 SHAs in Blue Nile, South Kordofan, and West Kordofan states.[24] However, as of 1 March 2020, Sudan reported 90 recorded antipersonnel mine hazardous areas in eight areas including three SHAs in Blue Nile and four in South Kordofan, as well as one in West Kordofan states encompassing 19km2 total contaminated area.[25] There is also contamination on the border with Chad.[26]

Sudan started NTS at the end of 2019 to establish a national baseline of antipersonnel mine contamination. The survey will be carried out across the territories of Blue Nile, South Kordofan, West Kordofan, and the five Darfur states, with completion planned by the end of 2021. However, the survey is dependent upon access being granted to insecure areas. It was expected that newly found contamination would be added to the database but that a large proportion of the existing SHAs would be cancelled.[27]

Cluster munition remnant contamination

The exact extent of contamination from cluster munition remnants in Sudan is not fully known. At the beginning of 2018 only two areas in Sudan were suspected to contain cluster munition remnant contamination: one in South Kordofan and the other in West Kordofan state, each with an estimated size of 1km2.

At the end of 2019, NMAC reported that the security situation was an issue in the areas with the remaining suspected cluster munition contamination.[28]

ERW contamination

Darfur is contaminated by ERW.

The extent of ERW contamination in the disputed area of Abyei between Sudan and South Sudan is not known.

In Sudan’s Operational Plan 2020–2023 the total amount of ERW contamination was estimated to be 4.31km2 in the three territories of Blue Nile, Southern Darfur, and South Kordofan. It was expected that the amount of recorded ERW contamination would increase with the completion of NTS in 2021.[29]

Casualties

Casualties overview

Casualties

All known mine/ERW casualties (between 1964 and 2019)

2,171 casualties (623 killed and 1,548 injured)

Casualties in 2019

Annual total

30 casualties (decrease from 40 in 2018)

 

Survival outcome

24 injured; 6 killed

Device type causing casualties

1 antipersonnel mine; 5 antivehicle mines; 24 ERW

Civilian status

30 civilians

Age and gender

6 adults (all men)

24 children (17 boys and 7 girls)

 

 

Casualties in 2019: details

In 2019, 30 mine/ERW casualties were recorded in incidents in Blue Nile, Central and North Darfur, and South Kordofan, states. Children represented the majority of casualties recorded in 2019 (24 or 80%).[30] Several challenges to data collection were identified by NMAC. These included that most of the casualties live in or move around rural and remote areas, as well as the tough geography and harsh topography of the affected areas. The impact of indigenous customs and traditions and lack of resources also constituted a challenge to data collection.[31]

Cluster munition casualties

A total of 39 casualties from cluster munitions were recorded in Sudan by the Monitor from 2000 through to the end of 2013.

Casualties from unexploded submunitions were reported in 2013 in Western Darfur; in 2012 in Southern Darfur and South Kordofan; and in 2011 in Blue Nile. Prior to 2009, casualties occurred in Blue Nile, Kassala, and South Kordofan.

Addressing the impact

Mine action

Operators and service providers

Clearance operators[32]

National

NMAC

National Units for Mine Action and Development (NUMAD)

JASMAR

Friends for Peace and Development Organization (FPDO)

Global Aid Hand (GAH)

International

Dynasafe (hired by UNAMID)

 

Clearance

Clearance overview[33]

Landmine clearance in 2019

0.87 km2

Ordnance destroyed in 2019

1 antipersonnel mine; 12 antivehicle mines; 13,775 ERW

Landmine clearance in 2015–2019

2015: 0.42km² (28 antipersonnel mines)

2016: 1.04km² (105 antipersonnel mines)

2017: 0.71km² (144 antipersonnel mines)

2018: 0.97km² (31 antipersonnel mines)

2019: 0.87km2 (1 antipersonnel mine)

Total land cleared: 4.01km²

Cluster munition remnant land release in 2010–2019

 

15,318m²

Ordnance destroyed: 13 cluster munition remnants and 75,578 ERW

Progress

Landmines

One antipersonnel mine was found and destroyed during clearance in 2019 which suggests the need for more robust evidence-based survey

Note: ERW=explosive remnants of war.

 

Land release

Landmines

During 2019, Sudan cleared 0.87km2. Another 6.13km2 of land was released through technical survey, which was above the target of 5.49km2 for release through technical survey in 2019. No NTS was carried out in 2019, the target for cancelation through NTS was 4.9km2.[34]

From 2004 to 2019, Sudan reported the total destruction of 10,307 antipersonnel mines.[35] Sudan reported only finding one antipersonnel mine in the Blue Nile province during clearance in 2019.[36]

During 2019, access to Blue Nile and South Kordofan states was limited for clearance and survey operations due to security concerns in some parts of these states.[37] However, in 2019, it was also reported that access to Blue Nile and South Kordofan improved, enabling the assessment of roads for humanitarian assistance and population movement. It was expected that the security situation for mine action would improve with the multiple signing of peace agreements during 2020.[38]

During 2019, no international humanitarian NGOs were conducting demining work in the country, while national operators included JASMAR, NUMAD, FPDO, and Global Aid Hand (GAH). In Darfur, UNAMID funds Dynasafe, a commercial demining company, and NUMAD to conduct NTS, surface, and subsurface battle area clearance (BAC) and EOD spot tasks.[39]

Cluster munition remnants

No cluster munition remnant clearance was reported in 2019.

Border clearance

There is contamination on the border with Chad, for which the Sudanese government initiated an agreement to clear it. Additional border contamination was reported near South Sudan; however, the government is waiting for further peace talks to have an agreement to clear the border.[40]

Residual capacity

The eastern states have been declared free of all known contamination, but the government continues to support a sub-office in Kassala and has emergency teams to deal with any residual contamination found.[41]

Risk education

Operators and service providers

Risk education operators overview

Type of organization

Name of organization

Type of activity

Government

NMAC

Overall management and coordination of risk education activities in collaboration with national and international NGOs (Al Amal Organization for Community Development, (AOCD), GAH, and NADA Alazhar)

Ministry of Education

Oversees the inclusion of risk education within the school curriculum

National

Global Aid Hand (GAH)

Risk education in support of UNAMID and in Blue Nile and South Kordofan

International

NADA Alazhar

Risk education in support of UNAMID and in Darfur

AOCD

Risk education in Darfur

UNMAS

Risk education to local populations and to humanitarian workers

 

Beneficiary numbers

Beneficiary numbers[42]

Operator

Men

Boys

Women

Girls

NMAC

58,309

108,073

63,764

96,444

 

Sudan reported a total of 4,200,936 beneficiaries of risk education between 2002 and 2019, including a total of 326,590 beneficiaries in 2019 alone.[43]

Implementation

During 2019, 10 risk education teams conducted activities in Sudan. The main risk education approaches employed in Sudan include: direct risk education to affected communities, internally displaced people (IDPs) and returnees; public campaigns; community-based risk education; mass media, including radio and television broadcasts; community liaison; safety programs (for humanitarian staff); and the inclusion of risk education in the school curriculum at primary and secondary level.[44]

Targeting of risk education is undertaken through the ranking of contaminated communities into high, medium, and low impact using impact criteria. Communities with a score of nine and above are considered high impact, with scores of five to eight medium impact, and one to four low impact. Sudan plans to target the high impact communities for risk education during 2020–2021.[45]

Target groups

School-age children are considered to be the most at-risk, which is substantiated by the casualty data. NMAC and the Ministry of Education have incorporated risk education messages into the school curriculum at primary and secondary schools and provided training for teachers.[46] In 2019 5,000 copies of the risk education school curriculum were printed and distributed in Darfur, 3,000 for primary schools and 2,000 for secondary schools.[47]

Community leaders are also trained to pass on risk education messages to their communities.[48]

Adult groups practicing agriculture, herding and the collection of water and wood are also a high-risk group, as are refugees and IDPs. NMAC also noted that there were specific risk behaviors resulting in intentional engagement with mines and ERW, including scrap metal collection and the use of war remnants for decorations or household and farming tools.[49]

Marking

NMAC organizes the marking of hazardous areas into four categories: improvised marking using available resources when temporary or permanent materials are not available; temporary marking in preparation for humanitarian demining; permanent marking of areas not scheduled for humanitarian demining in the near future; and route marking, to indicate where contaminated land exists on either side of a cleared road.[50]

Major developments in 2019

In 2019 several risk education workshops were conducted on the methodology, materials development, and risk education for explosive ordnance in Southern and Northern Darfur states. The workshops were conducted by the risk education department of NMAC and one by the Association of Aid and Relief, Japan (AAR Japan).[51]

Victim Assistance

Victim assistance providers and activities

Providers and activities overview[52]

Type of organization

Name of organization

Type of activity

Government

NMAC Victim Assistance Department

Coordination of all pillars of victim assistance

National Council of the Disabled Persons (NCDP)

Coordination of activities and provision of services with NMAC

National Authority for Prosthetics and Orthotics (NAPO)

Provision of prostheses, orthoses and other mobility devices and physical therapy services with ICRC support

National

JASMAR

Medical assessment, socio-economic integration, psychosocial support. and assistive devices.

International

Global Aid Hand (GAH)

Medical screening, socio-economic inclusion, psychosocial support in Darfur

UNMAS

Socio-economic and psychological support

UNAMID-ODO

Victim assistance through National Units for Mine Action and Development (NUMAD) for 25 families in the five states of Darfur

ICRC

Provision of supplies, training, advice, other forms of assistance to the National Authority for Prosthetics and Orthotics (NAPO) and the Khartoum Cheshire Home (KCH); as well as social and economic inclusion and referrals

 

Major developments in 2019

JASMAR implemented two victim assistance projects: one in Blue Nile and the other in South Kordofan funded by Japan and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The projects included medical assessment, socio-economic integration, psychosocial support, and assistive devices.[53]

Funding to victim assistance ended in areas that have officially been declared cleared from mines/ERW including Sudan’s eastern states. This has negatively impacted the support to victim assistance in those states, and consequently Sudan provided resources to try to fill the gaps created by the deficiency of external funding flows.[54]

NMAC identified several opportunities that could enhance victim assistance including the increased willingness of donors to support future mine action; a greater level of coordination between NMAC, UNMAC, and partners and national entities; successful peace building; enhanced attention from Sudan to its own national mine action program.[55]

Needs assessment

Sudan reported that there were still important challenges associated with the gathering of information on the victims in order to include them in the centralized database. These challenges include: the access to remote places of some of the victims and ensuring their mobility; the difficulty to reach and access the affected areas due to their geographic nature; the local customs and traditions which sometimes have limited the achievement of the desired objectives; and the scantness and scarcity of support to the victim assistance programs.[56]

Information on mine/ERW survivors is collected in the national disability system, managed by the NCPD.[57]

Medical care and rehabilitation

Sudan reported that all hospitals in towns which are located in the proximity of mine/ERW affected areas have been equipped with surgeons and medical staff. Medical protocols of mine/ERW clearance teams are considered prerequisites prior to their operations commencement of such medical capacities.[58] Even if medical assistance is available, Sudan also reported that survivors in remote areas need to be taken to larger cities to receive proper physical rehabilitation. To improve this situation, specialized technicians were being delegated to the centers that are lacking this kind of services, especially when the physical rehabilitation projects were being implemented. Another issue stated for the general provision of assistance is that there were not enough first-aid professional providers in comparison with the number of mine/ERW contaminated areas, making it essential to train more first-aid providers.[59]

The ICRC supported eight facilities, including the National Authority for Prosthetics and Orthotics (NAPO) and the Khartoum Cheshire Home (KCH) to provide physiotherapy, rehabilitation, and assistive devices with supplies, training, and advice and other forms of assistance.[60] The ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Programme provided regular training and a three-week course for NAPO Khartoum technical staff and technical support for KCH staff.[61] The ICRC facilitated access to services at the Nyala physical rehabilitation center to economically vulnerable people with disabilities from Darfur and West Kordofan.[62]

Socio-economic and psychosocial inclusion

NMAC reported an increase in the provision of social and psychological support to mine/ERW survivors and their families in the affected areas, including peer support in and outside of hospitals, in partnership with the medical cadres and unions of persons with disabilities. NMAC also recognized a scarcity of the provision of similar psychological support services to the victims in remote and unsafe areas, and highlighted the need to train psychological support professionals to provide an appropriate service to mine/ERW victims in those areas.[63]

Social inclusion activities included the involvement of mine/ERW survivors in cultural, entertainment and sport activities held in the affected areas, including in remote villages, with places reserved for persons with disabilities in stadiums and theaters.[64] The ICRC continued its support for wheelchair basketball teams and referred them to its economic inclusion program.[65]

NMAC noted that there was improvement in the economic situation and social inclusion of mine/ERW survivors and affected families. NMAC also reported the inclusion of victims and family members under existing health insurance and social and psychological support mechanisms. The percentage of survivors employed in governmental institutions and cooperative projects was maintained. A quota for higher and postgraduate education for persons with disabilities has contributed to social reintegration measures.[66]

JASMAR conducted two workshops on awareness and advocacy of the rights of persons with disabilities in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states.[67]

Cross-cutting issues

The unstable security situation in some parts of Blue Nile and South Kordofan states hampered victim assistance efforts. Seasonal climate conditions and remoteness of the mine/ERW affected areas from available services were noted as additional impediments.[68]

 


[1] Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), p. 17.

[3] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Hatim Khamis Rahama, Technical Advisor, NMAC, 30 March 2020.

[4] Ibid.

[6] Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form C, p. 9, and UNMAS, “Programmes: Sudan (Excluding Darfur),” October 2020.

[7] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Hatim Khamis Rahama, Technical Advisor, NMAC, 30 March 2020.

[8] Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form F, p. 16.

[9] Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), p. 18.

[10] Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, March 2018, pp. 37–38.

[11] Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form F, p. 20.

[13] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Hatim Khamis Rahama, Technical Advisor, NMAC, 30 March 2020.

[14] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohamed Abd Elmagid, Mine Risk Education (MRE) Manager, NMAC, 30 March 2020.

[15] Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form I; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohamed Abd Elmagid, MRE Manager, NMAC, 30 March 2020.

[16] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohamed Abd Elmagid, MRE Manager, NMAC, 30 March 2020.

[18] Ibid.; and Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Annex III.

[19] Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form J.

[20] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sahar Mustafa Mahmoud, Victim Assistance (VA) Associate, NMAC, 30 March 2020.

[21] NCPD, “Sudan National Council Annual report, 2017,” by Abdulrahman Esmael Ghani, Director of Planning, Policies and Research, NCPD, Khartoum, 17 May 2018.

[22] “Implementation of the CRPD, Alternative report – The Republic of Sudan,” Alradi Abdalla, ADD, Khartoum Sudan, 24 August 2017.

[23] Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019) Form C, p. 8.

[24] Ibid.

[26] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Hatim Khamis Rahama, Technical Advisor, NMAC, 30 March 2020.

[28] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Hatim Khamis Rahama, Technical Advisor, NMAC, 30 March 2020.

[30] Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form J, p. 35.

[31] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Asaad Ibrahim, IMSMA Officer, NMAC, 30 March2020.

[32] Republic of Sudan, “APMBC Compliance Mine Action, Multiyear Operational Plan 2020 to 2023,” 30 April 2020; and Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form G, p. 28.

[33] Landmine clearance totals for 2014 to 2017 are from previous Landmine Monitor reports, 2018 clearance figure is from Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), p.1 3, and 2019 clearance figure is from Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), p. 15. Cluster munition remnant clearance data: response to Monitor questionnaire by Hatim Khamis Rahama, Technical Advisor, NMAC, 30 March 2020.

[34] Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form F, pp. 15 and 19.

[35] Ibid., Form G, p. 29.

[36] Ibid., p. 28.

[38] Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form F, pp. 21–22.

[39] Ibid., Form G, p. 28.

[40] Response to Monitor questionnaire from Hatim Khamis Rahama, Technical Advisor, NMAC, 30 March 2020.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form I, p. 33.

[43] Ibid., p. 34.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohamed Abd Elmagid, MRE Manager, NMAC, 30 March 2020.

[47] Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form I, p. 34.

[48] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohamed Abd Elmagid, MRE Manager, NMAC, 30 March 2020.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form I, p. 32.

[51] Ibid., Form I, p. 34.

[52] ICRC, “I am no different than anyone else,” 3 December 2019; ICRC, “Annual Report 2019,” 29 June 2020; ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Program: 2019 Annual Report,” July 2020; Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form F; UNMAS, “Programmes: Sudan (Excluding Darfur),” October 2020; and UNMAS, “UNAMID ODO Victim Assistance Project,” 11 July 2019.

[53] Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form F.

[54] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sahar Mustafa Mahmoud, VA Associate, NMAC, 30 March 2020.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Annex III: VA Checklist.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Ibid.

[60] ICRC, “Annual Report 2019,” 29 June 2020.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sahar Mustafa Mahmoud, VA Associate, NMAC, 30 March 2020.

[64] Ibid.

[66] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sahar Mustafa Mahmoud, VA Associate, NMAC, 30 March 2020.

[67] Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form F.

[68] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sahar Mustafa Mahmoud, VA Associate, NMAC, 30 March 2020.


Mine Ban Policy

Last updated: 18 December 2019

Policy

The Republic of the Sudan signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 13 October 2003, becoming a State Party on 1 April 2004.[1] Sudan adopted the Sudan Mine Action Law by Presidential Decree #51 on 31 March 2010.[2] The act is comprised of 29 articles divided into four chapters. Chapter four includes Mine Ban Treaty obligations, including the prohibition on antipersonnel mine use and stockpiling, clearance of contaminated areas, risk education, victim assistance, and transparency reporting. It also includes penalties for violations.[3]

Sudan regularly attends meetings of the treaty, including the Third Review Conference in Maputo in June 2014, and more recently the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2018, where it requested an extension for its Article 5 mine clearance obligations.[4] Sudan also attended the intersessional meetings of the treaty in Geneva in May 2019, where it provided statements on victim assistance and cooperative compliance, as well as an update on Article 5 mine clearance progress. Sudan consistently submits annual updated Article 7 transparency reports.[5]

Sudan is not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Sudan signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) on 10 April 1981, but has not ratified it. Sudan is not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Production and transfer

Sudan has declared that it “never produced” antipersonnel mines.[6] It has repeatedly stated that it has not produced or exported antipersonnel mines.[7]

Use

There have been no confirmed instances of government forces using antipersonnel mines since Sudan became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty in 2004, but there were several reports of use of antipersonnel mines in Sudan in 2011, 2012, and 2013 that the Monitor has been unable to confirm.

It is clear from evidence and testimony from various sources that in the southern part of the country antipersonnel mines are available for use, but the Monitor has not seen definitive evidence about what forces may have used antipersonnel mines. There is also a lack of clarity about whether antipersonnel mines or antivehicle mines, or both, have been used. In its Article 7 reports and statements the government of Sudan has provided little to no official information on the mine use allegations, for which it has denied responsibility.

On 22 July 2014, Spokesperson for the Sudan Liberation Movement (Abdel Wahid al-Nur, SLM-AW) Mustafa Tambur told Radio Dabanga that the Sudanese government had planted landmines in the Kutum locality in North Darfur. Heavy rainfall allegedly revealed 23 antipersonnel mines in the Fonu area near Kutum. Tambur also demanded that the international community call on the Sudanese government to stop using landmines.[8]

On 14 August 2014, the Leaders of the both factions of the Sudan Liberation Movement—Mini Minawi, leader of the SLM-MM[9] and Abdol Wahid, leader of the SLM-AW[10]—met in Geneva to sign Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment to ban antipersonnel landmines. Abdol Wahid told Radio Dabanga that this agreement brought Sudan closer to fighting the deadly landmine contamination in Darfur. Mini Minawi also told the radio station that this commitment was “an importance step” within this humanitarian framework.[11] With the two main factions of the SLM signing Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment, all four main non-state armed groups actively operating in Sudan have pledged to refrain from using antipersonnel landmines.[12]

On 29 August 2013, a delegation of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), comprised of Deputy Chairman Abdelaziz Alhilu and Secretary General Yasir Arman, signed Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment, thereby agreeing to prohibit the use, production, and transfer of antipersonnel mines, to cooperate in humanitarian mine action activities, and to destroy its stockpiles. Upon signing, Alhilu said, “In compliance with our pledge, we will destroy all [antipersonnel] mines in our possession as soon as possible. These mines were captured during military operations.”[13] During Geneva Call’s third meeting of signatories to the Deed of Commitment, spokesperson of the SPLM-N’s delegation, Mubarak Ardol, stated that the SPLM-N will invite all interested parties to witness the public destruction of the landmines the group has acquired during “military operations over the past four year[s].” He also added that the SPLM-N’s delegation proposed adding a fourth protocol to the Deed of Commitment concerning humanitarian assistance in war zones.[14]

Stockpiling and destruction

Sudan reported completion of destruction of its stockpile of 10,566 antipersonnel mines on 31 March 2008, just ahead of its 1 April 2008 treaty-mandated deadline. The reported size and composition of Sudan’s stockpile, as well as the number of mines to be retained for training purposes, have varied.[15] At the Second Review Conference in 2009, Sudan stated that a total of 10,656 stockpiled antipersonnel mines were destroyed (possibly a typographical error from the 10,566 mentioned above).[16] However, Sudan declared in April 2012 and again in April 2013 that a total of 13,371 stockpiled antipersonnel mines were destroyed in Khartoum in 2007.[17]

In 2009, Sudan reported the discovery of arms caches including antipersonnel mines at various locations of southern Sudan that were subsequently destroyed in Blue Nile state in 2008.[18]

Mines retained for training purposes

In its April 2019 Article 7 report, Sudan stated that it is retaining a total of 739 mines. From 2009 to 2015, Sudan reported a total of 1,938 mines, but since 2016 has been steadily decreasing the number retained. In 2009, Sudan reported a reduction in the number of mines retained for training from 4,997 to 1,938 mines.[19] From 2009 to 2015, Sudan reported the transfer of 75 “Type 35” plastic mines from the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) to the UN Mine Action Office “for training purposes,” but the total number of mines retained for training remained unchanged.[20] Sudan has not disclosed the intended purposes or actual uses of its retained mines, as agreed by States Parties at Mine Ban Treaty Review Conferences held in 2004 and 2009.



[1] South Sudan became an independent state on 9 July 2011.

[2] Interview with Adil Abdelhamid Adam, Legal Advisor, National Mine Action Center, Khartoum, 28 March 2011. The Monitor has copies of the law and the decree in Arabic.

[3] Ibid., 31 March 2010. In April 2009, Sudan reported that draft national implementation legislation had been cleared by the Government of National Unity (GONU) Ministry of Justice and “endorsed by the concerned committee of the National Assembly responsible for the validations of humanitarian laws.” Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form A, 13 April 2009.

[4] Presentation by Sudan, Mine Ban Treaty Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 27 November 2018.

[5] Ambassador Osman Abufatima Adam Mohammed, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the UN in Geneva serves as President of the Convention and will chair the 18th Meeting of States Parties in November 2020. Mine Ban Convention, “Sudan, New Convention President,” 16 January 2020.

[6] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form E, April 2013.

[7] Previous editions of the Monitor have noted no evidence of production of antipersonnel mines by Sudan but have cited allegations of transfer to militant groups in neighboring countries prior to Sudan becoming a State Party. See, Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 223. Sudan has consistently reported that it “has never produced AP [antipersonnel] mines.” See, for example, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form E, April 2012.

[8]Landmines exposed by rain in North Darfur,” Radio Dabanga, 22 July 2014.

[10] Ibid.

[11]Last two Sudan rebel groups sign landmine ban,” Radio Dabanga, 15 August 2014.

[12] Geneva Call, “Sudan,” undated.

[13] Geneva Call Press Release, “Major Sudanese armed group commits against anti-personnel mines,” 29 August 2013.

[15] See, Landmine Monitor Report 2009, pp. 675–676. In its February 2006 Article 7 report, Sudan declared a total of 14,485 antipersonnel mines of eight types held in army and Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) stockpiles, and stated that 5,000 mines of various types would be retained for training purposes by the Engineer Corps of the SAF. In its Article 7 reports submitted in May 2006 and April 2007, Sudan declared a total of 4,485 stockpiled antipersonnel mines of 18 types, all under GONU control, and an additional 10,000 mines of unspecified types to be retained for training purposes, with GONU and the government of South Sudan each retaining 5,000 mines. Sudan destroyed a total of 10,556 mines on 30 April 2007 in northern Sudan and 31 March 2008 in Southern Sudan. In an April 2008 letter, Sudan stated that, of a total stockpile of 15,566 antipersonnel mines, it had destroyed 10,566 and retained 5,000. Sudan stated that the adjusted figure of 15,566 mines (rather than the 14,485 mines previously reported) was the result of additional mines stockpiled by SPLA forces not being previously included in inventories. In its 2009 Article 7 report, Sudan revised its number of mines retained for training purposes, this time reporting a total of 1,938 mines of six types. In a presentation during the May 2009 intersessional Standing Committee meetings, Sudan revised its total number of stockpiled mines, reporting that in spite of its original declaration of 14,485 stockpiled mines, only 12,513 were “accounted for” during physical stock-taking. It is likely that number is supposed to be 12,504 (the 10,566 destroyed mines plus the 1,938 retained mines). Sudan noted, “As no proper records have been maintained, determining the exact number and types of APMs [antipersonnel mines] was a challenge.” In its 2011 Article 7 report, Sudan declared the destruction of 10,656 stockpiled mines (4,488 mines destroyed in Khartoum in April 2007 and 6,078 in Juba, South Sudan on 31 March 2008). Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form G, April 2011.

[16] Statement by Dr. Abdelbagi Gailani, State Minister of Humanitarian Affairs and Secretary-General of the National Mine Action Authority, Mine Ban Treaty Second Review Conference, Cartagena, 3 December 2009.

[17] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form G, April 2012; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form G, April 2013.

[18] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form G, 13 April 2009. At the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008, Sudan said that it had found “additional abandoned caches” of mines and would destroy them. In March 2008, Sudan indicated that it expects additional stockpiled antipersonnel mines will be identified and destroyed, given the difficulties of doing a comprehensive inventory and collection of all the stockpiled antipersonnel mines belonging to all former combatants in Sudan. See, Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 634.

[19] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form D, 13 April 2009.

[20] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form D, 13 April 2009; and in reports submitted 13 April 2009, 28 April 2010, April 2011, April 2012, April 2013, April 2014, and April 2015.


Support for Mine Action

Last updated: 16 November 2020

In 2019, four donors contributed US$3.5 million toward mine action in the Republic of the Sudan through the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and national units for mine action.[1]

International contributions: 2019[2]

Donor

Sector

Amount

(national currency)

Amount

(US$)

United Kingdom

Clearance and risk education

£1,970,000

2,515,296

Italy

Clearance, risk education, and victim assistance

€500,000

559,700

Japan

Various

¥35,427,684

324,965

South Korea

Clearance and victim assistance

N/R

50,000

Total

 

N/A

3,449,961

Note: N/A=not available; N/R=not reported.

Since 2015, Sudan has received more than $14 million in total international support to mine action activities, with annual contributions fluctuating from less than $2 million to more than $5 million.

Summary of contributions: 2015–2019[3]

Year

International contributions (US$)

2019

3,449,961

2018

5,126,914

2017

1,586,230

2016

1,713,800

2015

2,377,400

Total

14,254,305

 


[1] Italy Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form I, 25 June 2020; Japan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 March 2020; UNMAS, ‘‘Annual Report 2019,’’ pp. 32–33, 22 April 2020; and United Kingdom Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2020.

[2] Average exchange rates for 2019: €1=US$1.1194; ¥109.02=US$1; and £1.2768=US$1. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 2 January 2020.

[3] See previous Monitor reports.