Korea, South

The Republic of Korea (South Korea) has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

In November 2011, South Korea stated that it “shares the international community’s concerns about humanitarian impact caused by the irresponsible use of cluster munitions” and expressed its support for a new protocol on cluster munitions in the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) “that strikes the right balance between humanitarian considerations and legitimate security needs.”[1] It is not known if South Korea intends to review its position on joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions following the CCW’s failure to conclude a protocol on cluster munitions (see the Convention on Conventional Weapons section below).

South Korea did not make any public statements on the Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2010, 2011, or the first half of 2012. Previously, in October 2009, an official said, “The Republic of Korea fully recognizes the need to reduce humanitarian suffering caused by cluster munitions,” but “due to the unique security situation on the Korean peninsula, my government is unable to take an active stance on the Convention on Cluster Munitions which bans the use of all cluster munitions.”[2] In December 2008, South Korea stated, “We value the intent of the [convention], but considering the current relations between the North and the South, we can’t sign it.”[3]

South Korea has also described cluster munitions as legitimate weapons that are “efficient…in deterring enemy attacks.”[4]

South Korea did not participate in any meetings of the Oslo Process that resulted in the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In September 2011, Wikileaks released a US Department of State cable from January 2007 that stated that South Korea apparently considered participating in the first meeting of the Oslo Process as an observer, because it was reportedly concerned that the cluster munition “issue will be co-opted just as the landmine issue was in the Ottawa process.”[5] South Korea did attend the convention’s Signing Conference in Oslo in December 2008 as an observer and made a statement.

South Korea has not participated in any meetings of the Convention on Cluster Munitions since 2008. It was invited to, but did not attend, the convention’s Second Meeting of States Parties in Beirut, Lebanon in September 2011.

A local peace group called “Weapon Zero Team” has undertaken several actions to call on the South Korean government to ban cluster munitions.[6]

South Korea is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Convention on Conventional Weapons

South Korea is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It opposed any efforts to address cluster munitions in the CCW until after the 2007 launch of the Oslo Process.[7]

At the outset of the CCW's Fourth Review Conference in November 2011, South Korea expressed its hope that the conference will find “common ground” on the chair’s draft text of the proposed CCW protocol on cluster munitions.[8] South Korea consistently sought to either preserve or further weaken many of the weakest aspects of the chair’s draft text during the negotiations, and opposed proposals that would make the CCW effort more compatible with the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In particular, South Korea wanted an exception to allow transfers of cluster munitions in order “to implement obligations pursuant to its security cooperation agreement” with the United States.[9]

The Review Conference ended without reaching agreement on the draft protocol, thus concluding the CCW’s work on cluster munitions.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

In April 2012, South Korea confirmed that it has not used cluster munitions.[10] It produces rockets, bombs, and projectiles containing submunitions and has licensed the production of artillery projectiles containing submunitions in Pakistan. South Korea has also exported cluster munitions. It has imported and licensed the production of cluster munitions from the United States. It is thought to possess a significant stockpile of cluster munitions.

Production

In 2005, the Ministry of National Defense said that “South Korea stopped production of old types of cluster munitions,” and “cluster munitions currently in production have a high level of reliability and most are equipped with [self-destruct] mechanisms.”[11] According to a US diplomatic cable dated April 2007, a senior Ministry of National Defense official informed the US that “more than 90 percent” of South Korea’s stockpile of cluster munitions were of the non-self-destructing kind and “the cost of retrofitting them would be prohibitive.”[12] In August 2008, the Ministry of National Defense adopted a directive requiring that it only acquire cluster munitions with self-deactivation devices and a 1% or lower failure rate, and recommending “the development of alternative weapon systems which could potentially replace cluster munitions in the long run.”[13]

Two companies in South Korea, Hanwha and Poongsan, produce cluster munitions.[14] Hanwha has acknowledged that it has produced two M261 Multi-Purpose Submunition rockets for the Hydra-70 air-to-ground rocket system, as well as KCBU-58B cluster bombs.[15] In April 2012, South Korea informed the Monitor that Hanwha produced 42,800 dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) extended range (base-bleed) 155mm artillery projectiles in 2011.[16]

Poongsan’s website has advertised a 155mm projectile containing 88 submunitions designated DPICM TP, and another 155mm projectile with submunitions designated DPICM K305.[17] In April 2009, Poongsan listed among its products the following two types of 155mm artillery projectiles that contain submunitions: K308 DP-ICM TP, containing 88 K224 submunitions, and K310 DPICM B/B, containing 49 K221 submunitions.[18]

Poongsan entered into a licensed production agreement with Pakistan Ordnance Factories in November 2004 to co-produce K310 155mm extended-range (base bleed) DPICM projectiles in Pakistan at Wah Cantonment. While the ammunition is primarily being produced for Pakistan’s army, the two firms will also co-market the projectiles to export customers.[19]

The United States concluded a licensing agreement with South Korea in 2001 for production of DPICM submunitions for Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) rockets.[20]  

According to the 2012 NGO report “Worldwide Investments in Cluster Munitions: a shared responsibility,” at least 22 Korean financial entities are involved in investments in manufacturers of cluster munitions. Hanwha receives funds from at least 16 Korean financial entities, including six US financial entities, one in the United Kingdom, and one in Switzerland. Poongsan receives investment from at least 15 Korean financial entities, including eight US financial entities, two in France, and one each in Switzerland and Singapore.[21]

Transfers

South Korea has imported a variety of cluster munitions from the US. It is known to possess M26 rockets, M26A1 extended range rockets, and ATACMS missiles for its MLRS launchers. Between 1993 and 1999, the US provided 393 M26A1 extended range rocket pods, 271 M26 rocket pods, 111 ATACMS-1 missiles, and 111 ATACMS missiles.[22] South Korea also stockpiles several artillery projectiles with DPICM submunitions (M483A1, M864, and M509A1) imported from the US.[23]In 2001, the US supplied South Korea with 16 each of the following cluster bombs: CBU-87, CBU-97, CBU-103, and CBU-105.[24] Jane’s Information Group lists it as possessing CBU-87 and Rockeye cluster bombs.[25]

In December 2011, Korea’s National Assembly set aside 236 billion won ($205 million) for the procurement of some 350 CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons from the United States.[26] On 1 June 2012, the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible sale of 367 CBU-105D/B Sensor Fuzed Weapons at an estimated cost of $325 million including associated parts, equipment and logistical support. The agreement requires “a statement by the Government of the Republic of Korea that the cluster munitions and cluster munitions technology will be used only against clearly defined military targets and will not be used where civilians are known to be present or in areas normally inhabited by civilians.”[27] While US law bans the export of nearly all US cluster munitions, it permits the export of Sensor Fuzed Weapons. The Convention on Cluster Munitions bans the export of Sensor Fuzed Weapons.

In March 2008, Hanwha apparently exported an unknown quantity of M261 Multi-Purpose Submunition rockets (each containing nine M73 submunitions) to Pakistan.[28]

Stockpile

The current size and content of South Korea’s stockpile of cluster munitions is not known. In 2005, South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense acknowledged that it “maintains stockpiles of old types of cluster munitions with a high failure rate” and stated, “There are currently no plans to upgrade these holdings…. Equipping old types of submunitions with [self-destruct] mechanisms is not considered feasible due to technical and financial problems.”[29] In April 2012 Korea informed the Monitor that it had destroyed 27 cluster munitions during the previous year.[30]