Russian Federation

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Last updated: 25 August 2022

Summary

Non-signatory Russia says it cannot join the Convention on Cluster Munitions as it regards cluster munitions as legitimate weapons, despite the humanitarian risks associated with their use. Russia last participated in a meeting of the convention in 2012. It was the only country to vote against a key United Nations (UN) resolution in December 2021, which urged states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”

Russia—and the Soviet Union before it—is a major producer, stockpiler, and exporter of cluster munitions. Russia has used cluster munitions extensively during its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, including newly developed models of cluster munitions.

Policy

The Russian Federation has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Russia is one of the most vocal critics of the convention and has not taken any steps to accede as it sees military utility in cluster munitions. Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov stated in 2016 that “our country strictly complies with its commitments, including with regard to cluster munitions (CMs) that Russia views as a legal means of warfare.”[1]

In 2017, Russia said its assessment of the convention “has not changed” and called it “a politicized document that tailors the very definition” of cluster munitions “to the interests of individual states which are trying to preserve their one-sided military and technical advantages.”[2] Russia has reiterated this position several times since. In November 2021, it called cluster munitions “a lawful form of munitions” that “are only harmful when misused.”[3]

Russia did not participate in the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[4] When the convention opened for signature in December 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed Russia’s opposition to “unjustified restrictions and bans on cluster munitions,” which it defended as “a legitimate type of weapon that is not banned by international humanitarian law and plays a significant role in the defense interests of Russia.”[5]

Russia participated as an observer in meetings of the convention in 2010 and 2011. Russia has been invited to, but has not attended, any of the convention’s meetings since then.

In December 2021, Russia voted against a key United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution urging states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”[6] Russia has previously abstained or voted against this annual resolution promoting the convention since it was first introduced in 2015.[7]

Previously, in 2014, Russia criticized and expressed “serious concern” at the use of cluster munitions “against civilian population” in eastern Ukraine.[8] Yet Russia has never acknowledged the use of cluster munitions by Russian-backed armed opposition groups in eastern Ukraine.

Russia voted in favor of a 2015 Security Council resolution that expressed concern at evidence of cluster munition use in Darfur, Sudan.[9] It also voted in favor of a 2014 Security Council resolution that expressed concern at the “indiscriminate” use of cluster munitions in South Sudan.[10]

Russia is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Russia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and, after opposing CCW discussions on cluster munitions for years, changed its position in 2011 to support an effort led by the United States (US) to conclude a new CCW protocol on cluster munitions.[11] That initiative failed in November 2011, which ended CCW deliberations on cluster munitions, leaving the Convention on Cluster Munitions as the sole international instrument specifically dedicated to ending the suffering caused by these weapons. Since 2011, Russia has not proposed any further CCW work on cluster munitions.

Development and production

Russia, and historically the Soviet Union, is a major producer and exporter of cluster munitions. Additionally, several states inherited stocks of cluster munitions when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Our records on the production, usage, and export of cluster munitions…are confidential and will not be publicized.”[12]

According to international technical reference materials and corporate marketing, three state-owned Russian companies have produced cluster munitions:

  • Bazalt State Research and Production Enterprise (air-dropped bombs);
  • Mechanical Engineering Research Institute (120mm, 152mm, and 203mm artillery projectiles); and
  • Splav State Research and Production Enterprise (122mm, 220mm, and 300mm rockets).

Russia continued to produce new cluster munitions in 2022. Since invading Ukraine in February 2022, Russian forces have used at least two new types of cluster munitions for the first time:

  • The 300mm 9M54-series guided missile, produced by Splav State Research and Production Enterprise, delivered by the 9K515 “Tornado-S” rocket launcher. The 9M544 model contains 552 3B30 dual-purpose submunitions, while the 9M549 model contains 72 antipersonnel submunitions.
  • A cluster munition variant of the Iskander-M 9M723 ballistic missile.

Splav State Research and Production Enterprise, which is part of state-owned arms company Rostec, displayed the new generation of 300mm multi-barrel rocket launchers at its rocket assembly facility in Tula, south of Moscow, in July 2020.[13] Photographs from the event showed 9M55K 300mm cluster munition rockets and 9N235 fragmentation submunitions, as well as 9M54-series cluster munition guided missiles made for the new Tornado-S launcher system.[14]

In early 2018, Russia began testing the “Drel” RBK-500U guided cluster bomb, developed by Bazalt State Research and Production Enterprise.[15]

Transfer

There is limited information available on Russian arms transfers, including cluster munitions. However, at least 35 states have stockpiled cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin, including 21 states not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[16]

At least 10 States Parties that have stockpiled cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin have formally declared the stocks and listed types and quantities, as outlined in the following table:

Stockpiled Russian/Soviet cluster munitions declared by States Parties[17]

Type

Cluster munition

Submunition

States that declared stockpiles (quantity of cluster munitions)

Bomb

RBK-250 PTAB-2.5M

PTAB-2.5M

Bulgaria (488), Croatia (9), Cuba (663), Hungary (17), Moldova (14), Mozambique (199), Peru (657), Slovakia (20)

RBK-250-275 AO-1SCh

AO-1SCh

Bulgaria (238), Côte d’Ivoire (68), Croatia (5), Cuba (282), Moldova (24), Mozambique (9), Peru (388)

RBK-500 AO-2.5RT

AO2.5RT

Bulgaria (201), Czech Republic (191), Moldova (16), Peru (198), Slovakia (50)

RBK-500 ShOAB-0.5M

SHOAB-0.5M

Bulgaria (36)

RBK-500-255 PTAB-10.5

PTAB-10.5

Moldova (8), Slovakia (23)

RBK-500-255 PTAB-2.5

PTAB-2.5

Moldova (16)

RBK-500-355 AO-10

AO-10

Slovakia (22)

Dispenser

BKF AO-2.5RT

AO-2.5RT

Bulgaria (3,086), Cuba (336), Hungary (247), Slovakia (63)

BKF PTAB-2.5

PTAB-2.5

Bulgaria (1,957), Cuba (382), North Macedonia (1,438), Slovakia (72)

BKF PTAB-2.5KO

PTAB-2.5KO

Hungary (23)

Projectile

3-O-13

O-16

Moldova (834)

Missile

9N123K

9N24

Bulgaria (8)

Rocket

9M27K

9N210

Moldova (473)

 

Stockpiling

In 2009, Russia acknowledged that it possesses a “large” stockpile of cluster munitions which are “stored throughout the state.” It said disposing of such a wide range of obsolete cluster munitions would be time-consuming and “a significant financial expenditure.”[18] In November 2011, Russia stated that its cluster munition stockpile was similar in size to that of the US, which then reported stockpiling 5.5 million cluster munitions.[19]

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The quantity and types of cluster munitions stockpiled in the Russian Ministry of Defence are confidential and will not be publicized.”[20] The following list of types stockpiled is based on a wide variety of publicly available sources.

Cluster munitions stockpiled by Russia[21]

Type

Caliber

Carrier name

Number of submunitions

Submunition type

Projectile

120mm

(unknown)

30

Dual-purpose

152mm

3-O-23

42

Dual-purpose

152mm

3-O-13

8

Dual-purpose

203mm

3-O-14

24

Fragmentation

240mm

3-O-8

14

Fragmentation

Dispenser

BKF ODS 35

8

FAE

BKF AO-2.5RT

96

Fragmentation

BKF PTAB-1M

248

HE/AT

BKF PTAB-2.5

96

HE/AT

Bomb

PROSAB-250

90

HE

RBK-250 PTAB-2.5M

42

HE/AT

RBK 250-275 AO-2.5RT

60

Fragmentation

RBK 250-275 AO-2.5RTM

60

Fragmentation

RBK 250-275 AO-1SCh

150

Fragmentation

RBK 250-275 PTAB 2.5M

30

HE/AT

RBK-500 AO-2.5RT

126

Fragmentation

RBK-500-255 PTAB-10.5A

30

HE/AT

RBK-500-375 AO-10

30

HE/AT

RBK-500 AO-2.5RTM

108

Fragmentation

RBK-500 PTAB-1M

268

HE/AT

RBK-500 PTAB 2.5

75

HE/AT

RBK-500 PTAB 2.5M

268

HE/AT

RBK-500 ShOAB-0.5

565

Fragmentation

RBK-500 SPBE

15

SFW

RBK-500 SPBE-D

15

SFW

RBK-500 SPBE-K

15

SFW

RBK-500 OFAB-50UD

10

Fragmentation

Rocket

122mm

Grad (9M218)

45

3-O-33 Dual-purpose

122mm

Grad (9M217)

2

SFW

220mm

Uragan (9M27K)

30

9N210 Fragmentation

220mm

Uragan (9M27K1)

30

9N235 Fragmentation

300mm

Smerch (9M55K)

72

9N210/9N235 Fragmentation

300mm

Smerch (9M55K1)

5

SFW

300mm

Smerch (9M55K5)

600

Dual-purpose

300mm

Tornado-S (9M544)

552

3B30 dual purpose

300mm

Tornado-S (9M549)

72

Fragmentation

Missiles

9K52 Luna-M with 9N18K

42

9N22 Fragmentation

9M79 Tochka with 9N123K

50

9N24 Fragmentation

9M723 Iskander-M

Unknown

Unknown

Note: FAE=Fuel Air Explosive; HE/AT=High Explosive/Antitank; SFW=Sensor Fuzed Weapon.

Use

The Russian Armed Forces have used cluster munitions in attacks which have caused hundreds of civilian casualties and damaged civilian infrastructure since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began on 24 February 2022.[22] Ukrainian forces have also used cluster munitions at least three times.[23]

The exact number of Russian cluster munition attacks is not known, though hundreds have been documented, reported, or are alleged to have occurred, many in populated areas. At least ten of Ukraine’s 24 oblasts have been struck by cluster munitions: Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia.

Russia has used at least six types of cluster munitions in Ukraine since February 2022; all launched from the ground using missiles and rockets, except for air-delivered RBK-series cluster bombs. These cluster munitions were all either manufactured in Russia, some as recently as in 2021, or by its predecessor state, the Soviet Union.

Types of cluster munitions confirmed to be in use by Russia include:

  • The 220mm 9M27K-series Uragan (“Hurricane”) cluster munition rocket, which has a range of 10–35km and delivers 30 9N235 or 9N210 fragmentation submunitions;
  • The 300mm 9M55K-series Smerch (“Tornado”) cluster munition rocket, which has a range of 20–70km and delivers 72 9N235 or 9N210 fragmentation submunitions;
  • The 300mm 9M54-series “Tornado-S” cluster munition guided missile, which delivers 552 3B30 dual-purpose 9M544 submunitions or 72 9M549 antipersonnel submunitions;
  • The 9M79-series Tochka ballistic missile, which is equipped with the 9N123K warhead containing 50 9N24 fragmentation submunitions;
  • A cluster munition variant of the Iskander-M 9M723 ballistic missile; and
  • The RBK-500 PTAB-1M cluster bomb, containing 268 PTAB-1M high explosive/antitank submunitions.

Russia has not denied using cluster munitions in Ukraine, but has sought to draw attention elsewhere. It has criticized past use of cluster munitions by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states in the former Yugoslavia in 1999.[24] Russia accused Ukraine of using cluster munitions in the city of Donetsk on 14 March 2022, in an attack that has not been independently confirmed.[25] In June 2022, France issued a statement denying “allegations circulating in the Russian media and amplified by social media asserting that France is supplying Ukraine with cluster munitions,” describing the reports as “totally false.”[26]

Russia’s use of cluster munitions in Ukraine been condemned by 39 states in national or joint statements at UN bodies including the Human Rights Council, Security Council, and the UNGA, as of 1 July 2022.[27] The cluster munition attacks have also been condemned by the European Union (EU), the NATO Secretary-General, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Human Rights Special Rapporteurs and Experts, and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC).

In March 2022, the current president of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the United Kingdom (UK), expressed grave concern at the use of cluster munitions during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The UK said that it “calls upon all those that continue to use such weapons to cease immediately, and calls upon all states that have not yet done so to join the Convention without delay.”[28]

Previously, in 2014–2015, Russian-backed insurgents used cluster munition rockets in eastern Ukraine.[29] Ukrainian government forces were also responsible for cluster munition rocket attacks.[30] Russia expressed concern at this Ukrainian government use of cluster munitions, but never commented on cluster munition attacks by pro-Russian separatist forces.[31]

Previous use in Syria

In Syria, there is strong evidence that Russia stockpiles cluster munitions at its airbase at Hmeymim, southeast of Latakia city. There is also strong evidence that Russia has used cluster munitions in Syria or, at a minimum, directly participated with Syrian government forces in attacks that have used cluster munitions on opposition-held areas.

Russian and Syrian government forces use many of the same aircraft and weapons, and frequently carry out operations together.[32] There have been at least 687 cluster munition attacks in Syria since July 2012, but no attacks were reported between 1 August 2021 and 31 July 2022. Previously, the Monitor reported at least a dozen cluster munition attacks in Syria between August 2019 and July 2020.

There was a significant increase in the use of cluster munitions in Syria after Russia began its joint operations with Syrian government forces on 30 September 2015.[33] All except two types of the cluster munitions used in Syria since 2012 were manufactured by Russia or the Soviet Union.[34]

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has not explicitly denied Russia’s involvement in using cluster munitions in Syria, but has claimed that cluster munitions have been used in accordance with international humanitarian law and not indiscriminately.[35] In December 2016, Russia issued a position paper on the use of cluster munitions in Syria, which concluded “the question of the involvement of the Russian military personnel in the cases of indiscriminate CMs [cluster munitions] use in Syria [is] totally inappropriate.”[36] In December 2015, the Russian Ministry of Defence stated that “Russian aviation does not use [cluster munitions]” and that “there are no such munitions at the Russian air base in Syria.”[37]

The civilian harm caused by use of cluster munitions in Syria has attracted widespread global media coverage, public outcry, and condemnations from more than 145 states.[38]

Previous use

During the August 2008 conflict with Georgia, Russia used cluster munitions including RBK-500 AO-2.5RTM cluster bombs and 9M27K-series Uragan ground-fired rockets containing 9N210 and 9N235 submunitions. Russia used cluster munitions in or near nine towns and villages in the Gori-Tskhinvali corridor, south of the South Ossetian administrative border.[39] Russia denied using cluster munitions in Georgia.[40]

Russian forces used cluster munitions in Chechnya from 1994–1996 and again in 1999.[41]

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, cluster munitions were used by various forces in conflicts in Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Tajikistan. The extent of involvement of Russian forces in this use of cluster munitions is not known, but cannot be discounted.

The Soviet Union used cluster munitions from 1979 to 1989 in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union had first used cluster munitions in 1943, against German forces during World War II.[42]



[1] Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Letter to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov Regarding Cluster Munitions in Syria,” 10 August 2016; and “Russia’s Position on the Use of Cluster Munitions in Syria,” Position Paper annexed to letter to HRW, from Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 9 December 2016.

[2] Russia expressed “concern about the humanitarian impact of the arbitrary use of cluster munitions,” but called the convention “a very poor example of how to reach agreement on arms control” that “is a cynical attempt to repartition [sic] the market for cluster munitions.” Statement of Russia, United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 20 October 2017.

[3] Statement of Russia, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 2 November 2021.

[4] Russia attended a regional meeting held during the Oslo Process as an observer, in Brussels in October 2007. For details on Russia’s policy and practice regarding cluster munitions through 2009, see HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 230–235.

[5] “Russia explains refusal to join cluster bombs convention,” Interfax: Russia & CIS Military Newswire,8 December 2008. Similar language was used in a September 2009 letter to the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC). Letter from Sergey Ryabkov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the CMC, 18 September 2009.

[6]Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 76/47, 6 December 2021.

[7] Russia voted against the resolution in 2015–2017 and 2019, and abstained in 2018 and 2020.

[8] Statement of Russia, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 23 October 2014. The next day, Russia told a Security Council debate on the situation in Ukraine that “there is an alarming and growing number of civilian victims, including children, as the result of…prohibited munitions, including cluster bombs.” Provisional report of the 7287th meeting of the UN Security Council, S/PV.7287, 24 October 2014.

[9] The five permanent members of the Security Council voted in favor of the resolution in addition to non-permanent members Angola, Chad, Chile, Jordan, Lithuania, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Spain, and Venezuela.

[10] The resolution noted “with serious concern reports of the indiscriminate use of cluster munitions” and called for “all parties to refrain from similar such use in the future.” Security Council, “Security Council, Adopting Resolution 2155 (2014), Extends Mandate of Mission In South Sudan, Bolstering Its Strength to Quell Surging Violence,” SC11414, 27 May 2014.

[11] At the CCW’s Third Review Conference in 2006, Russia stated, “We cannot accept the logic of restrictions or even bans on ammunition artificially and groundlessly declared as the most ‘dangerous weapons.’ This path would lead us to a stalemate. It could only result in a split and weaken the [CCW] and its Protocols.” Statement of Anatoly I. Antonov, Director, Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CCW Third Review Conference, Geneva, 7 November 2006.

[12] Letter from Sergey Ryabkov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to HRW, 20 March 2009.

[14] According to Rostec, President Vladimir Putin reportedly set an objective in 2016 for the company to use only Russian components in the modernized multi-launch rocket systems. See, Rostec, “The New Rocket System Passes Official Tests,” 25 January 2017.

[15] Piotr Butowsky, “Russia set to finalise PBK-500U glide bomb evaluation,” Jane’s 360, 9 January 2018; and Michael Peck, “Cluster Bombs Are Back – and America and Russia Can’t Get Enough,” The National Interest, 21 April 2018.

[16] Russian or Soviet-era cluster munitions have been stockpiled by 11 States Parties to the convention (Bulgaria, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Hungary, Iraq, Republic of Moldova, Mozambique, Peru, and Slovakia) and at least two dozen non-state parties (Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Mongolia, North Korea, Poland, Romania, Sudan, Syria, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Yemen). See Monitor Ban Policy country profiles for more information.

[17] All information in this table is taken from Article 7 reports submitted by States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database.

[18] Statement of Russia, CCW Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 12 November 2009. Notes by Landmine Action.

[19] Statement of Russia, CCW Fourth Review Conference, Geneva, 18 November 2011. Notes by HRW. An October 2004 report to the US Congress by the US Department of Defense disclosed a stockpile of 5.5 million cluster munitions, containing approximately 728.5 million submunitions.

[20] Letter from Sergey Ryabkov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to HRW, 20 March 2009.

[21] The data in this table comes from the following sources: Publishing House “Arms and Technologies,” undated; Information Centre of Defence Technologies and Safety, “The XXI Century Encyclopedia, Russia’s Arms and Technologies. Volume 12: Ordnance and Munitions,” CD Version, 2006; Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air–Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, 2004), pp. 414–41, and 422–432; Leland S. Ness and Anthony G. Williams, eds., Jane’s Ammunition Handbook 2007–2008 (Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, 2007), pp. 572, 597–598, 683, 703–706, 715–716, and 722–723; US Defense Intelligence Agency, “Improved Conventional Munitions and Selected Controlled-Fragmentation Munitions (Current and Projected),” partially declassified and made available to HRW under a Freedom of Information Act request; and “Russia’s Arms Catalog: Volume IV, Precision Guided Weapons and Ammunition, 1996–1997,” Military Parade: Moscow, 1997, pp. 138–139, 148–152, 373–392, 504, and 515–516. This research has been supplemented by information found on the Splav State Research and Production Enterprise website.

[23] ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Ukraine: Cluster Munition Ban Policy,” updated 17 May 2022.

[24] Statement of Amb. Gennady Gagtilov, Permanent Representative of Russia to the UN in Geneva, Human Rights Council, 49th Session, Geneva, 3 March 2022.

[25] Letter from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, 15 March 2022.

[26] French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Ukraine - Q&A (15 Jun. 2022),” 15 June 2022.

[27] Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Mexico, Republic of Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK.

[28] Statement of Amb. Aidan Liddle, Permanent Representative of the UK to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 3 March 2022.

[30] HRW, “Ukraine: Widespread Use of Cluster Munitions,” 20 October 2014.

[31] Statement of Russia, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 23 October 2014.

[32] However, Russia is the only force in Syria to operate Sukhoi SU-25 and SU-34 fighter-ground attack jets used to deliver RBK-series cluster bombs. HRW, Amnesty International, and others have compiled credible evidence, including videos and photographs, documenting SU-25 and SU-34 jets near or involved in attacks near sites when cluster munitions were used. Amnesty International, “Syria: Russia’s shameful failure to acknowledge civilian killings,” 23 December 2015; and HRW, “Russia/Syria: Daily Cluster Munition Attacks,” 8 February 2016.

[33] ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Syria: Cluster Munition Ban Policy,” updated 15 September 2021. The Russian Ministry of Defence appeared to acknowledge responsibility for a June 2016 attack on coalition-backed armed opposition forces near the Syrian al-Tanf border crossing with Iraq, which the UK and US said involved RBK-500 AO-2.5RT/RTM cluster munitions. Russian Ministry of Defence, “On June 18 Russia and US held teleconference on implementing the Memorandum on preventing aerial incidents in Syria,” 19 June 2016. See also, The New Syrian Army (NSyA_Official), “Russians are lying with E-conference & more updates on our FB page. ‪#NSyA ‪#RuAF.” 19 June 2016, 13:18 UTC. Tweet (no longer accessible).

[34] Cluster munition rockets manufactured in Egypt have also been used in Syria, while the Islamic State has used cluster munitions rockets of unknown origin containing a dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM)-type submunition called “ZP-39” in Syria. Soviet or Russian manufactured cluster munitions used in Syria include RBK-series bombs containing AO-1SCh, AO-2.5RT, PTAB-2.5M, PTAB-2.5KO and ShOAB-0.5 submunitions; Smerch 9M55K and Uragan 9M27K-series surface-to-surface rockets containing 9N235 submunitions; and Tochka 9M79-series ballistic missiles. More advanced RBK-500 SPBE bombs containing SPBE sensor-fuzed submunitions and a ground-fired 240mm 3-O-8 rocket-assisted mortar projectile have been used in Syria since September 2015.

[35]Russia’s Position on the Use of Cluster Munitions in Syria,” Position Paper annexed to letter to HRW from Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 9 December 2016.

[36] Ibid. In the cover letter, Lavrov states, “I expect our paper to be taken into account during the preparation of future Human Rights Watch reports on the activities of the Russian military personnel in the fight against terrorism in Syria.”

[38] More than 145 countries have condemned the use of cluster munitions in Syria via national statements and/or by endorsing resolutions or joint statements.

[40] Ibid.; and HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 232–233.

[41] Mennonite Central Committee, “Clusters of Death: The Mennonite Central Committee Cluster Bomb Report,” July 2000, chapter 3.