Yemen

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Last updated: 13 September 2021

Summary

Non-signatory Yemen has expressed support for the goal of banning cluster munitions but has not taken any steps to join the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Yemen has participated in several meetings of the convention, most recently in November 2020. Yemen voted in favor of a key United Nations (UN) resolution promoting the convention in December 2020.

Yemen is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions, but it has acquired them and may still possess a stockpile. Yemeni forces apparently used cluster munitions in 2009, while a Saudi Arabia-led military operation against Ansar Allah (Houthi) forces in Yemen used cluster munitions in 2015–2017.

Policy

The Republic of Yemen has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Yemen has expressed interest in the convention, but has not taken any steps to accede to it.[1]

Yemen participated in two meetings of the Oslo Process that created the convention—in Lima in May 2007, and Belgrade in October 2007—and has expressed its support for the work to prohibit cluster munitions.[2] Yemen did not attend the negotiations of the convention in Dublin in May 2008 or the Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference in Oslo in December 2008.[3]

Yemen has participated as an observer in the convention’s meetings, most recently the first part of the convention’s Second Review Conference held virtually in November 2020.[4]

In December 2020, Yemen voted in favor of a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution urging states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”[5] It has voted in favor of the annual UNGA resolution promoting the convention since 2017.[6]

Yemen has also voted in favor of UNGA resolutions expressing outrage at the use of cluster munitions in Syria, most recently in December 2020.[7]

Yemen is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

Yemen is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions.

Yemen acquired cluster munitions in the past and may still possess stocks. Jane’s Information Group reported in 2004 that KMGU dispensers that deploy submunitions were in service with the Yemeni Air Force.[8] Moldova exported 13 220mm Uragan multi-barrel rocket launch systems to Yemen in 1994, and Yemen possesses Grad 122mm surface-to-surface rocket launchers, but it is not known if the ammunition for these weapons includes versions with submunition payloads.[9]

Use

Yemen has not commented or responded to requests to confirm if its forces have used cluster munitions. Yemen’s Soviet-supplied aircraft are capable of delivering Soviet-made RBK cluster bombs, which local mine clearance operators have cleared and destroyed.[10]

Previous use by others

A Saudi Arabia-led coalition military operation in Yemen against Ansar Allah forces, known as the Houthi armed group, used air- and ground-delivered cluster munitions in 2015–2017, (see below).[11]

Cluster Munition Monitor has found no compelling evidence that the Saudi coalition has used cluster munitions in Yemen since then. Neither Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch (HRW) nor Mwatana, a Yemeni non-government organization (NGO), were aware of any use of cluster munitions during this reporting period (from July 2020-July 2021) .[12]

Previously, in 2015–2017, the Saudi Arabia-led coalition in Yemen, conducted at least 23 cluster munition attacks, using seven types of air-delivered and ground-launched cluster munitions manufactured and exported by three countries.

Cluster munition attacks in Yemen (April 2015 to February 2017)[13]

Type of cluster munition

Country of origin

Stocks possessed by

Governorate and date of attack

Air-delivered

CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapon, each deploying 10 BLU-108 canisters that disperse four submunitions called “skeet” by the manufacturer Textron

US

Saudi Arabia,

UAE

Al-Shaaf in Saada, 17 April 2015

Al-Amar in Saada, 27 April 2015

Harf Sofian in Amran, 29 June 2015

Sanhan in Sanaa, 1 November 2015

Al-Hayma in Hodaida, 12 December 2015

Amran in Sanaa, 15 February 2016

Al-Hayma in Hodaida, 5 October 2016

CBU-87 bomb, each containing 202 BLU-97 submunitions

US

Saudi Arabia

Al-Nushoor in Saada, 23 May 2015

Al-Maqash in Saada, 23 May 2015

CBU-58 bomb, each containing 650 BLU-63 submunitions

US

Morocco,

Saudi Arabia

Sanaa City, 6 January 2016

BL755 cluster bomb, each containing 147 No. 2 Mk 1 submunitions

UK

Saudi Arabia

Al-Khadhra in Hajja, 6 January 2016

Ground-launched

ASTROS II rocket, each containing up to 65 submunitions

Brazil

Bahrain, Qatar,

Saudi Arabia

Ahma in Saada, 25 October 2015

Sadaa City, 6 December 2016

Sadaa City, 15 February 2017

Qahza in Saada, 22 February 2017

M26 rocket, each containing 644 M77 Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM) submunitions

US

Bahrain,

Egypt,

UAE

Bani Kaladah in Hajja, April/May 2015

Al-Hazan in Hajja, May/June 2015

Malus in Hajja, 7 June 2015

Dughayj in Hajja, Jue/July 2015

Al-Qufl in Hajja, 14/15 July 2015

Haradh in Hajja, 25 July 2015

Al-Fajj in Hajja, 25 July 2015

“ZP-39” DPICM submunition (unknown delivery system)

Unknown

Unknown

Baqim in Saada, 29 April 2015

Note: US=United States; UAE=United Arab Emirates.

 

The Saudi Arabia-led coalition used CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons in several attacks in 2015 and 2016.[14] Saudi Arabia admitted the coalition used CBU-105 once, in April 2015, but claimed that they were not prohibited weapons.[15] The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has denied using the CBU-105 in Yemen.[16]

The United States (US) suspended its cluster munition transfers to Saudi Arabia in May 2016, following reports of civilian harm in Yemen.[17] CBU-105 manufacturer Textron Systems announced in August 2016 that it was stopping its production of the weapons.[18] The move has effectively ended US production of cluster munitions, as Textron Systems was the last US company to produce them.

The Saudi Arabia-led coalition also used BL755 cluster munitions in Yemen, which marked the first recorded use of United Kingdom (UK)-made cluster munitions since the Convention on Cluster Munitions, to which the UK is a State Party, took effect in 2010.[19] The last UK transfers of BL755 cluster munitions to Saudi Arabia occurred in 1989.[20] Saudi Arabia committed to stop using BL755 cluster munitions in December 2016.[21]

In September 2016, States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions issued a joint declaration stating that they “condemn any use by any actor” and expressing deep concern at “any and all allegations, reports or documented evidence of the use of cluster munitions, most notably in Syria and Yemen in the past year.”[22] The European Parliament adopted a resolution in November 2017 condemning the Saudi Arabia-led coalition airstrikes in Yemen, including the use of cluster munitions.[23]

In a December 2016 statement, the Saudi coalition forces did not deny the use of cluster munitions in Yemen and argued that “international law does not ban their use.”[24]

Saudi Arabia and the US also used cluster munitions in separate attacks in Yemen in 2009:

  • The Royal Saudi Air Force conducted air strikes and Saudi armed forces intervened on the ground in late 2009 in Saada governorate after fighting between the government of Yemen and Houthi rebels intensified and spilled over the border with Saudi Arabia.[25] Remnants of CBU-52 cluster bombs were filmed near Saada city.[26]
  • On 17 December 2009, the US used at least five ship- or submarine-launched TLAM-D cruise missiles, each containing 166 BLU-97 submunitions, in an attack on al-Ma‘jalah in Yemen’s southern Abyan governorate that killed 55 people, including 41 civilians.[27] Neither the US nor the Yemeni government has publicly denied the cluster munition use.[28] The government of Yemen accepted a 2010 Yemeni parliament report on the attack, but never implemented the recommendations to clear the contaminated area or provide compensation.[29]


[1] Previously, in May 2016, a representative of Yemen said the government was considering accession following new contamination from cluster munitions used by a Saudi Arabia-led coalition since March 2015. Statement of Yemen, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 19 May 2016. Notes by Human Rights Watch (HRW).

[2] Statement of Yemen, Lima Conference on Cluster Munitions, Session on Victim Assistance, Lima, 23 May 2008. Notes by Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom.

[3] For details on Yemen’s cluster munition policy and practice up to early 2009, see HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), p. 262.

[4] Yemen participated in the convention’s Meetings of States Parties in 2011, 2013–2014, and 2016, as well as the First Review Conference in 2015.

[5]Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 75/62, 7 December 2020.

[6] Yemen initially abstained from voting on the annual UNGA Convention on Cluster Munitions resolution in 2015 and 2016.

[7]Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution 75/193, 16 December 2020. Yemen voted in favor of similar resolutions related to Syria in 2013–2020.

[8] Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, 2004), p. 848.

[9] Submission of Moldova, UN Register of Conventional Arms, Report for Calendar Year 1994, 28 April 1995; International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2011 (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 335; and Colin King, ed., Jane’s Explosive Ordnance Disposal 2008, CD-edition (Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, 2008).

[10] For example, in 2013, the Houthi administration in Saada governorate shared photographs with VICE News that show the remnants of RBK-250-275 cluster bombs and AO-1SCh submunitions. Emails from Ben Anderson, Correspondent and Producer, VICE News, May 2014.

[11] None of the states participating in the Saudi Arabia-led coalition—Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Pakistan, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—are party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

[12] Email from Kristine Beckerle, Research Director, Mwatana, August 2020.

[13] HRW could not determine who used ground-launched cluster munitions containing “ZP-39” submunitions in Saada in April 2015, but Saudi Arabia and Houthi forces both possess rocket launchers and tube artillery capable of delivering them.

[14]Yemen: The Saudi-American aircraft dropped parachute bombs internationally prohibited,” YouTube.com, 17 April 2015 (title translated from Arabic by the Monitor; video no longer available); Al-Rodaini, Fatik (Fatikr), “Types of bombs being parchuted [sic] by Saudi warplanes in Saada N #Yemen”. 27 April 2015, 08:50 UTC. Tweet. Another attack was recorded in a subsequent visit by HRW researchers to al-Amar village, 30km south of Saada city. HRW confirmed a cluster munition attack on 27 April, and reported the presence of explosive remnants. HRW, “Yemen: Saudi-led Airstrikes Used Cluster Munitions,” 3 May 2015.

[15] Brig. Gen. Ahmed Asiri informed CNN on 4 May 2015 that Saudi Arabia had used CBU-105 cluster bombs in Yemen against armored vehicles only, describing it as an “antivehicle weapon” and stating, “We do not use it against persons. We don’t have any operation in the cities.” Ben Brumfield and Slma Shelbayah, “Report: Saudi Arabia used U.S.-supplied cluster bombs in Yemen,” CNN, 4 May 2015. Asiri also acknowledged to The Financial Times that Saudi forces had used a US-made weapon that engages targets such as armored vehicles and is “equipped with self-destruct and self-deactivation features” but did not call it a cluster munition and argued it was being used to target vehicles and not people. “Saudi Arabia accused of using cluster bombs in Yemen airstrikes,” The Financial Times, 3 May 2015. Asiri told Bloomberg that the categorization of the cluster munitions as banned “isn’t correct.” Glen Carey, “Saudis deny sending troops to Yemen, reject cluster-bomb report,” Bloomberg, 3 May 2015. Asiri further informed CNN on 11 January 2016 that Saudi Arabia had used cluster munitions against concentrated rebel camps and armored vehicles, but never against civilian populations. Zachary Cohen, “Rights group: Saudi Arabia used US cluster bombs on civilians,” CNN, 29 February 2016.

[16] A diplomatic representative of the UAE told the CMC that it is not using CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons because they are banned by the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions. Interview with UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs Representative, in Geneva, 12 April 2016.

[17] According to an article in Foreign Policy, a senior US official said the administration acknowledges reports that the weapons had been used “in areas in which civilians are alleged to have been present or in the vicinity” and added, “We take such concerns seriously and are seeking additional information.” John Hudson, “White House blocks transfer of cluster bombs to Saudi Arabia,” Foreign Policy, 27 May 2016; and HRW, “US: Stop Providing Cluster Munitions,” 2 June 2016. HRW collected evidence showing CBU-105s were used in or near civilian areas in apparent violation of US export laws. A woman and two children were injured in their homes by a CBU-105 attack on 12 December 2015 in the port town of Hodaida, while at least two civilians were wounded in an attack near al-Amar village in Saada governorate on 27 April 2015. HRW also found at least three instances where CBU-105s malfunctioned as their “skeet” or submunitions did not separate from the BLU-108 canister and did not explode. HRW, “Yemen: Cluster Munitions Harm Civilians,” 31 May 2015; and HRW, “Yemen: Saudis Using US Cluster Munitions,” 6 May 2016.

[20] Patrick Wintour, “MoD to investigate claims Saudis used UK cluster bombs in Yemen,” The Guardian, 24 May 2016.

[21] Rowena Mason and Ewen MacAskill, “Saudi Arabia admits it used UK-made cluster bombs in Yemen,” The Guardian, 19 December 2016.

[22] See the political declaration annexed to the “Final report of the Convention on Cluster Munitions Sixth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 5–7 September 2016,” CCM/MSP/2016/9, 30 September 2016.

[23] European Parliament, “Resolution on the situation in Yemen,” 30 November 2017. The European Parliament adopted similar resolutions in 2015–2017 condemning the coalition’s use of cluster munitions in Yemen. A similar resolution adopted in October 2018 did not include reference to use of cluster munitions by the Saudi-led coalition.

[24] “International law does not ban the use of cluster munitions. Some States have undertaken a commitment to refrain from using cluster munitions by becoming party to the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions. Neither the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia nor its Coalition partners are State Parties to the 2008 Convention, and accordingly, the Coalition’s use of cluster munitions does not violate the obligations of these States under international law.” See, “Coalition Forces supporting legitimacy in Yemen confirm that all Coalition countries aren't members to the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” Saudi Press Agency, 19 December 2016.

[25] In July 2013, the Monitor reviewed photographs taken by clearance operators in Saada governorate showing the remnants of unexploded BLU-97 and BLU-61 submunitions as well as DPICM submunitions of an unknown origin. Interview with Abdul Raqeeb Fare, Deputy Director, Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC), Sanaa, 7 March 2013; interview with Ali al-Kadri, Director, YEMAC, in Geneva, 28 May 2013; and email from John Dingley, UN Development Programme (UNDP) Yemen, 9 July 2013.

[26]VICE on HBO Debriefs: Crude Awakening & Enemy of My Enemy,” TV news report, HBO Television Network, 19 May 2014; and Ben Anderson and Peter Salisbury, “US Cluster Bombs Keep Killing Civilians in Yemen,” VICE News, 16 May 2014. See also, “Saudi Arabia used cluster bombs against Houthi Shiites,” AhlulBayt News Agency, 19 May 2014.

[27] Amnesty International published a series of photographs showing the remnants of the cruise missile, including the propulsion system, a BLU-97 submunition, and the payload ejection system, the latter of which is unique to the TLAM-D cruise missile. See also, “U.S. missiles killed civilians in Yemen, rights group says,” CNN, 7 June 2010.

[28] In December 2010, Wikileaks released a US Department of State cable dated 21 December 2009 that acknowledged the US had a role in the 17 December attack. The cable stated that Yemeni government officials “continue to publicly maintain that the operation was conducted entirely by its forces, acknowledging U.S. support strictly in terms of intelligence sharing. Deputy Prime Minister Rashad al-Alimi told the Ambassador on December 20 that any evidence of greater U.S. involvement such as fragments of U.S. munitions found at the sites - could be explained away as equipment purchased from the U.S.” See, “ROYG [Republic of Yemen Government] looks ahead following CT operations, but perhaps not far enough,” US Department of State cable SANAA 02230 dated 21 December 2009, released by Wikileaks on 4 December 2010.

[29] The report also called on the Yemeni authorities to compensate victims and clear cluster munition remnants from the attack site. Republic of Yemen, “Special Parliamentarian Investigating Committee Report On Security Events in the Province of Abyan,” pp. 21–22 (in English), p. 16 (in Arabic), cited in HRW, “Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda,” 22 October 2013.


Mine Ban Policy

Last updated: 12 November 2020

Policy

The Republic of Yemen signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 1 September 1998. It entered into force for the country on 1 March 1999.

Yemen enacted legislation to enforce implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty on 20 April 2005.[1] It last referred to Presidential Law No. 25 in its 2007 transparency report for the Mine Ban Treaty and continued to omit any reference in its 2019 report.[2]

Yemen last submitted an annual Article 7 transparency report for the treaty in 2020.[3] It previously submitted reports in 2019, 2017, and prior to 2014. Yemen has participated in all of the Mine Ban Treaty’s review conferences, including the Fourth Review Conference held in Oslo, Norway in November 2019. Yemen has attended every Meeting of States Parties of the treaty, including the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2018 and the treaty’s intersessional meetings in Geneva, including in June–July 2020.

In November 2019, Yemen told States Parties that the ongoing conflict that began in March 2015, when a Saudi Arabia-led coalition of nations began a military intervention against Houthi forces in Yemen, has restricted access to mined areas.[4] It reported in 2016 that the conflict was preventing the operation of its humanitarian mine clearance program.[5]

Yemen is not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It is also not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).

Production, transfer, stockpile destruction, and retention

Yemen has stated that it has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines.

Yemen destroyed a total of approximately 108,000 antipersonnel mines from its stocks. It reported destruction of 74,000–78,000 stockpiled antipersonnel mines in April 2002.[6] An additional 30,000 mines found in November 2006 were later destroyed, in December 2007.[7] In April 2017, Yemen reported that “there are no stockpiled anti-personnel mines found after the last 30,000 mines found and destroyed in 2006.”[8]

In 2017, Yemen again reported the retention of 3,760 antipersonnel mines of four types for training and research purposes, the same quantity and types it has declared as retained since 2008.[9] Yemen submitted an Article 7 transparency report for calendar year 2018 but did not provide an update on the number of mines retained. Yemen reported in its Article 7 report for calendar year 2019 that “at any given time there are a number of AP mines (and AP mines of an improvided nature) [sic] held at YEMAC storage locations whilst awaiting destruction…caused by the lack of access to explosives or other means to destroy items in place…The numbers and types vary and are kept only for so long as it takes to organise their destruction.”[10] Yemen has never reported on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines, as was agreed by States Parties in 2004.[11]

At least five types of antipersonnel mines produced in the 1980s have been used in Yemen since 2013. None of these mines were among the four types of antipersonnel landmines that Yemen has reported stockpiling in the past, including for training mine clearance personnel.

Types of antipersonnel mines previously stockpiled by Yemen and types used after 2013

Antipersonnel Mines Originally Stockpiled

PP-Mi-SR

PMD-6

PMN

POMZ-2

Antipersonnel Mines Used After 2013

GLD-150A (Claymore-type produced by China)

Gyata-64 (formerly produced by Hungary)

PMN-1 and PMN-2

PPM-2 (produced by former East Germany)

PSM-1 (formerly produced by Bulgaria)

Hybrid PMN & PPM-2 (origin not known)

 

The evidence of further use of antipersonnel mines in 2016 suggests either that the 2002 declaration to the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General on the completion of landmine stockpile destruction was incorrect, or that these mines were acquired from another source after 2002. In a September 2016 letter, Yemen’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Sanaa, controlled by the Houthis and the General People’s Congress, alleged that individuals had smuggled weapons, including landmines, into Yemen in recent years, noting that the government had not been able to control its land or sea borders due to instability and fighting.[12] In April 2017, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied that the Sanaa-based Ministry of Defense stockpiles antipersonnel mines.[13]

Production of landmines by Houthi forces

In September 2018, the arms consultancy Conflict Armament Research (CAR) reported that Houthi forces were “mass producing” landmines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs),[14] and associated triggering devices for victim-activation. This production includes the standardization and production of explosive charges, pressure plates, and passive infrared sensors. Based on a series of CAR field missions conducted in 2017–2018, the report also confirmed the use of PMN, PPM-2, and GLD-150A[15] antipersonnel mines, TM-57, PRB-M3, VS-1.6 antivehicle mines, and a variety of types of improvised mines, including directional fragmentation charges. According to CAR, several types of improvised mines appear to be mass-produced by Houthi forces in Yemen and were used in Aden, Mokah, and other locations on the west coast of the country.[16]

Use

The Monitor was unable to confirm any allegations of new use of antipersonnel mines during the reporting period (from September 2019 through October 2020). Previously, antipersonnel landmines, antivehicle mines, victim-activated improvised mines, and other types of IEDs were used by Houthi-associated forces in Yemen in early 2019, primarily in battles occurring on the west coast near the port of Hodeida. According to unconfirmed figures reported by the Yemen Mine Action Center, the Yemeni Army removed over 300,000 Houthi-laid landmines between 2016 and 2018.[17]

The Group of Eminent Experts on Yemen, convened by the Human Rights Council, reported in September 2019 that “[T]he use of landmines, both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle, by the Houthis has resulted in significant harm to civilians.” According to the report, the group “investigated reports of civilian casualties caused by antipersonnel and anti-vehicle landmines allegedly emplaced by Houthi fighters in Aden, Al Hudaydah, Lahij and Ta’izz governorates, and examined further reports of civilian casualties from landmines in Abyan, al-Dhale’e, Al-Bayda, Al-Jawf, Hajjah, Ibb, Ma’rib, Sana’a, Sa’dah and Shabwah governorates. It confirmed civilian casualties from anti-personnel landmines verified as having been emplaced by Houthi fighters in incidents it investigated in Aden, Al-Hudaydah, Lahij and Ta’izz governorates.”[18]

In April 2019, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that landmines emplaced by Houthi forces had killed at least 140 civilians since 2018. However, HRW was unable to confirm when the mines were placed.[19] In November 2018, employees at Hodeidah port accused Houthi forces of placing landmines in the area around the port’s entrances.[20]

Previously, journalists accompanying United Arab Emirates (UAE)-funded mine clearance teams in Yemen in 2018 documented hundreds of Houthi-laid mines and explosive devices prior to the weapons being destroyed.[21]

There has been no evidence to suggest that members of the Saudi Arabia-led coalition have used landmines in Yemen.

On 2 April 2017, Yemen’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is controlled by the Houthis and the General People’s Congress party, denied that Houthi-Saleh forces had used antipersonnel landmines, affirming the Sanaa-based authorities are “vigilant in abiding by [their] commitments” under the Mine Ban Treaty.[22]

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that “armed factions and terrorist groups” have produced and used improvised landmines in Yemen. It said that after the current conflict ends, the Sanaa-based authorities are prepared to create a committee to investigate the use of landmines in Taizz and to investigate any new information or documentation on the use of antipersonnel mines elsewhere, and to “take the necessary steps in accordance with national laws and regulations and its international obligations.”[23]

In early 2017, the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen reported that Houthi-Saleh forces have used victim-activated IEDs that deployed antivehicle mines as the main charge in Taizz.[24] Antivehicle landmines claimed casualties in Bayda governorate in October 2017 and Jawf governorate in April 2017, but it is unclear when those mines were laid.[25]

Previous use

The first confirmed use of antipersonnel mines by a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty occurred in Yemen in 2011–2012 at Bani Jarmooz, a location north of Sanaa, during the uprising that led to the ousting of then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh.[26] According to witness testimony and other evidence, GYATA-64, PMN-1, and PMD-6 antipersonnel mines were laid around the camps of the government’s Republican Guard at Bani Jarmooz in late 2011.[27]

In November 2013, the office of Yemen’s prime minister admitted that a “violation” of the Mine Ban Treaty occurred in 2011.[28] Yemen provided States Parties with an interim report on 29 March 2014 detailing plans to clear the mines laid at Bani Jarmooz.[29] In June 2014, it informed States Parties that the Military Prosecutor’s Office had begun an investigation to identify those responsible for the mine use at Bani Jarmooz.[30] In mid-2014, Houthi forces seized control of Bani Jarmooz.

The Mine Ban Treaty’s Committee on Cooperative Compliance has engaged with Yemen on the 2011–2012 use at Bani Jarmooz. In October 2016, the committee expressed appreciation for “the willingness of Yemen to engage in a continued dialogue, share information and clarify the situation with regard to the mentioned allegations.”[31] The committee concluded that “it would welcome updated information on efforts by the government of Yemen to carry out an investigation of the use of mines and any additional information on the use of mines within areas under its jurisdiction or control.”



[1] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form A, 30 March 2007. On 16 December 2004, the Yemeni Parliament endorsed national implementation legislation; on 20 April 2005, Presidential Law No. 25 was issued to bring the legislation into force. Yemen has listed its ratification legislation, stating that “The Parliament of Yemen issued, and the President signed law on 8\98 in June 1998. The law states that the Government of Yemen will enforce the ban from the day the law was issued.” Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for the period 31 March 2012 to 31 March 2013), Form A.

[2] Yemen’s 2017 Article 7 transparency report states that during 2016, “no legal, and other measures were taken as additional measures to the [ratification] law issued by the Parliament of Yemen and signed by the president in 1998.” Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form A, April 2017.

[3] The report covers the period from 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2019.

[4] Statement of Yemen, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, 30 June 2020.

[5] Intervention of Yemen, Mine Ban Treaty Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties, Santiago, 30 November 2016. Notes by the Monitor.

[6] In its Article 7 reports submitted in 2001 and 2002, Yemen reported a stockpile of 78,000 mines, including 4,000 to be retained for training. Its reporting on the destruction of the mines has contained discrepancies, but appeared to total about 74,000. Yet its Article 7 reports have usually cited the figure of 78,000 destroyed. See, Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 522, and subsequent editions of Landmine Monitor.

[7] On 16 December 2007, Yemen destroyed an additional 30,000 POMZ-2 antipersonnel mines that were found in November 2006 in an old military warehouse undergoing transformation into a tourist site. Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form G, 31 March 2008; and Form B, 30 March 2007.

[8] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form B, April 2017.

[9] Yemen declared the following mines: 940 PPMISR-2, 940 PMD-6, 940 POMZ-2, and 940 PMN. Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for the period 1 April 2016 to 31 March 2017), Form C. Yemen declared the same number (3,760) of retained mines in its Article 7 reports provided in 2008, 2009, 2010, 2012, 2013, and 2014. Yemen’s 2011 Article 7 report declared a total of 4,000 antipersonnel mines retained for training and research purposes, including 240 additional mines (60 more of each type): 1,000 PPMISR-2, 1,000 PMD-6, 1,000 POMZ-2, and 1,000 PMN. Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for the period 30 March 2010 to 30 March 2011), Form D. Yemen has not provided any explanation for the increased number listed in the 2011 report.

[11] The retained mines were transferred from centralized military storage facilities in Sanaa and Aden to the Military Engineering Department Training Facility and Mine Detection Dogs Unit. Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for the period 30 March 2011 to 30 March 2012), Form D.

[12] Letter from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yemen, to Human Rights Watch (HRW), 7 September 2016.

[14] Victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) fall under the definition of an antipersonnel landmine and are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.

[15] This is a Claymore-type directional fragmentation charge produced by China.

[16] Conflict Armament Research, “Mines and IEDs Employed by Houthi Forces on Yemen’s West Coast,” September 2018.

[17] Ibid., p. 4.

[21] See, for example, Weapons, Lost (LostWeapons), “another couple weeks, another thousand mines cleared in Yemen. TM62 antitank mines, press plates, cylinder IEDs”. 12 October 2018, 08:16 UTC. Tweet; and Browne, Gareth (BrowneGareth), “UAE soldiers prepare a cache of Houthi landmines and IEDs for a controlled explosion near Mokha today #Yemen #hodeidah #Aden #IEDS”. 17 July 2018, 20:02 UTC. Tweet.

[23] Ibid.

[25] Ali Owaida, “Landmine explosion kills 4 troops in central Yemen,” Anadolu Agency, 18 October 2017; and “Landmine explosion kills 2 soldiers in Yemen's north,” Anadolu Agency, 30 April 2017.

[26] Joe Sheffer, “Revenge Landmines of the Arab Spring,” Foreign Policy, 24 May 2013; Yemen Rights Foundation, “A report issued by the Yemen Rights Foundation about landmines that were previously used by members of the Republican Guard stationed in the military bases al-Sama and al-Fareeja in the valleys and mountains of Bani Jarmooz, Sanaa province, in 2011,” 10 April 2013; HRW, “Yemen: Investigate, Respond to Landmine Use Reports,” 27 May 2013; and HRW, “Memorandum to Mine Ban Treaty Delegates: Yemen’s Compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty,” 8 April 2014.

[27] Joe Sheffer, “Revenge Landmines of the Arab Spring,” Foreign Policy, 24 May 2013; and Yemen Rights Foundation, “A report issued by the Yemen Rights Foundation about landmines that were previously used by members of the Republican Guard stationed in the military bases al-Sama and al-Fareeja in the valleys and mountains of Bani Jarmooz, Sanaa province, in 2011,” 10 April 2013; HRW press release, “Yemen: Investigate, Respond to Landmine Use Reports,” 27 May 2013. In April 2014, HRW reported that the landmines laid at Bani Jarmooz had killed at least two civilians and wounded 20 others since late 2011, including at least one dead and six wounded in the year since April 2013. The casualties all occurred in the vicinity of military camps that the 63rd and 81st Brigades of the Republican Guard established at Bani Jarmooz around 26 July 2011, and which remained in place as of September 2014. During an April 2013 visit, HRW did not observe any fencing or warning signs. HRW, “Memorandum to Mine Ban Treaty Delegates: Yemen’s Compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty,” 8 April 2014.

[28]The government pledges its commitment to implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty,” Saba News Service, 19 November 2013. See also, ICBL, “Yemen mine use: official communiqué,” 22 November 2014; and statement of Yemen, Mine Ban Treaty Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 5 December 2013.

[30] Interview with Yemen’s Delegation to the Third Review Conference, Maputo, 26 June 2014. Notes by HRW.

[31] Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, “Activity Report and Conclusions of the Committee on Cooperative Compliance,” 17 October 2016.


Mine Action

Last updated: 12 November 2018

 

Treaty status

Mine Ban Treaty

State Party
Article 5 deadline: 1 March 2020
Not on track

Convention on Cluster Munitions

Non-signatory

Mine action management

National mine action management actors

National Mine Action Committee (NMAC)
Yemen Mine Action Center (YEMAC), works through Regional Executive Mine Action Branches (REMABs) in Sanaa, Aden, and al-Mukalla (Hadramout governorate)

UN agencies

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Mine action strategic plan

No national strategic plan
UNDP and YEMAC have a cooperation plan for 2017–2020

Operators in 2017

National:
YEMAC


International:
United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Sudan mine action teams as part of the Saudi-led coalition

Extent of contamination as of end 2017

Landmines

Extent of contamination: massive, but extent not known

New mine contamination in 2017

Yes, extent unknown (see the Mine Ban Policy profile for further information)

Cluster munition remnants

Extent of contamination: heavy, but not known

New cluster munition contamination in 2017

Yes, extent unknown (see the Cluster Munition Ban Policy profile for further information)

Other ERW contamination

Contaminated by other ERW

Land release in 2017

Landmines

Mined area cleared was not disaggregated from the amount of ERW land cleared
1,737 antipersonnel mines destroyed

Cluster munition remnants

3,245 submunitions destroyed

Other ERW

8.56kmreleased, and 341,175 mines/ERW destroyed (including submunitions)
632 improvised munitions destroyed, data did not identify how many were victim-activated
Clearance results by UAE military engineers was not reported

Progress

Landmine and cluster munition remnants

Despite adverse conditions arising from the continued armed conflict, Yemen expanded operations in 2017. However, systematic land release operations were not possible. In addition to poor security, teams are constrained by a lack of training and equipment
Improvements in productivity continued into the first half of 2018

Note: ERW = explosive remnants of war.

Mine Contamination

The Republic of Yemen is contaminated with mines from conflicts in 1962–1969 and 1970–1983, mines that were laid in border areas between North and South Yemen before they unified in 1990, and mines from successive conflicts that erupted since 1994. These and the ongoing conflicts that flared in March 2015 have “changed the extent and complexity of contamination dramatically,” though its full extent is unknown.[1]

Yemen did not submit an Article 7 transparency report in 2018. As of writing, the last report, submitted in 2017, stated that 569 suspected or known mined areas covering 323km2remained and that survey was expected to identify additional contamination.[2] A 2017 progress report by the UNDP observed that “currently, there are very few tangible indicators measuring contamination or impact and what is available is outdated, ad hocand often anecdotal.”[3]

Some of the heaviest mine and ERW contamination is reported in northern governorates bordering Saudi Arabia (al-Jawf and Saada), southern coastal governorates (Abyan, Aden, Lahej, and Taiz) and center-west governorates (Hodeida, Marib, and Sanaa).[4]

Successive conflicts in the past decade have generated multiple reports of mine use. These include the 2010 insurgency in northern Saada governorate led by Abdul Malik al-Houthi[5] and the 2011 insurgency around southern Abyan launched by militants belonging to Ansar al-Sharia, linked to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, as well as the war that erupted after March 2015 between Houthi rebels controlling the north of Yemen and the Saudi-led coalition backing President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, based in the south.[6] (See Yemen’s mine ban profile for details.)

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including improvised mines

The current conflicts have also resulted in increased contamination from improvised mines, such as devices initiated by a pressure plate or crushed necklace, as well as improvised devices activated remotely or by photo-electric cells. Improvised mines as well as other improvised devices are being laid along roads, inside buildings, and built into house walls, posing a serious hazard to displaced families returning to their property.[7]

YEMAC reported Houthi forces emplaced mines of an improvised nature in northern Saada governorate during the 2006–2009 insurgency, and frequently clears “cold” or abandoned devices.[8] Human Rights Watch reported YEMAC had cleared mines of an improvised nature in areas from which Houthi forces withdrew near the Red Sea port city of Mokha in February 2017.[9]

Independent investigators have documented three types of improvised mines used by Houthi forces on Yemen’s west coast that are identical to, or closely resemble, conventional mines. They include a Claymore-type mine almost identical to a Chinese-made directional mine (Type 150-A GLD), a larger directional mine similar to an Iranian-made mine (M18A2) and an antivehicle mine similar to Russian-made TM46 mines. Some of the improvised mines have serial numbers indicating mass production.[10] The UN reported the appearance of improvised sea mines in the Red Sea since 2017.[11]

Cluster Munition Contamination

Yemen was contaminated with ERW, including cluster munition remnants, before 2015, but the escalation of armed conflict since March 2015 has significantly increased both its extent and the threat to the civilian population, mainly as a result of airstrikes by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition.[12] (See the Cluster Munition Ban Policy profile for further information.)

YEMAC reported in 2014 that it had identified some 18kmof suspected cluster munition hazards in the northern Saada governorate bordering Saudi Arabia. It also knew of other areas of contamination in northwestern Hajjah governorate that it had not been able to survey.[13]

Since the start of the latest round of hostilities in March 2015, international observers and researchers reported that Saudi coalition land and aerial bombardments using a variety of cluster munitions had struck many areas of northwestern and central Yemen, with the latest confirmed attacks occurring in February 2017.[14] YEMAC has identified heavy cluster munition contamination in Saada and al-Jawf governorates as well as additional cluster munition contamination in Amran, Hodeida, Mawit, and Sanaa governorates, including in Sanaa city.[15] Contamination was also reported in Hayran, in Hajjah governorate.[16]

Program Management

A National Mine Action Committee (NMAC) is responsible for formulating policy, allocating resources, and developing a national mine action strategy.[17] It is chaired by a minister of state (a member of the cabinet) and brings together representatives of seven concerned ministries. It is unclear if, or to what extent, the NMAC remains functional.

YEMAC was established in Sanaa in January 1999 as NMAC’s implementing body with responsibility for coordinating mine action in the country.[18] Amid the upsurge of violence since 2015, YEMAC has become, de facto, two organizations, split between Sanaa, under the control of the Houthis, and the southern city of Aden controlled by the Saudi-led coalition and Yemen’s internationally recognized but exiled government. The Sanaa office coordinates operations in the north and center of the country while the Aden office oversees operations in southern provinces.[19]

YEMAC is supported by a Regional Executive Mine Action Branch (REMAB) in Aden, also set up in 1999, as well as REMABs in al-Mukalla (Hadramout governorate), opened in March 2004 and Saada (April 2016).[20]

In 2017, the UNDP reported that YEMAC administrative and operational capacity and productivity improved in 2017, helped by training courses for new recruits in ERW clearance, training for a survey leadership group, and Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) training in Jordan for database staff.[21] The UNDP’s international staff included a planning and reporting specialist in Sanaa and a technical advisor based in Aden. National staff included two posts in Sanaa and one in Aden.[22]

Strategic planning

YEMAC does not currently have a strategic plan for mine clearance. Since 2015, mine action has operated on an emergency basis and YEMAC has worked with UNDP to address emergency threats to communities posed by all explosive hazards, including mines, improvised explosive devices, cluster munition remnants, and unexploded aircraft and ground-launched ordnance. The lack of training and equipment limits YEMAC teams’ ability to tackle many of the items encountered.

The UNDP identified three main goals for emergency operations: preventing the situation from getting any worse; mitigating the impact of existing contamination; and, over the longer term, addressing Yemen’s Mine Ban Treaty obligations.[23]

In July 2017, the UNDP started implementing Phase V (2017–2020) of its program in Yemen, which includes support for YEMAC in preparing the request for an extension to its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline, due for submission by March 2019. It has identified four desired outputs:

  • Mine and unexploded ordinance (UXO) contamination is mapped and the impact assessed nationwide.
  • Mines and UXO are efficiently cleared in priority areas.
  • Risk education is increased in affected communities.
  • Survivors are screened, rehabilitated, and supported.

The UNDP estimated total funding required for Phase V at US$39.9 million. As of June 2017, funding pledged amounted to $9.8 million.[24] It sought to increase funding from around $6 million available in 2017 to around $15 million a year.[25]

Information management

YEMAC is responsible for information management and maintains an IMSMA database. The UNDP observed that although not updated, the system was providing more reliable data. Most database staff in Sanaa had left by the beginning of 2017. YEMAC recruited new staff for its offices in Sanaa and Aden, who underwent IMSMA training in Jordan in May 2017.[26]

The UNDP also recruited a mapping expert in 2017 working in the Aden office to boost preparation and distribution of contamination maps.

Operators

YEMAC was Yemen’s only humanitarian clearance operator in 2017. By the start of 2016, it had some 850 staff split between offices in Sanaa and Aden, of whom between 350 and 400 were said to be active. These included three UXO clearance teams set up at the end of 2015 to focus on contamination in cities.[27] YEMAC subsequently recruited additional staff and reported reaching around 700 field staff in 2017.[28] YEMAC also had 19 mine detection dogs (MDD) in 2017, of which six were active supporting survey and clearance.[29]

A Dynasafe MineTech subsidiary, Dynasafe Middle East Project Management, signed an agreement with Saudi Arabia’s King Salman Fund in March 2018 for a $40 million demining operation funded by the Saudi government. The project was due to run for a year initially, with the possibility of extension subject to review. It became operational in May 2018 with headquarters in Marib and sub-offices in Sanaa and Aden. The project expected to build up a staff of more than 400, including 20 international experts and advisers, and to operate with a little over 300 YEMAC staff, including 32 demining teams.[30]

Danish Demining Group (DDG) had offices in both Sanaa and Aden in 2016 but in 2017 worked only in the south. It is accredited to provide risk education, and in 2017 it delivered training for close to 10,000 people.[31]

Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) conducted an assessment mission to Sanaa in October 2017 to explore the possibilities for establishing a program to support YEMAC’s MDD capacity.[32]

HALO Trust agreed in 2017 to provide training on survey and use of thermite torches for YEMAC personnel in Jordan. However, 10 YEMAC personnel attempting to leave through Aden to attend a HALO course were detained by the authorities at the end of July 2018.[33]

The Saudi-led coalition has two mine action teams, from the UAE and Sudan, deployed in the south. Little is known about their capacity or assets, or any activities. The UAE has reportedly agreed to “clear” Dhubab city in southwestern Taiz governorate.[34]

Land Release

Despite Yemen’s continuing war and a humanitarian crisis described by the UN as the worst in the world, YEMAC expanded capacity and the scope of operations in 2017. YEMAC field staff operated in 55 districts of 14 governorates in 2017. This compares favorably with the previous year when it worked in 47 districts across nine governorates.[35]

Survey in 2017

YEMAC conducted technical survey on a total of 3kmin 2017. More than half of that amount was accounted for by operations to rehabilitate the Amran cement factory, a key economic facility, which had been hit by air strikes in 2015 and 2016, but did not involve mine clearance.

Clearance in 2017

YEMAC cleared 8,556,883mof ERW-contaminated land in 2017, according to the UNDP, more than double the area recorded as cleared in 2016. Available data, however, did not disaggregate the extent of mine clearance although it involved the destruction of at least 1,729 antipersonnel mines.[36] It also involved the destruction of 3,245 cluster munition remnants.[37]

YEMAC conducted mainly spot clearance of high-threat, high-impact tasks prioritizing civilian infrastructure rather than undertaking large area clearance that would tie down assets for extended periods of time.[38] YEMAC also reportedly cleared 632 items of improvised ordnance in 2017, but available data did not identify how many devices were victim-activated and therefore meet the definition of an antipersonnel landmine under the Mine Ban Treaty.

Some clearance of mines and other explosive ordnance was reportedly conducted by UAE military engineers but the objectives and extent of such activities was unknown.[39]

Clearance in 2016 and 2017[40]

Year

Area (m2)

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

Improvised munitions destroyed

ERW destroyed

2017

8,556,883

1,729

3,763

632

341,175

2016[41]

3,072,181

16,440

16,750

1,048

228,572

Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle.

Progress in 2018

The improvements in productivity appeared to continue in 2018 with clearance of 5,123,548mrecorded in the first five months of the year. Operations resulted in clearance of 448 antipersonnel mines, 4,122 antivehicle mines, 600 improvised munitions, and 1,846 items of UXO. Most clearance was in Dhamar (1.1km2) and Sanaa (1.01km2) governorates, with substantial areas also cleared in Hajjah, Saada, and Taiz governorates. Most of the items destroyed were in Aden and Sanaa.[42]

Dynasafe MineTech became operational in Yemen in May 2018 and reported clearing 800 mines in June 2018. Project goals include clearance of all high-threat areas, clearing roads to allow safe passage of humanitarian goods, and making schools safe. In August 2018, it reported operating in west coast areas and in the provinces of Lahej, Marib, Sanaa, and Shabwah.[43]

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the five-year extension granted in 2014), Yemen is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2020. It will not meet this deadline and will need to request a third extension by March 2019.

Yemen was previously granted five-year Article 5 deadline extensions by States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in 2008 and 2014. For the second extension, Yemen requested the additional time to clear 107 confirmed mined areas covering 8.1kmbut it is not on track to achieve this target.[44] The subsequent escalation in conflict disrupted clearance activity and shifted operational priorities from legacy minefields to emergency clearance of ERW.

Mine clearance in 2013–2017

Year

Area cleared (km2)

2017

Not reported

2016

3.07

2015

0

2014

0.34

2013

1.16

Total

5.57

 

YEMAC decided in consultation with the UNDP in June 2018 that it would request a three-year extension to its Article 5 deadline from April 2020 until April 2023 on the basis that in the prevailing environment of conflict it was not feasible to plan further ahead (and in the hope the conflicts would come to an end). YEMAC would treat the three years as an interim emergency response, and aim to conduct a national contamination survey to provide a realistic basis for a subsequent 10-year extension request. In the three-year interim period, clearance of legacy minefields, often well-known to communities, would take a lower priority than high-threat ERW.[45]

 

 

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and shared all its country-level landmine reports (from“Clearing the Mines 2018”) and country-level cluster munition reports (from “Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2018”) with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.



[1] UNDP, “Emergency Mine Action Project, Annual Progress Report 2017,” January 2018, p. 6; Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (update), 10 March 2016, p. 4.

[2] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 1 April 2016 to 31 March 2017), Forms D and L.

[3] UNDP, “Mid-Year Report, 2017,” 20 July 2017, p. 4.

[4] UNDP, Phase V, “Emergency Mine Action Project,” Project Document, p. 1.

[5] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 1 April 2009 to 31 March 2010), Form I.

[7] Minutes of Yemen Mine Action Technical Working Group Meeting, Amman, 24 July 2018.

[8] Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Extension Request (update), 10 March 2016, p. 5; and UNDP, “Mid-Year Report, 2017,” 20 July 2017, p. 4.

[9] Human Rights Watch, “Yemen: Houthi-Saleh Forces Using Landmines,” 10 April 2017.

[10] Conflict Armament Research, “Mines and IEDs Employed by Houthis on Yemen’s West Coast,” September 2018, pp. 5–6, 11.

[11] UN Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts, S/2018/68, Annexes 40 & 41, pp. 166–171, 26 January 2018.

[12] UNDP, “Grant Progress Report for 1 October–31 December 2015,” 25 January 2016.

[13] Email from Ali al-Kadri, General Director, YEMAC, 20 March 2014.

[14] See the 2017 Cluster Munition Monitor Ban Policy overview for details.

[15] Interview with Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, in Geneva, 17 February 2016; and with Stephen Bryant, Chief Technical Adviser, UNDP, in Geneva, 6 February 2017.

[16] Amnesty International, “Yemen: children among civilians killed and maimed in cluster bomb ‘minefields,’” 23 May 2016.

[17] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form I, 31 March 2009.

[18] Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, p. 2.

[19] Interviews with Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, and Stephen Bryant, UNDP, in Geneva, 17 February 2016; and UNDP, “Support to eliminate the impact from mines and ERW − Phase IV, Annual Progress Report 2014,” undated but 2015.

[20] Email from Stephen Bryant, UNDP, 22 July 2018.

[21] UNDP, “Emergency Mine Action Project, Annual Report 2017,” January 2018, pp. 10–12.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid., p. 6.

[24] UNDP, Phase V, “Emergency Mine Action Project,” Project Document, p. 1. Donors were the United States ($7 million), the United Kingdom ($1.1 million), the Netherlands ($1.1 million), and Germany ($0.5 million).

[25] UNDP, Phase V, “Emergency Mine Action Project,” Project Document, p. 7.

[26] UNDP, “Emergency Mine Action Project, Annual Progress Report 2017,” January 2018, p. 10.

[27] Interview with Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, and Stephen Bryant, UNDP, in Geneva, 17 February 2016.

[28] UNDP, “Emergency Mine Action Project, Annual Progress Report 2017,” January 2018, p. 12.

[29] Colin Bent and Alma Dukic, “Yemen Assessment Report,” NPA, undated but November 2017, pp. 16–18.

[30] Email from Chris Clark, Global Operations Director, Dynasafe MineTech, 6 August 2018.

[31] Email from Maria Ersvaer, Programme and Operations Coordinator, DDG, 30 April 2018.

[32] Colin Bent and Alma Dukic, “Yemen Assessment Report,” NPA, undated but November 2017; Minutes of Yemen Mine Action Technical Working Group Meeting, Amman, 24 July 2018; and email from Stephen Bryant, UNDP, 27 July 2018.

[33] Email from Stephen Bryant, UNDP, 31 July 2018.

[34] UNDP, Minutes of Mine Action Technical Working Group Meeting, Amman, Jordan, 24 July 2018.

[35] UNDP, “Emergency Mine Action Project, Annual Progress Report 2017,” January 2018, p. 9.

[36] UNDP, “YEMAC clearance activities 2016–2017, productivity January–December 2017,” received by email from Stephen Bryant, UNDP, 3 April 2018.

[37] UNDP, “Emergency Mine Action Project, Annual Progress Report 2017,” January 2018, pp. 12, 20.

[38] Ibid., p. 12.

[39] See, for example, “UAE armed forces continues clearing landmines in Yemen’s west coast,” Emirates News Agency, 30 January 2018.

[40] UNDP, “YEMAC clearance activities 2016–17, productivity January–December 2017,” received by email from Stephen Bryant, UNDP, 3 April 2018.

[41] Clearance data showed 16,198 antipersonnel mines were cleared in Aden and 15,947 antivehicle mines were cleared in Aden (9,476), Hadramout (4,779), and Lahej (1,692). No explanation for the exceptionally high number of items cleared in these locations was immediately available.

[42] UNDP, “YEMAC productivity, January to May 2018,” received by email from Stephen Bryant, UNDP, 15 July 2018; and Minutes of Yemen Mine Action Technical Working Group Meeting, Amman, 24 July 2018.

[43] Email from Chris Clark, Dynasafe MineTech, 6 August 2018.

[44] Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, p. 13.

[45] Minutes of Yemen Mine Action Technical Working Group Meeting, Amman, 24 July 2018.


Support for Mine Action

Last updated: 16 November 2020

In 2019, 10 donors contributed a total of US$16.1 million to support mine action activities in the Republic of Yemen. This represents an increase of 73% from 2018.[1]

International contributions: 2019[2]

Donor

Sector

Amount

(national currency)

Amount

(US$)

United States

Capacity-building and clearance

US$4,000,000

4,000,000

Germany

Capacity-building, clearance, risk education, and victim assistance

€3,149,186

3,525,199

New Zealand

Victim assistance

NZ$4,000,000

2,636,400

Netherlands

Clearance

€1,949,592

2,182,373

Japan

Capacity-building, clearance, risk education, and victim assistance

¥152,802,432

1,401,600

United Kingdom

Clearance and risk education

£1,000,000

1,276,800

Italy

Clearance, risk education, and victim assistance

€500,000

559,700

Norway

Risk education

NOK2,000,000

227,270

Sweden

Clearance and risk education

SEK2,000,000

211,408

Luxembourg

Advocacy

€67,900

76,007

Total

 

N/A

16,096,757

Note: N/A=not applicable.

Since 2015, international assistance to mine action in Yemen totaled some $44.5 million and fluctuated from an annual low of $2 million in 2015 to a high of $16.1 in 2019.

In its 2019 deadline extension request under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Yemen indicated that national support to its own mine action programs has been limited to cover the running costs of its mine action authorities, but did not provide details on the level of its contribution.[3]

Summary of support: 2015–2019[4]

Year

International contributions ($)

2019

16,096,757

2018

9,258,575

2017

11,916,217

2016

5,268,078

2015

2,000,000

Total

44,539,627



[1] Germany Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 16 March 2020; Italy Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form I, 25 June 2020; Japan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 March 2020; response to Monitor questionnaire by Steve Hoscheit, Desk Disarmament, Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, 4 May 2020; Netherlands Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 2020; New Zealand Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 2020; email from Ingrid Schøyen, Senior Advisor, Humanitarian Affairs, Norway Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 June 2020; email from Kajsa Aulin, Assistant Health Affairs and Disarmament, Permanent Mission of Sweden in Geneva, 24 September 2020; United Kingdom Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 2020; and US Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA), “To Walk the Earth in Safety 2019,” 2 April 2020.

[2] Average exchange rates for 2019: €1=US$1.1194; £1=US$1.2768; NZ$1=US$0.6591; NOK8.8001=US$1; SEK9.4604=US$1; and ¥109.02=US$1. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 2 January 2020.

[4] See previous Monitor reports.


Casualties

Last updated: 21 October 2018

 

Mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties

All known casualties by end 2017

9,118

Mine/ERW casualties in 2017[1]

Annual total

160

Decrease from 2,104 in 2016

Survival outcome

77 killed; 82 injured; 1 unknown

Device type causing casualties

1 antipersonnel mine; 64 antivehicle mines; 1 improvised mine; 63 unspecified mines; 28 unexploded submunition; 3 unknown devices

Civilian status

89 civilians; 2 deminers; 43 military; 26 unknown

Age and gender

36 adults
10 women; 26 men

19 children
1 boy; 2 girls; 16 unknown

105 unknown

 

The ongoing conflict in the Republic of Yemen prevented the operation of a national casualty surveillance mechanism. The 160 casualties identified by the Monitor for 2017 is certainly an underreporting of the annual total.

In 2017, the Monitor identified casualties in the following governorates: Abyan, Ad Dali, Aden, Al Bayda, Al Jawf, Hadramawt, Hajjan, Hodeida, Marib, Saada, Sanaa, Shabwah, and Taiz.

Various Yemeni authorities and human rights organizations reported annual totals and cumulative totals for all time. However, their reports rarely describe the source or methodology used to compile these figures, and in some cases, do not specify the time period. The figures provided are widely different, indicating the challenge of collecting reliable data in a context of ongoing conflict.

Okaz website reports that in 2017, mines laid by the Houthi killed 147 people, including 18 children and 11 women, and injured 244, including 33 children and 20 women. The majority of accidents took place in Taiz governorate, where 77 were killed and 178 injured. However, it does not provide any source for this information.[2] A media report provides slightly different figures for casualties in Taiz in 2017, where 193 people were killed and injured. Of those killed, 20 were military and 58 were civilian, of whom three were children and six were women.[3] Mwatana’s 2017 annual report for human rights gives a much lower figure of 14 civilians killed (including three women and two children), and 46 injured (including 19 women and 14 injured) as a result of 25 accidents in 2017.[4] Another media source states that in several governorates in the period between 1 January and 31 May 2017, 39 civilians were killed, including five children and three women, while 69 were injured, including 14 children.[5]

According to one media source from 15 April 2017, people were more aware of the dangers than they were in previous years.[6]

Through to the end of 2017, the Monitor identified at least 9,118 mine/ERW casualties in Yemen.[7] The 2017 total of 160 is much less than the 2016 total of 2,037. In 2016, the vast majority of casualties were reported by the ICRC—2,037 people injured by mines/ERW were admitted into 46 ICRC-supported hospitals.[8] However, in 2017, no data was available from the ICRC. The 2016 figure is more than double the 988 reported for 2015. In 2014, the Monitor identified 24 casualties. However, there was likely significant underreporting due to the challenges facing data collection caused by the intensified armed conflict.[9]

Other sources have provided cumulative figures for mine/ERW casualties since the current conflict began. As mentioned above, these vary widely. According to a media report in May 2017, Yemen’s Minister of Human Rights was quoted by a Saudi news agency as saying that landmines may have killed up to 440 people and injured more than 540 others.[10] However, another undated website states that the ministry reported that mines had caused permanent injury to 814 citizens.[11]

A reported entitled “Antipersonnel mine victims in Yemen: during the period from September 2014 to June 2018,” by the Yemeni Coalition for Monitoring Human Rights Violations, reports a total of 1,940 casualties, of which 906 were killed and 1,034 injured. However, it does not explain how this data was collected, nor does it give a breakdown by year. Accidents were reported in 19 governorates. Of the total, 1,508 were men, 116 women, and 316 children. Civilians made up 1,374 of the casualties, and 566 were military. Antipersonnel mines caused 1,196 casualties, antivehicle mines 672, and IEDs 72—no information was available as to whether these were improvised mines.[12]

The majority of casualties have occurred in Taiz governorate. A media source quoted Basam Al Ariqi from the Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) reporting that in Taiz province alone, landmines had killed 268 and injured 214 between April 2015 and March 2017. He also noted that “the conflict zones in Taiz are in residential areas, so the casualties are usually civilians.”[13] Another media source quoted the director of the center for artificial limbs in Taiz, reporting that approximately 315 people were injured in the city from the beginning of the war until mid-June 2017, of which 70% were caused by landmines.[14]

Prior to 2015, the casualty total for 2012 of 263 casualties was the highest annual number recorded by the Monitor for Yemen since research began in 1999, and was due to the conflict and increased population movement in that year.[15] A Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) identified 4,904 casualties through July 2000, of which 2,560 people were killed and 2,344 were injured.[16] In 2010, it was reported in the media that there had been 35,000 mine/ERW casualties in Yemen since 1995.[17]

Cluster munition casualties

In 2017, 54 casualties of cluster munitions were reported in Yemen, 26 were casualties of cluster munition attacks and unexploded submunitions caused 28 casualties.[18]

The 54 cluster munition casualties reported in 2017 represented an increase in the 38 reported in 2016, but was lower than the 104 reported in 2015.

Prior to new use of cluster munitions in 2015, a cluster munition attack in Yemen in December 2009 was reported to have killed 55 people, including 14 women and 21 children.[19] In 2013, it was reported that unexploded submunitions remaining from the 2009 attack had killed four civilians and injured 13 in two incidents, one inDecember 2009, a few days after the attack, and the other in January 2012.[20]

 


[1] Unless otherwise indicated, casualty data for 2017 is based on: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)data for Yemen, January to December 2017; Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)-Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute (SIRPI)antivehicle mine database provided by email from Ursign Hofmann, Policy Advisor, GICHD, 22 February 2018; Mwatana for Human Rights,“The Situation of Human Rights in Yemen 2017,” 15 May 2018, pp. 65–69; and Monitor media scanning for calendar year 2017.

[2]Victims of Houthi mines in 2017,” Okaz (daily newspaper), 24 April 2018 (in Arabic).

[3]Houthi mines kill 193 Yemenis in Taiz,” Al Bayan News (in Arabic), 15 April 2018.

[4] Mwatanafor Human Rights, “The Situation of Human Rights in Yemen 2017,” 15 May 2018, pp. 65–69.

[6]Houthi mines kill 193 Yemenis in Taiz,” Al Bayan News (in Arabic), 15 April 2018.

[7] ICRC, “Annual Report 2016,” Geneva, May 2017, p. 504; Monitor media scanning for calendar years 2011 through 2017; interviews with Ali Al-Kadri, YEMAC, in Geneva, 28 May 2013; and with Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, 25 February 2014; email from Yuko Osawa, UNICEF Yemen, 7 May 2014; Monitor media scanning for calendar year 2012; Wethaq Foundation for Civil Orientation, “Landmine Victims in Kushar District, Hajja: Death Creeping Towards Innocent People,” undated but 2012; United Nations Department for Safety and Security (UNDSS), “Yemen Daily Report,” 27 March, and 2 April 2012; email from Henry Thompson, Danish Demining Group (DDG) Yemen, 15 March 2013; telephone interview with Ahmed Aalawi, YEMAC, 13 March 2013; UNICEF, “Unexploded ordnance and landmines killing more children in Yemen,” Sanaa, 20 April 2012; Monitor interview with neighbor of victim, 27 March 2012; and interview with Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, Sanaa, 8 March 2011.

[8] ICRC, “Annual Report 2016,” Geneva, May 2017, p. 504.

[9] Ongoing conflict in both the northern and southern parts of Yemen prevented YEMAC from collecting and verifying casualty data from these areas. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “Humanitarian Bulletin Yemen,” Issue30, 11 August–3 September 2014.

[12] “Antipersonnel mine victims in Yemen: during the period from September 2014 to June 2018,” Yemeni Coalition for Monitoring Human Rights Violations–Rasd, undated.

[13]Landmines can destroy legs, but not love,” TRT World, 5 September 2017.

[14]Life turned upside down: Antipersonnel mines in Yemen,” Al Hurra (in Arabic), 29 June 2017.

[15] Wethaq Foundation for Civil Orientation, “Landmine Victims in Kushar District, Hajja: Death Creeping Towards Innocent People,” undated but 2012; “Landmine victims in southern Yemen on the rise,” Reliefweb, 13 June 2012; and “Wanting to go home but threatened by landmines, Ahim area IDPs caught in limbo,” Yemen Times, 7 February 2013.

[16] Survey Action Center, “Landmine Impact Survey Republic of Yemen Executive Summary,” July 2000, p. 15.

[17] Shatha Al-Harazi, “Yemen landmines kill 12 children this year,” UNICEF New Zealand,22 December 2010.

[18] ACLED data for Yemen, January to December 2017;“Citizen killed in Saudi cluster bomb in Taiz,” Saba Net, 22 October 2017; “US-Saudi aggression attacks several provinces,” Saba Net, 24 November 2017; and “Report: 48 Yemeni civilians killed, injured in 51 US-Saudi airstrikes in 24 hours,” Saba Net, 24 December 2017.

[19] There was a credible report of a cluster munition strike in Yemen in December 2009 that killed 55 people, including 14 women and 21 children. Amnesty International, “Wikileaks cable corroborates evidence of US airstrikes in Yemen,” 1 December 2010. In addition, although there is no specific data available on casualties, cluster munitions remnants have been recorded in northwestern Yemen, apparently following use in 2009/2010 in Saada governorate near the border with Saudi Arabia. Interviews with Abdul Raqeeb Fare, Deputy Director, YEMAC, Sanaa, 7 March 2013; and with Ali al-Kadri, YEMAC, in Geneva, 28 May 2013; and email from John Dingley, UNDP Yemen, 9 July 2013.

[20] HRW, “Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda,” 22 October 2013; and interview with Ahmed Alawi, Executive Officer, YEMAC, 25 February 2014. Previously, no confirmed cluster munition remnants casualties had been reported. Emails from Yuko Osawa, UNICEF Yemen, 7 May 2014; and from from Ali Al-Kadri, YEMAC, 5 October 2013.


Victim Assistance

Last updated: 21 October 2018

Victim assistance action points

  • Improve the collection of casualty data and ensure that information about services for persons with disabilities are available to stakeholders, including civil society organizations as recommended by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
  • Resume victim assistance coordination.
  • Revise and implement the National Victim Assistance Strategic Plan 2010–2015 to address the existing situation and needs.
  • Provide long-term support to survivors.
  • Increase the availability of psychosocial support.
  • Improve accessibility of buildings.

Victim assistance planning and coordination

Government focal point

Yemen Executive Mine Action Center(YEMAC)

Coordination mechanisms

Victim Assistance Advisory Committee (inactive): YEMAC with ministries of health, insurance, and social affairs; Mine Action Working Group

Coordination regularity/frequency and outcomes/effectiveness

None

Plans/strategies

National Victim Assistance Strategic Plan 2010–2015 (inactive)

Disability sector integration

The ongoing conflict led up to 100 local disability organizations to cease operations[1]

Survivor inclusion and participation

A mine survivor was appointed head of YEMAC’s Victim Assistance department.[2] Generally, however, it was noted that survivors have not participated in the coordination and planning of victim assistance[3]

Reporting

Yemen last reported on victim assistance in its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report for calendar year 2016

 

International commitments and obligations

Yemen is responsible for a significant number of landmine survivors, cluster munition victims, and survivors of other explosive remnants of war (ERW)

Mine Ban Treaty

Yes

Convention on Cluster Munitions

No

Convention on Conventional Weapons Protocol V

No

Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)

Yes

 

Laws and policies

Legislation protects the rights of persons with disabilities, but they were poorly enforced and discrimination remained in the Republic of Yemen. The law reserves 5% of government jobs for persons with disabilities.[4] Although the law mandates that new buildings have access for persons with disabilities, compliance was poor.[5]

Major Developments in 2017–2018

Ongoing conflict throughout 2017 caused all victim assistance activities, including coordination, to stop in Yemen.

Since 2015, YEMAC is working according to an emergency plan and focusing solely on mine clearance. In 2017 through 2018, there was no victim assistance program in place in Yemen, because funding for victim assistance was lacking.[6] Similarly, YEMAC Aden and the UNDP Aden office reported that no services were provided to mine/ERW survivors due to a lack of funding.[7]

The Fund for the Care and Rehabilitation of the Disabled in Sanaa, an independent body, which provided limited basic services and supported more than 60 NGOs assisting persons with disabilities remained operational in some areas of the country, however, during 2017–2018, the fund lost 86% of its financial resources. As a result, support to mine/ERW victims decreased.[8]

In 2017, victim assistance services were reported to be insufficient.[9]

Needs assessment

YEMAC’s victim assistance team screened 1,394 mine/ERW survivors in 2017 in five out of 22 governorates.[10]

UNICEF collected information on children who were killed or injured by mine/ERW and children with disabilities, in order to identify vulnerable children and provide services to address their needs or refer them to appropriate services.[11]

Medical care and rehabilitation

The ongoing conflict dramatically increased demand for emergency and ongoing medical care beyond the capacity of the medical system.[12] In addition to increased demand for emergency medical care, import restrictions and damaged port infrastructure prevented humanitarian aid, food, fuel, and medical supplies from reaching populations affected by the conflict.[13] Only 50% of all health facilities remained functional, and the remaining half facedsevere shortages in medicines, equipment, and staff.[14]

In 2017, the ICRC provided support to emergency and surgical treatment, including through first-aid training and supplies. Medical professionals were trained in mass-casualty management, emergency-room trauma care, and war surgery.[15] The ICRC supported 27 hospitals, including eight with ICRC staff on site. War-wounded people including 201 patients injured by mine/ERW received treatment at ICRC-supported hospitals.[16] The ICRC fully managed two facilities in Aden and Saada.[17] The Yemen Red Crescent Society expanded its emergency response capacities with ICRC support. It provided emergency transport for health referrals and medical evacuations.[18]

In 2017, YEMAC’s victim assistance team provided mobility and assistive devices to 673 mine/ERW survivors (almost half were children) in five governorates.[19] However, YEMAC’s healthcare plan does not provide for long-term support for mine/ERW survivors.[20] Mine/ERW survivors are not covered by health insurance.[21] There was no specific mechanism in place for managing the needs of new mine/ERW victims.[22]

In 2017, more than 6,600 amputees were among over 70,000 persons with disabilities who obtained physical rehabilitation services at five ICRC-supported centers in Aden, Mukalla, Sanaa, Taiz, and Saada.[23] Over 670 new patients were fitted with prostheses.[24] The ICRC supported 12% of the cost of raw materials for the Sanaa Orthopedic Center and all its branches in other governorates, and covered the cost of transportation and accommodation for about 80 destitute patients to reach orthopedic services.[25] The ICRC also donated wheelchairs for the social affairs ministry’s physical rehabilitation programs.[26] To ensure the sustainability of physical rehabilitation services, around 80 physical rehabilitation professionals and 22 students were trained either locally or abroad.[27]

In 2017, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) provided support to more than 20 hospitals and health centers in 11 Yemeni governorates: Taiz, Aden, Al-Dhale, Saada, Amran, Hajjah, Ibb, Sanaa, Hodaida, Abyan, and Lahj.[28] Since 2015, 72,300 patients were treated in MSF facilities.[29] MSF also provided medical supplies and equipment in 2017.[30]

In 2017, Humanity and Inclusion (HI, formerly Handicap International) supported eight health facilities in Sanaa with rehabilitation equipment, training on rehabilitation care and inclusion, and capacity-building on war injury management for physiotherapists. HI also provided rehabilitation care to people who had limbs amputated and needed to learn to use artificial limbs, and delivered assistive devices.[31] In 2018, HI started providing prostheses and orthoses.[32] Children injured by the conflict in all but two governorates (Al Mahrah and Soqtra) received financial support from UNICEF in order to be able to access medical treatment, artificial limbs, and mobility devices. UNICEF also provided medical supplies and raw materials to rehabilitation centers. Due to increased funding in 2017, a greater number of children received these services compared to 2016.[33]

Socio-economic and psychosocial inclusion

The Yemen Association of Landmine Survivors (YALS) is the mine action center’s implementing partner for economic reintegration activities. From 2004 to the end of 2017, YALS provided vocational training to 808 mine survivors.[34] In 2017, 48 mine/ERW survivors including 36 women participated in the YALS livelihood program.[35] YALS was only able to provide psychological support to a small number of survivors (nine), including through hospital visits.[36]

In 2017, HI continued to provide psychosocial support to the war-wounded and their families.[37]

Local organizations and the ICRC promoted the social inclusion of persons with disabilities through sports and awareness-raising events.[38]

Cross-cutting

The UNDP reported that women, children, the elderly, and disabled are at greater risk of losing access to health services. Appropriate services—including outreach services, separated spaces, and availability of female health workers—which are necessary for women and children to access healthcare are lacking.[39] In coordination with the UNDP, the Al Hikma Foundation and YEMAC trained 15 women in victim assistance and mine risk education for 10 days.[40] This training of women would enable women and girls to better access victim assistance services.

HI continued to increase the number of female staff for both functional rehabilitation and psychosocial support,[41] which helps improve the access of female survivors to these services.

Accessibility of buildings remained an issue for mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities, especially in rural areas.[42]

Victim assistance providers and activities

Name of organization

Type of activity

Government

YEMAC

Data collection, referrals, and support for medical attention and physical rehabilitation (In early 2018, YEMAC’s victim assistance activities were suspended)

Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs

The Social Fund for Development and the Fund for the Care and Rehabilitation of the Disabled assisted disability organizations

National

Aden Rehabilitation Center/Aden
Association of People with Special Needs

Inclusive education, and advocacy on the CRPD outreach services; all services gender- and age-appropriate

Yemen Association of Landmine
Survivors (YALS)

Advocacy, referrals, vocational training, psychological support, accommodation, and food for survivors studying in schools and universities in Sanaa

Raqeep Organization for Human Rights

Awareness of rights of mine/ERW survivors, documenting rights violations, advocacy

International

Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières,MSF)

Emergency and ongoing medical care

Humanity and Inclusion (HI, formerly Handicap International)

Psychosocial support, assistive devices, physical rehabilitation, support to eight health facilities, provision of prostheses, and orthoses; advocacy[43]

ICRC

Emergency relief, support for emergency medical care and material, and technical support to four physical rehabilitation centers

UNICEF

Financial support for children to be able to access services, medical supplies, and raw materials; referrals

 



[1] Interview with Raaja Al Masaabi, then Chairperson, Arab Human Rights Foundation (AHRF), Sanaa, 5 April 2016.

[2] Interview with Mohammed Alabdali, Secretary General, YALS, Sanaa, 20 March 2018.

[3] Interview with Rajaa Al Masaabi, Director, AHRF, Sanaa, 30 April 2018.

[4] United States Department of State, “Yemen 2017 Human Rights Report,” Washington, DC, 20 April 2018.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Interview with Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, in Geneva, 16 February 2018.

[7] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Abdulqawi Mohammed Abdullah, Deputy Director, YEMAC Aden, 16 April 2017; and interview with Steve Robinson, Chief Technical Advisor – Mine Action, UNDP Aden Office, Aden, 13 March 2018.

[8] Interview with Rajaa Al Masaabi, AHRF, Sanaa, 30 April 2018.

[9] Email from Mohammed Alabdali, Secretary General, YALS, 12 April 2018; OCHA, “Yemen: 2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview,” December 2017, p. 50; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Dhuha Al Basha, Child Protection Officer, UNICEF, 16 April 2018.

[10] UNDP, “Emergency Mine Action Project – 00103025: Annual Progress Report 2017,” January 2018, p. 17.

[11] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Dhuha Al Basha, UNICEF, 16 April 2018.

[12] OCHA, “Yemen: 2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview,” December 2017, p. 37.

[13] Ibid., pp. 5 & 8.

[14] Ibid., p. 6; and MSF, “Yemen: Crisis update - January 2018,” 11 December 2017.

[15] ICRC, “Annual Report 2017,” Geneva, June 2018, pp. 494 & 496.

[16] Ibid., pp. 493, 496, & 498.

[17] Ibid., p. 493.

[18] Ibid.

[19] UNDP, “Emergency Mine Action Project – 00103025: Annual Progress Report 2017,” January 2018, p. 17.

[20] Email from Mohammed Alabdali, YALS, 12 April 2018.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid.

[23] ICRC, “Where we work: Yemen,” undated, but 2018; and ICRC, “Annual Report 2017,” Geneva, June 2018, pp. 493 and 496.

[24] ICRC, “Annual Report 2017,” Geneva, June 2018, p. 498.

[25] Interview with Ahmed Al Sakkaf, Director, Sanaa Orthopedic Center, 5 May 2018; and ICRC, “Annual Report 2017,” Geneva, June 2018, p. 496.

[26] ICRC, “Annual Report 2017,” Geneva, June 2018, p. 496.

[27] Ibid.

[28] MSF, “Yemen: Crisis update - January 2018,” 11 December 2017.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Response to Monitor questionnaire by François Olive-Keravec, Head of Mission, HI, 3 May 2018; and HI “Country Card Yemen,” October 2017, p. 2.

[32] Response to Monitor questionnaire by François Olive-Keravec, HI, 3 May 2018.

[33] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Dhuha Al Basha, UNICEF, 16 April 2018.

[34] Email from Mohammed Alabdali, YALS, 12 April 2018.

[35] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohammed Alabdali, YALS, 19 April 2018.

[36] Email from Mohammed Alabdali, YALS, 12 April 2018.

[37] Response to Monitor questionnaire by François Olive-Keravec, HI, 3 May 2018.

[38] ICRC, “Annual Report 2017,” Geneva, June 2018, p. 496.

[39] OCHA, “Yemen: 2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview,” December 2017, p. 37.

[40] UNDP, “Emergency Mine Action Project – 00103025: Annual Progress Report 2017,” January 2018, p. 15.

[41] Response to Monitor questionnaire by François Olive-Keravec, HI, 3 May 2018.

[42] Email from Mohammed Alabdali, YALS, 12 April 2018.

[43] Response to Monitor questionnaire by François Olive-Keravec, HI, 3 May 2018; and HI “Country Card Yemen,” October 2017, p. 2.