Key developments
since March 1999: Government forces and at least ten ethnic armed groups
continue to lay antipersonnel landmines in significant numbers. Landmine
Monitor estimates there were approximately 1,500 new mine victims in 1999. The
Committee Representing the People’s Parliament endorsed the Mine Ban
Treaty in January 2000.
Mine Ban Policy
The military government of Myanmar is known as the
State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). The SPDC has not signed the Mine Ban
Treaty and did not participate in the Ottawa Process. It abstained on the UN
General Assembly resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999.
The representative of the SPDC explained by stating, “A sweeping ban on
landmines is unnecessary and unjustified. The problem is the indiscriminate use
of mines, as well as the transfer of
them.”[2]
The SPDC has stated that it supports a ban on transfer of antipersonnel
landmines, and believes that the Conference on Disarmament (of which it is a
member) is the appropriate forum to negotiate this
issue.[3] Myanmar is not a
signatory to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but in December 1999
it sent observers to the First Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW
Amended Protocol II (Landmines) in Geneva. Myanmar has not participated in any
other mine ban fora in 1999 or 2000.
Shortly after the release of the Landmine Monitor Report 1999, the
SPDC criticized the report for being based on sources residing mostly outside of
the country. It denied that Myanmar army (Tatmadaw) have laid mines inside
Thailand, that Tatmadaw mine use has been directed against the civilian
population, and that civilians have been used as “human mine
sweepers.”[4]
In January 2000 the Committee Representing the
People’s Parliament endorsed the Mine Ban Treaty. It stated that it would
“recommend to the People’s Parliament, when it is convened, as a
matter of immediate national concern, accession to the
Convention.”[5]
Production, Transfer, Stockpiling--Government
Myanmar is a producer of antipersonnel mines. The
Myanmar Defense Products Industries (Kahpasa) produce at least two mines,
designated as MM1 and MM2. These mines are modeled after the Chinese Type 59
stake-mounted fragmentation mine and the Chinese Type 58 blast
mine.[6] Ethnic militia members
have told Landmine Monitor researchers that the government produces three other
types of antipersonnel mines, designated MM3, MM4, and MM5, but no conclusive
evidence is available.[7]
Although the SPDC has declared its support for a ban on AP mine transfers, it
has yet to institute a formal moratorium or ban. There is no evidence that the
government has exported antipersonnel mines to other countries, but there have
been allegations that Tatmadaw units have provided mines to ethnic
combatants.[8]
Several types of antipersonnel mines from other countries continue to be
found in the field indicating past, if not current, importation. These include
Chinese, Israeli, Italian, Russian, U.S., and other unidentified AP
mines.[9]
Neither the SPDC, nor the Ministry of Defense, will release any statistics
regarding the size and type of mines in stockpile.
Use—Government
Mine warfare has continued since the release of
Landmine Monitor Report 1999. While the government does not deny that it
uses antipersonnel mines, it insists it does not do so in an indiscriminate
fashion.[10]
The rebel Shan State Army (SSA) alleges that sections of the border with
Thailand, southern Shan State and the banks of the Salween River have been mined
by the SPDC.[11] They also
allege that Lahu mercenaries hired by the SPDC have mined paths used by the SSA.
Landmine Monitor researchers have seen mines of Burmese manufacture removed by
the SSA.
In Dweh Loh township of Karen State, it was alleged in April 2000 that SPDC
units torched villages from which the inhabitants had fled, and then laid mines
in the remains and on paths and in fields adjacent to the
villages.[12] In the area
northeast of the capital, SPDC troops are said to have laid mines in retaliation
to mine laying by the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA). It is alleged that
the SPDC lays mines on KNLA supply lines, escape routes to the Thai border used
by refugees, and around villages and fields that Karen people have fled or been
forcibly relocated.[13]
In the Tenasserim Division, beginning late November 1999, the Tatmadaw has
used landmines to consolidate its control of areas on the border with Thailand
from Amalakee southward.[14]
This operation has placed a mixture of antivehicle and antipersonnel mines
between military posts along the border where persons, including those seeking
to flee Burma as refugees, could conceivably cross: along stream beds, on paths
and roads, and at passes.
There continue to be reports of Tatmadaw units deliberately laying mines in
Thailand, including reports from Thai military based on the
border.[15] Thai authorities
provided Landmine Monitor with what appear to be Tatmadaw documents related to
mine laying inside Thailand.[16]
Thai military border officers have been killed and wounded by Burmese-made mines
apparently placed during 1999 and early 2000 while on patrol along the
border.[17] They have cleared
mines in several locations.
The Tatmadaw uses two methods of laying mines: “registered” and
“lost.” Registered mines are laid as a defensive perimeter around
military camps, or along supply lines, at certain times. The locations of these
mines are recorded, and when the operation is finished these mines are removed.
Lost mines are never recovered. Neither registered nor lost mines are fenced or
marked in any way. The general location, numbers and types of lost mines are
usually recorded on Tatmadaw maps or records (e.g. five AP mines on hill 270).
This allows Tatmadaw units to know if an area was previously mined, but it does
not give the exact locations of the
mines.[18]
In addition, it is believed SPDC military engineers actively maintain
minefields along the border with Bangladesh, replacing old or exploded mines
with new mines.[19] Originally
laid in 1993, the minefields, which run nearly the entire length of the border,
now serve to prevent cross-border economic activities like woodcutting and
smuggling,[20] to deter further
flight by refugees from the interior of
Burma,[21] and to interdict
cross-border movement by armed ethnic
militias.[22] Some mines have
been placed on the Bangladesh side due to poor demarcation and thick vegetation.
Victims of AP mine incidents include both Burmese and Bangladeshi
citizens.[23] The government of
Bangladesh has repeatedly requested Myanmar remove these
mines.[24]
Regular Tatmadaw officers have told Landmine Monitor researchers that they
received no formal instruction in mine laying. Usually, mines are laid by
specialized “BE” military engineering units. Other soldiers only
lay mines when the engineers are “not available,” and do so under
the direction and instruction of their commanding
officer.[25]
Ethnic Armed Groups
Thirty armed organizations, most associated with an
ethnicity within the country, have been involved in armed struggle against the
SPDC (see chart below). In 1999, about a dozen armed groups were actively
engaged in some level of military activity (often quite limited) against the
Tatmadaw in Arakan, Chin, Shan, Karenni, and Karen States, as well as in the
Bago and Tennaserim
Divisions.[26]
Production, Transfer, Stockpiling—Armed Ethnic Groups
All of the armed groups are believed to be capable
of building blast mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Some groups can
also manufacture Claymore-type
mines.[27] Materials for mine
production are readily available. Many of the mines require batteries for
operation, limiting the mine’s life to that of the battery, usually said
to be one year. A new mine design by the Karen National Liberation Army does not
require a battery and has a longer field
life.[28]
The armed ethnic groups do not receive mines from foreign governments.
However, the wars in Vietnam and Cambodia have left ample quantities of
landmines on the regional black market. In 1999 the black market price for a
U.S.- or Vietnamese-made M14 antipersonnel mine was about US$5, and a Claymore
mine was about US$11.[29] Other
types of AP mines are available, including the Chinese-made Type 72. As
mentioned above, there have also been allegations that Tatmadaw units have
provided mines to ethnic
combatants.[30]
One knowledgeable source has said that two stockpiles of landmines in the
hands of ethnic military forces are estimated to number in the thousands, mostly
of indigenous
construction.[31]
Use—Ethnic Armed Groups
At least ten of the ethnic militias are mine users.
The Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) is likely to be the largest mine user,
followed by the Karenni Army (KA). The All Burma Students Democratic Front
(ABSDF), Peoples Defense Forces (PDF), Myiek-Dawei United Front (MDUF), Rohingya
Solidarity Organization (RSO), Shan State Army (SSA), Democratic Karen Buddhist
Army, God’s Army, and the Chin National Army (CNA) are also believed to
use mines.[32]
Like government-laid mines, mines laid by the KNLA, KA and others also
produce civilian casualties. Ethnic militias involved in mine warfare
acknowledge use of AP mines and/or Claymore mines for perimeter defense of their
mobile camps at night, but claim they remove all mines during daylight.
Command-detonated Claymore mines (usually U.S.-made M-18s) are also used during
offensive operations, such as
ambush.[33]
Mines have been used predominantly in conflicts between government troops and
ethnic armed groups, but have also been used in conflicts between various armed
ethnic organizations as well, both in competition for “business
interests” as well as over territorial disputes.
Active mine laying is occurring in Karen and Karenni states where the Karen
National Liberation Army and the Karenni Army are attempting to maintain control
or harass Tatmadaw troops, especially in the area to the northeast of Hpa-an,
where mine laying by both the KNLA and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army is
considered heavy.[34]
A former military advisor stated that the KNLA lay mines near SPDC camps, on
the flanks of key passes for the KNLA, along KNLA supply routes and refugee
escape routes. The KNLA lays a combination of their own mines and purchased
ones.[35]
God's Army has planted mines in their area of operation along the Thai-Burma
border opposite Ye according to a communiqué they released in late
January 2000.[36]
At least one militia is suggesting that it might cease antipersonnel mine
warfare. In March 2000 the SSA issued a statement claiming it was
“against the producing, stockpiling or using of these
mines.”[37] Earlier, at a
press briefing in December 1999, the SSA said that they have a military policy
of “no offensive mine use,” stating that it is “dangerous for
[Shan] villagers.”[38]
The KA is rumored to be cutting back on its mine use. The Rohingya
Army of the RSO and the Chin National Army allege that they lay no
“lost” mines. They also admit use of command-detonated
mines.[39] The People’s
Defense Force (PDF), made up of former Tatmadaw soldiers and officers and
operating in lower Karen State, admits to AP mine use for night perimeter
defense of mobile camps.[40]
Political Organization
Armed Wing
Cease-fire?
AP Mine User?
Producer?
Stockpile?
Mines in territory?
ARAKAN STATE
1
Arakan Liberation Party
Arakan Liberation Army
No
?
?
?
Yes
2
Arakan Army of Arakan Land (a.k.a. NUPA)
Arakan Army
No
Likely
Likely
Likely
Yes
29
Rohingya Solidarity Organization
Rohingya Army
No
Yes
?
Yes
Yes
3
Democratic Party Arakan (former NUFA)
Arakan Peoples Army
No
?
?
?
Yes
4
Arakan Rohingya National Organization
Rohingya National Army
No
Command Detonated
No
Yes
Yes
CHIN STATE
5
Chin National Front
Chin National Army
No
Command Detonated
Claim No
Yes
Yes
KACHIN STATE
8
Kachin Independence Organization
Kachin Independency Army
Yes
Not currently
Former
Likely
Yes
9
(former KIA 4th Brigade)
Kachin Democratic Army
Yes
?
?
?
Yes
13
(former CPB 101)
New Democratic Army
Yes
?
?
?
Yes
SHAN STATE
26
Restoration Council of Shan State (alliance SURA, former MTA)
Shan State Army
Partial
Command Detonated
Claim No
Yes
Yes
10
United Wa Organization
United Wa State Army
Yes
Likely
Former
?
Yes
11
Shan State Nationalities Peoples Liberation Organization
Shan State Nationalities Peoples Liberation Organization
Yes
?
?
?
Yes
12
Palaung Peoples Liberation Organization
Palaung State Liberation Army
Yes
?
?
?
Yes
14
Wa National Organization
Wa National Army
No
?
?
?
Yes
15
(former CPB 815)
National Democratic Alliance Army
Yes
?
?
?
Yes
KARENNI STATE
16
(former CPB ally)
Karenni National Peoples Liberation Forces
Yes
Likely
Likely
Likely
Yes
17
Karenni National Progressive Party
Karenni Army
Broken
Yes
Yes
Likely
Yes
18
Karenni National Democratic Front
Karenni National Democratic Army
Yes
Likely
Likely
Likely
Yes
KAREN STATE
19
Karen National Union
Karen National Liberation Army
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
20
Democratic Karen Buddhist Organization
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army
No
Yes
Likely
Yes
Yes
21
All Burma Students Democratic Front
All Burma Students Democratic Front
No
Likely
Likely
Yes
22
All Burma Muslim Union
All Burma Muslim Union
No
?
?
?
Yes
27
Peoples Defense Forces
Peoples Defense Forces
No
Command Detonated
Claim No
Yes
Yes
23
Peoples Liberation Front
Peoples Liberation Front
No
?
?
?
Yes
MON STATE
24
New Mon State Party
Mon National Liberation Army
Yes
Former
Former
Yes
Yes
PEGU DIVISION
19
Karen National Union
Karen National Liberation Army
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
SAGAING DIVISION
6
Kuki National Front
Kuki National Army
No
?
?
?
Likely
7
National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang)
National Socialist Council of Nagaland
?
?
Likely
Likely
Likely
30
Zomi National Front
Zomi National Army
No
?
?
?
Likely
TENASSERIM DIVISION
25
Myeik-Dawei United Front
Myeik-Dawei United Front
No
Command Detonated
?
Yes
Yes
19
Karen National Union
Karen National Liberation Army
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
21
All Burma Students Democratic Front
All Burma Students Democratic Front
No
Command Detonated
Yes
Yes
28
[KNU break-away]
God's Army
No
Yes
?
Yes
Yes
Notes:
Cease-fire: Has negotiated cease-fire agreement with SLORC or
SPDC.
AP Mine User: Is currently practicing mine warfare, either defensively
or offensively.
Producer: Manufacture IEDs that have the characteristic of an
antipersonnel landmine, or alter other munitions to serve as antipersonnel
landmines.
Stockpile: Maintain a store of mines, or components, for use in
warfare.
Mines in Territory: Mines now in the ground in their province or
division of activity. Could be laid by themselves, allies or adversaries.
There are a variety of small self-proclaimed armed groups that are
dysfunctional or not currently active that are not included.
Revolutionary political organizations, which do not maintain an armed wing,
are not included.
Some of the armed ethnic organizations are primarily involved in the
narcotics trade for self-perpetuation rather than any real political activity.
(10, 13, 15) Several armed groups are quite small, and work only in alliance
with other groups. (22,23)
Landmine Problem
Ten out of fourteen states and divisions in Burma
are mine-affected, with a heavy concentration in eastern Burma. Mines are found
widely in Karen, and Karenni states and the Tenasserim Division. The northwest
frontier in Arakan State and a few areas of the western edge of Chin State and
southern portions of Shan State are mined. There are also reports of landmines
in Mon and Kachin States and the Bago Division.
There are landmines planted along the majority of Burma’s border with
Thailand and there is in essence a massive boundary minefield that runs
virtually the entire length of Burma's border with Bangladesh, beginning a few
miles from the termination of the water border along the Naf river, up to the
Tri-Border junction with India. One officer interviewed specified that
landmines can be found beginning at border post 31 running right up to the
border with India.[41] The
mines were laid in 1993 after a massive departure by a quarter of a million
Rohingya people in 1991 and
1992.[42] There are also mines
in a few scattered and remote areas along the borders with China and India.
There are no reliable estimates of the number of mines planted in Burma, or
the amount of land affected.
Mine Clearance and Mine Awareness
There are no humanitarian mine clearance operations
in Burma. Some ethnic armed groups have lifted mines in their areas.
The Myanmar Red Cross has stated that it is not considering mobilizing a
landmine awareness program, or surveying mine victim needs. The Myanmar Red
Cross believes “the problem is going away” since “the
government has signed peace agreements with all but one armed group,” and
therefore they should not waste scarce resources on this
issue.[43]
Atrocity Demining
In a particularly ugly practice, Tatmadaw units operating in theaters of
conflict near Myanmar's border with Thailand have repeatedly been accused of
forcing the local population to walk in front of Tatmadaw soldiers in areas
suspected of mine
contamination.[44] There have
been new reports of this “human minesweeping” in late 1999 and early
2000: in Karen State in the Dooplaya
District,[45] south of the Karen
State capital Hpa-an,[46] during
military assaults on Shan State Army positions near Tachilek in Shan
State,[47] and during the
operations against God's Army camps in the Tenasserim
Division.[48] Danish doctors
interviewing Burmese refugees in Thailand in 1998 and 1999 received numerous
reports of human
mine-sweeping.[49]
Landmine Casualties
Landmine Monitor estimates that conflict in Burma
produced approximately 1,500 mine victims in 1999 alone. This estimate is based
on a compilation of statistics from the Karen State from 1998 suggesting that
this single state produces nearly one civilian landmine amputee per
day,[50] as well as statistics
given by the government’s National Rehabilitation Center in Rangoon and by
Handicap International on the Burma-Thai border, and the number of prosthetic
components given to the military by the ICRC (until recently). It assumes there
are two military casualties for every one civilian victim, since mines are used
mostly in theaters of conflict where the civilian population has either been
forcibly removed or has fled, and that 30 percent of the victims die prior to
any medical care.
The U.S. State Department estimated 1,500 victims per year in Burma in a 1994
report.[51] This could mean
that the number of mine victims in Burma has been holding steady, at a very high
level, for many years.
A recent report by a group of Danish doctors who interviewed 120 refugees
from Burma at refugee camps in Thailand in both 1998 and 1999 found that 30% of
the subjects they interviewed knew of a person who had suffered a landmine
incident. In 40% of these cases, the interviewee’s relationship to the
person was family member. Victims reported through this study were between 8-55
years of age, and 90% were male. 30% of the time the victim is reported to have
died from the injuries. Survivors lost a limb in 87% of the cases. In about half
the cases, the activity that the victims were involved in was field work; the
other half were reported to occur during service as a military porter or as
forced labor to detonate mines by walking in front of troops (human
mine-sweeping).[52]
Despite the fact that military mine victims can be seen in border areas of
the country, the Ministry of Defense maintains that there are no military
victims of landmines.[53] There
is no centralized agency collecting statistics on landmine survivors within
Burma.
One news article looking at mine incidents on the Burma-Bangladesh border
states that in the past six years there have been 170 victims, of which 50 have
died. Victims included both Burmese and Bangladeshi
citizens.[54] A list assembled
by the Bangladesh Rifles indicates one hundred deaths were attributable to mines
up to 1999.
There are other victims of mines: more than twenty elephants have died due to
mines along the Bangladesh border, with still more on the Thai border. In
Bangladesh the elephants have now changed their migration routes causing them to
become a problem in nearby Bangladeshi agricultural areas that they had
previously avoided.[55] One
event that brought mine laying along the Thai/Burma border into the headlines
this year was when an elephant triggered a mine. She survived and received a
prosthetic leg.[56] There is a
major black market in cattle in the region, and many cattle are killed by mines
as traders cross the border with them. Also, villagers living near the border
region have lost many cattle to
mines.[57]
Survivor Assistance
Several medical practitioners believe that 50% of
all people wounded by landmines die before receiving medical treatment, and at
least one close observer of the situation in Karen State believes that figure is
conservative.[58] Access to
first aid and surgical care is dependent on the victim's physical distance from
health care facilities and the prevailing security situation in the area at the
time of the accident. Mine victims have reported travelling hours or even days
in order to receive care. Medical care received prior to surgery is primitive
and depends on whether a medic is on
hand.[59]
The medical system in Myanmar has been devastated by neglect. Medical
practitioners in public hospitals receive a monthly salary of
US$5.[60] Unless a victim can
pay for care at public or private health facilities, no care is available. In
two cases told to Landmine Monitor researchers, victims of Tatmadaw-laid mines
were intercepted by soldiers before they could reach a hospital and turned back
with the warning that they should not reveal the cause of their
injury.[61]
The Myanmar Ministry of Health provides prosthetic devices through the
National Rehabilitation Centre (NRC). The NRC receives no funding from the
government for outreach to the nation. All patients must reach the Centre on
their own. There has been no systematic distribution of information through
Myanmar's health care system about the NRC, and the Director concedes many
health practitioners in the country may not even be aware of the Centre’s
existence. The NRC has two branches, one in Rangoon, and a second in Mandalay,
each with a maximum capacity of about thirty in-patients per month. The two NRC
facilities, and the Ministry of Defense hospital in Mingaladon near Rangoon, are
the only facilities in the country currently providing artificial legs. An
additional ICRC constructed facility in the Maymyo military hospital is
currently not functional. The majority of the Centre's patients arrive under a
joint ICRC-NRC program from Shan, Karen and Karenni States and the Bago
Division.
The NRC provides limited statistics on its patients. Between 1990-1998 it
fitted almost 1,400 patients with artificial limbs, of which more than 70% were
victims of landmines.[62]
Between April-September 1999, the NRC provided services for 157 landmine
victims.[63]
No information is available from the government on victim assistance through
hospitals under the management of the Ministry of Defense, but ICRC statistics
indicate military hospitals may be providing more than twice as many prosthetics
as the civilian system.[64]
There is one vocational rehabilitation center in Rangoon run by the Ministry
of Health. A second facility for the vocational rehabilitation of amputees is
being constructed in Rangoon by an international NGO.
An independent, ethnic-based, mobile medical organization named the Back Pack
Health Worker Team (BPHWT) operates in ethnic resistance areas of Mon, Karen,
Karenni and Shan States. These medics offer a variety of primary and emergency
services. They have received training in amputation from a U.S.-based medical
organization, and held a special workshop in Thailand in mid-July 1999 on Trauma
& Landmines. All medics have been trained in emergency amputation surgery.
Surgeries are performed on sterilized plastic sheets on the floor of huts in the
nearest village. Landmine Monitor researchers were asked for bone saws, as the
backpack medics complained their saws were now
dull.[65]
[1] The military junta now controlling the
government of the country changed the name from Burma to Myanmar. Many ethnic
groups within the country still prefer to use the name Burma. In this report,
Myanmar is used when referring to the policies and practices of the State Peace
and Development Council, and Burma is used
otherwise. [2] Explanation of Abstention
of vote by the Representative of Myanmar during the 54th Session of the United
Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/C.1/54/L.2 (no
date). [3] Diplomatic Handbook, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Yangon, pp. 313-314. Interview with unnamed Foreign Affairs
personnel, August and October 1999. [4]
Letter to the Landmine Monitor from Ambassador Tin Winn, Embassy of the Union of
Myanmar, Washington DC, 16 July 1999; http://www.icbl.org/lm/comments.html
While welcoming comment from the SPDC, Landmine Monitor researchers have
repeatedly asked the SPDC for assistance and information on the range of
landmine issues within the country, and received none. In attempting to develop
dialogue on the issue, Landmine Monitor researchers delivered an advance draft
of this 2000 report for comment and suggestion. No response has been
received. [5] CRPP, Endorsement of the
Committee Representing the Peoples Parliament of the Convention on the
Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, January
2000. [6] Interview with David
McCracken, Technical Advisor for Mine Action, Thai Mine Action Center, October
1999. The Type 59 copy has been modified with a weather cap. Another source
indicates the mines are produced by the Kahpasa at factories in Pyay and
Ma-gway. Andrew Selth, Transforming the Tatmadaw (Canberra: Strategic Defence
Studies Centre), pp. 30-35. [7]
Interviews with ethnic militia members in Burma, December
1999. [8]
Ibid. [9] Unnamed source, Ministry of
Defense, Rangoon, February 2000. [10]
Letter to the Landmine Monitor from Ambassador Tin Winn, Embassy of the Union of
Myanmar, Washington DC, 16 July
1999. [11] Press briefing at Bright Shan
Mountain Camp by Col. Yod Serk, Military Commander, Shan State Army, December
1999. [12] Karen Human Rights Group,
“Papun and Nyaunglebin Districts: Villagers Flee as SPDC Troops Resume
Burning and Landmining of Villages,” 25 April
2000. [13] Letter from former military
advisor to the ethnic resistance, sent to Landmine Monitor, 11 November 1999.
See also, Karen Human Rights Group, “Beyond all Endurance: The Breakup of
Karen Villages in Southeastern Pa'an District,” 20 December 1999, pp.
22-27. [14] Interview with
People’s Defense Forces, Foreign Affairs and Military Liaison officers,
Songklaburi, Thailand, December 1999; interview with Thai Border Police Officer,
March 2000. [15] Interview with Thai
military based on the border, September
1999. [16] KNLA troops overran one
forward Tatmadaw base in March 2000, apparently obtaining landmines and
documents related to mine laying operations in Thailand by the Tatmadaw. These
documents subsequently made their way to Thai authorities, copies of which were
made available to Landmine Monitor. The authenticity of the documents cannot be
completely verified. [17] “Thai
Soldiers wounded by Junta's Landmines,” Bangkok Post, 18 November 1999;
“Landmines: Burma row leaves border vulnerable,” Bangkok Post, 19
January 2000; “Ranger loses leg to mine,” The Nation, 19 January
2000; “Landmine Kills 4 Soldiers at Suan Phung,” The Nation, 21
January 2000; “Landmine blast injuries Thai soldiers,” The Nation,
1 February 2000; “Border patrol—Five soldiers hurt by
landmine,” Bangkok Post, 2 February 2000; “Landmine blast injures
four soldiers,” The Nation, 4 February
2000. [18] Interviews with former
Tatmadaw officers, August and December 1999. Sometimes different terms, such as
“reclaimed” or “neglected,” were used instead of
“lost” mines. [19] Chakma
villager from Walidong in Burma interviewed by Arakan armed opposition in
Bangladesh, as told to Landmine Monitor/Bangladesh
researcher. [20] Interviews with
villagers living near the Burma border, Bangladesh, November
1999. [21] Interview with Bangladesh
government officials, October 1999; interviews with humanitarian agencies
working at the Bangladesh-Burma border, August
1999. [22] Interview with Bangladesh
government officer, October 1999. [23]
Mohammad Nurul Islam, “Where landmines take a heavy toll,” The
Independent, 28 May 1999, p. 14. [24]
Interview with Bangladesh government official, August
1999. [25] Interviews with former
Tatmadaw officers, August and December
1999. [26] Based on numerous interviews
with ethnic militias, military officers, refugees, aid workers, governmental
authorities and other observers. [27]
For more details on production, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 448. Until
the Mong Tai Army (MTA) of Khun Sa capitulated to the government in early 1996,
the MTA had the most sophisticated mine production capacity of any ethnic group,
with factories at Ho Mong with lathes, milling equipment, and a foundry. They
produced a stake mounted fragmentation mine similar to the Kahpasa-produced MM2
mine. The facilities came under government control and 2,000 MTA mines were
reportedly destroyed. Landmine Monitor correspondence with William Ashton,
military analyst and freelance author, 7 May 2000, and notes from Ashton field
trip, November-December 1999. [28]
Photographic evidence given to Landmine Monitor by unnamed expatriate working
among Christian ethnic communities on the Thai-Burma
frontier. [29] Interviews with ethnic
combatants, November and December
1999. [30] Interviews with ethnic
militia members in Burma, December
1999. [31] Interview with former
military advisor to the ethnic resistance, February
1999. [32] Based on numerous interviews
with ethnic militias, military officers, refugees, aid workers, governmental
authorities and other observers. [33]
Interview with ethnic militia officer, December 1999; press briefing at Bright
Shan Mountain Camp by Col. Yod Serk, military commander, Shan State Army,
December 1999. [34] Karen Human Rights
Group, “Beyond all endurance: The Breakup of Karen Villages in
Southeastern Pa'an District,” 20 December 1999, pp.
22-27. [35] Letter from former military
advisor to the ethnic resistance, sent to Landmine Monitor, 11 November
1999. [36] Emergency Press Release of
God's Army People. Undated. Copy of document given to the Landmine Monitor,
February 2000. [37] “Opinion of
Standing Executive Committee of RCSS and Shan State Army–South on
Anti-Personnel Landmines,” undated, received in email to Landmine Monitor
researcher in March 2000, circulated by ICBL on 3 April
2000. [38] Press briefing at Bright Shan
Mountain Camp, December 1999. [39]
Interviews with ethnic militia members, June
1999. [40] Interview with PDF officers,
Sangklaburi, Thailand, December
1999. [41] Interview with Bangladesh
Rifles (border forces) commander, Chittagong, 30 November
1999. [42] International Federation of
Human Rights Leagues (FIDH), “Burma: Repression, Discrimination and Ethnic
Cleansing in Arakan,” Report of International Mission of Inquiry, April
2000, p. 24. [43] Interview with Dr.
Kyaw Win, President of the Myanmar Red Cross Society, Rangoon, October
1999. [44] For more detail, see Landmine
Monitor Report 1999, p. 452. [45] Karen
Human Rights Group, “Starving Them Out, Forced Relocations, Killings and
the Systematic Starvation of Villagers in Dooplaya District,” March 2000,
p. 34; William Barnes, “Karen flee army roundups of ‘human
minesweepers,’” South China Morning Post, 2 September
1999. [46] Karen Human Rights Group,
“Beyond all endurance,” 20 December 1999, pp.
22-27. [47] Shan Human Rights
Foundation, Monthly Report, January 2000, pp. 1,
4. [48] Interview with refugee living in
border camp across from Tenaserrim Division of Myanmar, 17 April
2000. [49] Hans Draminsky Peterson, et
al., “Results of Medical Examination of Refugees from Burma,” Danish
Medical Bulletin, Vol. 45, No. 3, 3 June 1998, pp. 313-316; and Hans Draminsky
Peterson, et al., “Human Rights Violations in Burma/Myanmar in
1999,” Report of Fact-finding Mission in December 1999, Danish Medical
Group, Danchurch Aid and Amnesty International (Denmark), 14 March
2000. [50] 1,198 medical records from
Township Medical officers in districts within Hpa-an
District. [51] U.S. Department of State,
“Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis,” December 1994, p.
18. [52] Hans Draminsky Peterson, et
al., Danish Medical Bulletin, 3 June 1998, pp. 313-316; and Hans Draminsky
Peterson, et al., Report of Fact-finding Mission in December 1999, Danish
Medical Group, Danchurch Aid and Amnesty International (Denmark), 14 March
2000. [53] Interview with health
workers, Rangoon, 25 April 2000. [54]
Mohammad Nurul Islam, “Where landmines take a heavy toll,” The
Independent, 28 May 1999, p. 14. [55]
Interview with Buddhist monk doing development work in border communities,
Chittagong, 4 December 1999. [56] Somsak
Suksai, “Elephants face risks in mine-strewn area,” Bangkok Post, 10
September 1999. Sakchai Lalit, “Thai Elephant Steps on Landmine,”
AP Online, 24 August 1999; “Motala's jumbo operation,” The Sunday
Nation, 29 August 1999; “Vets encouraged by Motala's initial
recovery,” The Nation, 31 August 1999; “New limb offers for
Motala,” Bangkok Post, 7 September
1999. [57] Interview with Arakan
insurgent, Chittagong, 3 December
1999. [58] See Landmine Monitor Report
1999, p. 453. [59] Landmine Monitor 1999
Burma (Myanmar) report [60] Interview
with WHO official in Yangon, January 2000. Also, “Human Development in
Myanmar,” United Nations Working Group, July 1998,
p.14. [61] Interviews with displaced
persons living in Thailand, December
1999. [62] National Rehabilitation
Centre statistics and Landmine Monitor interview with Dr. Ye Hliang, Director,
NRC, August 1999. [63] National
Rehabilitation Centre statistics provided to the Association for Aid and
Relief-Japan, December 1999. [64] The
ICRC was providing components for prosthetics to hospitals under the Ministry of
Defense in Rangoon and Maymyo. ICRC, “Tables and Graphs 1979-1998,”
dated 8 June 1999. Currently they are awaiting a new proposal to undertake
support for the Ministry of Defense hospitals. If figures provided by the ICRC
and the NRC are compared, then Ministry of Defense hospitals are providing 2.5
times the prosthetics distributed through the civilian
system. [65] Interviews with BPHWT
medics at training program on Trauma & Landmines in Mae Sot, Thailand, July
1999.
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