Ten-Year Review: Non-signatory the United States (US) has not taken any steps to join the Convention on Cluster Munitions, as it sees military utility in cluster munitions. The US has never participated in a meeting of the convention, even as an observer. It abstained from voting on a key United Nations (UN) resolution promoting the convention in December 2019.

In November 2017, the US reversed a long-standing policy requiring its forces to not use cluster munitions that result in more than 1% unexploded ordnance (UXO) after 2018. The US last used cluster munitions during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, with the exception of a single attack in Yemen in 2009. The US last budgeted funds to produce new cluster munitions in 2007 and since then has only manufactured them for foreign sales. Research and development programs for the replacing of artillery-delivered submunitions commenced in 2018.

Policy

The United States of America has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The US has not taken any steps to join the convention because, in its view, cluster munitions provide “a vital military capability.”[1]

National policy

In November 2017, the Trump administration replaced a July 2008 Department of Defense policy directive on cluster munitions issued under President George W. Bush.[2] The Trump policy abandons the requirement that the US no longer use cluster munitions that result in more than a 1% UXO rate by the end of 2018.[3]

The 2017 policy requires the Department of Defense to “program for capabilities to replace cluster munitions” that do not meet the 1% UXO standard.[4] However, to “meet immediate warfighting demand” the policy gives combatant commanders (the heads of various combatant commands with geographic and other areas of responsibility) the authority to approve employing (using) cluster munitions “that do not meet the standards prescribed by this policy for procuring new cluster munitions” as well as to accept transfers of those cluster munitions.[5]

Trump administration officials have not commented on cluster munitions or the 2017 policy since then. The 2017 policy roll-back was widely condemned.[6] A March 2018 Government Business Council report criticized the 2017 policy for exposing the US to “international backlash” and hampering its “ability to remain on the cutting edge of defense technology.”[7]

Following the 2017 policy, the Congressional Research Service recommended in February 2019 that the US Congress consider “how this U.S. policy reversal on the military use of cluster munitions will be perceived by the international community.”[8]

US and the Convention on Cluster Munitions

The US did not participate, even as an observer, in the 2007–2008 Oslo Process that resulted in the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[9] However, US Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks show how the US attempted to influence its allies, partners, and other states during the process in order to affect the outcome of the negotiations, especially with respect to the issue of “interoperability” (joint military operations between the US and States Parties to the convention).[10]

The US has never participated in a meeting of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, even as an observer. The US was invited, but did not attend, the convention’s Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2019.

In December 2019, the US abstained from the vote on a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that urged states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”[11] The US has abstained from voting on the annual UNGA resolution promoting the convention since it was first introduced in 2015. In 2015, the US explained that it considers the resolution to apply “only to those States Parties to this convention.”[12] In October 2019, the US again stated that it does not accept that the convention “represents an emerging norm.”[13]

However, the US has voted in favor of UNGA resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, most recently in December 2019.[14]

In previous years, Senators Dianne Feinstein and Patrick Leahy have introduced legislation encouraging the US to accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions as soon as possible.[15]

The US is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but has not proposed further CCW deliberations on cluster munitions since States Parties to the CCW failed to adopt a draft protocol on cluster munitions in 2011.[16] This effectively concluded CCW consideration on the matter, leaving the Convention on Cluster Munitions as the sole international instrument dedicated to ending the suffering caused by these weapons.

The US is not a party to the Mine Ban Treaty, but since 2009 has participated as an observer in Mine Ban Treaty meetings.

Use

Under the 2017 policy, any US cluster munition use that exceeds the 1% UXO rate must be approved by a combatant commander.[17]

The last US use of cluster munitions was during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, with the exception of a single attack in Yemen in December 2009.[18] Neither the US nor the Yemeni government has publicly denied US responsibility for the 2009 attack.[19]

In 2016, the US Air Force (USAF) said it had not used cluster munitions in the air war against the Islamic State during operations in Iraq, Syria, and Libya.[20] The US provided logistical and other support to a Saudi Arabia-led coalition of states that used US-supplied cluster munitions in Yemen in 2015–2017.

The US used cluster munitions in several conflicts in the past: Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam (1960s and 1970s); Grenada, and Lebanon (1983); Libya (1986); Iran (1988); Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia (1991); Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995); Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo (1999); Afghanistan (2001–2002); Iraq (2003); and Yemen (2009).[21]

In December 2019, the New York Times published an investigation documenting fratricidal cluster munition deaths among US troops in Iraq and other countries as well as at US training ranges.[22]

Production

The US Department of Defense could not confirm whether the US still produces cluster munitions as of December 2018, telling a US media outlet that it “is not aware of any U.S. industry production of cluster munitions.”[23]

Since 2005, all submunitions produced by the US must have a failure rate of less than 1%, according to a 2001 policy issued by Secretary of Defense William Cohen.[24] The US last budgeted funds to produce new cluster munitions in 2007.[25] Since then, it has manufactured cluster munitions only for each foreign sales order in accordance with the delivery schedule.

The US government has not taken any steps to prohibit US production of cluster munitions since 2016, when the sole remaining US producer, Textron Systems Corporation, announced an end to its production.[26] In a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission on 30 August 2016, Textron said it discontinued production of the CBU-105 cluster bomb because of reduced orders, stating that “the current political environment has made it difficult” to obtain sales approvals.[27]

In the past, before the adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the US licensed the production of cluster munitions with Japan, the Netherlands, Pakistan, South Korea and Turkey.

Alternatives to cluster munitions

The USAF, the US Army, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, are continuing research and development activities at the applied research level to develop alternatives to cluster munitions.[28]

Lockheed Martin is producing the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System-Alternate Warhead (GMLRS-AW) for the US Army.[29] The GMLRS-AW has been manufactured for foreign military sales.[30] In April 2020, Lockheed Martin vice president Jarrod P. Agen told media that the company “does not develop or produce cluster munitions, as defined in the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions.”[31]

The US Army initially awarded a US$71 million contract in April 2018 to acquire 1,250 155mm BONUS artillery projectiles from a company in Sweden.[32] The BONUS projectile contains two sensor-fuzed submunitions and is not prohibited by the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Budget justification materials described the BONUS as “an effective bridging strategy to address critical capability gaps from the loss of DPICM and mitigates risks until the planned program of record is completed.” This procurement has been expanded multiple times, most recently in March 2020, for subsequent fiscal years, and now funds the $245 million acquisition of 3,379 projectiles to be delivered through April 2022.[33]

The US Army has funded research and development programs that aim to “provide increased battlefield lethality with reduced unexploded ordnance (UXO) compliant with the Department of Defense (DoD) cluster munitions policy” such as the “Cannon-Delivered Area Effects Munitions (C-DAEM) Program.”[34] The C-DAEM program aims to replace the current US stockpile of 155mm Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM) “with DoD policy compliant munitions and address anti-armor and extended range capability requirements.” A total of $27.5 million was spent on C-DAEM in 2018–2020, while the fiscal year 2021 budget has requested $41 million for the program in 2021 for completion of the competitive demonstration phase.[35]

Beginning in 2018, the US spent $2.5 million testing the 155mm M999 “Advance Anti-Personnel Munition” containing M99 explosive submunitions produced by Israel Military Industries (IMI).[36] In October 2018, an IMI official told The New York Times that each M999 shell contains nine submunitions with self-destruct features.[37] More information is needed to determine if this weapon complies with the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Transfer

Export moratorium language has been included in the annual budget each year.[38] The provision of military assistance for cluster munitions, the issuing of defense export licenses for cluster munitions, or the sale or transfer of cluster munitions or cluster munitions technology is prohibited unless “the submunitions of the cluster munitions, after arming, do not result in more than 1 percent unexploded ordnance across the range of intended operational environments.” In addition, any agreement “applicable to the assistance, transfer, or sale of such cluster munitions or cluster munitions technology” must specify that the munitions “will only be used against clearly defined military targets and will not be used where civilians are known to be present or in areas normally inhabited by civilians.”

On 19 May 2011, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)—the US government agency that administers weapons transfers—issued a memorandum on the sale of cluster munitions that incorporates these legal requirements into DSCA policy by adding them to the Security Assistance Management Manual. According to the memorandum, “the only cluster munition with a compliant submunition (one that does not result in more than 1% UXO across the range of intended operational environments) is the CBU-97B/CBU-105, Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW).”[39]

The last congressional sales notification for CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons was in July 2015. Congressional notifications show that the US had concluded agreements from 2008 until 2015 to sell CBU-105 to India,[40] Oman,[41] Saudi Arabia,[42] Singapore,[43] South Korea,[44] Taiwan,[45] and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).[46]

In May 2016, a senior Department of Defense official said that the end-use provision of its 2012 agreement with Saudi Arabia and “a handful of other cases” was “incomplete.”[47] The use of US-manufactured and US-supplied CBU-105 in 2015 and 2016 raised serious questions about whether the transfer requirements were being met.[48] In May 2016, the Obama administration suspended transfers of cluster munitions to Saudi Arabia after reports of their use in civilian areas in Yemen.[49]

While the historical record is incomplete, in the past, the US transferred hundreds of thousands of cluster munitions containing tens of millions of submunitions to at least 30 countries: Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, the UAE, and the United Kingdom (UK).[50]

In 2012, Chile’s Ministry of National Defense provided information showing that Chile transferred one 250kg cluster bomb and one 500kg cluster bomb to the US in 1991.[51]

Stockpiling

A 2004 Department of Defense report to the US Congress detailed a stockpile of 5.5 million cluster munitions of 17 different types containing about 728.5 million submunitions, as listed in the following table. That number does not appear to be a full account of cluster munitions available to US forces, as it apparently does not include US cluster munitions stocks located in foreign countries or stockpiled as part of the War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA).[52]

While outdated, the 2004 list remains the most detailed public account of US cluster munition stocks.

US stockpile of cluster munitions (as of 2004)[53]

Stockpile destruction

All cluster munition stocks that exceed or do not satisfy operational planning requirements were removed by the service and combatant commands from the active inventory by June 2009.

The now-reversed 2008 policy required that the Department of Defense relinquish more than 99.9% of its cluster munition stocks by the end of 2018, as only the CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapon met the less than 1% UXO requirement.

According to a March 2019 Department of Defense budget request, “Currently, there are approximately 93,766 tons of cluster munitions” in the demilitarization account known as ‘B5A.’” The document states that an additional 203,024 tons of cluster munitions remain in CONUS outside the B5A, while another 91,362 cluster munitions are “OCONUS” or not scheduled for destruction.

Recent funding for the destruction of cluster munitions (US$ million)[54]

Note: FY=Fiscal year.

Previously, US budget materials released in February 2018 stated that there were “approximately 122,083 tons of cluster munitions in the demil stockpile” and another “188,787 tons remaining in [the continental US] outside the B5A and another 127,972 [outside the continental US].”[55]

US company General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems (GDOTS) claims to be “the only US company experienced with automated disposal of Cluster Munitions” and states that it operates “the only commercial submunitions demilitarization facility” in the US.[56] In 2013 and 2015, the company was awarded contracts to demilitarize US cluster munitions and other weapons.[57] In 2014, GDOTS completed the destruction of Canada’s stockpile of 12,597 M483A1 projectiles and 1,108,536 DPICM submunitions at its facility outside Joplin, Missouri.[58]

Since the fiscal year 2007, there has been a separate funding source for the destruction of Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) rockets and ATACM missiles, with special destruction facilities for MLRS rockets at the Anniston Defense Munitions Center in Alabama, and at the Letterkenny Munitions Center in Pennsylvania. The army requested $109 million for the destruction of 98,904 M26 MLRS rockets from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2012.[59]

Foreign stockpiling and transit

The US appears to have removed its cluster munition stocks from the territories of at least two States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The US removed its stockpiled cluster munitions from Norway in 2010,[60] while the UK announced in 2010 that there were now “no foreign stockpiles of cluster munitions in the UK or on any UK territory.”[61]

The US has stockpiled and may continue to store cluster munitions in countries including Convention on Cluster Munitions States Parties Afghanistan, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain, and in non-signatories Israel, Qatar, and perhaps Kuwait. This information is contained in the following US Department of State cables released by Wikileaks in 2010–2011:

• In Afghanistan, the “United States currently has a very small stockpile of cluster munitions,” according to a December 2008 cable.[62]
• Germany has engaged with the US on the matter of cluster munitions that may be stockpiled by the US in Germany, according to a December 2008 cable.[63]
• In Israel, US cluster munitions are “considered to be under U.S. title” until they are transferred from the WRSA for use by Israel in wartime.[64]
• Italy, Spain, and Qatar are identified in a November 2008 cable as “states in which the US stores cluster munitions,” even though apparently, Qatar “may be unaware of US cluster munitions stockpiles in the country.”[65]
• Japan “recognizes U.S. forces in Japan are not under Japan’s control and hence the GOJ [Government of Japan] cannot compel them to take action or to penalize them,” according to a December 2008 cable.[66]
• The US may store clusters munitions in Kuwait, according to a May 2007 cable.[67]

Policy

The United States of America (US) has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty.

On 31 January 2020, the administration of President Donald Trump announced new policy rolling back US prohibitions on landmine production and use.[1] The new policy—detailed below—has taken the US off the path towards joining the Mine Ban Treaty, a goal set by the Obama administration in 2014.

The US was the first country to call for the “eventual elimination” of antipersonnel mines in September 1994. It participated in the Ottawa Process to ban landmines, but did not adopt or sign the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997. That year, the Clinton administration set the goal for the US to join the treaty in 2006, an objective that the Bush administration then reversed in 2004.[2]

Since 2009, the US has participated as an observer in meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty.[3] It was present at, but did not address the treaty’s Fourth Review Conference in Oslo in November 2019.

In December 2019, the US abstained from voting on UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 74/61 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. The US has abstained from every Mine Ban Treaty resolution since 1998.

The US is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and provided an annual transparency report for Amended Protocol II on landmines on 10 April 2020.

2020 landmine policy

The 2020 landmine policy allows the US to develop, produce, and use landmines as long as they are “non-persistent,” that is, equipped with self-destruct and self-deactivation features. The policy abandons the previous constraint on using antipersonnel mines only on the Korean peninsula and instead permits the US to use them anywhere in the world.

The policy makes no distinction between antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, but the White House spokesperson stated that antipersonnel landmines are the focus of the new policy. The Mine Ban Treaty prohibits antipersonnel mines, but not antivehicle mines or command-detonated (remote-controlled) mines. It comprehensively bans all types of victim-activated explosive devices, regardless of their predicted longevity, delivery method, or type of manufacture (improvised or factory-made).

A Department of Defense fact sheet issued with the policy, entitled “Strategic Advantages of Landmines,” asserts that landmines are “a vital tool in conventional warfare” that provide “a necessary warfighting capability…while reducing the risk of unintended harm to non-combatants.” Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) prepared by the Department of Defensefor the policy announcement assert that the US needs landmines now, because “the strategic environment has changed” since 2014 with “the return of Great Power Competition and a focus on near-peer competitors” or adversaries. Defense officials announcing the policy told media they could envision the US using landmines in a variety of theaters against a range of adversaries, such as Russia and China.[4]

The Trump administration’s decision to reverse US prohibitions and limits on landmines has been widely condemned and criticized, including by the US Campaign to Ban Landmines (USCBL). Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont said it “reverses the gains we have made and weakens our global leadership.”[5] On 6 May 2020, Leahy, Representative Jim McGovern, and more than 100 other members of Congress wrote to Secretary of Defense Mark Esper expressing disappointment at the policy reversal, regret at the lack of consultation, and providing three pages of questions regarding future plans for development and use of antipersonnel mines.[6] The Department of Defense provided a detailed 12-page response in September 2020.

Department of Defense officials have said the US does not intend to pressure partners and allies to change their landmine policies, nor will the new US policy prevent it from conducting future operations in coalition with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other partners.

Mine Ban Treaty President, Ambassador Osman Abufatima Adam Mohammed of Sudan, issued a statement that said the policy “goes against” the “long-standing commitment” made by the US to help eradicate the suffering caused by landmines. States Parties including Belgium,[7] France, Germany,[8] the Netherlands,[9] Norway,[10] and Switzerland[11] expressed their concern and disappointment over the new US policy, as did the European Union.[12]

Previously, in 2014, the Obama administration issued a US landmine policy banning production and acquisition of antipersonnel mines as well as halting their use by the US anywhere except the Korean Peninsula.[13] The Obama administration brought US policy further in line with the Mine Ban Treaty, but did not take any measures towards US accession.[14]

Under the 2014 policy, the US committed to not use antipersonnel landmines outside of the Korean Peninsula and not to assist, encourage, or induce other nations to use, stockpile, produce, or transfer antipersonnel mines outside of Korea. It also committed to no future US production or acquisition of antipersonnel mines.

Use

The last US use of antipersonnel mines was in Iraq and Kuwait in 1991 with the exception of the use of a single antipersonnel mine in Afghanistan in 2002.[15] US forces in Afghanistan reportedly used Claymore directional fragmentation mines in 2009 and 2010, which are not prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty if used in command-detonated mode.[16]

The 2020 policy allows the US to develop, produce, and use landmines as long as they are “non-persistent,” that is, equipped with self-destruct and self-deactivation features. It abandons the previous constraint on using antipersonnel mines only on the Korean peninsula and instead permits the US to use them anywhere in the world.

The policy lowers the authorization for use of landmines to the level of a four-star general acting as a regional commander. Previous policy—since 1996—required authorization at the Presidential level. The Department of Defense said in September 2020 that “the President, as the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces, could either specifically authorize or restrict the use of anti-personnel landmines.”

According to FAQs prepared by the Department of Defense for the 2020 policy announcement, “Commanders will only approve the use of landmines when necessary for mission success in major contingencies or other exceptional circumstances.” This “exceptional circumstances caveat…indicates the tool [landmines] will not be a default option.” The FAQs also state that “anti-personnel landmines will be used in situations where they are most appropriate, can be used within the confines of DoD’s [Department of Defense] policy and when alternatives are not viable.” The September 2020 response from the Department of Defense states that the requirement to only use antipersonnel mines “when necessary for mission success in ‘major contingencies’ and ‘other exceptional circumstances’ indicates that the use of landmines will not be a default option.”

The Department of Defense has long cited the need for the US to use antipersonnel mines on the Korean Peninsula in the event of an invasion by North Korea. Moreover, in the event of active hostilities, the current arrangement for a joint combined command structure would put a US general in charge of South Korean military forces. If the US were party to the Mine Ban Treaty, this means the US would violate the Mine Ban Treaty’s prohibition on assisting any prohibited activities.[17]

Numerous retired US military officers have questioned the utility of antipersonnel landmines in South Korea and elsewhere, citing the overwhelming technological superiority of other weapons in the US-South Korean arsenal in comparison with North Korea’s as sufficient to compensate for not using mines. In addition, a former commander of US forces in South Korea, the late Lt. Gen. James Hollingsworth, said in 1997 that antipersonnel landmines’ “minimal” utility to US forces is “offset by the difficulty…[they] pose to our brand of mobile warfare…Not only civilians, but US armed forces, will benefit from a ban on landmines. US forces in Korea are no exception.”[18]

The US maintains no minefields anywhere in the world. The landmines already emplaced in and near the DMZ between North and South Korea are the responsibility of South Korean forces and not the US. The US cleared and destroyed the landmines laid around its Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba in 1999.[19]

Transfer

Since 23 October 1992, US law has prohibited any exports of antipersonnel mines through a comprehensive moratorium that has since been extended multiple times.[20] The 2020 policy states that it “will not seek to transfer landmines except as provided for under US law.”

The US exported antipersonnel landmines including more than 5.6 million antipersonnel mines to 38 countries between 1969 and 1992. Deminers in at least 28 mine-affected countries have reported the presence of US-manufactured antipersonnel mines, including non-self-destructing and self-destructing/self-deactivating types.

Production

The US last produced antipersonnel mines in 1997.[21] Under the Trump administration policy, the US may acquire “area denial systems” or landmines that have an “on/off” feature, allowing them to be remotely activated to address an imminent or probable threat then de-activated when the threat subsides.

No antipersonnel mines or other victim-activated munitions are being funded in the fiscal year 2021 ammunition procurement budgets of the US Armed Services or Defense Department.

The last time the US produced antipersonnel mines was in 1997, when it manufactured 450,000 ADAM and 13,200 CBU-89/B Gator self-destructing/self-deactivating antipersonnel mines for $120 million. The last non-self-destruct antipersonnel mines were procured in 1990, when the US Army bought nearly 80,000 M16A1 antipersonnel mines for $1.9 million.

Alternatives to antipersonnel mines

For more than 20 years, the US has spent approximately 2 billion dollars to develop and produce weapons systems that could be considered alternatives to antipersonnel mines.[22] The 2020 policy does not appear to abandon that long-standing search as it states that “the Military Departments should explore acquiring landmines and landmine alternatives that could further reduce the risk of unintended harm to noncombatants.” (Emphasis added).

Previously, in 2016, the US announced that it was modernizing its Volcano vehicle and helicopter landmine dispenser system and from 2023 it intended to field a “Gator Landmine Replacement” networked munition system to “use non-lethal means to keep civilians away from dangerous areas.”[23] Before that, the US undertook alternatives programs including the XM-7 Spider Networked Munition and the IMS Scorpion. Both initially had the potential for victim-activated features (thereby making them antipersonnel mines) but the Department of Defense later indicated they would be command-detonated and not victim-activated.

Fiscal Year 2021 budget justification materials do not specify if the victim-activated feature of Spider, called the “battlefield over-ride” feature, will be reinserted as the system is modernized in coming years. The M87A1 Volcano uses M74 antivehicle mines containing a magnetic influence fuze as well as self-destruct and self-deactivation features. TheVolcano system has three different initiation methods, including the Spider or “SAVO system” which initiates when the Volcano canister deploys its payload, dispensing the mines that will remain active for approximately 48 hours then self-destruct. Previously, M87 Volcano canisters contained antivehicle mine and one antipersonnel mine.

In its September 2020 reply to Congress, the Department of Defense refused to answer if its future “terrain shaping area denial munitions” would be consistent with the Mine Ban Treaty definition of an antipersonnel mine. However, it also stated that the Volcano air and ground dispensers “will use common anti-tank landmines and common anti-personnel landmines with three self-destruct times.” The Department of Defense argued that antipersonnel mines are necessary in ‘mixed systems’ to “discourage and delay adversaries from hand clearing of minefields intended to block, fix, or channel enemy tanks and vehicles.”

Stockpiling

In 2014, the Department of Defense disclosed that the US has an “active stockpile of just more than 3 million anti-personnel mines.”[24] This is a significant reduction from the previous number reported in 2002 of approximately 10.4 million antipersonnel mines.[25] The 2020 policy announcement did not provide an updated number of antipersonnel landmines still stockpiled by the US.

The US stockpile consists mostly of remotely-delivered mines that are scattered over wide areas by aircraft or tube artillery and equipped with self-destruct features designed to blow the mine up after a pre-set period of time, as well as self-deactivating features. Various types of antipersonnel mines are stockpile according to the following table, which is significantly out of date.

US stockpiles of antipersonnel mines in 2010[26]

Note: * The accounting for GATOR includes CBU-89 [22], CBU-104 [22], and CBU-78 [15] air-dropped bombs.

Stockpile destruction

The existing US stockpile of antipersonnel mines is expected to expire—become unusable—by the early 2030s, in part because their shelf-life of 36 years decreases over time as batteries embedded inside the mines deteriorate with age. The 2014 policy precluded the US from extending or modifying the life of the batteries in its stockpiled antipersonnel mines.[27]

A Defense Department spokesperson stated in 2014 that the existing antipersonnel mine stocks “will start to decline in their ability to be used about [sic]—starting in about 10 years. And in 10 years after that, they’ll be completely unusable.”[28]

According to the 2020 policy, the Department of Defense will “maintain a robust stockpile surveillance program to ensure the operational quality and reliability of landmines, particularly the reliability of self-destruction mechanisms and self-deactivation features.” A Department of Defense fact sheet claims that “reliability of safety features of the landmines in the operational inventory is very high.”

The 2014 policy committed the US to destroy antipersonnel mines that were “not required for the defense of the Republic of Korea.[29] In 2014, Expal USA—the US subsidiary of Spanish defense company Expal—won a contract to destroy Gator and Volcano mines at its facility in Marshall, Texas.[30] The estimated completion date was June 2020 according to Maxam, the multinational company that owns Expal.[31]

General Atomics built the US Army a special “munitions cryofracture demilitarization facility” at the McAlester Army Ammunition Plant in Oklahoma to destroy US stocks of ADAM mines through disassembly and cryofracture.[32] The destruction process started in December 2004 and was supposed to conclude by June 2018, but it is unclear if this deadline was met.[33]

Since 2011, at least 96 M86 Pursuit Deterrent Munitions and 40 M74 antipersonnel mines as well as other “problematic munitions” have been destroyed in a static detonation chamber built to destroy US stocks of chemical weapons.[34]

It is unclear how many landmines were destroyed prior to the 2020 policy change.

Retention

In 2020, the US said a small quantity of “persistent mines” (non-self-destructing) are retained for demining and counter-mine testing and training.[35]

In 2019, the United States (US) contributed more than US$177 million to 21 countries as well as global activities.[1] This represent a 12% decrease from the $201.7 million provided in 2018.

US support to mine action was distributed among the following regions: East and South Asia and the Pacific ($74.5 million, 42%, five recipient countries), the Middle East and North Africa ($48.9 million, 28%, five recipient countries), the Americas ($24 million, 14%, one recipient country), Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia ($14.5 million, 8%, six recipient countries), and Sub-Saharan Africa ($11.1 million, 6%, four recipient countries). A further $4.4 million (2%) designated as global was not earmarked for any state, area or region.

The US allocates the majority of its mine action funding through the State Department’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA). Additional funding is allocated through the Patrick Leahy War Victims Fund within the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance at the US Agency for International Development (USAID).

Contributions by recipient: 2019

From 2015–2019, the cumulative US contribution for mine action totaled approximately $1 billion. This represents three-fifths more than the $622.1 million provided in the previous five-year period from 2010–2014.[2]

It is the eleventh consecutive year that annual US support has totaled more than $100 million.

Summary of contributions: 2015–2019[3]

Note: N/A=not applicable.