Key developments since May 2003: Russian forces continued to use
antipersonnel mines in Chechnya. The rebels who seized the school in Beslan,
North Ossetia with disastrous consequences emplaced both antipersonnel mines and
improvised explosive devices throughout the school. Landmine Monitor was told
that Russia destroyed 1.85 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines in 2003.
Key developments since 1999: Russia has used antipersonnel mines in
Chechnya, Dagestan, Tajikistan, and on the Russia-Georgia border since 1999.
CCW Amended Protocol II was submitted to the State Duma for ratification in May
2000, but has not been approved. Still, Russia maintains it is complying with
letter of the law. Russia stated that it stopped production of blast mines in
1997. Russia’s five-year moratorium on transfer of non-detectable and
non-self-destructing mines expired in 2002, but officials have stated that it is
still being observed. In 2003, Russia surprisingly reported that it had
destroyed more than 16.8 million antipersonnel mines from 1996 through 2002. New
information in 2004 indicates Russia’s antipersonnel mine stockpile may
number 22-25 million, rather than the previously estimated 50 million. Russia
has been increasingly involved in international demining operations.
Mine Ban Policy
Russia has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Its long-held reservations to
joining the treaty include its perception of the utility of antipersonnel mines
and of the lack of viable alternatives, and its potential inability to meet the
financial commitment to destroy the country’s considerable stockpile of
antipersonnel mines within four years, as required by the
treaty.[1]
On several occasions, Russia has stated its strong preference for dealing
with controls on antipersonnel mines through the Convention on Conventional
Weapons (CCW) and the Conference on Disarmament (CD), rather than the Mine Ban
Treaty.[2] In November 2003,
Ambassador A. Antonov stated that while “Russia fully shares the concern
of the world community” over the use of certain inhumane weapons, Russia
believes in “the balance of humanitarian, military and financial interests
initially built into the
CCW.”[3]
Russia has on endorsed the goal of the eventual elimination of antipersonnel
mines. In 1997, then-President Boris Yeltsin stated his support for Russia to
sign the Mine Ban Treaty.[4] In
March 1998, representatives spoke of Russia’s “positive
approach” to the treaty and its willingness to accede “in the
foreseeable future.”[5]
President Vladimir Putin issued a press release in 1999 in which he spoke of a
policy “aimed at the banning of
landmines.”[6] In a
November 2003 statement at the Fifth Conference of States Parties to the Amended
Protocol II to the CCW, the head of the Russian delegation said that “the
world without mines remains to be our goal. However, as we repeatedly pointed
out, the movement to that noble goal should be realistic, we should proceed
stage-by-stage while ensuring the necessary level of
stability.”[7]
Russia participated in the Ottawa Process as an observer, and unlike other
major powers China and the United States, Russia has since participated in every
intersessional Standing Committee meeting since 2000 and every annual meeting of
States Parties, except one (September 2000). It has, however, abstained on each
annual United Nations General Assembly vote supporting a global ban on landmines
and the Mine Ban Treaty since 1996. Regionally, a large Russian government
delegation attended a seminar hosted by the International Committee of the Red
Cross in Moscow on landmines and explosives remnants of war in November 2002,
and a landmines conference held in Moscow by ICBL and IPPNW-Russia in May 1998.
It also sent representatives to regional landmines meetings held in Georgia in
December 1999.
Russia is a State party of the CCW and its original Protocol II. In May
2000, Amended Protocol II was submitted to the State Duma for
ratification.[8] In March 2001,
the ratification package was withdrawn for review, and there has been no further
progress since then.[9]
However, Russia insists that it is complying with the letter of the protocol,
even if not legally bound.[10]
Thus on 27 November 2003, Ambassador Antonov stated that ratification was
“a matter of the nearest future,” and that “the Russian
Federation fully complies with the provisions of the Amended Protocol
II.”[11] On 30 September
2004, the State Duma’s Defense Committee recommended that the Duma ratify
Amended Protocol II.[12]
In April 2001, the Federal Working Group for Mine Action was formed under the
direction of the Chief of the Russian Federal Agency of Munitions, Zinoviy Pak.
The organization includes as members representatives from both governmental and
non-governmental organizations, and works for progress toward mine action and
deeper integration of Russia into the Mine Ban Treaty process.
Production
The Soviet Union was one of the world’s largest producers of landmines.
There were over 20 landmine production or assembly enterprises in the Soviet
Union, but some 90 percent of engineer ammunition and armament production
facilities were outside of Russia in other Soviet
republics.[13] Between 1995 and
2000, however, a landmine production capacity was created within
Russia.[14]
Russia has reportedly produced at least ten types of antipersonnel mines
since 1992, including blast mines (PMN, PMN-2, PMN-4 and PFM-1S) and
fragmentation mines (OZM-72, MON-50, MON-90, MON-100, MON-200, and
POMZ-2).[15] In May 1998,
however, representatives of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign
Affairs declared that the Russian Federation had stopped producing blast
landmines,[16] a report that was
later confirmed by the Russian
military.[17] In December 2000,
it was announced that Russia was decommissioning production facilities for blast
landmines,[18] and a year later
Russia stated that it had not manufactured blast mines in four
years.[19] On November 2002, it
was stated for the first time that Russian troops had not been provided with
PFM-1, PMN, PMN-2, or PMN-4 type mines in the previous eight
years.[20]
The Russian Federation has been researching alternatives to landmines since
at least 1997, working to create new landmines and to modernize old
ones.[21] Development and
production of alternatives acceptable under the Mine Ban Treaty was projected in
2000 to cost 3.2 billion
rubles.[22]
Transfer
The Soviet Union was one of the world’s largest exporters of
antipersonnel mines. To date, a total of approximately 1.06 million
antipersonnel mines of Soviet or Russian origin have been declared in the
stockpiles of 20 States Parties of the Mine Ban
Treaty.[23] Antipersonnel mines
of Soviet origin are found emplaced in at least 28 mine-affected
countries.[24] The PMN-type
mines (known as the Black Widow) are, along with the Chinese Type 72, the most
widely found mine in the world. The PFM-type mine (known as the Butterfly or
Green Parrot) was used in huge quantities by the USSR in Afghanistan and
volatile PFM stockpiles pose particular destruction challenges for Mine Ban
Treaty members Belarus and Ukraine.
Successor states and Mine Ban Treaty States Parties Belarus, Lithuania,
Moldova, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan collectively inherited 11.3 million
antipersonnel mines from the Soviet
Union.[25] Treaty signatory
Ukraine has voluntarily declared that it inherited another 6.4 million
antipersonnel mines.
On 1 December 1994 Russia announced a three-year moratorium on the export of
antipersonnel mines that are not detectable or not equipped with
self-destruction devices. On 1 December 1997 the moratorium was extended for
another five years, until December
2002.[26] The export moratorium
expired on 1 December 2002, but a Russian military official told Landmine
Monitor in April 2003 that it was still being observed and that a new version
was being prepared; this was confirmed in a NATO-Russia meeting the same
month.[27] In November 2003,
Russia told CCW States that it still observing the expired
moratorium.[28]
Russia is not known to have made any state-approved transfers of any type of
antipersonnel mine since 1994. However, since 1999, Chechen officers have
claimed that Chechen insurgents obtained their landmines in part through the
Russian military, either through criminal arms trafficking and partly from arms
depots handed over to Chechens in
1991-1992.[29]
Stockpiling and Destruction
Official information on the number of antipersonnel mines stockpiled by
Russia is not publicly available. Landmine Monitor previously estimated a
stockpile of 60-70 million antipersonnel mines, the world’s second largest
stockpile.[30] After Russia
surprisingly reported that it had destroyed 16.8 million antipersonnel mines
from 1996 to 2002, Landmine Monitor reduced its estimate of Russia’s
stockpile to 50 million antipersonnel mines in 2003. According to new
information received by Landmine Monitor in 2004, which has yet to be confirmed,
Russia’s stockpile could total closer to 22-25 million antipersonnel
mines.[31]
Russian officials have acknowledged antipersonnel mine stockpiles at the
disposal of Russian military units in other CIS states, notably Georgia and
Tajikistan. In February 2003, Mine Ban Treaty State Party Tajikistan officially
declared that Russian forces stockpile 18,200 antipersonnel mines of different
types on Tajik territory and that bilateral negotiations concerning the
disposition of these stockpiles are
ongoing.[32]
In 2003, Russia publicly claimed for the first time that it destroyed more
than 16.8 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines from 1996 through 2002. While
inconsistent with past statements and documents (which indicated about 1 million
antipersonnel mines destroyed since 1996), this claim appeared to be the result
of changes in the counting methods for some mines. Russia originally counted
destruction of KSF-1 and KSF-1S mines as one each; however, each KSF-1 contains
72 PFM-1 mines, and each KSF-1D contains 64 PFM-1S mines. Thus, while
destruction of less than 150,000 PFM-1 and PFM-1S mines had been reported before
2002, the new figures showed more than 13.8 million PFMs destroyed from 1999
through 2002.[33] Russian
military sources told Landmine Monitor that in 2003, Russia destroyed 1.85
million antipersonnel mines.[34]
This brings the total destroyed from 1996-2003 to nearly 18.7 million
antipersonnel mines.
Antipersonnel Mine Stockpile Destruction in Russia
1996-2003[35]
Type of Mine
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Total Destroyed
PMN
9,908
61,400
40,771
609,000
3,675
390,000
1,114,754
PMN-2
65,100
800,000
800,000
1,655,100
PMN-4
50,000
50,000
OZM-72
25,700
94,100
107,639
227,439
MON-100
22,200
8,000
22,500
7,799
111,600
11,766
120,000
303,865
MON-200
11,100
5,369
12,000
9,036
76,600
298
115,000
229,403
POMZ-2M
197,000
350,000
275,000
444,000
1,266,000
PFM-1 in KSF-1
1,615,680
3,117,600
2,592,000
7,325,280
PFM-1S in KSF-1S
2,788,288
2,554,496
640,000
512,000
6,494,784
Other types
3,049
3,049
Total
33,300
23,277
433,700
4,753,968
5,729,702
5,198,300
638,427
1,865,000
18,679,674
By 2001 most of Russia’s PFM stockpiles had reached the end of their
shelf life, increasing the risk of explosive degradation of the
mines.[36] Russia stated at a
March 2001 seminar in Budapest that it would need to build four destruction
complexes to destroy its PFM
stockpiles.[37] Between 2002
and early 2003, Russian Foreign and Defense Ministry representatives held
consultations with the NATO Partnership for Peace fund aimed at developing an
agreement to demilitarize PFM-type antipersonnel mines using the Russian
cementation disposal method. Preliminary talks were also held on the same issue
with technical experts from the European
Commission.[38] Stockpile
destruction is currently being assisted by Ecodem (Ecological Demilitarization),
a scientific production association established in 2001 that includes the
Ministry of Defense and the Russian Federal Agency of
Munitions.[39]
At a meeting between European Union representatives and officials of MoD,
MoFA and Center for Mine Action and Munitions Disposal on 27 March 2003, Russian
officials lauded a Russian cementation method—developed by the state-owned
Bazalt enterprise[40]—that
they maintain irreversibly deprives PFM-1/1S mines of the landmine function,
secures safe transportation and storage, and allows further use of
“converted” cluster mines as industrial explosive charges with no
way of using them as mines.[41]
According to a May 2003 media report, five to seven facilities equipped with the
new technology could destroy “all such mines within a
year.”[42] The scope of
the statement was unclear. In November 2003, a Russian official referred to the
“possibility of developing and implementing a joint project with the NATO
aimed at the destruction of ten million most dangerous anti-personnel mines of
the PFM-1 type....”[43]
Use
During this Landmine Monitor reporting period, Russia has continued to use
antipersonnel mines in Chechnya. Russia has used mines continuously since 1999,
primarily in Chechnya, but also at times in Dagestan, Tajikistan, and on the
border with Georgia. Mines have been emplaced by hand, air-scattered, and
artillery-scattered. Russia has generally argued that its mine usage has been
necessary to stop flows of terrorists, weapons and drugs, and has been in full
compliance with CCW Amended Protocol
II.[44]
As Landmine Monitor Report 2004 went to print, on 3 September at least 338
people died when rebels seized a school in Beslan, North
Ossetia.[45] The hostage-takers
emplaced both antipersonnel mines and improvised explosive devices (IED)
throughout the school, including in a gymnasium crowded with over 1,000 children
and their parents. Various sources have indicated that the mines used included
PMN blast mines and MON-50, MON-100, OZM-72, and POMZ fragmentation
mines.[46] At least 127
improvised explosive devices were reportedly laid in the
school.[47] After the siege,
Russian EOD teams located and destroyed approximately 70 antipersonnel mines and
a 50-kilogram IED.
Chechnya
Russian forces have used mines extensively in Chechnya since the renewal of
armed conflict in September 1999. Federal troops have laid mines around and
leading up to bases, checkpoints, commanders’ offices, governmental
buildings, factories and power plants; on roads, including the main road between
Grozny and Nazran in March 1995; on mountain paths in the rebel-dominated south;
in fields running from Grozny to Alkhan-Kalu; in the estuary of the River
Sunzha; along various borders; and in areas deemed
“suspicious.”[48] A
representative of the break-away Chechen government estimated the Russians used
three million mines during the second Chechen
war.[49] Russian officials have
repeatedly claimed that all minefields are mapped, marked, and removed when
troops relocate.[50] These
assertions have been contradicted by statements from both civilians and military
officers. For more information on Russian mine use in Chechnya, see the
relevant section in the Chechnya report in this Landmine Monitor Report
2004.
Tajikistan
Russian forces are known to have used antipersonnel mines in Tajikistan
between 1995 and 2001. In 1995, Russia laid six minefields in the Rushan region
of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast. In 2003, Russia provided Tajikistan
with records for four of these
minefields.[51] In 1995,
Russian forces emplaced another seven other minefields in the Vanch region and
eight minefields in the Darvoz region. PFM-1 scatterable mines were used in one
minefield in the Rushan region and one minefield in the Vanch
region.[52]
In 2000, Russian forces emplaced nine more minefields in “regions
subordined (sic) to the central government” using PMN, PMN-2, POMZ-2, and
OZM-72 antipersonnel landmines. These latter minefields are located on parts of
the Tajik-Afghan border that are under the control of the Russian border guard
forces.[53] The last time
Russian authorities informed Tajik authorities of mine use by Russian forces in
Tajikistan was October 2001.[54]
In December 2001, a senior official in the Russian Federal Border Service
confirmed to Landmine Monitor that Russian troops had laid antipersonnel mines
inside Tajikistan. He said that the mine-laying operations had been carried out
with the full knowledge and consent of the Tajikistan government, and in
accordance with a military cooperation agreement signed in 1993. After Landmine
Monitor pointed out that this could constitute a violation of the Mine Ban
Treaty by Tajikistan, he said that mines were laid prior to October 1999 when
Tajikistan acceded to the Mine Ban
Treaty.[55]
In keeping with its general stance on landmine use, Russia has maintained
that it has complied fully with Amended Protocol II of the CCW in deploying
landmines in Tajikistan.[56] In
a November 2003 statement, Ambassador A. Antonov said that records pertaining to
the minefields on the Tajik-Afghan border were being transferred to the
government of Tajikistan.[57] An
August 2001 Foreign Ministry letter stated, “Mines are emplaced in
observance of requirements to prohibit or restrict the use of anti-personnel
mines...as set forth in the supplemented ‘mine’ Protocol II, with
the exception of requirements in point 2a of Article 5 Restrictions on the use
of anti-personnel mines other than remotely delivered mines in that part
relating to perimeter-marked areas; anti-personnel mines are marked and fenced
along the entire perimeter of the area except the part of the perimeter on the
side of the state
border.”[58] Use of mines
is cast as a necessary protective measure, for small-scale defenses around bases
and posts, as well as to halt the flow of weapons, terrorists and drugs across
international borders.[59]
Georgia
Russia has used mines in Georgia-Abkhazia conflict, has mined the
Georgia-Russian border, and in at least one incident “accidentally”
mined Georgia territory. In April 2000, it was reported that the
“military leadership and border services of Russia and Georgia have
adopted the decision to mine several stretches of the border” in order to
stop the flow of men and materiel between Georgia and Chechnya. The types of
mines used were not disclosed, but officials said that over twenty mountain
passes and dozens of pathways would be mined along an 80 kilometer-long stretch
of the border near the southern Chechen Argun
gorge.[60] Russian officials
claimed that the mining was carried out in compliance with CCW Protocol II and
mainly involved remote controlled devices, which it said were permissible under
the Mine Ban Treaty.[61] In
May 2001 a Georgian official stated that there have been cases of Russian mining
of the Chechen stretch of the Russian-Georgian
border.[62] On 16 October 2002,
there was a landmine incident involving a 14-year-old boy in the upper part of
the Kodori gorge (on the border between Georgia and Russia), allegedly planted
by Russian peacekeepers during their patrolling of the
gorge.[63] The press secretary
of the CIS Peacekeeping Force, Aleksander Tretyakov, rejected these
claims.[64]
Landmine Monitor Report 1999 reported that mines were used by the CIS
peacekeeping force in the Georgia-Abkhazian conflict starting from June 1994,
but there was no new evidence as of 2001. In August 2001 Russian officials said
that no mines had been emplaced in Abkhazia since May
2000.[65]
At least a portion of the mines laid by Russia on the Russia-Georgia border
were delivered by aircraft. In December 1999, a Georgian officer noted that
air-scattering of mines had been going on for two months, and that once a
20-kilometer stretch was mined in one
day.[66] On 9 August 1999, two
Su-25 aircraft entered Georgian airspace from Dagestan, where Russia was
fighting against rebels, and bombed in and around the village of Zemo Omalo;
three people were wounded, one
severely.[67] The Georgian
military was able to identify the weapons used as KSS-1S cluster bombs,
containing PFM-1S antipersonnel
mines.[68] This was later said
to have been a mistake.[69] A
US government official told the ICBL that there was a second incident in which a
Russian helicopter dropped mines inside
Georgia.[70]
Landmine Problem and Clearance
World War II left the USSR heavily infested with mines and unexploded
ordnance. The problem was most serious in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and the
Caucasus. One Russian official recently stated that tens of thousands of UXO
from WWII are removed annually from Russian
territory,[71] while another put
the figure at 100,000.[72]
According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, between 1946 and 2002 more than
153 million items of UXO and mines were cleared and destroyed in the
USSR/Russian Federation.[73]
The overall cost for these activities has been estimated at tens of billions of
US dollars.[74]
Mine clearance is currently the responsibility of three governmental
organizations: the Engineer Forces of the Ministry of Defense; the Russian
National Corps of Emergent Humanitarian Operations of the Ministry for Civil
Defense, Emergencies and Disaster Resources; and demining brigades of the
Ministry of Internal
Affairs.[75] Non-governmental
enterprises also conduct demining activities, such as the company
“Fort” in Moscow and the company “Iskatel” in St.
Petersburg. Employees of these companies are mainly retired officers of
engineer forces.[76]
In 2003, engineers from the Moscow Military District carried out 326
mine-clearance operations, removing a total of 4,959 explosives in 19
regions.[77] The Ministry of
Emergencies reported that 1,381 WWII mines were found and destroyed in the
Novgorod region over a five-day period in August 2004, and that a total of 8,000
mines had been cleared so far that
year.[78] In August 2004, rail
workers discovered a weapons cache including 80 WWII landmines near St.
Petersburg.[79] In 2002, bomb
disposal experts reportedly responded to 159 calls in and around St. Petersburg,
removing nearly 15,000 WWII-era UXO and
mines.[80] After violent
floodwaters swept through a region on the Black Sea coast in August 2002,
explosive removal experts cleared some 50 World War II-era mines and explosives
found on the shore.[81]
Mines and UXO are reemerging as an issue for a number of reasons. There is
increased demand for economic development of lands that were never cleared of
UXO, including former battlefields. Moreover, before 1999 clearance operations
never probed deeper than 30-40 cm, while UXO buried deeper has moved upwards to
the surface making previously cleared territories now
unsafe.[82] This aggravation of
the mine and UXO problem is shown in the progression of estimates for clearance
completion: according to a 1998 estimate, clearance would not be complete for
10-15 years,[83] while in April
2003 it was estimated that clearance would take 15-20 years providing “all
means and resources are
utilized.”[84]
Mine Action Assistance
Russia has become increasingly engaged in demining operations abroad. In
November 2003, during a UN Security Council discussion on mine action, Russia
reported the government had “enacted a measure entitled ‘Measures to
facilitate the Russian Federation’s participation in humanitarian
mine-clearance programs, projects and operations,” which “regulates
the provision of assistance to other States in the area of mine
action.”[85] The Russian
Ministry of Defense works with other governments through bilateral agreements or
through the Rosvooruzheniye (State Company for the Export and Import of
Armaments and Military Equipment) and Promexport (Industry Export). Russian
officials noted in 2000 and 2001 that the government is broadening its
participation in international humanitarian mine clearance in an attempt to
address the “compelling humanitarian issues” resulting from mine
contamination.[86]
In 2000, the government formed a Federal Working Group for Mine Action and
appointed a special coordinator on humanitarian demining to coordinate
activities within various state agencies related to international humanitarian
mine clearance. In June 2003, it was reported that a new Counter Mine Danger
Service had been established under the Russian Federation Engineer Forces to
integrate military and civilian mine action-related
elements.[87] A Russian
official stated in November 2003 that a Center of Demining had been established
“on the basis of the Moscow University of Military Engineers in order to
train experts in detecting and clearing of explosive
devices.”[88] In June
2003 it was reported that the Russian Minister of Emergency Situations had
called for the creation of a Russo-Spanish anti-mine center to train engineers
for “civilian
purposes.”[89]
Russia has not made any contributions to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for the
Assistance of Mine Clearance, nor has it received any funds for mine action
programs within Russia. However, at a Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee
meeting in May 2001, the executive secretary of the Working Group noted that the
Russian government was prepared to offer training of humanitarian demining
personnel; to offer means of mine/UXO surveillance, detection and clearance; to
conduct joint research and development on demining equipment; and to offer
personnel for mine clearance operations, among other
things.[90]
Russia has sent deminers to over 20 countries, including major operations in
Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, and many CIS countries.
In July 2003, the Kyrgyz border service invited Russian sappers to assist in
demining the border with
Uzbekistan.[91]
Since 1994, the special engineering unit of the Russian Ministry of Defense
has been demining in Abkhazia as a part of the CIS peacekeeping force. Roads,
land and infrastructure in Abkhazia and the south bank of the Inguri River have
been surveyed and demined by the Russians. As of December 2002, the Russians
had cleared 25,000 mines and UXO from Georgia and
Abkhazia.[92]
From 6 August to 15 November 1999, a demining team of twenty engineers and
four mine dogs from the Ministry of Emergent Situations and Catastrophes
conducted operations in Kosovo; they surveyed 85,309 square meters of land and
detected ten minefields. Another team of 28 deminers and 11 mine detecting dogs
carried out a six-month mission in Kosovo in the second half of 2001. The team
surveyed 324,213 square meters of territory and cleared 467 antipersonnel mines,
17 antivehicle mines, and 109
UXO.[93]
In late November 2001, Russia sent demining experts to Afghanistan to
establish a humanitarian center in Kabul, as well as to reopen the Russian
Embassy.[94] Russian engineers
reportedly destroyed 8,000 explosives in Afghanistan from late 2001 to mid-2002.
In April 2002, specialists from Russia’ Ministry of Emergency Situations
began a three-month training course for 50 Afghan sappers in Madrid, Spain. All
costs were paid by Spain. Russian engineers have removed approximately 35,000
mines from Afghanistan.[95]
Russian forces have reportedly cleared some 35,000 pieces of ordnance in
Tajikistan,[96] and 15,000 in
Bosnia and Herzegovina.[97]
From February through March 2002, the non-governmental company
“Fort” participated in humanitarian demining operations in Croatia
under a contract with Heinrich Hirdes GmbH. It checked and cleared over 156,000
square meters of land.[98]
Mine Risk Education
During the Soviet era, district military recruiting offices disseminated Mine
Risk Education (MRE) information in mine-affected
areas.[99] The compulsory
secondary education program included a course of primary military training
providing information on mine danger to students living in mine-affected areas.
After the disintegration of the USSR and the ensuing economic crisis, these
activities halted, although the secondary school courses have been
reinstated.[100] Since 2000,
instead of the Soviet-era primary military training, a new compulsory course has
been introduced in the secondary education entitled “Basics of Life
Safety.”[101]
In the North Caucasus, where there are no federal mine risk education
programs, the International Committee of the Red Cross and UNICEF are
responsible for the bulk of MRE activities. In 2001, the ICRC began to provide
MRE in Ingushetia, which houses most IDPs escaping the conflict in Chechnya;
activities included distribution of posters and leaflets, organizing
presentations and a workshop, and unveiling the star of mine awareness puppet
shows for years to come,
Cheerdig.[102] By May 2003, the
puppet theater, the ICRC “Child to Child” program (in which children
inform their own families and other children of the dangers of mines), similar
“Child to Child puppet” shows and “Teenager to Teenager
programs,” and various media campaigns were all well
established.[103]
The ICRC launched a mine risk education program in Dagestan in January 2002
after a needs assessment revealed a low level of mine awareness there. The
program was carried out in the Botlikh and Novolak regions of Dagestan, and
targeted resident and IDP
children.[104]
The ICRC also runs mine risk education programs in North Ossetia,
Kabardino-Balkaria and the south of Russia. It initiated MRE in these regions
in March 2001.[105] Activities
now include mine awareness seminars, the Child to Child program, a game sheet
called “Find the Safest Way,” drawing books, and crossword puzzles.
Posters and comics are also used, and leaflets are given to teachers
accompanying the
children.[106]
UNICEF began to sponsor mine risk education activity in Ingushetia, Dagestan
and Chechnya in 2000, in cooperation with the UNHCR, distributing leaflets and
posters. In 2002 UNICEF launched a program in the North Caucasus in conjunction
with the UNHCR, ICRC, Danish Demining Group (DDG) and local NGOs, including
Voice of the Mountains (VoM) and Let’s Save the Generation
(LSG).[107] Classes are held
regularly in Ingushetian IDP camps and spontaneous settlements, which have
reached at least 1,700 IDP children since January
2003.[108]
MRE in Ingushetian camps has lessened in 2004 as official camps have been
closed by authorities and the IDP population has decreased due to returns to
Chechnya. In 2002, UNICEF began to sponsor MRE drama presentations in
Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia, through its implementing partner,
LSG.[109] LSG provided
transportation for Chechen children to Vladikavkaz, and distributed MRE
materials after the shows. By the time the program was moved to Grozny in
September 2003, these presentations had reached some 11,000
children.[110]
Mine risk education programs in Chechnya have proliferated since 1999, when
there were almost none. Both the ICRC and UNICEF are currently implementing a
wide range of programs through various local NGO partners. Children are the
targeted population in Chechnya. Major achievements include the formal
incorporation of MRE into the Chechen school curriculum; the creation and
regular performance of mine awareness drama presentations and drama circles
through LSG; a five-part television series entitled “Beware Mines,”
broadcast in 2003; and the opening of a Landmine Café in Grozny. Since
January 2003, over 138,000 schoolchildren have been reached in Chechnya through
formal education classes, and tens of thousands more have been reached through
other programs. From January to November 2003, UNICEF distributed 240,000 MRE
items (posters, notebooks, pens, leaflets, T-shirts) in Chechnya and Ingushetia.
Landmine Casualties
There is no comprehensive official information on landmine casualties in
Russia. On 29 June 2003, an eight-year-old boy was seriously injured after
stepping on an antipersonnel landmine in the Novosibirsk district near the site
of a former military
settlement.[111] In April, May
and July 2003, a total of 12 soldiers were killed and another three injured in
three separate incidents involving landmines or improvised explosive devices in
the southern republic of
Ingushetia.[112]
There have been substantial numbers of mine casualties in parts of the
Russian Federation, particularly in Chechnya since 1994 and Dagestan since 1999.
Two major landmine blasts in Dagestan claimed close to 50 lives in the first
half of 2002. The first blast came on 18 January 2002, when a car carrying
servicemen set off a landmine in Makhachkala, the capital of Dagestan, killing
seven of the servicemen.[113]
The second, more deadly blast came during Victory Day celebrations in Kaspiysk,
near the border with Chechnya on 9 May 2002. Dagestani pro-Chechen rebels
reportedly detonated a MON-90 mine via remote control, killing 42 people and
seriously injuring at least 30
others.[114] Mines continue
killing and maiming people more than half a century after WWII ended. In
September 2002, five boys were killed after tampering with a World War II
landmine at the site of the Stalingrad battle near
Volgograd.[115] There is
limited official data on mine casualties in these regions.
There is no complete official data on mine casualties or incidents among the
Russian soldiers fighting in Chechnya, or for civilians. According to various
media and military sources, there were over 1,300 mine incidents involving
Russian federal forces, including police and internal forces, in Chechnya from
1999 to March 2003, resulting in 2,500 military casualties, including more than
600 killed and 1,700 injured. Not all military casualties were the result of
rebel mine use; accidents and improper handling or storage of mines also caused
many casualties.[116]
Landmine Monitor recorded at least 246 new casualties (126 killed and 120
injured) caused by landmines, UXO and improvised explosive devices (IED) in
Chechnya from international media sources in 2003, including 170 military
personnel, militants, sappers and police, and four women and five
children.[117] International
media sources reported 298 mine/UXO/IED casualties (119 killed and 179 injured),
including 187 military personnel, militants, sappers and police, in Chechnya in
2002.[118] In 2001, Landmine
Monitor collated data on 1,153 mine/UXO/IED casualties (367 killed and 786
injured); 137 were civilians (62 killed and 75 injured) including 23
children.[119] (See Chechnya
report for more information on civilian mine casualties.)
In April 2003, a Russian UN Military Observer was killed when his vehicle
detonated an antivehicle mine in the
DRC.[120] On 8 June 2002, a
Russian peacekeeper was killed in the Kodori Gorge in
Georgia.[121] On 13 November
2003 a Russian official said that 10 Russian soldiers had been killed by mines
in Georgia-Abkhazia peacekeeping
operations.[122]
The total number of landmine casualties in Russia over time is not known but
there are believed to be significant numbers of mine/UXO survivors from
casualties caused by mines and UXO left from World War II, the 1980s war with
Afghanistan, and from the conflict in Chechnya.
Survivor Assistance
Russian military medical practice has accumulated enormous experience in the
treatment of blast injuries. Medical, surgical, prosthetic, rehabilitation, and
reintegration services are available for landmine survivors in Russia. There
are about seventy specialized federal prosthetic enterprises operating in the
Russian Federation. Some mine survivors receive assistance in Moscow and others
travel to Baku (Azerbaijan) within the framework of a joint program of the
Ministries of Social Insurance of both republics; details on the number of mine
survivors benefiting from this program was not available. Russia manufactures
about 600 types of prosthetic devices. Lower limbs comprise about 90 percent of
all prostheses produced.[123]
Medical assistance was also provided by the All-Russian Center of Medicine of
Catastrophies “Zaschita” (Protection) under the RF Ministry of
Health.[124] In 1999-2002 alone
the mobile hospitals of the All-Russian Center of Medicine of Catastrophies
“Zaschita” in Chechnya provided medical assistance to 170,000
persons including 63,000 children and conducted more than 4,400 surgical
operations.[125]
The International Institute for the Prosthetic Rehabilitation of Landmine
Survivors (IPRLS) and its Russian partner, the St. Petersburg Institute of
Prosthetics, have been assisting mine survivors with surgical and rehabilitation
assistance, vocational training and socio-economic reintegration since
1998.[126] An Ice
Hockey-On-Prostheses Team, the “St. Petersburg Elks,” was formed
under the program, and in April 2003 the team participated in the first-ever
World Standing Amputee Ice Hockey Championships in
Helsinki.[127] Members of the
team, which included seven mine survivors, participated in the Standing
Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration in Geneva in
February 2003, following a demonstration ice hockey match in Geneva the previous
weekend.
Many international agencies and local and international NGOs are working to
strengthen the health infrastructure in Ingushetia and other regions of the
Northern Caucasus with medicines, hospital supplies, expertise and training for
local staff at hospitals and health posts. Others have supported mobile
clinics, psychosocial support services, transportation to medical facilities,
and other humanitarian aid activities, often aimed at internally displaced
persons from Chechnya. Organizations that engage in survivor assistance-related
activities include Agency for Rehabilitation and Development, Center for
Peacemaking and Community Development, Danish Refugee Council/Danish Peoples
Aid, Hammer Forum e.V., Handicap International, International Committee of the
Red Cross, International Humanitarian Initiative, International Medical Corps,
Islamic Relief, Médecins du Monde, Médecins sans
Frontières, Memorial, Saudi Red Crescent Society, Save the Generation,
Serlo, UNICEF, WHO, and World
Vision.[128]
Disability Policy and Practice
Since 1995, mine survivors in Russia have been under the protection of the
Federal Law “On Social Security of Disabled.” The law guarantees
multilevel rehabilitation programs aimed either at complete physical
rehabilitation and socio-economic reintegration, or compensation for physical
and social limitations and the provision of financial independence. All issues
of disability are under the control of the Ministry of Labor and Social
Development.
Since 2002, the All-Russian Public National Military Foundation has been
focusing its efforts on the support of military personnel injured in Chechnya.
In February 2002, two major directions for the Foundation’s efforts were
identified: the purchase of flats for the families of the servicemen killed in
Chechnya; and ensuring medical aid to servicemen injured in Chechnya, especially
to those who need prosthetic aid. According to the Chairman of the Council,
state agencies including the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal
Affairs will provide the Foundation with verified lists of persons needing
medical or other aid, and the Foundation will arrange and finance the necessary
aid.[129]
In May 2001 the “International Complex Program on the Rehabilitation of
War Veterans, Participants of Local Conflicts, and Victims of Terrorism for
2001-2005” was approved by a resolution of the Council of the Heads of
Government of the CIS
countries.[130] In 2001,
prioritized targets of Section I on “Medico-Social Aid” included:
facilitating the work of rehabilitation centers in ensuring qualified and
effective medical, social, psychological, and professional rehabilitation of
war-wounded; medical examinations, consultations of specialists, verification of
medical diagnosis, hospitalization, elaboration of individual rehabilitation
programs; provision of prostheses, wheelchairs, rehabilitation means and
medicine; and, medical and psychological rehabilitation and treatment in
specialized sanatoria.[131]
Within the framework of the Program, support was provided to 45
veterans’ organizations. About 2.5 million people in 17 countries have
benefited from the Inter-State Program’s support from 2001 through early
2003.[132]
[1] See, for example, Vladimir P.
Kuznetsov, “Ottawa Process and Russia’s Position,” Krasnaya
Zvezda Daily, 27 November 1997; Maj. General Alexander Averchenko, Ministry of
Defense, “Making the Ottawa Convention a Reality: Military
Implications,” in proceedings of the Regional Conference on Landmines and
Explosive Remnants of War, organized by the ICRC, Moscow, 4 November 2002, pp.
43-49. See Landmine Monitor 2000, pp.
835-836. [2] Boris Schiborin and
Andrei Malov, “Russia and Antipersonnel Mines,” 26 February 1999;
Interviews with Counselor Andrei Malov, 29 November 2000, 18 December 2000, and
23 January 2001. [3] Statement by A.
Antonov, Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation, Annual Meeting of the
States Parties to the CCW, Geneva, 27 November
2003. [4] New York Times, 11 October
1997. [5] Statement by Boris
Schiborin, Representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry at the Budapest
Seminar, 26-28 March 1998. [6] Press
release, AP RF Division of Governmental Information/Information Analytical
Materials, No. 177, 9 March 2000. [7]
Statement of Amb. Anatoly Antonov, Fifth Annual Conference of States Parties to
CCW Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 26 November
2003. [8] “Putin Urges
Ratification of Protocol Limiting Mines,” ITAR-Tass, 7 May
2000. [9] Interview with Counselor
Andrei Malov, 30 April 2000. See Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp.895 for more
information. [10] Press release of the
Chief Division of Engineer Forces at the opening of the 1998 Moscow conference
“New Steps to a Mine-Free Future,” IPPNW-ICBL, 27-28 May 1998;
Working Materials, Second International Conference on Landmines in Russia and
FSU, IPPNW-Russia, Tbilisi, Georgia, 5-7 December 1999; Statement by the Russian
Federation to the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol
II, 10 December 2001. [11] Statement
by Russia, CCW Annual Meeting, 27 November
2003. [12] “Parliamentary
committee recommends Russia ratify land mines protocol,” Interfax-AVN
(Moscow), 30 September 2004. [13]
Interview with Andrei Malov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 February 1999;
Vladimir Kuznetsov, “S uchetom boevogo opyta zivut i uchatsya ingenernie
voiska,” Krasnaya Zvezda (The Red Star), 21 January 1998; A. Yarlyan,
“Like a Phoenix From its Ashes,” Armeysky Sbornik (magazine), No. 1,
1998, p. 64-65. [14] Vladimir
Kuznetsov, “Novyi oblik ingenernych voisk,” (New outlook of the
Engineer Troops), Armeysky Sbornik (Army’s journal) No. 1, 1998,
p.11. [15] Russia’s Arms
Catalogue, Volume 1, Army 1998-1997, published by “Military Parade,”
JSC, under general supervision of Anatolyi Sitnikov, Chief of the Armed Forces,
Ordnance, Moscow, 1996, pp.276-83. See also, “Landmines: Outlook from
Russia,” Report prepared by the Chief Division of Engineer Forces of the
RF Ministry of Defense for IPPNW-Russia, 25 February 1999. For more on these
mines and other mines produced by Russia in the past, see Landmine Monitor
Report 1999, p. 805. [16]
Presentations by Boris Schiborin, then-chief counselor of the Department for
Security and Disarmament, Russian Foreign Ministry, and A. Nizhalovsky,
then-deputy-commander of Engineering Forces, Ministry of Defense, at IPPNW-ICBL
Moscow Conference, 27 May 1998. [17]
Lt. Col. Mikhail Nagorny, Senior Officer, Division of Engineer Forces, Tbilisi
Conference 5-7 December 1999. At the CCW Protocol II Conference in Geneva on 16
December 1999, Col. Vladimir Bobkov, Adviser, Ministry of Defense, confirmed
this, noting that PMN-1 and PMN-2 mines were no longer
produced. [18] Oral remarks of Russian
delegation, Second Annual Meeting of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II,
Geneva, 11 December 2000. Landmine Monitor
notes. [19] Statement by Russia, Third
Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, 10 December
2001. [20] Presentation by Maj.
General Alexander Averchenko, Ministry of Defense, “Making the Ottawa
Convention a Reality: Military Implications,” in proceedings of the
Regional Conference on Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War, organized by the
ICRC, Moscow, 4 November 2002, pp.
43-49. [21] A. Averchenko,
“Traditional and New Tasks,” Amreysky Sbornik Magazine, No. 1,
1997. [22] “Landmines: Outlook
from Russia”, IPPNW-Russia information analytical report, 1999, Moscow;
see also Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p.
837. [23] The following States parties
have declared mines of Soviet origin in their transparency measures reports
required by Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty: Algeria, Angola, Bulgaria,
Cambodia, Congo-Brazzaville, Ecuador, Guinea-Bissau, Jordan, Mali, Mauritania,
Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Peru, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda, Yemen, Zambia,
and Zimbabwe. [24] Afghanistan,
Angola, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Cuba, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Georgia, Honduras, Iraq, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua,
Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe. [25] Although State Party
Estonia has yet to submit a transparency report, it has declared in its Article
13 Report for CCW Amended Protocol II that it does not possess a stockpile of
antipersonnel mines. [26] Presidential
Decrees No. 2094 of 1 December 1994, and No. 1271 of 1 December
1997. [27] Telephone interview with a
representative of the Russian Ministry of Defense, 7 April 2003; Presentation by
the Russian Federation delegation to a NATO-Russia Group of Experts Meeting,
Brussels, 29 April 2003. [28]
Statement by Russia, CCW Amended Protocol II Conference, 26 November
2003. [29] Interview with Col. M.
Arsaliev, engineer at “Krasny Molot” plant, Grozny, December 1999;
interview with I. T. Tauzov, Assistant Commander of the Southwestern Front of
the Chechen forces, 20 February 2001; interview with a group of Chechen
fighters, 15 January 2001. [30] See
Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 805-806,
809. [31] Russian military sources and
independent military analysts told Landmine Monitor in 2004 that the 50 million
figure is not accurate, and that the true number is less than half that total.
Landmine Monitor is in the process of trying to confirm new details on types and
numbers of mines still in stock. It is possible that the original estimate of
60-70 million may have been based on total holdings in the former Soviet Union,
and not just the Russian Federation. Landmine Monitor based the original
estimate on a published report in the Russian military trade press, and
interviews with Russian Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry officials, as well
as knowledgeable officials from other
governments. [32] Tajikistan Article 7
Report, Form B, 3 February 2003. [33]
Presentation by Russia, NATO meeting, 29 April 2003. For more on Russia’s
conflicting statements, see Landmine Monitor Report 2003, pp. 668-669.
[34] Information provided by the
Ministry of Defense. [35] Presentation
by Russia, NATO meeting, 29 April 2003; supplemented with information for 2003
received from the Ministry of
Defense. [36] Presentation by Canada,
Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 31 January 2001. A Russian
company involved in PFM destruction stated that “in the year 2000 the
guaranteed shelf life of existing stocks of cluster ammunitions KSF-1 based on
PFM-1 APL mines expired.” Research and Production Association
“Ecodem,” “Appeal for a Credit Emergency Humanitarian
Appeal,” received by Landmine Monitor on 15 August
2001. [37] Presentation by Yuri P.
Osipovitch, “Demilitarization of APMs with Cementation Method,” made
at the Budapest Seminar “Destruction of PFM-1 mines,” March
2001. [38] Interviews with Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, January-March
2003. [39] Presentation by Yuri P.
Osipovitch, Executive Secretary, Federal Working Group for Mine Action, Standing
Committee Meeting, Geneva, 9 May
2001. [40] “Russia patents new
technology for scrapping antipersonnel mines,” Interfax, 29 May
2003. [41] Vladimir Korenkov, General
Director of FGUP GNPP “Bazalt,” at the meeting between EU
representatives and officials of MoD, MoFA and Center for Mine Action and
Munitions Disposal, 27 March
2003. [42] “Russia patents new
technology for scrapping antipersonnel mines,” Interfax, 29 May
2003. [43] Statement by Russia, CCW
Amended Protocol II Conference, 26 November
2003. [44] For the most recent
example, see the statement by Amb. Anatoly Antonov, to the CCW Group of
Government Experts, “On the Landmines Other Than Antipersonnel Mines
(MOTAPM),” Geneva, 18 November
2003. [45] In a letter published on
the Internet, Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev subsequently claimed responsibility
for the siege. “Excerpts: Basayev claims Beslan,” BBC News, 17
September 2004. [46] Many types of
mines could be clearly seen in television footage of the
event. [47] "127 Home-made Explosives
Laid in Beslan School," Novosti Rossii, 9 September
2004. [48] See past editions of
Landmine Monitor Report. [49] Umar
Khanbiev, Minister for Health of the Chechen republic, citation translated from
Russian by Landmine Monitor, 18 July 2002, www.chechenpress.com
. [50] See, for example, Deputy Chief
of the Military Engineering University, Maj. Gen. A. Nizhalovskii’s report
during a virtual roundtable discussion of engineer equipment of military
operations in Chechnya, Armeyskiy sbornik (Army collection), No. 6, June 2000,
pp.35-40. [51] Tajikistan Article 7
Report, Form C, 4 February 2004. [52]
Tajikistan Article 7 Report, Form C, 3 February
2003. [53] From Tajikistan Article 7
Report, Form C 3 February 2003. [54]
Interview with Johnmahmad Rajabov, Deputy Head of the Board of the
Constitutional Guarantees of Citizens Rights, Executive Board of the President
of Tajikistan, Geneva, 5 February
2003. [55] Meeting with Col. Mikhail
Zenkin, Federal Border Service, and Vladimir Kurikov, Counsellor, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation, at the Second CCW Review Conference,
Geneva, 13 December 2001. [56] Georgiy
Mekhov, “How to Solve the Mine Problem: Russia Supports the Aspirations of
the World Community to Ban Anti-Personnel Mines, But is not Ready for it,”
Moscow Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, November 2000; Interview with Boris
Kvok, Deputy Director, Department of Security and Disarmament, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Geneva, 13 December 2000; Statement by the Russian Federation
to the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, 10
December 2001. [57] Statement of
Russia, CCW Amended Protocol II Conference, 26 November
2003. [58] Response by Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation, 16 August
2001. [59] Andrei Malov, Counselor,
Department for Security and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
presentation to IPPNW-Russia, 19 January 2001. Also, interviews with Senior
Counselor Malov, 29 November 2000, 18 December 2000, and 23 January 2001;
Response by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 August
2001. [60] Aleksandr Igorev and
Georgiy Dvali, “Minefields Will Separate Russia from Georgia,”
Moscow Kommersant, 12 April 2000; “Federals to Mine 80Km of
Chechnya-Georgia Border,” AVN, 11 April
2000. [61] Interview with Andrei
Malov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 May
2000. [62] Interview with Sergo
Gumberidze, Security Council Staff, 23 May
2001. [63] Black Sea Press Information
Agency, 15 October 2002; “Rustavi-2” TV company, 15 October 2002;
APSNYPRESS Information Agency (Abkhazia), #210, 15 October
2002. [64] APSNYPRESS Information
Agency (Abkhazia), #210, 15 October
2002. [65] Response to Landmine
Monitor by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, sent by fax to
Landmine Monitor (HRW) by Vassily V. Boriak, Counselor, Embassy of the Russia to
US, 16 August 2001. [66] Lt-Gen. Guram
G. Nickolaishvili, “Peaceful Caucasus: Toward a Future Without
Landmines,” Regional Landmine Conference, Tbilisi, Georgia, 5-7 December
1999. [67] Prime-News (television),
Tbilisi, Georgia, 10 August 1999. [68]
“Georgian Deputy Says Type of Russian Bomb Established,” RIA News
Agency, 1 August 1999. [69]
“Sources Say Russian Air Force to Apologize to Georgia,” Interfax,
17 August 1999. [70] ICBL meeting with
US delegation to CCW Protocol II meeting, Geneva, 13 December
1999. [71] Statement of Alexander
Konuzin, UN Security Council 4858th meeting, New York, 13 November
2003. [72] Statement of Russia, CCW
Amended Protocol II Conference, 26 November
2003. [73] Presentation by Russian
Federation Ministry of Defense to a Russia-UK meeting on anti-terrorism measures
within the international military cooperation program, London, April
2003. [74]
Ibid. [75] Presidential Decree #1010
of 13 November 1995, “On Russian National Corps for Emergent Humanitarian
Operations.” [76] A. Kostiukov,
demining commercial enterprise “Fort”: verbal statement at the
working group meeting, 10 November
1998. [77] “Moscow sappers
detail 2003 mine clearing operations,” Interfax, 21 Jan
2004. [78] “WWII mines cleared
in Northwestern Russia,” RIA Novosti, 21 August
2004. [79] “Russian rail workers
unearth World War II explosives,” Agence France-Presse, 6 August
2004. [80] “15,000 WWII shells
and mines found in 2002 in St Petersburg,” AFP, 30 December
2002. [81] “At least 58 dead in
Black Sea floods,” Agence France-Presse, 11 August
2002. [82] IPPNW-Russia,
“Materials of the First International Conference on APMs in Russia-CIS,
27-28 May 1998,” Moscow, 1998, p.
30. [83]
Ibid. [84] Presentation by Russian
Ministry of Defense to anti-terrorism meeting, April 2003.
[85] “The Importance of Mine
Action for Peacekeeping Operations,” UN Security Council 4858th meeting,
New York, 13 November 2003 [86]
Interviews with Andrei Malov, 29 November 2000, 18 December 2000, and 23 January
2001. [87] Official response to
Landmine Monitor (IPPNW-Russia) by General of Army Nikolai Kormiltsev, Chief
Commander, Ground Forces of the Russian Federation and Deputy Minister of
Defense, Ref. #565/2507, 27 June
2003. [88] Statement by Russia, CCW
Amended Protocol II Conference, 26 November
2003. [89] “Russian minister
calls to create Russo-Spanish anti-mine center,” ITAR-Tass, 27 June
2003. [90] Statement by Yuri P.
Osipovitch, Standing Committee Meeting, Geneva, 9 May
2001. [91] “Russian Sappers to
Help Kyrgyz Colleagues to Demine Border,” ITAR-Tass, 14 July
2003. [92] Statement by Russian
Delegation to the OSCE, 23 December
2002. [93] Russian Information Agency
RIA “OREANDA,” 6 December
2001. [94] Steven Mufson, “U.S.
Talks to Moscow About Force in Kabul,” Washington Post, 29 November 2001,
p. A25. [95] Statement by Russian
Delegation to the OSCE, 23 December
2002. [96]
Ibid. [97] Statement by the Russian
Federation to the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol
II, 10 December 2001. [98] Interview
with Andrei Kostiukov, Director, Fort, Moscow, 23 March
2003. [99] The so-called
“District Military Committee” –
“raivoenkomat.” [100] Lt.
Gen. (Rt.) V. Vasiliev, Ministry of Disaster Resources, 10 November
1998. [101] Landmine Monitor Report
2002, pp.738. [102] ICRC,
“Emergency action of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement for the North
Caucasus and the South of Russia Jan 2001,” 14 March
2001. [103] See, for example, ICRC,
“Facts and Figures: The North Caucasus and the South of Russia,” 6
May 2003. [104] ICRC, “Emergency
action of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement for the North Caucasus and the
South of Russia,” March
2002.” [105] Ibid, Mar
2001. [106] ICRC, “Northern
Caucasus and southern Russia: facts & figures on recent ICRC action (Apr -
May 2002),” 8 July 2002. [107]
Landmine Monitor Report 2002,
pp.804. [108] UNICEF, “Northern
Caucasus,” Situation Report, 4 November
2003. [109] Landmine Monitor Report
2003, pp.739. [110] UNICEF,
“Northern Caucasus,” Situation Report, 1 September
2003. [111] “Child seriously
injured in mine explosion in Novosibirsk region,” Itar-Tass (Russia), 30
June 2003. [112] “Four Russian
soldiers killed in Caucasus landmine blast,” AFP (Moscow), 1 April 2003;
“3 army servicemen die in explosion in Ingushetia,” Itar-Tass
(Moscow), 16 May 2003; “Death Toll from Truck Explosion in Ingushetia
Reaches Five,” Interfax (Russia), 30 July
2003. [113] “Investigation Of
Blast In Makhachkala Continues,” RosBusiness Consulting (Russia), 21
January 2002. [114] “Three
arrested for Dagestan landmine blast,” AFP (Russia), 11 May 02; “A
car bomb defused in Dagestan,” AFP, 17 May
2002. [115] “Second World War
mine kills five boys in Russia,” Reuters, 14 September 2002. For details
on post-WW II casualties, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p.
814. [116] For more details see
Landmine Monitor Report 2003, p.
740. [117] Data collated by Landmine
Monitor from 54 media reports between 9 January and 2 December 2003. Media
reports often listed several people killed or injured without giving a specific
number. It was often not possible to differentiate between incidents caused by
landmines and improvised explosive
devices. [118] Data collated by
Landmine Monitor from 60 media reports between 8 January and 31December
2002. [119] For more details see
Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p.
805. [120] “UN Envoy Condemns
Violence in Wake of Historic Meeting in Capital,” UN News Service, 30
April 2003. [121] “Russian
peacekeeper killed in breakaway Georgian province,” Associated Press, 9
June 2002. [122] Statement by
Alexander Konuzin, UN Security Council 4858th Meeting, New York, 13 November
2003. [123] For more information see
Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp.
907-908. [124] “MChS: Major
Operations in 2003,”; Irina Krasnopolskaya, “Zhizn v zone
bedy” (“Living in the zone of calamity”) Rossiyskaya gazeta, 4
February, 2004. [125]
“Organization of Medical Aid to Population,” Part 3, available at
http:// medafarm.ru/php/content.html?group=4&id=1275,
accessed 12 October 2004. [126] For
more details see Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p.
908. [127] Christopher Hamilton,
“Amputation No Handicap for These Hockey Players,” St. Petersburg
Times, 29 April 2003. [128] For more
information on the activities of these organizations, see World Health
Organization, “Health Sector Field Directory: Republics of Chechnya and
Ingushetia, Russian Federation,” Nazran, June
2004. [129] RIA NOVOSTI, 21 February
2002. [130] Resolution of the Council
of the Heads of Government of the CIS countries, 31 May
2001. [131] Report on the fulfillment
of the “International Complex Program on the Rehabilitation of the War
Veterans, Participants of Local Conflicts and Victims of Terrorism for
2001-2005” in 2001. [132] Letter
to Landmine Monitor (IPPNW-Russia) from Prof. Galina Z. Demchenkova, Doctor of
Medical Science, Deputy Chairman of the Committee for War Veterans Affairs under
the CIS Council of Heads of Governments, 25 June 2003. For more details see
Landmine Monitor Report 2003, pp. 674-675.
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