Non-signatory Israel has acknowledged the humanitarian concerns associated with cluster munitions but has not taken any steps to join the convention as it sees military utility in these weapons. Israel has never attended a meeting of the convention. It abstained from voting on a key United Nations (UN) resolution promoting the convention in December 2020.
Israel has produced, exported, and acquired cluster munitions, but it has not used them since 2006. The country’s last manufacturer of cluster munitions IMI Systems was acquired by Elbit Systems Ltd. at the end of 2018, which ended its production of cluster munitions. The government of Israel must still pledge not to produce cluster munitions in the future. Israel possesses a stockpile of cluster munitions and also hosts United States (US) cluster munition stocks.
The State of Israel has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
Israel rarely comments on the convention and has taken no steps to join it as it sees military utility in cluster munitions. In 2011, Israel said that such “expansive” treaties are not supported by “relevant states.”
Israel did not participate in the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The convention, adopted in Dublin in May 2008, came into being less than two years after Israel extensively used cluster munitions in Lebanon in 2006.
Israel has never participated in a meeting of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, even as an observer. Israel was invited to, but did not attend, the first part of the convention’s Second Review Conference held virtually in November 2020.
Israel abstained from voting on a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution in December 2020 that urged states outside the convention to “join as soon as possible.” It has abstained from voting on the annual UNGA resolution promoting the convention since it was first introduced in 2015.
Israel has voted in favor of UNGA resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, most recently in December 2020.
Israel is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.
Israel is a State Party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), where it opposed any discussions about regulating cluster munitions until 2008. Israel has expressed regret that states failed in 2011 to adopt a draft CCW protocol on cluster munitions, but it has not proposed further CCW deliberations on the matter.
Israel used cluster munitions in July and August 2006 in southern Lebanon against Hezbollah, but there is no evidence that it has used cluster munitions since then. The Winograd Commission of inquiry, launched by the Israeli government to investigate the 2006 conflict, found a lack of clarity concerning the acceptable or appropriate use of cluster munitions. In 2006, Israel defended the use as conforming with “accepted practice” and international humanitarian law.
Israel also used cluster munitions in Lebanon in 1978, and again in 1982 against Syrian forces and non-state armed groups. In 1973, Israel used cluster munitions in Syria against the training camps of non-state armed groups near Damascus. The Israeli Air Force also used cluster bombs to target Egyptian air defense positions in the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
Production and transfer
Israel has acquired, produced, and exported cluster munitions. At the end of 2018, Israel’s last cluster munition manufacturer, Israel Military Industries (IMI), was acquired by Elbit Systems Ltd., which announced it was discontinuing the production of cluster munitions. The government of Israel has not committed to never produce cluster munitions in the future.
In the past, IMI produced, licensed the production of, and exported numerous types of cluster munitions including artillery projectiles (105mm, 122mm, 130mm, 152mm, 155mm, 175mm, and 203mm), mortar projectiles (120mm), and rockets (EXTRA, GRADLAR, and LAR-160). Most of the cluster munitions delivered M85 dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions. More recently, IMI produced the 155mm M999 “Advanced AntiPersonnel Munition” that delivered M99 DPICM submunitions.
In the past, Israel concluded licensing agreements for production or assembly of the M85 DPICM submunition with Germany, India, Romania, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom (UK), and the US. Austria, Denmark, Germany, Norway, and the UK declared stockpiling 155mm artillery projectiles containing M85 submunitions in their transparency reports for the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
Azerbaijan received a total of 50 EXTRA missiles from Israel for its Lynx-type launchers in 2008–2009. Georgia received four GRADLAR rocket launchers from Israel in 2007. Chile has reported that it possessed 249 LAR-160 cluster munition rockets. Israel reportedly also exported the LAR-160 rocket system to Venezuela.
Israeli company Elbit Systems Ltd. acquired IMI in November 2018 and renamed it IMI Systems. In January 2019, Elbit’s vice president David Vaknin told media that “As part of the Elbit Systems organization, IMI Systems will not be continuing its prior activities with respect to cluster munitions. All of Elbit Systems activities relating to munitions, including those activities to be continued by IMI Systems, will be conducted in accordance with applicable international conventions or US law.”
In October 2020, a company representative confirmed that “Elbit Systems has discontinued production, sales and deliveries of IMI’s M999 submunition, as well as all other munitions that are prohibited under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.”
Other Israeli companies produced several types of air-dropped cluster munitions in the past. The Rafael Corporation produced ATAP-300, ATAP-500, ATAP-1000 RAM, TAL-1, and TAL-2 cluster bombs, as well as the BARAD Helicopter Submunition Dispenser. In 2011, Venezuela destroyed TAL-1 cluster bombs belonging to its air force. An air-dropped cluster bomb of Israeli origin called ARC-32 was stockpiled by Colombia.
In the past, Israel has imported cluster munitions from the US, including M26 rockets (each with 644 M77 DPICM submunitions) for its M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) launchers and 155mm M483A1 projectiles (each with 88 M42/M46 submunitions). Israel used both in southern Lebanon in 2006. Israel has also received and used US-made and supplied Rockeye cluster bombs (with 247 submunitions each) and CBU-58B cluster bombs (with 650 submunitions each).
During 2017, a government upgrade of artillery systems for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reportedly rejected a system made in Germany because of the German government’s insistence that Israel not use it to deliver cluster munitions.
The size and composition of Israel’s current stockpile of cluster munitions is not known, but it is likely to be significant and comprised of the cluster munitions listed in the previous section.
Haaretz reported in September 2018 that the Israeli Air Force was preparing to destroy unspecified types of air-dropped cluster munitions.
Israel hosts a stockpile of US ammunition, which could be transferred to Israel for use in an emergency. A 2008 US Department of State cable, released by Wikileaks in 2011, contained the claim that in 2008, US-manufactured cluster munitions with more than a 1% tested failure rate “constitute greater than 60 percent of the overall” holdings of cluster munitions in the “pre-positioned War Reserve Stockpiles in Israel (WRSA/I).” Israeli officials reportedly warned the US that “unless the prohibition is lifted, Israel will have to revise its defensive doctrine, find a solution to the one-percent dud rate requirement for cluster munitions, and look to another type of weapon system.”
 For details on Israel’s cluster munition policy and practice through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 212–215.
 “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 75/62, 7 December 2020.
 “Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution 75/193, 16 December 2020. Israel voted in favor of similar resolutions in 2013–2020.
 Letter from Rodica Radian-Gordon, Director, Arms Control Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to HRW, 23 February 2009. In 2011, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the views it expressed in a 2009 letter to the Monitor remain unchanged. Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 June 2011. See also, statement of Israel, CCW Fourth Review Conference, Geneva, 25 November 2011. Notes by Action on Armed Violence.
 In 2015, Israel again expressed regret and said “the CCW should remain open to the possibility of returning to this important issue in an opportune time in the future.” Statement of Israel, CCW Meeting of the High Contracting Parties, Geneva, 12 November 2015.
 See, for example, HRW, “Flooding South Lebanon: Israel’s Use of Cluster Munitions in Lebanon in July and August 2006,” Vol. 20, No. 2(E), February 2008.
 Landmine Action, “Cluster Munitions: A survey of legal responses,” 2008, pp. 18–26. According to a US Department of State cable dated 7 May 2008 and made public in September 2011, Israeli Defense Force (IDF) lawyers informed the US that “Winograd Report recommendations concerning cluster munitions were being implemented.” According to the cable, “Since the summer of 2006, the IDF has improved command and control over cluster munitions, improved the documentation system utilized by firing level units, revised its training program to ensure widespread familiarization of the requirements for using cluster munitions, and placed a greater emphasis on accountability.” See, “Cluster munitions: Israeli’s operational defensive capabilities crisis,” US Department of State cable 08TELAVIV1012 dated 7 May 2008, released by Wikileaks on 30 August 2011.
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Behind the Headlines: Legal and operational aspects of the use of cluster bombs,” 5 September 2006.
 During the 1978 and 1982 Lebanon conflicts, the US placed restrictions on the use of its cluster munitions by Israel. In response to Israel’s use of cluster munitions in 1982, and the civilian casualties they caused, the US issued a moratorium on the transfer of cluster munitions to Israel. The moratorium was lifted in 1988. HRW, “Flooding South Lebanon: Israel’s Use of Cluster Munitions in Lebanon in July and August 2006,” Vol. 20, No. 2(E), February 2008, p. 26.
 Abraham Rabinovich, The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter that Transformed the Middle East (New York: Random House, 2004), p. 33.
 Information on surface-launched cluster munitions produced and possessed by Israel was taken primarily from IMI’s corporate website and supplemented with information from Leland S. Ness and Anthony G. Williams, eds., Jane’s Ammunition Handbook 2007–2008 (Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, 2007); and US Defense Intelligence Agency, “Improved Conventional Munitions and Selected Controlled-Fragmentation Munitions (Current and Projected) DST-1160S-020-90,” undated.
 In 2004, an IMI representative claimed that the company had produced more than 60 million M85 DPICM submunitions. Mike Hiebel, Alliant TechSystems, and Ilan Glickman, IMI, “Self Destruct Fuze for M864 Projectiles / MLRS Rockets,” Presentation to the 48th Annual Fuze Conference, Charlotte, US, 27–28 April 2004, slide 9.
 In October 2018, an IMI official told The New York Times that each M999 shell contains nine M99 submunitions with self-destruct features. John Ismay, “With North Korean Threats Looming, the U.S. Army Pursues Controversial Weapons,” The New York Times Magazine, 30 October 2018. The US spent $2.5 million in 2018 to test the M999 Advanced Anti-Personnel Munition, but no funds have been spent since then. Department of the Army, “Weapons and Munitions Engineering Development: System Development & Demonstration, Program Element Number: 0604802A,” pp. 77–82.
 HRW, “Flooding South Lebanon: Israel’s Use of Cluster Munitions in Lebanon in July and August 2006,” Vol. 20, No. 2(E), February 2008, p. 27.
 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “Arms Transfers Database.” Recipient report for Azerbaijan for the period 1950–2011, generated on 15 May 2012. According to SIPRI, the Azerbaijani designation for the Lynx multiple rocket launchers are Dolu-1, Leysan, and Shimsek.
 Georgia used the launchers with 160mm Mk IV rockets, each containing 104 M85 DPICM submunitions, during a 2008 conflict with Russia. The transfer of the GRADLAR launchers was reported in UN Register of Conventional Arms. Submission of Georgia, UN Register of Conventional Arms Report for Calendar Year 2007, 7 July 2008. The Georgian Ministry of Defense on 1 September 2008 admitted to using Mk IV rockets against Russian forces on its website. Ministry of Defense, “Georgian Ministry of Defence’s Response to the Human Rights Watch Inquire [sic] about the Usage of M85 Bomblets,” undated.
 Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Forms B and C, September 2012.
 Israel also exported the EXTRA missile system to Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, but it is not known if submunitions were included in these deals. SIPRI, “Arms Transfers Database.” Recipient report for Israel for the period 1950–2011, generated on 6 June 2012.
 According to Elbit Systems Ltd. vice president David Vaknin, “As part of the Elbit Systems organization, IMI Systems will not be continuing its prior activities with respect to cluster munitions. All of Elbit Systems activities relating to munitions, including those activities to be continued by IMI Systems, will be conducted in accordance with applicable international conventions or US law.” See, Tovah Lazaroff, “Elbit rejects HSBC's BDS disclaimer stating: ‘We don’t produce cluster bombs’,” Jerusalem Post, 3 January 2019. See also, PAX Stop Explosive Investments, “Elbit Systems confirms cluster munitions exit,” 23 January 2019.
 Email to PAX from David Block Temin, Executive Vice President, Chief Compliance Officer and Senior Counsel, Elbit Systems Ltd., 14 October 2020.
 Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, 2004), pp. 370–380.
 ‘‘El Ministerio de la Defensa de Venezuela destruye bombas de racimo’’ (“The Ministry of Defense of Venezuela destroys cluster bombs”), Infodefensa.com, 26 August 2011.
 Presentation on cluster munitions of the Ministry of Defense of Colombia, Bogotá, December 2010.
 HRW, “Flooding South Lebanon: Israel’s Use of Cluster Munitions in Lebanon in July and August 2006,” Vol. 20, No. 2(E), February 2008, pp. 27–28.
 Gideon Levy, “The Cluster Bomb Nation,” Haaretz, 10 August 2017. See also, Gill Cohen, “Israeli Army Buying Local Cannons to Sidestep International Ban on Cluster Bombs,” Haaretz, 8 August 2017.
 Additionally, Israel has captured and possesses Grad 122mm surface-to-surface rocket launchers, but it is not known if the ammunition for these weapons includes versions with submunition payloads. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2011 (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 313; and Colin King, ed., Jane’s Explosive Ordnance Disposal 2007–2008, CD-edition, 15 January 2008 (Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, 2008).
 According to the report, a tender has been issued for bids from commercial companies to destroy air-dropped cluster munitions, but the “IDF has so far not said that it will be destroying the cluster bombs fired by rockets and artillery shells.” Yaniv Kubovich, “Israel Air Force Plans to Destroy Controversial Cluster Bombs,” Haaretz, 18 September 2018.
 “The [Department of Defense] maintains a [war-reserve stockpile] in Israel. This is a separate stockpile of US-owned munitions and equipment set aside, reserved, or intended for use as war reserve stocks by the US and which may be transferred to the Government of Israel in an emergency, subject to reimbursement.” Legislative Proposals contained in a letter by the General Counsel of the Department of Defense to the chairs of the Congressional Armed Services Committees, 11 March 2004.
 According to the cable, until the munitions are transferred from the War Reserve Stockpiles for use by Israel in wartime, “they are considered to be under U.S. title, and U.S. legislation now prevents such a transfer of any cluster munitions with less than a one percent failure rate.” The cable described the inaugural meeting on 1 May 2008 of the “U.S.-Israeli Cluster Munitions Working Group (CMWG).” In this meeting, “Israeli MOD [Ministry of Defense], IDF and MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] officials warned that the current U.S. legislative prohibition on exporting cluster munitions” with more than a one-percent tested failure rate “seriously degrades Israel’s operational capabilities to defend itself.” “Cluster munitions: Israeli’s operational defensive capabilities crisis,” US Department of State cable 08TELAVIV1012 dated 7 May 2008, released by Wikileaks on 30 August 2011.
 “Cluster munitions: Israeli’s operational defensive capabilities crisis,” US Department of State cable 08TELAVIV1012 dated 7 May 2008, released by Wikileaks on 30 August 2011.