Nepal

Background

On 21 November 2006, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) interim government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal/Maoist (CPN/M) ended a decade of civil war. In April 2007, the CPN/M became a part of the interim government, and in April 2008, it went on to win the largest number of seats in national parliamentary elections. Nepal became a republic in May, and in July 2008, a president was elected for the first time.

Mine Ban Policy

Nepal has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. The November 2006 CPA committed the government of Nepal and the rebels to halt the use of landmines, prohibited the transporting of weapons and explosives, and required the parties to assist each other to mark and clear mines and booby-traps within a certain time.^[1]

On 1–3 October 2007, the ICBL undertook a mission to Nepal to promote its adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty. The mission, organized by the Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines (NCBL), met with the Speaker of the Parliament, leaders of various political parties, including the CPN/M, senior officers of the Nepal Army, as well as members of the National Mine Action Steering and Technical Committees. All expressed a strong commitment to ban antipersonnel landmines and join the Mine Ban Treaty.^[2]

Nepal attended as an observer the Eighth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in November 2007 in Jordan. While most of its remarks focused on efforts to deal with mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination, Nepal also told delegates, “Definitely, our ultimate goal is [a] ‘mine free world.’ Towards this end, Nepal remains fully committed to the humanitarian objectives of the convention.”^[3]

In contrast to these generally positive remarks, on 5 December 2007, Nepal abstained for the first time on the vote on the annual UN General Assembly resolution calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty (Resolution 62/41). It had voted in favor of the corresponding resolution in previous years, except for 2004 and 2006 when it was absent. It did not offer an explanation for the change in vote.

Nepal subsequently participated in the regional Ottawa Convention Implementation and Universalization Workshop in Bali, Indonesia, on 25–27 February 2008. The ICBL concluded from discussions with the Nepali representatives that there is general support for a ban on landmines, though still reluctance on the part of some in the military; in any event, no timetable for accession can be established until the political situation stabilizes.^[4]

Also in February 2008, at an event celebrating the tenth anniversary of the Mine Ban Treaty, the foreign minister stated that the provisions of the CPA “show our commitment to do away with landmines.”^[5] In March 2008, Superintendent of Police Gupta Bahadur Shrestha stated that Nepali law makes it punishable for a person to use, stockpile, transfer, or produce an antipersonnel mine, and that he believed that no provision of the Mine Ban Treaty would negatively affect Nepal’s security.^[6]

In May 2008, Canada sent a universalization mission to Nepal, which met with members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Nepal Army, political leaders, UN agencies, and the NCBL. Representatives were generally supportive of the treaty, but stressed that the focus was on building mine action efforts, and that the writing of the new constitution and other transitional political processes were the priorities.^[7]

Advocacy efforts by the NCBL have focused on promoting the implementation of the clearance commitments in the CPA as well as Nepal’s accession to the Mine Ban Treaty. In 2007 and early 2008, the NCBL organized a series of seminars and events on a landmine ban in Nepal.^[8] In December 2007, the NCBL released a report on improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and mines in eight former conflict-affected districts.^[9]

Nepal did not attend the June 2008 intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva.

Nepal is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It registered for the Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions in May 2008, but did not attend.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, and Use

Nepali officials have provided conflicting information about past production of antipersonnel mines, with some military and political officials acknowledging domestic production, but others—more recently—denying it.^[10] In 2007 and 2008, two different army officials have insisted that there was no past production of antipersonnel mines. In 2007, a Nepal Army spokesperson denied any mine production, while acknowledging that soldiers frequently made command-detonated IEDs at barracks using munitions such as mortar shells, rockets, bombs, and antivehicle mines.^[11] In 2008, another army official told Landmine Monitor that Nepal did not produce or use any victim-activated mines or IEDs.^[12] It is also notable that as of mid-2008, no Nepali-produced antipersonnel mines have been found in minefields.

Given the conflicting information, Landmine Monitor will continue to list Nepal as a producer of antipersonnel mines until there is official confirmation that production did not take place in the past and/or that no future production will be allowed.

Nepal is not known to have exported antipersonnel mines. According to the army, Nepal imported mines from India, China, and the former Soviet Union, mostly in the 1980s. It imported blast and fragmentation mines and also Claymore-type antipersonnel mines.^[13] In March 2007, Brigadier-General Thapa stated that the Nepal Army has a stockpile of about 3,000 antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, including POMZ-2 and PMD mines.^[14] This was the first time a stockpile number has been cited. There have been no subsequent statements or clarifications on this number.

There have been no reports of new mine use by the Nepal Army since the May 2006 cease-fire. Previously, the Nepal Army used IEDs assembled in-country, as well as antipersonnel mines, around military installations, police posts, and infrastructure.^[15] The Nepal Army has stated that it started using mines in 2002, and estimates it deployed around 14,000 antipersonnel mines (including 11,000 PMD-6 mines and 3,000 POMZ-2 and M14 mines). It also estimates that it used about 25,000 command-detonated IEDs.^[16]

Non-state armed groups

Although the former rebel CPN/M became a part of the state after it joined the interim government in April 2007, its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) still exists and is being demobilized. In the past, the PLA were expert at the manufacture and use of a variety of IEDs, including victim-activated, time-delayed, and command-detonated types.^[17] There have been no reports of new use of antipersonnel mines, victim-activated IEDs, or booby-traps by the PLA since the May 2006 cease-fire.^[18]

Under the terms of the CPA and the Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies agreement, the PLA has been cantoned at seven sites and is obliged to turn in all IEDs at designated storage locations a safe distance from the sites (see Landmine/ERW Problem section for details of quantities destroyed).^[19]

Rebel armed groups still exist in Nepal, especially in the Terai region. There is no evidence that any of them have used, produced, or stockpiled antipersonnel mines. Some have used IEDs.^[20] Peace and Reconstruction Minister Ram Chandra Poudel stated in March 2008 that four armed groups in the Terai—the Madhesi Mukti Tigers, Terai Cobras, Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha, and Samyukta Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha—have responded to a government offer to begin peace talks.^[21]

Landmine/ERW Problem

Nepal is affected by landmines, almost all antipersonnel, as well as by ERW. The decade of civil war that ended in November 2006 left Nepal widely contaminated by IEDs, used by both Nepal’s army and police, and by the CPN/M. The army also emplaced antipersonnel mines.^[22]

The Security Forces, which includes both the Nepal Army and the Armed Police Force,^[23] laid 53 antipersonnel minefields and a further 300 or so areas are protected with command-detonated devices (including IEDs), as defensive perimeters around military installations, police posts, and infrastructure.^[24] As of June 2008, five of the minefields had been fully cleared (two in the Central region and one each in the Eastern, Western, and Far Western regions), two partially cleared (both in the Western region), and an eighth was being worked on.^[25]

The total size of mined areas is not known, but according to the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), the typical size of the minefields was between 10,000 and 20,000m².^[26] Three antipersonnel mine types have been encountered in the army minefields: the PMD-6 “box” mine (generally the majority of mines found, but only about 30% of them have been found to still function as the wood had often rotted); the POMZ-2 fragmentation mine; and the M14, an Indian variant of the United States low-metal mine.^[27]

IEDs produced by the CPN/M—including socket bombs (improvised hand grenades), “bucket” bombs, and pipe bombs—are said to account for most of the contamination and have caused an estimated 90% of civilian casualties from victim-activated devices.^[28] However, a data gathering project in the Central region conducted by ArmorGroup, a British commercial company, over five months through March 2008 found ERW contamination on only a limited scale.^[29]

Nepal has significantly reduced the problem of abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO), completing in May 2008 destruction of 14,682 CPN/M IEDs that had been collected in seven UN-monitored cantonment sites.^[30] IEDs prepared by Nepali police were being stored at a further 48 locations.^[31]

As of June 2008, there was no evidence that burgeoning conflict in the south was resulting in a threat from victim-activated devices, although command-detonated IED attacks against the Security Forces were occurring.^[32]

Mine Action Program

Coordination and management

On 21 June 2007, the Nepali cabinet decided to set up a National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), consisting of an interministerial Steering Committee with strategic policy responsibility and an implementing Technical Committee, both under the auspices of the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction.^[33] In remarks to a workshop in early March 2008, a senior ministry official conceded that these bodies needed to become “more effective.”^[34]

A UN interagency mine action assessment was conducted in late 2007 to “make recommendations for a suitable response, including institutional arrangements for the coordination and implementation of operational activities.”^[35] As of early June 2008, the report was still awaiting comment by the government.^[36]

Also, a mine action center was created within the Ministry of Defense,^[37] and a database set up in September 2007 on the premises of the Army’s Engineers Directorate, equipped with the latest version of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).^[38]

A Joint Mine Action Working Group addresses all mine action issues, including mine/ERW risk education and victim assistance (see Risk Education section below). Working group members included the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, the army and police, UN agencies, the Nepal Red Cross Society, the NCBL, various national and international NGOs, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as an observer.^[39]

National mine action legislation and standards

Mine action is governed by the 2007 cabinet decree.^[40] Standing operating procedures for demining were started based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and training provided by ArmorGroup, and their further development was ongoing as of March 2008.^[41]

Status of strategic mine action planning

Nepal had no comprehensive national mine action strategy as of March 2008.^[42] At a workshop on mine action in early March, a senior official in the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction stressed the need for an action plan to deal with the threat “in a comprehensive manner.”^[43]

Integration with reconstruction and development

There has been some effort by the army to coordinate demining with reconstruction needs. A minefield around a hydropower station in Khimti in the Central region was cleared of mines (but not IEDs laid by the Security Forces) in late 2007, allowing a hydropower project to proceed.^[44]

Demining

The Nepal Army’s 14th Brigade is the primary demining operator in Nepal. Its work has been supported by a mine action unit within UNMIN and by ArmorGroup, working under an UNMIN contract awarded through a process of international tender. The contract was due to end in November 2008.^[45]

In November 2007, the UN reported that the Nepal Army’s explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) unit had the capacity to deploy quick response teams and met “most of Nepal’s emergency requirements for EOD and IED disposal,” although it was deemed “slightly under-equipped.”^[46] At the same time, the UN affirmed that engineer units within the Nepal Army did “not have an adequate level of training, equipment or experience to safely and effectively deal with the landmine threat.”^[47] By March 2008, this situation had changed with the first batch of two teams of deminers having been trained by ArmorGroup.^[48] By early April, training of a further 40 demining personnel had been completed.^[49]

The police are not trained, equipped, or mandated to deal appropriately with explosive ordnance. In March 2007, the Nepali police tried to deal with an IED in Jalpa, but it exploded injuring 32 people (see below Casualties section).^[50] The Armed Police Force did, however, destroy some IEDs around their posts soon after the end of the conflict was declared.^[51]

Identifying hazardous areas

The Nepal Army provided the UN with details of 53 minefields, including maps described as of a “good standard” for 44 of them.^[52] The army also identified some 300 security posts protected by command-detonated explosive devices.^[53]

As noted above, the precise extent of AXO remains unclear. Under the CPA, the Nepal Army and the CPN/M agreed to “assist each other to mark landmines and booby traps used during the time of armed conflict by providing necessary information within 30 days and defuse and excavate it within 60 days.”^[54] The Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction acknowledged in March 2008 that implementation of this provision had been “so late,”^[55] although UNMIN stated that the provision had been useful even though the deadlines were unrealistic.^[56]

ArmorGroup conducted a “data gathering pilot project” in central areas of Nepal between November 2007 and the end of March 2008, visiting 117 locations, including 37 sites of clashes between the army and insurgents, a number of “corridors” used by insurgents, and other areas which had registered spikes in casualties in recent years. The project findings indicated that ERW still pose a threat to the community, but since much is either isolated items of UXO or part of old stockpiles of IEDs in communities, a conventional battle area clearance response would not be effective.^[57]

Marking and fencing of affected areas

All minefields are marked and fenced, according to the army, except for one which, as of June 2008, was undergoing clearance.^[58] Fencing and signs are often removed by the local population, but civil society organizations have expressed concern that “they are often not properly fenced and marked and the nearby population is often not properly informed of the risk.”^[59]

Mine and ERW clearance in 2007 and 2008

All clearance of mines and ERW in Nepal is by manual means. Clearance is not feasible during monsoon season from late June through mid-September.^[60]

The army reported clearing three minefields in 2007, removing and destroying a total of 522 mines. The army also reported that it cleared 25 battle areas in 2007, destroying more than 400 IEDs.^[61]

UNMIN has encouraged the army to conduct a public handover ceremony following completion of clearance operations and quality control. Army demining personnel walk around the former demining site physically removing the yellow sticks that indicate the location of cleared ordnance.^[62]

From October 2007 through June 2008, the army completed clearance of five minefields, and had started clearing three more. The army allowed only partial clearance of one minefield, which had shifted as a result of a landslide.^[63] It suspended operations on two more because of the onset of the monsoon season. By then, the army had cleared a total area of 12,003m², disposing of 1,145 PMD-6s and POMZ-2 antipersonnel mines, two antivehicle mines, and 18 items of UXO.^[64]

Landmine/ERW/IED Casualties^[65]

Casualties by Age and Gender

Casualties by Device Type

*mostly IEDs

In 2007, the Informal Service Sector (INSEC), a Nepali NGO, recorded at least 104 civilian mine/IED/ERW casualties in 42 incidents, including 13 people killed and 91 injured. The vast majority of casualties (72%) were male. Boys accounted for 38% of all casualties and 48% of total casualties were children.

Bystanding or being nearby an explosion caused 50 casualties, followed by handling out of curiosity (19). Children were 89% (17) of all handling casualties, an increase from 82% in 2006. Incidents occurred mostly in agricultural areas (36) or by the home (35). Most casualties were reported in the Eastern region (44) where a single incident injured 32 people. On 16 March, a police officer was moving abandoned IEDs in an agricultural area in Jhapa district when one of the devices exploded while a large number of civilians were standing nearby. Other regions recording casualties were the Western and Central regions (18 each), the Mid-Western region (17) and the Far Western region (seven).

INSEC also recorded another 164 casualties (11 killed and 153 injured) in 2007, which were not included in the civilian surveillance system and for which the circumstances and devices were not specified. These casualties included security forces, former combatants, or civilian casualties of planned attacks.^[66] Landmine Monitor has excluded these casualties from the total number of mine/IED/ERW casualties, due to a lack of detailed information.

The casualty rate in 2007 was a sharp decrease compared to 169 civilian casualties (39 killed, 130 injured) in 2006, particularly in the Far Western region which saw 35 casualties in 2006.^[67] When considering that a single incident caused 32 casualties, the decrease is even more significant. The decreased casualty rate was said to be due to increased clearance and emergency mine/ERW risk education (RE), and media attention to incidents both locally and nationally.^[68] The number of “unspecified” casualties, however, increased from 111 in 2006, to 164 in 2007.

Casualties continued to occur in 2008, again at a sharply decreased rate, with 24 civilian casualties in 16 incidents as of May (two people killed, 19 injured, and three unknown). During the same period in 2007, 69 casualties were recorded. Nearly 71% of casualties were children (17). ERW caused 23 of the casualties and one casualty was caused by an antipersonnel mine. The majority of casualties occurred in the Central region (11) followed by the Eastern region (eight).

Data collection

The Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction is responsible for collecting and managing mine action data, but is said to have allotted little time for this.^[69] IMSMA was installed in September 2007, and five army and one ministry staff member were trained by GICHD.^[70]

INSEC is the de facto source of casualty data through its surveillance system operating in all districts of the country since 2006.^[71] With the exception of combatant casualties, data appears to be collected for all casualties of unintentional explosions. Data is collected in standardized forms with clear case definitions, differentiation of device types and their detonation mechanism, personal and socio-economic information, incident circumstances, and location.^[72] The INSEC casualty form has been integrated into IMSMA and INSEC data has been provided to the army.^[73] In July 2008, the Mine Action Joint Working Group (MAJWG) discussed revision of the INSEC case definitions to also include all non-civilian casualties of unintentional explosions.^[74]

UNICEF continued to collect data on non-civilian casualties and non-victim-activated explosions through media reports; the data was cross-checked with INSEC to avoid duplications.^[75] The Nepal Army and the NCBL also collected information on casualties. However, the NCBL data continued to display inaccuracies in incident categorization and device type, making it difficult to use for planning purposes.^[76]

Although victim assistance was in its early stages in 2007–2008, INSEC data was used for planning and the MAJWG intended to continue using it as the sector developed.^[77] UNICEF used INSEC data and media surveillance mechanisms for RE and advocacy.^[78] The MAJWG members also used INSEC data to select and prioritize districts for RE programs.^[79]

The total number of casualties from victim-activated devices in Nepal remains unknown. However, through to the end of 2007, at least 644 casualties due to victim-activated devices had been recorded, including 125 combatant casualties recorded in 2004–2005 (203 people killed and 441 injured).^[80]

General injury surveillance exists in Nepal but is not digitized or using internationally recognized standards. There are no comprehensive statistics on persons with disabilities or conflict-injured people. The National Federation of the Disabled planned to conduct a nationwide disability survey to address the lack of data.^[81]

Landmine/ERW Risk Education

While the total number of mine/ERW RE beneficiaries in Nepal in 2007 is unknown, there was an expansion of emergency RE in the most affected areas as focal points were mobilized.^[82] In 2007–2008, basic emergency RE and information dissemination through mass media remained the primary methods, but RE was also included to a limited extent in cross-sectoral programs and school curricula.^[83] However, to ensure sustained behavioral change there remains a need for systematic community-based RE, which was in 2007 almost exclusively conducted by the Nepal Red Cross Society (NRCS).Emergency RE sessions were conducted in response to all incidents, but the number of people reached was not registered due to the impromptu nature of the activities. In addition, few implementers reported on their activities to the coordinating body. It was estimated that at least 7,508 people received some form of RE in 2007.^[84] There was no clear information about the number of recipients among the most at-risk groups, but children were considered the highest at-risk group.^[85]

Strategic framework and capacity

Although in principle, the NMAA Technical Committee, was responsible for mine action implementation (including RE), no national mine action strategy, workplan, or standards, including for RE, existed as of June 2008.^[86] The Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction stated that there was a clear need for an action plan to deal with the threat of contamination “in a comprehensive manner,”^[87] yet government involvement in RE remained limited in 2007–2008, mainly due to political reasons (elections) and competing priorities.^[88] As of July 2008, no decision had been taken on whether to have a unified sub-working group for RE and victim assistance or separate groups under the Technical Committee; this discussion started in July 2007.^[89]

In 2007–2008, UNICEF continued to coordinate the RE sector through the MAJWG. UNICEF also provided training of trainers, as well as refresher training to MAJWG members.^[90] The NMAA had no plans for taking over RE coordination and only attended one meeting in 2007.^[91]

During the reporting period, the MAJWG continued to develop RE activities based on studies and input from the field and the UNICEF emergency kit, developed in 2006, continued to be the basis of standard messages.^[92] The deployment of RE focal points improved the coordination and timely response of emergency RE; most responses were made within one week of the incident.^[93] As of July 2008, there were focal points in 67 districts, including the 58 districts considered to be most affected.^[94] In 2008, it was planned to establish regional MAJWG coordination meetings, to expand the inclusion of RE into the school system, and to provide more direct RE, rather than just distributing materials and basic RE orientation.^[95]

UNICEF noted that a strong monitoring mechanism was needed to assess RE coverage and efficacy; standard reporting forms were developed but little used in 2007. A fulltime staff person would be hired to take on this monitoring role and emergency RE activities would be mapped to avoid overlap.^[96] Other challenges in 2007 included: difficult access to remote areas; casualties occurring in scattered locations making targeting difficult; and weak incorporation of RE in broader, cross-cutting projects. Adequate funding was also lacking.^[97]

In 2008, results from a Knowledge, Attitude and Practices UNICEF-commissioned survey conducted by the Center for Research on Environment Health and Population Activities (CREHPA) in the six most-affected districts of Nepal found that exposure to RE was negligible in all the districts. Only 2.5% of respondents stated that RE activities had occurred in their communities and 11% had received RE materials, despite the nationwide RE campaign implemented in 2007. People were unaware of where explosive devices could be encountered and how to practice safe behavior. Mass media were said to be main source of information about explosive devices. However, CREPHA also noted that actual exposure to explosive devices was moderate and communities had other priorities, such as basic sanitation.^[98]

A baseline study by Partnership Nepal, in preparation of program expansion in June 2008, noted that at-risk groups were not aware of the dangers of IEDs. The study also noted that journalists were not accurately reporting, or in sufficient detail, on the IED/mine issue.^[99]

There is sufficient emergency RE capacity, as well as materials for public information dissemination, such as the nationwide broadcasting campaign “Don’t Touch Explosives–Save Limbs, Save Lives.” Revision and minor adaptations were made continuously to the RE tools and a new message, “Don’t Keep Bombs in Your House” was added.^[100] Some 100,000 leaflets were distributed through the MAJWG and other organizations in 2007.^[101] However, UNICEF estimated that only about 5% of the population in affected districts had received any form of direct RE.^[102]

UNICEF trained 200 trainers in 58 districts in the use of the emergency kit in 2007 and to 3 July 2008, another 213 were trained to respond to new incidents in cooperation with the village development committees in 71 districts through a network of some 35 NGOs.^[103] UNMIN continued to provide safety briefings to its staff in 2007 with UNICEF support (253 recipients). In August 2007, UNMIN also started a radio program which occasionally included RE.^[104]

The Nepal Army continued to conduct RE for civilians near army posts and in areas where clearance or verification of minefields is conducted.^[105] The Nepali police conducted RE and marking of IED sites in 2007, and at least 330 recruits received RE orientation and materials.^[106]

In 2007, the NRCS conducted emergency RE in 46 districts (up from 20 districts in 2006). Coverage reduced again to 30 districts by January 2008 (including two previously uncovered areas) due to the sharp decrease in incidents.^[107] Through the NRCS, the Lutopia Théâtre from Toulon, France, presented a puppet show on the mine/IED situation in Nepal and visited the two most affected districts, Kailali and Kavre.^[108] ICRC continued support to the NRCS.^[109]

Partnership Nepal conducted emergency RE activities and limited community-based activities, such as group discussions and street drama, in three districts (Kavrepalanchok, Dadeldhura, and Sindhupalchok): reportedly 6,000 people, including 3,500 children benefited in 2007. In 2008, the organization started a community-based RE campaign in 10 districts in the south of Nepal, as part of the Schools as Zones of Peace initiative.^[110]

Rural Reconstruction Nepal, operating in four districts, expanded its RE activities in 2007 to students in five schools.^[111] HimRights provided RE orientation, including safe behaviors and how to report suspicious devices, to nearly 900 students in six districts in 2007.^[112] NCBL claims it did conduct RE in 20 districts, reaching 9,336 people in 2007.^[113] Save the Children Norway, with UNICEF, conducted a one-day training of trainers workshop on emergency RE for its partners in seven districts and provided emergency kits; RE was also included in other activities in schools across 23 districts.^[114] Porter’s Progress was no longer active in the MAJWG, but was believed to continue some RE activities.^[115]

Victim Assistance

At the Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Nepal stated that it would ensure the existence of a fully operational mine action program, including RE and victim assistance (VA).^[116] However since the peace agreement of November 2006, the government or mine action bodies have not taken concrete steps to improve services for casualties of unintentional explosions, other persons with disabilities, or their families. Responsible authorities were said to be awaiting the outcome of an assessment by the UNMIN Mine Action Unit, which was completed in November 2007 but had not been approved by the government as of March 2008. NGOs continued to carry out the bulk of the services to survivors and persons with disabilities.^[117] Most persons with disabilities relied almost exclusively on family members for assistance.^[118]

Conflict casualties were eligible for free government assistance if available and if they possessed the necessary documents. Post-conflict casualties can receive assistance if their injuries happened at or near military posts. In all other cases, a letter from Ministry of Home Affairs with a recommendation from Chief District Officer needed to be submitted to the cabinet for approval; this process often takes months.^[119]

Evacuation of severely injured casualties, mostly poor people from rural areas, remained a challenge, as it was not clear who to contact or how to receive support to cover costs. Although first-aid training has been provided to at least 8,000 NRCS volunteers, recent survivors reported to INSEC they had not received any assistance when injured;^[120] a recent study found that “pre-hospital care is still in its nascent stage.”^[121] NRCS ambulances continued to charge for emergency evacuation according to the distance traveled, while others required a “donation” of no set amount.^[122]

Services for trauma cases were available at eight well-staffed and well-equipped government hospitals in larger cities and from various NGO-run or private hospitals. However, access to these services was limited as most were concentrated in the Kathmandu Valley.^[123] Efforts to upgrade trauma facilities at Bir Hospital in Kathmandu, which started in 2006, were expected to be completed in 2008.^[124] Both the Nepal Army and the PLA provided assistance to their injured members; the Nepal Army reportedly also assisted civilians.^[125]

Physical rehabilitation services were provided through 17 centers in five regions of Nepal; facilities have been brought to acceptable international standards through the efforts of international NGOs.^[126] Access remained a concern since most survivors needed to travel long distances. Community-based rehabilitation (CBR) programs existed in 45 of 75 districts. The National Rehabilitation Centre of the Nepal Army provided rehabilitation and vocational training to military personnel and civilians.^[127]

There were no programs providing psychosocial support specifically for post-conflict civilian casualties of explosive devices. Counseling was available as part of broader cross-sectoral projects and focused on children, but coordination and funding were said to be lacking.^[128] The government reportedly funded some special education initiatives.^[129]

Opportunities for economic reintegration of conflict casualties expanded in 2007, but remained mostly limited to the southern plains of the Kathmandu Valley. There were no government services specifically for mine/IED survivors. Non-civilian casualties are eligible for financial compensation, pensions, and training.^[130] Families of people killed during the 10-year conflict are eligible for a one-time payment; those injured or killed after the peace accords are not eligible.^[131] Persons with disabilities or surviving family members can receive a monthly allowance of NPR100 ($1.55) through village development committees.^[132]

Nepal has laws to protect the rights of persons with disabilities, but discrimination existed and physical accessibility provisions were not enforced.^[133] Nepal signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol on 3 January 2008, but as of 31 July 2008 had yet to ratify.

Victim assistance strategic framework

The NMAA, responsible for mine action, including VA, had not developed a VA strategy or activities as of March 2008 pending approval of the UN assessment. As of July 2008, no decision had been taken on the creation of a VA working group within the National Mine Action Authority.^[134] The Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction had no plans to take over coordination responsibilities from the MAJWG.^[135] The MAJWG provided VA through advocacy and ad hoc activities in districts where its members operated, but in practice very few people benefited.^[136]

The Ministry of Women, Children and Social Welfare is responsible for assistance to persons with disabilities. It did not provide direct services but organized disability awareness events and distributed relevant policy documents to agencies, and identity cards to persons with disabilities.^[137] The National Coordination Committee (a government body coordinating disability) developed a Policy and Plan of Action for Disability, which entered into force in late 2006.^[138]

In November–December 2007, Handicap International (HI) was commissioned by UNICEF to conduct a “National Assessment on Rights, Care and Rehabilitation of Survivors of Explosive Devices.” The study found that VA was the weakest component of mine action, as the relevant commissions had not been created in the NMAA and discussions had not included the Ministry of Women, Children and Social Welfare. Key recommendations were to:

• improve capacity of first responders, ensure timely evacuation of casualties, and strengthen referral and links with CBR programs;
• create an emergency fund and coordination mechanisms among rehabilitation providers;
• introduce psychosocial support training in CBR programs;
• develop peer support groups and a comprehensive plan for social reintegration
  activities;
• ensure that the most vulnerable families are prioritized for economic assistance; and
• integrate VA into existing development activities.^[139]
  

At least 6,096 persons with disabilities received services in 2007, including 1,651 survivors or their families. At least three survivors received physical rehabilitation, and 1,648 received socio-economic or educational assistance. The ICRC-assisted Green Pastures Hospital provided rehabilitation to 1,444 people (three survivors) and 128 received transportation assistance; economic assistance (through NRCS) was provided to 1,623 households with conflict casualties (beneficiaries unknown).^[140] HI provided physical rehabilitation to 1,736 persons with disabilities, 253 received prosthetic repairs, and 887 received economic assistance (number of survivors unknown).^[141] The NCBL assisted 17 persons with disabilities with income-generating activities and eight with educational assistance.^[142]

In 2007, the Nepal Army provided assistance to civilian conflict casualties if the army was deemed to be responsible; it did not pay transport costs for caretakers or compensation.^[143] The number of survivors assisted by the Nepal Army was not known.

The ICRC continued to support physical rehabilitation at the Green Pasture Hospital and the rehabilitation center in Pokhara by providing materials, components, and equipment.^[144] The ICRC Micro-Economic Incentives program implemented by the NRCS assisted families with conflict casualties to start small businesses or raise goats in 24 districts. In 2008, the ICRC planned to increase coverage to 2,500 families in 45 districts.^[145]

In 2007, HI continued to provide rehabilitation services through five centers and three satellite centers managed by local partners. In remote areas, 16 mobile camps were used to improve access for isolated populations. The HI Socio-Economic Fund supported the poorest beneficiaries in accessing treatment.^[146] The NCBL, with funding from Adopt-A-Minefield, provided economic and educational assistance to primarily female survivors, and capacity-building training to conflict casualties.^[147] In 2008, HimRights began providing emergency assistance to new conflict casualties.^[148] The Indian NGO Bhagwan Mahaveer Viklang Sahayata Samiti continued to distribute the Jaipur artificial foot in Nepal.^[149] The Nepal Disabled Association, a national network, facilitates coordination among CBR implementers.^[150]

Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of any comprehensive long-term cost estimates or resource mobilization strategies for fulfilling mine action needs (including RE and VA) in Nepal. The interministerial steering committee within the NMAA holds responsibility for setting strategic mine action policy.^[151] UNMIN and UNICEF coordinate UN assistance according to a strategic agreement between the two agencies for the period 2007–2008.^[152] In November 2007, a UN assessment was completed in response to Nepal’s request for assistance in mine action: as mentioned above, as of early June 2008, the draft report was still awaiting comment by the government.^[153]

National support for mine action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of funding for mine action from the national budget of Nepal in 2007. No national funding was reported in 2006.

International cooperation and assistance

In 2007, Canada and Denmark reported providing $1,756,621 (€1,281,177) to mine action in Nepal. Reported mine action funding in 2007 was eight times the amount reported for 2006. International funding to Nepal has increased significantly since 2005, when funds totaling $156,000 were reported. Landmine Monitor did not report contributions from donor states to Nepal during the period from 1999 to 2004. While funding has improved, there are no strategic plans or baseline cost estimates against which to judge the adequacy of 2007 funding levels.

2007 International Mine Action Funding to Nepal: Monetary^[154]

UNICEF reported additional contributions in 2007 from the United Kingdom ($50,000) and Sweden ($65,000) for unspecified activities.^[155] Neither country reported contributions to mine action in Nepal to Landmine Monitor.