Mali

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Last updated: 19 June 2019

Summary: State Party Mali ratified the convention on 30 June 2010. It has participated several meetings of the convention, but not since 2014. Mali voted in favor of a key UN resolution promoting the convention in December 2018.

Mali provided an initial transparency report for the convention in May 2016, which confirms it never produced cluster munitions and possesses no stockpiles, including for research or training. Mali states that it has never used or transferred cluster munitions.

Policy

The Republic of Malisigned the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008, ratified on 30 June 2010, and the convention entered into force for the country on 1 December 2010.

Mali has not enacted specific national implementation legislation to enforce the convention’s provisions. [1]

Mali provided its initial Article 7 transparency report for the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 May 2016, covering calendar year 2015. It has not submitted annual updated reports, which are due by 30 April.

Mali actively participated in the Oslo Process that created the convention and advocated for a total ban on cluster munitions without exception and with immediate effect. [2]

Mali attended several meetings of the convention, but not since 2014. [3]

In December 2018, Mali voted in favor of a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution promoting implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. [4] It has voted in favor of the annual UNGA resolution promoting the convention since it was first introduced in 2015.

During the treaty negotiations, Mali argued against including Article 21 on interoperability (relations with states not party). [5] It has not elaborated its views on other important issues regarding interpretation and implementation of the convention, such as the prohibition on foreign stockpiling and transit of cluster munitions, and the prohibition on investment in cluster munition production.

Mali is party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

In May 2016, Mali confirmed that it has never produced cluster munitions and does not possess any stocks, including for research and training. [6] Mali has stated on several occasions that it has never transferred or used cluster munitions. [7]



 [1] Mali did not complete Form A (national implementation measures) in the Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report submitted on 3 May 2016. In 2011, Mali expressed an interest in pursuing implementing legislation for the convention, but it has not taken any steps towards this goal since then. Statement of Mali, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Session on Victim Assistance, Geneva, 28 June 2011. Notes by the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC).

 [2] For details on Mali’s cluster munition policy and practice through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 115–116.

 [3] Mali participated in the convention’s Meetings of States Parties until 2014 and the intersessional meetings in 2011. It did not attend the First Review Conference in September 2015. It has participated regional workshops, most recently in Lome, Togo in May 2013.

 [4]Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 73/54, 5 December 2018.

 [5] Statement of Mali, Committee of the Whole on Article 1, Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions, 27 May 2008. Notes by Landmine Action.

 [7] Statement of Mali, Lomé Regional Seminar on the Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Lomé, Togo, 22 May 2013. Notes by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV); statement of Mali, Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Meeting of States Parties, Oslo, 12 September 2012; and statement of Mali, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Meeting of States Parties, Vientiane, 10 November 2010. Notes by the CMC.


Impact

Last updated: 20 April 2021

Jump to a specific section of the profile:

Treaty Status | Management & Coordination | Impact (contamination & casualties) | Addressing the Impact (land release, risk education, victim assistance)

Country Summary

The Republic of Mali has confirmed antivehicle mine contamination and since 2017 has experience a significant increase in incidents caused by improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including improvised mines, in the center of the country.[1]

In 2001, Mali stated that there had been no reports of use of antipersonnel mines by government forces or Tuareg rebels.[2] Mali has not submitted a Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report since 2005. In 2009 and 2010 Mali reported the presence of 80 mined areas in the regions of Kidal and Tombouctou, particularly along the roads between Abubaza and Tinza.[3] The upsurge in conflicts in Mali in 2012 resulted in reports of mine laying around the northern town of Gao by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and an offshoot, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa.[4]

The situation deteriorated in 2019, particularly in northern and central Mali. The extent of contamination is not known, and no land was released in 2019. In 2020, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) noted that because of the conflict “no clear mapping of the contamination is possible, and no proactive elimination is deemed possible at this time.”[5]

International mine action operators were focusing on risk education to reduce the number of new casualties and were working with local implementing partners. Risk education activities in Mali were often combined with non-technical surveys (NTS), referral of survivors to appropriate services, and victim assistance activities. However, the number of new casualties remained high, with civilians making up two-thirds of all mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties in 2019.

Access to basic victim assistance services was disrupted by the intensification of the conflict in 2019. Although UNMAS reported improved geographical coverage of medical care and referral in the central and northern regions due to the increased number of victim assistance service providers and international financial support for such services. Access to physical rehabilitation and psychological support services was also strengthened.

Treaty status

Treaty status overview

Mine Ban Treaty

State Party

Article 5 clearance deadline: 1 March 2009

Convention on Cluster Munitions

State Party

Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)

State Party

 

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Mali was required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2009. Despite many reports of improvised mine incidents in recent years, Mali did not request an extension to its Article 5 deadline.

Management and coordination

Mine action management and coordination

Mine action management and coordination overview[6]

National mine action management actors

None

Other actors

The Humanitarian Mine Action Working Group is the mine action coordination body

Mine action legislation

None

Mine action strategic and operational plans

None

Mine action standards

National Technical Guidelines for Mine Action (NTSG), developed by UNMAS Mali as interim standards

 

Mali does not have a national mine action authority. The government however committed to create a mine action authority within the Permanent Secretariat to Counter the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons, with support from UNMAS.[7] As co-chair of the Humanitarian Mine Action Working Group (Groupe de travail de lutte antimines humanitaire, GT-LHAM), UNMAS leads, coordinates, and implements mine action activities, and ensures that international partners comply with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).[8]

Strategies and policies

The Permanent Secretariat to Counter the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons has a 2019–2023 action plan, however as of October 2020 this plan did not include mine action activities.[9]

Legislation and standards

There are no national mine action standards. In 2013, UNMAS developed interim standards, the National Technical Guidelines for Mine Action (NTSG). These guidelines cover accreditation, risk education, NTS, victim assistance, monitoring and quality management.[10]

Information management

Information is managed through the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) since 2019.[11]

Gender and diversity

In 2019, UNMAS organized internal trainings on gender and diversity in mine action, established gender focal points, and developed an action plan for gender equality and diversity. Priority was given to project proposals mainstreaming gender.[12]

Risk education management and coordination

Risk education management and coordination overview[13]

Coordination mechanisms

The Humanitarian Mine Action Working Group coordinates risk education and meets monthly to discuss mine action operations, including risk education activities

Coordination outcomes

Development of risk education messages and tools, coordination of risk education activities, data reporting and sharing, coordination with other humanitarian sectors

Risk education standards

NTSG 22–Risk Education, developed by UNMAS Mali as interim standards, and the IMAS

 

Coordination

The Humanitarian Mine Action Working Group, under the UN Protection Cluster, coordinates humanitarian mine action activities in Mali, including risk education. The working group is co-chaired by UNMAS and another member of the group. The working group meets once a month in Bamako.[14] Topics include development of messaging and tools, coordination of risk education activities, and data reporting and coordination with other humanitarian sectors.[15]

Risk education operators are accredited by UNMAS, in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and the NTSG.[16]

National Standards and guidelines

There are no national risk education standards. In 2013, UNMAS developed interim standards, the NTSG 22–Risk Education.[17]

Victim assistance management and coordination

Victim assistance management and coordination overview[18]

Government focal points

None

Coordination mechanisms

The Humanitarian Mine Action Working Group coordinates mine action activities in Mali, including victim assistance activities

Coordination regularity and outcomes

Victim assistance was included on the agenda of the monthly mine action coordination meetings of the Humanitarian Mine Action Working Group

Plans/strategies

None

VA standards

Included in the interim National technical guidelines for risk education, developed by UNMAS Mali

Disability sector integration

 

The Malian Federation of Persons with Disabilities was consulted by the Humanitarian Mine Action Working Group with regards to victim assistance projects

Survivor inclusion and participation

Mine/ERW survivors were hired as community liaison within the framework of mine action projects; DanChurchAid (DCA) and Humanity & Inclusion (HI) also collaborated with local associations of persons with disabilities and associations of victims of conflict for the implementation of assistance projects

 

Laws and policies

In June 2018, Mali adopted the Law 2018–027 on the rights of persons with disabilities.[19] There was no specific legislation mandating physical accessibility to public buildings. Persons with disabilities had access to basic health care. The Ministry of Solidarity and Humanitarian Action is responsible for persons with disabilities. However, the government did not prioritize the protection of the rights of persons with disabilities and many relied on begging.[20] Persons with disabilities faced discrimination in employment.[21]

Impact

Contamination

Landmine

The extent of contamination with improvised mines is not known. In 2009 and 2010 Mali reported the presence of 80 mined areas in the regions of Kidal and Tombouctou, particularly along the roads between Abubaza and Tinza.[22] The upsurge in conflicts in Mali in 2012 resulted in reports of mines laying in the north of the country. The central regions were the most affected by the threat of improvised mines.[23] UNMAS said in March 2013 that it had received reports of antivehicle mines in the Kidal region being cleared towards Tin and Zaotene.[24] In 2018, Mali topped the list of countries with the highest number of casualties from antivehicle mines.[25]

While armed groups often used command-detonated explosive devices between 2017 and 2018, they have increasingly been using pressure-plate devices since.[26] UNMAS found that victim-operated devices represented at least half of all IED incidents in Mali in 2019, and over 60% between January and October 2020.[27] UNMAS indicated that trigger mechanisms of these improvised mines included pressure plates and tripwires, but had no evidence of any improvised mines activated by the contact or weight of a person. UNMAS confirmed that some of these improvised mines had been newly emplaced.[28]

Regions most affected by improvised mines are Gao, Kidal, and Mopti. Improvised mine incidents were also reported in Koulikoro, Segou, Sikasso, and Timbuktu.[29] The presence of improvised mines impedes the use of roads in the central and northern regions.[30] The mine contamination also obstructed access to education, health, land, housing, food, and basic services. It also hampered the delivery of humanitarian assistance, as well as economic recovery and development. Civilians were increasingly among the casualties of improvised mines in Mali.[31] The threat was particularly significant for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returnees.[32]

ERW

Mali has ERW contamination obstructing the delivery of humanitarian aid, freedom of movement, and efforts to stabilize and rebuild the economy in the aftermath of its civil war. Aerial attacks, artillery bombardments, and ground fighting in central and northern Mali left extensive unexploded and abandoned explosive ordnance ranging from grenades, mortars, and rockets to artillery shells and aircraft bombs. The towns of Diabaly, Douentza, Konna, and Gao were reportedly among the worst affected.[33] The extent of contamination with ERW is not known.

Casualties

Casualties overview[34]

Casualties

All known mine/ERW casualties (between 2006 and 2019)

1,362 (431 killed; 931 injured)

 

Casualties in 2019

Annual total

345 (increase from 303 casualties in 2018)

Survival outcome

126 killed; 219 injured

Device type causing casualties

288 improvised mines; 47 antivehicle mines; 5 ERW; 5 unspecified mines

Civilian status

227 civilians; 116 military; 2 unknown

Age and gender

126 adults (120 men; 2 women, 4 gender) unknown

6 children (1 girl; 3 boys, 2 gender) unknown

213 age and gender unknown

Note: ERW=explosive remnants of war.

Casualties in 2019: details

The Monitor identified at least 345 new mine/ERW casualties in Mali in 2019. The majority of incidents occurred in the region of Mopti. Other mine/ERW incidents were reported in Gao, Kidal, Ségou and Timbuktu. Of the total casualties for 2019, 236 were recorded by UNMAS, 104 identified in data analysis of the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project and five were reported by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).[35]

The Monitor recorded 931 mine/ERW survivors (people injured) in Mali by the end of 2019. UNMAS reported a total of 234 mine survivors and 218 survivors of ERW incidents by the end of 2019.[36]

Although 2019 had the highest number of annual casualties recorded by the Monitor for Mali, as there is no centralized mine/ERW casualty data collection mechanism or database this may not be indicative of a trend. Conflict-related casualty data is collected by the Regional Directorates for Social Development and Solidarity Economy of Mali, without any specific focus on mine/ERW casualties. UNMAS collects casualty data in accordance with the IMAS. Other organizations and medical institutions collect mine casualty data such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the National Center for Orthopedic Appliances of Mali (Centre National d'Appareillage Orthopédique, CNAOM).[37] UNMAS considered casualty data collected in Mali to be reliable and reflective of the reality.[38]

Addressing the impact

Mine action

Operators and service providers

Clearance operators

National

Malian Armed Forces

International

  • United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
  • UNMAS since 2013
  • Operation Barkhane

 

Clearance

Land release overview[39]

Clearance in 2019

Only EOD spot tasks

Ordnance destroyed in 2019

1,164 ERW

8 improvised mines

28 IEDs

Note: EOD=explosive ordnance disposal; ERW=explosive remnants of war; and IED=improvised explosive device.

Land release: landmines

No clearance operations took place in Mali in 2019, and operations were limited to EOD spot tasks.[40]

The Malian Armed Forces received EOD training in Benin.[41] UNMAS also provided them with training, equipment, and technical support, and trained MINUSMA personnel to mitigate the threat from explosive ordnance.[42] In September 2019, the United States (US) donated equipment to the Malian Armed Forces to address the IED threats, including extraction robots, mine detectors, and medical kits.[43]

NTS were conducted in 170 areas in 2019, combined with risk education activities.

Risk education

Operators and service providers

Several national civil society organizations provided risk education in Mali in 2019. These included: Support Association for Rural Populations (AAPPOR); the Youth and Development Association of Mali (AJDM); the Malian Association for Survival in the Sahel (AMSS); Action Research for the Development of Local Initiatives (ARDIL); the Platform of Initiatives, Expertise, Education, and Support to local decentralized bodies (PIEAPCD); and TASSAGHT.[44]

Risk education international operators[45]

Name of organization

Type of activity

DanChurchAid (DCA)

ERW, IEDs, and small arms and light weapons risk education; NTS to locate and mark any contaminated areas (activities conducted through local implementing partners)

Humanity & Inclusion (HI)

Emergency risk education through local implementing partners

Mine Advisory Group (MAG)

Explosive ordnance and small arms and light weapons risk education in Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu regions

 

UNMAS

Combined risk education with NTS, victim assistance, and community violence reduction activities; focused on populations which are difficult to reach such as IDPs and nomad

Note: IDP=internally displaced people; IED=improvised explosive device; and NTS=non-technical survey.

Beneficiary numbers

Beneficiaries of risk education in 2019[46]

Risk education operator

Men

Boys

Women

Girls

UNMAS*

16,076

21,286

15,396

18,971

MAG

7,134

7,159

8,781

7,721

* UNMAS beneficiary numbers include figures of MAG and other operators.

 

Implementation

Target groups

Risk education planning was informed by casualty information, which guided the preparation of tailored messages.[47] Risk education was provided in central and northern Mali in 2019, as part of the humanitarian protection strategy.[48] Risk education messaging included the threat from antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, improvised mines, and ERW. Risk education sessions did not include messages on command-detonated IEDs.[49]

Main target groups included children, internally displaced people (IDPs) and returnees, local and host communities. Local and host communities are exposed to the risk of explosive ordnance in areas affected by conflict, while IDPs flee to areas they are not familiar with. Nomads and seasonal farmers were also a target group due to their movements in search for grazing land and water. IDPs and nomads are particularly difficult to reach due to the unpredictability of their movements, including to areas which cannot be easily accessed for security reasons. Scrap metal collectors and dealers were also targeted with risk education sessions due to the nature of their activity which exposed them to the risk of explosive ordnance.[50]

In 2019, risk awareness and mitigation was also provided to aid workers and drivers from humanitarian organizations and private companies operating in the affected regions of central and northern Mali.[51] For drivers, sessions reinforced the need for visual checking during travel, communicating regarding potential risks with local community members, and decision making in the case of a mine incident on the road.[52] Community leaders also received risk education to support the sustainability of messaging in the community.[53]

Risk education is integrated into the school curriculum at primary and secondary school.[54]

UNMAS and its implementing partners worked to fully include persons with disabilities in risk education sessions. Mine/ERW survivors identified during these sessions were referred to UNMAS-funded victim assistance projects in central and northern Mali.[55]

Depending on the context and the needs, risk education was sometimes delivered separately to women and men of the same community.[56] The inclusion of risk education into armed violence reduction activities facilitated access to and acceptance of risk education teams by the communities.[57]

Delivery methods

Risk education activities of the Mine Advisory Group (MAG) were conducted in partnership with two Malian NGOs and included community sessions and school sessions. MAG trained community focal points to identify and report explosive ordnance contamination and incidents, and to refer victims to appropriate services. In addition to face-to-face sessions, MAG and its partners used leaflets and posters, radio messages and interactive radio talks to disseminate risk education messages.

UNMAS implementing partners conducted sessions adapted to children in schools and community focal points were trained to deliver risk education messages to their communities and to identify and refer victims to appropriate services. UNMAS also used printed materials, posters, radio messages, locality-wide sessions, and text messages.

Major developments in 2019 and 2020

MAG and its partners implemented emergency risk education in northern Mali in 2019, through distribution of leaflets, posters, radio messages, and briefings with available community representatives.

Security concerns in some areas restricted the access of risk education teams.[58]

In 2020, risk education actors had to adapt their activities due to the COVID-19 pandemic, including providing risk education to smaller groups.[59] In 2020, UNMAS was also considering the use of billboards, social media, and phone applications.[60]

Victim assistance

Victim assistance providers and activities

Providers and activities[61]

Type of organization

Name of organization

Type of activity

Government

Ministry of Solidarity and Humanitarian Action

Support to income-generation activities for persons with disabilities

Ministry of Health and Social Development

Health care and the physical rehabilitation sector

National

National Center for Orthopedic Appliances of Mali (Centre National d'Appareillage Orthopédique, CNAOM)

Physical rehabilitation

Regional Orthopedic and Functional Rehabilitation Centers (Centres Régionaux d'Appareillage Orthopédique et de Rééducation Fonctionnelle, CRAORFs)

Physical rehabilitation services at regional centers located in Gao, Mopti, and Ségou

Support Association for Rural Populations (Association d’Appui pour les Populations Rurales, AAPPOR)

Psychological support

Framework for Research Study and Dialogue for Action (Cadre d'Étude de recherche et de Concertation pour Agir, CERCA)

Socio-economic inclusion

The Malian Federation of Persons with Disabilities

Advocacy for the adoption of the implementing decree of Law 2018-027 on the rights of persons with disabilities

International

DCA

Psychosocial support; socio-economic inclusion

HI

Assessment of the needs of mine/ERW survivors; referral; economic inclusion trough micro businesses

UNMAS

Support provided to survivors to establish small businesses; direct support to survivors

ICRC

Emergency medical care; first-aid training; psychological support; support to physical rehabilitation centers

Doctors Without Borders (Médecins sans frontières, MSF)

Health care and psychological support in Mopti and Kidal regions

World Education Inc. (WEI)

Socio-economic inclusion

 

Major Developments in 2019

The conflict in Mali intensified in 2019, disrupting access to basic services and impeding the delivery of aid. Activities of the ICRC were at times limited or temporarily suspended due to security constraints, in particular the threat of improvised explosive devices.[62]

Since May 2019, responsibility for the physical rehabilitation sector has been with the Ministry of Health and Social Development. It has been responsible for developing and implementing a national strategy for the development of physical rehabilitation in Mali.[63]

Geographical coverage of medical care was extended, and referral systems improved in the central and northern regions, especially in the Mopti region. The number of medical field teams increased, and health workers were trained to provide psychosocial support.

In April 2019, the ICRC began support to a third hospital to treat conflict wounded people in Mopti.[64]

Needs assessment

Through the CARE project, HI assessed the needs of mine/ERW survivors who are beneficiaries of the project.[65]

Medical care and rehabilitation

Mali’s health care system was poor. Health centers lacked equipment, supplies, medicine, and staff.[66] In 2019, there were reports of attacks on the health system in central and northern regions.[67] Due to the security situation, many healthcare providers, including public health providers, have either reduced activities or left the conflict-affected areas.[68] The conflict has also hindered trips to reach health facilities.[69] As a result, access to and quality of health care services were limited in conflict-affected and remote parts of Mali.[70]

The ICRC and MSF continued to provide health care and psychosocial support to affected populations in Gao, Kidal, and Mopti.[71] The ICRC supported four physical rehabilitation centers with equipment, components, services reimbursements, training, prosthetics and orthotics scholarships, quality control for devices, and physiotherapy. It also supported the construction of a rehabilitation center in Mopti and management of the CNAOM.[72] Referral capacities to physical rehabilitation structures were strengthened.[73]

Socio-economic and psychosocial inclusion

There was an increase in the number of providers of psychological support services with DCA and the national NGO Support Association for Rural Populations (Association d’Appui pour les Populations Rurales, AAPPOR), and improvements were reported in terms of referral to psychological support services in central regions of Mali.[74]

The ICRC supported the organization of the International Day of Persons with Disabilities and the month of solidarity and the construction of offices and shed for income-generating activities in Gao.[75]

Cross-cutting issues

Member organizations of the Humanitarian Mine Action Working Group identified focal points in remote areas to facilitate the identification of mine/ERW survivors and their timely referral to appropriate services. This work has been conducted in partnership with community health centers.[76]

The assistance offered to mine/ERW survivors was adapted to the age and gender of the beneficiaries. Eight of the 22 community focal points were women.[77]

 



[1] UNMAS, “Programmes: Mali,” updated, accessed in October 2020.

[2] Statement by the Ministry of Defense, Seminar on the Universalization and Implementation of the Ottawa Convention in Africa, Bamako, 16 February 2001.

[3] Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), “Mali: Overview of information on mine action and ERW including submunitions,” Second African Francophone Seminar on Mine and ERW Action, Dakar, Senegal, 2–4 November 2009; and GICHD, “Mali: Overview of information on mine action and ERW including submunitions,” Third African Francophone Seminar on Mine and ERW Action, Nouakchott, Mauritania, 27–30 September 2010.

[4]Al Qaeda has mined access to key northern town: Tuareg rebels,” Agence France Presse, 2 July 2012.

[5] Response to Monitor questionnaire, Leonie Evers, Programme Specialist, UNMAS, 5 October 2020.

[6] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Nora Achkar, Project Manager, UNMAS, 11 May 2020; and by Leonie Evers, Programme Specialist, UNMAS, 5 October 2020.

[7] Response to Monitor questionnaire, Leonie Evers, Programme Specialist, UNMAS, 5 October 2020.

[8] UNMAS, “Programmes: Mali,” undated, accessed in October 2020.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Nora Achkar, Project Manager, UNMAS, 11 May 2020.

[11] GICHD, “Annual report 2019,” Geneva, May 2020, p. 16.

[12] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Leonie Evers, Programme Specialist, UNMAS, 5 October 2020.

[13] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Nora Achkar, Project Manager, UNMAS, 11 May 2020; by Glenn Derrien, Programme Officer, MAG, 5 June 2020; and by Leonie Evers, Programme Specialist, UNMAS, 5 October 2020.

[14] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Leonie Evers, Programme Specialist, UNMAS, 5 October 2020.

[15] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Glenn Derrien, Programme Officer, MAG, 5 June 2020.

[16] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Leonie Evers, Programme Specialist, UNMAS, 5 October 2020.

[17] Ibid.; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Nora Achkar, Project Manager, UNMAS, 11 May 2020.

[18] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Leonie Evers, Programme Specialist, UNMAS, 5 October 2020.

[19] Secrétariat Général du Gouvernement du Mali, “Official Journal of the Republic of Mali,” 18 June 2018, pp. 863–865.

[20] US Department of State, “2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Mali,” 11 March 2020, pp. 27–28.

[21] Ibid., p. 35.

[22] Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), “Mali: Overview of information on mine action and ERW including submunitions,” Second African Francophone Seminar on Mine and ERW Action, Dakar, Senegal, 2–4 November 2009; and GICHD, “Mali: Overview of information on mine action and ERW including submunitions,” Third African Francophone Seminar on Mine and ERW Action, Nouakchott, Mauritania, 27–30 September 2010.

[23] UN General Assembly, “Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices,” 17 July 2020, p. 4.

[24] Email from Charles Frisby, UNMAS, 29 March 2013.

[26]In Sahel, French troops hunt jihadist landmines,” Middle East Online, 4 December 2019.

[27] Presentation of Nora Achkar, Project Manager, UNMAS, Twenty-third International Meeting of National Mine Action Directors and UN Advisors, Plenary Session VII, “Improvised Explosive Devices,” 11–14 February 2020.

[28] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Leonie Evers, Programme Specialist, UNMAS, 5 October 2020.

[29] Presentation of Nora Achkar, Project Manager, UNMAS, Twenty-third International Meeting of National Mine Action Directors and UN Advisors, Plenary Session VII, “Improvised Explosive Devices,” 11–14 February 2020.

[30] UNHCR, “Protection Cluster monthly report n° 4: April 2019,” undated, p. 2.

[31] UN General Assembly, “Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices,” 17 July 2020, p. 4.

[32] Presentation of Nora Achkar, Project Manager, UNMAS, Twenty-third International Meeting of National Mine Action Directors and UN Advisors, Plenary Session VII, “Improvised Explosive Devices,” 11–14 February 2020; and UNMAS, “Programmes: Mali,” undated, accessed in October 2020.

[33]Abandoned munitions endanger lives in Mali,” IRIN, 19 March 2013; and Humanity & Inclusion (HI), “Malians return to deadly ground,” 31 July 2013.

[34] Unless otherwise indicated, casualty data for 2019 is based on: email from Leonie Evers, Programme Specialist, UNMAS, 25 September 2020; Monitor media monitoring from 1 January to 31 December 2019; and Monitor analysis of Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project (ACLED) data for calendar year 2019. Approved citation: Clionadh Raleigh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen, “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data,” Journal of Peace Research, Issue 47(5), 2010, pp. 651–660.

[35] Monitor analysis indicates that 127 casualties in 2019 were in both UNMAS and ACLED data, which have been reported here among the 236 casualties recorded by UNMAS.

[36] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Leonie Evers, Programme Specialist, UNMAS, 5 October 2020.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Nora Achkar, Project Manager, UNMAS, 11 May 2020.

[39] The UN reported the destruction of 13,380 ERW in 2019. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Leonie Evers, Programme Specialist, UNMAS, 5 October 2020; and OCHA, “Revised humanitarian response plan: Mali,” August 2020, p. 94.

[40] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Leonie Evers, Programme Specialist, UNMAS, 5 October 2020.

[41] MINUSMA, “MINUSMA press conference of 12 September 2019,” 13 September 2019.

[42] UNMAS, “Programmes: Mali,” updated October 2020; UNMAS, “Annual Report 2019,” April 2020, p. 6; and Presentation of Nora Achkar, Project Manager, UNMAS, Twenty-third International Meeting of National Mine Action Directors and UN Advisors, Plenary Session VII, “Improvised Explosive Devices,” 11–14 February 2020.

[44] Tassaght means “link” in the Tamasheq language. TASSAGHT is a Malian peacebuilding organization.

[45] OCHA, “Monitoring of the humanitarian response: October to December 2019,” 3 April 2020, p. 22; responses to Monitor questionnaire by Leonie Evers, Programme Specialist, UNMAS, 5 October 2020; by Glenn Derrien, Programme Officer, MAG, 5 June 2020; and by Nora Achkar, Project Manager, UNMAS, 11 May 2020; Presentation of Nora Achkar, Project Manager, UNMAS, Twenty-third International Meeting of National Mine Action Directors and UN Advisors, Plenary Session VII, “Improvised Explosive Devices”, 11–14 February 2020; and DanChurchAid (DCA), “Mali,” October 2019.

[46] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Nora Achkar, Project Manager, UNMAS, 11 May 2020; and by Glenn Derrien, Programme Officer, MAG, 5 June 2020.

[47] Ibid.

[48] OCHA, “Revised humanitarian response plan: Mali,” August 2020, p. 94.

[49] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Glenn Derrien, Programme Officer, MAG, 5 June 2020.

[50] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Nora Achkar, Project Manager, UNMAS, 11 May 2020; and by Glenn Derrien, Programme Officer, MAG, 5 June 2020.

[51] UN General Assembly, “Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices,” 17 July 2020, p. 9; response to Monitor questionnaire by Nora Achkar, Project Manager, UNMAS, 11 May 2020; and by Monitor questionnaire by Glenn Derrien, Programme Officer, MAG, 5 June 2020.

[52] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Glenn Derrien, Programme Officer, MAG, 5 June 2020.

[53] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Nora Achkar, Project Manager, UNMAS, 11 May 2020.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Leonie Evers, Programme Specialist, UNMAS, 5 October 2020.

[57] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Nora Achkar, Project Manager, UNMAS, 11 May 2020.

[58] Ibid.; and by Glenn Derrien, Programme Officer, MAG, 5 June 2020.

[59] OCHA, “Revised humanitarian response plan: Mali,” August 2020, p. 94.

[60] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Nora Achkar, Project Manager, UNMAS, 11 May 2020.

[61] ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2019, Annual Report,” June 2020, pp. 20 and 22; ICRC, “Annual report 2019,” June 2020, pp. 184–185; ILO, “Official Journal of the Republic of Mali,” 13 May 2019, pp. 545–546; HI, “Mali Country Card,” July 2019; Humanitarian Response, “Assistance to victims of explosive devices in northern Mali: Gao and Timbuktu regions,” undated but 26 October 2015; MSF, “International activity report 2019,” undated, p. 62; Nouhoum Tounkara, “Symposium on Rehabilitation Services and Mobility Assistance in Africa,” December 2018; Ousmane Baba Dramé, “CNAOM Orientation Council: Support for the rehabilitation of 8,306 victims of the conflict in the north,” Malijet, 28 March 2019; Response to Monitor questionnaire by Leonie Evers, Programme Specialist, UNMAS, 5 October 2020; UNMAS, “Annual Report 2019,” April 2020, pp. 10 and 18; and US Department of State, “2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Mali,” 11 March 2020, p. 28.

[62] ICRC, “Annual report 2019,” June 2020, p. 182.

[64] ICRC, “Annual report 2019,” June 2020, p. 185.

[65] HI, “Mali Country Card,” July 2019.

[66] International Peace Institute (IPI), “Providing Healthcare in Armed Conflict: The Case of Mali,” January 2019, p. 3.

[67] OCHA, “Health Cluster Bulletin: January-April 2020,” 18 May 2020, p. 2.

[68] Médecins sans frontières (MSF), “Conflict, curfew and floods put healthcare out of reach in Mopti,” 12 March 2019.

[69] Ibid.

[70] IPI, “Providing Healthcare in Armed Conflict: The Case of Mali,” January 2019, p. 3; and Foussénou Sissoko, “Security peril in central Mali: health personnel and infrastructure at risk,” International Health Policies, 4 October 2019

[71] ICRC, “Annual report 2019,” June 2020, pp. 184–185; and MSF, “International activity report 2019,” undated, p. 62.

[73] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Leonie Evers, Programme Specialist, UNMAS, 5 October 2020.

[74] Ibid.

[76] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Leonie Evers, Programme Specialist, UNMAS, 5 October 2020.

[77] Ibid.


Mine Ban Policy

Last updated: 18 December 2019

Policy

The Republic of Mali signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified on 2 June 1998, and became a State Party on 1 March 1999. National implementation measures adopted in 2000 include penal sanctions and fines.[1]

Mali occasionally attends meetings of the treaty, most recently the Third Review Conference in Maputo in June 2014 and, prior to that, the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in Cambodia in November–December 2011. Mali last submitted an Article 7 transparency report in 2005.

Mali is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on explosive remnants of war. It is also party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

Mali has never produced or exported antipersonnel landmines. Mali initially declared that it had possessed stockpiles of antipersonnel mines since 1974, the majority supplied by the former Soviet Union.[2] In 1998, it destroyed a stockpile of 7,127 antipersonnel mines, together with 5,131 antivehicle mines.[3] In 2003, Mali reported that it retained 600 antipersonnel mines for training purposes, but it has never reported any use of these mines.[4]

Use

Mali stated in 2001 that it had never used antipersonnel mines and that there had been no reports of use by government forces or Tuareg rebels.[5]

In January 2012, an armed conflict began in the north of the country between the Malian government and its allies versus armed opposition groups allied with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In January 2013, the French military began operations in cooperation with the government of Mali to help to re-take areas in the north of the country. Military personnel from African Union states deployed as part of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali, while the UN deployed the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.

In 2013 and 2014, there were several reports indicating the use of either antivehicle mines or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by armed opposition groups participating in the armed conflict. Between November 2013 and July 2014, there were several antivehicle mines incidents that caused civilian casualties, including aid workers and UN peacekeepers.[6] According to GICHD-SIPRI data, the number of antivehicle mine incidents that caused civilian casualties has increased significantly in recent years, due to mines laid by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in Mali.

In 2018, Mali topped the list of countries with the highest number of casualties from antivehicle mines, at 254. This shows a dramatic increase in casualties from 76 in 2015. GICHD-SIPRI also noted that the locations of the incidents were no longer contained to the northern regions of Mali; in 2018, 44% of antivehicle mine incidents occurred in the central regions.[7] In 2019, there were several antivehicle mine incidents resulting in UN peacekeeper casualties: on 25 January two UN peacekeepers were killed and six injured in Mopti region.[8] On 20 April, one peacekeeper was killed and four were wounded in Timbuktu.[9] On 5 October, one peacekeeper was killed and four wounded in northern Mali.[10]

In July 2012, a NSAGs called the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa claimed it had laid antipersonnel mines near the city of Gao. After several apparent landmine casualties near Gao in early 2013, Mali’s Minister of Foreign Affairs accused AQIM of using antipersonnel mines.[11] The ICBL described the reported landmine use as “disturbing.”[12] However, no antipersonnel mines were ever recovered from the area.



[1] Two legal texts, an ordinance, and a decree prohibit the development, manufacturing, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, offer, import, export, transfer, and use of antipersonnel mines. Breach of the legislation is punishable with a maximum of life imprisonment and a fine of between CFA500,000 and CFA3 million (approximately US$1,150 to $6,900). Ordinance No. 049/P-RM on the Implementation of the Convention, adopted on 27 September 2000; and Decree No. 569/P-RM on the Application of the Ordinance, adopted on 15 November 2000. An interministerial National Commission for a Total Ban on Landmines was established in June 2002 to take responsibility for the mine issue. See, Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 341.

[2] Anonymous Malian sources.

[3] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form B, 17 May 2001.

[4] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form D, 31 July 2003. Mali initially reported in 2001 that it retained 2,000 antipersonnel and 1,000 antivehicle mines for training purposes. In 2003, it reported having consumed 1,400 antipersonnel mines and 700 antivehicle mines during training activities.

[5] Statement by the Ministry of Defense, Seminar on the Universalization and Implementation of the Ottawa Convention in Africa, Bamako, 16 February 2001.

[6] See, for example: “Officials: 4 people killed in landmine explosion in northern Mali,” The Washington Post, 5 November 2013; “Land mine injures 5 Chadian peacekeepers patrolling in northern Mali,” Fox News, 20 January 2014; “Two aid workers injured in landmine explosion in Mali,” World Bulletin, 27 February 2014; and “Land mine kills UN peacekeeper in northern Mali,” Grand Island Independent, 1 July 2014.

[8] Joanne Stocker, “UN peacekeepers in Mali killed by mine near Douentza,” Defense Post, 25 January 2019.

[11] Jeffery Schaffer, “AP Interview: Mali Wants Help Against Land Mines,” Associated Press, 4 February 2013. For example, on 4 February 2013 the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) stated that two civilians had died in an explosion involving a landmine or an IED on the road between Kidal, Anefis, and North Darane. “UN: 2 civilians killed by land mines in north Mali,” Associated Press (Timbuktu), 4 February 2013.

[12] ICBL Press Release, “Landmine Use in Malian Conflict Disturbing,” 12 February 2013.


Support for Mine Action

Last updated: 07 October 2013

Recent and ongoing armed conflict in the Republic of Mali has created a problem of contamination by weapons and explosives. At the request of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) deployed mine action staff to Mali in January 2013 in order to conduct an emergency assessment of the situation with regards to explosive threats and in support of Security Council Resolution 2085 (2012).[1]

In 2012, four donors contributed US$7,681,063 to Mali to begin a mine action program. Japan, France, and the United Kingdom (UK) provided funding through UNMAS while Sweden provided the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency with SEK10.6 million ($1.56 million) to train the Malian Defense and Security Forces in explosive ordnance disposal.[2]

International contributions: 2012[3]

Donor

Sector

National currency

Amount ($)

Japan

Various

¥478,920,000

6,000,000

Sweden

Clearance

SEK10,600,000

1,565,246

France

Various

€50,000

64,295

UK

Clearance

£32,500

51,522

Total

 

 

7,681,063

 

 



[1] UNMAS website, programs, “About UNMAS in Mali.”

[2] Ibid.

[3] Japan, Convention on Conventional Weapons Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, 28 March 2013; Sweden, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 25 March 2013; response to Monitor questionnaire by Richard Bolden, Policy Analyst Mine Action, Arms Exports and ATT, DD, 7 May 2013; France, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2013; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2013. Average exchange rate for 2012: ¥79.82=US$1; SEK6.7721=US$1; €1=US$1.2859; and £1=US$1.5853. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2013.