Venezuela

Mine Ban Policy

The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 14 April 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 October 1999. Venezuela has not adopted national implementation legislation stipulating penal sanctions for treaty violations, maintaining that domestic legislation to implement the Mine Ban Treaty is not necessary because international treaties ratified by the government automatically become national law.^[1] Venezuela restated this view forcefully during the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2008, in response to an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) presentation on Article 9 (national implementation measures). It said that all ratified international treaties are of the highest domestic legal standing, that of the constitution.^[2]

Venezuela submitted its sixth Article 7 report in April 2008, for the period April 2007 to April 2008.^[3]

Venezuela participated in the Eighth Meeting of States Parties in Jordan in November 2007, where it made a statement on mine clearance. At the June 2008 intersessional meetings, in addition to its comments on domestic legislation, it made a statement on mine clearance and another related to interpretation of and compliance with the treaty. It also responded to the ICBL’s intervention on extension requests.

Venezuela’s statement on treaty interpretation and compliance also appeared to be a response to criticism, particularly from the ICBL, regarding Venezuela’s failure to begin mine clearance, and the fact that it had yet to use any of the mines it retains for training purposes. Venezuela stressed its commitment to the treaty, and compliance with all its obligations. It emphasized that verification should be based on good faith, and that implementation should be based on the literal treaty text and not on alleged “original intent” of the treaty’s negotiators. It said that assessments of implementation efforts must take each state’s individual characteristics into account, and that fair analyses cannot be based on cross-national comparisons of data reported by countries with unique circumstances. Venezuela also emphasized that States Parties retaining mines under Article 3 have no obligation to use these immediately. Venezuela pointedly said that NGOs should work with States Parties, not against them.^[4]

Venezuela has not engaged in the discussions that States Parties have had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2 and 3. Thus, it has not made known its views on the issues of joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and the permissible number of mines retained for training.

Venezuela is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. It participated in the Ninth Annual Conference of States Parties to the protocol in November 2007. It did not submit the annual report required by Article 13. Venezuela is not party to CCW Protocol V on explosive remnants of war.

Venezuela participated in the Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions in May 2008 and adopted the final treaty text.

Use

Venezuela has reported that it laid 1,074 antipersonnel mines around six naval bases between April 1995 and March 1997, one of which was subsequently accidentally detonated.^[5]

In 2007, Venezuela made statements indicating that it is still making active use of these emplaced antipersonnel mines which is inconsistent with Article 1’s ban on use. In a memorandum regarding its Article 7 report for the period April 2006–April 2007, Venezuela, in explaining why it may need an extension of its mine clearance deadline, stated that its border naval posts are under threat from Colombian guerrillas, making it necessary to acquire a detection and early alert system to substitute for the antipersonnel mines.^[6] In April 2007, Venezuela declared there had been no progress in clearance in part because it did not yet have a replacement for the antipersonnel mines guarding its naval bases.^[7]

At the April 2007 intersessional meetings, the ICBL said, “Does this not constitute ‘use’ of antipersonnel mines? Venezuela has in essence said that it is purposefully deploying antipersonnel mines in order to derive military benefit from them, and is refusing, as required by the treaty, to clear them as soon as possible, or possibly even by the ten-year deadline. It can be easily argued that this may constitute two treaty violations: of the Article 1 prohibition on use and of the Article 5 clearance requirements.”^[8] The ICBL repeated these concerns in a letter to the foreign minister, dated 18 July 2007, in statements at the Eighth Meeting of States Parties on 18 and 22 November 2008, and in several meetings with Venezuelan officials during the year.

More recently, Venezuela has stressed other factors—such as dense vegetation, rough weather, and safety concerns—to explain why it has not yet cleared its antipersonnel mines.^[9] (See below for more detail). In June 2008, Venezuela stated that it was not using mines for defensive purposes, even though there are still “anti-state actors” across the border.^[10]

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, and Destruction

Venezuela has stated that it has not produced antipersonnel mines.^[11] It is not known to have exported antipersonnel mines. Venezuela previously obtained antipersonnel landmines manufactured by Belgium, Italy, Spain, the United States, and the former Yugoslavia.^[12]

Venezuela completed destruction of its stockpile of 47,189 antipersonnel mines on 24 September 2003.^[13] It has never specified the types of antipersonnel mines that were destroyed.^[14]

Venezuela’s most recent Article 7 report states it is retaining 4,960 PMA3 antipersonnel mines for training and development purposes, held by the Ministry of Defense.^[15] The number is unchanged from the previous three reports.^[16] At the June 2008 intersessional meetings, Venezuela emphasized that States Parties retaining mines under Article 3 have no obligation to use these immediately, and noted that not all states can or need to use them with the same frequency.^[17]

Venezuela has not used the expanded Form D for reporting on retained mines adopted by States Parties in 2005. Venezuela has not yet reported in any detail on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines—a step agreed by States Parties at the First Review Conference in 2004.

Landmine/ERW Problem

Venezuela’s mine contamination is the result of mine emplacement by its armed forces at six naval bases near the Arauca river in the Amazon region along its border with Colombia.^[18] After a 25 February 1995 attack on the naval post in Cararabo, Apure state, by suspected non-state armed groups operating on the border with Colombia, Venezuela laid 1,074 mines in 13 minefields around six naval posts in Cararabo, Guafitas, Isla Vapor, Puerto Páez, Río Arauca, and San Fernando de Atabapo; the total mined area is 180,000m². The maps and photographs in Venezuela’s Article 5 deadline extension request clearly show the locations and terrain of the mined areas.^[19] The minefields are located on a flood plain in dense vegetation and in an isolated part of Venezuela.^[20]

Location of Mined Areas in Venezuela^[21]

Although in previous years Venezuela had announced plans to carry out clearance of the naval bases, as of June 2008 it had still to initiate clearance operations, despite becoming a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty in 1999. In its Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in March 2008, Venezuela said difficult geographical, environmental, climatic, and technical factors have prevented mine clearance from taking place.^[22] The request also notes that clearance personnel were at risk from attack by Colombian irregular groups, and that “the transportation of personnel and equipment must take place under maximum safety in order to prevent placing the deminers in a vulnerable and insecure position.^[23]

The impact of the 13 mined areas is negligible since they are located on naval bases near sparsely populated centers. The mined areas are difficult to access and are in areas where civilians are not allowed. In a 2007 memorandum provided to Landmine Monitor, Venezuela stated that its border naval posts were under threat from Colombian non-state armed groups, making it necessary to acquire a detection and early alert system to substitute for the antipersonnel mines.^[24] In its Article 5 deadline extension request of March 2008, Venezuela stated the mines were laid in order to protect border naval posts.^[25]

There is no evidence of a significant problem with unexploded ordnance, although four casualties were reported in 2004, two of which occurred on an army firing range (see below Casualties section).

Mine Action Program

Coordination and management

The mine action program is under the control of the Ministry of Defense with no civilian input, including that of the legislature.^[26] Rear Admiral Alcibíades Jesús Paz, from the Department of Defense, continued to be responsible for coordination, a post to which he was first appointed in 2004.^[27]

According to its Article 5 deadline extension request, Venezuela has not yet adopted national standards or confirmed standing operating procedures, although the process is underway.^[28]

Demining

No mine clearance has taken place since Venezuela adhered to the Mine Ban Treaty in 1999.

Summary of Efforts to Comply with Article 5

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Venezuela is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 October 2009. In March 2008, Venezuela requested it would request an extension to its deadline of five years to 2014, citing the wet weather as the main reason for not being able to conduct mine clearance. The annual heavy rains are estimated to be from 1,500 to 3,000mm a year although the number of rainy days is quite low for seven months of the year.^[29] With the mined areas being located on a flood plain, Venezuela has claimed that the rains would quickly end any ongoing clearance activities.^[30]

At the Standing Committee meetings in June 2008, Venezuela stated that, although they were not using mines for defense purposes, “we still have anti-state actors across the river.” Venezuela also stated clearance had not started because they wanted to be certain all measures had been taken to ensure mine clearance would be conducted at the highest standards to protect the deminers from injury.^[31]

The first year of the operational plan under any deadline extension would be devoted to training deminers. The four-year clearance operations at the six naval bases are now planned to commence in October 2010 and be completed in October 2014. With only a five-month clearance period each year because of the wet climate it is therefore planned that clearance would take 20 months over a four-year period.

The extension request stated that Venezuela would contribute VEF30 million (some US$14 million), but with rampant inflation and frequent devaluations over the past 10 years it was not clear what the true value of the contribution would be, and no detailed budget was provided. In its statement to the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies in June 2008, Venezuela further declared that a lack of financial resources could impact the operational plan.^[32]

Also at the meetings, the ICBL stated that it was not in favor of States Parties that had not initiated clearance operations prior to the expiry of its Article 5 deadline being granted an extension.^[33] The ICBL called on Venezuela to provide more details to support its extension request, to begin demining before the expiry of its ten-year deadline, and re-submit a request. It also recommended that Venezuela receive no more than a one-year extension based on the condition that they begin demining prior to their deadline expiring.

Landmine/ERW Casualties

At the Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Venezuela reported that no fatal mine incidents had ever occurred in Venezuela.^[34] No new mine/ERW casualties were recorded in 2007 and through June 2008.^[35] The last known mine casualty was reported in 2004.^[36] From 1999 to June 2008, Landmine Monitor recorded two military personnel injured by mines and five casualties, including four killed and one injured (three children, two men), as a result of unexploded ordnance close to a military base and training area.^[37] In 2008, Venezuela reported that only one mine casualty had been recorded, on 6 September 2004.^[38]

Landmine/ERW Risk Education

Venezuela has no mine/ERW risk education program. The government reported in its Article 7 Report that mines do not represent a danger to the civilian population, since they are not laid in areas of public transit, but rather in defensive patterns around the various border naval posts.^[39] Minefields are marked and periodically controlled by technical teams.^[40]

Victim Assistance

In 2008, Venezuela reiterated that the survivor from the 2004 incident received medical, psychological, and economic assistance.^[41] Venezuela did not provide information on victim assistance activities in its latest Article 7 report.^[42] However, it made a statement at the Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in June 2008 expressing its condolences to the families of those killed by mines.^[43] Venezuela has a national health system with specialized services located in main urban centers, including rehabilitation services.^[44]

The Venezuelan constitution prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities but implementation remains problematic and the government has made no efforts to raise awareness on rights of persons with disabilities.^[45] As of 31 July 2008, Venezuela had not signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities or its Optional Protocol.