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Sri Lanka, Landmine Monitor Report 2008

Sri Lanka

Mine Ban Treaty status

Not a State Party

Use, production, transfer in 2007–2008

Alleged use by both government and LTTE

Stockpile and destruction

Unknown

Contamination

Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, ERW

Estimated area of contamination

Unknown

Demining progress in 2007

Mined area clearance: 2.2km2 (2006: 1.7km2)

Battle area clearance: 154km2 (2006: 5.3km2)

Mine/ERW casualties in 2007

Total: 34 (2006: 64)

Mines: 10 (2006: 45)

ERW: 22 (2006: 16)

Unknown devices: 2 (2006: 3)

Casualty analysis

Killed: 6 (2006: 27)

Injured: 28 (2006: 37)

Estimated mine/ERW survivors

Unknown, but at least 1,150

RE capacity

Decreased—inadequate

Availability of services in 2007

Decreased—inadequate

Mine action funding in 2007

International: $7.6 million (2006: $9.9 million)

National: none reported (2006: none reported)

Key developments since May 2007

Renewed conflict between the government and LTTE saw strong allegations of use against both parties. NPA suspended its demining program in 2008. The conflict also resulted in restrictions on access to affected populations as well as on the movements of RE providers. Motivation, a United Kingdom-based NGO active in Sri Lanka, was tasked in June 2008 to undertake a three-month study to assess the situation of VA and help design a strategy and workplan for UNICEF.

Background

Despite the 2002 Cease Fire Agreement between the government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), conflict escalated during much of 2007 and 2008. In July 2007, the army took control of the last LTTE-controlled areas on the east coast. In January 2008, the government of Sri Lanka decided to terminate the Cease Fire Agreement.[1]

Mine Ban Policy

The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Government representatives have previously stated that Sri Lanka’s accession was dependent on progress in the peace process and linked its position on accession to agreement by the LTTE to foreswear use of the weapon.[2]

Sri Lanka again supported the annual UN General Assembly Resolution calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty, voting in favor of Resolution 62/41 on 5 December 2007, as it has for every annual pro-ban General Assembly resolution since 1996.

Sri Lanka provided a voluntary Article 7 report in 2005. It subsequently indicated it would provide an update, but has not yet done so.[3]

Sri Lanka did not attend as an observer either the Eighth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in November 2007 or the June 2008 intersessional Standing Committee meetings.

In February 2008, Sri Lanka sent a military officer to the Ottawa Convention Implementation and Universalization Workshop in Bali, Indonesia. He told the ICBL that, given the current state of the conflict in Sri Lanka, it was not a time for the army to be thinking about accession, but, he said, it could happen in future years.[4]

Sri Lanka is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. It attended the Ninth Annual Conference of States Parties to the protocol in Geneva in November 2007 but has never submitted an annual Article 13 report.

Sri Lanka did not attend the Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions in May 2008.

The Landmine Ban Advocacy Forum (LBAF) is the leading non-governmental advocacy body promoting an antipersonnel mine ban in Sri Lanka.[5] In June 2007, the LBAF conducted a media workshop in Colombo to raise awareness among journalists; one objective was to improve media reporting of mine incidents, including distinguishing between use of command-detonated and victim-activated devices.[6] In October 2007, the LBAF initiated an eminent persons group to raise awareness on banning antipersonnel mines in Sri Lanka.[7]

Use, Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling

Knowledgeable sources in Sri Lanka that wish to remain anonymous, including those engaged in mine action activities in the field, have alleged that Sri Lankan security forces used antipersonnel mines in 2007 and 2008. Although Landmine Monitor is not able to confirm the allegations, it considers this the first serious charge of use of antipersonnel mines by government forces since the 2002 Cease Fire Agreement. A representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Colombo denied the allegations when asked by Landmine Monitor in February 2008.[8] A Sri Lanka Army (SLA) representative also categorically denied any recent use of landmines and said that it was disinformation spread by the LTTE who were using landmines themselves.[9]

There is no evidence that the government of Sri Lanka has ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. It appears that it imported antipersonnel mines from China, Italy (and/or Singapore), Pakistan, Portugal, and perhaps Belgium, the United States and others.[10]

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE)

From the signing of the Cease Fire Agreement in February 2002 until mid-2006, Landmine Monitor received no confirmed reports of use of antipersonnel mines by the LTTE, other than command-detonated Claymore-type devices.[11] Since May 2006, the SLA has repeatedly accused the LTTE of planting antipersonnel mines.[12] The army has reported encountering newly laid mines, and capturing newly manufactured mines containing a high explosive charge and a battery mechanism—a modified version of the Jony 99 mine earlier produced by the LTTE.[13] In March 2008, an SLA officer told Landmine Monitor the army was encountering a modified Rangan 99 type antipersonnel mine produced by the LTTE which has an electronic antihandling feature.[14]

In the past, the LTTE produced several types of antipersonnel mines: Jony 95 (a small wooden box mine), Rangan 99 or Jony 99 (a copy of the P4 MK1 Pakistani mine), SN 96 (a Claymore-type mine), and some variants of these.[15] The LTTE has also manufactured antivehicle mines, including the Amman 2000, and is considered expert in making explosive weapons.

Since 2003, the Swiss NGO Geneva Call has organized programs seeking to engage the LTTE in a public pledge to a landmine ban.[16] In October 2006, the LTTE denied to Geneva Call that it had engaged in any new use of mines, but has not made any statements regarding use in 2007 or 2008.[17] Geneva Call has been refused access to LTTE areas by the government, although Sri Lanka has professed to support engaging the LTTE in a mine ban. In January 2008, Geneva Call sent a letter to the LTTE that urged the group to refrain from mining areas that had already been cleared during the cease-fire period.[18]

Landmine/ERW Problem

Sri Lanka is extensively contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) resulting from two decades of armed conflict between the government and the LTTE seeking a separate homeland for Tamils in the north and east. Sri Lanka last submitted a voluntary Article 7 report in June 2005 that identified 12.6km2 of land (308 mined areas in eight regions) known to be contaminated by antipersonnel mines and 136km2 of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) (2,341 SHAs in 10 regions).[19] The Article 7 report pointed out that this was a rough estimate, partly based on 3,008 SLA maps of minefields, and actual contamination might prove much less.[20]

In 2006, Sri Lanka reported that of 730 villages contaminated with mines, 173 had been cleared, 250 were in the process of being demined and the remainder would be tasked after technical survey.[21] Contamination included belts of Pakistani-made P4 mines laid by the SLA and nuisance minefields placed by the LTTE. However, the government has acknowledged it does not have precise knowledge of the total extent of contamination.[22] According to UN the Development Programme (UNDP), by 31 December 2007, a total of 29km2 of mine contamination had been confirmed, with an additional 523 recorded SHAs.[23] In addition, the government estimated some 99km2 of land were affected by ERW.

The 2002 cease-fire agreement began to collapse in mid-2006 and conflict intensified, resulting in additional (and unsurveyed) mine/ERW contamination. Furthermore, government allegations that the LTTE emplaced new mines, although not confirmed independently, suggest the problem may have worsened.[24] Recent government use of air- and ground-delivered ordnance and LTTE artillery attacks has also increased contamination by unexploded ordnance (UXO).[25]

The northern Jaffna peninsula, a focal point of fighting, is the most severely affected area. About half of all mines laid in Sri Lanka are estimated to be in the peninsula and to affect some 228 villages, excluding military-occupied High Security Zones (HSZ).[26] However, northern districts of Kilinochchi, Mullaittivu, Mannar, and Vavuniya, and eastern districts of Ampara, Batticaloa, and Trincomalee have also been affected by resumed conflict.

Sri Lanka has some 62km2 of HSZ—areas near military emplacements, camps, barracks or checkpoints, often protected by a defensive perimeter of mines. These zones are not accessible to demining agencies.[27] Since the flare-up in fighting between LTTE and government forces in August 2006, the SLA also put other clearance tasks off-limits to operators because of their proximity to SLA positions.[28]

Mines and UXO pose an immediate threat to internally displaced persons (IDPs) as well as an obstacle to their resettlement and a serious long-term challenge to economic reconstruction. UN agencies estimated there were more than 425,000 IDPs in March 2007;[29] by end May 2008, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) put the number at 182,802.[30]

Mine Action Program

Coordination and management

A National Steering Committee for Mine Action (NSCMA), established in August 2002, is responsible for setting mine action policy and priorities, and coordinating mine action, mine/ERW risk education (RE), and victim assistance (VA).[31] In June 2007, the NSCMA was placed under the authority of a Resettlement Authority set up by an act of parliament in March 2007.[32] In late June, a presidential decree reversed that decision, returning the NSCMA to the Ministry of Nation Building and Development and its former chairperson.[33]

The NSCMA aims to achieve national ownership of mine action in Sri Lanka by setting up a national humanitarian mine action center.[34] In 2007–2008, however, demining operations continued to be coordinated by the UNDP Support to Mine Action Project through its project office in Colombo and UNDP-supported District Mine Action Offices (DMAOs) in Jaffna and Vavuniya. Under a three-year agreement with the government that ended in 2006 but was extended annually up to 2008, UNDP has provided international technical advisors and manages the Sri Lanka Mined Area Database, which uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA).[35] UNDP supports the NSCMA to identify priorities and coordinate operations through tasking, quality assurance and control, and issue of completion reports.[36]

The UNDP Mine Action Project has suffered from turnover of international staff since late 2006. Its Colombo-based technical advisor (who acted as program manager) left in November 2006 and had not been replaced as of end-May 2008. The technical advisor stationed in Jaffna also left in November 2006, and has not been replaced as of end August 2008.[37] In June 2007, at the request of the NSCMA, UNDP set up a new mine action sub-office in the eastern city of Trincomalee to expedite mine action in the districts of Ampara, Batticaloa and Trincomalee.[38] In February 2008, UNDP set up another mine action sub-office equipped with an IMSMA terminal and support staff in Batticaloa to cover the districts of Ampara and Batticaloa.[39] As of August 2008, the Trincomalee office had one IMSMA operator, and Batticaloa had become the key district mine action office for the east.[40] The majority of the Vavuniya DMAO staff has been temporarily posted to the Batticaloa sub-office to support the accelerated demining and resettlement program in this region.[41]

Sri Lanka has not enacted any national mine action legislation. UNDP drafted national standards in 2003 that were approved by the Ministry of Nation Building and Development in 2005 and published on 4 April 2006. As of September 2008, at the request of the NSCMA, a UNDP technical advisor was updating the Sri Lanka National Mine Action Standards to bring them closer in line with the international standards.[42]

Status of strategic mine action planning

In February 2004, Sri Lanka declared that it had embarked on a comprehensive humanitarian mine action program with the objective of becoming mine-free by the end of 2006.[43] A senior ministry official subsequently stated that, “all the landmines in Sri Lanka will be cleared by the end of 2008.”[44]

The NSCMA continued to identify this as the objective of mine action in Sri Lanka in 2007,[45] but by then mine action operators considered it implausible in view of the disruption to demining resulting from the revival of hostilities in 2006, the extent of known contamination, reports of possible new use, and the refusal of the military to allow clearance of minefields in the HSZ.[46] In April 2008, officials changed their position to say “all mined areas except HSZ will be cleared by the end of 2009.”

Integration of mine action with relief, reconstruction, and development

Mine action prioritizes clearance that supports the resettlement of displaced people, reconstruction of infrastructure such as roads, powerlines, and drinking water supply, and community needs such as schools and hospitals.[47] Tasks and local priorities are selected by government agents in each district, who draw up a task list from clearance needs identified by divisional secretaries, in consultation with mine action operators.[48]

Renewed conflict since mid-2006 has led the government to focus mine/UXO clearance on Eastern province where the security forces have retaken control of large areas previously occupied by the LTTE. Since 2007 the government has prioritized emergency demining of these areas to expedite its “Re-awakening of the East Programme,” of resettlement, reconstruction, and development to rebuild houses, schools, public buildings, roads, and bridges while creating employment and encouraging investment in these areas.[49]

Demining

Nine organizations carried out demining operations in Sri Lanka in 2007. The SLA’s Humanitarian Demining Unit (HDU), trained by the US commercial company RONCO in humanitarian demining between 2003 and 2006, is the biggest operator. In addition, demining was conducted by the national NGO Milinda Moragoda Institute for People’s Empowerment (MMIPE), and seven international NGOs—Danish Demining Group (DDG), HALO Trust, Horizon, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), Sarvatra and the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD). Some operators worked jointly.

Identifying hazardous areas

No comprehensive national survey of mine/ERW contamination has been conducted; some operators have conducted surveys within their area of operation.[50] As a result, the extent of contamination is unknown.

The NCSMA planned in 2006 for technical survey of all mine-affected areas to provide a basis for planning and prioritizing mine action.[51] The European Comission (EC)-supported survey was to establish the extent of mine contamination and “to remove or replace all SHA by identifying, confirming and quantifying all minefields in Sri Lanka excluding high security zones.”[52]

Mine and ERW clearance in 2007 and 2008

Since fighting resumed in 2006, mine action in Sri Lanka has shifted from being a development- and reconstruction-related activity to being focused largely on emergency responses to UXO and mine contamination resulting from conflict and the need for resettling IDPs.[53] The government reported that demining released a total of 156km2 in 2007, compared with less than 7km2 in 2006.[54] However, more than 85% of the 2007 total was accounted for by the SLA, which conducted emergency battle area clearance (BAC) as troops took back areas from the LTTE in the east, where it regained full control in September 2007.

Despite the escalating hostilities, NGOs increased the area they cleared manually by close to 30% to 2.2km2 in 2007, up from 1.7km2 the previous year, and increased the area covered by BAC almost fourfold to 19.4km2 in 2007 from 4.9km2 in 2006. However, the operating environment became increasingly difficult as government imposed tighter controls on movement of people, equipment, and supplies such as fuel and explosives which they feared might fall into LTTE hands.

Operators also faced threats to the security of their deminers, a majority of whom are Tamils. Operators experienced abductions of deminers in areas controlled by security forces or pro-government militias. Many deminers working in LTTE-controlled territory either left or were forcibly recruited into “local security forces.” Operators also faced tight restrictions on moving Tamil deminers to tasks in different districts.[55]

Demining in 2007[56]

Operators

Mined area

clearance (m2)

Antipersonnel mines

destroyed

Antivehicle mines

destroyed

UXO

destroyed

BAC (km2)

Total area cleared (km2)

SLA

22,055

21

0

13,488

134.68

134.70

MMIPE

71,009

385

0

3

0.78

0.85

Horizon

27,729

273

0

62

11.85

11.88

Savatra

413,270

103

0

62

0.53

0.94

DDG

384,116

1,478

15

249

1.72

2.10

HALO

399,794

1,899

0

1,227

0

0.40

MAG

5,321

18

0

2

1.07

1.08

NPA

624,143

3,455

642

2,561

2.19

2.81

FSD

260,993

1,405

0

404

1.22

1.49

Total

2,208,430

9,037

657

18,058

154.04

156.25

The SLA operated with four regiments of field engineers comprising a total of 505 deminers. It suspended humanitarian demining operations after the outbreak of hostilities in August 2006, but resumed demining in mid-January 2007 in the Eastern province.[57]

NPA/HDU, working with the Solidar consortium of 19 NGOs in the Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu districts of the LTTE-controlled Vanni region, revised its 2007 workplans, including previously identified tasks with high social and economic impact to focus on clearing areas close to recent arrivals of people displaced by conflict. NPA also supported the SLA, financing and providing technical advice on use of an MV4 flail.[58] In September 2006, NPA had taken on the deminers who previously worked in the area for DDG, FSD and MAG,[59] but in 2007 it progressively scaled down operations because of security factors: this led some personnel to leave and also included forced recruitment of some deminers by the LTTE. NPA started 2007 with some 650 deminers but by the time of its annual stand-down in December it had only some 450 staff.[60]

MAG had operated in Trincomalee district for six months of 2006 until November when it completed all tasks to which it could gain access.[61] It resumed operations in September 2007, working in Trincomalee district for only three weeks and then deployed its deminers in Batticaloa district to support emergency mine clearance.[62] As of May 2008, MAG had 38 operational staff, including three mine action teams, two mechanical flail teams, and three community liaison teams.[63]

HALO, working in government-controlled areas of Jaffna peninsula, conducted manual and mechanical mine clearance, marking, area reduction, survey and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), working with two international and 350 national staff, making up 31 manual demining sections, five mechanical sections, and one survey team. In 2007, HALO completed 30 minefields, manually and mechanically, clearing both army-laid mine belts and LTTE-laid nuisance mining,[64] but operations faced increasing logistical difficulties after closure of the A9 Colombo-Jaffna road in August 2006, and increased restrictions on transporting supplies by air and sea.[65]

FSD worked in Mannar and Vavuniya districts and, after conducting a security assessment, took up operations in Batticaloa and Trincomalee districts. It operated with four international staff and 89 nationals making up five manual clearance teams and four mechanical teams with mini-flails, undertaking manual clearance and BAC as well as conducting impact and technical surveys. In Batticaloa and Trincomalee districts, operations supported the resettlement of IDPs.[66]

In 2007, DDG had 430 staff split between bases in Jaffna and Trincomalee, which also supported operations in Anuradhapura, Mannar and Vanni districts, undertaking technical survey, manual demining, BAC, and EOD.[67] In Jaffna, where DDG had 280 staff, including 185 deminers, DDG suspended work in August 2007 for nearly two weeks after armed assailants killed one deminer and seriously injured another.[68]

MMIPE, in collaboration with Horizon and Sarvatra, conducted mine clearance in government-controlled areas: MMIPE in Anuradhapura and Trincomalee districts; Horizon in Mannar and Trincomalee districts; and Sarvatra in Batticaloa and Vavuniya districts.[69]

Demining in Sri Lanka 2002–2007[70]

Year

Mine
clearance (km2)

BAC (km2)

2007

2.20

154.04

2006

1.70

5.30

2005

1.50

18.00

2004

1.74

2.53

2003

0.94

0.05

2002

0.07

0.00

Total

8.15

179.92

In 2008, demining continued against a background of intensified fighting between government forces and the LTTE. As in 2007, operators expressed serious concern for the security of deminers against a background of abductions and murders of NGO workers, and concern that humanitarian mine action standards are being subordinated to the government’s political-military agenda of seeking to consolidate control of formerly LTTE-controlled areas.[71]

The SLA, NSCMA and district authorities continued to give highest priority to emergency demining of eastern areas taken back from the LTTE to facilitate resettlement between Batticaloa and Trincomalee.[72] By April 2008, the SLA’s HDU had cleared 6.58km2 of battle area and recovered 33 items of UXO.[73]

HALO continued demining in Jaffna but by June 2008 the future of the humanitarian demining effort in Jaffna was uncertain. HALO worked on 13 tasks and had only five tasks remaining which it expected to finish by the end of the year.[74] With almost all high and medium priority tasks in the accessible areas of the Jaffna peninsula completed, HALO was planning to suspend its operations and put into storage its equipment if the SLA did not release more areas for clearance.[75]

NPA suspended operations in early January 2008 until the end of April in view of a decision by authorities not to allow its international staff access to its area of operations. After a review of the situation in April, NPA extended the suspension until the end of August.[76] As a result, NPA maintained only a skeleton staff in Colombo and Kilinochchi.[77] By July, NPA had withdrawn its program manager and expected to extend the suspension of its operations indefinitely, but to keep vehicles and equipment in storage in Sri Lanka until such time as conditions permitted a resumption of operations.[78]

Landmine/ERW Casualties

Landmine Monitor identified at least 34 new mine/ERW casualties in 2007 in Sri Lanka, including six people killed and 28 injured in 14 incidents. Two were Buddhist monks, four were security forces, and the others were civilian. UNDP recorded 18 civilian casualties; four people killed and 14 injured in 11 incidents: 11 were male (eight men and three boys) and seven were female (four women and three girls).[79] This total excludes casualties from command-detonated Claymore devices/roadside bomb attacks. Antivehicle mines caused five casualties, antipersonnel mines caused three, and ERW caused eight; the causes of two casualties were unknown. There were no deminer casualties during clearance operations in 2007.

Landmine Monitor identified at 14 additional casualties to the UNDP total when, on 6 February 2007, a hand grenade exploded during an armaments exhibition in Colombo.[80] Ten of the casualties were civilians, two were Buddhist monks, and two were police. Some media reports said that the device was a landmine rather than a grenade.[81] The media also reported on two security forces killed in separate antipersonnel mine incidents in January and October 2007. The incidents occurred in Batticaloa district and Yala National Park in Monaragala district.[82]

The 2007 casualty rate is a sharp decrease compared to 2006 when 64 casualties occurred in 23 incidents, including 31 casualties in three antivehicle mine incidents.[83] However, comparisons with previous years might be unreliable: casualties are probably under-reported because of a lack of access to mine-affected areas and the media focus on large-scale attacks on military forces, and there is insufficient distinction in device types used. A surgeon working in affected areas noted that in the North-Central and Eastern provinces there was an increase in mine casualties, as IDPs returned to areas recently affected by conflict.[84]

The increased fighting is also said to have resulted in a significant number of military casualties, but figures were not available.[85]

Casualties continued to be reported in 2008, with at least 39 casualties tracked by Landmine Monitor to early August 2008, including nine people killed and 30 injured, of which four were casualties from two incidents in March and June that were reported by UNDP.[86] UNDP provided a subsequent update, formally reporting 10 civilian casualties to 31 August.[87]

Landmine Monitor identified 35 casualties through media reports, usually transmissions of daily security briefings by the Ministry of Defence. At least four of the casualties were children, and one was a deminer. The accident involving the deminer occurred in a marked minefield during clearance operations in Vavuniya district, but no further details were available.[88] One soldier was also killed by an antipersonnel mine during clearance in Palampiddi in Mannar district.[89] Antipersonnel mines caused 16 casualties.[90]

Many more casualties were said to have been caused by Claymore mines or IEDs with remote-detonation mechanisms. The use of these devices has resulted in numerous civilian casualties. The UN Secretary-General found that children were particularly vulnerable: between November 2006 and September 2007 at least eight children were killed and 20 injured.[91] On 29 January 2008, 20 civilians, including 11 children, were killed when a bus detonated a Claymore mine in Mannar district.[92] The UN Department of Safety and Security in Sri Lanka recorded 1,619 casualties from Claymore mines/directional fragmentation devices from 2006 to 8 September 2008, including 641 people killed and 978 injured. It recorded 740 casualties in 2006, 629 in 2007 and 250 to September 2008.[93]

Data collection

Mine/ERW casualty surveillance in Sri Lanka slowed down in 2007. UNICEF was planning to place mine/ERW RE and VA staff in three DMAOs in 2009, as was the case prior to 2007.[94] Previously, reports of casualties were reported to the relevant DMAO by RE field offices, mine action focal points, hospitals, and local media. Several NGOs providing services to persons with disabilities differentiate mine/ERW survivors in their service data.[95]

Renewed conflict from mid-2006 had negative effects on the reliability and completeness of casualty surveillance and data collection. In late 2007, discontinuation of support by UNICEF to its RE/VA local partners curtailed activities and delayed and eventually suspended casualty surveillance and data collection.[96]

The IMSMA database has records for 1,367 civilian casualties (221 killed and 1,146 injured) from 1985 to December 2007; children accounted for 20% (281) and women for 9% (126) of casualties. UNDP believes that the actual number of casualties is higher than currently recorded.[97]

A national census in 2001 noted that 1.6% of the population was disabled.[98] However, due to the conflict, the census was not carried out in seven districts within the Northern and Eastern provinces, and most households surveyed did not complete the disability questions due to social stigma.[99] The National Community Based Rehabilitation (CBR) program recorded 106,900 persons with disabilities in 22 districts of which 58,902 were identified as needing rehabilitation.[100]

Landmine/ERW Risk Education

The renewed conflict in 2007 resulted in restrictions on access to affected populations as well as on the movements of RE providers. RE capacities in the affected areas decreased as a result. Moreover, internal displacement increased in the east in early 2007 and in the north later in the year, with some RE volunteers themselves becoming IDPs. UNICEF and its partner organizations sought to balance established RE priorities with the need for emergency RE.[101] This was achieved by redeploying RE capacities from other districts to address the increased needs in Batticaloa district.[102]

During 2007, at least 367,170 people received RE sessions in the 10 most affected districts, mostly in northern and eastern Sri Lanka, compared to 626,767 in 2006,[103] a 48% decrease. Since 2003, according to the IMSMA database, 2,254,248 people have received “direct” RE (some may have received multiple sessions). This excludes people reached through mass media campaigns.[104]

UNICEF partners conducting RE in 2007 included the local NGOs Sarvodaya, White Pigeon, Community Trust Fund (CTF) and in Trincomalee district the Kachcheri Child Focus Unit (Kachcheri CFU), Trincomalee District Development Association (TDDO), Surakuma Organization for Community Resource Development (SOCRD), and Pooncholai Peoples Development Association (PPDA).[105]

School-based RE was provided by more than 10,000 trained teachers in mine-affected and neighboring districts in the north and east, where RE is integrated into school curricula.[106] UNICEF stated that all master teachers/in-service advisors and subject directors/assistant directors of education had been trained and were implementing the common monitoring tool designed for school-based RE.[107]

RE strategies include community-based initiatives, mass media campaigns and school-based programs. In 2006, the Sri Lanka RE program developed an emergency strategy to respond to the needs of thousands of newly displaced people, and for new humanitarian workers. UNICEF arranged with the UN Department of Safety and Security and the international NGO RedR to include landmine safety in briefings for local and international aid workers.[108] In 2007, 2,362 non-mine action NGO staff and 2,150 government officials received a standard RE briefing from UNICEF through local partners.[109]

Although RE for IDPs was prioritized in 2006, the standard priorities remained in effect in other areas. People are most at risk in September when harvesting and planting begins. The most at-risk groups are men aged 18 to 45, and those displaced by the conflict. RE also targets people undertaking risky activities including collectors (of scrap metal, honey, forest fruits, and firewood), those fishing or hunting, and children. ERW pose the greatest threat to children and ERW RE was a primary focus in 2007.[110]

Until June 2007, national coordination meetings occurred on schedule. However, since 2005 district coordination meetings have been disrupted by conflict and displacement of the local population, including district officials and RE volunteers, resulting in about half of the district offices not conducting meetings.[111] Due to the deteriorating security situation, travel restrictions and other administrative/logistical constraints, the national coordination meetings were rescheduled to be held once every three months, as opposed to every six weeks previously.[112] The NSCMA coordinates RE, based on reports provided by UNICEF and the district-based IMSMA databases maintained by UNDP. At the district level, government agents decide on RE priorities and methodologies.[113]

In mid-2007, UNICEF restructured its country program approach to one with a “broad vision of holistic child protection.”[114] UNICEF mine action staff have been absorbed into child protection activities, which includes mine action. This resulted in a reduction in staff for the RE and VA programs.[115]

Bureaucratic delays at UNICEF were said to have left former local partners in RE and VA “isolated,” with most of the staff hired by local partners having moved to other jobs.[116] According to UNICEF, since mid-2008 most have returned to their previous RE and VA work.[117] In May 2008, UNICEF hired an expatriate consultant to revive its mine action program. UNICEF held an RE and VA Technical Working Group meeting in July 2008.[118]

A mid-term internal evaluation of RE and VA contracted by the European Union was carried out in May–August 2007;[119] the findings were not made available to the public.[120]

Victim Assistance

Landmine Monitor previously reported the enormous difficulties faced by persons with disabilities in seeking assistance due to routinely scrutinized civilian movements during the renewed conflict. Persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, were reluctant to travel as they were required to produce a police report detailing the cause of their disability.[121] This situation has worsened due to new military operations in northern Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mannar, Mullaitiva, and Vavuniya districts.[122] The movement of civilians, including persons with disabilities, is regularly restricted by military forces to curtail the transportation of prohibited items.[123]

Medical facilities in Sri Lanka are reportedly adequate to provide medical care to mine/ERW survivors, but services are likely to be less adequate in LTTE-controlled areas and conflict areas.[124] The Jaffna Teaching Hospital and the Point Pedro Hospital provide primary and secondary surgical treatment. However, the renewed conflict has damaged some medical facilities: between 1 November 2006 and 14 September 2007, Landmine Monitor is aware of three verified attacks, as well as allegations of further attacks, on hospitals that caused physical damage to infrastructure, loss of power supply, and looting of medical equipment. Following the 14 July 2007 shelling of a hospital in north Vavuniya district, hospital staff were afraid to return to work and, as of December 2007, the hospital was operating “at a minimal level.”[125]

Motivation, a United Kingdom-based NGO active in Sri Lanka, was tasked in June 2008 to undertake a three-month study to assess the situation of VA and help design a strategy and workplan for UNICEF.[126]

Sri Lanka has a total of eight physical rehabilitation centers producing artificial limbs and assistive/mobility devices, all of which are NGO-supported. Four of these centers are in the Northern and Eastern provinces: Jaffna Jaipur Center for the Rehabilitation of the Disabled (JJCRD); Jaffna White Pigeon Technical Institute of Prosthetics in LTTE-controlled Kilinochchi; Valvuthayam Mannar Rehabilitation Center; and the Handicap International (HI) Physical Rehabilitation Center (PRC) in Batticaloa. HI opened the PRC in 2005 and planned to hand over the managerial and financial aspects to the Teaching Hospital in Batticaloa in 2008.[127]

Limited psychosocial and economic rehabilitation services for mine/ERW survivors and their families are available in most mine-affected districts, particularly in Kilinochchi and Jaffna.[128] The government provides some financial support to NGOs providing mobility devices, education, and capacity-building for persons with disabilities.[129] In late 2006, the Ministry of Social Service and Social Welfare, through the Department of Social Service, committed funds to construct a vocational training center for persons with disabilities in the districts of Jaffna and Trincomalee.[130] In 2007, the Department of Social Service operated six vocational training centers and another 11 were run by NGOs and registered with the department. However, courses offered in the centers were often not market-driven, resulting in a skills mismatch between training and employment opportunities. As of September 2007, plans were underway to include persons with disabilities in mainstream vocational training institutes by improving accessibility.[131]

Military war victims in Sri Lanka, including mine/ERW survivors receive full rehabilitation, compensation, pension benefits, and free public transport.[132] Civilian mine/ERW survivors in Jaffna receive a one-time grant of $75–250, depending on the degree of disability, from the Emergency Relief Fund.[133] In 2007, the government began providing a monthly allowance of LKR3,000 ($28) to families of the disabled.[134]

The 1996 Act for the Protection of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities protects the rights of people with regard to non-discrimination in employment and education, and serves as a comprehensive statement of the national policy on rehabilitation.[135] However, in 2007, there were instances of discrimination against persons with disabilities.[136] On 20 March 2007, a new disability regulation required that all existing buildings be made accessible for persons with disabilities within seven years.[137] On 30 March 2007, Sri Lanka signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, but not its Optional Protocol. The same day, Sri Lanka declared 2007 as the “Year of Accessibility” to create an enabling environment for persons with disabilities.[138] As of 31 July 2008, Sri Lanka had not ratified the convention.

Victim assistance strategic framework

A January 2006 Strategy for Mine Action called for a national policy on VA, but as of June 2008 none had been developed. This is partly blamed on ongoing conflict and adjusted mine action priorities.[139] Overall, support for VA has deteriorated compared to the previous reporting period, due to an increased focus on emergency clearance and changes in UNDP and UNICEF capacities.

The Landmine Monitor researcher for Sri Lanka observed that UNICEF support for VA was negligible from late 2007 to mid-2008. Two VA officers seconded to Vavuniya and Jaffna in 2006 to conduct survivor needs assessments and identify available services were discontinued by UNICEF due to funding constraints.[140] In a donor forum in June 2008, it was revealed that VA would no longer be funded through future EC grants, with the exception of some emergency funding.[141]

At least 7,508 persons with disabilities received services during 2007, including 1,494 mine/ERW survivors. This included 321 people receiving medical care, 3,812 receiving physical rehabilitation (1,367 survivors), 371 receiving psychosocial support (42 survivors), 2,629 receiving support for socio-economic reintegration and educational support (10 survivors), and 375 others receiving other services (75 survivors).

HI provided physical rehabilitation to at least 2,614 persons with disabilities. White Pigeon provided physical rehabilitation to 2,945 people. Jaipur Jaffna Center for Disability Rehabilitation provided physical rehabilitation to 219 persons with disabilities, referrals and psychosocial support to 68, mobility and assistive devices to 24, and economic support to 15. Valvuthayam Mannar Rehabilitation Center provided physical rehabilitation to 226 people, including 76 artificial limbs/assistive/mobility devices, 88 psychosocial support services, and economic support for one person. Kilinochchi Association for Rehabilitation of Displaced provided medical care to 1,825 persons with disabilities. Sarvodaya Jaffna provided loans to 10 mine/ERW survivors. CTF provided referrals for 76 persons with disabilities to other services. Jaffna Family Rehabilitation Center provided counseling to 162 and referrals for 149 persons with disabilities (42 survivors received both services) and loans to a further 22.[142]

Since May 2007, HI has been implementing a new project to train physiotherapists and nurses in hospitals in Vavuniya. It is also training volunteers and staff of international NGOs to mainstream disability awareness in their organizations, and to identify and refer persons with disabilities and people with injuries in camps and villages.[143] HI is seeking to draw attention to 5,000 persons with disabilities, including many amputees and mine/ERW survivors, among the conflict displaced in Batticaloa.[144]

In 2008, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) conducted a series of war surgery seminars for medical staff in conflict-affected areas of Sri Lanka. A doctor from a hospital in the northeastern region noted that since 2006 “on several occasions his hospital has had to deal with civilians injured by fragmentation mines [Claymore mines], some of which had targeted public transport.” The ICRC further noted that the health infrastructure in Sri Lanka can better cope with conflict-injured than many other countries where it operates.[145]

Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of any comprehensive long-term cost estimates or resource mobilization strategies for fulfilling mine action needs (including RE and VA) in Sri Lanka. The NSCMA, which is responsible for setting overall mine action policy, includes representatives from the donor community.[146]

National support for mine action

Sri Lanka did not report contributions to mine action from the national budget in 2007 or 2006.

International cooperation and assistance

In 2007, six countries reported providing $7,586,350 (€5,533,039) to mine action in Sri Lanka. Reported mine action funding in 2007 was approximately 24% less than reported in 2006. Funding levels have decreased each year since 2004, when approximately $23.6 million was contributed. Funding levels in 2007 were the lowest since 2003, yet no baseline cost estimates exist against which to measure the adequacy of current funding levels.

As of June 2007, UNDP reported that insufficient overall funding for mine action in 2007 had “impacted on work and plans” of some mine action agencies, “necessitating a change in strategic approach,” but did not report details of revised strategies.[147]

2007 International Mine Action Funding to Sri Lanka: Monetary[148]

Donor

Implementing Agencies/Organizations

Project Details

Amount

Norway

NPA, Milinda Moragoda Institute, unspecified

Mine clearance

$3,578,260 (NOK20,950,000)

Japan

MAG, NPA, DDG, HALO

Mine clearance

$3,166,336 (¥372,510,104)

US

From the US Department of State and the Centers for Disease Control

$425,000

Australia

UNDP

Mine action coordination

$184,602 (A$220,000)

Switzerland

FSD

Mine clearance

$150,012 (CHF180,000)

Sweden

Swedish Rescue Services Agency

Mine action coordination with UNDP

$82,140 (SEK555,000)

Total

$7,586,350 (€5,533,039)


[1] The Cease Fire Agreement came into effect on 22 February 2002. The government withdrew on 2 January 2008, citing the number of cease-fire violations by the LTTE and other factors. See Government of Sri Lanka, “Government abolishes the cease fire agreement from 16 January 2008,” 4 January 2008, www.reliefweb.int..

[2] Statement of Sri Lanka, Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 18 September 2006. See also Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1116; and Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 878.

[3] At the Seventh Meeting of States Parties in 2006, Sri Lanka stated that it would soon provide an update to its report submitted in 2005. The report did not include information on stockpiled antipersonnel mines. Sri Lanka stated this would be reviewed for future reports. See also Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 988; Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 1071; and Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 878.

[4] The officer was Brig. Chandra Rajapakse, Engineering Corps, SLA. Emails from Simona Beltrami, Advocacy Director, ICBL, 11 March 2008; and Amb. Satnam Jit Singh, Diplomatic Advisor, ICBL, 29 February 2008.

[5] For more background on LBAF, see Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 988. According to Geneva Call, the LBAF appears to have been inactive since mid-2007. Email from Katherine Kramer, Programme Director Asia, Geneva Call, 8 September 2008.

[6] This one-day workshop was conducted on 24 July 2007 and was supported by Geneva Call. Journalists and editors of Tamil, Sinhalese and English media attended. Several media agencies also covered the event. See LBAF, “Seminar for Media Reporting on Landmine and Humanitarian Issues,” www.banlandmines.lk.

[7] The Eminent Persons Group consists of prominent academics, former military, and other public figures. See LBAF, “Eminent Persons Group Inaugural Meeting,” www.banlandmines.lk..

[8] Interview with Anzul Janz, Deputy Director, UN and Multilateral Affairs Desk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Colombo, 6 February 2008.

[9] ICBL discussion with Brig. Chandra Rajapakse, SLA, Ottawa Convention Implementation and Universalization Workshop in Bali, Indonesia, 27–28 February 2008; and email from Amb. Satnam Jit Singh, ICBL, 29 February 2008.

[10] Landmine Monitor has identified the following antipersonnel mines as having been used by government troops in the past: P4 and P3 MK (manufactured by Pakistan); Type 72, Type 72A, and Type 69 (China); VS-50 (Italy or Singapore); NR409/PRB (Belgium); M409 and M696 (Portugal); and M18A1 Claymore (US). See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1118; and Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 881. In its voluntary Article 7 report, Sri Lanka noted the presence of these antipersonnel mines in minefields: P4 MK1, Type 69 (Pakistan); PRB 413 (Portugal/Pakistan); PRB 409 (Portugal); Type 72 (China); and VS-50 (Italy/Singapore). Voluntary Article 7 Report, Forms C and H, 13 June 2005.

[11] Under the Mine Ban Treaty, use of Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines is permissible in command-detonated mode (initiated by the soldier), but is prohibited if used with tripwires (exploded by the target/victim).

[12] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 989.

[13] Interview with Capt. Thushara Jaywardhena, Mine Action Officer, SLA, Colombo, 21 August 2006.

[14] Ibid, 28 March 2008. This modified version has two light-emitted diodes connected to an electronic circuit designed to automatically activate if handled. SLA infantry units experienced at least 15 casualties attempting to clear the mine prior to discovering the modification and now destroy it in situ. Upon request by UNICEF, Lt.-Col. Heath from the SLA gave a two-hour presentation on explosive devices laid by LTTE encountered during clearance operations at a MRE Technical Working Group Meeting in Negombo on 28 August 2008. A variety of new, sophisticated antipersonnel mines, with or without antihandling devices, and mainly claymore-type IEDs were presented. Email from Sebastian Kasack, MRE consultant, UNICEF, 9 September 2008.

[15] Sri Lanka provided technical details of the Jony 95 and Jony 99 mines, which it identified as “produced and used” by the LTTE. Voluntary Article 7 Report, Form H, 13 June 2005.

[16] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, pp. 988–989; Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 1076–1077; Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 879; Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1117; and Landmine Monitor Report 2003, p. 687.

[17] Emails from Katherine Kramer, Geneva Call, 13 December 2006, 15 February 2007 and 20 June 2008. Geneva Call met with an official from the LTTE Peace Secretariat on 30 October 2006, who denied that the LTTE had started planting new mines.

[18] Emails from Chris Rush, Program Officer, Geneva Call, 14 April 2008; and from Katherine Kramer, Geneva Call, 20 June 2008.

[19] Voluntary Article 7 Report, Form C, 13 June 2005.

[20] Ibid. For survey results in previous years, see Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 1119–1120.

[21] Ministry of Nation Building and Development, “Strategy for Mine Action Sri Lanka,” 4 April 2006, p. v.

[22] Interview with M.S. Jayasinghe, Chairman, NSCMA, Colombo, 4 April 2007.

[23] Email from Katrine Kristensen, Programme Analyst, Conflict Prevention and Recovery Team, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP, 10 September 2008.

[24] Interview with Maj. Pradeep Gamage, Officer-in-charge, North Jaffna HDU, SLA, Jaffna, 3 April 2007.

[25] Interviews with humanitarian agencies in Colombo and Trincomalee, 2–7 April 2007.

[26] Ministry of Nation Building and Development, “Strategy for Mine Action Sri Lanka,” Colombo, 26 January 2006, p. 18.

[27] Ministry of Nation Building and Development, “Strategy for Mine Action Sri Lanka,” 4 April 2006, p. 31.

[28] Interview with Elmo Anandarajah, Mine Action Officer, UNDP, Jaffna, 2 April 2007.

[29] UNHCR, “Sri Lanka government assures UNHCR of full engagement in future moves to return IDPs,” www.unhcr.org.

[30] UNHCR, “IDP movement after 7 April 2006 up to 31 March 2008,” www.unhcr.lk.

[31] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 1080.

[32] Resettlement Authority Act, No. 09 of 2007, 23 March 2007.

[33] Telephone interview with Monty Ranantunga, Secretary, NSCMA, 25 June 2007.

[34] Interview with M.S. Jayasinghe, NSCMA, Colombo, 4 April 2007.

[35] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 1080; and Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1120.

[36] Email from Nicola Perera, Reporting Assistant, UNDP, 14 June 2007; interview with Niloufer De Silva, Senior Program Manager, UNDP, Colombo, 28 May 2008; and email from Katrine Kristensen, UNDP, 10 September 2008.

[37] Email from Sebastian Kasack, UNICEF, 9 September 2008.

[38] Telephone interviews with Krishanti Weerakoon, Project Manager, Mine Action Office, UNDP, 23 April and 8 June 2007; and email from Nicola Perera, UNDP, 14 June 2007.

[39] Telephone interview with Steven Kerwin, Technical Advisor, UNDP, 2 June 2008.

[40] Email from Sebastian Kasack, UNICEF, 9 September 2008.

[41] Email from Katrine Kristensen, UNDP, 10 September 2008.

[42] Ibid.

[43] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1119; and Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 883.

[44] “Sri Lanka aims to be rid of landmines by end-2008,” Reuters (Colombo), 7 March 2006.

[45] Interview with M.S. Jayasinghe, NSCMA, Colombo, 4 April 2007.

[46] Interviews with demining operators, Colombo, 2–8 April 2007.

[47] Ministry of Nation Building and Development, “Strategy for Mine Action Sri Lanka,” Colombo, 26 January 2006, pp. 4–5.

[48] Telephone interview with Tim Horner, Mine Action Chief Technical Advisor, UNDP, 7 May 2006; and Ministry of Nation Building and Development, “Strategy for Mine Action Sri Lanka,” Colombo, 26 January 2006, p. 8.

[49] Interview with Monty Ranatunga, NSCMA, Colombo, 28 March 2008; and Rohitha Bogollagama, Minister of Foreign Affairs, “Counter Terrorism–Sri Lanka Experience,” www.dailynews.lk.

[50] Telephone interview with Tim Horner, UNDP, 7 May 2006.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Ministry of Nation Building and Development, “Mine Action Technical Survey Strategy,” Colombo, 4 April 2006.

[53] UN, “Country Profile: Sri Lanka,” www.mineaction.org.

[54] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 992; and Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 1082–1083.

[55] Interviews with demining operators, Colombo and Jaffna, 2–8 April 2007.

[56] Ministry of Nation Building and Development, “Progress Report on National Mine Action Program Year 2007,” 10 March 2008, pp. 3–6; and emails from Vartharajah Murugathas, National Information Management Associate, UNDP, 8 and 23 April 2008. UNDP’s clearance statistics are based on weekly clearance reports filed by demining operators, but are not all consistent with operators’ reports, due to the occasional time lag in reporting to the IMSMA database. No area reduction/cancellation was reported. Only NPA conducted clearance operations in the Vanni region until 19 December 2007. See also Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 993.

[57] Interview with Capt. Thushara Jaywardhena, SLA, Mathegoda, 28 March 2008.

[58] Emails from Jane Filseth Andersen, Advisor, Mine Action Department, NPA, 9 July 2008; Harshi Ginawardana, Project Coordinator, NPA; and Fedrick Holmegaard, Senior Technical Advisor, NPA, 24 April 2008.

[59] Interview with Aubrey Sutherland, Program Manager, NPA, Colombo, 14 March 2007.

[60] Telephone interview with Jane Filseth Andersen, NPA, 2 July 2008.

[61] Telephone interview with David Hayter, Country Program Manager, MAG, 20 June 2007.

[62] Interview with Ricky Nilsen, Program Manager, MAG, Colombo, 27 May 2008.

[63] Email from Ricky Nilsen, MAG, 26 May 2008.

[64] Telephone interview with Adchalingam Pradeepan, Administrative Assistant, HALO, 4 July 2008; and email from Calvin Ruysen, Programme Manager, HALO, 9 September 2008.

[65] Email from Rory Forbes, Program Manager, HALO, 17 April 2008.

[66] Interview with and email from Marc Farineau, Operations Manager, FSD, 1 April and 18 April 2008; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 995.

[67] Interview with P. Premkumar, National Operations Manager, DDG, Trincomalee, 5 April 2007; and email from Steen Wetlesen, Program Manager, DDG, 24 April 2008.

[68] Email from Roger Fasth, Operation Manager, Middle East and North Africa, DDG, 7 July 2008; and “Demining in Jaffna suspended following killing of NGO staffer,” Sibernews Media, 22 August 2007.

[69] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 994.

[70] Emails from Vartharajah Murugathas, UNDP, 8, 12 and 14 June 2007, and 8 and 23 April 2008. No area reduction/cancellation was reported.

[71] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 995; and interview with mine action operators, Colombo, April–May 2008.

[72] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 994.

[73] Email from Vartharajah Murugathas, UNDP, 23 April 2008. Most of the BAC was conducted by the SLA and likely includes a large amount of area verification, reduction or cancellation.

[74] Email from Rory Forbes, HALO, 17 April 2008.

[75] Telephone interview with Gerhard Zank, Desk Officer, HALO, 30 June 2008; and email from Katrine Kristensen, UNDP, 10 September 2008.

[76] Emails from Harshi Ginawardana, and Fedrick Holmegaard, NPA, 24 April 2008; and telephone interview with Jane Filseth Andersen, NPA, 2 July 2008.

[77] Interview with Aubrey Sutherland, NPA, Colombo, 2 May 2008.

[78] Telephone interview with Jane Filseth Andersen, NPA, 2 July 2008.

[79] In September 2008, UNDP reported that six more civilian casualties were identified for 2007 but insufficient detail was available to include them in casualty totals for 2007. Email from Dilrukshi Fonseka, Team Leader, Peace and Recovery, UNDP, Colombo, 10 September 2008.

[80] Telephone interview with Capt. Thishara Jaywardhena, SLA, 20 August 2008. This was originally reported as an antipersonnel mine explosion. See Ministry of Defence, “An accidental explosion at BMICH premises – Colombo,” 2 June 2007, www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20070206_09, accessed 20 August 2008.

[81] “Mine accidentally explodes at S.Lanka show, 14 hurt,” Reuters (Colombo), 6 February 2007, www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/COL276258.htm, accessed 26 February 2008.

[82] “Blast kills seven in Sri Lanka’s east,” Agence France-Presse (Colombo), 31 January 2007; and “Sept soldats tués dans une embuscade des Tigres tamouls dans le sud du Sri Lanka” (“Seven soldiers killed in Tamil Tiger ambush in the south of Sri Lanka”), La Presse Canadienne, 15 October 2007.

[83] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 987.

[84] Vindya Amaranayake, “Rise in number of landmine victims,” The Nation, 11 March 2007, www.nation.lk.

[85] Email from Sebastian Kasack, UNICEF, 8 August 2008.

[86] Landmine Monitor media monitoring from 1 January–4 August 2008; and telephone interview with Vartharajah Murugathas, UNDP, 30 June 2008.

[87] Email from Katrine Kristensen, UNDP, 10 September 2008.

[88] “DDAS Accident Report,” Database of Demining Accidents, 12 February 2008, www.ddasonline.com.

[89] “Eleven Tamil Tigers killed in north Sri Lanka clashes,” BBC Monitoring South Asia, 12 May 2008.

[90] Landmine Monitor media monitoring from 1 January–4 August 2008. The security briefings can be found at www.defence.lk.

[91] “Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Sri Lanka,” (New York, 21 December 2007), S/2007/758, p. 11.

[92] “Claymores used to lethal effect,” IRIN (Colombo), 5 February 2008.

[93] Email from Sebastian Kasack, UNICEF, 9 September 2008.

[94] Ibid, 8 August 2008.

[95] Interview with Thahir Mohamed Kubais, Consultant, MRE School Based Program, UNICEF, Colombo, 18 April 2008.

[96] Interviews with Thahir Mohamed Kubais, UNICEF, Colombo, 18 April 2008; and S.H.M. Manarudeen, Assistant Project Officer Protection, UNICEF, Ampara, 17 June 2008.

[97] Interview with and emails from Vartharajah Murugathas, UNDP, Colombo, 17 March, 7–23 April, 28 May, and 2–6 June 2008; see also Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 998; and Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 1090.

[98] Sri Lanka Department of Census and Statistics, “Census of Population and Housing 2001: Brief Analysis of Characteristics of the Disabled Persons,” Colombo, p. 2, www.statistics.gov.lk.

[99] Padmini Mendis, “The Status of Training and employment policies and practices for people with Disabilities in Sri Lanka,” International Labour Organization, August 2002, pp. 11–12; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 998.

[100] The National CBR program is implemented in 22 of 25 districts, 198 out of 324 divisional secretariat divisions, and 7,100 out of 14,008 villages. Ministry of Social Service and Social Welfare, “Social Achievement,” Colombo, September 2007, p. 26.

[101] Landmine Monitor interviews with humanitarian agencies, Colombo and Trincomalee, 2–7 April 2007; and with Monty Ranatunga, NSCMA, Colombo, 28 March 2008; and telephone interviews with Mohamed Hakeem, Child Protection Officer, UNICEF, 23 March 2008; and Thahir Mohamed Kubais, UNICEF, 28 March 2008.

[102] Email from Sebastian Kasack, UNICEF, 8 August 2008.

[103] Email from Vartharajah Murugathas, UNDP, 20 June 2008.

[104] Ibid.

[105] Information from IMSMA database provided by emails from Vartharajah Murugathas, UNDP, 23 April and 20 June 2008.

[106] Telephone interview with Insaf Nizam, Assistant Project Officer, Children Affected by Armed Conflict, UNICEF, 5 June 2007; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 996.

[107] Interview with and email from Thahir Mohamed Kubais, UNICEF, Colombo, 18 April and 6 June 2008.

[108] UNICEF, “Annual Report 2006,” Colombo, March 2007, p. 7; and telephone interview with Insaf Nizam, UNICEF, 5 June 2007.

[109] Information from IMSMA database provided by email from Vartharajah Murugathas, UNDP, 23 April 2008.

[110] Telephone interview with Insaf Nizam, UNICEF, 5 June 2007; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Claire Sanford, Programme Officer, MAG, 17 April 2007.

[111] Telephone interview with Insaf Nizam, UNICEF, 5 June 2007.

[112] Interviews with Monty Ranatunga, NSCMA, Colombo, 8 February and 28 March 2008.

[113] Voluntary Article 7 Report, Form I, 13 June 2005; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 1085. RE standards in compliance with the International Mine Action Standards were developed in 2004, translated into Tamil and, in 2006, into Sinhalese.

[114] Telephone interview with Mohamed Hakeesm, UNICEF, 23 March 2008; and interviews with and email from Thahir Mohamed Kubais, UNICEF, Colombo, 18 April, 9 May, and 6 June 2008; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 997.

[115] Interviews with Thahir Mohamed Kubais, UNICEF, Colombo, 18 April 2008; and Thewarajah Umesh, Former Project Assistant for Mine Action, UNICEF, Colombo, 20 February 2008.

[116] Email from Sebastian Kasack, UNICEF, 8 August 2008.

[117] Ibid.

[118] Interviews with Sebastian Kasack, UNICEF, Colombo, during the periods 25–31 May, and 7–14 June 2008.

[119] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 997.

[120] Interview with Thahir Mohamed Kubais, UNICEF, Colombo, 18 April 2008.

[121] Telephone interview with Insaf Nizam, UNICEF, 5 June 2007; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 998.

[122] Telephone interview with Mohamed Hakeem, UNICEF, 23 March 2008; interviews with and email from Thahir Mohamed Kubais, UNICEF Colombo, 18 April, 9 May, and 6 June 2008; and email from Sebastian Kasack, UNICEF, 9 September 2008.

[123] This was initially revealed by RE/VA coordinators during the MRE/VA Technical Working Group meeting on 12–14 June 2006 organized by UNICEF in Colombo. Notes by Landmine Monitor. The situation is said to have worsened since August 2007 after the escalation of hostilities in northern Sri Lanka. Interviews with Mohamed Hakeesm, and Thahir Mohamed Kubais, UNICEF, Colombo, 18 April 2008.

[124] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1127.

[125] “Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Sri Lanka,” (New York: UN Security Council, 21 December 2007), S/2007/758, p. 13.

[126] Email from Sebastian Kasack, UNICEF, 8 August 2008.

[127] Interviews with Bernard Franc, Disability Coordinator, HI, Colombo, 19 March and 11 June 2008; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 16 June 2008; and visit to the PRC by Landmine Monitor, 25 March 2008.

[128] UNICEF, “Annual Report 2006,” Colombo, March 2007, p. 37; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 999.

[129] US Department of State, “2007 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sri Lanka,” Washington, DC, 11 March 2008.

[130] Ministry of Social Service and Social Welfare, “Social Achievement, Activities of Department of Social Service,” Colombo, September 2007, p. 8.

[131] Presentation by Cyril Siriwardane, “Achievements and Challenges regarding Implementation of Biwako Millennium Framework in Sri Lanka,” High-level Intergovernmental Meeting on the Midpoint Review of the Asian and Pacific Decade of Disabled Persons 2003–2012, Bangkok, 19–21 September 2007, www.worldenable.net.

[132] Government of Sri Lanka, “Release of Combat Casualties,” Cabinet Paper No. 305(9), 21 July 1982; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 998; Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 892; and Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 1093.

[133] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 999; and Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 1093.

[134] US Department of State, “2007 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sri Lanka,” Washington, DC, 11 March 2008.

[135] Padmani Mendis, “Act for the Protection of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Sri Lanka,” Asia & Pacific Journal on Disability, Vol. 1, No. 1, September 1997, p. 1.

[136] US Department of State, “2007 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sri Lanka,” Washington, DC, 11 March 2008.

[137] Government of Sri Lanka, “The Gazette of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka,” No. 1467/15 of 17, Government Press, Colombo, 20 March 2007; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 1093.

[138] See, for example, “Sri Lanka Minister Douglas Devananda signs UN Treaty on Disability Rights,” Asian Tribune, 31 March 2007, www.asiantribune.com; and UN, “Countries and Regional Integration Organizations,” www.un.org.

[139] Interview with Monty Rantunga, NSCMA, Colombo, 15 March 2007; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 1090–1091.

[140] Interview with Thewarajah Umesh, UNICEF, Colombo, 20 February 2008; see also Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 1090–1091; and Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 999.

[141] Presentation by Sebastian Kasack, UNICEF, “UNICEF contribution to MRE: Victim Assistance and Advocacy in Sri Lanka–Status Quo and Future Action, Donor Peace Support Group–Sub Group on Mine Action,” Colombo, 13 June 2008.

[142] KAROD (Kilinochchi Association for Rehabilitation of Displaced) notes from field visit on 27 May 2008 to White Pigeon and KAROD, Kilinochchi, provided by Sebastian Kasack, UNICEF, Colombo, 31 May, 7–14 June 2008; CTF, “Quarterly Report April–June 2007,” Colombo, 2007, p. 6; email from Bernard Frank, HI, 11 June 2008; telephone interview with Michel Scott, Country Director, Sri Lanka School of Prosthetics and Orthotics, 6 June 2007; interviews with Thewarajah Umesh, UNICEF, Colombo, 24 March and 28 June 2008; and UNICEF, “Annual Report 2006,” Colombo, March 2007. The number of mine/ERW survivors, within the total of persons with disabilities, is not known in all cases. See also Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 1092.

[143] Interviews with Bernard Franc, HI, Colombo, 19 March and 11 June 2008; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 16 June 2008.

[144] Telephone interview with Florent Milesi, Program Director, HI, 12 June 2007; see also Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 1091; and Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 998.

[145] “ICRC gives training on treatment of war wounds,” IRIN (Colombo), 28 August 2008.

[146] UN, “Country Profile: Sri Lanka,” www.mineaction.org.

[147] UN Mine Action Service, “Mid-Year Review of the Portfolio of Mine Action Projects 2007,” undated.

[148] Emails from Yngvild Berggrav, Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 May 2008; and Yasuhiro Kitagawa, Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL), 22 May 2008, with translated information received by JCBL from the Humanitarian Assistance Division, Multilateral Cooperation Department, and Conventional Arms Division, Non-proliferation and Science Department; USG Historical Chart containing data for FY 2007, by email from Angela L. Jeffries, Financial Management Specialist, US Department of State, 22 May 2008; and emails from Leisa Gibson, AUSAID, 29 April and 8 May 2008; Rémy Friedmann, Political Division IV, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 April 2008; and Sven Malmberg, Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 March 2008.