Germany

Mine Action

Last updated: 08 July 2018

 

Treaty status

Convention on Cluster Munitions

State Party. Article 4 deadline: 1 August 2020
Unclear whether on track to meet deadline

Mine action management

National mine action management actors

Clearance is the responsibility of the federal government authority in charge of real estate, Bundesanstalt für Immobilienaufgaben (BImA), which owns the Wittstock fomer training range, the area contaminated by cluster munition remnants

Mine action strategic plan

No

Operators in 2017

National government. By the end of 2017, 40–45 deminers per month

Extent of contamination as of end 2017

Landmines

No mine contamination

Cluster munition remnants

Approximately 11km2, all at a former Soviet military training area at Wittstock, Brandenburg

ERW

The former military training area at Wittstock is also contaminated with various kinds of explosive ordnance

Land release in 2017

Cluster munition remnants

0.5km2 cleared
513 submunitions destroyed

ERW

2,395 ERW destroyed during cluster munition clearance

Progress

Cluster munition remnants

In 2017, Germany commenced clearance, five years after it first reported cluster munition contamination. However, it has not stated when it expects the clearance to be completed. Although it intends to meet its August 2020 clearance deadline, there are several factors that may lead to unplanned delays

Note: ERW = explosive remnants of war.

Contamination

As of December 2017, the Federal Republic of Germany had approximately 11km2of area suspected to contain cluster munition remnants at a former Soviet military training area at Wittstock, Brandenburg, in the former East Germany.[1] This is unchanged from the contamination reported for 2016,[2] despite clearance of 470,000m2 in 2017.[3] The Soviet-era ShOAB-0.5 submunitions contaminating Wittstock result from testing of the weapon in 1952–1993.[4] The area is heavily contaminated with various kinds of explosive ordnance, and “especially ordnance with considerable explosive power,” as well as scrap metal.[5] The area is completely perimeter-marked with warning signs, and an official directive (effective 1 July 2011) has been issued by the responsible regulatory and supervisor authority, constraining access to the area.[6]

In its initial Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 transparency report, submitted in January 2011, Germany declared having no areas confirmed or suspected to contain cluster munition remnants.[7] In June 2011, however, at a Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee meeting, Germany declared that the area at Wittstock was suspected to contain cluster munition remnants.[8] Germany repeated the information at the Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings a week later, noting that the remnants were “principally found within the confines of a target range” located at the south of the training area.[9]

From 2011 to early 2014, suspected cluster munition contamination was reported to total 4km2.[10] In August 2014, however, Germany reported that the total suspected hazardous area (SHA) was actually 11km2.[11] The greatly increased estimate was ascribed to discovery of submunitions during non-technical survey across a wider area than previously reported.[12]

Program Management

In early October 2011, ownership of the Wittstock former training range was transferred from the military to the federal government authority in charge of real estate, Bundesanstalt für Immobilienaufgaben (BImA). Beginning in 2012, BImA implemented a risk education program in collaboration with local authorities based on a “danger prevention plan.” The plan was described as a “crucial prerequisite” for further technical survey of the area.[13] Activities included marking the perimeter and preventing civilian access to the area.[14]

Once safely released, the site is due to remain part of a “nature protection area” in the Kyritz-Ruppiner-Heide, managed by BImA as part of the Europa NATURA 2000 site, under the European Union (EU) Habitats Directive.[15]

Strategic planning

Germany has not yet developed a national plan to complete clearance of all cluster munition remnants; nor has it set specific milestones for the release of areas confirmed or suspected to contain cluster munition remnants. It has explained that their decision is due to the high level of contamination at the site, which includes different types of ERW, and the varying spatial distribution of contamination, due to overlapping contamination from multiple weapon types, encountered during clearance efforts in 2017.[16]

Operators

Clearance capacity during the first months of 2017 comprised some 20 deminers, which later increased to a monthly average of 40–45.[17] As of July 2018, three private companies were being tasked to conduct operations at the site.[18] Germany was hoping to further increase clearance capacity to around 150 deminers in 2018, but may not be able to achieve this.[19] There are reportedly staff shortages for deminers in companies and in the market in general in Germany, in particular for the specially licensed team leaders required by German law.[20]

Land Release

In 2017, Germany conducted clearance, for the first time, of cluster munition-contaminated area at Wittstock. It reported total clearance of 470,000m2.

Survey in 2017

No cluster munition-contaminated area was released by survey in 2017.

Clearance in 2017

Clearance efforts at Wittstock began in March 2017, following completion of preparation of a fire protection system the same month, during which 2km2 of heathland was burnt.[21] Germany cleared 470,000m2, between March and December 2017, during which 513 submunitions were destroyed (329 shOAB-0.5; 33 AO-1SCh; 1 AO-1 SC; 61 ZAB 2.5M; 87 PTAB 2.5M; and 2 PTAB 10-5), along with 2,395 items of other unexploded ordinance (UXO).[22] Magnetometers were used for pre-clearance of large ferrous items, and metal detectors for cluster munition remnant detection.[23]

Article 4 Compliance

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Germany is required to destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 August 2020. It is unclear whether Germany is on track to meet this deadline.

In the last five years, Germany has conducted clearance in only one year, 2017, clearing less than 0.5km2 of cluster munition remnant-contaminated area (see table below).

Clearance capacity in 2017 increased from 20 personnel at the start of clearance in early 2017, to a monthly average of 40–45, and could potentially be increased to up to as many as 150 in 2018.[24] However, staffing shortages in Germany may pose challenges to achieving this.[25]

Furthermore, in addition to possible staffing shortfalls, Germany foresees other potential obstacles that could impact its ability to meet its Article 4 deadline, including the very high level of cluster munition and UXO contamination; the very different spatial distribution of the contamination; higher levels of contamination than expected; restrictions due to legal requirements (fire protection and nature conservation); reduced burning of heathland due to unfavorable meteorological conditions; and shortage of destruction capacities at the responsible state authorities.[26]

Germany reported that it intends to meet its Article 4 deadline, but that these factors could lead to unplanned delays.[27] Given the tight timetable, such delays could prevent Germany from meeting its Article 4 deadline of 1 August 2020.

 

 

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and shared all its country-level landmine reports (from“Clearing the Mines 2018”) and country-level cluster munition reports (from “Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2018”) with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.



[1] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for 2017), Form F; and email from official from the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, German Federal Foreign Office, 7 May 2018.

[2] Email from official from the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, German Federal Foreign Office, 19 April 2017; and Convention On Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for 2016), Form F.

[3] Email from official from the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, German Federal Foreign Office, 7 May 2018.

[4] Convention On Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for 2016), Form F; and statement of Germany, High-Level Segment, Convention On Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 7 September 2015.

[5] Statement of Germany, Convention On Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 7 September 2015.

[6] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form G, 4 April 2012; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form F (2014), 20 April 2015.

[7] Convention On Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for 2010), Form F.

[8] Statement of Germany, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 21 June 2011.

[9] Statement of Germany, Convention On Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings (Clearance and Risk Reduction Session), Geneva, 28 June 2011.

[10] Ibid.; and statement of Germany, Convention On Cluster Munitions Third Meeting of States Parties, Oslo, 13 September 2012; Convention On Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for 2012), Form F; and Convention On Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for 2013), Form F.

[11] Email from official from the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, German Federal Foreign Office, 4 August 2014.

[12] Statement of Germany, Convention On Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 7 September 2015.

[13] Statement of Germany, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 23 May 2012.

[14] Convention On Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for 2011), Form G.

[15] Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 15 April 2013, p. 7; and Convention On Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form F.

[16] Emails from official from the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, German Federal Foreign Office, 7 May and 12 July 2018.

[17] Email from official from the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, German Federal Foreign Office, 7 May 2018.

[18] Ibid., 12 July 2018.

[19] Ibid., 7 May 2018.

[20] Ibid., 12 July 2018.

[21] Ibid., 19 April and 13 June 2017; and Convention On Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for 2016), Form F.

[22] Convention On Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for 2017), Form F; and email from official from the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, German Federal Foreign Office, 7 May 2018.

[23] Convention On Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for 2017), Form F.

[24] Email from official from the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, German Federal Foreign Office, 7 May 2018; and Convention On Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for 2017), Form F.

[25] Email from official from the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, German Federal Foreign Office, 7 May 2018.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid.