Russian Federation

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Last updated: 25 August 2022

Summary

Non-signatory Russia says it cannot join the Convention on Cluster Munitions as it regards cluster munitions as legitimate weapons, despite the humanitarian risks associated with their use. Russia last participated in a meeting of the convention in 2012. It was the only country to vote against a key United Nations (UN) resolution in December 2021, which urged states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”

Russia—and the Soviet Union before it—is a major producer, stockpiler, and exporter of cluster munitions. Russia has used cluster munitions extensively during its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, including newly developed models of cluster munitions.

Policy

The Russian Federation has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Russia is one of the most vocal critics of the convention and has not taken any steps to accede as it sees military utility in cluster munitions. Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov stated in 2016 that “our country strictly complies with its commitments, including with regard to cluster munitions (CMs) that Russia views as a legal means of warfare.”[1]

In 2017, Russia said its assessment of the convention “has not changed” and called it “a politicized document that tailors the very definition” of cluster munitions “to the interests of individual states which are trying to preserve their one-sided military and technical advantages.”[2] Russia has reiterated this position several times since. In November 2021, it called cluster munitions “a lawful form of munitions” that “are only harmful when misused.”[3]

Russia did not participate in the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[4] When the convention opened for signature in December 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed Russia’s opposition to “unjustified restrictions and bans on cluster munitions,” which it defended as “a legitimate type of weapon that is not banned by international humanitarian law and plays a significant role in the defense interests of Russia.”[5]

Russia participated as an observer in meetings of the convention in 2010 and 2011. Russia has been invited to, but has not attended, any of the convention’s meetings since then.

In December 2021, Russia voted against a key United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution urging states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”[6] Russia has previously abstained or voted against this annual resolution promoting the convention since it was first introduced in 2015.[7]

Previously, in 2014, Russia criticized and expressed “serious concern” at the use of cluster munitions “against civilian population” in eastern Ukraine.[8] Yet Russia has never acknowledged the use of cluster munitions by Russian-backed armed opposition groups in eastern Ukraine.

Russia voted in favor of a 2015 Security Council resolution that expressed concern at evidence of cluster munition use in Darfur, Sudan.[9] It also voted in favor of a 2014 Security Council resolution that expressed concern at the “indiscriminate” use of cluster munitions in South Sudan.[10]

Russia is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Russia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and, after opposing CCW discussions on cluster munitions for years, changed its position in 2011 to support an effort led by the United States (US) to conclude a new CCW protocol on cluster munitions.[11] That initiative failed in November 2011, which ended CCW deliberations on cluster munitions, leaving the Convention on Cluster Munitions as the sole international instrument specifically dedicated to ending the suffering caused by these weapons. Since 2011, Russia has not proposed any further CCW work on cluster munitions.

Development and production

Russia, and historically the Soviet Union, is a major producer and exporter of cluster munitions. Additionally, several states inherited stocks of cluster munitions when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Our records on the production, usage, and export of cluster munitions…are confidential and will not be publicized.”[12]

According to international technical reference materials and corporate marketing, three state-owned Russian companies have produced cluster munitions:

  • Bazalt State Research and Production Enterprise (air-dropped bombs);
  • Mechanical Engineering Research Institute (120mm, 152mm, and 203mm artillery projectiles); and
  • Splav State Research and Production Enterprise (122mm, 220mm, and 300mm rockets).

Russia continued to produce new cluster munitions in 2022. Since invading Ukraine in February 2022, Russian forces have used at least two new types of cluster munitions for the first time:

  • The 300mm 9M54-series guided missile, produced by Splav State Research and Production Enterprise, delivered by the 9K515 “Tornado-S” rocket launcher. The 9M544 model contains 552 3B30 dual-purpose submunitions, while the 9M549 model contains 72 antipersonnel submunitions.
  • A cluster munition variant of the Iskander-M 9M723 ballistic missile.

Splav State Research and Production Enterprise, which is part of state-owned arms company Rostec, displayed the new generation of 300mm multi-barrel rocket launchers at its rocket assembly facility in Tula, south of Moscow, in July 2020.[13] Photographs from the event showed 9M55K 300mm cluster munition rockets and 9N235 fragmentation submunitions, as well as 9M54-series cluster munition guided missiles made for the new Tornado-S launcher system.[14]

In early 2018, Russia began testing the “Drel” RBK-500U guided cluster bomb, developed by Bazalt State Research and Production Enterprise.[15]

Transfer

There is limited information available on Russian arms transfers, including cluster munitions. However, at least 35 states have stockpiled cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin, including 21 states not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[16]

At least 10 States Parties that have stockpiled cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin have formally declared the stocks and listed types and quantities, as outlined in the following table:

Stockpiled Russian/Soviet cluster munitions declared by States Parties[17]

Type

Cluster munition

Submunition

States that declared stockpiles (quantity of cluster munitions)

Bomb

RBK-250 PTAB-2.5M

PTAB-2.5M

Bulgaria (488), Croatia (9), Cuba (663), Hungary (17), Moldova (14), Mozambique (199), Peru (657), Slovakia (20)

RBK-250-275 AO-1SCh

AO-1SCh

Bulgaria (238), Côte d’Ivoire (68), Croatia (5), Cuba (282), Moldova (24), Mozambique (9), Peru (388)

RBK-500 AO-2.5RT

AO2.5RT

Bulgaria (201), Czech Republic (191), Moldova (16), Peru (198), Slovakia (50)

RBK-500 ShOAB-0.5M

SHOAB-0.5M

Bulgaria (36)

RBK-500-255 PTAB-10.5

PTAB-10.5

Moldova (8), Slovakia (23)

RBK-500-255 PTAB-2.5

PTAB-2.5

Moldova (16)

RBK-500-355 AO-10

AO-10

Slovakia (22)

Dispenser

BKF AO-2.5RT

AO-2.5RT

Bulgaria (3,086), Cuba (336), Hungary (247), Slovakia (63)

BKF PTAB-2.5

PTAB-2.5

Bulgaria (1,957), Cuba (382), North Macedonia (1,438), Slovakia (72)

BKF PTAB-2.5KO

PTAB-2.5KO

Hungary (23)

Projectile

3-O-13

O-16

Moldova (834)

Missile

9N123K

9N24

Bulgaria (8)

Rocket

9M27K

9N210

Moldova (473)

 

Stockpiling

In 2009, Russia acknowledged that it possesses a “large” stockpile of cluster munitions which are “stored throughout the state.” It said disposing of such a wide range of obsolete cluster munitions would be time-consuming and “a significant financial expenditure.”[18] In November 2011, Russia stated that its cluster munition stockpile was similar in size to that of the US, which then reported stockpiling 5.5 million cluster munitions.[19]

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The quantity and types of cluster munitions stockpiled in the Russian Ministry of Defence are confidential and will not be publicized.”[20] The following list of types stockpiled is based on a wide variety of publicly available sources.

Cluster munitions stockpiled by Russia[21]

Type

Caliber

Carrier name

Number of submunitions

Submunition type

Projectile

120mm

(unknown)

30

Dual-purpose

152mm

3-O-23

42

Dual-purpose

152mm

3-O-13

8

Dual-purpose

203mm

3-O-14

24

Fragmentation

240mm

3-O-8

14

Fragmentation

Dispenser

BKF ODS 35

8

FAE

BKF AO-2.5RT

96

Fragmentation

BKF PTAB-1M

248

HE/AT

BKF PTAB-2.5

96

HE/AT

Bomb

PROSAB-250

90

HE

RBK-250 PTAB-2.5M

42

HE/AT

RBK 250-275 AO-2.5RT

60

Fragmentation

RBK 250-275 AO-2.5RTM

60

Fragmentation

RBK 250-275 AO-1SCh

150

Fragmentation

RBK 250-275 PTAB 2.5M

30

HE/AT

RBK-500 AO-2.5RT

126

Fragmentation

RBK-500-255 PTAB-10.5A

30

HE/AT

RBK-500-375 AO-10

30

HE/AT

RBK-500 AO-2.5RTM

108

Fragmentation

RBK-500 PTAB-1M

268

HE/AT

RBK-500 PTAB 2.5

75

HE/AT

RBK-500 PTAB 2.5M

268

HE/AT

RBK-500 ShOAB-0.5

565

Fragmentation

RBK-500 SPBE

15

SFW

RBK-500 SPBE-D

15

SFW

RBK-500 SPBE-K

15

SFW

RBK-500 OFAB-50UD

10

Fragmentation

Rocket

122mm

Grad (9M218)

45

3-O-33 Dual-purpose

122mm

Grad (9M217)

2

SFW

220mm

Uragan (9M27K)

30

9N210 Fragmentation

220mm

Uragan (9M27K1)

30

9N235 Fragmentation

300mm

Smerch (9M55K)

72

9N210/9N235 Fragmentation

300mm

Smerch (9M55K1)

5

SFW

300mm

Smerch (9M55K5)

600

Dual-purpose

300mm

Tornado-S (9M544)

552

3B30 dual purpose

300mm

Tornado-S (9M549)

72

Fragmentation

Missiles

9K52 Luna-M with 9N18K

42

9N22 Fragmentation

9M79 Tochka with 9N123K

50

9N24 Fragmentation

9M723 Iskander-M

Unknown

Unknown

Note: FAE=Fuel Air Explosive; HE/AT=High Explosive/Antitank; SFW=Sensor Fuzed Weapon.

Use

The Russian Armed Forces have used cluster munitions in attacks which have caused hundreds of civilian casualties and damaged civilian infrastructure since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began on 24 February 2022.[22] Ukrainian forces have also used cluster munitions at least three times.[23]

The exact number of Russian cluster munition attacks is not known, though hundreds have been documented, reported, or are alleged to have occurred, many in populated areas. At least ten of Ukraine’s 24 oblasts have been struck by cluster munitions: Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia.

Russia has used at least six types of cluster munitions in Ukraine since February 2022; all launched from the ground using missiles and rockets, except for air-delivered RBK-series cluster bombs. These cluster munitions were all either manufactured in Russia, some as recently as in 2021, or by its predecessor state, the Soviet Union.

Types of cluster munitions confirmed to be in use by Russia include:

  • The 220mm 9M27K-series Uragan (“Hurricane”) cluster munition rocket, which has a range of 10–35km and delivers 30 9N235 or 9N210 fragmentation submunitions;
  • The 300mm 9M55K-series Smerch (“Tornado”) cluster munition rocket, which has a range of 20–70km and delivers 72 9N235 or 9N210 fragmentation submunitions;
  • The 300mm 9M54-series “Tornado-S” cluster munition guided missile, which delivers 552 3B30 dual-purpose 9M544 submunitions or 72 9M549 antipersonnel submunitions;
  • The 9M79-series Tochka ballistic missile, which is equipped with the 9N123K warhead containing 50 9N24 fragmentation submunitions;
  • A cluster munition variant of the Iskander-M 9M723 ballistic missile; and
  • The RBK-500 PTAB-1M cluster bomb, containing 268 PTAB-1M high explosive/antitank submunitions.

Russia has not denied using cluster munitions in Ukraine, but has sought to draw attention elsewhere. It has criticized past use of cluster munitions by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states in the former Yugoslavia in 1999.[24] Russia accused Ukraine of using cluster munitions in the city of Donetsk on 14 March 2022, in an attack that has not been independently confirmed.[25] In June 2022, France issued a statement denying “allegations circulating in the Russian media and amplified by social media asserting that France is supplying Ukraine with cluster munitions,” describing the reports as “totally false.”[26]

Russia’s use of cluster munitions in Ukraine been condemned by 39 states in national or joint statements at UN bodies including the Human Rights Council, Security Council, and the UNGA, as of 1 July 2022.[27] The cluster munition attacks have also been condemned by the European Union (EU), the NATO Secretary-General, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Human Rights Special Rapporteurs and Experts, and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC).

In March 2022, the current president of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the United Kingdom (UK), expressed grave concern at the use of cluster munitions during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The UK said that it “calls upon all those that continue to use such weapons to cease immediately, and calls upon all states that have not yet done so to join the Convention without delay.”[28]

Previously, in 2014–2015, Russian-backed insurgents used cluster munition rockets in eastern Ukraine.[29] Ukrainian government forces were also responsible for cluster munition rocket attacks.[30] Russia expressed concern at this Ukrainian government use of cluster munitions, but never commented on cluster munition attacks by pro-Russian separatist forces.[31]

Previous use in Syria

In Syria, there is strong evidence that Russia stockpiles cluster munitions at its airbase at Hmeymim, southeast of Latakia city. There is also strong evidence that Russia has used cluster munitions in Syria or, at a minimum, directly participated with Syrian government forces in attacks that have used cluster munitions on opposition-held areas.

Russian and Syrian government forces use many of the same aircraft and weapons, and frequently carry out operations together.[32] There have been at least 687 cluster munition attacks in Syria since July 2012, but no attacks were reported between 1 August 2021 and 31 July 2022. Previously, the Monitor reported at least a dozen cluster munition attacks in Syria between August 2019 and July 2020.

There was a significant increase in the use of cluster munitions in Syria after Russia began its joint operations with Syrian government forces on 30 September 2015.[33] All except two types of the cluster munitions used in Syria since 2012 were manufactured by Russia or the Soviet Union.[34]

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has not explicitly denied Russia’s involvement in using cluster munitions in Syria, but has claimed that cluster munitions have been used in accordance with international humanitarian law and not indiscriminately.[35] In December 2016, Russia issued a position paper on the use of cluster munitions in Syria, which concluded “the question of the involvement of the Russian military personnel in the cases of indiscriminate CMs [cluster munitions] use in Syria [is] totally inappropriate.”[36] In December 2015, the Russian Ministry of Defence stated that “Russian aviation does not use [cluster munitions]” and that “there are no such munitions at the Russian air base in Syria.”[37]

The civilian harm caused by use of cluster munitions in Syria has attracted widespread global media coverage, public outcry, and condemnations from more than 145 states.[38]

Previous use

During the August 2008 conflict with Georgia, Russia used cluster munitions including RBK-500 AO-2.5RTM cluster bombs and 9M27K-series Uragan ground-fired rockets containing 9N210 and 9N235 submunitions. Russia used cluster munitions in or near nine towns and villages in the Gori-Tskhinvali corridor, south of the South Ossetian administrative border.[39] Russia denied using cluster munitions in Georgia.[40]

Russian forces used cluster munitions in Chechnya from 1994–1996 and again in 1999.[41]

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, cluster munitions were used by various forces in conflicts in Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Tajikistan. The extent of involvement of Russian forces in this use of cluster munitions is not known, but cannot be discounted.

The Soviet Union used cluster munitions from 1979 to 1989 in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union had first used cluster munitions in 1943, against German forces during World War II.[42]



[1] Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Letter to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov Regarding Cluster Munitions in Syria,” 10 August 2016; and “Russia’s Position on the Use of Cluster Munitions in Syria,” Position Paper annexed to letter to HRW, from Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 9 December 2016.

[2] Russia expressed “concern about the humanitarian impact of the arbitrary use of cluster munitions,” but called the convention “a very poor example of how to reach agreement on arms control” that “is a cynical attempt to repartition [sic] the market for cluster munitions.” Statement of Russia, United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 20 October 2017.

[3] Statement of Russia, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 2 November 2021.

[4] Russia attended a regional meeting held during the Oslo Process as an observer, in Brussels in October 2007. For details on Russia’s policy and practice regarding cluster munitions through 2009, see HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 230–235.

[5] “Russia explains refusal to join cluster bombs convention,” Interfax: Russia & CIS Military Newswire,8 December 2008. Similar language was used in a September 2009 letter to the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC). Letter from Sergey Ryabkov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the CMC, 18 September 2009.

[6]Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 76/47, 6 December 2021.

[7] Russia voted against the resolution in 2015–2017 and 2019, and abstained in 2018 and 2020.

[8] Statement of Russia, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 23 October 2014. The next day, Russia told a Security Council debate on the situation in Ukraine that “there is an alarming and growing number of civilian victims, including children, as the result of…prohibited munitions, including cluster bombs.” Provisional report of the 7287th meeting of the UN Security Council, S/PV.7287, 24 October 2014.

[9] The five permanent members of the Security Council voted in favor of the resolution in addition to non-permanent members Angola, Chad, Chile, Jordan, Lithuania, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Spain, and Venezuela.

[10] The resolution noted “with serious concern reports of the indiscriminate use of cluster munitions” and called for “all parties to refrain from similar such use in the future.” Security Council, “Security Council, Adopting Resolution 2155 (2014), Extends Mandate of Mission In South Sudan, Bolstering Its Strength to Quell Surging Violence,” SC11414, 27 May 2014.

[11] At the CCW’s Third Review Conference in 2006, Russia stated, “We cannot accept the logic of restrictions or even bans on ammunition artificially and groundlessly declared as the most ‘dangerous weapons.’ This path would lead us to a stalemate. It could only result in a split and weaken the [CCW] and its Protocols.” Statement of Anatoly I. Antonov, Director, Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CCW Third Review Conference, Geneva, 7 November 2006.

[12] Letter from Sergey Ryabkov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to HRW, 20 March 2009.

[14] According to Rostec, President Vladimir Putin reportedly set an objective in 2016 for the company to use only Russian components in the modernized multi-launch rocket systems. See, Rostec, “The New Rocket System Passes Official Tests,” 25 January 2017.

[15] Piotr Butowsky, “Russia set to finalise PBK-500U glide bomb evaluation,” Jane’s 360, 9 January 2018; and Michael Peck, “Cluster Bombs Are Back – and America and Russia Can’t Get Enough,” The National Interest, 21 April 2018.

[16] Russian or Soviet-era cluster munitions have been stockpiled by 11 States Parties to the convention (Bulgaria, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Hungary, Iraq, Republic of Moldova, Mozambique, Peru, and Slovakia) and at least two dozen non-state parties (Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Mongolia, North Korea, Poland, Romania, Sudan, Syria, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Yemen). See Monitor Ban Policy country profiles for more information.

[17] All information in this table is taken from Article 7 reports submitted by States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database.

[18] Statement of Russia, CCW Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 12 November 2009. Notes by Landmine Action.

[19] Statement of Russia, CCW Fourth Review Conference, Geneva, 18 November 2011. Notes by HRW. An October 2004 report to the US Congress by the US Department of Defense disclosed a stockpile of 5.5 million cluster munitions, containing approximately 728.5 million submunitions.

[20] Letter from Sergey Ryabkov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to HRW, 20 March 2009.

[21] The data in this table comes from the following sources: Publishing House “Arms and Technologies,” undated; Information Centre of Defence Technologies and Safety, “The XXI Century Encyclopedia, Russia’s Arms and Technologies. Volume 12: Ordnance and Munitions,” CD Version, 2006; Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air–Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, 2004), pp. 414–41, and 422–432; Leland S. Ness and Anthony G. Williams, eds., Jane’s Ammunition Handbook 2007–2008 (Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, 2007), pp. 572, 597–598, 683, 703–706, 715–716, and 722–723; US Defense Intelligence Agency, “Improved Conventional Munitions and Selected Controlled-Fragmentation Munitions (Current and Projected),” partially declassified and made available to HRW under a Freedom of Information Act request; and “Russia’s Arms Catalog: Volume IV, Precision Guided Weapons and Ammunition, 1996–1997,” Military Parade: Moscow, 1997, pp. 138–139, 148–152, 373–392, 504, and 515–516. This research has been supplemented by information found on the Splav State Research and Production Enterprise website.

[23] ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Ukraine: Cluster Munition Ban Policy,” updated 17 May 2022.

[24] Statement of Amb. Gennady Gagtilov, Permanent Representative of Russia to the UN in Geneva, Human Rights Council, 49th Session, Geneva, 3 March 2022.

[25] Letter from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, 15 March 2022.

[26] French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Ukraine - Q&A (15 Jun. 2022),” 15 June 2022.

[27] Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Mexico, Republic of Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK.

[28] Statement of Amb. Aidan Liddle, Permanent Representative of the UK to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 3 March 2022.

[30] HRW, “Ukraine: Widespread Use of Cluster Munitions,” 20 October 2014.

[31] Statement of Russia, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 23 October 2014.

[32] However, Russia is the only force in Syria to operate Sukhoi SU-25 and SU-34 fighter-ground attack jets used to deliver RBK-series cluster bombs. HRW, Amnesty International, and others have compiled credible evidence, including videos and photographs, documenting SU-25 and SU-34 jets near or involved in attacks near sites when cluster munitions were used. Amnesty International, “Syria: Russia’s shameful failure to acknowledge civilian killings,” 23 December 2015; and HRW, “Russia/Syria: Daily Cluster Munition Attacks,” 8 February 2016.

[33] ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Syria: Cluster Munition Ban Policy,” updated 15 September 2021. The Russian Ministry of Defence appeared to acknowledge responsibility for a June 2016 attack on coalition-backed armed opposition forces near the Syrian al-Tanf border crossing with Iraq, which the UK and US said involved RBK-500 AO-2.5RT/RTM cluster munitions. Russian Ministry of Defence, “On June 18 Russia and US held teleconference on implementing the Memorandum on preventing aerial incidents in Syria,” 19 June 2016. See also, The New Syrian Army (NSyA_Official), “Russians are lying with E-conference & more updates on our FB page. ‪#NSyA ‪#RuAF.” 19 June 2016, 13:18 UTC. Tweet (no longer accessible).

[34] Cluster munition rockets manufactured in Egypt have also been used in Syria, while the Islamic State has used cluster munitions rockets of unknown origin containing a dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM)-type submunition called “ZP-39” in Syria. Soviet or Russian manufactured cluster munitions used in Syria include RBK-series bombs containing AO-1SCh, AO-2.5RT, PTAB-2.5M, PTAB-2.5KO and ShOAB-0.5 submunitions; Smerch 9M55K and Uragan 9M27K-series surface-to-surface rockets containing 9N235 submunitions; and Tochka 9M79-series ballistic missiles. More advanced RBK-500 SPBE bombs containing SPBE sensor-fuzed submunitions and a ground-fired 240mm 3-O-8 rocket-assisted mortar projectile have been used in Syria since September 2015.

[35]Russia’s Position on the Use of Cluster Munitions in Syria,” Position Paper annexed to letter to HRW from Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 9 December 2016.

[36] Ibid. In the cover letter, Lavrov states, “I expect our paper to be taken into account during the preparation of future Human Rights Watch reports on the activities of the Russian military personnel in the fight against terrorism in Syria.”

[38] More than 145 countries have condemned the use of cluster munitions in Syria via national statements and/or by endorsing resolutions or joint statements.

[40] Ibid.; and HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 232–233.

[41] Mennonite Central Committee, “Clusters of Death: The Mennonite Central Committee Cluster Bomb Report,” July 2000, chapter 3.


Mine Ban Policy

Last updated: 17 November 2022

Policy

The Russian Federation has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty.  

Russia said in November 2020 that it “shares the goals of the treaty and supports a world free of mines,” but regards antipersonnel mines “as an effective way of ensuring the security of Russia’s borders.”[1]

Russia has used antipersonnel landmines repeatedly in Ukraine since it invaded the country on 24 February 2022, resulting in an unprecedented situation in which a country that is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty is using the weapon on the territory of a State Party.

Russia has also said that it cannot join due its “serious doubts” over the treaty’s “reliability” because, in its view, the treaty lacks “the necessary tools to ensure the compliance of those States that have violated it.”[2] Russia has only ever alleged Mine Ban Treaty violations by one State Party, Ukraine.

Russia participated as an observer in the 1996–1997 Ottawa Process that created the Mine Ban Treaty, but did not adopt or sign the treaty. It attended the treaty’s First Meeting of States Parties in 1999 and the Second Review Conference in 2009 as an observer. Russia last participated in a Mine Ban Treaty meeting in 2010.

Russia has consistently abstained from voting on the annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution promoting universalization and full implementation of the treaty. Russia most recently abstained from voting on UNGA Resolution 76/26 on 6 December 2021.[3]

Russia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on explosive remnants of war (ERW). Russia last submitted annual transparency reports for both protocols in April 2022. Russia is not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Production                        

Russia has produced at least 12 types of antipersonnel landmines since 1992, including blast mines (PMN, PMN-2, PMN-4, and PFM-1S) and fragmentation mines (POM-2, POM-3, POMZ-2, OZM-72, MOB, MON-50, MON-90, MON-100, and MON-200). Russia has stated on several occasions that its production of blast mines halted in 1997.[4]

Russia has been conducting research on new landmines, modifications to existing mine types, and alternatives to mines since at least 1997.[5] Russia debuted new “smart” landmine systems during annual military exercises in 2021, including the POM-3 “Medallion” self-destructing bounding fragmentation antipersonnel mine, which is equipped with inherent antihandling/anti-disturbance capability and had been in development since at least 2015.[6] It also tested several types of newly developed antivehicle mines in 2021, such as the PTKM-1R mine.[7]

Ukrainian forces displayed a new directional fragmentation Claymore type mine, called MOB, in October 2022, which had been captured from Russian forces.[8]

Russia’s landmine production is illustrated by its use of newly manufactured MOB, POM-3, and PTKM-1R mines in Ukraine during 2022.

Transfer

On 1 December 1994, Russia put in place a moratorium on the export of antipersonnel landmines that are either not detectable or not equipped with self-destruct devices. The moratorium formally expired in 2002, but Russia reported in 2022 that was still being observed.[9]

Antipersonnel landmines of Soviet/Russian origin have been found emplaced in at least 30 mine-affected countries.[10] In recent years, antipersonnel mines of Russian manufacture—distinct from versions produced in the former Soviet Union—have appeared in Syria[11] and Ukraine.[12]

In Libya, six types of Russian-made antipersonnel mines, and two types of antivehicle mines that had not been seen before in Libya, were used in and around Tripoli in 2019 and 2020.[13] In March 2021, a United Nations (UN) Security Council Panel of Experts on Libya reported evidence that private military contractors from the Wagner Group had brought the antipersonnel mines to Libya to use in their operations.[14]

Stockpiling and destruction

In 2004, Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov said that Russia stockpiled 26.5 million antipersonnel mines.[15] This marked the first time that Russia had released official information on the number of antipersonnel mines in its stocks.

The defense minister forecast that approximately 23.5 million of these antipersonnel mines would be destroyed between 2005 and 2015. In 2010, Russia told a Mine Ban Treaty meeting that it had destroyed a total of 10 million mines, including antipersonnel mines.[16] In 2010 alone, more than 464,000 antipersonnel landmines that did not meet international requirements were destroyed.[17]

Since 2010, Russia has not shared any public information on its stockpile or destruction efforts.

Russian military units have maintained landmine stocks in other countries within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), such as 18,200 mines in Tajikistan, a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty.[18]

Use

New use

Russia has used antipersonnel landmines in Ukraine since its invasion of the country began on 24 February 2022.[19] There were also numerous allegations from Russian media sources in 2022 that Ukrainian forces have used antipersonnel mines in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

At least eight types of antipersonnel mines have been used, or are alleged to have been used, by Russian forces in Ukraine since February 2022. There is confirmed evidence that Russian forces have also emplaced victim-activated booby-traps and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) since February 2022, at numerous locations prior to retreating and abandoning their positions.[20]

Antipersonnel landmines used in Ukraine since February 2022

Designation

Origin

Type

Initiation

PFM-1 PFM-1S

USSR

Blast

Pressure

MOB

Russia

Fragmentation

Tripwire/command

MON-50

USSR/Russia

Fragmentation

Tripwire/command

MON-100

USSR/Russia

Fragmentation

Tripwire/command

OZM-72

USSR/Russia

Fragmentation

Tripwire/command

PMN-4

Russia

Blast

Pressure

POM-2/POM-2R

USSR/Russia

Fragmentation

Tripwire/self-destruct

POM-3

Russia

Fragmentation

Seismic

Note: USSR=Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

All the mine types listed above were manufactured in Russia or its predecessor, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, or Soviet Union). Some of the landmines used in Ukraine in 2022 were manufactured as recently as 2021. This includes the POM-3 antipersonnel mine, which is delivered by the ISDM Zemledelie-I mine-laying rocket launcher from between 5–15km away.[21] The POM-3  mine is equipped with a sensitive seismic fuze that makes it prone to detonate when approached, as well as a self-destruct feature. Another antipersonnel mine used in Ukraine is the PMN-4 blast mine developed by Russia in the early 1990s, after Ukraine achieved its independence.[22]

Other types of landmines used in Ukraine can be used in a command-detonated or victim-activated mode, including the newly seen MOB, MON-series, and OZM-72 mines.[23] The POM-2 landmine is delivered by helicopter, ground-fired rockets, or other remote means such as vehicles, while its variant the POM-2R is designed to be emplaced by hand.[24]If activated by the victim through a mechanical pull, tension release, seismic fuze, or other means, then such munitions are considered to be antipersonnel mines, which are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.[25]

Use of PFM-series mines

There have been numerous allegations and counter-allegations that both Russia and Ukraine have used PFM-series antipersonnel mines in Ukraine in 2022. The claims began during the first days of the invasion and have continued to emerge with greater frequency. The Monitor has reviewed approximately 30 such allegations, most of which related to territory under the control of Russian forces at the time the claim was made. After Ukrainian forces re-captured territory, particularly in eastern parts of the Kharkiv region and the city of Izium in September 2022, and former Russian-controlled territory became accessible to independent researchers, more information on the scale and method of PFM-series mine use has become available.

Both Russia and Ukraine stockpile PFM-series mines, which are delivered by a variety of dispersal systems including hand-carried ground launchers, vehicle-mounted launchers, jets and helicopters, and ground-fired 122mm and 220mm rockets.[26] The size of Russia’s stockpile of PFM-series mines is unknown.

Ukraine declared possessing 3.3 million PFM-series mines in 2020, which are all earmarked for destruction in accordance with the Mine Ban Treaty.[27] Ukraine has already destroyed more than three million PFM-series mines contained in cartridges used in the KMGU aerial dispenser and other types of “cassettes” carrying PFM-series mines used to load different types of delivery systems. The vast majority of Ukraine’s remaining antipersonnel landmine stocks consist of PFM-1S self-destructing mines contained in 220mm 9M27K3 rockets fired by the Uragan multi-barrel rocket launchers.[28]

Ukrainian Prosecutor General Irina Venediktova claimed that PFM-series landmines were used by Russian forces in the Kharkiv region as early as 26 February 2022.[29] Subsequently, a Polish media outlet reported that the General Staff of the Ukrainian Army had confirmed the discovery of such mines.[30] Other allegations of Russian use of PFM-series mines, recorded by the Monitor, include claims made on Ukrainian social media that a Russian aircraft scattered PFM mines in the Sumi region in mid-March 2022.[31] Similar reports surfaced in early April 2022 alleging Russian use of PFM-series mines near the town of Popasnaya.[32]

Russian officials have alleged that Ukrainian forces used PFM-series antipersonnel mines, while photographs and videos shared by Russians on social media showed PFM-series mines lying in place after attacks in areas that were under Russian control at the time.[33] Ukraine has denied the allegations and blamed Russian forces for PFM-series mine use.[34] The United Kingdom (UK) and the US have accused Russian forces of using PFM-series mines in the Donbas region.[35]

Initially, most claims of use made by Russian sources consisted of a close-up photograph of a mine posted to social media with no further context.[36] This trend culminated in July 2022, as Russian media sources in the city of Donetsk claimed that PFM-series mines had been scattered at several locations in the city center. These allegations were accompanied by images of mine clearance;[37] of individual PFM mines in isolation;[38] of civilians handling presumably live mines;[39] and claims of civilian casualties.[40] Russian diplomatic posts globally shared and quickly amplified the story.[41]

One of the more notable Russian claims of PFM-series mine use by Ukrainian forces originated from an attack in late May 2022 on Russian positions in Novovoskresenske, in the Kherson region. Evidence of the attack included photographs of mines in place, remnants of detonated mines, and remnants of the 220mm 9M27K3 Uragan mine-laying rocket, which opens in flight and scatters a payload of 312 PFM-type mines.[42] Ukrainian officials cited in a Ukrainian media report about this attack on 25 May 2022 counter-attributed responsibility to Russian forces.[43]

As of October 2022, there was significant visual evidence of PFM-type mine use and the remnants of the distinctive carrier equipment necessary to deploy these mines. For example, there have been sightings of the KPFM-1M cassette assembly used by 9M27K3 220mm Uragan mine-laying rockets.[44] Both elements were present in images accompanying the Russian claim that Ukrainian troops had mined the approaches to Bakhmut and Soledar, in the Donetsk region, in early August 2022.[45] There have been no sightings of KSF-1 series canisters or the BKF-PFM cartridges necessary to deploy these mines from other launch modalities, such as trucks or helicopters.

Since there is no independent confirmation of the allegations, a final assessment and attribution of use of PFM-type mines in Ukraine is not possible at this time.

International reaction

Since March 2022, Russia’s use of antipersonnel mines in Ukraine has been strongly condemned, including by the Mine Ban Treaty president of the Twentieth Meeting of States Parties, Colombia, as well as Austria, Belgium, Italy, New Zealand, Poland, and the US. The new use of antipersonnel landmines in Ukraine has also been condemned by the treaty’s special envoy for universalization, as well as by US congressional representatives such as Senator Patrick Leahy.[46] 

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) called on all parties to the armed conflict in Ukraine to ensure that no antipersonnel mines were used by any actor, and to destroy any antipersonnel mines seized or otherwise acquired.[47]

Previous use

Antipersonnel mines were used in the conflict between Ukrainian government forces and Russian-supported separatists that erupted in early 2014—initially in Crimea, and later in the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces of eastern Ukraine. The government of Ukraine has stated that it did not use antipersonnel mines and has accused Russian-supported insurgent forces of laying mines.[48]

Since 1999, Russian forces have used antipersonnel landmines in Chechnya, but also at times in Dagestan, Tajikistan, and on Russia’s border with Georgia.[49] Russia has argued that its mine use has been necessary to stop the flow of weapons, drugs, and terrorists; and maintains that it has been in full compliance with CCW Amended Protocol II on landmines.[50]

In Libya, significant new mine contamination was discovered in Tripoli in May 2020 after Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) fighters withdrew from the city. Credible evidence indicated that the Wagner Group, a private Russian military security contractor with apparent links to the Russian government,[51] was responsible for transferring and using antipersonnel mines as part of its support to the LAAF.

Several types of Russian or Soviet-made antipersonnel landmines were laid in the Ain Zara, Al-Khilla, Salahuddin, Sidra, and Wadi al-Rabi districts of Tripoli in 2019–2020, according to the Government of National Accord (GNA), the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the Libyan Mine Action Center (LibMAC) and mine clearance operators. This included Russian-made MON-50, MON-200, and OZM-72 mines, which had not been used in Libya previously. Various explosive charges were also used to booby-trap homes, including antivehicle mines.

In August 2021, the BBC published a report on the contents of an electronic tablet believed to have belonged to a fighter from the Wagner Group, which included maps of mined areas in Tripoli in 2020.[52] Mine clearance operators subsequently confirmed to Human Rights Watch (HRW) in May 2022 that all 35 locations listed in the tablet were indeed contaminated by landmines, and that the Wagner Group was likely responsible given its presence in those areas at the time.[53]


[1] Russia Explanation of Vote on Resolution L.26, 75th Session, United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) First Committee, New York, 6 November 2020. 

[2] Ibid.

[4] See, for example, Statement of Russia, CCW Amended Protocol II Tenth Annual Conference of States Parties, Geneva, 12 November 2008.

[5] In 2004, Russia said that it had spent or planned to spend RUB3.33 billion (US$115.62 million) on research, development, and production of new engineer munitions, including alternatives to antipersonnel mines. Statement by Sergei Ivanov, Minister of Defense, parliamentary hearings on ratification of Amended Protocol II, 23 November 2004. Average exchange rate for 2004: RUB1=US$0.03472. Oanda.

[6] Roman Kretsul and Anna Cherepanova, “Fire and ‘Tick’: Russia tested a new system of minefields,” Izvestia, 6 September 2021. In 2015, the POM-3 mine’s design engineers claimed that the seismically-activated POM-3 would be able to distinguish between combatants and civilians as it is activated by a sensor that detects the footfall of an individual, characterizes it against known signatures, and fires its warhead into the air. Directors Igor Smirnov and Mikhail Zhukov of the Scientific Research Institute of Engineering’s Department of Munitions, Mining, and Demining, interviewed on Zvezda TV, 20 November 2015, cited in “Russia Develops Landmine With ‘Electronic Brain’,” Defense World, 20 November 2015. See also, “Perspective Anti-Personnel Mine POM-3 ‘Medallion’,” Military Review, 30 November 2015.

[7] Landmine delivery systems Zemledeliye and UMZ-K Klesh-G, as well as antivehicle mine PTKM-1R. See, Lee, Rob (RALee85), “UMZ-K Klesh-G and Zemledeliye minelayers at the Mulino training area.” 31 July 2021, 21:53 UTC. Tweet; and Roman Kretsul and Anna Cherepanova, “Fire and ‘Tick’: Russia tested a new system of minefields,” Izvestia, 6 September 2021.

[8] Ukraine Weapons Tracker (UAWeapons), “#Ukraine: A previously unseen Russian MOB AP directional mine was captured by the AFU. Apparently, this type is modular - up to 3 units can be connected to each other. They can also be fitted with additional preformed fragmentation blocks and various aiming and mounting devices.” 3 October 2022, 13:19 UTC. Tweet.

[9] Russia CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form F, April 2022. See, CCW Amended Protocol II Database.

[10] Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Cuba, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Honduras, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Ukraine, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

[11] Since 2012, the Syrian Army has used landmines of Soviet/Russian origin, including PMN-2 and PMN-4 antipersonnel mines, and TMN-46 and TM-62 antivehicle mines, along its borders with Lebanon and Turkey. See, HRW, “Syria: Army Planting Banned Landmines: Witnesses Describe Troops Placing Mines Near Turkey, Lebanon Borders,” 13 March 2012.

[12] Since 2014, antipersonnel mines produced in Russia but never stockpiled in Ukraine have been spotted in visual media reports and reported as being seized by Ukrainian authorities. For example, in a video produced by a pro-rebel media source in July 2014, combatants associated with the Russian-supported Zarya Battalion were shown emplacing a PMN-4 antipersonnel mine, in conjunction with emplacing TM-62M antivehicle mines at an unknown location in eastern Ukraine. This type of mine has never been declared to be stockpiled by Ukraine and was only first publicly displayed by Russia in 1993. See, “Life of Zarya battalion,” YouTube.com, July 2014 (video no longer available); and “Anti-personnel mine PMN-4,” Saper, undated.

[13] Antipersonnel mines: MON-50, MON-90, OZM-72, POM-2, POM-2R, and PMN-2; antivehicle mines: TM-62M and TM-83. See, Berkowitz, Oded (Oded121351), “#Libya-#GNU photos of ERW (~ 9 tons) from the #Tripoli campaign that were recently removed from the south of the city. Note the North Korean PG-7 shells (F-7 HE) and extensive mint condition mines used by #Russia|n PMC, including MON-50, MON-90, PMN-2 & OZM-72 with older PRB M3.” 5 September 2021, 09:54 UTC. Tweet.

[15] Statement by Sergei Ivanov, Parliamentary Hearings on Ratification of CCW Amended Protocol II, 23 November 2004. Ivanov said that in 2000, Russia stockpiled 46 million antipersonnel landmines, but had since destroyed or disposed of around 19.5 million of them.

[16] Statement of Russia, Mine Ban Treaty Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2010. Notes by ICBL.

[17] Russia CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form B, 1 March 2011.

[18] In each of its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports since 2003, Tajikistan has reported that intergovernmental talks are “currently underway” to clarify and complete data collection regarding these Russian mines.

[19] See, for example, Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Background Briefing on Landmine Use in Ukraine,” 15 June 2022.

[21] Collective Awareness to UXO [unexploded ordnance], “POM-3 Landmine: Description,” undated; HRW, “Ukraine: Russia Uses Banned Antipersonnel Landmines,” 29 March 2022.

[22] Collective Awareness to UXO, “PMN-4 Landmine: Description,” undated.

[23] Collective Awareness to UXO, “OZM-72 Landmine: Description,” undated.

[24] Collective Awareness to UXO, “POM-2 Landmine: Description,” undated.

[25] HRW, “Backgrounder on Antivehicle Landmines,” 8 April 2022.

[26] Of the states of the former USSR, Belarus and Turkmenistan joined the Mine Ban Treaty and destroyed their significant stockpiles (3.4 million and 5.4 million respectively). North Macedonia found a residual stockpile of banned antipersonnel mines in May 2012, including a small number of PFM-series mines, after it completed the destruction of its stockpile.  

[27] The requirement to destroy almost six million PFM-series antipersonnel mines was a key obstacle that prevented Ukraine from rapidly ratifying the Mine Ban Treaty. For years, Ukraine repeated at nearly every formal and informal Mine Ban Treaty meeting that it would depend on international support for the destruction of its stockpile. Ukraine missed its 1 June 2010 treaty-mandated deadline for the destruction of all stockpiled antipersonnel mines.

[28] Submission of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 18 June 2014; statement of Ukraine, Committee on Cooperative Compliance, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 26 June 2015; and statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 22 May 2019. In December 2014, Ukrainian government officials stated that “no banned weapons” had been used in the “Anti-Terrorist Operations Zone” by the Armed Forces of Ukraine or forces associated with them, such as volunteer battalions. The Military Prosecutor confirmed that an assessment had been undertaken to ensure that stockpiled KSF-1 and KSF-1S cartridges containing PFM-1 antipersonnel mines, BKF-PFM-1 cartridges with PFM-1S antipersonnel mines, and 9M27K3 rockets with PFM-1S antipersonnel mines were not operational, but rather destined for destruction in accordance with the Mine Ban Treaty.

[29] Facebook post by Irina Venediktova, Prosecutor General of Ukraine, 26 February 2022.

[30] “Ukraine attacked by Russia. Butterfly mines in the Kharkiv region,” Polish News, 26 February 2022.

[31] Daria Skuba, “In Sumy, during a night raid, the invaders scattered anti-personnel mines: what they look like,” Obozrevatel, 17 March 2022.

[32] Necro Mancer (666_mancer), “Russians fill residential areas of the city with mines-petals,” 4 April 2022, 17:36 UTC. Tweet.

[33] See, Permanent Mission of Russia to the UN, “Statement by Permanent Representative Vassily Nebenzia at UNSC briefing on Ukraine,” 24 August 2022; and statement of Russia, Security Council, 27 July 2022.

[34] Facebook post by Irina Venediktova, Prosecutor General of Ukraine, 26 February 2022.

[36] Alikantes, Marina (Marianna9110), “The Armed Forces of Ukraine “littered” the territory of the Orphanage in Makiivka, a satellite city of Donetsk, with prohibited anti-personnel mines PFM-1 “Lepestok”, as well as in other cities of the DPR. These mines are prohibited by international conventions.” 2 August 2022, 18:51 UTC. Tweet.

[37] Nikolai (Nikolai11449196), “A Russia tank drives through Donetsk setting off PFM-1 ‘petal’ anti-personnel mines. Ukraine firing these mines into a civilian area is a war crime.” 31 July 2022, 08:26 UTC. Tweet; Bob in NZ (BobInNZ1), “A novel manner of demining the PFM-1 “Petal” anti-personnel mines spread by the UAF over Donetsk. These mines are small and disguised, and can easily kill a child or main an adult. Ukraine committed to destroying 10 million of these weapons in 1999, but failed to do so.” 31 July 2022, 11:18 UTC. Tweet; Chronology (Chronology22), “Local residents of #Donetsk help the sappers in clearing Ukrainian anti-personnel mines PFM-1 #Lepestok (#Petal) with simple improvised methods, a tire and a rope. How many did you demine today?, correspondent asked. About 20, replied the local resident. #Ukrainewar #Ukraine.” 2 August 2022, 09:20 UTC. Tweet.

[38] Glosm Eusec (glosmeusec), “On use of mines inside civilian areas. #Ukraine - 20220813 - unknown place, #Donetsk Oblast - Reported around 17.00 pm, video showing box with PFM-1 anti-personnel mines being described as on Marshak Street, Kyivs'kyi district, Donetsk.” 13 August 2022, 16:46 UTC. Tweet.

[39] NEXTA (nexta_tv), “In occupied #Donetsk, a woman picked up a petal mine and put it in her bag to show her colleagues at work. Due to the small size of the mine, she thought it was a shell fragment.” 31 July 2022, 12:34 UTC. Tweet.

[40] Dubovikova, Maria (politblogme), “Ukrainian “petal” mines were found in the following streets, avenues and lanes of Donetsk: Mira, Universitetskay, Oreshkova, Vatutina, Chelyuskintsev, Lubavina, Shchorsa, Bogdan Khmelnitsky. These are residential areas. No military infrastructure.” 30 July 2022, 23:23 UTC. Tweet.

[41] See, for example, Russia in Canada (RussianEmbassyC), “The retreating Ukrainian troops mine heavily the territories in Donbass with anti-personnel landmines PFM-1 “Lepestok” prohibited by the #OttawaConvention.” 7 July 2022, 16:17 UTC. Tweet.

[42] Ukraine Weapons Tracker (UAWeapons), “#Ukraine: UA forces reportedly hit RU-controlled Novovoskresenske, Kherson Oblast with 2 9M27K3 cluster MLRS rockets- each containing 312 infamous PFM-1S land mines. Whilst being very small they leave horrible injuries, though this time they should at least self-destruct in time.” 26 May 2022, 21:45 UTC. Tweet.

[43] “In the Kherson region, the Russian military shelled the villages of Novovoskresenske and Dudchany,” Suspilne Media, 26 May 2022.

[44] Chronology (Chronology22), “Ukrainian troops continue scattering mines PFM-1 #Lepestok (#Petal) in Donetsk using cluster munition of MLRS Uragan. The cluster shell is also sighted (photo no. 1). Civilians! Be careful! #Ukrainewar #Ukraine #Civilians #Donetsk #Cluster #HRW #AmnestyInternational.” 12 August 2022, 09:07 UTC. Tweet.

[45] Chronology (Chronology22), “Ukrainian troops have mined the approaches to Bakhmut and Soledar with anti-personnel mines PFM-1 Lepestok (#Petal). For the mining they use cluster munition from Uragan MLRS. The clusters are also seen in the footage #Ukraine #Ukrainewar #Soledar #Bakhmut #Artyomovsk #Lepestok.” 1 August 2022, 16:56 UTC. Tweet.

[46] Patrick Leahy, US Senator for Vermont, press release, “Statement on Russian Landmines: Congressional Record,” 7 April 2022.

[48] Submission of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 18 June 2014; statement of Ukraine, Committee on Cooperative Compliance, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 26 June 2015; and statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 22 May 2019. In December 2014, Ukrainian government officials stated that “no banned weapons” had been used in the “Anti-Terrorist Operations Zone” by the Armed Forces of Ukraine or forces associated with them, such as volunteer battalions.

[49] For a summary of past use, see, ICBL, Landmine Monitor Report 2004: Toward a Mine-Free World (New York: Human Rights Watch, October 2004), pp. 1,186–1,187. Russia has denied any use of antipersonnel mines during the conflict in 2008 with Georgia over South Ossetia. HRW investigations could find no evidence of use of mines. See, ICBL, Landmine Monitor Report 2009: Toward a Mine-Free World (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2009), p. 1,069.

[50] See, for example, statement by Amb. Anatoly I. Antonov, CCW Group of Governmental Experts, Sixth Session, Geneva, 18 November 2003.

[51] For background on the Wagner Group, see, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “Band of Brothers: The Wagner Group and the Russian State,” 21 September 2020.

[52] Nader Ibrahim and Ilya Barabanov, “The lost tablet and the secret documents: Clues pointing to a shadowy Russian army,” BBC News, 11 August 2021.


Mine Action

Last updated: 19 November 2018

 

Treaty status

Mine Ban Treaty

Not a party

Mine action management

National mine action management actors

None

Mine action strategic plan

None

Operators in 2017

Federal Ministry of Defense engineers

Demining brigades of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

The Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES), through its specialized demining units (EMERCOM Demining and the “Leader” Center for Special Tasks)

An International Demining Action Center conducts specialist training

Extent of contamination as of end 2017

Landmines

Not known

Cluster munition remnants

None

Land release in 2017

ERW

331,607 explosive devices destroyed, including 30,292 improvised explosive devices (IEDs)

Progress

Landmines

Russia is continuing to demine in Chechnya and Ingushetia, but the extent of progress being made and the expected completion date are not known, as this information is not officially reported by Russia

 

Contamination

 

The Russian Federation is heavily contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) as a result of World War II, the two Chechen wars (1994–1996 and 1999–2009), and armed conflicts in the Caucasian republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria.

Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were used extensively in the two major conflicts in Chechnya. Estimates of the extent of contamination vary greatly because no systematic effort has been undertaken to assess the scope or impact of the problem.[1] In 2010, Russia’s deputy prime minister and presidential special envoy to the Caucasus, Aleksandr Khloponin, claimed that mines affected 14km2 of land and posed a major obstacle to development.[2] In contrast, Chechen officials and human rights organizations have previously estimated that 245km2 of land was mined, including 165km2 of farmland and 73km2 of woodland.[3]

In January 2017, a commander in the Russian armed forces reportedly told press agency Interfax that more than 100km2 of land remained to be cleared in Chechnya, and a further 20km2 in neighboring Ingushetia.[4] According to the online media report, areas cleared to date had nearly all been in lowland Chechnya and remaining mined area is in more mountainous terrain, complicating demining efforts.[5]

 

Program Management

 

There is no formal civilian mine action program in Russia and no national mine action authority. Mine clearance is carried out by Federal Ministry of Defense engineers, demining brigades of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and by the MES, through its specialized demining units (EMERCOM Demining and the “Leader” Center for Special Tasks).[6]

Russia reported that its armed forces established an International Demining Action Center in 2014. The center serves as a base for specialist training in detection and clearance of explosive devices, demining, and operation of mobile robotic tools, and does not function as a mine action center as the term is generally understood in mine action.[7]

Clearance of explosive ordnance in 2017 was reportedly undertaken by 7,050 military personnel, including 846 officers, 97 demining teams, 978 vehicles, and 51 pieces of demining machinery.[8]

 

Land Release

 

In its Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V transparency reports for 2017, Russia reported that its armed forces engineering units conducted demining and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) in the “territories of the Russian Federation,” including the western, southern, central, and eastern military districts, and the northern navy district.In total, more than 331,607 explosive devices were destroyed, including 30,292 IEDs.[9]

In 2016, the Deputy Chief Engineer of Russia’s armed forces, Colonel Ruslan Alahverdiev, had reportedly promised to complete clearance of Chechnya and Ingushetia by 2018.[10] However, in the online media report, it was unclear whether Colonel Alahverdiev was referring only to clearing all roads and forests, or if roads and forests are the only remaining mined areas in Chechnya and Ingushetia. In September 2017, online media reported that combat engineers had been working since April 2017 to clear forests in mountainous areas and foothills in Chechnya.[11]

 

Progress in 2018

 

For 2018, Russia planned to clear more than 53km2 of ERW: 14.7km2 in the western military district, 14.2km2 in the southern military district, 13.9km2 in the central military district, 6.2km2 in the eastern military district, and 4.1km2 in the northern navy district.[12]

 

 

 

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and shared all its country-level landmine reports (from “Clearing the Mines 2018”) and country-level cluster munition reports (from “Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2018”) with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.



[1] UNMAS, “Portfolio of Mine Action Projects 2009,” New York, 2008, p. 284.

[3]MoE sappers to demine arable land in Chechnya,” Caucasian Knot, 3 April 2009; “In Chechnya MES deminers destroyed 25 explosive devices,” Caucasian Knot, 5 October 2009; and “Human rights activists: 25,000 hectares of Chechen territory are still mined,” Caucasian Knot, 7 May 2008.

[4]Landmine threat in Chechnya still prevalent,” OC Media, 23 January 2017.

[5] Ibid.

[6] See, for example, “It is planned to establish special groups for demining of lands within MES,” Caucasian Knot, 23 July 2009; and “Autumn demining is completed in Chechnya,” Vesti Kavkaza, 28 October 2009.

[7] CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report, Form B, 31 March 2015; and meeting with Andrey Grebenshchikov, First Secretary, Department for Nonproliferation and Arms Control, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Geneva, 9 April 2015.

[8] CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (for 2017), Form A.

[9] CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2016), Form B; and Protocol V Article 10 Report (for 2016), Form A.

[11]MfE's combat engineers defuse two air bombs in Chechnya,” Caucasian Knot, 22 September 2017.

[12] CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (for 2017), Form A.


Casualties

Last updated: 23 January 2018

Casualties Overview

All known casualties by end 2016

3,187 civilian mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties (746 killed; 2,440 injured; 1 unknown)

Casualties in 2016

4 (2015: 14)

2016 casualties by outcome

3 killed; 1 injured (2015: 7 killed; 7 injured)

2016 casualties by device type

2 other ERW; 2 unknown mine/ERW type

 

In 2016, four mine/ERW casualties were identified in the Russian Federation through Monitor media scanning. All recorded casualties in 2016 were adult male civilians. No child casualties were recorded among civilians.[1]

The total number of mine/ERW casualties throughout Russia remains unknown.

A total of 3,187 civilian mine/ERW casualties (746 killed; 2,440 injured; 1 unknown) have been recorded since 1994, including in UNICEF data for casualties in Chechnya.[2]

Cluster munitions were reported to have caused at least 638 casualties; 612 of the casualties occurred during strikes in Chechnya (294 killed; 318 injured) in the period from 1994 to the end of 1999. The other 26 casualties were caused by unexploded submunitions and were reported between 1994 and the end of 2007.[3]



[1] Monitor media monitoring from 1 January 2016 to 31 December 2016.

[2] Monitor annual media monitoring since 2011; and email from Eliza Murtazaeva, UNICEF, 2 May 2011.

[3] Handicap International (HI), Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities (Brussels: HI, May 2007), p. 85; and ICBL, Landmine Monitor Report 2007: Toward a Mine-Free World (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, 2007).


Casualties and Victim Assistance

Last updated: 17 September 2014

Casualties

Casualties Overview

All known casualties by end 2013

3,169 civilian mine/ERW casualties (736 killed; 2,432 injured; 1 unknown)

Casualties in 2013

25 (2012: 23)

2013 casualties by outcome

7 killed; 17 injured; 1 unknown (2012: 2 killed; 21 injured)

2013 casualties by device type

17 undefined mines; 7 other ERW; 1 unknown device

In 2013, 25 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties were identified in the Russian Federation through Monitor media scanning. All recorded casualties in 2013 were male. The great majority (23) were military or police security personnel. No child casualties were recorded among civilians. All casualties took place in either Chechnya (16) or Ingushetia (nine).

The total number of mine/ERW casualties throughout Russia remains unknown. Casualties from explosives, particularly those involving improvised explosive devices (IEDs), have occurred regularly in Russia due to insurgent use in the North Caucasus and criminal activities throughout the country. Most reported incidents were clearly caused by command-detonated devices. However, in many cases, the types of explosive items involved could not be identified.

Casualty reporting in Chechnya over time has been more consistent than the rest of the Russian Federation. However, in 2010 the NGO Voice of the Mountains (Laman Az, VoM), which had been supported by UNICEF, ceased its active surveillance of explosive incidents due to a lack of funding.[1]

Under an agreement signed in early 2012 between the ICRC and the Russian Red Cross, the VoM casualty database served as the basis for tracking mine/ERW survivors. Members of the Chechen branch of the Russian Red Cross were subsequently trained to collect and manage data on mine incidents and the needs of the survivors. As of end of 2013, some 1000 mine/ERW casualties had been visited and their data has been collected. The database is managed by the Russian Red Cross Chechen branch coordinator with the assistance of the ICRC.[2]

As of the end of 2013, there were at least 3,169 civilian mine/ERW casualties (736 killed; 2,432 injured; 1 unknown), including 783 children, since 1994. UNICEF data demonstrated a steady decline in annual casualties in Chechnya from a peak of 713 in the year 2000.[3]

Cluster munitions were reported to have caused at least 638 casualties; 612 of the casualties occurred during strikes in Chechnya (294 killed; 318 injured) in the period from 1994 to the end of 1999. The other 26 casualties were caused by unexploded submunitions and were reported between 1994 and the end of 2007.[4]

Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW survivors is not known, but is in the thousands. Most mine survivors in the Russian Federation are war veterans from the conflicts in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and the South Caucasus, or are civilian casualties in Chechnya. At least 2,414 civilians have been injured by mines/ERW in Chechnya since 1994.[5]

There is no victim assistance coordination in Russia, specifically not in Chechnya which is the most mine/ERW-affected area. The Ministry of Health and Social Development is responsible for programs and benefits for persons with disabilities.

 In 2013, the ICRC and the Russian Red Cross continued to identify and collect data on the needs of mine/ERW survivors with a view to facilitate support of survivors in Chechnya in cooperation with the ICRC, national authorities, or other international and national organizations.[6]

In 2013, the ICRC continued to provide micro-economic grants to support income generating projects, based on data collected under the agreement between the ICRC and the Russian Red Cross. Throughout 2013, 126 mine/ERW survivors and their families in Chechnya received support through this program.[7]

Mine/ERW survivors in most of Russia are provided with the same services as other persons with disabilities or, in the case of military casualties, as disabled veterans from post-World War II conflicts.[8]

In 2013, the authorities took steps to enhance the availability and quality of emergency medical care in the Russian northern Caucasus regions. Physicians, nurses and ambulance workers bolstered their ability to treat those in need, including weapon-wounded or mine/ERW victims, through advanced training, several sessions of which were organized by a local training center supported by the ICRC.[9]

Numerous war veterans’ groups and associations of disabled war veterans in many regions of Russia advocated for improved benefits and implementation of legislation. They also provided services, including physical rehabilitation and social and economic reintegration activities.[10] Civilians with disabilities were entitled to free prostheses and mobility devices as well as free transportation to the place of treatment or rehabilitation in the available network of institutions.[11]

Several laws prohibit discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, education, transportation, access to healthcare, and the provision of state services or guarantee their rights to equal treatment, but these laws were generally not enforced. Persons with disabilities continued to face discrimination and denial of equal access to education, employment, and social institutions. Legislation on the protection of persons with disabilities requires that buildings be made accessible to persons with disabilities, but the law was not enforced and in practice many buildings were not accessible. In March 2011, Russia adopted the State Program on Accessible Environment for 2011–2015 to provide access to services in healthcare, culture, transport, and information. During 2013, the program continued under the supervision of the newly formed Ministry of Labor and Social Development.[12]

Russia ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 25 September 2012.

 



[1] Email from Eliza Murtazaeva, Project Officer, Child Protection, UNICEF, 11 March 2012.

[2] Email from Herbi Elmazi, Regional Weapon Contamination Advisor, ICRC, 25 July 2014.

[3] Monitor media monitoring for 2011; and email from Eliza Murtazaeva, UNICEF, 2 May 2011.

[4] Handicap International (HI), Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities (Brussels: HI, May 2007), p. 85; and ICBL, Landmine Monitor Report 2007: Toward a Mine-Free World (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, 2007).

[5] This includes the UNICEF cumulative total 1994–April 2011 and Monitor media scanning for 2011, 2012, and 2013.

[6] Emails from Herbi Elmazi, ICRC, 12 April 2013, and 25 July 2013.

[7] Ibid., 25 July 2014.

[8] See previous ICBL, “Country Profile: Russia.”

[9] ICRC, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, May 2014, p. 391.

[11] CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report, Form F, 22 March 2010.

[12] United States Department of State, “2013 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Russia,” Washington, DC, 27 February 2014; and Human Rights Watch, “Russia: Reform Domestic Laws on Disability Rights,” 4 May 2012.