Azerbaijan

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Last updated: 15 September 2021

Summary

Non-signatory Azerbaijan says it cannot accede to the convention until its dispute with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh and other occupied territories is resolved. Azerbaijan has participated as an observer in meetings of the convention since September 2019. It voted in favor of a United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution promoting the convention in December 2020.

Azerbaijan is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions but inherited a stockpile of cluster munitions from the Soviet Union. Azerbaijan used cluster munitions during the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh in September–October 2020.

Policy

The Republic of Azerbaijan has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Azerbaijan says it cannot join the convention until its conflict with Armenia is resolved, including the status of the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.[1] Nagorno-Karabakh is claimed by Azerbaijan but under the control of a breakaway governing authority. In November 2020, Azerbaijan told States Parties that it cannot consider accession as “the obvious reasons arising from our assessment that the military posture of Armenia does not allow us” to.[2]

Azerbaijan participated in some Oslo Process meetings that led to the creation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions but did not attend the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008.[3]

Azerbaijan first participated in a meeting of the convention in September 2019. At the first part of the convention’s Second Review Conference, held virtually in November 2020, Azerbaijan denied using cluster munitions in Nagorno-Karabakh and condemned “in the strongest terms any use of cluster munitions by any actor under any circumstances.”[4]

In December 2020, Azerbaijan voted in favor of a UNGA resolution that urges states to join the Convention on Cluster Munitions “as soon as possible.”[5] Azerbaijan has voted for the annual UNGA resolution promoting the convention since it was first introduced in 2015.

Azerbaijan is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty or the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

Azerbaijan is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions, but it inherited a stockpile from the Soviet Union.

According to Jane’s Information Group, Azerbaijan’s air force possesses RBK-250, RBK-250-275, and RBK-500 cluster bombs.[6] RBK-250 bombs with PTAB submunitions were observed among the abandoned Soviet-era ammunition stockpiles located near Saloğlu village in northwest Azerbaijan in 2005.[7]

Azerbaijan received at least 50 Extra surface-to-surface missiles from Israel for its LAR-160 multi-barrel rocket launchers in 2008–2009.[8] The missiles can have either a unitary or submunition warhead. Based on the use of the weapons, it appears that Azerbaijan acquired both types.[9]

Azerbaijan also possesses Grad 122mm and Smerch 300mm surface-to-surface rockets, but it is not known if these include cluster munition rockets.[10] Azerbaijan acquired 12 Smerch 300mm surface-to-surface rocket launchers from Ukraine in 2007–2008.[11]

Use

Use in 2020

Azerbaijan’s use of cluster munitions during the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh in September–October 2020 has been widely reported.

There’s no complete accounting of the use of cluster munitions in the conflict as it has not been possible to investigate every reported or alleged attack. However, there is compelling evidence that Azerbaijan used Israeli-produced LAR-160 cluster munitions rockets, each containing 104 M095 DPICM submunitions, in attacks on the following locations:[12]

  • Stepanakert on 27 September, 3 October, and 4 October;
  • Hadrut on 3 and 4 October;[13]
  • Martakert on 4 October.

Additionally, the Washington Post reported in December 2020 that more than 30 unexploded M095 submunitions were cleared and destroyed from a home in Kaghartsi village, 25km east of Stepanakert.[14]

Azerbaijan has vigorously denied using cluster munitions in the conflict.[15] In November 2020, Azerbaijani President Ilham Ailyev called the evidence “fake news.”[16] (See profile for Nagorno-Karabakh for more details)

Armenian forces, or forces it supports in Nagorno-Karabakh, or one of the seven occupied districts of Azerbaijan under Armenian control fired cluster munitions into Azerbaijan during the conflict. Russian-made Smerch cluster munition rockets containing 9N235 submunitions were used in an attack on Barda city in western Azerbaijan on 28 October, killing at least 21 civilians and wounding at least 70 more.[17] There was evidence of use of cluster munitions by Armenian or Nagorno-Karabakh forces supported by Armenia in at least four other locations of Azerbaijan: Gizilhajili on 3 October, Tapgaragoyunlu on 23 October, Kebirli on 24 October, and Garayusifli on 27 October.[18]

Previous Use

There is evidence that Azerbaijan used cluster munitions in Nagorno-Karabakh in the first week of April 2016, during fighting across the line of contact separating local Armenian-backed separatists and Azerbaijani forces.[19] Within 10 days of the ceasefire agreement, remnants of LAR-160 rockets and approximately 200 unexploded M095 DPICM submunitions were cleared and destroyed from near the villages of Nerkin Horatagh and Mokhratagh, close to the town of Martakert in northeast Nagorno-Karabakh.[20]

Armenia’s Ministry of Defense issued photographs on 6 April 2016 showing the remnants of 300mm Smerch cluster munition rockets that it alleged Azerbaijan fired into Nagorno-Karabakh.[21]

Azerbaijan and Armenia both denied using cluster munitions in the 2016 conflict and accused the other side of using the weapon against civilians.[22]

Previously, RBK-series cluster bombs were used in Nagorno-Karabakh during the 1988–1994 conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and HALO deminers have cleared unexploded PTAB-1M submunitions near Mugalny village.[23]



[1] In August 2010, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official said Azerbaijan cannot join “at this stage” because of Armenia’s “ongoing occupation” of Nagorno-Karabakh and “seven areas adjoining regions.” Statement by Elchin Huseynli, Arms Control Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Baku, 2 August 2010. The Azerbaijan Campaign to Ban Landmines organized this roundtable meeting on the mine and cluster munition problem in Azerbaijan and globally. “Azerbaijan will not join the UN Convention on the prohibition of cluster munitions,” Zerkalo (newspaper), 3 August 2010; and Letter No. 115/10/L from Amb. Murad N. Najafbayli, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the UN in Geneva, 10 May 2010.

[2] Statement of Azerbaijan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Review Conference (held virtually), Geneva, 25 November 2020.

[3] For details on Azerbaijan’s cluster munition policy and practice through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), p. 188.

[4] Statement of Azerbaijan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Review Conference, 25 November 2020.

[5]Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 75/62, 7 December 2020.

[6] Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2004), p. 835.

[7] HRW visit to Saloğlu, May 2005.

[8] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “Arms Transfers Database.” Recipient report for Azerbaijan for the period 1950–2011, generated on 15 May 2012. According to SIPRI, the Azerbaijani designation for the Lynx multiple rocket launchers are Dolu-1, Leysan, and Shimsek.

[9] The warhead types are listed in Israel Military Industries, “Product Information Sheet: Extra Extended Range Artillery,” undated, p. 3.

[10] International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2011 (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 88; and Colin King, ed., Jane’s Explosive Ordnance Disposal 2007–2008, CD-edition, 15 January 2008 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2008).

[11] SIPRI, “Arms Transfers Database.” Recipient report for Azerbaijan for the period 1950–2011, generated on 15 May 2012.

[15] Statement of Azerbaijan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Review Conference (held virtually), Geneva, 25 November 2020.

[17] HRW, “Armenia: Cluster Munitions Kill Civilians in Azerbaijan,” 30 October 2020; and Amnesty International, “Armenia/Azerbaijan: First confirmed use of cluster munitions by Armenia ‘cruel and reckless,’” 29 October 2020

[19] Roberto Travan, “Nagorno-Karabakh, A 25-Year Border War Reignites With Religion,” La Stampa, republished in English by World Crunch, 11 June 2016.

[20] HALO NagornoKarabakh (@HALO_NK), “HALO's assessment of new ‪#clustermunition contamination is underway near Mokhratagh village, Martakert, ‪#Karabakh,” 6:39am, 14 April 2016, Tweet; and HALO NagornoKarabakh (@HALO_NK), “Rapid assessment of new ‪#clustermunition strikes in ‪#Karabakh has allowed HALO to establish the footprint (extent),” 8:19am, 6 May 2016, Tweet. HALO NagornoKarabakh (@HALO_NK), “HALO starts emergency clearance of ‪#clustermunition(s) in Nerkin Horatagh village, Martakert, ‪#Karabakh,” 6:19am, 12 April 2016, Tweet.

[21] The article stated that Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh “do not possess weaponry of this kind.” “Armenian MOD provides factual proof of prohibited cluster missile use by Azerbaijani army,” ArmenPress, 6 April 2016.

[22] In April 2016, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed that “cluster munitions used by the Armenian troops against the civilian Azerbaijani population living densely along the line of contact…do not bear any military goal and serve solely to perpetrate mass killings among the civilians.” “Azerbaijani MFA: Armenian use of cluster munition serves only committing mass destruction among civilians,” Report.az, 28 April 2016.

[23] HALO NagornoKarabakh (@HALO_NK), “Thanks to Aleksey Saradjanov for reporting this PTAB cluster munition found on his farm near Mugalny vil. ‪#Karabakh,” 5:40am, 1 June 2016, Tweet.


Impact

Last updated: 09 February 2021

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Treaty Status | Management & Coordination | Impact (contamination & casualties) | Addressing the Impact (land release, risk education, victim assistance)

Country Summary

Mine contamination in the Republic of Azerbaijan is the consequence of the armed conflict with Armenia between 1988–1994, which saw landmines laid by both sides. In addition to landmines, explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination resulted from ammunition abandoned by the Soviet Army in 1991.

The most heavily contaminated areas are along the borders and confrontation lines between Armenia and Azerbaijan, including the area in and around Nagorno-Karabakh and the Nakhchivan region.[1] Some of the contaminated areas are under the control of Armenian forces and so the full extent of contamination is not known.[2] (See Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh impact profiles for further information).

Since cluster munition remnants clearance last took place in 2011 up to early 2020, Azerbaijan was not believed to be contaminated with cluster munition remnants. However, in September 2020, tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh escalated and involved the use of cluster munitions.[3] On 28 October 2020, a cluster munition attack in Barda, 230km west of Baku, killed at least 21 civilians and injured at least another 70.[4]

Mine risk education is well established in Azerbaijan. Conducted under the auspices of Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA), risk education is integrated into the school curriculum and conducted at community level in mine and ERW-affected areas.[5] The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Emergency Situations operates a hotline through which residents can report the presence of explosive ordnance.[6]

Victim assistance is assigned to the information department of ANAMA, which is responsible for coordinating access to all pillars of victim assistance including medical care, physical rehabilitation including prothesis, psychosocial support, and livelihood assistance.[7]

Treaty status

Treaty status overview

Mine Ban Treaty

Non-signatory

Convention on Cluster Munitions

Non-signatory

Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)

State Party

 

Management and coordination

Mine Action management and coordination

Mine action management and coordination[8]

Mine action commenced

1999

National mine action management actors

Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA)

United Nations Agencies

United Nations Development Program (UNDP)

Plans/strategies

The National Mine Action Plan expired in 2018 and as of December 2019 a revised plan had not been adopted

Mine action legislation

In the process of being adopted

 

Coordination

ANAMA was set up with the support of UNDP at the request of the government of Azerbaijan in 1998.[9] As of June 2020, UNDP continued to support ANAMA with capacity development.[10]

ANAMA is responsible for coordinating and monitoring mine action in the country and reports to the Deputy Prime Minister as head of the State Commission for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation.[11]

Strategies and policies

Mine action is integrated into the Azerbaijan Socio-Economic Development plan 2019–2023 and is considered a key contributor to meeting the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).[12]

All clearance operations are carried out in line with the annual plan approved by the government of Azerbaijan and based on requests from landowners such as local executive authorities, farmers, and different state organizations involved in reconstruction and rehabilitation activities in mine/ERW-affected areas.[13]

Legislation and standards

As of June 2020, Azerbaijan was still in the process of reviewing its national mine action law.[14]

The Azerbaijan National Mine Action Standards are in line with the Internationl Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

Information management

ANAMA uses an IMSMA database and has received technical assistance from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) in its development and use.[15] Azerbaijan was reported as a country that had improved its information management system in 2019.[16]

Gender and diversity

Only 11% of the mine action program staff in Azerbaijan comprise women, mainly employed in administrative positions in ANAMA.[17]

Risk Education management and coordination

Risk education management and coordination[18]

Government focal points

ANAMA supported by the Ministry of Education and District Executive Authority coordinators

Coordination mechanisms

Mine Risk Education Technical Working Group (TWG)

Coordination outcomes

The TWG meets at the beginning of each year to set priority tasks, discuss activities, and adopt the annual work plan

Risk education standards

There are no existing risk education standards

 

Coordination

ANAMA coordinates the risk education program at the national level and works with the Ministry of Education in integrating risk education into the curriculum. The District Executive Authority coordinators are involved in coordinating risk education activities at the district level.

The Mine Risk Education TWG was established in 2000. Coordinated by ANAMA, it consists of representatives from several ministries including education, health, social protection, defence, and youth and sport, as well as from the Republic Children’s Organization, the Red Crescent Society, and other non-governmental organization (NGO) implementing partners.[19] The TWG holds an annual meeting at the beginning of each year to discuss and approve the annual risk education activity plan.

Victim assistance management and coordination

Victim assistance management and coordination[20]

Government focal points

ANAMA’s Mine Victim Assistance (MVA) Department, which sits within the Information Management Department

Coordination mechanisms

The MVA Department coordinates with the Azerbaijan Red Crescent Society (ARCS) on the collection of data on mine incidents and casualties, while ARCS officers of district branches complete designated IMSMA forms and send them to ANAMA headquarters

Plans/strategies

None reported

Survivor inclusion and participation

The Head of Operations for ANAMA’s regional office in Fuzuli is a landmine survivor

 

Impact

Contamination

Contamination overview (as of December 2019) [21]

Landmines*

9.44km² (CHA: 2.44km²**; and SHA: 7km²)

Extent of contamination: Medium

Cluster munition remnants

Extent of contamination: Unknown

Other ERW contamination

Extent of contamination: Unknown

Notes: CHA=confirmed hazardous area; SHA=suspected hazardous area; ERW=explosive remnants of war.

* In areas controlled by Azerbaijan.

** This includes 1.01km² contaminated by antipersonnel mines and 1.43km² by antivehicle mines.

 

Landmine contamination

At the end of 2019, Azerbaijan reported a total of 9.44km² of mined areas in the regions under its control. The full extent of contamination in the areas under the control of Armenian forces is unknown.

In 2019, additional contamination was found, mainly in former Soviet Army firing ranges and training polygons. ANAMA has reported that precise figures for the extent of the contamination require country-wide survey, which will be carried out once resources are available.[22]

The Nakhchivan region and Nagorno-Karabakh are also affected by mine contamination.[23] (See Nagorno-Karabakh impact profile for more information).

Cluster munition remnant contamination

Use of cluster munitions during the escalation in conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in September–October 2020 resulted in contamination in both Azerbaijan and Nagorno- Karabakh. In October 2020, Smerch cluster munition rockets containing 9N235 submunitions were fired at Barda city, resulting in casualties.[24] The extent of contamination caused by cluster munition use during the 2020 conflict is unknown.[25]

ERW contamination

The extent of ERW contamination in Azerbaijan remains unknown. Ammunition abandoned by the Soviet Army in 1991 along with ERW resulting from the conflict with Armenia have both contributed to ongoing contamination. The number of ERW cleared by ANAMA during 2019 dwarfed the number of mines cleared (see clearance section below).

Casualties

Casualty data presented below corresponds with Azerbaijan excluding Nagorno-Karabakh. (See Nagorno-Karabakh impact profile for additional information).

Casualties overview[26]

Casualties

All known mine/ERW casualties

Unknown but is believed to be at around 3,000 (including 500 fatalities)

Casualties in 2019

Annual total

7 (increase from 4 in 2018)

Survival outcome

All injured

Device type causing casualties

All undifferentiated mines/ERW

Civilian status

All civilian

Gender

All men

 

Casualties in 2019—details

For 2019, ANAMA reported seven mine/ERW casualties.[27]

The total number of casualties from mines/ERW in Azerbaijan is unknown. The variation in past annual casualty figures reported by key actors is due to differing collection methodologies. ANAMA collects casualty data through a network of district representatives and from media reports. Only incidents that occur in mine/ERW hazard areas and that can be verified are recorded in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). The Azerbaijan Campaign to Ban Landmines (AzCBL) gathers information in affected districts, with the exception of the Nakhchivan region, from its regional coordinators, civil and military hospitals, and rehabilitation centers, as well as from the local media.[28]

Addressing the impact

Mine Action

Operators and service providers

Clearance operators

National

ANAMA

 

 

Clearance

Land release overview[29]

Land release in 2019

0.9km2 released through clearance

0.19km2 reduced by technical survey

Ordnance destroyed in 2019

32 antipersonnel mines; 32 antivehicle mines; 4.637 items of ERW

Landmine clearance in 2015–2019

2015: 1.49km²

2016: 0.83km²

2017: 7.69km2*

2018: 0.35km²

2019: 0.90km²

Total land cleared: 11.26km²

Note: ERW=explosive remnants of war.

* This includes 3.7 km² cleared with no antipersonnel mines found.

 

Land release: landmines

ANAMA deploys mechanical clearance assets and mine detection dog (MDD) teams alongside manual clearance teams. Between 2011–2018, a total of 25 MDD were bred and trained.[30] In terms of mechanical clearance, ANAMA possesses six mechanical demining machines: four mini flail demining machines and two medium flail demining machines.[31]

Clearance operations are carried out in line with an annual plan approved by the government of Azerbaijan and based on requests from landowners and state organizations involved in reconstruction and rehabilitation.

In 2019 ANAMA released land through clearance and technical survey. Mine clearance output has increased between 2015 and 2019, but that included clearance of areas with no contamination.

Risk Education

Operators and service providers

Risk education operators[32]

Type of organization

Name of organization

Type of activity

Governmental

ANAMA

Coordinates risk education activities at the national level, including the integration of risk education into the national curriculum

Conducts community-based risk education sessions through trained volunteers

Ministry of Education

Integration of risk education into the national curriculum

Local District Executive Authorities

Coordination of risk education at local level

International

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

Risk education activities integrated into other interventions along frontline villages in rural Azerbaijan

Mine Mark

Pilot project in 2019 to deliver risk education to children, young people, and vulnerable groups

 

Beneficiary numbers

Beneficiary numbers[33]

Operator

Men

Boys

Women

Girls

ICRC

73

234

198

239

UNICEF

N/A

58

N/A

54

Note: N/A=not applicable.

 

In addition to the figures reported in the table above, a further 750 children participated in the ICRC’s forum theatre throughout 2019. The data for these participants was not disaggregated by gender.[34]

Each year via the curriculum, risk education messaging is delivered to 55,000 children in 1,200 schools across conflict-affected districts of Azerbaijan.[35]

During 2019, ANAMA oversaw 158 community risk education groups operating across 10 affected districts. These groups delivered risk education training to 26,663 residents throughout the year.[36]

UNICEF trained 60 youth leaders as risk education peer trainers in 2019. A total of 112 adolescents (58 boys and 54 girls) participated in risk education peer training provided by these youth trainers.

Implementation

Risk education in Azerbaijan is delivered mainly through schools and community sessions.

In 2004, ANAMA, the Ministry of Education, and UNICEF signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to work on integrating risk education into the school curriculum. Textbooks for students and corresponding manuals for teachers were introduced. By the end of 2019, a total of 3,635 teachers had received risk education training across 1,200 schools in 26 districts.[37]

ANAMA and the Afghan government collaborated on the integration of risk education into the Afghan educational curriculum. Azerbaijan provided the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority with copies of the risk education student textbooks and teacher manuals translated into Dari. This pilot project was funded by the government of Azerbaijan and produced 24,000 textbooks along with 1,500 teacher manuals.[38]

ANAMA conducts training of trainers for volunteers to conduct community-based risk education sessions. The community risk education is coordinated by members of the District Executive Authority who report to ANAMA.[39] One hundred fifty-eight community committees have been set up in 11 frontline districts. ANAMA also uses billboards to raise public awareness in contaminated areas. In 2019, ANAMA produced over 100 billboards and displayed them in and around affected areas.[40]

Emergency risk education sessions are delivered in areas where items of ERW are found or a casualty occurs. Two hotline numbers to the Ministry of Internal Affairs are in place for people to report ERW finds.[41]

As part of the Azerbaijan Youth Advocates Program, UNICEF trains Youth Advisory Council members as peer educators for risk education.[42]

The ICRC delivers risk education training predominantly through face-to-face sessions with both children and adults.[43] Risk education is conducted in schools through a week-long participatory forum theatre activity.

Mine Mark started risk education activities in Azerbaijan in 2019. The pilot project was focusing on child-friendly spaces and was utilizing games, puzzles, and other materials specific to the target audience.[44]

In 2002, the risk education program was evaluated by UNICEF and ANAMA, but no further evaluation has taken place since. However annual monitoring has been conducted by the Ministry of Education and ANAMA.[45]

Target groups

ANAMA has collected data on mine/ERW incidents since 2000 and use the victim data to target risk education activities. The civilian accidents in 2019 were caused by people undertaking agricultural and animal herding activities. ANAMA reported that the incidents mainly happened in restricted military areas or areas under military surveillance and that people entered the areas intentionally.[46]

ANAMA considers children as a high-risk group and targets them through the school program.[47]

Teachers and parents are targeted to ensure that they understand and can reinforce the risk education messaging delivered to children.[48]

ICRC also identifies adult men as the largest casualty group due to their need to access hazardous areas to farm and cultivate the land. They are also the most difficult to reach for risk education sessions.[49]

Victim Assistance

Victim assistance providers and activities

Victim assistance providers and activities overview[50]

Type of organization

Name of organization

Type of activity

Governmental

ANAMA

Coordination of victim assistance pillars

 

National

AzCBL

Legal assistance and support to survivors

Chirag

Local NGO selected as an ANAMA victim assistance partner in 2018

International

UNICEF

Works with ANAMA to promote and develop inclusive education for children with disabilities

UNDP

Supports ANAMA’s mine action programming

 

ANAMA is responsible for coordinating access to all pillars of victim assistance, notably: medical care, physical rehabilitation (including prothesis), psychosocial support, and socioeconomic reintegration. [51]



[1] United States (US) Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “To Walk the Earth in Safety, 2014-2015,” 2016, p. 31.

[2] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sabina Sarkarova, Public Relations Officer, ANAMA, 19 June 2020.

[3] Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Azerbaijan: Cluster Munitions Used in Nagorno-Karabakh,” 23 October 2020.

[5] Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA), “Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE) Programme,” undated.

[6] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sabina Sarkarova, Public Relations Officer, ANAMA, 19 June 2020.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[10] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sabina Sarkarova, Public Relations Officer, ANAMA, 19 June 2020.

[11] Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), “Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to National Ownership: Azerbaijan,” March 2012.

[12] UNDP, “In Azerbaijan, UNDP and ANAMA celebrate 20 years of success in mine action,” 18 July 2018; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Sabina Sarkarova, Public Relations Officer, ANAMA, 19 June 2020.

[13] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sabina Sarkarova, Public Relations Officer, ANAMA, 19 June 2020.

[14] Ibid.

[15] ANAMA “Information management,” undated, last accessed on 25 November 2020); and ANAMA. “Work Plan,” undated, p. 13.

[16] GICHD, “Annual Report 2019,” June 2020, p. 22.

[17] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sabina Sarkarova, Public Relations Officer, ANAMA, 19 June 2020.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] ANAMA, “Information Management: Mine Victim Assistance,” undated, last accessed on 25 November 2020; and Ghulam Isaczai,“Azerbaijan’s heroic steps to eliminate landmines,” UNDP Azerbaijan, 7 August 2018.

[21] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sabina Sarkarova, Public Relations Officer, ANAMA, 19 June 2020.

[22] Email from Sabina Sarkarova, Public Relations Officer, ANAMA, 21 May 2018.

[23] United States (US) Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “To Walk the Earth in Safety, 2014-2015,” 2016, p. 31.

[26] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sabina Sarkarova, Public Relations Officer, ANAMA, 19 June 2020.

[27] Ibid.

[28] International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), Landmine Monitor 2010, (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010).

[29] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sabina Sarkarova, Public Relations Officer, ANAMA, 19 June 2020.

[30] ANAMA, “Work Plan,” undated, p. 14.

[31] Ibid., p. 16.

[32] ANAMA, “Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE) Programme,” undated; Response to Monitor "risk education” questionnaire by Maryam Walton, ICRC, Weapon Contamination Coordinator, Armenia and Azerbaijan, 29 April 2020; and Mine Mark, homepage, undated.

[33] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Maryam Walton, Weapon Contamination Coordinator, ICRC, Armenia and Azerbaijan, 29 April 2020; and UNICEF, “Risk Education Strategic Monitoring Questions data for 2019,” provided by Hugues Laurenge, Child Protection Specialist, UNICEF, 2 June 2020.

[34] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Maryam Walton, Weapon Contamination Coordinator, ICRC, Armenia and Azerbaijan, 29 April 2020.

[35] ANAMA, “About ANAMA: Brief description,” undated, last accessed on 25 November 2020.

[36] Ibid.

[38] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sabina Sarkarova, Public Relations Officer, ANAMA, 19 June 2020; and ANAMA. “Work Plan,” undated, p. 35.

[39] ANAMA, “Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE) Programme,” undated; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Sabina Sarkarova, Public Relations Officer, ANAMA, 19 June 2020.

[40] ANAMA, “About ANAMA: Brief description,” undated, last accessed on 25 November 2020.

[41] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sabina Sarkarova, Public Relations Officer, ANAMA, 19 June 2020.

[42] UNICEF, “Risk Education Strategic Monitoring Questions data for 2019,” provided by Hugues Laurenge, Child Protection Specialist, UNICEF, 2 June 2020.

[43] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Maryam Walton, Weapon Contamination Coordinator, ICRC, Armenia and Azerbaijan, 29 April 2020.

[44] Mine Mark, homepage, undated.

[45] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sabina Sarkarova, Public Relations Officer, ANAMA, 19 June 2020.

[46] Ibid.

[48] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Maryam Walton, Weapon Contamination Coordinator, ICRC, Armenia and Azerbaijan, 29 April 2020.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sabina Sarkarova, Public Relations Officer, ANAMA, 19 June 2020; ANAMA, “Information Management: Mine Victim Assistance,” undated; and UNICEF Azerbaijan, “Inclusive Education,” 2018.

[51] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sabina Sarkarova, Public Relations Officer, ANAMA, 19 June 2020.


Mine Ban Policy

Last updated: 12 November 2019

Policy

The Republic of Azerbaijan has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. It has stated that it supports the goals of the treaty, including a comprehensive ban, but that it “cannot accede to the Ottawa Convention without settlement of the armed conflict, restoration of territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and having a threat of hostility resumption, even though Azerbaijan stopped planting of additional mines…Therefore adherence to the Ottawa Convention will be possible only after the final settlement of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia.”[1]

Still, Azerbaijan has demonstrated support for the treaty. It has voted in favor of the annual UN General Assembly resolution promoting universalization of the treaty every year since 2005, including Resolution 73/61 in December 2018.[2] Azerbaijan submitted voluntary Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency reports in 2008 and 2009. While the reports have details about mine clearance, victim assistance, and mine risk education, they do not include any information on Azerbaijan’s stockpiled antipersonnel mines.

Azerbaijan did not attend the 2014 Mine Ban Treaty Review Conference in Maputo. However, it did attend the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2018, but it did not provide a statement.

Azerbaijan is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. Azerbaijan is also not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Production, transfer, stockpiling, and use

The disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh is contaminated by landmines, remnants from the Nagorno-Karabakh War fought from 1992–1994 between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan has stated on several occasions that it does not produce or export antipersonnel mines.[3] Azerbaijan’s landmine stockpile is a legacy of the Soviet era, but the types and quantities in the stockpile are not known.

Officials have stated that Azerbaijan has not used antipersonnel mines since the end of open conflict with Armenia in 1994. They have also said that while Azerbaijan does not intend to use antipersonnel mines in the future, it does not rule out the possibility.[4] Azerbaijan apparently has not taken any specific legal measures to prohibit production, trade, or use of antipersonnel mines.



[1] Mine Ban Treaty Voluntary Article 7 Report (for the period June 2000–November 2008), Form A.

[2] “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,” UNGA Resolution 73/61, 5 December 2018.

[3] Ibid. In June 2005, Azerbaijan said that it is “unilaterally committed to non producing and non accumulating” of antipersonnel mines. Statement of Azerbaijan, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 13 June 2005.

[4] See, Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 844. See also, Mine Ban Treaty Voluntary Article 7 Report (for the period June 2000–November 2008), Form A.


Support for Mine Action

Last updated: 16 December 2013

In 2012, the government of the Republic of Azerbaijan contributed US$10.4 million to mine action through the Azerbaijan National Agency of Mine Action (ANAMA); this is approximate to the amount contributed in 2011. This amount also represents one of the largest contributions in terms of percentage that a national government contributes to its own mine action program. Since 2008, the government of Azerbaijan has contributed 82% of the total cost of the program.

International support in 2012 was slightly more than the five-year average of $1.9 million. The NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, combined with $257,816 from Norway, contributed $1,784,733 specifically towards the clearance of the former Soviet-era training base at Jeyranchel on the Georgia-Azerbaijan border.

International contributions in 2012[1]

Donor Country

Sector

National currency

Amount ($)

NATO PfP Fund

Clearance

$1,526,917

1,526,917

UNDP

Clearance

$300,000

300,000

Norway

Clearance

NOK1,500,000

257,816

Australia

Victim assistance

A$50,000

51,795

Slovenia

Victim assistance

$11,766

11,766

Total

 

 

2,148,294

 

Summary of contributions in 2008–2012[2]

Year

National contributions ($)

International contributions ($)

2012

10,421,508

2,148,294

2011

10,203,713

1,649,243

2010

8,997,993

2,190,927

2009

8,086,793

2,176,208

2008

6,312,500

1,723,262

Total

44,022,507

9,887,934

 

 



[1] Australia, Convention on Conventional Weapons Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form B, 28 March 2013; response to Monitor questionnaire by Ingunn Vatne, Senior Advisor, Department for Human Rights, Democracy and Humanitarian Assistance, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 April 2013; International Trust Fund Enhancing Human Security, “Annual Report 2012,” Slovenia, 2013, p. 36; ANAMA, “Annual Report 2012,” Baku, p. 5. Average exchange rate for 2012: NOK5.8181=US$1 and A$1=US$1.0359. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2013.

[2] See Landmine Monitor reports 2008–2011; and ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Azerbaijan: Support for Mine Action,” 19 September 2012.