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Russia

Last Updated: 23 July 2012

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

The Russian Federation has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

In November 2011, Russia stated that cluster munitions play “a very substantive role” in its defense and “cannot be abandoned yet” due to their “defensive role.” In Russia’s view, “cluster munitions still preserve their status of non-prohibited weapon.”[1]

Russia has conceded on several occasions that cluster munitions cause serious humanitarian harm, but it has argued that technical improvements to the weapon coupled with their “appropriate application,” can reduce the humanitarian risks associated with their use.[2] Russia did not participate in the Oslo Process that produced the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[3] When the convention was opened for signature in 2008, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that cluster munitions were “a legitimate type of weapon that is not banned by international humanitarian law and plays a significant role in the defense interests of Russia…. We are against unjustified restrictions and bans on cluster munitions.”[4]

Since 2008, Russia has shown limited interest in the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It attended the convention’s First Meeting of States Parties in Vientiane, Lao PDR in November 2010 and the Second Meeting of States Parties in Beirut, Lebanon in September 2011 as an observer, but did not make any statements at either meeting.[5] Russia also participated in intersessional meetings of the convention in Geneva the April 2012, but likewise did not engage in the deliberations.

Russia is not a party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Convention on Conventional Weapons

Russia is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). After years spent opposing any CCW discussion on cluster munitions, Russia changed its position in 2011 to support the US-led effort to conclude a new CCW protocol on cluster munitions.[6]

At the outset of the CCW's Fourth Review Conference in November 2011, Russia adopted a more optimistic and flexible stance on the proposed cluster munitions protocol than it had in previous meetings, but at the same time emphasized “our possible consent … will require from Russia considerable military and technical, organizational and financial and economic efforts.”[7]

During the detailed examination of the draft protocol’s provisions, Russia consistently argued against provisions that would strengthen the chair’s draft text, such as a deadline for destruction of stockpiles, and sought provisions that would weaken the text, such as a lengthy transition period before key restrictions would take effect.[8]

The Review Conference ended without reaching agreement on the draft protocol, thus concluding the CCW’s work on cluster munitions.

Use

The Soviet Union used cluster munitions in 1943 against German armed forces during World War II and from 1979–1989 in Afghanistan.[9] Russia used cluster munitions in Chechnya from 1994–1996 and again in 1999.[10]

Russia most recently used cluster munitions in the August 2008 conflict with Georgia. According to Human Rights Watch, Russian cluster munition strikes on populated areas killed 12 civilians and injured 46 more. Clearance personnel have found Russian air-dropped AO-2.5 RTM and rocket-delivered 9N210 submunitions, delivered by RBK aerial bombs and Uragan ground rockets, respectively. Russia used cluster munitions in or near nine towns and villages in the Gori-Tskhinvali corridor south of the South Ossetian administrative border.[11]

Russia has denied using cluster munitions in Georgia since the first reports about its cluster use were published.[12]

Production and transfer

Russia, and historically the Soviet Union, is a major producer and exporter of cluster munitions. Additionally, a number of states inherited stocks of cluster munitions when the Soviet Union dissolved. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Our records on the production, usage, and export of cluster munitions…are confidential and will not be publicized.”[13]

According to international technical reference materials, the following Russian companies are associated with the production of cluster munitions: Bazalt State Research and Production Enterprise (air-dropped bombs), Mechanical Engineering Research Institute (120mm, 152mm, and 203mm artillery projectiles), and Splav State Research and Production Enterprise Rocket (122mm, 220mm, and 300mm rockets).[14]

Cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin have been reported in the stockpiles of at least 33 states:[15] Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria,[16] Republic of the Congo, Croatia,[17] Cuba, Czech Republic,[18] Egypt, Hungary,[19] Georgia,[20] Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, India,[21] Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Kuwait,[22] Libya,[23] Macedonia FYR,[24] Moldova,[25] Mongolia, Peru,[26] Poland,[27] Romania, Slovakia, Syria, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine,[28] Uzbekistan, and Yemen. In addition, Russian cluster munitions have been identified in Sudan, although the government has denied having a stockpile.[29]

The types of cluster munitions produced in the USSR or Russia that have been declared by States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions are detailed in the following table:[30]

Types and Quantities of Soviet/Russian Cluster Munitions in Declared Stockpiles

Type of Cluster Munition

Name of Cluster Munition

Submunition Name

(quantity of per weapon)

Countries Declaring Stockpiles

(quantity of cluster munitions)

Bomb

RBK 250 PTAB-2.5M

PTAB-2.5M (42)

Bulgaria (478); Croatia (84); Moldova (14)

RBK 250 ZAB-2.5M  

ZAB-2.5M (48)

Bulgaria (60); Croatia (49)

RBK 250 275 AO-1 Sch

AO-1 Sch (150)

Bulgaria (213); Croatia (3); Moldova (24)

RBK 500 AO2.5RT

AO2.5RT (60)

Bulgaria (201); Moldova (16)

RBK 500 ShOAB-0.5M

ShOAB-0.5M (565)

Bulgaria (39)

RBK 500 ZAB-2.5SM

ZAB-2.5SM (54)

Bulgaria (86)

RBK 500 255 PTAB-10.5

PTAB-10.5 (30)

Moldova (8)

RBK 500 255 PTAB-2.5

PTAB-2.5 (50)

Moldova (16)

Dispenser

BKF AO-2.5RT

AO-2.5RT (10)

Bulgaria (3,086)

BKF PTAB-2.5

PTAB-2.5 (10)

Bulgaria (1,957); FYR Macedonia

Projectile

3-O-13

O-16 (8)

Moldova (834)

Missile

9N123K

9N24 (8)

Bulgaria (50)

Rocket

9M27K

9N210 (30)

Moldova (473)

Stockpiling

Russia has acknowledged possessing a “large stockpile” of cluster munitions “stored throughout the state,” and has said that the disposal of a wide range of obsolete cluster munitions types would be time-consuming and result in “a significant financial expenditure,” comparable to the US$2.2 billion that the United States has estimated it will cost to destroy the US stockpile.[31] At the Fourth CCW Review Conference in November 2011, Russia stated that the size of its cluster munitions stockpile is similar to that of the US, which has a reported 5.5 million cluster munitions.[32]

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The quantity and types of cluster munitions stockpiled in the Russian Ministry of Defence are confidential and will not be publicized.”[33] The following chart is based on a wide variety of publicly available sources.

Cluster munitions stockpiled by the Russian Federation[34]

Type

Caliber

Carrier Name

No. of Sub

Submunition Type

 

Projectile

120mm

(unknown)

30

Dual Purpose

 

152mm

3-O-23

42

Dual Purpose

 

152mm

3-O-13

8

Dual Purpose

 

203mm

3-O-14

24

Fragmentation

 

Dispenser

BKF ODS 35

8

FAE

 

BKF AO-2.5RT

96

Fragmentation

 

BKF PTAB-1M

248

HE/AT

 

BKF PTAB-2.5

96

HE/AT

 

Bomb

PROSAB-250

90

HE

 

RBK-250 ZAB-2.5

48

Incendiary

 

RBK-250 PTAB-2.5M

42

HE/AT

 

RBK 250-275 AO-2.5RT

60

Fragmentation

 

RBK 250-275 AO-2.5-2RTM

60

Fragmentation

 

RBK 250-275 AO-1SCh

150

Fragmentation

 

RBK 250-275 PTAB 2.5M

30

HE/AT

 

RBK-500 AO-2.5RT

126

Fragmentation

 

RBK-500 AO-2.5RTM

108

Fragmentation

 

RBK-500 PTAB 2.5

75

HE/AT

 

RBK-500 PTAB 2.5M

268

HE/AT

 

RBK-500 ShOAB-0.5

565

Fragmentation

 

RBK-500 BETAB

12

Anti-runway

 

RBK-500 ZAB 2.5

51

Incendiary

 

RBK-500 ZAB 2.5SM

54

Incendiary

 

RBK-500 SPBE-D

15

SFW

 

RBK-500 SPBE-K

15

SFW

 

RBK-500 OFAB-50UD

10

Fragmentation

 

Rocket

122mm

Grad (9M218)

45

Dual Purpose

122mm

Grad (9M217)

2

SFW

220mm

Uragan (9M27K)

30

9N210 Dual Purpose

300mm

Smerch (9M55K)

72

9N235 Fragmentation

300mm

Smerch (9M55K1)

5

SFW

300mm

Smerch (9M55K5)

600

Dual Purpose

Missiles

9K52 Luna-M with 9N18K

42

9N22 Fragmentation

9M79 Tochka  with 9N123K

50

9N24 Fragmentation

HE/AT=High Explosive Anti-Tank

 



[1] Statement of Russian Federation, CCW Fourth Review Conference, Geneva, 24 November 2011. Notes by HRW.

[2] Statement by Amb. Anatoly I. Antonov, Head of the Russian Delegation, CCW Meeting of the High Contracting Parties, Geneva, 25 November 2010. Unofficial translation by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[3] Russia attended a regional meeting held during the Oslo Process as an observer (in Brussels in October 2007). For details on Russia’s policy and practice on cluster munitions through 2009, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 230–235.

[4] “Russia explains refusal to join cluster bombs convention,” Interfax: Russia & CIS Military Newswire, 8 December 2008. Similar language was used in a September 2009 letter to the CMC. See: Letter from Sergey Ryabkov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the CMC, 18 September 2009. Unofficial translation by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[5] CMC meeting with Alexander Artamonov, Counsellor, Embassy of the Russian Federation to Lao PDR, Vientiane, 12 November 2010.

[6] At the Third CCW Review Conference in 2006, Russia stated, “We cannot accept the logic of restrictions or even bans on ammunition artificially and groundlessly declared as the most ‘dangerous weapons.’ This path would lead us to a stalemate. It could only result in a split and weaken the [CCW] and its Protocols. Statement by Anatoly I. Antonov, Director, Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CCW Third Review Conference, Geneva, 7 November 2006. In 2005, Russia argued that the humanitarian problems associated with cluster munition use are “mythical,” and asserted that submunitions can be accurately targeted to minimize civilian damage. Presentation of the Russian Federation, “Cluster Weapons: Real or Mythical Threat,” CCW Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), Geneva, 2–12 August 2005, p. 3.

[7] Statement of Russian Federation, CCW Fourth Review Conference, Geneva, 14 November 2011, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/2809BB94361FE3B1C1257965004B00F8/$file/4thRevCon_RUSSIA_Rev2.pdf.

[8] Ibid., 18 November 2011. Notes by HRW.

[9] Mennonite Central Committee, “Drop Today, Kill Tomorrow: Cluster Munitions as Inhumane and Indiscriminate Weapons,” June 1999, p. 5. Additionally, cluster munitions were also used by various forces in several conflicts that resulted from the breakup of the Soviet Union in Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Tajikistan. The degree of involvement of Russian forces in the use of cluster munitions is not known but cannot be discounted.

[10] Mennonite Central Committee, “Clusters of Death: Global Report on Cluster Bomb Production and Use,” 2000, Chapter 3.

[11] See Human Rights Watch, “A Dying Practice: Use of Cluster Munitions by Russia and Georgia in August 2008,” April 2009.

[12] See Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 232–233; and Human Rights Watch, “A Dying Practice: Use of Cluster Munitions by Russia and Georgia in August 2008,” April 2009.

[13] Letter from Sergey Ryabkov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Human Rights Watch, 20 March 2009.

[14] The primary sources for information on Russian companies that produce cluster munitions are Jane’s Air Launched Weapons and Jane’s Ammunition Handbook. Splav State Research and Production Enterprise Rocket details the numerous types of rockets it produced at www.splav.org.

[15] Unless otherwise footnoted with supplementary information, the source is Jane’s Information Group.

[16] Bulgaria, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 27 March 2012 declares over 6,800 RBK series bombs containing a variety of submunition types including PTAB, AO-2.5, AO-1 SCh, and SHOAB. It also declares 50 warheads for 9N123K surface-to-surface missiles, each containing eight 9N24 submunitions.

[17] Croatia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 24 January 2011 reported a stockpile that includes RBK series bombs containing PTAB and AO-1 SCh submunitions.

[18] In 2009, the Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic stockpiled 67 containers and 5,377 pieces of RBK-500 and KMGU BKF PTAB submunitions. Letter from Jan Michal, Director, UN Department, Czech Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Human Rights Watch, 17 March 2009.

[19] Action on Armed Violence, “Report on the Special Event on Stockpile Destruction in Erdőkertes, Hungary, 24 March 2011,” 30 April 2011.

[20] The Georgian Ministry of Defense reports having RBK-500 cluster munitions and BKF blocks of submunitions that are carried in KMGU dispensers, but told Human Rights Watch that their shelf-lives have expired and they are slated for destruction. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Georgian Ministry of Defense, 12 February 2009.

[21] In February 2006, India bought 28 launch units for the 300mm Smerch Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) fitted with DPICM and Sensor Fuzed Submunitions. “India, Russia sign $500mn [sic] rocket systems deal,” Indo-Asian News Service (New Delhi), 9 February 2006.

[22] In 1995, Kuwait was the first export customer for the Russian produced 300mm Smerch MLRS fitted with DPCIM and Sensor Fuzed Submunitions, buying 27 launch units. “Kuwait to get smart submunitions for Smerch MRL,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 21 April 1995.

[23] Human Rights Watch observed PTAB submunitions at the abandoned ammunitions storage depot at Mizdah during a visit in March 2012. See “Statement on Explosive Remnants of War in Libya and Implementation of CCW Protocol V,” 25 April 2012, http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/25/statement-explosive-remnants-war-libya-and-implementation-convention-conventional-we. In addition, deminers from the Mines Advisory Group encountered dud PTAB submunitions about 20 miles from Ajdjabiya. See: CJ Chivers, “More Evidence of Cluster-Bomb Use Discovered in Libya,” “At War” blog at nyt.com, 13 February 2012, accessed 7 June 2012, http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/13/more-evidence-of-cluster-bomb-use-discovered-in-libya/.

[24] Macedonia FYR, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 8 May 2012 declared stockpiles of containers with AO-2.5RT submunitions.

[25] Moldova, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 27 January 2012 reported destroying a stockpile of 1,385 cluster munitions with more than 27,000 submunitions in July 2010. The stockpile included RBK series bombs containing PTAB, AO-2.5, and AO-1 SCh submunitions. It also destroyed 473 9M27K rockets, each containing 30 9N210 self-destructing submunitions and 824 3-O-13 artillery projectiles, each containing eight O-16 submunitions.

[26] In May 2007 it was disclosed that the Peruvian air force possesses stockpiles of RBK-500 bombs. Ángel Páez, “Peru se suma a iniciativa mundial para prohibir y destruir las ‘bombas de racimo’” (“Peru joins global initiative to ban and destroy the ‘cluster bombs’”), La Republica, 29 May 2007. Human Rights Watch was shown photographs of these cluster munitions by a member of the national media in May 2007. See also, Ángel Páez, “Se eliminaran las bombas de racimo” (“Cluster bombs will be eliminated”), La Republica, 29 May 2007.

[27] The Polish Air Force possesses “BKF expendable unit loader with anti-tank, incendiary and fragmentation bomblets, imported from USSR.” Letter from Adam Kobieracki, Director, Security Policy Department, Poland Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Human Rights Watch, 10 March 2009.

[28] Presentation of Ukraine, “Impact of the CCW Draft Protocol VI (current version)” on Ukraine’s Defense Capacity, made to CCW GGE on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 30 March 2011.

[29] For example, independent journalist Aris Roussinos filmed and photographed a failed RBK-500 AO-2.5RT cluster bomb near the village of Ongolo in South Kodorfan in April 2012. See Human Rights Watch, “Sudan: Cluster Bomb Found in Conflict Zone,” 25 May 2012, http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/05/24/sudan-cluster-bomb-found-conflict-zone.

[30] All information in this table was extracted from Article 7 transparency reports submitted so far by States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, available at: http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/84610CE6A9FDDACDC1257823003BBC39?OpenDocument.

[31] Statement of Russian Federation, CCW Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 12 November 2009. Notes by Landmine Action.

[32] Statement of Russian Federation, CCW Fourth Review Conference, Geneva, 18 November 2011. Notes by Human Rights Watch. An October 2004 report to the US Congress by the US Department of Defense disclosed a stockpile of 5.5 million cluster munitions containing about 728.5 million submunitions.

[33] Letter from Ryabkov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Human Rights Watch, 20 March 2009.

[34] The data in this table comes from the following sources: Publishing House ‘Arms and Technologies’ & Information Centre of Defence Technologies and Safety, “The XXI Century Encyclopedia ‘Russia’s Arms and Technologies’ Volume 12: Ordnance and Munitions” CD Version 2006.1eng; Robert Hewson, ed., Janes AirLaunched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2004), pp. 414–415, 422–432; Leland S. Ness and Anthony G. Williams, eds., Janes Ammunition Handbook 20072008 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2007), pp. 572, 597–598, 683, 703–706, 715–716, 722–723; US Defense Intelligence Agency, “Improved Conventional Munitions and Selected Controlled-Fragmentation Munitions (Current and Projected),” partially declassified and made available to Human Rights Watch under a Freedom of Information Act request; and “Russia’s Arms Catalog: Volume IV, Precision Guided Weapons and Ammunition, 1996–1997,” (Military Parade: Moscow), 1997, pp. 138–139, 148–152, 373–392, 504, 515–516. This research has been supplemented by information found on the Splav State Research and Production Enterprise corporate website: www.splav.org.