Ethiopia

Mine Ban Policy

The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 17 December 2004, becoming a State Party on 1 June 2005. Ethiopia has not yet reported on any steps it has taken to implement the treaty domestically, including penal sanctions, as required by Article 9 of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Ethiopia submitted its initial Article 7 report in July 2008. The report, which was due by 28 November 2005, did not include Form A (national implementation measures) or Form B (stockpiled antipersonnel mines), and did not note what period it covered.^[1]

Ethiopia attended the Eighth Meeting of States Parties in Jordan in November 2007 and the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2008. At both meetings it made statements on mine clearance and victim assistance. Ethiopia has not engaged in States Parties’ discussions on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2 and 3 and thus has not made known its views on issues related to joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and the permissible number of mines retained for training. Ethiopia’s lack of engagement or a stated position on Article 1 is particularly notable in light of Ethiopia’s ongoing military support for, and joint military operations with, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, which is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Ethiopia is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It attended as an observer the Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions in May 2008.

Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines

The two most recent reports of the UN group monitoring the arms embargo on Somalia, dated 18 July 2007 and 24 April 2008, do not make new allegations of transfers of antipersonnel mines from Ethiopia to Somalia.^[2] In November 2006, however, the Monitoring Group reported that in September 2006 the Ethiopian military transferred 180 antipersonnel mines and other unspecified mines to Puntland and Qeybdiid militias.^[3] The Monitoring Group previously alleged transfers of mines from Ethiopia to Somalia, but did not specify whether the mines were antipersonnel or antivehicle.^[4] In response to Landmine Monitor’s inquiries about the 2006 transfer of antipersonnel mines, Ethiopia described the allegations as “without foundation…unsubstantiated…[and] false.” It stated that “Ethiopia is in full compliance of its obligations under the Convention…. [T]here has never been any transfer of antipersonnel mines to any third party including in Somalia.”^[5]

During the April 2007 Standing Committee meetings, the President of the Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Ambassador Caroline Millar of Australia, expressed concern over the UN reports and said that she had written to the Chair of the Monitoring Group to seek further information.^[6] During the June 2008 Standing Committee meetings, the President of the Eighth Meeting of States Parties, His Royal Highness Prince Mired Raad Al-Hussein of Jordan, also expressed concern over the reports and stated that he had also written to the Chair of the Monitoring Group to seek further information, in particular about the specific types of mines reportedly transferred to Somalia.^[7] As of July 2008, no response from the Monitoring Group to either request had been reported.

While the Monitoring Group report in April 2008 contained no new allegations of mine transfers directly from Ethiopia to Somalia, the report cited the involvement of members of the armed forces of both Ethiopia and the TFG in the trade of weapons at Somali arms markets. The report states that between the second half of 2007 and March 2008, the TFG and Ethiopian forces seized weapons abandoned or surrendered by insurgents during battles in Mogadishu, “many of which” were sold at the Bakaraaha Arms Market.^[8]

Production, Stockpiling and Use

Ethiopia has stated that it does not produce antipersonnel mines, and has not imported antipersonnel mines since the overthrow of the Mengistu regime in 1991.^[9]

The Mine Ban Treaty requires that Ethiopia destroy all of its stockpiled antipersonnel mines as soon as possible, but not later than 1 June 2009. It is not clear if Ethiopia still has a stockpile of antipersonnel mines. It has not made any statements on the subject, and its most recent Article 7 report does not include a Form B (for reporting on stockpiled mines).

However, on Form G (for reporting on stockpiled antipersonnel mines destroyed after the treaty’s entry into force), Ethiopia provided an inventory of 39,759 items described as stockpiled antipersonnel mines destroyed between 2004 and 2007. Of the declared items, only 5,867 appear to be antipersonnel mines.^[10]

Ethiopia reported retaining 303 mines for training purposes. The types are PMN, PMD-6, M14, M16, and POMZ-2, but the number of each type was not provided. Ethiopia referred to “training areas or centres” at Entoto, Gemhalo, and Togochale. The Ethiopian Mine Action Office (EMAO) has stated that it began using the facilities at Gemhalo and Togochale in 2007.^[11]

There have been no reports of new use of antipersonnel mines since the end of the 1998–2000 war with Eritrea.^[12] However, each year since 2003 there have been incidents caused by newly laid antivehicle mines in the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) separating Eritrea and Ethiopia, according to the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) Mine Action Coordination Center (MACC). The UN has said it does not know who planted the mines. In July 2008, UNMEE reported that the TSZ had been “effectively closed” since March 2008, with no information on mine activities possible since that time due to restrictions imposed on UNMEE.^[13]

The Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed in March 2008 that captured Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) fighters had received training in Eritrea in 2006 and 2007, including training in the operation of mines.^[14] It did not provide evidence to support this claim, and Landmine Monitor has not been able to verify it.

In February 2008, an antivehicle mine killed two and injured seven people along the Shilalo-Barentu road on the Eritrea-Ethiopia border.^[15] In December 2007, three incidents involving antivehicle mines were recorded in which two persons were injured. One of the vehicles belonged to an UNMEE demining contractor, and UNMEE reported, “The incident took place on a road that had been recently cleared, which may represent a worrying trend of new mine placement.”^[16] According to UN reports, during late 2006 and early 2007 newly laid antivehicle mines killed one and injured five, including two demining staff.^[17] Eight incidents of newly laid mines on previously cleared roads took place in 2006.^[18] Ten incidents took place in 2005, two in 2004 and 15 in 2003.^[19]

Landmine/ERW Problem

Ethiopia is contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), primarily unexploded ordnance (UXO), resulting from internal and international armed conflicts dating back to 1935.^[20] The Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), completed in 2004, identified 1,492 communities as impacted by mines and UXO in 1,916 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs). Afar, Tigray, and Somali regions accounted for more than 80% of the impacted communities in the country.^[21] However, EMAO considered the size of the SHAs identified in the LIS as too large,^[22] but it has never officially quantified its landmine problem. The extent of any residual (cluster) submunitions problem is not known.

In 2007, as a consequence of the outdated and sometimes questionable LIS data, EMAO began to conduct general and technical surveys in all of the LIS communities to more accurately measure its mine problem. In June 2008, Ethiopia stated that it would revise its strategic plan after the completion of the technical surveys, scheduled for the end of the year.^[23]

In its initial Article 7 report, Ethiopia declared 4,097 suspected mined areas; the date of emplacement of the mines ranges from 1935 to 2000.^[24] EMAO, however, believes the actual number is lower than the 1,916 SHAs identified by the LIS and does not know the source of the Article 7 data on SHAs.^[25]

According to EMAO, technical survey in Tigray region was almost completed as of April 2008. Only some difficult-to-access communities remain to be surveyed.^[26]

In April 2007, an attack by the ONLF at an oil exploration site resulted in blockades and restrictions on movement in five “operational military zones” (Degahabur, Fik, Gode, Korahey, and Warder). This led to unknown quantities of contamination from mines and UXO throughout Somali region, particularly along the border areas, former military bases and battlegrounds. According to the UN, mine and UXO contamination in Somali region increases food insecurity, adds to regional poverty and denies safe movement.^[27]

In December 2007 to January 2008, a Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) assessment of mine/ERW risk education (RE) needs in Somali region for UNICEF found that, although there was a considerable mine and UXO problem in Somali region, the majority of the people interviewed agreed that clearance was not their first priority. Drought, food and water shortages, as well as health, were considered more serious problems.^[28]

Mine Action Program

Coordination and management

EMAO was created as an autonomous statutory body by the Council of Ministers in February 2001.^[29] Originally, EMAO reported to the Office of the Prime Minister, but in a public-sector reorganization in 2005, responsibility was transferred to the Ministry of Federal Affairs.^[30] EMAO formulates policy, allocates resources, and approves mine action strategies and workplans.^[31]

A Mine Action Supervisory Board was set up under the 2001 regulation to oversee EMAO’s work. A GICHD evaluation of mine action in Ethiopia in November 2006 concluded the board had been given less authority than should be expected for a national mine action authority.^[32] The GICHD evaluation also concluded that EMAO’s “institutional make-up for mine action in Ethiopia is deficient.” As a result, EMAO took on the responsibilities of quality assurance, accreditation, licensing, and the signature of contracts with donors and operators.^[33]

In 2008, following a recommendation by its 2006 evaluation, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) changed the Ethiopia mine action program from one of direct execution to a nationally executed program, with one international mine action project officer, who is based at EMAO.^[34]

Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), which implemented the Ethiopian LIS in 2002–2004, initiated a project in 2005 with EMAO to enhance EMAO’s mine detection dog (MDD) and technical survey/task impact assessment (TIA) capacities.^[35]

National standards for mine clearance operations were adopted in 2001 and revised in 2006.^[36]

Status of strategic mine action planning

Even though the decree that established EMAO did not explicitly require a strategic plan, in August 2005 EMAO completed a strategic plan for 2006–2011 which, as of May 2008, had still not been approved by the Council of Ministers. The draft strategy reportedly sets the following goals:^[37]

• Elimination of the socio-economic impact of landmines and UXO in mine-affected communities;
• Provide risk education effectively to mine-affected communities and thereby reduce the number of victims;
• Build an internationally competent mine action program; and
• Build a mine information system capacity which will assist in planning of demining and risk education, and will provide full information to other developmental actors.

According to GICHD, the plan “appears to serve more as a corporate strategy for EMAO as an organization than a strategy for a national mine action programme.”^[38] As noted above, EMAO will revise the strategic plan after the completion of technical surveys.^[39]

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development

According to the UN, clearance priorities in Afar and Tigray regions were mainly determined by the value of land for agricultural purposes, as well as humanitarian needs, safety, and livelihood requirements in support of the return of IDPs and consolidation of peace. All cleared land is said to be made available for common use by community farmers and herders, and in most cases plowing and grazing begins immediately after the handover of cleared land to the community.^[40]

Mine action evaluations

In 2006, UNDP conducted an evaluation of Ethiopia’s mine action program and GICHD evaluated the NPA mine action program and EMAO. The UNDP evaluation found that “a high degree of national management, planning and operational capacity had been developed,” and that the national mine action program should transition to national execution in early 2007.^[41] UNDP subsequently changed the mine action program to a nationally executed one in 2007 and a mine action project officer, based at EMAO, replaced the chief technical officer, while NPA took on an enhanced technical advisory and training role with EMAO.^[42] In August 2008, UNDP reported that it continues to provide support for technical capacity development, project quality assurance, program advice, strategic partnering, and resource mobilization.^[43]

The GICHD evaluation concluded that EMAO “has performed increasingly well since its establishment. Its demining operations have made a substantial contribution to resettlement and rehabilitation efforts in the war-affected districts (“woredas”) of Tigray and Afar regions, delivering significant socio-economic benefits for those regions and promoting Ethiopia’s post-war recovery.”^[44]

A socio-economic assessment of the World Bank financed Emergency Rehabilitation Programme in 2006 concluded that demining had a positive impact; one outcome was that displaced persons from mine-affected communities were able to return home. The demining teams, the assessment also concluded, developed skills that could be used beyond mine action.^[45]

Demining

Ethiopia made progress in 2007 in addressing its mine problem through general and technical surveys and clearance. According to NPA, maximum progress was made on land release through the training, equipping, and fielding of five technical survey teams at EMAO.^[46]

EMAO demining and survey teams, with technical support from NPA, are the only demining operators in Ethiopia. Six manual demining companies, 12 MDD teams, and six mechanical demining teams constitute the demining capacity. In 2007, the five technical survey teams were deployed to Amhara, Dire Dawa, Oromia, Somali, and Tigray regions to resurvey the SHAs identified by the LIS.^[47]

NPA drafted standing operating procedures (SOPs) for technical survey, which EMAO accepted in October 2006.^[48] The new SOPs are in two phases: Phase 1 is an information gathering and analysis process through general surveys without entering the SHA; Phase 2 is a technical survey approach using machines/manual deminers or MDDs that further reduces the polygons (shapes that more accurately delineate the perimeters of an SHA) identified in Phase 1.^[49]

In April 2007, NPA completed a MDD training center at Entoto Mountain near Addis Ababa as part of a larger EMAO training center that remains under construction on the site.^[50] In December 2007, the agreement between EMAO and NPA was extended to 2010.^[51]

In 2008, as technical advisors to EMAO, NPA planned to:

• increase MDD capacity by 10 training dogs and 10 EMAO handlers;
• complete an MDD instructor’s course for three EMAO staff;
• train five technical survey teams to complete the national survey;
• retrain five technical survey teams as Rapid Response Teams;
• continue construction of the Entoto Mine Action Training Centre; and
• assist EMAO with a national mine action workplan based on the results from the national survey.^[52]

By 2008, NPA had trained and accredited 27 MDDs with a capacity of approximately 1,000m² of clearance or verification per day per dog.^[53]

Identifying hazardous areas

The LIS conducted in 2002–2004 was not certified by the UN until July 2006. If someone with a demining background had participated in the community interviews, EMAO believes the results would have been more accurate.^[54] At EMAO’s request, NPA trained their survey teams to conduct technical and general surveys in the SHAs identified by the LIS.^[55]

The GICHD evaluation concluded that the process of delineating and marking minefields in preparation for clearance by EMAO had improved significantly in Tigray, because, in part, greater use was being made of minefield sketch maps handed over by the Eritrean army following the peace agreement in 2000. The result has been more land released through survey without clearance. In turn, that has allowed “expensive clearance operations on areas where there remains a strong suspicion that landmines are present.”^[56]

The GICHD/UNICEF RE needs assessment completed in January 2008 indicated that contamination in Somali region was said to be mainly of mixed minefields of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, as well as areas with UXO or abandoned tanks. Floods during the rainy season force communities to move to other areas.^[57]

General and technical surveys in 2007 and 2008

As of April 2008, EMAO had conducted surveys in 814 communities, leaving approximately 680 more to survey. No official interim results are available but in an interview with Landmine Monitor in April 2008 EMAO said the number of SHAs had been reduced through cancellation, and that more than 370km² of estimated area had also been cancelled.^[58]

Marking and fencing of affected areas

There is no permanent marking of mine/UXO-contaminated areas in Ethiopia. Some areas may be marked for later clearance.^[59] The GICHD/UNICEF RE needs assessment for Somali region found no permanent marking but noted that communities have used tree branches to fence off some minefields, and that EMAO also marks affected areas when conducting clearance.^[60] According to NPA, the technical survey teams mark minefields with wooden sticks and mine tape, along with mine danger signs, as a temporary measure.^[61]

Mine and ERW clearance in 2007 and 2008

In 2007, more antivehicle mines and fewer items of UXO were found than in 2006. In November, Ethiopia reported release of 37.46km² of land during the year to date.^[62] Subsequently, in response to a query from Landmine Monitor, EMAO reported clearance for the year of 7.54km² of mined areas, and that the total SHA for the country had been reduced by 122.11km². During clearance operations 1,818 antipersonnel mines, 230 antivehicle mines, and 4,740 items of ERW were destroyed.^[63]

Summary of Efforts to Comply with Article 5

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Ethiopia is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 June 2015. In April 2007, Ethiopia informed States Parties that high-priority mined areas will be cleared by 2010 and the remaining areas by its Article 5 deadline.^[64] In November 2007, Ethiopia did not foresee any impediments, with the exception of available resources, to meeting its 2015 deadline and they were not expecting to have to request an extension of its deadline: “We expect mine clearance to speed up with the existing momentum and destruction of antipersonnel mines from high prioritized areas to be completed up to 2010 and the remaining suspected mined area before the deadline.”^[65]

Demining in 2003–2007

N/R = Not reported

Landmine/ERW Casualties^[66]

In 2007, Landmine Monitor identified at least 84 new civilian mine/ERW casualties in Ethiopia, including 31 people killed, 49 injured, and four unknown. There were at least 47 child casualties (six boys, two girls, others unknown), 32 were adults (four men, remaining unknown) and the age/gender of five casualties was unknown. Antivehicle mines caused 40 casualties, antipersonnel mines 31, and ERW 13. Almost all the antivehicle mine casualties (28) happened in Somali region.

Traveling and tampering/handling caused 23 casualties each, followed by shepherding (18). All the shepherding casualties occurred in Somali region and 17 of the tampering/handling casualties happened in Tigray. Most casualties occurred in Somali region (36), followed by Tigray (27) and the Ethiopian side of the TSZ (21). Most of the traveling casualties occurred in the TSZ (19). EMAO recorded five casualties. The Tigray Bureau of Labor and Social Affairs (BoLSA) recorded 24 casualties in the eight northern districts of Tigray bordering Eritrea. UNMEE MACC recorded all the casualties on the Ethiopian side of the TSZ. A GICHD evaluation team, in cooperation with the Somali BoLSA and local NGO HIMILO Relief Association, recorded at least 34 new mine casualties in Somali region.

The 2007 casualty rate is a sharp increase compared to 2006 (34 mine/ERW casualties) and 2005 (31 casualties). This is partly due to one-off survey activity in Somali region and to apparent new mine use in the TSZ.^[67] However, it is likely that more casualties were unreported due to incomplete data collection.

In addition, in 2007 four Ethiopian military casualties were recorded on the Eritrean side of the TSZ, in Gash Barka.^[68] Landmine Monitor also identified at least 13 mine incidents involving Ethiopian military in Somalia in 2007, but the number of casualties from these incidents was unknown. It appeared that seven of the incidents were caused by victim-activated devices.^[69]

Casualties continued to be reported in 2008 with at least 62 casualties in three incidents through to July (12 people killed and 50 injured). The Tigray BoLSA recorded 52 casualties in two incidents in Tigray region. One incident caused 44 casualties when a bus traveling between Humera and Shire hit an unknown device, probably an improvised explosive device (IED) or an antivehicle mine.^[70] UNMEE MACC recorded 10 casualties when UXO exploded while burning paper at a school in Humera on the Ethiopian side of the TSZ. Among the casualties were a 16-year-old girl, a 50-year old woman, and eight men.^[71] EMAO did not record any new casualties in 2008 through 13 May.^[72]

In 2008, Ethiopian troops in Somalia were increasingly involved in explosive device incidents, although most appear to be caused by remote-detonated devices. Media reported at least 42 soldiers killed and 40 injured. However, the media reports contained insufficient information to determine the cause of the incident and the exact number of casualties.^[73]

Data collection

There is no nationwide casualty data collection system in Ethiopia because mine action is not a government priority.^[74] Data collection is also hampered by a lack of information sharing and coordination between actors, capacity, and resources.^[75] EMAO’s mandate includes casualty data collection, but it only collects information in areas where it conducts clearance activities. In 2007, this meant only limited areas in Tigray and Somali regions. Data is stored in the Information Management System for Mine Action.^[76] Outside EMAO’s areas of operation, casualty data collection has been left to regional authorities who, in most cases, do not have adequate capacity or resources and lack interest in the issue.^[77] In Tigray region, BoLSA is only capable of collecting data in the eight most contaminated districts bordering Eritrea (out of 46 districts); it did not share information with EMAO.^[78] In Afar region, the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness and Food Security Bureau is responsible for casualty data collection but is not able to collect data systematically.^[79]

In some mine-affected regions, NGOs also collect casualty data while conducting other activities. As part of the GICHD evaluation, HIMILO collected casualty data in 36 mine-affected communities in Somali region, but this covers only 5% of communities in suspected contaminated areas.^[80] Rehabilitation and Development Organization (RaDO) continued collecting data in Tigray region, but not in Afar.^[81]

The Ministry of Health, in cooperation with the World Health Organization (WHO), operates an injury surveillance mechanism in six hospitals in Addis Ababa. The system will be expanded to other regions once it is fully operational in the capital.^[82]

The total number of mine/ERW casualties in Ethiopia is unknown.^[83] The most complete data source remains the LIS, which recorded 16,616 mine/ERW casualties (9,341 people killed and 7,275 injured).^[84] EMAO data was not available. Between 2000 and early 2008, RaDO recorded 343 mine/ERW casualties in Tigray region (97 people killed and 246 injured). The vast majority of casualties were male (300), usually herders or farmers; 220 casualties were children and 123 were adults. Some 60% of casualties were caused by antipersonnel mines, 5% by antivehicle mines, and the remainder by ERW or unknown devices.^[85]

The GICHD evaluation team and HIMILO, in cooperation with the Somali BoLSA, identified 88 mine/ERW casualties in 2006–2007 (25 people killed, 59 injured, and four unknown). Three-quarters were male (66) and children younger than 15 accounted for 61% of casualties (54). Antipersonnel mines caused 63 casualties, antivehicle mines 17, and ERW eight. However, it was unclear if the local population was able to distinguish device types. The most common activities at the time of the incident were herding (31) and playing (31) followed by traveling and household work (eight each).^[86] Between 2000 and 2007 Survivor Corps (formerly Landmine Survivors Network, LSN) registered 1,163 mine/ERW survivors (1,102 male and 61 female).^[87]

There are no reliable statistics on persons with disabilities in Ethiopia. In 2007, the Central Statistical Agency conducted a population and housing census, for which the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MoLSA) and Survivor Corps requested the inclusion of questions on the type and cause of disability. The census excluded the Afar and Somali regions and results were not available as of July 2008.^[88] It was reported that results would be available before the end of 2008 and that national disability organizations in cooperation with UNICEF and MoLSA were also compiling information on the cause of disability and the socio-economic needs of persons with disabilities.^[89] The Ethiopian Federation of Persons with Disabilities estimates there are some 7 million persons with disabilities in the country.^[90]

Landmine/ERW Risk Education

In 2007–2008, RE activities remained focused on children, shepherds, and refugees, and did not cover the majority of mine-affected areas. EMAO, Tigray BoLSA, and RaDO reported conducting RE in Tigray and Somali regions and in two refugee camps. The total number of people reached with RE messages, and if they belonged to the groups at most risk, is not known. EMAO and the Tigray BoLSA reported providing RE to 144,216 people. While EMAO nearly doubled its capacity (76,453, up from 40,624 in 2006), BoLSA activities reached nearly 100,000 people fewer (67,763, down from 161,978 in 2006).^[91]

Strategic framework

In June 2008, Ethiopia stated that EMAO is responsible for RE and is the only RE provider in the country.^[92] This would corroborate the lack of coordination and a clear mandate reported by other organizations. At the Eighth Meeting of States Parties, EMAO reported that it has a strategic plan for RE,^[93] but there does not appear to be a national strategy involving other stakeholders.^[94] A lack of funds and capacity, as well as security obstacles hampered service delivery.^[95]

In early 2007, a GICHD review of the mine action program concluded that no RE services were available to the majority of mine-affected communities, coordination was lacking, and a needs assessment in Somali region was needed.^[96] This assessment was conducted by GICHD on behalf of UNICEF in 2007–2008. It concluded that RE was needed in Somali region due to the high number of casualties and ongoing conflict. The communities surveyed had little knowledge of the danger posed by mines/ERW, particularly to children and herders. The assessment recommended adopting a participatory community-based approach by using local resources supported by external actors and taking into consideration lessons learned from RE in Tigray and Afar regions. RE should also support data collection efforts.^[97]

In its initial Article 7 report, Ethiopia stated that standard RE was provided in mine-affected areas. No further detail was provided.^[98]

Coverage and response

In 2007, EMAO provided RE in conjunction with its clearance activities in Somali and Tigray regions (10 sites).^[99] In June 2008, Ethiopia reported that 326,236 people had received RE from EMAO between 2002 and April 2008 and that RE recipients had reported 383 antipersonnel mines, 92 antivehicle mines, and 41,863 items of UXO. To fulfill its Article 5 obligations, EMAO would need to expand its clearance and RE coverage from three to 10 regions.^[100]

The Tigray BoLSA conducted community-based RE in the eight most affected districts. BoLSA uses casualty data to adjust RE activities and holds one stakeholder meeting every six months.^[101] UNICEF funds BoLSA’s RE activities. The budget for 2006–2007 was ETB2,027,942 (US$220,000). The amount allocated for 2006 had not been entirely spent.^[102]

With funding from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), RaDo continued to provide RE to Sudanese refugees in two camps. It has reported using language-appropriate materials, training refugees to be RE trainers, and using structures already present in the camps.^[103]

Victim Assistance

The government supported efforts by domestic and international NGOs that focused on social, health, and legal issues, despite its limited ability to provide improved health care, basic education, or child protection.^[104] Disability is not considered a priority issue in Ethiopia and is not mainstreamed into general development initiatives.^[105] It was also noted that disability organizations are uncoordinated and lack direction.^[106] Ethiopia acknowledged that progress in developing a comprehensive plan of action for victim assistance (VA) were “slow” due to a lack of resources and poor inter-ministerial coordination and capacity.^[107] As a result, many survivors may not receive adequate treatment. The GICHD assessment found that only half of all survivors interviewed had received medical care and only 1% had received physical rehabilitation. Psychosocial support was not provided.^[108]

In principle, medical care is free for people who can prove they cannot afford the services, but few people have the certificate required.^[109] While Ethiopia has improved health sector coverage and capacity through the Health Sector Development Program (Phase III 2005–2010), there were shortages in staff, medicine and supplies, as well as high staff turnover rates. It was estimated that 83% of persons with disabilities live in rural areas, but most services were in urban centers and pre-hospital and emergency care were insufficient.^[110] Medical services are further hampered by limited road connections.^[111]

There is an unequal distribution of services in the mine-affected regions, with comparatively more services in Tigray than in Somali and Afar regions. Reportedly, one of the reasons for this is that more facilities were constructed near the frontline of the war with Eritrea and this situation was not readjusted to regional needs afterwards.^[112] NGOs working in Somali region reported that access to the population is limited by the government.^[113] In 2008, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) withdrew from Somali region stating that “repeated administrative hurdles and intimidation had prevented it from providing medical care to vulnerable populations.”^[114]

MoLSA is responsible for the physical rehabilitation sector, but in practice leaves the management of the rehabilitation centers to the regional BoLSA office or NGOs. Access to services remained difficult because there are not enough centers and people cannot afford the cost of transportation or accommodation.^[115] Services are further limited by a lack of specialized staff and material or financial resources.^[116] The centers do not operate at full capacity. Mine/ERW survivors are often not aware of the existence of services and that their costs can be covered by humanitarian organizations.^[117] UNICEF conducted a rapid assessment of rehabilitation needs in Somali region and concluded there was no capacity to assist mine/ERW survivors.^[118]

Psychosocial support services are limited and mostly provided by NGOs.^[119] There are several disabled people’s organizations (DPOs), but they have insufficient capacity to advocate for persons with disabilities. Although the government has a strategy for special needs education, it was estimated that less than 1% of disabled children had access to education. Specialized education facilities are limited, under-funded, and mostly run by NGOs. In 2007, the Ministry of Education published a directory with information on specialized education.^[120]

Economic reintegration activities are limited and exacerbated by extreme poverty, conflict, and geographic obstacles. Access to vocational training and micro-credit institutions is limited by strict eligibility criteria and interest rates.^[121] Although employment quotas were reported to exist, they were not implemented. Civil servants receive a disability pension under strict criteria; the pensions are only 30% of the last earned salary.^[122]

Ethiopia has legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities but implementation was inadequate and discrimination was common, particularly in rural areas.^[123] Several disability laws and policies were under revision in 2007–2008 to make them more in line with the needs of the country and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. This was part of a study commissioned by UNICEF to compare the legislative structures with the reality on the ground.^[124] Ethiopia signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on 30 March 2007, but as of 31 July 2008 had not ratified nor had it signed the Optional Protocol. The convention was submitted for ratification to the Council of Ministers and an inter-ministerial committee was set up to study the convention’s implementation.^[125]

Progress in meeting VA25 victim assistance objectives

Ethiopia is one the 25 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors, and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation and reintegration of survivors.^[126] As part of its commitment to the Nairobi Action Plan, Ethiopia developed 2005–2009 VA objectives for the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in 2005.^[127] They have not been revised since and remain non-SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound). No plans to achieve the objectives have been developed and Ethiopia did not report on progress related to the objectives in 2007–2008.^[128]

While progress was made in strengthening various sectors relevant to VA, this was not in relation to the VA objectives as set by Ethiopia and was dependent on international support. Ethiopia cited the lack of human resources, coordination, and funding as the main reasons for lack of progress.^[129] However, according to the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) of the GICHD some signs of more active engagement in the VA process were apparent towards the end of 2006, and this continued in 2007.^[130] On 23 August 2007, as part of a visit by the ISU, a roundtable discussion was convened with relevant ministries, international organizations, NGOs, and DPOs to identify the priorities in all areas of VA and to discuss the development of a national response.^[131]

A VA expert was included in the Ethiopian delegation at the Eighth Meeting of States Parties in November 2007 and at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2008. Ethiopia did not use Form J of its initial Article 7 report to report on VA, but annexed a document outlining the same points as presented at the Eighth Meeting of States Parties and the 2008 Standing Committee meetings.^[132]

Victim assistance strategic framework

MoLSA is responsible for disability issues, including assistance to mine/ERW survivors; implementation is left to the BoLSA offices and NGOs.^[133] In May 2008, however, the Ministry of Health claimed that “the lead institution responsible for the coordination of VA activities is the Federal Ministry of Health.”^[134] EMAO does not consider VA as within its mandate and has not implemented nor coordinated any activities in this field.^[135]

The roundtable discussion and a subsequent ICRC Mine Ban Treaty implementation workshop recommended that relevant ministries and other key stakeholders start developing a comprehensive action plan to address the needs of mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities. A focal point (most likely at MoLSA) should be appointed to coordinate the development and implementation of the plan complementary to activities undertaken within the framework of the UN disability convention.^[136] Recognizing its lack of progress in this area, Ethiopia stated in June 2008 that “MoLSA is investigating opportunities to secure funds for recruiting a specialist to coordinate the efforts of relevant ministries and other key actors.”^[137]

Disability organizations stated that MoLSA was not capable of planning and coordinating VA because of a lack of political will from the government.^[138] The ministry added that funding and a lack of capacity at the regional level were further challenges. ^[139]

In 2007, a unit for emergency preparedness was created at the Ministry of Health and it developed an injury prevention and medical emergency system strategy (2007–2010), which aims to develop emergency and rehabilitation services for “injury and violence victims.”^[140] The plan has measurable objectives, plans and task division.^[141]

The ICRC provided support to the physical rehabilitation sector and assisted MoLSA in developing a national rehabilitation strategy.^[142] The Ethiopian National Disability Action Network was established in 2007 to enhance provision of rehabilitation services.^[143] Until June 2007, capacity-building support was also provided through the Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (EDRP) funded by a World Bank loan.^[144] The International Labour Organization provided support to DPOs and women’s associations providing economic reintegration opportunities for persons with disabilities.^[145] The WHO is working with disability and rehabilitation stakeholders to implement community-based rehabilitation (CBR) in Ethiopia; activities will be coordinated through a national committee.^[146]

Assistance activities

In October 2007, the National Orthopedic Center (NOC) at the Black Lion Hospital in Addis Ababa was inaugurated, but it was not fully operational as of April 2008.^[147] The NOC will function as the national referral and prosthetic-orthotic technician training center. No mine/ERW survivors were treated in 2007 or to April 2008.^[148] The semi-governmental Addis Ababa Prosthetic Orthotic Center (POC) remains the largest center in the country. Until 2008, it was supported by the ICRC, but will become a government structure.^[149] The POC’s 2007 beneficiary statistics are included in the ICRC figures below.

Addis Development Vision provided direct and referral services through its CBR network in Addis Ababa, Awasa, and Lalibela. In 2007, 75 persons with disabilities received physical rehabilitation (four survivors), 80 received micro-credits or grants, 87 received vocational training (one survivor), and 15 received educational support (one survivor). Peer-support groups assisted 100 persons with disabilities, and 10 persons with disabilities participated in sports activities.^[150]

RaDO provided physical rehabilitation services for refugees in four camps in eastern and western Ethiopia in coordination with the Administration for Refugees and Returnees Affairs and the UNHCR.^[151] However, a UNICEF assessment of rehabilitation needs in Somali region noted that BoLSA monitoring of “the RaDO rehabilitation program indicated substantial failures in the quality and quantity of service provision.”^[152]

Cheshire Services Ethiopia provided rehabilitation services and orthopedic appliances to persons with disabilities, mainly children. In 2007, its prosthetic and orthotic center produced 4,157 orthopedic appliances and repaired 1,481 (number of survivor beneficiaries unknown). CSE planned to open two more workshops in Dire Dawa and Awasa at the end of 2008.^[153]

In 2007, the ICRC supported eight rehabilitation centers with donations of materials and components. It also covered transportation, accommodation, patient registration costs, and provided technical support. Support to the Harar center ended in October 2007 due to a lack of support from the regional authorities. In 2007, the ICRC-supported centers assisted 10,209 people; 2,316 prostheses (813 for survivors) and 3,870 orthoses (385 for survivors) were produced.^[154] With ICRC support, 126 weapons-injured were treated in Afar, Gambela, and Somali regions.^[155]

Survivors Corps provided assistance to 272 survivors through its peer support groups in Addis Ababa in 2007: 52 survivors received direct health assistance and seven were referred to other health services; 62 received direct economic support and 67 were referred to socio-economic reintegration service providers; and 84 survivors received advocacy training.^[156]

Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of any comprehensive long-term cost estimates for meeting mine action needs (including RE and VA) in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian national mine action program was established using a combination of national funds and financing from a World Bank loan.^[157] Authority for mine action strategy and implementation rests with EMAO. Following transition to national management of mine action programming, UNDP provides project support and services, and NPA provides technical assistance and capacity-building support to EMAO.^[158] Short-term EMAO and UNDP programming is supported by a $10,968,800 (€8 million) agreement between the European Commission (EC) and UNDP to fund mine action operations for 2007 and 2008.^[159]

National support for mine action

Ethiopia did not report national mine action funding in 2006 or 2007. At the Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Ethiopia stated that its government, in cooperation with UNDP and the EC, provided the “lion share” of funding for mine action programs in the country, however, it did not provide a figure for national mine action funding, or a proportion of funds contributed by the government as opposed to UNDP or the EC.^[160]

The 2007 GICHD evaluation of Ethiopia’s mine action program concluded that, in the absence of new financing from the World Bank, EMAO needed to “make a new case for funding from the Federal Government” based on the impact of mine action on national development priorities. It also recommended changing mine action financial planning from a calendar based on international donor timelines to one based on the national budget calendar, to harmonize mine action with the national budget cycle.^[161]

GICHD reported, as of February 2007, that the government continued to make an “annual budget provision” of ETB17 million to 20 million ($1,941,400–$2,284,000) on a contingency basis for mine action but, for the most part, the reserved funds had not been spent. In 2005–2006, EMAO reimbursed the government more than ETB11.5 million ($1,313,300 at 2007 exchange rate) in unspent funds covering the period from 2002 to 2005.^[162]

International cooperation and assistance

In 2007, five countries and the EC reported providing $5,828,048 (€4,250,637) to mine action in Ethiopia. Reported mine action funding in 2007 was roughly 26% less than reported in 2006. The EC and Norway have sustained high levels of support since 2006. Annual international funding since 2005 has been notably inconsistent, with $2.6 million at its lowest and $7.89 million at its highest. World Bank support for mine action in Ethiopia, through loan and grant arrangements, ended in 2006.^[163]

Ethiopia highlighted replacement of demining assets in 2008 and 2009, and support of operational costs from 2010 to 2015, as the priorities for financial support in the short- and long-term.^[164] It reported that the sudden drop in funding in 2007 might slow down EMAO’s mine clearance operations.^[165] However, international funding at 2007 levels, if maintained, would total approximately $54 million during the period from 2007 to 2015 and would make a substantial contribution to meeting Ethiopia’s mine clearance deadline. Financial support for VA remains inadequate.

2007 International Mine Action Funding to Ethiopia: Monetary^[166]