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Sub-Sections:
Yemen, Landmine Monitor Report 2007

Yemen

State Party since

1 March 1999

Treaty implementing legislation

Adopted: 20 April 2005

Last Article 7 report submitted on

30 March 2007

Article 4 (stockpile destruction)

Deadline: 1 March 2003

Completed: 27 April 2002

Article 3 (mines retained)

Initially: 4,000

At end-2006: not reported

Contamination

APMs, AVMs, UXO

Estimated area of contamination

419 km2

Article 5 (clearance of mined areas)

Deadline: 1 March 2009

Likelihood of meeting deadline

Low

Demining progress in 2006

Mine/battle area clearance: 1.92 km2

(2005: 2.73 km2)

Area cancellation/reduction: 184.6 km2

(2005: 32.03 km2)

MRE capacity

Adequate

Mine/ERW casualties in 2006

Total: 17 (2005: 35)

Mines: 6 (2005: unknown)

ERW: 11 (2005: unknown)

Casualty analysis

Killed: 7 (2005: 9)

Injured: 10 (2005: 26)

Estimated mine/ERW survivors

2,900

Availability of services in 2006

Unchanged or decreased-inadequate

Progress towards survivor assistance aims

Slow (VA24)

Mine action funding in 2006

International: $4,072,155/€3,241,388

(2005: $2,458,864)

(Yemen received 53% of UN Portfolio appeal)

National: $3.5 million/€2.8 million

Key developments since May 2006

In November 2006, 30,000 POMZ-2 antipersonnel mines were found in an old military warehouse. Yemen’s mine action program became fully national in 2006. Demining productivity increased (when compared with downward-revised results for 2005). Fewer mine/ERW casualties were reported than in 2005, but there are estimates of 48-72 casualties annually. A GICHD survey and ICBL visit found YEMAC survivor assistance services are limited and little known; psychosocial care and economic reintegration are lacking. In April 2007 there were unconfirmed reports of mine-laying during fighting between government and rebel forces.

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Yemen signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, ratified it on 1 September 1998, and it entered into force on 1 March 1999. On 16 December 2004 the Yemeni Parliament endorsed national implementation legislation for the treaty and on 20 April 2005, Presidential Law No. 25 was issued to bring the legislation into force.[1] Yemen submitted its ninth Article 7 transparency report on 30 March 2007, covering 30 March 2006 to 30 March 2007.[2]

Yemen participated in the Seventh Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2006, where it made statements on its mine clearance and victim assistance programs. Yemen also attended the meetings of the intersessional Standing Committees in Geneva in May 2006 and April 2007. In April, it made presentations on mine clearance, victim assistance and destruction of newly discovered stockpiles.

Yemen elaborated its views on key matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1 and 2 of the Mine Ban Treaty in a letter to Landmine Monitor in April 2006 and again during the intersessional meetings in May 2006. It articulated strong positions mirroring those of the ICBL and many other States Parties.[3]

On 3 February 2007, in Sana’a, the ICBL in collaboration with the Yemen Executive Mine Action Center hosted a Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Workshop to enhance understanding of the provisions of the treaty among all parties working on mine action, mine risk education and victim assistance in the country. Subsequently, 65 Landmine Monitor researchers and ICBL campaigners from over 25 countries attended a three-day Campaign and Research Training Meeting in Aden.

Yemen is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, but participated as an observer in the Eighth Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in November 2006.

Use, Transfer, Production and Stockpiling

In April 2007 there were two reports of the use of antipersonnel mines during conflict between government troops and rebel forces led by Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi in the northern mountainous Sa’ada governorate.[4] Landmine Monitor has not been able to confirm any of the information in these reports. The UN told Landmine Monitor that while it has heard reports about use of mines, it has been impossible to verify it. It said that due to lack of access, it had no information on the subject.[5] The Yemeni government did not provide Landmine Monitor with an official response to the reports.

In June 2004, shortly after the insurgency started, the Ministry of Interior accused the rebels of laying mines in clashes with Yemeni troops.[6] After a quiet period, open armed conflict began again in January 2007. The area has been closed to the media, making it difficult to obtain further information.[7]

Yemen has stated that it has never exported antipersonnel mines. In November 2006 the UN arms embargo monitoring group for Somalia reported allegations of transfers of arms from Yemen to Somalia by both the government and Yemeni arms trading networks, but antipersonnel mines were not specified.[8] An October 2005 report by the monitoring group alleged transfers of mines from the government of Yemen to Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government in July 2005; the report did not specify if the mines were antipersonnel or antivehicle. In a July 2006 letter to Landmine Monitor, Yemen strongly denied transferring mines.[9]

Yemen has stated that it has never produced antipersonnel mines. It completed destruction of its stockpile of 74,000 antipersonnel mines on 27 April 2002. In November 2006, an additional 30,000 POMZ-2 antipersonnel mines were found in an old military warehouse during the process of changing the warehouse into a tourist site.[10] The mines were transferred by the Yemen Mine Action Program for destruction in 2007.[11]

In May 2007 it was reported that antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were among the weapons which were bought from the public in various parts of the country as part of a governmental arms reduction and arms collection program. The different types of weapons were in the hands of “regular civilians, tribal sheikhs and clans from around the country.”[12]

Mines Retained for Research and Training

Yemen has retained 4,000 antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes under Article 3 of the treaty. Each year since 2003 Yemen has reported that it has used 240 of the retained mines for the training of mine detection dogs, but it has not subtracted this from the total number reported in its Article 7 report, indicating either that the mines are not consumed (exploded) during the training or that mines collected from demining activities are used for the training.[13]

Yemen has not reported in any detail on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines. It did not use the new expanded Form D for reporting on retained mines agreed to in December 2005 in either its 2006 or 2007 Article 7 reports.

Landmine and ERW Problem

Yemen is contaminated with both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), primarily unexploded ordnance (UXO) as a result of several conflicts, including the 1962-1975 war in the north between republicans and royalists, the 1963-1967 war of independence in the south, the 1970-1983 war against left-wing guerrillas, and the 1994 separatist war. Most landmines were laid in border areas between northern and southern Yemen, prior to unification. All governorates are contaminated, with the exception of Aden and Al Hodaida, both of which have been fully cleared. Hadramawt governorate is the most affected, containing 42 percent of all suspected land.[14]

As of 30 March 2007 Yemen reported that it still suspected around 550 square kilometers of land to be contaminated by landmines and UXO.[15] However, the Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) expects most of this suspected area will be canceled after impact and technical surveys.[16] In July 2007 YEMAC informed Landmine Monitor that there remained 388 square kilometers of suspected contamination.[17] To this total, however, must be added some 31 square kilometers of high-impact areas in Khanfar, al-Dale and Juban districts, a medium-impact area in al-Nadra, as well as low-impact areas in Khanfar, Dar Sa’ad, Damt, Juban and Tuban districts, which have been marked and then “suspended.”[18] On this basis, some 419 square kilometers of land remained to be demined as of July 2007.[19]

In 2006 a livelihoods analysis of mine-affected communities in Yemen reported that, “landmines and ERW have an impact on infrastructure development, which is denying people access to economic opportunities. This problem also has the effect of further reducing the already limited arable land (only 2.6 percent of the country) and frequently it results in the death or disabling of farmers, herders (often children) and livestock essential for agricultural production and the resumption of basic economic activities. The government is unable to implement social-development projects with these affected communities due to the presence of landmines and ERW.”[20]

Mine Action Program

The National Mine Action Committee (NMAC), established in 1998, is chaired by the Minister of State and brings together representatives of concerned government ministries.[21] NMAC met three times in 2006, and during this period approved national mine action standards, and the restructuring of two companies into smaller units of platoons that allow effective demining of smaller contaminated areas.[22]

The Yemen Executive Mine Action Center is in charge of implementing the plans and policies approved by NMAC. YEMAC’s headquarters are in the capital, Sana’a, with regional branches in Aden and al-Mukalla (Hadramawt).[23] YEMAC uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) to manage mine action data; installation of version 4 of IMSMA was expected to be completed by the end of 2007.[24]

Since 1999, Yemen’s mine action program has been supported by the UN Development Programme (UNDP). The UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) executed the first phase of the project from 1999 to 2003, while the second phase, from October 2003 until the end of 2006, aimed to strengthen national capacity for mine action.[25] Phase three focuses on Yemen having a fully national mine action program, with UNDP providing only ad hoc support, mainly resource mobilization.[26] The last UNDP chief technical advisor left Yemen in August 2006, although the UNDP Yemen office remains.[27]

Yemen’s mine action coordination and management institutions were set up by decree in 1998.[28] In 2006, the Yemen national mine action standards were approved by NMAC. Generic standing operating procedures have also been developed.[29]

Strategic Mine Action Planning

The National Mine Action Strategic Plan for 2001-2005, based on Landmine Impact Survey results, was revised in June 2004 to cover the period 2004-2009. The plan’s vision is to “put an end to the suffering of the people and the casualties caused by antipersonnel mines in mine-affected areas by the end of March 2009.”[30] In May 2006, Yemen stated that by 2009 it aimed to “clear, fence or mark all hazard areas that present a threat to people, economic and social livelihood of communities.”[31] This goal was reiterated in February 2007.[32] A revised strategic plan was expected by the end of 2007, after completion of a re-survey of Hadramawt governorate, which has the largest amount of suspected contaminated land.[33]

YEMAC has adopted a “cluster clearance approach” to deal with impacted areas, focusing not only on high impact communities but also on medium and low-impact communities clustered close to each other. This has allowed for a greater reduction of risk among communities from the same cluster but with different levels of impact. It is also more efficient logistically.[34] Priorities are based not only on the Landmine Impact Survey results but also on identified needs of the local communities.[35]

Evaluations of Mine Action

One of the recommendations of the April 2005 evaluation of phase two of UNDP’s support to the mine action program was that Yemen should conduct a socioeconomic assessment of the use of released land.[36] As a result, in 2006 a livelihoods study was conducted on behalf of YEMAC by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the National Resources Institute of the University of Greenwich, in London. It aimed to assess the overall socioeconomic returns from mine clearance investments, to make a preliminary assessment of complementary development initiatives for mine-affected communities, and to enhance YEMAC’s capacity to conduct future socioeconomic assessments.[37]

The report found that clearance had made considerable areas of land available to the whole community for grazing, fuel wood, beekeeping and fodder collection. “This has had major social and economic impact across the whole community. Cropland, water harvesting channels and stone collection areas have also been returned to safe use, to the great benefit of their individual owners. Clearance of roads and paths has enhanced access to land, to neighbouring villages and to markets.” It concluded that “the economic benefits [of mine action] are very substantial and, in total, exceed the cost of demining.” However, the report also noted that, “Some communities are still not confident about the safety of cleared land. Further inputs might be required to convince all members of the community of the safety of their assets before they will be used fully.”[38]

Based on the results of this study, YEMAC planned to establish a department in YEMAC, subject to the approval of NMAC, to concentrate on the socioeconomic development of cleared areas. Projects will include construction of schools, hospitals, roads and wells. The focus will be on the areas covered in the land use survey.[39]

Demining

Mine clearance in Yemen is undertaken solely by YEMAC using staff seconded from the Engineering Department of the Ministry of Defense. In February 2007 there were 12 technical survey teams, four explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams, and eight demining companies and three platoons. Restructuring of another company into three platoons was planned for 2007.[40]

Manual techniques and mine detection dogs are used during clearance, technical survey and quality assurance. A Backhoe mechanical demining machine has been on loan from the United States since January 2007. This is intended for clearing mines below 1.5 meters in desert areas, and was tested in February 2007. Unfortunately, it can only handle antipersonnel mines, and most of the minefields consist of both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines. Nonetheless, if tests are successful, it will be used in Lahij province, in an area where reconstruction of a highway is planned.[41]

Identification of Affected Areas

The Landmine Impact Survey conducted in 2000 has served as the primary source of information for mine action planning. It estimated that 923 square kilometers of land was contaminated.[42] By July 2007, apart from three high impact communities where hazardous areas had been marked and clearance operations suspended, eight medium and 274 low impact communities remained to be cleared.[43]

Since the Landmine Impact Survey, YEMAC has undertaken further “surveillance,” conducting additional impact surveys and, where necessary, technical surveys, using manual techniques and mine detection dogs.[44] The methodologies used have typically enabled YEMAC to cancel or reduce between 50 and 90 percent of the suspected contaminated areas identified previously.[45] UNDP reported that in 2006-2007 YEMAC re-surveyed communities identified by the Landmine Impact Survey as mine-affected, starting in Hadramawt governorate, which had previously been identified as containing 42 percent of the country’s contamination.[46]

Marking and Fencing

In 2006 YEMAC marked 2,583,000 square meters of suspected land, bringing the total area marked, as of February 2007, to more than 16 square kilometers.[47] There are two major challenges to marking some areas, as YEMAC has reported.

First, YEMAC intends to “permanently” mark areas that cannot be cleared with existing technology. This consists of using concrete to mark the area, as ropes and iron tend to be removed by local people or moved by the sand and weather conditions. However, this is costly and YEMAC does not want to divert resources from clearance operations. Until resources become available for permanent marking YEMAC conducts mine risk education instead. On occasions, local communities have mistaken technical survey teams for clearance teams, and mine risk education is used to ensure the communities understand that the areas are still unsafe.[48]

Second, mountainous areas are also problematic for marking and fencing. At present, where marking to international standards is impossible, painted stones are used to mark the area.[49]

Mine/UXO Clearance

In 2006 YEMAC reported clearing 1.92 square kilometers of mined and battle areas, some 50 percent more than in 2005, and around 184.6 square kilometers was released by area reduction or cancellation.[50] That is substantially more than previous years (albeit following significant revision of the figures provided previously for demining in 2005).[51]

The Landmine Impact Survey in 2000, surveillance through questionnaires to local communities and technical surveys have been key sources of information allowing this huge cancellation or reduction of suspected contaminated areas to be made. According to YEMAC, not many mines were found because demining units are re-clearing according to humanitarian standards areas previously cleared by army personnel.[52]

Clearance has been completed in Aden and Al Hodaida and these two governorates are now declared free of landmines. All cleared land is handed over during a ceremony attended by local authorities who sign a document releasing the land to the community.[53]

Demining by YEMAC in Yemen in 2006[54]

Mined/battle area clearance (km2)

APMs

destroyed

AVMs

destroyed

UXO

destroyed

AXO

destroyed

Area reduced or cancelled (km2)

1.92

109

24

4,798

0

184.6

YEMAC reported that it lacked sufficient funds for equipment to cover spare parts and engineers to deal with the rough conditions which cause the rapid wearing down of vehicles. It is also reported that shortage of explosives and lack of destruction facilities continue to be a problem. Landmines are destroyed in situ, but UXO often has to be removed and stored in a warehouse until explosives become available. Explosives are also in short supply because of the difficulty in getting them to Yemen and because of a lack of funding.[55]

To resolve this problem, in 2006 UNDP provided funds and the Ministry of Defense was persuaded to provide explosives, but the General Director of YEMAC feared that there would again be a problem in 2007 due to lack of funding. YEMAC noted that the restructuring of companies into platoons for more efficient work also required additional funding.[56]

In February 2007, YEMAC again reported several technical constraints on marking and clearance. In some areas shifting sand makes clearance of mines, some of which are up to two meters deep, impossible with existing technology, and marking is very difficult and expensive. In other areas, steep terrain prevents the use of mine detection dogs, and prodding is difficult because of the stony ground. In addition, weather conditions restrict the time of year when mines can be cleared in some areas, such as Hadramawt.[57]

Summary of Efforts to Comply with Article 5

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Yemen is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but no later than 1 March 2009. YEMAC has claimed that because some mines are located deep below shifting sand they cannot be removed with existing technology. Yemen’s mine action strategy is to ensure “all communities classified as high and medium-impact, and 27 percent of the most critical low-impacted areas (147 square kilometers) are cleared by the end of March 2009.” [58] In its Article 7 report Yemen said it plans to permanently mark 16 of the remaining minefields, a strategy that falls short of the full requirements of the treaty.[59]

YEMAC has stated that there is still a possibility that Yemen will meet its mine ban treaty deadline but that it will probably request an extension. The revised strategic plan due by the end of 2007 would provide a clearer picture of what is achievable. Area reduction in mountainous areas will help towards meeting the deadline. YEMAC was also concerned that failure to secure the necessary funds to restructure clearance units and replace old equipment would delay its progress.[60]

Mine Risk Education

In Yemen, mine risk education (MRE) is coordinated at the national level by YEMAC and is part of the national mine action strategy. As in previous years, organizations involved in MRE in 2006-2007 were YEMAC and the NGO Yemen Mine Awareness Association (YMAA).[61]

In 2006 YEMAC had 16 full-time MRE trainers (four female and 12 male).[62] YMAA worked with 17 part-time volunteer MRE trainers.[63] Of the 10 newly recruited staff trained in 2005, all were working in MRE; the training of eight women among them has resulted in improved access to MRE for women and girls.

YEMAC continued to provide MRE in advance of demining operations in mine-affected villages in the governorates of Sa’ada, Ibb, al-Dale, Ta’izz, Abyan and Lahij. A total of 42,524 people in 52 affected communities received MRE in 2006.[64] YMAA reached an additional 3,000 people.[65]

From the start of the YEMAC MRE program in 1997 to December 2006, 410 mine/UXO affected communities received MRE and 683,106 people were exposed to some form of basic MRE (365,831 males, 317,275 females).[66] In addition, YMAA reached about 31,000 beneficiaries in 133 villages of six governorates with community-based MRE between 1998 and the end of 2006.[67]

Reportedly, all the high-impact and most of the medium-impact communities had received MRE as of 30 March 2007, leaving a few medium and most low-impact communities which have not received MRE.[68] Some 184 mine/UXO-affected communities had not received any form of MRE or awareness training.[69] However, villages originally classified in the Landmine Impact Survey as low or medium-impact are not reclassified as high-level once a new incident occurs.[70]

The significant reduction in casualties in 2000, compared with previous years, has been attributed to MRE. This decrease was relatively stable until the increase in 2005, which may be attributed partly to insufficient identification of MRE target groups. People most at-risk continue to be shepherds, people collecting wood/food/water, and nomads. In the first two groups women, boys and girls are especially vulnerable (girls and women constitute a relatively large proportion of casualties).[71] MRE trainers focus on these groups through special sessions and household visits. In schools, a child-to-child approach is used.[72] No materials specifically targeting the most at-risk groups are used.[73] YMAA notes that economic difficulties in many mine/UXO-affected villages still lead to risk-taking behavior despite MRE.[74]

YMAA volunteers receive continuous training on safe practices, but it is unknown whether safety trainings are provided to NGOs working in mine/UXO-affected areas by YMAA, YEMAC or other organizations.[75]

In July 2006 Mines Action Canada provided YMAA with a US$3,000 grant to initiate an MRE youth empowerment project in the governorates of al-Dale and Lahij. The project provided training of trainers courses to six young people, including mine survivors. These six then taught young people in their own communities, who then reached 3,000 people with MRE sessions.[76]

Coordination

In June 2006 national mine action standards for MRE were endorsed after field-testing in YEMAC branches in Aden and Hadramawt. YEMAC reported it was already implementing the standards.[77] According to YMAA it was too early to evaluate the effectiveness of the standards.[78]

MRE was coordinated by YEMAC at the national level in cooperation with its regional branch in Aden governorate and the YMAA chairperson.[79] In June 2006 an MRE strategy was developed in response to the GICHD livelihoods recommendations and according to the new standards. The main GICHD observation was that gender-related procedures were needed in all aspects of mine action to ensure participation of women; there should be “greater involvement of women and girls in MRE and awareness campaigns by recruiting more women’s awareness teams and by extending the house to house approach.”[80] The number of house visits and awareness for females has reportedly increased.[81] However, it is not known if this is sufficient. Another GICHD observation was that interviewees stated that MRE messages and reports of cleared land did not reach them. As a result, YMAA and YEMAC trainers based in Aden started to target each mine-affected village separately instead of gathering representatives of five to seven villages at a time, as was done previously.[82]

Quality assurance and monitoring is undertaken by YEMAC for all mine action components including MRE. The issue of marking is dealt with during MRE sessions, but remains non-standardized due to cultural differences.[83] However, school sessions do not appear to contain messages on marking and fencing.[84]

Overall, coordination of MRE activities and information exchange between relevant actors has improved. The GICHD evaluation appears to have been taken into account, although results are not yet apparent. Sustained funding is needed to continue to build capacity and ensure continuous activity. Follow-up MRE activities are lacking and targeting of most at-risk groups appears to be uneven. Since funding from Japan ended in mid-2005, YMAA has had difficulties obtaining funding and maintaining its level of activity. In 2006 funding was provided by YEMAC which enabled intermittent activity during the year. As YMAA does not own vehicles, it is dependent on YEMAC to carry out its activities in less accessible areas. YMAA depends on volunteers without paid staff dedicated to the projects on a full-time basis; organizational growth and consistency of MRE activities are challenges.[85]

Landmine/ERW Casualties

In 2006 there were at least 17 new mine/ERW casualties in Yemen, including seven killed and 10 injured. Four casualties occurred in antipersonnel mine incidents, two in antivehicle mine incidents and 11 in ERW incidents in Ibb, Hajja, Abyan, al-Dale, Sana’a and al-Bayda governorates. Five of those involved in incidents were children under 18 years (two girls and three boys), 11 were adults (two women and nine men) and the age of one male casualty is unknown.[86] Most incidents occurred in Abyan governorate, followed by al-Bayda, Ibb and al-Dale. Most of the casualties were civilian (15); two casualties occurred during clearance activities. According to MRE providers, most casualties occurred while carrying out livelihood activities, such as shepherding and tampering out of economic necessity, or playing.[87]

The 2006 casualty rate as reported by YEMAC appears to be a significant decrease compared to 2005 when Landmine Monitor found 35 new mine/ERW casualties, and a smaller decrease from the 23 casualties recorded in 2005 by YEMAC. Initially, YEMAC’s General Director reported that there were 36 mine/ERW casualties in 2006 (20 females and 16 males).[88] In YEMAC’s revised total of 17 casualties it is not clear if an incident causing six casualties (one killed and five injured in al-Dale in January 2006) was included.[89]

Casualties continued to occur in 2007, and at a higher rate than in 2006: there were at least 18 new mine/ERW casualties (three killed and 15 injured) as of 31 May 2007. Two of the casualties were deminers injured on 14 March.[90] One antivehicle mine incident in Lahij killed one person and injured nine more.[91] On 22 May, a 12 year-old girl was injured by an antipersonnel mine while tending animals in al-Nadra (Ibb governorate).[92] Also in 2007, it was reported that at least 60 people were admitted to hospital with injuries resulting from mine explosions in the northern province of Sa’ada where the government carried out an offensive against followers of Shia opposition leader Hussein al-Houthi; the number of casualties has not been confirmed.[93]

Analysis of Casualty Trends

Whereas casualty rates were relatively stable from 2000, with slight increases until 2004, in 2005 the casualty rate nearly doubled (as compiled by Landmine Monitor from all available sources). In 2006 and 2007 to date, this upward trend appears to have continued. The increase is in part explained by several incidents causing multiple casualties, but is also due to insufficient awareness about marking and technical survey practices, lack of MRE in remote mine/ERW-affected areas, and economic necessity which prompts people to use contaminated land for livelihood activities.[94]

In 2007 it was noted that there were four to six new casualties per month (48-72 annually). This confirms earlier estimates that five Yemenis per month would be injured or killed by landmines. But these estimates are not evidenced by an increased number of recorded casualties, suggesting that there is significant under-reporting of casualties. Most under-reported groups are females and people in remote villages. In 2007, YEMAC’s capacity to record casualties expanded towards a nationwide system, as set out in its 2005-2009 objectives prepared for the Sixth Meeting of States Parties.[95]

Despite under-reporting, children and women remain the most vulnerable groups due to the nature of the activities causing incidents, such as shepherding and playing. However, the proportion of child casualties has decreased from 88 percent in 2004 to approximately 34 percent in 2005 and 29 percent in 2006, which is explained by adjustments in MRE priorities and increased MRE in schools.[96]

There is also uncertainty about the total number of mine/ERW casualties in Yemen. According to the Landmine Impact Survey, by 2000 there were 4,904 mine/ERW casualties (2,560 people killed and 2,344 injured). However, in May 2006, YEMAC estimated there are approximately 2,900 mine/ERW survivors.[97] The difference seems to correspond to the high end of the annual casualty estimate. The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation stated in October 2006 that there were 5,478 mine/ERW casualties, mostly women and children, and 828,000 people live in affected communities.[98]

YEMAC informed Landmine Monitor in June 2007 that it recorded in IMSMA between 2000 and June 2007 a total of 122 mine/ERW casualties (53 men, 14 women, 27 boys, 21 girls, seven deminers): 2000: two casualties; 2001: 20; 2002: 16; 2003: nine; 2004: 1; 2005: 23; 2006: 17; and, January-June 2007: 18.[99] However in March 2006, YEMAC reported 264 mine/ERW casualties between 2000 and 2005. Previous editions of the Landmine Monitor reported 126 casualties recorded by YEMAC 2000-2006 (2000: 12, 2001: 20, 2002: 19, 2003: 18, 2004: 17, 2005: 23, 2006: 17).[100] This indicates a data management problem at YEMAC, a concern shared by the GICHD livelihoods survey which stated that it was unclear whether casualty and survivor assistance data were collected in a way that allows monitoring of progress and comparison.[101] YEMAC has undertaken steps to verify previously collected casualty data.

Data Collection

YEMAC has maintained casualty data in its IMSMA database since 2000; the database also contains casualties recorded by the Landmine Impact Survey. Casualties are reported via hospitals, police and security departments, the Ministry of Public Health and Population, Ministry of Local Administration, YEMAC and YMAA field teams, and occasionally via media and other NGOs.[102]

YEMAC casualty data appears to be recorded for all affected groups in society. However, it is possible that female casualties, fatal casualties and slightly injured casualties were under-reported due to cultural and geographical barriers. The most under-reported group of casualties would be females; 55 percent of casualties were girls.[103] The YEMAC casualty database does not differentiate among different types of ERW and, as a result, possible cluster munitions casualties would not be recorded as such. Activity at the time of the incident is not recorded systematically, especially among child casualties, which would be an obstacle for targeted MRE.[104]

National casualty data collection appears to be increasingly adequate, despite continued under-reporting of casualties and inaccuracies in data entry. Collected data are used for victim assistance provision and to a lesser extent for MRE. A more detailed level of data collection and entry, for example, including activities for all casualties, increased device type distinction, social indicators and service provision would improve utility of the data for analysis and planning purposes. Occurrence of new incidents does not mean re-prioritization of the area where the incident occurred for MRE. Information about assistance received by mine/ERW casualties is not included in IMSMA, nor is it distributed among stakeholders on a regular basis. However, separate case files are kept for those mine/ERW survivors assisted by YEMAC.[105]

Accurate information about the number of people with disabilities and their living circumstances is lacking, impeding progress in disability planning.

Survivor Assistance

Landmine/ERW survivors are a small proportion of people with disabilities in Yemen, and therefore should not be an undue drain on the country’s assistance facilities.[106] But, being concentrated in the poor segment of society living in remote areas, they suffer more from limitations of service provision. Almost all governmental and NGO rehabilitation services in Yemen are urban-based and do not fully reach individuals with disabilities in rural areas.[107]

The Ministry of Public Health and Population provides free healthcare to people with disabilities.[108] Sana’a and other major cities such as Aden and Ta’izz have hospitals with surgical units capable of handling landmine injuries including amputations.[109] Outside these main cities facilities are limited in most regions, especially in rural areas. Services are further hampered by structural problems, a lack of coordination, low salaries for medical staff and a lack of trained staff, medicines and transport. It is costly and difficult for people with disabilities to travel to large cities for follow-up treatment and medication. A community-based rehabilitation network tries to support the needs of people in remote areas, but it is staffed mainly by volunteers.[110]

Although psychological support is available at clinics in Sana’a and Aden, landmine survivors do not receive counseling as this is not perceived as a priority, and is something adequately dealt with by the family. Survivors have indicated feeling isolated. Both they and service providers acknowledge the need for peer-to-peer support and formal counseling.[111]

The government’s Victim Assistance Advisory Committee, comprised of various ministries was established to assist with the planning and evaluation of survivor assistance activities. However, the committee was called upon “only when needed” and had no decision-making or policy-making capacity.[112] Representatives from NGOs and international organizations are not invited to its meetings, resulting in a lack of coordination.[113] The committee met only twice between May 2006 and March 2007, because it is thought sufficient that survivor assistance is also covered in the three annual NMAC meetings.[114] At the ministerial level, assistance to mine/ERW survivors is provided by the Ministry of Public Health and Population and Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, who both support various rehabilitation centers; there is a lack of clearly defined tasks and responsibilities between the two ministries.[115]

Yemen has a reasonably well-developed disability sector, featuring approximately 75 governmental organizations such as the Rehabilitation Fund and Care of Handicapped Persons (Disability Fund) under the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, a Social Welfare Fund, the Higher National Committee for the Welfare of the Disabled under the Prime Minister, a disability union, several disabled people’s organizations and NGOs working on disability. They service approximately 123,000 people with disabilities.[116] The Disability Fund finances and facilitates services for disabled people, either directly or through partners.[117] The Social Fund for Development (SFD), an independent body under the Prime Minister, also coordinates and finances disability projects. In 2006, SFD provided services and funding to approximately 60 organizations working with people with disabilities.[118] However, weak human resource capacity and inefficient public finance systems have minimized the Fund’s impact.[119] Mine/ERW survivors are often not included or seldom possess information about these organizations.[120] The lack of strong linkages and coordination between programs specific to mine/ERW survivors and the general disability sector is perceived as a weakness in service provision.[121] Social welfare services for the disabled lack capacity, financial resources, expertise and motivation, hampering timely services for the targeted groups. There is an additional lack of relevant data and information and the capacities of the NGOs working in this field are weak.[122]

The Ministry of Civil Service and Procurement is responsible for finding job opportunities for people with disabilities and government offices are required to employ five percent disabled staff. However, both measures seem to be only partially implemented.[123] Less than one percent of people with disabilities are employed.[124] Nearly all mine survivors interviewed in the GICHD livelihoods survey indicated that they would like socioeconomic assistance, such as training, jobs or grants to start a business. Some mine/ERW mine survivors are able to start small-scale businesses through an informal community-based rotating fund.[125]

Care for people with disabilities including mine/ERW survivors is specified in Yemen’s Third Socio-Economic Development Plan for Poverty Reduction (DPPR, 2006-2010). This states that mine action should be incorporated in the expanding scope of social protection, as the number of people affected by landmines is 828,000. The DPPR’s core aims are: increasing income-generating and employment schemes; extending social services and basic infrastructure into remote areas; caring for and rehabilitating the disabled and addressing their educational, health and training needs and integrating them into society; reviewing the system for cash assistance in terms of eligibility, amounts and distribution; and developing a policy for social security.[126] Social and economic reintegration of people with disabilities also featured in the 2001-2005 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, with the aim of training 5,430 people with disabilities and integrating 4,190 in formal education.[127] It is not known if this goal was achieved.

Yemen has legislation to protect the rights of all people with disabilities, with benefits including welfare, rehabilitation, tax and tuition fee exemptions, reduced public transport fees and equal (job) opportunities. However, the laws are not fully implemented and there is a general lack of awareness concerning disability.[128] Especially women with disabilities face difficulties, as they are usually kept ‘hidden’ at home, do not have prospects of marriage and can seldom get treatment without a male caretaker accompanying them.[129] Landmine survivors and other people with a disability receive an allowance of YR1,000 (about $5.50) per month, which is insufficient for a reasonable standard of living.[130]

Yemen has signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol which allows the monitoring of the implementation of the Convention. Yemen has stated that it is planning to ratify both instruments.[131]

Progress in Meeting VA24 Survivor Assistance Objectives

Yemen is one of 24 States Parties identified at the First Review Conference in Nairobi in November-December 2004 as having significant numbers of mine survivors and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation and reintegration of survivors.[132] As part of its commitment to the Nairobi Action Plan, Yemen prepared its 2005-2009 objectives for the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in Zagreb.[133] At the Standing Committee meetings in April 2007 Yemen submitted plans to achieve some of these objectives but did not detail the progress made towards its 2005-2009 objectives.[134]

Progress on Yemen’s Nairobi Action Plan Victim Assistance Objectives[135]

Service

Objectives

Time-frame

Task

assigned to

Plans to achieve objectives

Actions

in 2006-2007

Data

collection

Develop a nationwide landmine surveillance system

2006

YEMAC

Implement phase I of program: visit mine survivors

No progress reported, but seemingly improved data collection

Visit/register all survivors in affected areas

None

YEMAC

N/A

No new registrations in 2006-2007

Emergency medical care

Provide and cover cost of emergency services for 500 survivors per year and 2,000 by 2009

Annual/

2009

YEMAC

Implement phase II: transfer survivors with needs to medical centers

Target not achieved in 2006

Continuing medical care

Evaluate health infrastructure

2006

MoPHP

N/A

No progress reported

Identify ways to improve health infrastructure

None

MoPHP

N/A

No progress reported

Improve stakeholder coordination

None

N/A

N/A

No progress reported

Physical

rehabilitation

Provide physical rehabilitation to 500 survivors per year and 2000 by 2009

Annual/

2009

YEMAC

Implement phase III: provide assistive devices

Target not achieved in 2006

MoPHP needs

assessment

2006

MoPHP/

YEMAC

N/A

No progress reported

Provide assistive devices

None

YEMAC

N/A

Not a SMART objective

Psychosocial support

Determine what counseling services are needed and how to established them

None

YEMAC

N/A

No progress reported

Socioeconomic reintegration

Integrate 500 survivors

2009

YALS/

YEMAC

Implement phase IV: provide training/establish small enterprises

No progress, due to funding constraints

Laws and public policies

Implement MoLSA five-year strategic plan on PWD once approved

None

N/A

N/A

No progress reported

Raise PWD’s awareness of their rights

None

N/A

N/A

No progress reported

MoLSA = Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs; PWD = people with disabilities; MoPHP = Ministry of Public Health and Population; YALS = Yemen Association for Landmine and UXO Survivors

Within the framework of the Nairobi Action Plan, Yemen aims to provide economic rehabilitation for 500 mine survivors by 2009, by providing training and establishing small enterprises. To achieve this aim, six vocational training centers will be established in addition to the nine that reportedly already function.[136] No progress on the issue was reported in 2007.[137]

In February 2007 ICBL and YEMAC co-organized an implementation workshop in which survivor assistance issues were discussed by experts from the government, NGOs and international organizations. They highlighted the medical approach of survivor assistance in Yemen, lack of funding, the need for socioeconomic reintegration and coordination as well as the need for awareness-raising. Recommendations were developed and accepted.[138] An ICBL field visit in February 2007 also found lack of coordination, exclusion of mine survivors from some services, employment difficulties and insufficient transport.[139]

Yemen received support from the victim assistance specialist of the treaty’s Implementation Support Unit (ISU) in 2006.

In 2006 GICHD carried out a livelihoods survey as a follow-up to its 2005 evaluation mission. The initial evaluation was that, “The Yemen Landmine/UXO Victim Assistance Programme… is probably one of the most advanced in the world due to institutional support and strong management by the YEMAC Programme Manager.”[140] However, the field-based follow-up survey in 2006 concluded that, “…although the Programme is doing some excellent work, its coverage to date is limited. Very few of the survivors we interviewed had received significant help apart from emergency medical care.” Most survivors had not heard of the YEMAC program and lived without appropriate medical or socioeconomic support.[141]

GICHD recommended a comprehensive survey of mine/ERW survivors and their needs; criteria for eligibility to assistance from various sources so all survivors and types of disabilities can be included; and, training and resources to enable survivors to start sustainable businesses. In addition, medical and rehabilitation services, including transportation and lodging costs should be expanded to all mine/ERW survivors regardless of when the incident happened. It “was emphasised that mental health care needs were sometimes as important as physical health needs.” Awareness among survivors about services needs to be increased and greater government and donor support is needed to respond to increasing demands. The GICHD study also recommended extending assistance to families of survivors and including feedback from survivors in future planning.[142]

Yemen reported at the Standing Committee meetings in April 2007 that several assessments of the health and rehabilitation sector had been scheduled in 2006 but results were not reported.[143]

Survivor Assistance Strategic Framework

The revised and extended Mine Action Strategic Plan for 2004-2009 defines survivor assistance as one of its priorities.[144] Survivor assistance is coordinated and implemented by YEMAC’s Victim Assistance Department and monitored by NMAC. The centralized YEMAC management and lack of cooperation with NGOs reportedly makes obtaining independent funding for disability-related projects more difficult for some NGOs.[145] YEMAC planned to create a new department to develop projects aiming at improving livelihoods in communities that have been cleared of mines.[146]

YEMAC’s victim assistance program has four phases: visits to all mine survivors, medical and physical examination to determine needs and treatment, providing medical care and rehabilitation, and socioeconomic reintegration. It also provides emergency transport when an incident occurs. The YEMAC program covers all medical and rehabilitation costs of mine/ERW survivors, including artificial limbs. Psychosocial support is not provided and the economic reintegration component, carried out by the NGO Yemen Association for Landmine and UXO Survivors, was unable to secure funding in 2006 and the first quarter of 2007.[147]

As of December 2006, files had been opened on 1,357 mine/ERW survivors, and in the first quarter of 2007 files were opened on a further 175.[148] In some cases, survivors identified during the 2000 Landmine Impact Survey are still awaiting treatment; it was suggested that mine/ERW survivors should be able to get treatment at military facilities, where quality of services is higher and treatment swifter.[149] Survivors are not always aware of YEMAC services or the scope of its operations. Mine/ERW survivors had received YEMAC assistance in only two of 25 communities surveyed by the GICHD, 15 received none and in eight no survivors were met.[150]

Yemen provided information on survivor assistance activities in its Article 7 report for 30 March 2006-30 March 2007.[151]

According to the UN, 316 mine/ERW survivors in Yemen received medical services and 257 received assistance in the forms of prosthetics, wheelchairs, hearing aids, eye glasses, surgery and/or physiotherapy during 2006.[152]

According to information provided to Landmine Monitor by each organization, at least 9,872 people with disabilities in Yemen received services during 2006, including 473 mine/ERW survivors. Of these survivors, 134 received medical care, 224 received physical rehabilitation and at least 15 received socioeconomic reintegration services. Within this total, YEMAC assisted 270 mine/ERW survivors (193 received medical or physical rehabilitation and 46 were referred to Aden Rehabilitation Center), ICRC assisted 6,018 people (119 were mine/ERW survivors) and Yemen Association for Landmine and UXO Survivors (YALS) provided 10-15 mine/ERW survivors with vocational training and micro-credits. The Community-Based Rehabilitation Network, Aden Vocational Training Center, Adventist Development and Relief Agency, Ta’izz Rehabilitation Center, Ministry of Public Health and Population and Disability Fund also provided services to people with disabilities in 2006 but the number of mine/ERW survivors is unknown.[153]

The rehabilitation centers in Aden and Tai’zz previously supported by Handicap International continued to face challenges in 2006-2007, especially obtaining raw materials and maintaining equipment. It is considered that Handicap International did not prepare the nationalization of the centers sufficiently for future sustainability. Staff salaries in Aden have been reduced to volunteer wages. Following a ministry request, ICRC agreed to provide support to the centers in Ta’izz and Aden. A consignment of raw materials has been provided in 2006.[154]

YALS is an independent NGO but has a main role in the fourth phase (socioeconomic reintegration) of the YEMAC victim assistance program. The annual budget needed for the YALS program is $200,000.[155] YEMAC does not provide funding to YALS. Some 10-15 mine/ERW survivors were assisted during 2006, but YALS did not function at full capacity due to lack of funding.[156] There was no activity in the first months of 2007, due to lack of capacity.[157] On 10 July 2007 Japan announced a $73,566 grant to YALS for its socioeconomic reintegration program.[158]

Funding and Assistance

Landmine Monitor identified international donations to mine action in Yemen totaling $4,072,155 (€3,241,388) in 2006, contributed by four countries and the European Commission (EC). This represents a 66 percent increase from 2005 ($2,458,864 provided by six countries).[159] Funding was provided by:

  • EC: €2 million ($2,512,600) for mine action;[160]
  • France: €250,000 ($314,075) for mine clearance;[161]
  • Germany: €284,196 ($357,035) to UNDP for the mine detection dog center;[162]
  • Italy: €150,000 ($188,445) to UNDP for mine clearance and capacity building;[163]
  • US: $700,000 for mine action.[164]

The 2006 end-year review of the UN’s Portfolio of Mine Action Projects reported that Yemen received 53 percent ($1,980,897) of funds requested through the appeal process in 2006, with shortfalls occurring mostly in MRE and victim assistance.[165]

The 2007 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects included five project appeals for Yemen totaling $2,660,360, none of which had been funded at the time of publication.[166]

National Contribution to Mine Action

The Yemeni government covered more than 50 percent of the mine action budget, according to Yemen’s statement at the 2007 Standing Committee meetings.[167] In June 2006 the United Nations Information Center in Yemen reported that national funds for mine action amounted to $3.5 million per year.[168]


[1] Article 7 Report, Form A, 30 March 2007.

[2] Previous reports were submitted: 3 May 2006, 7 April 2005, 30 March 2004, 10 April 2003, 27 April 2002, 18 September 2001, 14 November 2000 and 30 November 1999.

[3] For details, see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 782. Yemen supported the view that any mine (even if it is called an antivehicle mine) equipped with a sensitive fuze or sensitive antihandling device that causes the mine to explode from an unintentional act of a person is considered to be an antipersonnel mine and therefore prohibited. It supported the view that the Mine Ban Treaty prohibits the transit and foreign stockpiling of antipersonnel mines. Regarding the issue of joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, Yemen stated the view that it is prohibited to participate in any activity related to the use of antipersonnel mines.

[4] A report in the Yemen Times said it was unknown who planted the mines but “events indicate that the Yemeni army is planting them at some military sites before evacuating in order to trap Houthis.” It claimed that the United Nations had warned the government and rebels about using antipersonnel mines. However, the UN told Landmine Monitor that it had issued no such warning.  Mohammed bin Sallam, “Yemeni army reinforced in Sa’ada, fighting continues,” Yemen Times, 22 April 2007; email from Flavia Pansieri, UN Resident Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative, Sana’a, 14 July 2007. A report from the UN Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) cited an anonymous source also accusing the army of laying the mines. “YEMEN: Government accused of planting landmines,” IRIN News, 11 April 2007.

[5] Email from Flavia Pansieri, UN/UNDP, Sana’a, 14 July 2007. 

[6] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 865.

[7] “YEMEN: Government accused of planting landmines,” IRIN News, 11 April 2007; “Yemeni army reinforced in Sa’ada, fighting continues,” Yemen Times, Issue 1044, Volume 15, 23-25 April 2007.

[8] “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1676 (2006),” S/2006/913, 22 November 2006, p. 27. The government of Yemen has denied the charges, offered to cooperate with investigations by the monitoring group and requested its help in identifying any instances of arms smuggling. Ibid, pp. 67-68.

[9] Letter from Dr. Abdulla Nasher, Ambassador of the Republic of Yemen to Canada, on behalf of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Steve Goose, Landmine Monitor Ban Policy Coordinator, 24 July 2006. In addition, a May 2006 report by the monitoring group said that in August 2005, traders at the Bakaraaha arms market in Somalia reportedly purchased mines and other arms from a Yemen arms trading network, and a 2003 report said that landmines had been shipped from Yemen to Somalia. For more details, see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 783.

[10] Article 7 Report, Form B, 30 March 2007.

[11] Ibid, Form D. Yemen also informed States Parties during the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction on 23 April about the discovery of the 30,000 mines, and indicated they had been handed over for destruction by the end of 2007. Notes by Landmine Monitor/ HRW.

[12] Saddam al-Ashmouri, “Weapon buy-backs showcased in Sana’a,” Yemen Times, 29 May 2007.

[13] Article 7 Report, Form D, 30 March 2007, and earlier Article 7 reports.

[14] Presentation by Mansour al-Azi, General Director, YEMAC, at ICBL/YEMAC workshop, Sana’a, 3 February 2007.

[15] Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 March 2007. The total figure of more than 550 square kilometers is obtained by adding figures for mined areas reported as “left to clear” with those that are the subject of “ongoing” demining operations.

[16] Interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, Sana’a, 10 February 2007.

[17] Email from Ahmed Alawi, Information Officer, YEMAC, Sana’a, 17 July 2007.

[18] The figure of 31 square kilometers is obtained by adding up the square meters of locations marked as “suspended” and “marked” in the 2007 Article 7 report.

[19] According to YEMAC, from the program’s start in 1999 to May 2006, 315 square kilometers out of the total of 922 square kilometers of contaminated land were surveyed and cleared. As a result, 607 square kilometers of suspected land remained to be surveyed and cleared as of May 2006. See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 789.

[20] B. Pound et al., “Departure of the Devil: Landmines and Livelihoods in Yemen,“ Volume 1, Main Report, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), Geneva, 2006, p. 1.

[21]Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 784.

[22] Interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, Geneva, 27 April 2007.

[23] Interview with Ali Abdul Raqeeb, Deputy Director, YEMAC, Sana’a, 12 June 2005; GICHD, “Mid-Term Outcome Evaluation for Strengthening National Capacity for Mine Action in Yemen-Phase II,” Geneva, 2005, p. 8.

[24] Email from Mohamed Ahmed, IMSMA Regional Coordinator for Africa and the Middle East, GICHD, 8 June 2007; email from Davide Orifici, Policy and External Relations, GICHD, Geneva, 18 July 2007.

[25] GICHD, “Mid-Term Outcome Evaluation for Strengthening National Capacity for Mine Action in Yemen-Phase II,” Geneva, 2005, pp. 1-3; email from Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, 3 August 2005.

[26] Interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, Sana’a, 10 February 2007;  Mine Action Support Group (MASG), “Newsletter-First Quarter of 2007,” Washington, DC, 4 May 2007, p. 6.

[27] Email from Melissa Sabatier, Mine Action and Small Arms Unit, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP, 7 June 2007.

[28]Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 784.

[29] Presentation by Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, at ICBL/YEMAC workshop, Sana’a, 3 February 2007, and interview, Sana’a, 10 February 2007.

[30] YEMAC, “Five year national strategic mine action plan for Yemen, 2004-2009, Revised and Extended,” June 2004.

[31] Presentation by Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 10 May 2006.

[32] Presentation by Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, at ICBL/YEMAC workshop, Sana’a, 3 February 2007.

[33] Interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, Sana’a, 10 February 2007.

[34] YEMAC/UNDP, Mine Action Programme, “2005 End Year Review,” Sana’a, undated.

[35] Interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, Sana’a, 10 February 2007.

[36]GICHD, “Mid-Term Outcome Evaluation for Strengthening National Capacity for Mine Action in Yemen-Phase II,” Geneva, June 2005, p. 49. For details of the evaluation, see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 786-787.

[37] B. Pound et al., “Departure of the Devil: Landmines and Livelihoods in Yemen, Volume 1, Main Report,” GICHD, Geneva, 2006, p. i.

[38] Ibid, p. x.

[39] Presentation by Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, at ICBL/YEMAC workshop, Sana’a, 3 February 2007.

[40] Interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, Geneva, 27 April 2007; presentation by Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, at ICBL/YEMAC workshop, Sana’a, 3 February 2007.

[41] Presentation by Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, at ICBL/YEMAC workshop, Sana’a, 3 February 2007.

[42] SAC/VVAF, “Landmine Impact Survey: Republic of Yemen, Executive Summary,” October 2000, pp. 4, 5.

[43] Email from Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, Yemen, 17 July 2007.

[44] Presentation by Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, at ICBL/YEMAC workshop, Sana’a, 3 February 2007.

[45] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 788.

[46]  MASG, “Newsletter-First Quarter of 2007,” Washington, DC, 4 May 2007, p. 6.

[47] Email from Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, 25 February 2007.

[48] Presentation by Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, at ICBL/YEMAC workshop, Sana’a, 3 February 2007.

[49] Ibid.

[50] YEMAC has noted that area reduction should be considered as clearance, since both require “exactly the same methodology and resources.” Interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, Sana’a, 10 February 2007.

[51] Emails from Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, 21 May and 17 July 2007.

[52] Interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, Sana’a, 10 February 2007.

[53] Presentation by Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, at ICBL/YEMAC workshop, Sana’a, 3 February 2007.

[54] Interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, Sana’a, 10 February 2007.

[55] Presentation by Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, at ICBL/YEMAC workshop, Sana’a, 3 February 2007.

[56] Ibid, and interview, Sana’a, 10 February 2007.

[57] Presentation by Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, at ICBL/YEMAC workshop, Sana’a, 3 February 2007.

[58] Ibid, and email, 8 August 2005.

[59] Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 March 2007.

[60] Presentation by Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, at ICBL/YEMAC workshop, Sana’a, 3 February 2007, and interview, Geneva, 27 April 2007.

[61] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 619, for details of MRE methodologies used.

[62] Email from Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, 3 June 2007.

[63] Interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, Sana’a, 2 April 2007.

[64] Email from Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, 3 June 2007; UN, “2006 Portfolio End-Year Review,” p. 5, www.mineaction.org, accessed 8 June 2007.

[65] Interview with Fawaz al-Harib, youth mine survivor, Aden, 10 March 2007.

[66] Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 March 2007.

[67]Presentation by Aisha Saeed, Chairperson, YMAA, at ICBL/YEMAC workshop, Sana’a, 3 February 2007.

[68] Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 March 2007.

[69] Interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, Sana’a, 2 April 2007.

[70] Information provided by Nabeel Rassam, Head of MRE Department, YEMAC, at ICBL/YEMAC workshop, Sana’a, 3 February 2007.

[71] Interview with Dr. Fouad al-Shamiri, Head of VA Department, YEMAC, Sana’a, 1 April 2007.

[72] Interview with Shafika Saeed, Field Trainer, YMAA, Aden, 10 April 2007.

[73] Observations during ICBL/LM MRE field visit, Ibb governorate, 6 February 2007.

[74]Presentation by Aisha Saeed, YMAA, at ICBL/YEMAC workshop, Sana’a, 3 February 2007.

[75] Interview with Ali al-Montasar, Field Trainer, YMAA, Aden, 22 March 2007.

[76] Interview with Fawaz al-Harib, Aden, 10 March 2007.

[77] Interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, Sana’a, 1 February 2007.

[78]Presentation by Aisha Saeed, YMAA, at ICBL/YEMAC workshop, Sana’a, 3 February 2007.

[79] Interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, Sana’a, 1 February 2007.

[80] B. Pound et al., “Departure of the Devil: Landmines and Livelihoods in Yemen,“ Volume I, Main Report, GICHD, Geneva, 2006, p. 86.

[81] Interview with Shafika Saeed, YMAA, Aden, 10 April 2007.

[82] Interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, Sana’a, 1 February 2007.

[83] Ibid.

[84] Observations during ICBL/LM MRE field visit, Ibb governorate, 6 February 2007.

[85]Presentation by Aisha Saeed, YMAA, at ICBL/YEMAC workshop, Sana’a, 3 February 2007.

[86] Email from Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, 4 June 2007.

[87] Presentation by Aisha Saeed, YMAA, at ICBL Implementation Workshop, Sana’a, 3 February 2007.

[88] Interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, Sana’a, 1 April 2007.

[89] “One Person dead and injury of five others of which two women in two AP explosions in al-Shuaib, al-Dale Governorate,” al-Ayam, 14 January 2006.

[90] Interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, Sana’a, 1 April 2007.

[91] Telephone interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, Sana’a, 3 June 2007.

[92] Information provided by Fouad al-Shamiri, Head Victim Assistance Department, YEMAC, Sana’a via Aisha Saeed, YMAA, Aden, 31 May 2007.

[93] “Government accused of planting landmines,” IRIN News, 11 April 2007; Mohammed bin Sallam, “Yemeni army reinforced in Sa’ada, fighting continues,” Yemen Times, 22 April 2007. The government did not confirm these reports.

[94] Interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, Sana’a, 1 February 2007; Presentation by Aisha Saeed, YMAA, at ICBL Implementation Workshop, Sana’a, 3 February 2007.

[95] Telephone interviews with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, Sana’a, 4 February and 3 June 2007; see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 793; Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 870.

[96] Interview with Fouad al-Shamiri, YEMAC, Sana’a, 1 April 2007; interview with Shafika Saeed, YMAA, Aden, 10 April 2007.

[97] Presentation by Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 8 May 2006.

[98] Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, “The Socio-Economic Development Plan for Poverty Reduction,” Sana’a, October 2006, p. 109.

[99] Emails from Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, 4 and 6 June 2007.

[100] See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.

[101] B. Pound et al., “Departure of the Devil: Landmines and Livelihoods in Yemen,” Volume I, Main Report, GICHD, Geneva, 2006, p. 76.

[102] Interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, Sana’a, 1 April 2007.

[103] Telephone interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, Sana’a, 3 June 2007; interview with Fouad al-Shamiri, YEMAC, Sana’a, 1 April 2007.

[104] Analysis of extract of YEMAC database provided via e-mail from Faiz Mohammad, UNDP/YEMAC, Sana’a, 27 March 2006.

[105] Information provided by Nabeel Rassam, YEMAC, at YEMAC/ICBL workshop, Sana’a, 3 February 2007.

[106] YEMAC estimated there are 2,900 mine survivors, whereas the general disabled population was estimated at 776,197 by the 2006 World Bank Disability and Living Standard Study, draft results of which were presented to Yemen on 19 April 2007. Robert L. Metts, “Yemen National Disability and Poverty Study and Action Plan,” draft final report, 7 January 2006, pp. 6, 10.

[107] Human Development Department Middle East and North Africa, “A Note on Disability Issues in the Middle East and North Africa,” World Bank, 30 June 2005, pp. 21-22.

[108] Robert L. Metts, “Yemen National Disability and Poverty Study and Action Plan,” draft final report, 7 January 2006, p. 13.

[109] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 795-796.

[110] Interview with Yassin A. Wadood, Head, CBR Network, Aden, 26 March 2007.

[111] Observations during victim assistance field trip, Aden, 5 February 2007.

[112] Interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, Geneva, 12 May 2006. See also Landmine Monitor Report 2005, pp. 622-623.

[113] Notes from presentations during victim assistance session, YEMAC/ICBL workshop, Sana’a, 3 February 2007.

[114] Interview with Fouad al-Shamiri, YEMAC, Aden, 27 March 2007.

[115] Observations during victim assistance field trip, Aden, 5 February 2007.

[116] Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, “The Socio-Economic Development Plan for Poverty Reduction,” October 2006, p. 109.

[117] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 799-800.

[118] US Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2006: Yemen,” Washington, DC, 6 March 2007.

[119] Human Development Department Middle East and North Africa, “A Note on Disability Issues in the Middle East and North Africa,” World Bank, 30 June 2005, p. 17.

[120] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 794.

[121] Notes from presentations during victim assistance session, YEMAC/ICBL workshop, Sana’a, 3 February 2007.

[122] Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, “The Socio-Economic Development Plan for Poverty Reduction,” Sana’a, October 2006, p. 109.

[123] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 799.

[124] Robert L. Metts, “Yemen National Disability and Poverty Study and Action Plan,” draft final report, 7 January 2006, p. 13.

[125] B. Pound et al., “Departure of the Devil: Landmines and Livelihoods in Yemen,” Volume I, Main Report, GICHD, Geneva, 2006, pp. 54-64, 65-288.

[126] Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, “The Socio-Economic Development Plan for Poverty Reduction,” Sana’a. October 2006, p. 24.

[127] Republic of Yemen, “Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) 2003-2005,” Sana’a, 31 May 2005, p. 108.

[128] Interviews with Saleh al-Dahyani and Saba Ali Ahmad al-Jiradi, YALS, Sana’a, 30 April 2005; Mohammad Saleh and Faisal Amin, AAPD, Aden, 27 April 2005; Raja Abdullah al-Masabi, AHRF, Sana’a, 2 May 2005.

[129] Notes from presentations during victim assistance session, YEMAC/ICBL workshop, Sana’a, 3 February 2007.

[130] B. Pound et al., “Departure of the Devil: Landmines and Livelihoods in Yemen,“ GICHD, Geneva, 2006, p. 174.

[131] Presentation by Fouad al-Shamiri, YEMAC, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 24 April 2007.

[132] UN, “Final Report, First Review Conference,” Nairobi, 29 November-3 December 2004, APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, p. 99.

[133] “Final Report of the Sixth Meeting of States Parties/ Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V, Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, pp. 219-226.

[134] Presentation by Fouad al-Shamiri, YEMAC, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 24 April 2007.

[135] “Final Report of the Sixth Meeting of States Parties/ Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V, Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, pp. 217-224; Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, “Status of the development of SMART victim assistance objectives and national plans,” Geneva, 23 April 2007, pp. 47-48.

[136]“Final Report of the Sixth Meeting of States Parties/ Zagreb Progress Report,” Part I, Annex V, Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, pp. 223-225.

[137] Presentation by Fouad al-Shamiri, YEMAC, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 24 April 2007.

[138] Tamar Gabelnick, Treaty Implementation Director, ICBL, “ICBL Workshop Report,” by email, 13 April 2007. Recommendations were: improve communication among all actors and victims; seek partnerships and promote coordination between all actors and service providers; provide psychosocial support; increase socioeconomic reintegration programs; clarify roles and responsibilities of YEMAC, MoPHP and MoLSA to secure efficient use of funds; and seek health and social insurance mechanisms allowing higher pensions and affordable continuing medical care.

[139]Observations during victim assistance field trip, Aden, 5 February 2007.

[140] GICHD, “Mid-Term Outcome Evaluation for Strengthening National Capacity for Mine Action in Yemen-Phase II,” 2005, p. 24.

[141] B. Pound et al., “Departure of the Devil: Landmines and Livelihoods in Yemen,” Volume I, Main Report, GICHD, Geneva, 2006, pp. viii, 33.

[142] Ibid, pp. xi, 33, 50.

[143] Presentation by Fouad al-Shamiri, YEMAC, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 24 April 2007.

[144] YEMAC, “Five Year National Strategic Mine Action Plan for Yemen, 2004-2009,” revised June 2004.

[145] Interviews during field visit to Yemen, 26 April-9 May 2005.

[146] MASG, “Newsletter-First Quarter of 2007,” Washington, DC, 4 May 2007, p. 6.

[147] Notes from presentations during victim assistance session, YEMAC/ICBL workshop, Sana’a, 3 February 2007; Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 March 2007; see Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 871; Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 794-795.

[148]Presentation by Fouad al-Shamiri, YEMAC, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 24 April 2007.

[149] Interview with Abdullah al-Dushami, Deputy-Director Aden Orthopedic Center, Aden, 28 February 2007. Information provided by Nathalie Abdou, Young Professional, Mines Action Canada.

[150] B. Pound et al., “Departure of the Devil: Landmines and Livelihoods in Yemen,” GICHD, Geneva, 2006, Annex 11, pp. 65-288; Annex 6, pp. 33-35; Annex 9, pp. 42-52.

[151] Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 March 2007.

[152] UN, “2006 Portfolio End-Year Review,” New York, November 2006, p. 6, www.mineaction.org, accessed 8 June 2007.

[153] For information on these organizations, see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 796-799.

[154] Information received from Nathalie Abdou, Mines Action Canada, Aden, 28 February 2007; observations during victim assistance field trip, Aden, 5 February 2007.

[155] Interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, Aden, 5 February 2007.

[156] Observations during victim assistance field visit and YEMAC/ICBLworkshop, Yemen, 1-7 February 2007.

[157] Telephone interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, Sana’a, 3 June 2007.

[158] “Japan cancels $6.45 million of Yemen’s debts,” Yemen Observer (Sana’a), 10 July 2007, www.yobserver.com, accessed 10 July 2007.

[159] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 791.

[160] “EC Budget line 19 02 04, Community participation to actions relating to antipersonnel mines, Annual Work Plan 2006,” Version 15/13/2006; additional data provided by Antoine Gouzée de Harven, EuropeAid Co-operation Office, EC, 23 July 2007.

[161] Email from Anne Villeneuve, Advocacy Officer, HI, 12 July 2007.

[162] Germany Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2007.

[163] Mine Action Investments Database, www.mineaction.org, accessed 21 March 2007.

[164] USG Historical Chart containing data for FY 2006, by email from Angela L. Jeffries, Financial Management Specialist, US Department of State, 20 July 2007.

[165] UN, “2006 Portfolio End-Year Review,” New York, January 2007, p. 3.

[166] UN, “2007 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, November 2006, List of Projects, pp. 406-423.

[167] Statement by Yemen, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 25 April 2007.

[168] The Italian Government announces additional funds of EUR 150,000 for the Yemen Mine Action Programme,” United Nations Information Center Yemen Newsletter, Issue 12, June 2006. www.unicyem.org, accessed 2 June 2007.