[UPDATE May 2022: A Human Rights Watch (HRW) report documents Russian forces' use of cluster munitions in attacks across Ukraine. At least six types of cluster munition has been used by Russia since the beginning of its invasion in February 2022. Evidence indicates that Ukraine has used them at least once.]

Summary

Non-signatory Russia says it cannot join the convention as it regards cluster munitions as legitimate weapons despite the humanitarian risks associated with their use. Russia last participated in a meeting of the convention in 2012. It abstained from the vote on a key United Nations (UN) resolution in December 2020, which urged states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”

Russia—and the Soviet Union before it—is a major producer, stockpiler, and exporter of cluster munitions. Russia continued to develop newer models of cluster munitions in 2020, but there is no information on the status of any production and transfers. Russia has participated in a joint military operation with the Syrian government since September 2015, which has seen the widespread use of cluster munitions.

Policy

The Russian Federation has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Russia is one of the most vocal critics of the convention and has not taken any steps to accede as it sees military utility in cluster munitions. Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov stated in 2016 that “our country strictly complies with its commitments, including with regard to cluster munitions (CMs) that Russia views as a legal means of warfare.”[1] In 2017, Russia said its assessment of the convention “has not changed” and called it “a politicized document that tailors the very definition” of cluster munitions “to the interests of individual states which are trying to preserve their one-sided military and technical advantages.”[2] Russia reiterated this position in November 2020, calling cluster munitions “a lawful form of munitions.”[3]

Russia never participated in the Oslo Process that produced the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[4] When the convention opened for signature in December 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed Russia’s opposition to “unjustified restrictions and bans on cluster munitions,” which it defended as “a legitimate type of weapon that is not banned by international humanitarian law and plays a significant role in the defense interests of Russia.”[5]

Russia participated as an observer in meetings of the convention in 2010 and 2011. It has been invited to, but has not attended any of the convention’s meetings since then.[6]

In December 2020, Russia abstained from the vote on a key UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution urging states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”[7] Russia has previously voted against the annual resolution promoting the convention.[8]

In 2014, Russia criticized and expressed “serious concern” at the use of cluster munitions “against civilian population” in eastern Ukraine.[9] However, it did not acknowledge or take any measures to address the use of cluster munitions by Russian-backed armed opposition groups in eastern Ukraine (see Use section below).

Russia has not condemned the use of cluster munitions in Syria or Yemen. However, it voted in favor of a 2015 UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution that expressed concern at evidence of cluster munition use in Darfur, Sudan.[10] Russia also voted in favor of a 2014 UNSC resolution that expressed concern at the “indiscriminate” use of cluster munitions in South Sudan.[11]

Russia is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Russia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and, after opposing CCW discussions on cluster munitions for years, changed its position in 2011 to support an effort led by the United States (US) to conclude a new CCW protocol on cluster munitions.[12] That initiative failed in November 2011, which ended CCW deliberations on cluster munitions, leaving the Convention on Cluster Munitions as the sole international instrument specifically dedicated to ending the suffering caused by these weapons. Since 2011, Russia has not proposed any more CCW work on cluster munitions.

Development and production

Russia, and historically the Soviet Union, is a major producer and exporter of cluster munitions. Additionally, several states inherited stocks of cluster munitions when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Our records on the production, usage, and export of cluster munitions…are confidential and will not be publicized.”[13]

According to international technical reference materials and corporate marketing, three state-owned Russian companies have produced cluster munitions:

• Bazalt State Research and Production Enterprise (air-dropped bombs);
• Mechanical Engineering Research Institute (120mm, 152mm, and 203mm artillery projectiles); and
• Splav State Research and Production Enterprise Rocket (122mm, 220mm, and 300mm rockets).

Russia is continuing to develop new cluster munitions, but information on production is limited. In July 2020, Splav, which is part of state-owned arms company Rostec, displayed a new generation of multi-barrel rocket launchers at its refurbished rocket assembly facility in Tula, south of Moscow.[14] Photographs from the event show 9M55K 300mm cluster munition rockets and 9N235 fragmentation submunitions made for the Tornado-S system, a modernized version of the BM-30 Smerch rocket.[15]

In early 2018, Russia began testing the “Drel” RBK-500U guided cluster bomb developed by Bazalt State Research and Production Enterprise, according to the company.[16]

As of July 2021, there is no evidence that Russia has deployed either of these new cluster munitions.

Transfer

There is limited information available on Russian arms transfers, including cluster munitions. However, at least 35 states have stockpiled cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin, including 21 states not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[17]

At least 10 States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions that have stockpiled cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin have formally declared the stocks, providing types and quantities, as listed in the following table:

Stockpiled Soviet/Russian cluster munitions declared by States Parties[18]

Stockpiling

In 2009, Russia acknowledged that it possesses a “large” stockpile of cluster munitions “stored throughout the state” and said disposing of such a wide range of obsolete cluster munitions would be time-consuming and “a significant financial expenditure.”[19] In November 2011, Russia said its cluster munitions stockpile was similar in size to that of the US, which then reported stockpiling 5.5 million cluster munitions.[20]

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The quantity and types of cluster munitions stockpiled in the Russian Ministry of Defence are confidential and will not be publicized.”[21] The following list of types stockpiled is based on a wide variety of publicly available sources.

Cluster munitions stockpiled by the Russian Federation[22]

Note: FAE = fuel air explosive; HE/AT = high explosive antitank; SFW = sensor-fuzed weapon.

Use

Use in Syria

In Syria, there is strong evidence that Russia stockpiles cluster munitions at its airbase at Hmeymim, southeast of Latakia city, and that it is using cluster munitions or, at a minimum, directly participating together with Syrian government forces in attacks that have used cluster munitions on opposition-held areas of governorates.

Russian and Syrian government forces use many of the same aircraft and weapons and frequently carry out operations together.[23] There have been at least 687 cluster munition attacks in Syria since July 2012, including at least one attack between 1 August 2020 and 31 July 2021. Previously, Cluster Munition Monitor reported at least a dozen attacks using cluster munitions in Syria between August 2019 and July 2020.

There was a significant increase in the use of cluster munitions in Syria after Russia began its joint operation with Syrian government forces on 30 September 2015.[24] All except two types of the cluster munitions used in Syria since 2012 were manufactured by the Soviet Union/Russia.[25]

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has not explicitly denied Russia’s involvement in using cluster munitions in Syria, but has claimed that cluster munitions have been used in accordance with international humanitarian law and not indiscriminately.[26] In December 2016, Russia issued a three-page position paper on the use of cluster munitions in Syria that concluded that “the question of the involvement of the Russian military personnel in the cases of indiscriminate CMs [cluster munitions] use in Syria [is] totally inappropriate.”[27] In December 2015, the Russian Defense Ministry stated that “Russian aviation does not use [cluster munitions]” and that “there are no such munitions at the Russian air base in Syria.”[28]

The civilian harm caused by the use of cluster munitions in Syria has attracted widespread media coverage, public outcry, and condemnations from more than 145 states.[29]

In July 2019, research organization Conflict Intelligence Team identified an RBK-500 ShOAB-0.5 cluster bomb and RBK-500 AO-2.5RT cluster bomb on display at the Patriot Military Park in Moscow as part of an exhibition of weapons and military equipment used by Russia in its joint military operation in Syria.[30]

Previous use

In 2014–2015, Russian-backed insurgents used cluster munition rockets in eastern Ukraine.[31] Ukrainian government forces were also responsible for cluster munition rocket attacks.[32] Russia expressed concern at Ukrainian government use of cluster munitions, but never commented on cluster munition attacks by separatist forces.[33] There has been no evidence or allegations of new use of cluster munitions in eastern Ukraine by any party since a February 2015 ceasefire went into effect.[34]

During an August 2008 conflict with Georgia, Russia used cluster munitions including RBK-500 AO-2.5RTM cluster bombs and Uragan ground-fired rockets containing 9N210 and 9N235 submunitions. Russia used cluster munitions in or near nine towns and villages in the Gori-Tskhinvali corridor south of the South Ossetian administrative border.[35] Russia denied using cluster munitions in Georgia.[36]

Russian forces used cluster munitions in Chechnya from 1994–1996 and again in 1999.[37]

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, cluster munitions were also used by various forces in several conflicts in Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Tajikistan. The extent of involvement of Russian forces in this use of cluster munitions is not known but cannot be discounted.

The Soviet Union used cluster munitions from 1979–1989 in Afghanistan. It first used cluster munitions in 1943 against German armed forces during World War II.[38]

Policy

The Russian Federation has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Russia has long expressed its opposition to the Mine Ban Treaty and appears to have toughened that stance in recent years. In November 2020, Russia told the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) that is it “not advisable for it to adhere” to the treaty and it has “serious doubts as to the reliability [of the treaty] as it does not have the necessary tools to ensure the compliance of those States that have violated it.” Russia said it “shares the goals of the treaty and supports a world free of mines,” but views antipersonnel mines “as an effective way of ensuring the security of Russia’s borders.”[1]

The position stands in stark contrast to a previous statement made by Russia at the UNGA in 2017: “We do not exclude our possible accession to Ottawa [Mine Ban] Convention in the future. In the meantime, Russia continues work to address a number of technical, organizational and financial issues related to implementation of Ottawa Convention.”[2]

Russia participated as an observer in the 1996–1997 process that created the Mine Ban Treaty, but did not adopt or sign the treaty. It attended the treaty’s First Meeting of States Parties in 1999 and the Second Review Conference in 2009 as an observer, but has not participated in any Mine Ban Treaty meetings since 2010.

In the past, Russia has said it cannot accede to the treaty as it sees military utility in antipersonnel mines and a lack of viable alternatives.[3] Russia has also indicated financial challenges in relation to the Mine Ban Treaty’s requirement to destroy stockpiled antipersonnel mines within four years.

Russia has consistently abstained from voting on the annual UNGA resolution promoting the universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. Russia abstained from the most recent vote in December 2020, on Resolution 75/52.

Russia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines.[4] It routinely submits national annual reports as required by Article 13. Russia is also party to CCW Protocol V on explosive remnants of war (ERW). Russia is not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Russia has reported that in order to comply with CCW Amended Protocol II, a “National System of Technical Requirements for Landmines including antipersonnel and other than antipersonnel ones was elaborated and adopted; planned disposal of obsolete landmines is underway; new, more effective types of detection and demining tools are developed and commissioned. Marking of mine fields at the national boarder of the Russian Federation is fulfilled in full compliance with Paragraph 1 of the RF Federal Law #158FZ of December 7, 2004, ‘On Ratification of Amended Protocol II…’”[5]

Use

Since 1999, Russian forces have used antipersonnel landmines in Chechnya, but also at times in Dagestan, Tajikistan, and on the border with Georgia.[6] Russia has argued that its mine use has been necessary to stop the flow of weapons, drugs, and terrorists; and maintains that it has been in full compliance with CCW Amended Protocol II on landmines.[7]

In May 2020, the UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) in Libya discovered significant mine contamination in areas of Tripoli vacated by opposition forces, including those from a Russian government-linked military company, the Wagner Group. The GNA claimed that antipersonnel landmines manufactured in the Soviet Union or Russia were “laid by the Wagner mercenaries” in the Ain Zara, Al-Khilla, Salahuddin, Sidra, and Wadi al-Rabi districts of Tripoli.[8]

In August 2021, the BBC published a report on the contents of an electronic tablet believed to have belonged to a fighter from the Wagner Group, which included maps of mined areas in Tripoli in 2020.[9] In mid-2020, clearance teams reportedly cleared more than 400 mines and other explosive devices from more than 200 homes in Tripoli’s southern enclave of Salahideen, which they said had been emplaced by the Russian mercenaries.[10]

In July 2020, the United States (US) military’s Africa Command (AFRICOM) criticized the “Wagner Group’s reckless use of landmines and booby traps,” which it said was “harming innocent civilians.”[11]

Production

Russia has produced at least 10 types of antipersonnel landmines since 1992, including blast mines (PMN, PMN-2, PMN-4, and PFM-1S) and fragmentation mines (POMZ-2, OZM-72, MON-50, MON-90, MON-100, and MON-200). Russia has stated on several occasions that its production of blast mines halted in 1997.[12] Russia has been conducting research on new mines, modifications to existing mines, and alternatives to mines since at least 1997.[13]

Russia debuted new “smart” landmine systems during its annual military exercises in 2021, including mines delivered by rockets and scattered from truck-mounted launchers.[14] It introduced the POM-3 or “Medalyon” antipersonnel mine—a self-destructing bounding fragmentation mine equipped with inherent antihandling/anti-disturbance capability—that had been in development since at least 2015.[15] Several types of self-destructing/self-deactivating antivehicle mines were also tested in 2021.[16] The status of Russia’s production plans for the POM-3 mine is not known.

Transfer

Since 1 December 1994, Russia has had a moratorium on the export of antipersonnel landmines that are not detectable or not equipped with self-destruct devices. The moratorium formally expired in 2002, yet Russian officials stated in June 2009 that it was still being observed.[17]

Antipersonnel landmines of Soviet/Russian origin have been found emplaced in at least 30 mine-affected countries.[18]

In recent years, antipersonnel mines of Russian manufacture—distinct from versions produced in the former Soviet Union—have appeared in Libya, Syria,[19] and Ukraine.[20]

Most recently, six types of Russian-made antipersonnel mines and two types of antivehicle mines, which had not been observed before in Libya, were used in and around Tripoli in 2019 and 2020, indicating that the mines were recently transferred into the country.[21] In March 2021, a report by the UN Security Council Panel of Experts on Libya found that private military contractors from Russia had imported the antipersonnel mines to use in their operations.[22]

Stockpiling and destruction

In November 2004, for the first time, Russia released official information on the number of antipersonnel mines in its stockpiles, when then-Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov cited a figure of 26.5 million. He forecast that approximately 23.5 million of these antipersonnel mines would be destroyed between 2005 and 2015.[23] At the Mine Ban Treaty Tenth Meeting of States Parties in 2010, Russia declared that it had destroyed a total of 10 million mines, including antipersonnel mines.[24] In 2010 alone, more than 464,000 antipersonnel landmines that did not meet international requirements were destroyed.[25]

Russian officials have acknowledged that Russian military units in other countries within the Commonwealth of Independent States maintain antipersonnel landmine stockpiles; for example, 18,200 in Tajikistan, and an unknown number in Georgia (Abkhazia).[26]

Contamination

The Russian Federation is heavily contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) as a result of World War II, the two Chechen wars (1994–1996 and 1999–2009), and armed conflicts in the Caucasian republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria.

Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were used extensively in the two major conflicts in Chechnya. Estimates of the extent of contamination vary greatly because no systematic effort has been undertaken to assess the scope or impact of the problem.[1] In 2010, Russia’s deputy prime minister and presidential special envoy to the Caucasus, Aleksandr Khloponin, claimed that mines affected 14km² of land and posed a major obstacle to development.[2] In contrast, Chechen officials and human rights organizations have previously estimated that 245km² of land was mined, including 165km² of farmland and 73km² of woodland.[3]

In January 2017, a commander in the Russian armed forces reportedly told press agency Interfax that more than 100km² of land remained to be cleared in Chechnya, and a further 20km² in neighboring Ingushetia.[4] According to the online media report, areas cleared to date had nearly all been in lowland Chechnya and remaining mined area is in more mountainous terrain, complicating demining efforts.[5]

Program Management

There is no formal civilian mine action program in Russia and no national mine action authority. Mine clearance is carried out by Federal Ministry of Defense engineers, demining brigades of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and by the MES, through its specialized demining units (EMERCOM Demining and the “Leader” Center for Special Tasks).[6]

Russia reported that its armed forces established an International Demining Action Center in 2014. The center serves as a base for specialist training in detection and clearance of explosive devices, demining, and operation of mobile robotic tools, and does not function as a mine action center as the term is generally understood in mine action.[7]

Clearance of explosive ordnance in 2017 was reportedly undertaken by 7,050 military personnel, including 846 officers, 97 demining teams, 978 vehicles, and 51 pieces of demining machinery.[8]

Land Release

In its Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V transparency reports for 2017, Russia reported that its armed forces engineering units conducted demining and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) in the “territories of the Russian Federation,” including the western, southern, central, and eastern military districts, and the northern navy district.In total, more than 331,607 explosive devices were destroyed, including 30,292 IEDs.[9]

In 2016, the Deputy Chief Engineer of Russia’s armed forces, Colonel Ruslan Alahverdiev, had reportedly promised to complete clearance of Chechnya and Ingushetia by 2018.[10] However, in the online media report, it was unclear whether Colonel Alahverdiev was referring only to clearing all roads and forests, or if roads and forests are the only remaining mined areas in Chechnya and Ingushetia. In September 2017, online media reported that combat engineers had been working since April 2017 to clear forests in mountainous areas and foothills in Chechnya.[11]

Progress in 2018

For 2018, Russia planned to clear more than 53km² of ERW: 14.7km² in the western military district, 14.2km² in the southern military district, 13.9km² in the central military district, 6.2km² in the eastern military district, and 4.1km² in the northern navy district.[12]

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and shared all its country-level landmine reports (from “Clearing the Mines 2018”) and country-level cluster munition reports (from “Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2018”) with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.

Casualties Overview

In 2016, four mine/ERW casualties were identified in the Russian Federation through Monitor media scanning. All recorded casualties in 2016 were adult male civilians. No child casualties were recorded among civilians.[1]

The total number of mine/ERW casualties throughout Russia remains unknown.

A total of 3,187 civilian mine/ERW casualties (746 killed; 2,440 injured; 1 unknown) have been recorded since 1994, including in UNICEF data for casualties in Chechnya.[2]

Cluster munitions were reported to have caused at least 638 casualties; 612 of the casualties occurred during strikes in Chechnya (294 killed; 318 injured) in the period from 1994 to the end of 1999. The other 26 casualties were caused by unexploded submunitions and were reported between 1994 and the end of 2007.[3]