Senegal

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Senegal signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified on 24 September 1998, and became a State Party on 1 March 1999. On 3 August 2005 the president signed the “Law in regard to ban of antipersonnel mines,” after its approval by parliament on 14 July 2005.^[1] The law makes production, purchase, sale, stockpiling, transfer and use of antipersonnel mines a criminal offense.^[2] The president signed two implementation decrees on 18 August 2006, establishing a national mine action authority and a mine action center.

Senegal submitted its eighth Article 7 transparency report on 30 April 2007, covering calendar year 2006. It included voluntary Form J with mine casualty data.^[3]

Senegal attended the Seventh Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2006, where it made statements with regard to mine clearance, victim assistance and cooperation and assistance. Senegal did not participate in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2006. It did attend the Standing Committee meetings in April 2007 where it provided an update on victim assistance and its efforts toward meeting its mine clearance deadline in 2009.

Senegal has not engaged in the discussions that States Parties have had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2 and 3. Thus, Senegal has not made known its views on issues related to joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and the permissible number of mines retained for training.^[4]

On 22 November 2006, in Dakar, the ICBL in collaboration with its representative in Senegal, Boubine Touré, organized a workshop on the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty in Senegal. The workshop was held with the support and active participation of the National Commission on the Implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. A summary of the workshop’s findings was presented the next day in Ziguinchor in the mine-affected province of Casamance. Participating in this event were almost 40 representatives of local and international NGOs working on mine action, victim assistance and economic reconstruction, foreign aid organizations from Canada, France, Germany and the US, UNICEF and the former rebel group MFDC (see below).^[5]

Senegal is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. Senegal did not attend the Eighth Annual Conference of States Parties to the protocol in November 2006, and did not submit an annual transparency report as required under Article 13 of Amended Protocol II. Senegal is not party to Protocol V on explosive remnants of war.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling and Use

Government authorities claim that Senegal has never used antipersonnel mines inside or outside the country, and in its Article 7 reports Senegal has consistently stated that it has never produced, possessed or stockpiled mines, even for training purposes.^[6]

However, in April 2007 Senegal reported that 24 antipersonnel mines were used for training purposes before their destruction in August and September 2006. It stated that the mines were either taken from demining operations or discovered among rebel stockpiles, and that the de-fuzed mines were used to instruct deminers.^[7]

Conflict with the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance, MFDC) in Casamance officially ended with the December 2004 peace accord.^[8] However, a faction of the MFDC led by Salif Sadio continued to engage in armed conflict, using antipersonnel and antivehicle mines in Guinea-Bissau in March 2006.^[9] In September 2006 security forces in Guinea-Bissau seized a shipment of antivehicle mines which they claimed were bound for the MFDC.^[10] Also in September an aid vehicle struck an antivehicle mine on a commonly used road in Casamance, killing one staff and injuring three.^[11]

Landmine and UXO Problem

Mine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination in Senegal was caused mainly by fighting in Casamance, an area composed of the regions of Kolda and Ziguinchor, between the Senegalese Army and the MFDC, which ended in December 2004.^[12]

Estimates by Senegal in September 2005 that some 1,400 square kilometers were “potentially hazardous” were reduced greatly by the Emergency Landmine Impact Survey of Casamance (ELISC) which found 149 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) affecting 93 communities (equivalent to 7 percent of the population).^[13] Departments most affected were Ziguinchor (72 SHAs), Sédhiou (58 SHAs), Oussouye (12 SHAs), Kolda (four SHAs) and Bignona (three SHAs). For the most part, contamination was the result of nuisance mining by armed groups.^[14] In its Article 7 report for 2006 Senegal noted that certain areas had not been accessible to the survey teams due to security concerns.^[15]

The ELISC was carried out by Handicap International (HI) under the supervision of UN Development Programme (UNDP) from October 2005 to May 2006 and followed the Survey Working Group protocols for an LIS but adapted to the local context.^[16] As of July 2007 consideration of the survey report for approval was underway.^[17]

In October 2006 MFDC representatives said that mine clearance in areas under their influence needed their consent.^[18] Subsequently, when Senegalese army personnel supported by about 500 Moroccan soldiers entered Casamance to conduct demining operations, attacks by the Sadio faction of the MFDC killed two and injured 14 Senegalese personnel. The Sadio faction demanded Moroccan specialists assisting the clearance operations leave, as removal of minefields in the area would allow attack by government forces.^[19] Senegalese refugees who had recently returned to their homes in Casamance fled back into Guinea-Bissau as a result of fighting between the Senegalese army and the Sadio faction.^[20]

Similar attacks by the Sadio faction in 2004 also caused casualties amongst Senegalese army demining teams, and halted demining operations in Casamance.^[21]

In February 2007 the ICBL expressed its concern about the operations and was assured that the “episode” was over.^[22] In April Senegal reiterated the 2006 decision to create a civilian mine action program: “because of the potentially sensitive nature of the demining operations in Casamance, the Government of Senegal had decided to create a civilian, neutral and humanitarian program that would work in close cooperation with all the stakeholders.”^[23]

Mine Action Program

On 18 August 2006 the National Commission for the Implementation of the Ottawa Convention was designated as the national mine action authority for Senegal by presidential decree. Its responsibilities were defined as overseeing the work of the national mine action center and adopting a national mine action strategy. It includes representatives of the presidency and government ministries; it is chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.^[24]

On the same day a second decree established the Senegal National Mine Action Center (Centre National d’Action Antimines du Sénégal, CNAMS).^[25] CNAMS is responsible for operational implementation of Senegal’s mine action strategy and serves as the secretariat to the National Commission. The CNAMS director was appointed by decree in January 2007.^[26] In April 2007 Senegal announced that the government had made US$300,000 and a building in Ziguinchor available to CNAMS.^[27]

In 2004, before the peace agreement was signed, Senegal asked UNDP to help create national mine action structures and a mine action program. A $19 million Mine Action Assistance Project for Casamance (Projet d’Assistance à la Lutte Antimines en Casamance, PALAC) for the period 1 July 2007-end 2009 was approved in June 2007. The project included support for the institutional and regulatory framework for mine action as well as for demining, mine risk education and victim assistance activities. As of July, $14 million had already been pledged by donors.^[28]

Strategic Mine Action Planning

In 2007 it was decided to update the 2004 national mine action strategy, to develop it into an operational strategic plan. The 2004 strategy set out the institutional framework for mine action and the roles and responsibilities of institutions. It explicitly linked mine action to the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.^[29]

The National Commission approved the recruitment of an international consultant to develop an operational strategy for mine action, by the end of 2007.^[30]

Integration of Mine Action with Reconstruction and Development

In April 2007 Senegal stated that the 2004 strategy had foreseen that the mine action program would contribute to the Program for the Revival of Social and Economic Activities in Casamance (Programme de Relance des Activités économiques et sociales de la Casamance, PRAESC). In addition, it noted that the 2006 presidential decree explicitly mentioned the need for mine action to support the economic recovery of the Casamance region.^[31]

Demining

As of July 2007 no technical survey had been carried out in Senegal.^[32] Since the limits of affected areas had not been established, no professional marking of affected areas had taken place, although the local population has conducted some informal marking. Senegal’s 2007 Article 7 report stated that once the implementation of the mine action program had begun, technical survey and marking would be critical elements in the broader risk reduction strategy for at-risk populations.^[33]

Limited clearance operations were conducted by the army in 2006. According to Senegal’s Article 7 report, 209 mines (including 64 antipersonnel mines) and other items of explosive ordnance were destroyed in the 12 months to 31 January 2007. Three clearance operations took place in the north and south of Ziguinchor, notably in Sindian, Bourkadier and Niaguiss sectors.^[34]

According to press reports, in operations starting in mid-December 2006, 84 kilometers of roads in Ziguinchor were cleared, with the destruction of 13 antipersonnel mines, 15 antivehicle mines, and 11 grenades and mortars.^[35]

No civilian mine clearance operations took place in Senegal in 2006. In 2007 Handicap International was awarded funds by the US Department of State to implement a pilot demining project in Casamance. The project began in May 2007, in coordination with CNAMS, recruiting, equipping and training civilian humanitarian deminers to humanitarian standards, with operations due to start in July.  Funding for the project amounted to $420,000; further funding was sought to extend operations beyond the initial phase, and for the procurement of ground preparation machinery.^[36]

Summary of Efforts to Comply with Article 5

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Senegal must destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but no later than 1 March 2009. Despite the protracted delays in setting up a demining program, in April 2007 Senegal expressed its determination “to respect its undertakings set out in Article 5 of the Convention and to ensure the destruction of antipersonnel mines under its jurisdiction or control within the prescribed deadlines, i.e. March 2009, to the extent possible.”^[37] Under the PALAC agreement, UNDP with its partners undertake to provide all necessary assistance to enable Senegal to meet its obligations.^[38]

Mine Risk Education

Mine risk education (MRE) in Casamance was provided in 2006 by Handicap International, with US funding, UNICEF and local NGOs and community groups, as in previous years.^[39] Senegal’s MRE capacity included one national MRE coordinator and eight educators working with HI, 386 community focal points, and NGO and government partners. A total of 74 “mine committees,” 2,110 teachers and 116 members of the national NGO Senegalese Association of Mine Victims, were trained in MRE.^[40]

By April 2007 school/community-based MRE and MRE radio messages had reached all 93 mine/ERW affected communities identified by the ELISC. Additional efforts have been made to reach internally displaced people, particularly after renewed fighting in northern Casamance in August 2006.^[41]

HI reported that 152,842 people received MRE during 2006, in 546 direct sessions in 151 localities. From December to March, 29,924 people also received community-based MRE.^[42] HI worked closely with the regional education departments to integrate MRE into the school curriculum; partnership agreements to this effect were signed with two regional and four departmental education authorities. From May 2005 to July 2006, 2,110 teachers were trained in 362 elementary schools (18 in urban areas), reaching more than 95,000 students from 6 to 13 years of age in interactive MRE sessions. Since May 2006, 20 new volunteers have been trained and 577 received refresher trainings.^[43] Some volunteers were from the 74 mine committees; six new committees have been formed since May 2006. The mine committees’ tasks include MRE and marking minefields with locally appropriate signs as well as identifying people with disabilities for referral.^[44]

In 2006 HI also focused on underserved areas and on children and displaced people returning to their homes, “because both groups face greater risk as they resume their daily activities.”^[45] A special session was held for 400 women who had gathered for a peace meeting.^[46] As well as providing MRE for 450 displaced people in Nyassia district, HI targeted NGOs working with displaced people, training 23 local staff and identifying 13 new locations for the future training of local volunteers.^[47]

UNICEF’s MRE activities were limited in 2006 by a lack of resources. It continued to develop community liaison projects as part of peace-building and development programs. From August 2006 members of 14 community-based “reconciliation units” were prepared to “implement an integrated training on stress, conflict prevention and mine accident prevention, in areas where the situation has deteriorated over the past few months...Mine victims are always associated with such trainings, as resource persons and facilitators.”^[48]

An MRE evaluation by UNICEF in 2005 recommended that communication strategies be better adapted to the context and needs of the communities.^[49] After a workshop on risks and risk behavior, UNICEF developed an MRE plan in June 2006 involving a workshop in July for local press and community leaders, and materials for children to children, women to women communication MRE.^[50]

UNDP continued facilitating landmine safety sessions in 2006 for over 80 staff from all UN and other agencies.^[51] Its PALAC agreement with the government of Senegal envisaged support for CNAMS to coordinate MRE, collect relevant data, and develop a strategy and operational plans for the sector.^[52]

According to UNDP, one of the main challenges for MRE in Casamance will be to provide appropriate support for the repatriation of displaced people: “MRE will have to be closely coordinated with repatriation movements as well as with other demining activities (such as surveys and marking) in order to minimize the risk faced by displaced families when they will move back into their villages.”^[53]

Landmine/ERW Casualties

In 2006 Senegal reported 18 new mine/ERW casualties (three killed and 15 injured)―an increase from 2005 (12 casualties) and the first year there has been an increase since 2001.^[54] Thirteen of the casualties were civilians and five were military casualties.^[55] All but two casualties were male and three were boys under 15 years. The civilian casualties were caused by landmines: five were due to antipersonnel mines and eight due to antivehicle mines.^[56] Civilian casualties occurred while collecting wood, water or food, except for one incident which involved a vehicle on a humanitarian mission; this occurred on 1 September 2006 when an American-Swiss delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was killed and three others (two Senegalese and one Ukrainian) were injured, when driving over an antivehicle mine or ERW.^[57] All the 2006 casualties occurred in the Ziguinchor region of Casamance; most civilian incidents occurred in Niaguis district; the ICRC incident occurred in Sindian district. No mine/ERW incidents and casualties occurred in the Kolda region of Casamance, whereas more than half of the casualties (seven) in 2005 occurred in this region. Niaguis has recorded the majority (198) of incidents since 1997.^[58]

Casualties continued to be reported in 2007; by 11 July one civilian injured by an antipersonnel mine in Oussouye district in Casamance had been reported.^[59]

Until 2006, casualties had been declining steadily since 1999, and had been below 50 casualties per year since 2001.^[60]

Data Collection

Since 1999 Handicap International has maintained a database of mine and UXO casualties in Casamance, which includes 730 casualties between 1988 and 2007. From 1997 to June 2007, 697 mine/UXO casualties were recorded (152 people killed and 545 injured); 65 percent (452) of casualties were men, 18 percent (125) were women and 17 percent (120) were children. The majority (534 or 77 percent) of casualties were civilians, and 163 were military. Antivehicle mines caused most (408 or 59 percent) casualties, antipersonnel mines caused 270 and ERW caused 17 casualties.^[61] HI distributes casualty information to all actors who need it for planning purposes; mine survivors are followed up by HI after the incident. The database does not contain follow-up information on the survivors’ needs or services received.^[62]

It is probable that fatal casualties are under-reported due to Islamic burial practices and the absence of death registries. Data on mine/ERW casualties is usually provided by hospitals. The army and the Senegalese Association of Mine Victims (Association Sénégalaise des Victimes de Mines, ASVM) also collect casualty information. Although it was reported in 2005 that ASVM would store the national casualty database, it seems to lack the technical and budgetary capacities to do this.

The unification of the HI database and other data sources into one database at CNAMS was ongoing in 2007; an international technical advisor started working for CNAMS.^[63] This work may have resulted in the identification of 730 casualties from 1988 to January 2007 (161 killed, 569 injured); of these 196 were military and 534 civilian (the same number as identified by HI).^[64] More than 70 percent of casualties (514) occurred in Ziguinchor, followed by Kolda at 21 percent (153).

Survivor Assistance

Nearly all mine/ERW survivors live in the Casamance region where services are more limited than elsewhere in Senegal. A small survey of 15 survivors in the Ziguinchor region of Casamance indicated that 80 percent of casualties lived in rural areas; on average they spent 41 days in hospital. Medical services and emergency evacuation infrastructure are almost non-existent outside the towns of Ziguinchor and Kolda. Delivery of emergency aid varies according to the location of the mine incident; on average it takes two hours but can take several days in remote areas.^[65] Casualties are usually evacuated by the army to regional hospitals in Kolda and Ziguinchor, which have sufficient capacity although supplies are sometimes lacking. Military casualties are transferred to military facilities in the capital Dakar.^[66]

Physiotherapy sessions for mine/ERW survivors are started immediately after operations and throughout the prosthetic fitting process, free of charge. Rehabilitation and mobility devices are available through the regional hospitals in Casamance and mobile units, as well as in Dakar. Raw materials are often not available, so survivors may wait several months for prosthetic devices and services.^[67] Survivors are not well aware of their rights and organizations occasionally accompanied survivors to facilitate treatment. Although raw materials are said to be free of charge, prosthetic devices are not free for people without insurance, as the ASVM fund which covered costs previously ceased to exist. The rehabilitation sector also suffers from a lack of coordination and services are limited.^[68]

Psychosocial support services for mine/ERW survivors are limited, national coordination is lacking and there are no qualified psychologists in mine-affected areas.^[69] In 2007 Handicap International carried out a project to train a network of professionals to respond to psychological trauma in Casamance. Some hospital staff received counseling training and peer-support groups exist. Married female survivors are often abandoned after the incident; more effort was needed for them and their children to benefit from rehabilitation and inclusion projects.^[70] Economic reintegration and education opportunities for people with disabilities are integrated in national development and poverty reduction plans. The government runs schools for disabled children, although only 30 percent of disabled children are enrolled, and provides grants for vocational training. However, NGOs stated that several programs which appeared to be for people with disabilities actually targeted other vulnerable groups. Access for mine/ERW survivors and their families can be problematic because not all services are free of charge and they are considered to be a high-risk group for loans and credits. Some specialized programs exist.^[71]

There is no specific legislation protecting the rights of people with disabilities in Senegal, but general legislation in the Constitution appears to be enforced.^[72] A bill for social guidance and equal opportunities for people with disabilities was before parliament in December 2005, but no progress has been reported.^[73] On 25 April 2007 Senegal signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol allowing for the monitoring of disability activities.

Progress in Meeting VA24 Survivor Assistance Objectives

At the First Review Conference in Nairobi in November-December 2005, Senegal was identified as one of 24 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation and reintegration of survivors.^[74]

As part of its commitment to the Nairobi Action Plan, Senegal prepared its 2005-2009 objectives for the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in Zagreb in 2005.^[75] However, these objectives cannot be considered to be SMART (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Time-bound) and at the Seventh Meeting in September 2006 and the Standing Committee meetings in April 2007 Senegal did not present revised objectives, plans or progress made. It did provide some detail on the situation of survivors, the survivor assistance strategic framework and a small survey in 2006.^[76] What progress has been made in achieving objectives is due mainly to NGO efforts.

Senegal did not request or receive support from the victim assistance specialist of the Mine Ban Treaty’s Implementation Support Unit (ISU) in 2006 and 2007 to date.^[77]

On 22 and 23 November 2006 the ICBL organized an implementation workshop in Zuiginchor which included survivor assistance.^[78] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and UNDP stated that the new mine action strategy would include a section on victim assistance and pledged to involve victim assistance specialists and survivors in its development. On 23 November the main findings of the workshop were presented in Ziguinchor, Casamance to 40 representatives of local and international NGOs.^[79]

Senegal provided casualty data and limited information about survivor assistance activities in voluntary Form J of its Article 7 report for 2006.^[80]

Survivor Assistance Strategic Framework

Survivor assistance is said to be an integral part of Senegal’s mine action strategy.^[81] PALAC, the mine action assistance project for Casamance for the period 1 July 2007 to the end of 2009 developed by the government and UNDP, budgeted survivor assistance activities at $ 1.2 million.^[82] This included support to CNAMS for coordination and liaison with assistance service providers as well as direct support to disabled and mine survivors associations for assistance activities.^[83] The Senegal delegation stated at the April 2007 Standing Committee meetings that a survivor assistance strategy had been developed, and included strengthening medical infrastructure and socioeconomic reintegration in close cooperation with ASVM. ^[84] Although it planned technical assistance for all components of mine action, UNDP did not provide direct technical advice on survivor assistance in 2006, focusing instead on capacity-building and resource mobilization.^[85]

Interministerial coordination on survivor assistance issues improved in 2006. Survivor assistance in Casamance was identified as one of the priorities for 2007, due to the urgent need for activities but also because it is less “controversial” than demining in Casamance. There is a lack of knowledge about the living conditions of survivors and a lack of planning, implementation and monitoring capacity at the governmental level.

The National Commission for the Implementation of the Ottawa Convention includes the ministries of health, women, family and social development. Senegal reported in April 2007 that the commission, with CNAMS, will monitor access to services and contribute to the Programme for the Revival of Social and Economic Activities in Casamance (Programme de Relance des Activités économiques et sociales de la Casamance, PRAESC).^[86]

Senegal does not have a government minister dedicated to disability issues, despite civil society lobbying for this.^[87] Although there is no clear ministerial responsibility for disability, there is a presidential advisor on disability issues within the Department of Social Services and Development, Family Planning and National Solidarity.^[88] On 14 July 2006 the government launched a five-year national program for community-based rehabilitation of people with disabilities, but no progress was evident in 2006.^[89]

It is unknown how many people with disabilities and mine/ERW survivors received assistance in 2006. According to partial information provided to Landmine Monitor by implementers, at least 860 people with disabilities (including 16 mine/ERW casualties) received services during 2006. Within this total, the Ziguinchor Regional Hospital performed 270 surgical operations, including to 16 new mine casualties. Orthopedic appliances were distributed to 297 people (two to new survivors) and 2,376 physiotherapy sessions were performed (280 for new survivors). Among the other beneficiaries there were an unspecified number of mine/ERW survivors from before 2006.^[90] The Senegalese Association for the Support of the Creation of Socio-Economic Activities (Association Sénégalaise pour l’Appui à la Création d’Activités Socio-économiques, ASACASE) provided economic reintegration assistance to 4,372 people, including 249 people with disabilities who received grants and micro-credit, with HI support.^[91] The Mbour Socio-Professional Center for Disabled provided services to 300 people with disabilities including 840 orthopedic consultations, 1,254 physiotherapy sessions and 58 orthopedic appliances.^[92]

In 2006 the ICRC restored several health facilities and supplied basic equipment and medicines in Casamance. Following the September 2006 mine incident involving four ICRC staff, plans to renovate three more facilities were suspended and most ICRC programs remained suspended as of July 2007.^[93]

Handicap International supported physical rehabilitation, psychological support and social/economic inclusion activities in Casamance. The program focuses on identification and referral of people with disabilities, capacity-building of local partners, training, and provision of materials. Ziguinchor Regional Hospital, which is the best-equipped hospital in Casamance, received material and technical assistance; it has an orthopedic department. In Kolda the regional hospital is less well-equipped for complex surgery but also has facilities for prosthetics and rehabilitation. In 2006 HI continued supporting two satellite rehabilitation units in Bignona and Oussouye districts of Ziguinchor.^[94] The outreach program seeks clients in the most affected districts to inform them about services and arrange referral. HI supported the ongoing training of orthopedic technicians and physiotherapists. In 2006 HI trained 62 people (including hospital staff and mine survivors) in Ziguinchor and Kolda in trauma management, counseling and psychotherapy. Handicap International, in cooperation with local organizations of people with disabilities and mine survivors, operates two economic inclusion projects in Casamance. A sports program which includes training of trainers and support for accessible sport venues is also operated by HI.^[95]

UNICEF organized psychosocial assistance for children traumatized by landmines in 2006; activities continued in 2007, but no further information was available.^[96]

Other organizations providing survivor assistance in Senegal were noted in last year’s Landmine Monitor.^[97]

Funding and Assistance

In 2006 international funding for mine action in Senegal totaled $924,272 (€735,710) from four countries-an increase of 14 percent from 2005 ($807,758 provided by two countries).^[98] Donations were reported by:

• Canada: C$147,654 ($130,201) for victim assistance;^[99]
• France: €263,226 ($330,691) consisting of €252,000 ($316,588) to UNDP for integrated mine action, €10,403 ($13,069) for training in Benin, and €823 ($1,034) for victim assistance;^[100]
• Japan: ¥5,044,240 ($43,380) to HI for victim assistance;^[101]
• US: $420,000 for mine action.^[102]

France reported an agreement to provide €8 million ($10,050,400) of multiyear funding to UNDP for technical support to CNAMS in Zinguinchor.^[103] As of June 2007, the three-year UNDP agreement with the government of Senegal had already attracted pledges of more than $14 million from donors, including more than $5.3 million from Spain and a further $5.3 million from the European Commission.^[104]

No national funding for mine action was reported by Senegal in 2006 and the first half of 2007, nor in previous years.