Turkey

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Last updated: 13 September 2021

Summary

Non-signatory Turkey has acknowledged the humanitarian concerns raised by cluster munitions, but has not taken any steps to join the convention. It abstained from voting on a key United Nations (UN) resolution promoting the convention in December 2020. Turkey last participated in a meeting of the convention in September 2018.

Turkey has reported that it has not produced cluster munitions since 2005, and has never exported them. Turkey has, however, imported cluster munitions and possesses a stockpile.

Policy

The Republic of Turkey has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Turkey has expressed concern at the “indiscriminate use” of cluster munitions, but has not taken any steps to accede to the convention.[1] It has provided several reasons for not joining the convention, including concern over its capacity to meet the eight-year deadline for destroying stockpiled cluster munitions.[2]

Turkey attended several diplomatic conferences of the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions. However, it participated as an observer in the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008, raising “interoperability” concerns over the potential use of cluster munitions by states not party during joint military operations. Turkey attended the Oslo Signing Conference in December 2008 as an observer, and did not explain why it could not sign the convention.[3]

Turkey has participated as an observer at meetings of the convention, including the First Review Conference held in Dubrovnik, Croatia in September 2015.[4] It was invited, but did not attend, the first part of the convention’s Second Review Conference held virtually in November 2020

In December 2020, Turkey abstained from the vote on a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution urging states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”[5] Turkey has not explained why it has abstained from voting on the annual UNGA resolution promoting the convention since it was first introduced in 2015.

Turkey has condemned the use of cluster munitions on several occasions.[6] It has voted in favor of UNGA resolutions expressing outrage at the use of cluster munitions in Syria, most recently in December 2020.[7]

Turkey is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).

Use

In 2009, Turkey told the Monitor that it was “not making use of cluster munitions.”[8] Since then, officials have repeated that Turkey has not used and does not intend to use cluster munitions.[9]

A 2008 United States (US) Department of State cable claimed that the Turkish armed forces have “a de facto moratorium on the use of cluster munitions” but “Turkey’s military doctrine continues to call for the use of cluster munitions in the event of an ‘all-out war.’”[10]

There is some evidence to indicate that Turkey may have used cluster munitions at least once in the past, in 1994.[11]

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

In the past, Turkey produced, exported, and imported cluster munitions. Turkey possesses cluster munitions but has not shared information on the types or quantities stockpiled.

In 2010, Turkey told the Monitor that it “does not use, transfer, produce or import cluster munitions.”[12] Since then, officials have continued to state that Turkey “no longer produces, transfers, exports or imports cluster munitions; has not produced cluster munitions since 2005; and has never used cluster munitions in the past.”[13]

At least two Turkish companies have produced ground-delivered cluster munitions:

  • Makina ve Kimya Endüstrisi Kurumu (MKEK) has produced an extended range M396 155mm artillery projectile containing self-destructing M85 Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM) submunitions.[14] It has also produced M483A1 155mm artillery projectiles with DPICM submunitions, under license from the US.[15]
  • Roketsan has produced the TRK-122 122mm rocket, which contains 56 M85 DPICM submunitions.[16]

Turkey sold 3,020 TRK-122 122mm rockets to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2006–2007.[17]

The US supplied Turkey with 3,304 Rockeye cluster bombs, each containing 247 submunitions, at some point between 1970 and 1995.[18] In 1995, the US announced that it would provide Turkey with 120 ATACMS missiles with submunitions for its M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) launchers.[19] Turkey also possesses US-supplied M26 rockets, each with 644 submunitions, for its MLRS. In 2004, the US announced a sale to Turkey of two CBU-103 Combined Effects Munitions cluster bombs, each with 202 submunitions, and two AGM-154 Joint Stand-Off Weapons (JSOW), each with 145 submunitions.[20] In 2005, the US announced another sale to Turkey of 50 CBU-103 and 50 JSOW.[21]

States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions have reported transferring cluster munitions to Turkey in the past, before they joined the convention. Slovakia reported a transfer of 380 AGAT 122mm rockets, each containing 56 submunitions, to Turkey in 2007.[22] Chile’s Ministry of National Defense has provided the Monitor with a document detailing the export of four CB-250 cluster bombs to Turkey in 1996.[23]



[1] In 2009, Turkey said it shares the “humanitarian concerns behind the efforts limiting the indiscriminate use of cluster munitions” and “attaches importance to the restriction of the use of cluster munitions” but could not consider accession until Mine Ban Treaty obligations are fulfilled. Letter from Amb. Tomur Bayer, Director-General, International Security Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Human Rights Watch (HRW), 2 March 2009. Turkey completed the destruction of its stockpiled antipersonnel landmines in 2011.

[2] Turkey is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty and in 2011 completed the destruction of its stockpiled antipersonnel landmines.

[3] For details on Turkey’s cluster munition policy and practice through early 2009, see HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 246–249.

[4] Turkey attended every Meeting of States Parties in 2010–2018, as well as the First Review Conference in Dubrovnik in September 2015, and intersessional meetings in 2013–2015. It did not attend the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in 2019.

[5]Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 75/62, 7 December 2020.

[6] Statement of Turkey, Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings, Geneva, 23 June 2015. Notes by HRW; and statement of Turkey, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fifth Meeting of States Parties, San Jose, 3 September 2014. Notes by HRW.

[7]Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution 75/193, 16 December 2020. Turkey voted in favor of similar UNGA resolutions on Syria in 2013–2018.

[8] Letter from Amb. Tomur Bayer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to HRW, 2 March 2009.

[9] Email from İsmail Çobanoğlu, Permanent Mission of Turkey to the UN in New York, 24 June 2010; email from Ramazan Ercan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 August 2011; CMC meeting with Kultuhan Celik, Second Secretary, Embassy of Turkey to Zambia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 11 September 2013; and Monitor meeting with Ramazan Ercan, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Turkey to the UN in Geneva, CCW Meeting of Experts on Protocol V, Geneva, 7 April 2015.

[10]Turkey Shares USG Concerns About Oslo Process,” US Department of State cable dated 12 February 2008, released by Wikileaks on 20 May 2011.

[11] In January 1994, the Turkish Air Force carried out an attack on the Zaleh camp of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) in northern Iraq near the Iranian border. Turkish television reported that US-supplied cluster bombs were used. See, HRW, “U.S. Cluster Bombs for Turkey?,” Vol. 6, No. 19, December 1994, citing Foreign Broadcast Information Network, Western Europe, FBIS-WEU-94-0919, 28 January 1994, p. 26, from Ankara TRT Television Network in Turkish, 11:00 GMT, 18 January 1994.

[12] Email from İsmail Çobanoğlu, Permanent Mission of Turkey to the UN in New York, 24 June 2010.

[13] Email from Ramazan Ercan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 August 2011; and Monitor interview with Ramazan Ercan, Permanent Mission of Turkey to the UN in Geneva, Geneva, 7 April 2015.

[14] MKEK, “155 mm M396 ERDP Ammunition,” undated.

[15] Leland S. Ness and Anthony G. Williams, eds., Jane’s Ammunition Handbook 2007–2008 (Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, 2007), pp. 635–636.

[17] Submission of the Republic of Turkey, UN Register of Conventional Arms, Report for Calendar Year 2006, 22 March 2007; and Report for Calendar Year 2007, 7 July 2008.

[18] US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), “Cluster Bomb Exports under FMS, FY1970–FY1995,” obtained by HRW in a Freedom of Information Act request, 28 November 1995.

[19] Congressional Record, “Proposed Sale of Army Tactical Missile System to Turkey,” 11 December 1995, p. E2333. Each ATACMS missile contains 300 or 950 submunitions.

[20] US DSCA, “Notifications to Congress of Pending US Arms Transfers,” No. 05-12, 7 October 2004.

[21] US DSCA press release, “Turkey – Munitions and Aircraft Components for F-16 Aircraft,” Transmittal No. 05-29, 8 September 2005; and US DSCA press release, “Turkey Wants the AGM-154A/C Joint Standoff Weapons,” Transmittal No. 05-33, 6 September 2005.

[22] Submission of the Slovak Republic, UN Register of Conventional Arms, Report for Calendar Year 2007, 12 June 2008. In 2014, Slovakia reported that it prepared a contract in 2011 to produce 8,000 AGAT cluster munition rockets for Turkish company Roketsan, which supplies the Turkish Army, at a cost of €25.6 million. However, the transfer did not happen as the Turkish Ministry of Defense did not sign-off on it, apparently due to financial and other reasons. “Draft Action Plan for the Implementation of the Commitments of the Slovak Republic under the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” attached to Letter No. 590.736/2014-OKOZ from Miroslav Lajčák, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign and European Affairs, to Sarah Blakemore, CMC, 25 April 2014.

[23] “Exports of Cluster Bombs Authorized in the Years 1991–2001,” official document provided by the General Directorate of National Mobilization (Dirección General de Movilización Nacional, DGMN), within the Chilean Ministry of National Defense. The document was provided along with a letter from Brig. Gen. Roberto Ziegele Kerber, Director-General of National Mobilization, Chilean Ministry of National Defense, 18 May 2012.


Impact

Last updated: 21 April 2021

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Treaty Status | Management & Coordination | Impact (contamination & casualties) | Addressing the Impact (land release, risk education, victim assistance)

Country summary

The Republic of Turkey is affected by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), particularly along its borders with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Turkey also has responsibility for the clearance of landmines in areas under its control in Northern Cyprus. Turkey has only made marginal progress in addressing mine contamination in its territories, and its 2013 Mine Ban Treaty extension request did not include planning or resources for the clearance of mines in Northern Cyprus.[1]

The Turkish Mine Action Center (TURMAC) was established on 3 February 2015 under the Ministry of National Defense,[2] and became operational in 2016.[3] Since 2016, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), and other partners have supported TURMAC’s capacity development needs.[4]

TURMAC coordinates risk education and prioritized 899 villages most at-risk in 15 provinces in its National Mine Risk Education Plan 2020–2022. Within the plan’s framework, non-technical survey (NTS) teams, local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and gendarmerie personnel are expected to be trained to deliver risk education over the three-year period.

Turkey is responsible for thousands of mine/ERW survivors. Mine survivors can receive care and assistance, including home-based care. Turkey continued to report that it was prioritizing the socioeconomic inclusion of mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities. However, the employment rate for persons with disabilities in the public sector remained below the 4% legal obligation and most persons with disabilities, especially women, remained unemployed.

Treaty status

Treaty status overview

Mine Ban Treaty

State Party

Article 5 clearance deadline: 1 March 2022

Convention on Cluster Munitions

Non-signatory

Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)

State Party

 

Turkey became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 March 2004 and its original Article 5 deadline was 1 March 2014. In 2012, at the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Turkey reported that it would seek an extension to its deadline.[5] In March 2013, Turkey submitted a request for an eight-year extension, until 2022, to complete clearance of all mined areas.[6]

In 2019, Turkey cited a number of challenges that have slowed down clearance progress, including the difficult terrain, the security situation, and climatic conditions.[7] Based on the remaining contamination problem, Turkey indicated in 2020 that it planned to submit a second extension request.[8]

Turkey has made marginal progress in addressing its landmine contamination. The 2013 extension request revealed that since 1998 only 1.15km² of mined area had been cleared, most of which took place in 2011. In addition, military teams had cleared 24,287 mines, but only to allow safe movement of troops, not to release a contaminated area.[9] However, management of mine action and progress have improved following the establishment of TURMAC in 2015 and mine clearance capacity increased in 2019.

Northern Cyprus

Turkey did not request additional time as part of its 2013 extension request for the clearance of the areas it controls in Northern Cyprus.[10] (See Cyprus's Mine Action profile for further information).

Management and coordination

Mine action management and coordination

Mine action management and coordination overview[11]

Mine action commenced

2015

National mine action management actors

TURMAC, established 2015

United Nations Agencies

UNDP is managing demining operators and quality assurance along the eastern border and supporting capacity development of TURMAC

Other actors

GICHD, capacity development of TURMAC

Mine action legislation

Law No. 6586 on the “Establishment of a National Mine Action Center and Amendment of Some Other Laws,” adopted in January 2015

Mine action strategic and operational plans

Strategic Mine Action Plan 2020–2025

Mine action standards

44 National Mine Action Standards including a land release policy issued in February 2019

Strategies and policies

Turkey developed its first-ever National Mine Action Plan for 2019­–2021, which was expected to be approved and published in 2020.[12] The three-year plan covered national capacity development, survey and clearance of mined areas and areas containing unexploded ordnance within its borders, and the provision of mine risk education and assistance to mine victims.[13]

In 2020, Turkey reported the release of a five-year Strategic Mine Action Plan 2020–2025.[14]

Legislation and standards

The mandate of TURMAC is guided by Law No. 6586 on the “Establishment of a National Mine Action Centre and Amendment of Some Other Laws,” which was adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly and entered into force on 3 February 2015. A presidencial decree from 10 July 2018 mandates TURMAC to report directly to the Deputy Minister of National Defense.[15]

Forty-four National Mine Action Standards, including a land release policy, were released in February 2019, along with five standard operating procedures.[16] Specific standards for the clearance of the eastern border have been reviewed.[17]

Information management

The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) was established with the support of UNDP and the GICHD. TURMAC and military personnel have been trained to use the system. Turkey stated that the system has been fully operational since 2018.[18] However, due to national security concerns, much of the minefield data remains classified, presenting a challenge to mine action information management in Turkey.[19]

Gender and diversity

Turkey stated that “gender and diversity are taken into consideration in all mine action activities.” Nearly half (45%) of TURMAC’s personnel were women. While no women had integrated the military demining units, civilian contractors were encouraged and advised to include women within their personnel. Documentation around the Eastern Border Mine Clearance project include specific gender indicators and reports provide age- and gender-disaggregated data.[20]

Risk education management and coordination

Risk education management and coordination overview

Government focal points

TURMAC

Coordination mechanisms

Not reported

Risk education strategy

National Mine Risk Education Plan 2020–2022

 

Coordination

TURMAC developed a National Mine Risk Education Plan 2020–2022 aiming to inform communities living in the vicinity of mined areas. Within the framework of this plan, risk education trainers were to be trained and certified by TURMAC. Implementation of the plan was set to start in June 2020.[21]

Victim assistance management and coordination

Victim assistance management and coordination overview[22]

Government focal points

Disabled and Senior Citizens Directorate General, Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services and TURMAC

Coordination mechanisms

TURMAC meets with relevant actors as necessary

Coordination regularity and outcomes

Not reported

Plans/strategies

Not reported whether the Strategic Mine Action Plan 2020–2025 included survivor assistance provisions

Disability sector integration

 

Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services through its General Directorate of Services for Persons with Disabilities and the Elderly is responsible for protecting the rights of persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors and casualties’ family members

Survivor inclusion and participation

Survivors were not reported to have been included in the planning or implementation of services; and limited inclusion of organizations representing persons with disabilities in legislative, policymaking, and monitoring processes

 

TURMAC reported that necessary coordination was held with the relevant bodies “so that every mine victim may attain their legal rights.”[23]

Laws and policies

In 2020, the European Commission (EC) noted the lack of a national action plan on the rights of people with disabilities, and that discriminatory provisions remained in Turkish legislation such as restricting access to certain public positions.[24]

Turkish law prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities. NGOs that advocate for the rights of persons with disabilities reported that the laws were not enforced effectively.[25]

Accessibility of public services and buildings for persons with disabilities remained limited.[26]

Employment quotas of persons with disabilities in the public and private sectors were implemented in 2014.[27]

Under the 2828 Social Services Act, mine survivors receive care and assistance as long as they need it, including home-based care.[28]

The Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services operated social service centers assisting vulnerable individuals, including persons with disabilities.[29] All public schools are required by law to accommodate students with disabilities, although disability rights activists reported that a large number of school-age children with disabilities did not receive adequate access to education.[30]

Turkey had no mental health laws.[31]

Impact

Contamination

Contamination overview (as of December 2019)[32]

Landmines

150.42 km²

In addition 162 SHAs in non-border areas (extent unknown)

Extent of contamination: Massive

Other ERW contamination

Contamination includes IEDs

Note: ERW=explosive remnants of war; IED=improvised explosive device; and SHA=suspected hazardous area.

Landmine contamination

The majority of antipersonnel mines in Turkey are found along its borders. The mines were laid in 1955–1959 all along the border with Syria, as well as on some sections of the border with Armenia, Iran, and Iraq in 1992–1995,[33] and with Azerbaijan.[34] According to Turkey, its western borders with Bulgaria and Greece, as well as the border with Georgia, are mine-free.[35] Mines were also laid around military installations.[36]

Government forces placed landmines during the 1984–1999 conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) in the southeast of the country. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, these mines have been progressively cleared since 1998.[37] In addition to mines laid by Turkish security forces, non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have also emplaced mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), rendering the clearance process more complex.[38]

The Syrian border is estimated to account for two-thirds of the mines and close to 90% of the remaining mined area in the country. While the minefields in this region are clearly mapped, marked, fenced, and reported to be well known to the local population,[39] clearance has been delayed due to the armed conflict in Syria.[40]

Turkey indicated that remaining contamination totaled 150.42km² as of the end of 2019. In addition, 162 non-border areas were suspected to contain antipersonnel mines. NTS of the 162 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) was to be conducted as part of phase 3 of the Eastern Border Mine Clearance project.[41]

Mine contamination in Turkey has both a humanitarian and economic impact. Up to 80% of mined areas along the Syrian border are on arable land, which cannot be used. The risk to livestock is widespread, especially where fencing is damaged. Mined areas have also prevented access for development activities.[42]

Casualties

Casualties overview[43]

Casualties

All known mine/ERW casualties (between 1984 and 2019)

6,857 (1,393 killed and 5,464 injured)

Casualties in 2019

Annual total

62 (increase from 31 in 2018)

 

Survival outcome

18 killed; 44 injured

Device type causing casualties

52 improvised mines; 9 mine/ERW; 1 unspecified mine

Civilian status

24 civilians; 38 military

Age and gender

57 adults (2 women and 55 men)

5 children (1 girl and 4 boys)

 

Casualties in 2019: details

The Monitor analysis of media reports collected by the Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey (IMFT) and Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project (ACLED) identified at least 62 new mine/ERW casualties in 2019 in Turkey. Of the total, 24 were civilians and 38 were military personnel. Most of the new casualties were adults. The 2019 total represents a sharp increase from 31 new mine/ERW casualties in 2018 and is also an increase from previous years.[44] It was however less than the 69 new casualties identified in Turkey from IMFT reporting in 2012.[45]

While most reported mine/ERW casualties in 2017 were from ERW, nearly half of the 2018 reported casualties were caused by unspecified mines and the overwhelming majority of the 2019 casualties were caused by improvised mines.

Turkey reported that there were 100 mine/ERW casualties in 2019, including 54 civilians and 46 military personnel.[46] Turkey also reported a clear increase in improvised mine casualties in 2019.[47]

The total number of mine/ERW casualties in Turkey is unknown. Past Monitor reporting found that more than 6,800 people were reported to have been injured by mines in Turkey since 1984. In 2017, TURMAC stated that existing records indicated that there had been some 4,000 landmine casualties in Turkey. Turkey had reported 4,602 mine/ERW casualties, including 919 people killed and 3,683 injured, as of the end of 2015.[48] However, according to a media report in April 2010, the Ministry of Internal Affairs had recorded 6,360 mine casualties since 1984: with 1,269 people killed (625 security personnel and 644 civilians) and another 5,091 people injured (with the number of civilians compared to security personnel injured not reported) in mine incidents.[49] In 2007, a demining specialist reported at least 10,000 mine casualties, mostly civilians, along the Turkish-Syrian border since the 1950s, of whom more than 3,000 were killed and 7,000 injured).[50]

Reported figures possibly include casualties of some command-detonated IEDs that were not improvised mines. In its Article 5 deadline extension request of March 2013, Turkey provided information on antipersonnel mine casualties occurring between 2004 and the end of 2012: 882 military personnel (260 killed and 622 injured) and 168 civilians (56 killed and 112 injured). Turkey also included disaggregated information on the age and gender of civilian casualties for a similar time period (10 years); of the total civilian casualties reported, 15 were women and 50 were children.[51] In contrast, the Monitor reporting, which included IMFT data for the period from 2004 to the end of 2012, counted more than twice the number of civilian mine/ERW casualties; 377 civilian casualties of 979 casualties recorded in total.

Addressing the impact

Mine action

Operators and service providers

Clearance operators

National

Turkish Armed Forces

Military Demining Troops of gendarmerie

International

Denel MECHEM (MECHEM) with national sub-contractor Altay, since 2015

RPS-Explosive Engineering Services (quality assurance and quality control), since 2016

 

Clearance

Land release overview[52]

Antipersonnel mine clearance in 2019

Cleared: 0.67km2

Reduced: 0.14km2

Cancelled: 6.1km2

Ordnance destroyed in 2019

25,959 antipersonnel mines ; 17 antivehicle mines: 4 ERW

Turkey reported the clearance and destruction of 4,038 improvised mines by the Turkish Armed Forces

Landmine clearance in

2015–2019*

2015: 0

2016: 0.12km²

2017: 0.82km²

2018: 2.08km²

2019: 0.67km²

Total land cleared: 3.69km²

Progress

  • Not on target to meet it clearance deadline of 2022, Turkey indicated it will request a second extension
  • Phases a and 2 of European Union (EU) Eastern Border Mine Clearance project on the border with Iran completed at the end of 2019; phase 3 was due to start in 2021
  • Demining is being conducted to enable safe construction of a Border Security Surveillance System along the Syrian border; once completed, this is expected to allow for planned demining of the Syrian border to commence
  • No clearance was conducted along the Iraqi and Armenian borders in 2019

* In 2016–2017, 0.07km2 were reduced and 7.58km2 were cancelled; 4.67km2 were cancelled in 2018; 0.14km2 were reduced and 6.1km2 were cancelled in 2019. Clearance total for 2017 also includes some 2016 clearance outputs.

Land release: landmines

Turkey increased its clearance capacity in 2019 with 12 additional military demining teams. The country aimed to accredit eight additional teams by mid-2021, while also acquiring six additional demining machines.[53] Military demining teams will also be supported by 20 mine detection dogs.[54]

Turkey reported the clearance of 0.67km2 in 2019. A comprehensive desk assessment of minefield records was conducted in 2019 which resulted in the addition of previously suspected areas to the total of areas known to contain antipersonnel mines.[55] In 2019, 0.14km2 were reduced by technical survey and 6.1km2 were cancelled by NTS.[56]

Turkey was planning to survey the remaining minefields over the 2021–2023 period, as part of the “NTS project.”[57]

Border clearance

Since 2016 demining has been conducted for the construction of a Border Security Surveillance System along Turkey’s border with Syria.[58] It is expected that once completed, the Border Security Surveillance System will allow for planned demining of the Syrian border to commence.[59]

In May 2015, the European Union (EU), UNDP, and Turkey launched a project on the eastern borders, the “Technical Assistance for Socioeconomic Development through Demining and Increasing Border Surveillance Capacity at the Eastern Borders of Turkey,” to enable better border management. The areas being cleared as part of the project will remain restricted areas even after clearance.[60] During the first two phases of the project, completed in December 2019, 4.7km2 were released through clearance and technical survey and 45,608 mines were removed and destroyed.[61] Phase 3 of the project was set to start in 2020 through 2022, but delays were expected for the implementation due to the COVID-19 pandemic.[62] Phase 3 was due to start in 2021,[63] and it includes a mine clearance, a NTS, and a risk education component. NTS will provide a precise map of the contamination on the eastern border, and 4.2km2 of contaminated land are to be cleared as part of phase 3.[64]

Clearance along the southeastern/Iraqi border has been delayed due to the conflict in Syria,[65] and the EU Eastern Border Mine Clearance project.[66] It was expected to take place from 2019–2021 with the destruction of 79,017 antipersonnel mines.[67] However no areas were cleared along the southeastern/Iraqi border in 2019.[68]

Risk education

Operators and service providers

Risk education operators[69]

Type of organization

Name of organization

Type of activity

Governmental

TURMAC

A risk education protocol signed with the Turkish Gendarmerie whereby TURMAC will train gendarmerie personnel and monitor its risk education activities in 15 provinces

National

Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey (IMFT)

Train-the-trainer workshop in Diyarbakır, with participants from most affected provinces; part of the workshop was dedicated to risk education activities adapted to children

Humanitarian Mine Action Association (Insani Mayın Faaliyeti Derneği, iMFAD)

Risk education to children and refugees

International

Danish Demining Group (DDG)

Risk education to Syrian refugees in Hatay, Kilis, and Sanliurfa; Syrian facilitators, trained by DDG, conducted awareness sessions for children, youth and adults using tools and method adapted to the different target groups

 

Beneficiary numbers

TURMAC reported that risk education sessions were conducted for 388 beneficiaries.[70]

Implementation

Target groups

In Turkey, risk education targets populations who live close to mined areas.[71] TURMAC identified and prioritized 899 villages in 15 provinces for risk education.

The Humanitarian Mine Action Association (iMFAD) provided risk education in refugee camps. Syrian refugees are considered as one of the most at-risk groups in Turkey, as they will be returning home after the conflict.[72] Some Syrian refugees also cross the border to return to Syria to check on property or to visit relatives.

Delivery methods

The National Mine Risk Education Plan, which is part of the Strategic Mine Action Plan 2020–2025, sets three main objectives for the period 2020 to 2022: NTS teams will run risk education sessions for populations in the vicinity of minefields in parallel to their survey activities; TURMAC will encourage local NGOs to conduct risk education workshops and training with the support of the third phase of the Eastern Border Mine Clearance project; and the Turkish Gendarmerie will conduct risk education in the 899 villages identified as most at-risk. Gendarmerie personnel will be trained by TURMAC.[73]

Major developments in 2019

Turkey anticipated delays in the implementation of risk education-related projects, due to the COVID-19 pandemic.[74]

Victim assistance

Victim assistance providers and activities

Victim assistance operators[75]

Type of organization

Name of organization

Type of activity

Governmental

General Health Insurance system

Provides orthosis, prosthetics, and wheelchairs

Gulhane Military Medical Academy and the Turkish Armed Forces Rehabilitation and Care Center (TAF-RCC)

Specialized facilities assist people wounded by weapons with high-quality services: rehabilitation, economic and social inclusion, and psychological support

Gaziler Physical Therapy and Rehabilitation Training and Research Hospital

Physical rehabilitation

National

IMFT

Advocacy and assistance to individual survivors and peer support

International

Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH)

Physical rehabilitation, including 3D printed prosthetic and orthotic devices, psychological support for Syrian refugees

Relief International

Physical rehabilitation and mental health services for Syrian refugees and host communities

 

Major developments in 2019

The large influx of refugees coming into Turkey continued to strain the national healthcare system,[76] especially in the provinces hosting the largest number of refugees: Ankara, Gaziantep, Hatay, Istanbul, Izmir, Mersin, and Sanliurfa.[77]

Needs assessment

A data collection mechanism was established for victims of mine/ERW incidents who are taken to the hospital with the Ministry of Health’s module for civilian casualties, the “Health Management System.” The system was designed for improved monitoring and assistance to mine victims. Mine/ERW victims are recorded on the IMSMA database.[78] IMFT continued to collect information available on survivors and persons killed through media scanning and crosschecking with other organizations and local sources.[79]

Since 2016, the Ministry of Interior, through the gendarmerie and national police, has updated TURMAC on the details of incidents and casualties in the areas under their responsibility within a month of each mine/ERW incident.[80] In addition, the General Staff, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services and other relevant ministries and bodies report quarterly on changes to personal data and health status of mine victims. Persons considered official mine victims according to the legislation were to be assisted to attain their legal rights in coordination with the other relevant bodies.[81] However, civil society reported that there was no accessible and comprehensive data on mine incidents and mine victims in Turkey.[82]

Medical care and rehabilitation

Turkey reported that emergency and continuing health services, and physical rehabilitation services are provided to mine/ERW survivors in both private and state-funded structures, while transportation to rehabilitation centers is provided by the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services.[83] Generally, healthcare facilities in towns in the mine-affected regions (other than the largest cities) have been underfunded, had inadequate staffing levels and equipment, and often were not able to address survivors’ emergencies or ongoing medical needs.[84] Emergency services are free-of-charge for all citizens in both public and private hospitals.[85] According to the General Health Insurance system, payment of premiums based on income-level is required. General Health Insurance premiums for people in need are covered by state funding.[86]

The General Health Insurance system provides orthosis, prosthetics, and wheelchairs; however, the provision of these assistive devices is time-bound and limited to one new fitting every five years.[87] There was a lack of affordable occupational therapy services and vocational rehabilitation services.[88]

Socio-economic and psychosocial inclusion

No specific economic inclusion or work programs existed for mine/ERW victims. However, some broader services exist that provide mine/ERW survivors and affected families with monthly payments, employment opportunities, enterprising grant, free job counselling, and courses according to their specific needs.[89]

Through the quota program for employment of persons with disabilities, the number of persons with disabilities employed in the public sector increased.[90] Nonetheless, the public sector’s employment rate for persons with disabilities remained well below its 4% commitment.[91]

Cross-cutting issues

The World Health Organization (WHO) supported Turkish health authorities providing access to health services to Syrian refugees.[92] The WHO supported refugee health training centers where Syrian refugees were trained in providing health services to fellow Syrian refugees in Turkey. It also trained Turkish and Syrian health workers in mental health and psychosocial support to serve refugees, thereby providing career opportunities to Syrian doctors and nurses in Turkey.[93] In Turkey, refugees have free access to emergency care,[94] but physical rehabilitation and mental health support were only available in private facilities and therefore not covered by the state.[95]



[1] Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2013.

[2] Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2014), Form F.

[3] Interview with Gen. Coban, and Col. Güngör, TURMAC, in Geneva, 18 February 2016.

[4] Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form H; statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Committee on Enhancement of Cooperation and Assistance, Geneva, 8 June 2017; and statement of Turkey on International Cooperation and Assistance, Mine Ban Treaty Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties, Vienna, 21 December 2017.

[5] Statements of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Phnom Penh, 1 December 2011; and Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 5 December 2012.

[6] Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2013, p. A-13.

[7] Statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 27 November 2019.

[8] Statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties, 18 November 2020.

[9] Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2013, pp. A-8 and A-9.

[10] Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2013.

[11] Statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 27 November 2019; and Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), forms A and H.

[12] Statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 27 November 2019.

[13] Ibid.; and Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form A.

[14] Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form A.

[15] Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form A.

[16] Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form A.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid.; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form A.

[19] Interview with Hans Risser, UNDP, Geneva, 7 September 2016.

[20] Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form H.

[21] Turkey Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2019), forms A and B.

[22] United States (US) Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, “2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Turkey,” Washington, DC, 11 March 2020, p. 60; and interview with Gazi Alatas, Ministry of Family and Social Policy, 4 March 2013; and European Commission (EC), “Turkey 2020 Report,” Brussels, 6 October 2020, p. 39.

[23] Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form H.

[24] EC, “Turkey 2020 Report,” Brussels, 6 October 2020, p. 39.

[25] US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, “2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Turkey,” Washington, DC, 11 March 2020, p. 60; and EC, “Turkey 2019 Report,” Brussels, 29 May 2019, p. 86.

[26] US Department of State, “2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Turkey,” Washington, DC, 11 March 2020, p. 60; the Confederation of the Disabled of Turkey, “United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) Shadow Report Turkey,” 20 August 2018, p. 9; and EC, “Turkey 2020 Report,” Brussels, 6 October 2020, p. 39.

[27] US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, “2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Turkey,” Washington, DC, 11 March 2020, p. 61.

[28] Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form H; and EC, “Turkey 2020 Report,” Brussels, 6 October 2020, p. 92.

[29] US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, “2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Turkey,” Washington, DC, 11 March 2020, p. 60.

[30] Ibid.

[31] EC, “Turkey 2020 Report,” Brussels, 6 October 2020, p. 40.

[32] Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form D.

[33] Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2013, pp. A-1 and A-5.

[34] Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form D.

[35] Statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional meetings, Standing Committee on Mine Action, Geneva, 23 May 2012; and Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2013, p. A-1.

[36] Turkey CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2019), Form A; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2013, pp. A-1 and A-5.

[37] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Elif Comoglu Ulgen, Head, Disarmament and Arms Control Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 July 2008.

[38] Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2013, p. A-5.

[39] Statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties, Santiago, 29 November 2016.

[40] Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2014), “Workplan for mine clearance activities,” pp. 3 and 8; statements of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties, Santiago, 29 November 2016; and Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties (virtual), 18 November 2020.

[41] Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form D.

[42] Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2013, pp. A-4 and A-7.

[43] Unless otherwise indicated, casualty data for 2019 is based on: email from Muteber Öğreten, Coordinator, Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey (IMFT); and Monitor analysis of Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project (ACLED) data for calendar year 2019. Approved citation: Clionadh Raleigh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen, “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data,” Journal of Peace Research, Issue 47(5), 2010, pp. 651–660.

[44] There were 42 casualties recorded in 2017, 57 in 2016, 32 in 2015, 28 in 2014, and 23 in 2013.

[45] Emails from Muteber Öğreten, IMFT, 4 May 2014 and 28 March 2013.

[46] Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form H.

[47] Statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties (virtual), 18 November 2020.

[48] Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports (for calendar years 2006–2014), Form J; response to Monitor questionnaire by the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the UN in Geneva, 31 August 2005; and presentation of Turkey, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 13 May 2003.

[49] Melik Duvaklı, “Turkey, in 26 years 1,269 lives victimized by mines,” Zaman, 13 April 2010.

[50] Email from Ali M. Koknar, President, AMK Risk Management, 5 July 2007; and Ali M. Koknar, AMK Risk Management, “Turkey Moves Forward to Demine Upper Mesopotamia,” Journal of Mine Action, No. 8, 2 November 2004.

[51] Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Extension Request, 28 March 2013, p. 7.

[52] Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form A.

[53] Statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties (virtual), 18 November 2020; and Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form A.

[54] Statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties (virtual), 18 November 2020.

[55] Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form D.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties (virtual), 18 November 2020.

[58] Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports (for calendar years 2016 and 2017), Form A.

[59] Interview with Col. Zaki Eren, Director of Operations Department and Acting Director of TURMAC, and Maj. Can Ceylan, Head of Quality Management Section, in Vienna, 20 December 2017.

[60] UNDP, “Mine Action Programming: Turkey,” February 2016.

[61] Statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties (virtual), 18 November 2020. Turkey’s CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 report for 2019 gives slightly different figures, reporting 4.8km² released and 47,001 mines removed and destroyed.

[62] Email from Can Ceylan, Chief of Accreditation and Quality Management Office, Turkish Mine Action Center (TURMAC), 13 April 2020.

[63] Statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties (virtual), 18 November 2020.

[64] Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form A; and CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2019), Form B.

[65] Email from Lt.-Col. Şen, TURMAC, 21 June 2017.

[66] Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2014), “Workplan for mine clearance activities,” p. 7.

[67] Ibid., pp. 7–8.

[68] Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form D.

[69] Statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties (virtual), 18 November 2020; Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form G; email from Muteber Öğreten, Coordinator, IMFT, 9 September 2020; Humanitarian Mine Action Association (Insani Mayın Faaliyeti Derneği, iMFAD), “MRE,” undated; and Danish Demining Group (DDG), “Where we work: Turkey,” undated.

[70] Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form G.

[71] Statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 27 November 2019.

[72] iMFAD, “MRE,” undated.

[73] Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form G.

[74] Ibid. At the time of submission of its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Turkey had suspended its risk education activities due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

[75] Turkey CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form B; Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), “Syria activity Report 2012–2018,” Istanbul, July 2018, p. 30, and “Victims of war are given prosthetic limbs,” 6 November 2017; “Syrian refugees get prosthetic limbs in Turkey,” Hurriyet Daily News, 31 October 2017; “Syrian Children Walk Towards Hope With Artificial Limbs in Turkey,” The Syrian Observer, 18 March 2019; and Relief International, “Providing Life-Changing Prosthetics for Syrian Refugees,” 2 May 2019.

[76] World Health Organization (WHO), Regional Office for Europe, “Health emergency response to the crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic: Annual Report 2018,” Copenhagen, 2019.

[77] Ibid., p. 25.

[78] Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form A; and statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 28 November 2019.

[79] Email from Muteber Öğreten, Coordinator, IMFT, 9 September 2020.

[80] Statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 28 November 2019.

[81] Statements of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 22 May 2019; and Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 27 November 2018; and Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form H.

[82] Email from Muteber Öğreten, Coordinator, IMFT, 24 September 2019.

[83] Statements of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 28 November 2019; and Mine Ban Treaty Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties (virtual), 18 November 2020.

[84] See previous Landmine Monitor victim assistance profiles for Turkey.

[85]The politics of healthcare in Turkey,” Hurriyet Daily News, undated.

[86] EC, “Turkey 2018 Report,” Strasbourg, 17 April 2018, p. 85; and email from Muteber Öğreten, IMFT, 17 May 2016.

[87] Email from Muteber Öğreten, IMFT, 17 May 2016.

[88] EC, “Turkey 2019 Report,” Brussels, 29 May 2019, pp. 38 and 86.

[89] Statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2017; and Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form J.

[90] Turkey Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form H.

[91] EC, “Turkey 2019 Report,” Brussels, 29 May 2019, p. 91; and “92.5 percent of persons with disability are unemployed,” Bianet, 3 December 2018.

[92] WHO, Regional Office for Europe, “Health emergency response to the crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic: Annual Report 2018,” Copenhagen, 2019, p. 25.

[93] WHO, Regional Office for Europe, “Health emergency response to the crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic: Annual Report 2018,” Copenhagen, 2019.

[94] Health Cluster Turkey Hub, “Health Cluster Bulletin: June 2020,” undated, p. 2.


Mine Ban Policy

Last updated: 18 December 2019

Policy

The Republic of Turkey acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 25 September 2003, becoming a State Party on 1 March 2004. Turkey has not enacted domestic implementation legislation but has indicated that its constitution and criminal code, as well as directives from Turkish Armed Forces General Staff, give legal effect to the treaty’s provisions.[1]

Turkey has attended most meetings of the treaty, most recently the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2018, where it made statements on victim assistance and support for mine clearance.[2] Turkey also provided an update on its Article 5 obligations.[3] Turkey also attended the intersessional meetings in May 2019. It served on the Committee on the Enhancement of Cooperation and Assistance in 2018–2019.

Turkey is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines.

Production and transfer

Turkey halted production of antipersonnel mines concurrently with a moratorium on the transfer of mines in January 1996. Its production facilities were then closed.[4] Turkey is not known to have exported antipersonnel mines. It has imported mines from Germany and the United States (US).

Use

Turkish Armed Forces

Even prior to joining the Mine Ban Treaty, the chief of the Turkish General Staff issued a directive banning the use of antipersonnel mines by the Turkish Armed Forces on 26 January 1998.[5] However, there have been serious allegations of at least two instances of use by members of the Turkish Armed Forces in southeastern Turkey near the border with Iraq, in Sirnak province (April 2009) and Hakkari province (May 2009).

In the first incident, the Turkish newspaper Taraf published a document allegedly belonging to the 23rd Gendarmerie Division Command that indicated that on 9 April 2009 members of the Turkish Armed Forces emplaced M2A4 antipersonnel mines in Sirnak province.[6] Turkey did not announce that an investigation into this incident was underway until May 2012.[7] In May 2013, Turkey informed States Parties that “A detailed investigation comprising a consequent administrative legal scrutiny were [sic] undertaken. Let me share with you, for the record, that there has not been an explosion. Moreover the registry of Turkish Armed Forces shows that the mine allegedly in question was destroyed before the end of 2009, together with the stockpiled ones.”[8] It remains unclear if further mines from this alleged mined area remain in the ground as Turkey’s report only indicated the destruction of one mine.

The second case relates to seven Turkish soldiers who were killed and eight wounded by an antipersonnel mine near Cukurca on 27 May 2009.[9] The Turkish army initially alleged that the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) planted the mine, but in June 2009 the Turkish media reported that the mine was in fact laid by Turkish forces not long before the detonation.[10] An investigation by the chief prosecutor in Van determined that the mine belonged to the Turkish military and was planted on the orders of a Turkish commander.[11] The case was forwarded to the Turkish General Staff military prosecutor’s office.[12]

According to media accounts, a report on the incident in September 2010 provided to the Military’s prosecutor’s office found that the device used was an “anti-personnel landmine.” Brigadier General Zeki Es, who allegedly ordered the placement of the mine, was arrested in November 2010 and a case was opened in the Turkish martial court.[13] General Es was released in February 2011 after several soldiers recanted their previous testimony.[14] In October 2011, according to a media account, an expert report prepared at the request of the military court found that commanders were responsible for the deaths due to negligence and poor planning.[15] In February 2012, the Turkish General Staff’s martial court continued hearing the case against two generals and four other officers.[16] In May 2013, Turkey informed States Parties that “The most recent hearing of the trial was held by this Military Court on April 19, 2013. The court rendered its verdict and sentenced a Turkish Brigadier General to 6 years and 8 months of imprisonment due to “causing death and injury by negligence.” Turkey informed States Parties that this was an initial verdict, not a final decision, and that “the work on producing the reasoning of this decision is still underway.”[17] No mention was made of a violation of the ban on antipersonnel mines in the court’s proceedings, findings, or judgment.

Under the Mine Ban Treaty, Turkey must take every measure to prevent the use of antipersonnel mines, including the application of penal sanctions. The ICBL has previously called on Turkey to thoroughly investigate the use allegations, to report to States Parties on its findings, and undertake measures to prevent further use.[18] It has also emphasized the need to establish the origin of the mines used, which could have been lifted from the ground and re-laid or could have been taken from stocks retained for training purposes, and to clarify what specific law or laws had applied during the trial.[19] Several States Parties and the ICRC have expressed their deep concern about these allegations of mine use since they were reported in 2010.

PKK/Kongra Gel

Turkish officials have previously accused the PKK/Kurdistan People’s Congress (Kongra Gel) of use of antipersonnel mines.[20]

In the past, the Turkish General Staff published information on mines recovered without specifying the types and locations of the mines.[21] The Turkish General Staff no longer lists this information on its website. Turkey did not specifically report on recovered mines and their disposition in previous Article 7 reports.

The Monitor was not able to obtain from Turkey specific dates and locations, or other concrete details, of the allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by the PKK/Kongra Gel or of specific incidents that led to casualties from antipersonnel mines.

The PKK/Kongra Gel have admitted to the use of command-detonated mines, but denied any use of mines or other explosive devices that can be activated by a person or a vehicle.[22] In July 2006, the NGO Geneva Call reported that the PKK had unilaterally halted antipersonnel mine use by signing the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment.

Stockpiling and destruction

Turkey announced in December 2011 that its stockpile destruction program was completed on 21 June 2011. It had missed its 1 March 2008 treaty-mandated deadline for stockpile destruction, and was in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty for over three years. Turkey had previously reported that its munitions disposal facility had not been officially inaugurated until 8 November 2007.[23]

Turkey stated that in 2004, when it became a State Party, it had a stockpile of 2,973,481 antipersonnel mines. In early 2006, Turkey indicated it had a stock of 2,866,818 antipersonnel mines to destroy. In its Article 7 report issued after the announcement of the completion of the destruction program, Turkey stated that 2,938,060 mines had been destroyed in total.[24]

In the past, Turkey also reported possession of 18,236 M18 Claymore mines, but in 2007 it reported that M18 mines were removed from its stockpile destruction list due to their “specific technical features” and “will not be used as victim activated.”[25] In 2008, officials said that the tripwires for M18s had been destroyed.

Mines retained for research and training

On becoming a State Party in 2004, Turkey initially retained 16,000 antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes.[26] In its Article 7 report submitted in 2019, Turkey reported 9,259 mines retained for training and research.[27]

Turkey retains the fourth-largest number of antipersonnel mines among States Parties. In December 2012, it repeated that the “large size, as well as the different types of mine action units, necessitate the Turkish Armed Forces to retain a certain number of APLMs [antipersonnel landmines] for training purposes.”[28] In December 2012, Turkey defended its large number of retained mines by stating, “Article 3 recognizes the specific and different needs of States Parties by not fixing numbers or ceilings for mines retained for training purposes.”

In December 2012, Turkey repeated that it is “considering reassessing the number of mines retained for permitted purposes.”[29] It made similar statements in 2010.[30] Similarly, in May 2006, it stated that “after covering some more ground in mine clearance, Turkey may review the number of mines retained for training purposes.”[31] In June 2005, Turkey said, “This figure [16,000 mines] may be reassessed as the process of downsizing the armed forces progresses.”[32]



[1] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Reports, Form A, and Annexes A, B, and C, 1 October 2004 and 10 May 2005. Turkey’s Form A in 2013 states only that “Turkey stopped using APMs [antipersonnel mines] and commenced clearing APMs in 1998.” In July 2011, Turkey stated that two laws apply in cases where death or injury is caused due to explosion of mines or improvised explosive devices (IEDs): Articles 81, 86, and 89 of the Turkish Penal Code (Law No. 5237) and Articles 87 and 89 of the Turkish Military Penal Code (Law No. 1632). Email from Serhan Yigit, Head of Arms Control and Disarmament Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 July 2011.

[2] Statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 27 November 2018; and statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 29 November 2018.

[3] Statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 29 November 2018.

[4] In the past, Turkey had produced both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines. The Turkish company, Makinave Kimya Endustrisi Kurumu(MKEK), produced copies of two United States (US) antipersonnel mines (M14 and M16).

[5] Statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Meeting of States Parties, Bangkok, 17 September 2003.

[6] Melìs Gönenç, “Mine news became evidence,” Taraf online, 16 April 2010; and “Allegation: Turkey breaking landmine ban,” United Press International, 16 April 2010.

[7] Statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on General Status and Operation, Geneva, 25 May 2012. Notes by the ICBL.

[8] Statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on General Status and Operation, Geneva, 27 May 2013.

[9] “Tripwire mine incident kills six soldiers,” Radikal (Hakkari), 29 May 2009; and Mustafa Yuksel, “Explosion which killed seven soldiers under desk investigation,” Zaman (Ankara), 9 April 2010.

[10] The article stated that the mine was a handmade victim-activated explosive that was only referred to as a “Special Alert Warning System.” “Shocking allegations on 6 killed in mine explosion,” Zaman, 24 June 2009; and Metin Arslan, “TSK mine martyrs seven soldiers,” Zaman, 8 April 2010.

[11] Metin Arslan, “Last photo of TSK mine victims in Çukurca revealed,” Zaman, 7 May 2010.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Metin Arslan and Fatih Karakiliç, “General who planted deadly Çukurca mines sent to jail,” Zaman, 8 November 2010.

[14] “Turkish general released after soldiers change testimony,” Hurriyet Daily News, 22 February 2011.

[15] Metin Arslan, “Expert report: Commanders responsible for land mine deaths of 7 soldiers,” Today’s Zaman, 23 October 2011.

[16] Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, “Senior officers tried in the case on the mine explosion,” 9 February 2012.

[17] Statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on General Status and Operation, Geneva, 27 May 2013.

[18] ICBL, “Grave concerns over allegations of landmine use by Turkey,” Press release, 19 April 2010; and letter to Ahmet Davutoglu, Minister of Foreign Affairs, from Sylvie Brigot, Executive Director, ICBL, 18 May 2010.

[19] Turkey has reported that M2 mines are among those retained for training purposes. Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2011), Form D.

[20] Statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on General Status and Operation, Geneva, 21 May 2012. Notes by the ICBL. The PKK/Kongra Gel is listed as a terrorist organization by Australia, Canada, the European Union, NATO, the United Kingdom, and the US. As a matter of practice, the Monitor does not apply the term “terrorist” to any individual or organization except within an attributed quotation.

[21] Turkish General Staff, “The number of IED and mine incidents perpetrated by the terror organization in 2009 (1 January–25 December 2009),” and “The number of IED and mine incidents perpetrated by the members of the terror organization in 2010 (1 January–20 August 2010),” undated, www.tsk.tr.

[23] Statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Dead Sea, Jordan, 19 November 2007.

[24] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for the period 1 January 2011 to 31 December 2011), Form G. In the first half of 2011, Turkey declared that its remaining 631 stockpiled Area Denial Artillery Munition (ADAM) artillery projectiles (each containing 36 mines, or a total of 22,716 ADAM mines) had been transferred for destruction. See, statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 20 June 2011; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for the period 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2010), Form D. On behalf of Turkey, the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency had signed a contract in November 2010 with Spreewerk Lübben GMBH, a company in Germany, to destroy the ADAM mines as Turkey’s Munitions Disposal Facility could not complete this task. Destruction of the first ADAM mines began in Germany in March 2011 and the program concluded on 21 June 2011. Statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Phnom Penh, 1 December 2011.

[25] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form B, 23 April 2007. Use of victim-activated Claymore mines is prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty, but use of command-detonated Claymore mines is permitted. In May 2006, Turkey stated that “the victim activation components of M18 Claymore mines have recently been added to the list of mines to be destroyed and the necessary steps have been taken to stock only command detonated M18 Claymore mines.” Statement of Turkey, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Mine Ban Treaty, Geneva, 11 May 2006.

[26] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form D, 1 October 2004. This included 4,700 each of DM-11 and M14, and 2,200 each of M16, M18, and M2 mines. In 2006, Turkey reported the number of mines retained for training had decreased to 15,150 “because 850 mines have been used for mine detection, mine clearance and mine destruction programmes carried out to train military personnel involved in mine action, as well as for related training at various military training institutions.” Statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on General Status and Operation, Geneva, 12 May 2006. This information was also indicated in Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form D, 30 April 2006. However, neither document specified how many of each type of mine were destroyed, and how many remained.

[28] Statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 7 December 2012; and statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on General Status and Operation, Geneva, 25 May 2009.

[29] Statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 7 December 2012.

[30] Statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on General Status and Operation, Geneva, 25 June 2010.

[31] Ibid., 12 May 2006. It made a similar statement in October 2005. Letter No. 649.13/2005/BMCO DT/8805 from Vehbi Esgel Etensel, Permanent Mission of Turkey to the UN in Geneva, 3 October 2005.

[32] Statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Geneva, 13 June 2005.


Last updated: 08 November 2018

In 2017, the Republic of Turkey provided US$10,000 through the ITF (International Trust Fund) Enhancing Human Security for victim assistance activities in Lebanon.[1]

Turkey is also affected by antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, as well as improvised explosive devices (IEDs).[2] Between 1998–2012, Turkey reported contributing approximately 68.7 million Turkish Lira (approximately $30 million) to its own mine clearance efforts.[3] Turkey has not reported the amounts contributed since then.

In 2014, the European Union (EU) contributed €19,800,000 ($26,328,060) for clearance activities in the eastern border regions, as part of an integrated border management project.[4] Turkey did not receive international funding in 2015, 2016, and 2017.



[1] ITF Enhancing Human Security, “Annual Report 2017,” March 2018, p. 25.

[2] For more details, see, Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, “Country Profile: Turkey: Mine Action.”

[4] Email from Jérôme Legrand, Policy Officer, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Conventional Weapons and Space Division (K1), European External Action Service, 11 June 2015. Average exchange rate for 2014: €1=US$1.3297. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 2 January 2015.