It appears certain that Senegalese troops used
antipersonnel landmines in Guinea-Bissau in 1998, supporting the government in
fighting that erupted in that country in June. (See country report on
Guinea-Bissau). In the midst of the conflict, Senegal ratified the Mine Ban
Treaty on 24 September 1998. Though the Mine Ban Treaty had not entered into
force for Senegal, the use of mines by a signatory can be judged a breach of its
international obligations. Under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, “a state is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat
the purpose of a treaty when...it has signed the treaty.” Clearly, new
use of mines defeats the purpose of the treaty.
Senegal has a severe landmine problem in its southern enclave province of
Casamance where fighting has intensified between the Senegalese army and the
separatist Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)
since August of 1997. The conflict, which began in 1982, has had disastrous
results for the civilian population. The situation has been aggravated by the
recent proliferation of antipersonnel and antitank mines in the region, laid in
large numbers by the rebels. Civilians—the main victims of
landmines—have been severely affected and the agrarian base of the
Casamançais economy destroyed.
The consequences—for public health, the regional economy, and the
environment—are alarming. Rural activities in the entire region south of
the Casamance River are heavily affected. Investments totaling several billions
CFA francs in rural development projects have been shelved or canceled.
Technical assistance to farmers and breeders is paralyzed in 60-80 percent of
cases: agriculture is virtually at a standstill. Vaccination campaigns and
public health activities have slowed down considerably. Tourism, relatively
unaffected until recently, has been hit by the fear that the indiscriminate
nature of AP mines has sown in the region.
Mine Ban Policy
Senegal signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December
1997 and ratified it on 24 September 1998. Senegal participated fully in the
Ottawa Process; it attended the treaty preparatory meetings and the Oslo treaty
negotiations, endorsed the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration, and supported the
key 1996, 1997 and 1998 pro-ban UN General Assembly resolutions on
landmines.
The Dakar-based NGO, Recontre Africaine pour la Defense des Droits de l'Homme
(Raddho) played an active role in lobbying the government to sign the ban
treaty. It also co-hosted with African Topics magazine a media workshop
that drew domestic and international attention to Senegal's landmine problem, in
Dakar on 3 November 1997.[1] In
1997 Raddho also met with the head of the separatist MFDC Senghor and urged him
to use his influence in stopping the MFDC from using
landmines.[2]
Production, Transfer, Stockpiling
Senegal is not a known producer of landmines.
Members of the Senegalese engineering corps assert that the army has only mines
of Warsaw Pact origin,[3] although
the U.S. may have also supplied
Claymores.[4] There is no further
information on Senegalese stockpiles. The government claims that MFDC mines are
of Belgian, Portuguese, Spanish, Russian and Chinese
origin.[5] Recorded incidents
confirm that both AP and ATMs have been used by rebels. A number of these are
apparently undetectable with the army’s current detection equipment.
Photographic and pathological evidence suggest that blast-effect mines have been
used by the MFDC.[6] The loss of
one lower limb, but not the other suggests the characteristic effects of blast
mines.
An important source of mines used by the rebels is apparently the black
market in Guinea- Bissau, where mines are reportedly obtainable for as little as
1,500 CFA francs (less than $3) for AP mines and 2,500 CFA francs for AT
mines.[7] It has also been
reported that rebel elements of the Guinea-Bissau military provided mines to the
Casamance separatists – one of the factors that lead to the fighting in
that country. (See country report on Guinea Bissau). Gambia has also been named
as a source for the MFDC
rebels.[8]
MFDC Use
Mines traceable to the MFDC conflict began causing
damage in 1991. But it was around the Senegalese presidential and legislative
elections in February 1993 that the MFDC stepped up military pressure by using
mines to prevent the people from going to the polls to vote in Casamance. In
January 1993, an ICRC vehicle exploded as it went over an antitank mine, killing
and mutilating several people. Large-scale laying of mines by the MFDC began in
August 1997.
According to well-informed sources in contact with the MFDC, the use of mines
is due to a number of factors,[9]
including increased pressure on MDFC rear bases in the Guinea-Bissau border area
as a result of improving diplomatic relations between the Senegalese and
Guinea-Bissau governments. The pressure weakened the MFDC’s logistical
support of food and funds, forcing it to rely more heavily on food resources in
Casamance itself. Where previously the MFDC had levied informal taxes on the
population, it now took full control of areas rich in natural resources to
satisfy its own needs and market the surplus. The decision was made to construct
security perimeters and expel the local populations. Landmines were a useful
means of terror. At the same time, the MFDC separatists are split on their use
of landmines. Its hardliners wanted to step up the fight at any cost, while its
political leader, Father Augustine Diamacoune Senghor, currently under house
arrest in Zinguinchor, is said to have been shocked by the rebels’ use of
antipersonnel mines.[10]
MFDC forces inside the country admitted to using mines in November 1997 but
promised not to do so any more. This was contradicted by the French branch of
the MFDC, which issued a statement in early February 1998, claiming that the
landmines, the “instruments of death,” had been laid by the
government. Landmines continued to be laid in
1998.[11] To complicate things
further the MFDC has now split into two antagonistic fronts, a “Front
Sud” under Senghor and a “Front Nord” led by Sidy Badji, the
MFDC's first guerrilla chief of staff.
The MFDC was almost certainly still laying mines in August 1998. Two
incidents involving antitank mines took place on dirt roads in the Ziguinchor
area that month. On 10 August, an accident occurred with a minibus in the
Bignona department in the Sindian zone, killing thirteen people and injuring
ten. On 13 August, three children died and another was seriously injured when
their cart hit a mine 3 -4 km from Ziguinchor, on the road to Soukouta. This
road is used constantly so there is no doubt that the mines were recent. This
mine may have been intended for an expected military
convoy.[12] The wide-spread
laying of mines also contributed to economic chaos which the MFDC wished to
instigate to force the Senegalese authorities to negotiate.
According to the Senegalese military not all mines planted in Casamance are
by rebels. Mines are also used to sort out local vendettas and have been used by
bandits and highwaymen to cover their tracks and frighten
locals.[13] A number of merchants
in Ziguinchor have been arrested for possession of
landmines.[14]
Senegal Army Use
The first landmines are thought to have been laid
in Casamance in 1968-73, when the African Party for the Independence of
Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) began the fight for independence against
Portuguese colonialism in Guinea-Bissau, which Casamance adjoins. PAIGC enjoyed
the backing of the OAU, Senegal and people along the Casamance border, many of
whom had family and ethnic links with PAIGC activists.
After independence, Senegalese armed forces have laid mines to protect the
border with Guinea-Bissau where, as noted above, the MFDC has had rear bases,
and to protect military perimeters and
infrastructure.[15] The army has
stuck to conventional mining doctrine, with a clear laying pattern. This is less
dangerous for civilians and less problematic for future mine clearance
operations than MFDC practices. Some sources have reported a few examples of
“terrorist” mining, aimed at civilians in high-risk areas. But
these are apparently isolated cases, which do not seem to correspond to orders
from the military hierarchy.[16]
The U.S. Department of State's report Hidden Killers noted in 1993 that
two Senegalese members of ECOMOG were killed in Liberia while laying
landmines.[17] It is not clear if
Senegalese forces have laid mines inside Senegal since it signed the ban treaty
in December 1997. The official line is, “It is not the Senegalese
army’s vocation to lay
mines.”[18]
Use by Senegalese forces in Guinea-Bissau
It appears certain that Senegalese forces used
antipersonnel mines in Guinea-Bissau in 1998, in support of government troops.
The conflict erupted on 7 June 1998 when Guinea-Bissau President João
Bernardo Viera sacked then Army Chief-of-Staff Ansumane Mane for supposedly
covertly supplying arms to the MFDC. News reports claim that landmines, which
have been used in the Cassamance conflict, were included in the suspected arms
shipments.[19] Mane quickly
rallied almost the entire Guinea-Bissau army into a self-proclaimed Military
Junta and called for President Viera's removal on charges of corruption and
mismanagement. With almost no forces to defend his regime, Viera called on the
neighboring countries of Senegal and Guinea-Conakry to send troops to hold off
the advancing Junta, which both countries quickly did.
Fighting centered on the capital, Bissau, where government troops reinforced
by Senegalese troops defended the center of the city south of the airport. The
Junta eventually consolidated its hold on the interior and forced the withdrawal
of the foreign troops, turning the focus of fighting to the city of Bissau.
Reports also put Cassamance rebels fighting on the side of the Junta. On 1
November, the Abuja Accord was signed by the government and the Military Junta
and on 20 February 1999 the Government of National Unity was sworn in to oversee
the transition period until elections can be organized sometime this year. (See
country report on Guinea-Bissau.)
Use of antipersonnel mines in the conflict by Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, and
Junta forces has been reported by the United Nations, the commander of ECOMOG
forces, the chief of staff of Guinean forces in Guinea-Bissau, and by the media
and other on-the-ground observers of the conflict. According to a U.N. Mine
Action Service (UNMAS) assessment, the use of mines by both sides left
2,000-3,000 mines, and “it is reported that Junta and government forces
as well as the Senegalese contingent have established records of the different
minefields.”[20] An
informed military source who was present on the ground contends that the vast
majority of mines were planted by the government and Senegalese forces in their
defense of the city against the advancing Junta
forces.[21] That mines were used
by government and Senegalese troops was reported on Portuguese television:
“RTP [Lisbon RTP International Television] has confirmed the existence of
antipersonnel mines in Guinnea-Bissau, where the conflict’s front line
used to be. They were laid by government and Senegalese troops. The Bishop of
Bissau had warned of mines
before.”[22]
Mine Action Funding
So far, almost no financial resources have been
dedicated to the support of technical surveys, mine clearance, mine awareness or
victim assistance, for two main reasons: 1) The proliferation of landmines in
Casamance is a relatively new phenomenon and, as such, has taken the
international community by surprise, and 2) Peace has not yet been restored.
This prevents large operations, particularly in sensitive fields like technical
survey, marking and mine clearance. Although the army has engaged in demining
operations, it has received no specialist assistance. The Senegalese authorities
report that several of their deminers have been shot at by MFDC while trying to
clear landmines.[23]
Little has been done in the field of landmine awareness. At the end of 1998,
no specific programs have implemented for mine victim assistance. However,
growing international awareness of the problem may change this situation in
months to come. In March 1999 Handicap International initiated a two-year
program, with funding from the EU and the French cooperation secretariat, to
strengthen local capacity for victim assistance and landmine awareness.
Mine Clearance
The army claims to have destroyed 786 antitank
mines and 1,947 antipersonnel mines, and lifted fifty-nine antitank mines and
106 antipersonnel mines between 24 October 1995 and 30 May 1998. It is unclear
exactly which areas have been cleared. The current situation does not allow
large-scale mine clearance programs that could be supported by specialist
international agencies; additionally, the authorities are opposed to such
interventions while fighting continues. It is difficult to ascertain the
MFDC’s position on mine clearance activities. Sources close to the
movement feel its military leadership would be hostile to such an idea, fearing
a loss of tactical advantage. In addition, mines are still being laid, rendering
clearance pointless at present.
Future clearance operations will be expensive. The low density of mining in
some areas, the terrain and the lack of plans or maps will increase the level of
logistical difficulty. It is as yet impossible to make an in-depth assessment
of the location, number and socio-economic impact of landmines in Casamance.
Existing information, although carefully sourced, should be treated as
indicative. Whereas the army appears to have laid mines according to
conventional doctrine, the MFDC appears to have mined indiscriminately,
compounding surveying problems.
Most mine-laying has occurred in the southern strip of land between the
Casamance River and the Guinea-Bissau border, in Ziguinchor and Oussouye
departments and in part of the Sédhiou department in the south-west of
the Kolda region. The Ziguinchor region has a population of about 492,000
people, about 176,000 of them in Ziguinchor itself. The strip of land south of
the river, severely affected by the fighting, previously had a population of
roughly 300,000 people. An estimated 60,000 people have now moved to other parts
of country, mostly to large towns. 5,000-60,000 (depending on the source) have
fled to Guinea-Bissau and The Gambia.
Mine Awareness
Some prevention mechanisms already exist. The army
prevents civilian access to some mined areas, while others are marked. The
Senegalese Red Cross has carried out basic mine risk awareness education, as has
the army. Reportedly, the army has been teaching civilians to detect mines,
providing them with a three-pronged fork with a long handle for
probing.[24] Once the mines have
been found, the civilians contact the military so that they can be neutralized.
Landmine Survivor Assistance
In late 1998, Handicap International recorded
forty-six villages (plus Ziguinchor itself) where mine incidents had taken
place. Of these, forty-three are located south of the Casamance River.
Forty-three were in the Ziguinchor region and four in the Kolda region. Eighty
percent of these sites were cross-confirmed. The fact that accidents took place
in these villages does not mean that they still contain mines. In some cases
the army has carried out demining operations, although there are doubts about
their exhaustiveness. In other cases few mines appear to have been laid and all
may now have been detonated.
According to a survey of mine victims by the NGO Radho, 32 percent of
surviving landmine victims are in Ziguinchor itself, 23 percent in Oussouye, 16
percent in Oussouye and six per cent from Bignona. The other 32 per cent of
survivors are from various locations. Thirty-five percent of victims are women,
but the most surprising statistic is the victims' youth: 58 percent one and 17
years of age. And another 13 percent are 18 to
30.[25]
Senegalese military records indicate that, between 24 October 1995 and 15
June 1998, 226 mines were detonated by people or vehicles in the Ziguinchor
region. These accidents are said to have resulted in 153 victims, all
civilians, including forty-five dead and 108
injured.[26] This suggests an
average of about thirteen victims per month.
Between 2 August 1997 and 10 August 1998, 193 civilian mine victims were
treated at Ziguinchor regional hospital, an average of sixteen victims per
month. At the present the hospital is treating two to three victims a week.
However, not all cases are recorded as mine victims, while people killed
instantly are not registered. According to the authorities, between 1 July and
31 December 1997, fifty-six soldiers were mine victims, eleven died.
Extrapolating from these figures, it is safe to assume a “real”
figure of 500 mine victims. Taking into account the surface area concerned
(7,339 sq. km), total population (492,000) and the fact that an estimated 90 per
cent of the mines are located in an area of no more than 2,500 sq. km, the
annual ratio (1.5 victims per 1,000 people) is extremely high.
As noted above, the statistics for victims should be treated with care, but
it is clear that women and children are heavily affected. Local sources claim
that the army death toll is higher than officially declared. The director of
Ziguinchor regional hospital hopes to build a dedicated mine victim unit, in
part because of mine cases’ psychological impact on other patients. For
military victims, generally evacuated to Dakar, medical care does not pose any
particular problem.[27] Treatment
of mine victims today represents 40 per cent of the workload of the
hospital’s orthopedic center. A shortage of raw materials is beginning to
be felt. There is only one physiotherapist for the two regions of Kolda and
Ziguinchor (one million inhabitants), based at Ziguinchor regional hospital.
Ongoing care and the follow-up to the fitting of prostheses are inadequate.
Broader Socio-Economic Impact of Mine Use
Obsessive fear of landmines has developed since the
beginning of massive laying in 1997. The people are shocked by the suffering of
the victims and their families and by the terrible increase in the number of
disabled, and by the disastrous effects of the proliferation of mines on the
economy. In the wider climate of terror which currently reigns in Casamance, it
is difficult to discern what is the result of mines and what stems from the
fighting, surprise attacks by the MFDC and repression of the civilian population
by the two warring parties. Many activities relating to health, agriculture,
and rural life in general, are at a complete standstill and many parts of the
region are now no-go areas.
Vaccination, prenatal visits and medical assistance in general have been
badly disrupted. Health workers note an increase in endemic diseases and home
births. The army is now frequently used to carry out vaccination campaigns. A
heavy food deficit has built up, resulting in malnutrition and even famine
according to some people, although some reports may be exaggerated.
Ziguinchor’s regional agricultural service estimates an 80 per cent
reduction in agricultural activity south of the Casamance River, in what used to
be the region’s richest agricultural zone. Fruit is rotting on the trees,
while rice fields are no longer
cultivated.[28] Agricultural
extension services are paralyzed, as are regional agricultural inventory and
stock breeding programs. Vulnerable fresh-water systems are becoming salinated
for lack of dam maintenance. Most of the food consumed now comes from Dakar. On
average, food prices have doubled, partly due to the greatly increased
difficulty in distributing supplies.
Before August 1997, tourism was not direct target for the MFDC, although four
French tourists disappeared in 1994. In principle, tourism is still not a
direct target today, but unlike the rebels, mines do not choose their victims.
Since August 1997, the massive appearance of landmines has frightened off
potential holiday makers. All reservations during the last November 1997-March
1998 season were canceled leading to significant loss of earnings. The mining of
roads, including arteries such as the road between Kolda and Ziguinchor, has
frightened off a large number of tourism promoters. Alternative solutions have
been found, including direct flights between Paris and Cape Skirring, but these
are at best a partial solution. It has been estimated that up to 70 per cent of
the region’s 16,000 tourism-related jobs are at risk.
[2]Alioune Tine,
“Landmines in Casamance Against the March of History,” African
Topics, no's 23-24, May-July 1998.
[3]Handicap International,
“The Impact of Landmines in Casemance/Senegal”, Exploratory
Mission Report, August 1998. To protect sources, this is a confidential
document.
[4]Barbarcar Ndiaye and Alex
Vines, “Senegal: Old Mines, New Wars,” African Topics, no.
22, January-March 1998.
[17]U.S. Department of State,
Hidden Killers, (Washington DC: US Department of State, 1993), p.
150.
[18]Barbarcar Ndiaye and Alex
Vines, “Senegal: Old Mines, New Wars.”
[19]Alex Duval Smith,
“Just a Little War among the Crocodile Swamps,” Guardian News
Service. Johannesburg. 24 June 1998; West Africa, (London), 26
January - 1 February 1998.
[20]Major Herve Petetin,
“Mine Situation in Guinea-Bissau,” United Nations Mine Action
Service, December 1998, p. 1.
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