+   *    +     +     
About Us 
The Issues 
Our Research Products 
Order Publications 
Multimedia 
Press Room 
Resources for Monitor Researchers 
ARCHIVES HOME PAGE 
    >
Sub-Sections:
Western Sahara, Landmine Monitor Report 2008

Western Sahara

Stockpile

Unknown, although 8,353 antipersonnel mines destroyed since 2006

Contamination

Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, submunitions, other UXO

Estimated area of contamination

No credible estimate

Demining in 2007

Reported mine clearance of 256km2 by Morocco

Landmine Action cleared 0.9km2 of battle areas

Mine/ERW casualties in 2007

Total: 36 (2006: 24)

Mines: 23 (2006: 13)

Submunitions: 2 (2006: 0)

ERW: 2 (2006: 0)

Unknown device: 9 (2006: 11)

Casualty analysis

Killed: 12 (2006: 9)

Injured: 24 (2006: 11, and 4 unknown)

Estimated mine/ERW survivors

400

RE capacity

Increasing, but inadequate

Availability of services in 2007

Inadequate

Mine action funding in 2007

$895,000 (2006: $600,000)

Key developments since May 2007

In 2007, Morocco reported huge clearance figures for 2007 that appears to cover mainly Western Sahara, but details of areas cleared were not provided. Partial survey by Landmine Action in 2007 identified 154 dangerous areas. In February 2008, MINURSO’s mine action cell was upgraded to a mine action coordination center. In May 2008, Polisario destroyed 2,000 mines. In July 2008, Morocco reported casualty data to Landmine Monitor for the first time; casualties in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara increased significantly in 2007.

Mine Ban Policy

The sovereignty of Western Sahara remains the subject of a dispute between the government of Morocco and the Polisario Front (the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguía el Hamra and Río de Oro). Polisario’s Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) is a member of the African Union, but is not universally recognized. It has no official representation in the UN, which prevents formal accession to the Mine Ban Treaty. Polisario officials have, since 1999, stated that they would adhere to the Mine Ban Treaty if permitted to do so.

On 3 November 2005, Polisario Minister of Defense Mohamed Lamine Buhali committed Polisario unilaterally to a ban on antipersonnel mines through the Deed of Commitment administered by the NGO, Geneva Call.[1] The Deed of Commitment pledges Polisario to a ban on use, production, transfer and stockpiling of antipersonnel mines, and cooperation in mine action.

Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer

Both Polisario and Moroccan forces used mines extensively in the past. Polisario is not known to have produced or transferred antipersonnel mines. Polisario officials claim they acquired antipersonnel mines in the past by lifting them from Moroccan minefields, especially those around the defensive walls (berms).[2] Based on mines destroyed in 2006, 2007 and 2008, Polisario stocks have included antipersonnel mines of Belgian, Chinese, French, Israeli, Italian, Portuguese, Romanian, Soviet, and Yugoslav manufacture.[3]

Polisario has not revealed the total number of antipersonnel mines it possesses in its stockpile, and has previously provided conflicting information about whether it even has one. In 2002, Polisario told Landmine Monitor in writing that it no longer had a stockpile of antipersonnel mines, except for 1,606 disarmed mines on display in a military museum.[4] In January 2006, however, Polisario’s Chief Engineer told Landmine Monitor that the stockpile consisted of more than 10,000 antipersonnel and antivehicle mines.[5]

Polisario has undertaken three public destructions of stockpiled antipersonnel mines, pursuant to the Deed of Commitment. Most recently, on 21 May 2008, Polisario destroyed 2,000 antipersonnel mines in a public event in the Tifariti region of Western Sahara. The numbers and types of mines destroyed were: 1,040 VS-50 (Italy); 500 PMD-6M (USSR); 180 PROM-1 (Yugoslavia); 146 SB-33 (Italy); 33 PMD-6 (USSR); 32 M-35 (Belgium); 27 M966 (Portugal); 3 M969 (Portugal); 6 Type 58 (China); 9 MAI75 (Romania); 4 No. 6 MK1 (UK); and 20 POMZ-2M (USSR). The destruction was carried out with technical assistance from the British NGO, Landmine Action.[6]

Polisario previously destroyed 3,181 stockpiled antipersonnel mines and 140 antivehicle mines in February 2007 and 3,172 antipersonnel mines and 144 antivehicle mines in February 2006.[7]

Landmine/ERW Problem

Western Sahara is contaminated with antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, and explosive remnants of war (ERW), especially (cluster) submunitions and other unexploded ordnance (UXO).[8] More than 2,000km of berms (earthen walls about 3m high) were built during conflict in the 1980s, and remained after the 1991 ceaseire between Morocco and Polisario. Moroccan troops emplaced antipersonnel and antivehicle mines in and around the berms.[9] According to Landmine Action, Western Sahara is “one of the most heavily mined territories in the world.”[10]

The precise extent of contamination is, however, not known, with earlier UN estimates of around 100,000km2 implausibly high.[11] In August 2006, Landmine Action began a general survey of minefields and other hazardous areas east of the berm,[12] which is expected to give a better picture of overall contamination.[13] Based on the results of the survey, the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) expects to significantly reduce earlier estimates of contaminated area, although the situation west of the berm, in Moroccan-controlled territory, will still need clarification.[14] Furthermore, Landmine Action has a 5km buffer zone from the berm, which it is not authorized to cross.[15]

ERW contamination is also significant, with unexploded submunitions a particular threat. The Landmine Action survey found that traditional grazing land and settlements remain heavily contaminated with unexploded submunitions and are in need of urgent clearance. Indeed, according to the UN Secretary-General: “The extent of cluster-munition contamination is increasingly evident as Landmine Action’s work progresses. These types of munitions are responsible for many of the accidents, which are often fatalities, in Western Sahara. Notably, the first reported victim of explosive remnants of war in 2008 was a shepherd boy playing with a cluster bomblet.”[16]

To date, Landmine Action has identified US-manufactured BLU-63, Mk 118 “Rockeye” and M42 submunitions, as well as a range of unexploded mortars, rockets, projectiles, grenades, and aircraft bombs.[17] In 2007, Landmine Action concentrated its survey work in the regions surrounding Mehaires, Tifariti and Bir Lahlou, where the greatest risk to civilians was believed to exist.[18] Survey operations there identified a total of 154 dangerous areas and 366 items of UXO,[19] confirming the existence of ERW on well-used routes, around permanent and temporary settlements, and around vital water holes.[20]

In terms of human impact, in 2007–2008, the greatest number of casualties resulted from antivehicle mines near roads and in the buffer strip. Cluster munitions were the second highest cause of casualties, followed by antipersonnel mines. Other UXO seems to have been a very minor source of injury. MINURSO has found little evidence of a scrap metal trade in Western Sahara and little use of UXO in households or for construction.[21] In general, the most significant blockages are said to be to transportation routes—either by car or by foot—due to the nature of desert life.[22]

Personnel working for MINURSO have been said to be at increasing risk, especially after starting night patrols to better monitor Morocco and Polisario’s activities.[23] The last MINURSO casualty was in 1994 when an antivehicle mine injured a UN military observer.[24] It was also reported in Landmine Monitor Report 2007 that some refugees had claimed that if caught by the Moroccan security forces they are sent back to the berms and told to walk straight across the minefields.[25]

Mine Action Program

Coordination and management

MINURSO established a small mine action cell in January 2006 staffed with two military officers and one information technology specialist. On 1 February 2008, the cell was upgraded to a mine action coordination center (MACC). According to MINURSO, the change is to denote its more comprehensive role on mine action coordination as well as to signal the new integrated military/civilian structure of the UN operation.[26] The MACC has three staff members: a Senior Technical Advisor, an Operations Officer, and an IMSMA Officer. The MACC uses the latest version of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA).[27] In April 2008, the UN Security Council extended the mandate of MINURSO for a further year, to April 2009.[28]

According to the MACC’s Senior Technical Advisor, the MACC does not provide formal tasking orders to demining operators: “Landmine Action is working with local authorities through their bilateral agreements, as well as with the MACC, to define priorities for future clearance. They send us a weekly plan, which we review, and we also conduct joint field visits, to look at the areas that are being cleared. The guiding principles that define priorities are: danger to humans (and livestock) due to contamination in high traffic areas, and blockages to resources (primarily water and grazing areas).”[29]

National mine action legislation and standards

As noted in the previous Landmine Monitor report, in early 1999, Morocco and Polisario signed bilateral military agreements in which both parties agreed to cooperate with MINURSO in the exchange of mine-related information, marking of mined areas, and the clearance and destruction of mines and UXO in the presence of MINURSO observers. These agreements do not cover minefields along the berms and minefields that Morocco regards as an integral part of its defenses.[30]

Landmine Action uses its own standing operating procedures and operates in accordance with a Memorandum of Understanding it signed with MINURSO and Polisario.[31]

Status of strategic mine action planning

A strategic mine action plan is not yet in place but, as of June 2008, this was said to be one of the priorities for the MACC. It is hoped that this will increase the continuity and sustainability of the mine action effort.[32]

Integration of mine action with relief, reconstruction and development

Landmine Action is clearing Tifariti, located some 70km east of the berm, and its surrounding countryside, both of which are heavily contaminated with ERW. In April 2008, it announced plans to develop, in partnership with Polisario, a food and livelihood project to redevelop and encourage the town’s rehabilitation.[33] As of June 2008, this remained a “future goal.”[34]

Demining

The main mine action operators in Western Sahara were the Royal Moroccan Army (RMA) and Landmine Action. In January 2007, the RMA launched a comprehensive mine clearance operation in Western Sahara, west of the berm.[35] Morocco has reported some 10,000 troops have been deployed in the demining effort.[36]

Since October 2006, Landmine Action has been the only demining NGO working in Western Sahara, and has trained two battle area clearance (BAC) teams of former Polisario military personnel to mark, clear, remove, and destroy ERW.[37] An International Mine Action Standards Level 3 training course in explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) was conducted in March–April 2007 for both teams, under the supervision of Landmine Action’s international EOD instructor/technical advisor. The teams also received BAC training using large-loop and hand-held metal detectors.[38]

Since completing EOD training in April 2007, the teams had destroyed more than 830 items of explosive ordnance by the end of the year.[39] As of June 2008, Landmine Action had three “national operations teams” working east of the berm: two survey/EOD teams working in the southern sector and one BAC team working in the northern sector, where survey activities had been completed. Each team had six personnel.[40]

In October 2007, MINURSO announced plans to buy armored patrol vehicles, mine detectors and personal protective equipment, including mine shoes and safety foot markings.[41] Funding for the enhanced safety equipment was requested for the 2008–2009 budget; approval was obtained for some of the equipment but not the vehicles. Once received, equipment will be used, among other things, for an emergency response capacity.[42]

Polisario has also undertaken limited mine action activities. In his report to the Security Council of April 2008, the UN Secretary-General noted that Polisario’s violations of Military Agreement No. 1 between Morocco and Polisario included the destruction of mines without prior notification on 16 November 2007.[43]

Identifying and marking hazardous areas

As noted above, in 2007 Landmine Action continued to survey the impact of ERW contamination in Western Sahara, “comprehensively” mapping the northern sector of the region east of the berm. Landmine Action concentrated its work in the regions surrounding Mehaires, Tifariti and Bir Lahlou.[44]

According to MINURSO, many affected areas are marked with some type of warning sign, but no areas are fenced. The minefields along the berm are observed by RMA troops from their positions.[45] Landmine Action reports “routinely” marking dangerous areas it identifies during survey.[46]

Mine and ERW clearance in 2007 and 2008

In 2007, the RMA reportedly cleared 256km2 of land.[47] It is not known how much of this huge area of land was released other than by clearance or what methods were used for demining operations. The RMA has reported that its efforts had been hampered by limited resources and the lack of information relating to areas contaminated by mines.[48]

The UN Secretary-General has noted “close cooperation and information-sharing between MINURSO and the RMA’s demining operations.”[49] MINURSO military observers report UXO found during their patrols, which are then dealt with by RMA personnel. In 2007, when Moroccan clearance was intensified, MINURSO made 90 UXO reports to the RMA, all of which led to clearance of the contaminated sites. In 2008 through June, a further five EOD spot tasks were reported to the RMA, and all items were destroyed.[50]

In late 2007, Landmine Action began BAC in selected high-priority cluster strike tasks. The teams cleared some 886,462m² of battle areas in the last months of 2007.

Demining in 2007[51]

Demining operators

Mine/battle area
clearance (km2)

Antipersonnel mines destroyed

Antivehicle mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

Submunitions destroyed

Area cancelled or reduced (km2)

Royal Moroccan

Army

256*

965

337

64,624

Not reported

Not reported

Landmine Action

0.9

17

5

669

52

0

* It is likely that a major percentage of land reported as cleared was actually released by other means, such as general or technical survey.

It is clear that both mine clearance and BAC increased dramatically in Western Sahara during 2007. At the end of June 2008, the RMA deminers ceased operations because of the heat; MINURSO was notified they will resume in mid-October.[52] For the remainder of 2008 and into 2009, Landmine Action aimed to complete its survey of contamination and to continue BAC operations. It planned to “significantly increase the number of items destroyed by increasing its BAC and EOD operations, with a view to clearing all dangerous areas identified in the survey.”[53] It also found that the focus of its work was “beginning to shift to clearance as the survey progresses closer to completion.”[54]

Landmine/ERW Casualties[55]

Landmine Monitor identified at least 36 new mine/ERW casualties in 2007 in Western Sahara in 18 incidents, of whom 12 were killed and 24 injured. Seven casualties occurred in Polisario-controlled Western Sahara (three killed, four injured); the 29 others occurred in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara (nine killed, 20 injured). Most casualties were civilians (31), including 13 men, two women, three boys, one girl, and five children of unknown gender; the gender and age of the others was unknown. Five casualties were Moroccan soldiers. Two antipersonnel mines caused three casualties; antivehicle mines five; unspecified mines 15; a BLU-63 submunition two; other ERW two; and unknown devices nine.

All ERW casualties occurred in Polisario-controlled Western Sahara and all involved children playing with the device. The most common activity at the time of the incident was traveling by car (20). In Polisario-controlled Western Sahara, four casualties occurred in Mehaires and three in Zug. Most casualties in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara occurred in Bir Inzarane (six), Ad Dakhla (four) and Oum Dreyga (three). At least 12 casualties were Moroccan citizens and 12 were Saharawi (others unknown). Two of the casualties were French citizens previously reported as uninjured, but recorded as injured by MINURSO.[56] In addition, the Saharawi Campaign to Ban Landmines (SCBL) reported two mine/ERW incidents in Bir Lahlou and in Miyek in 2007, but it is not known if these caused casualties. MINURSO recorded three additional incidents which did not cause casualties.[57]

The overall casualty rate in 2007 was significantly higher than 2006 when 24 casualties were recorded. The casualty rate in Polisario-controlled Western Sahara remained similar to 2006 (eight) but substantially higher than 2005 (two). Casualties in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara increased from 16 to 29.[58] This increase is due to several explosions causing three or more casualties and possibly better reporting by MINURSO and Moroccan authorities. However, it remains possible that casualties remain unreported due to incomplete data collection and the large, inaccessible desert territory.

Casualties continued to be recorded in 2008 with at least 12 casualties (four killed, eight injured) in 10 incidents. All were civilians (six men, one boy, one girl, one child of unknown gender, and two unknown gender/age), except for one Moroccan military. Two casualties were caused by antipersonnel mines, three by an antivehicle mine, one by an unspecified mine, one by an M42 submunition, and five by unknown devices.[59] Seven casualties occurred in the Moroccan-controlled part of Western Sahara.[60]

The Collective of Saharawi Human Rights Defenders El-Aaiun Western Sahara (Collectif des défenseurs saharaouis des droits de l’homme El-Aaiun Sahara Occidental, CODESA) has reported that human and livestock casualties regularly occur in Western Sahara. The majority of casualties were nomads with their herds, children and people driving cars or riding camels.[61]

Data collection

Data collection in Western Sahara remains incomplete. MINURSO has strengthened its recording of mine/ERW incidents in both Moroccan and Polisario-controlled parts of Western Sahara, but data collection was hampered by the size of the territory and the lack of infrastructure (such as hospitals) to report to.[62] Analysis of MINURSO data still shows a lack of detail and imprecision in recording locations, device types and incident circumstances. The SCBL records casualties it hears about in Polisario-controlled Western Sahara, but lacks the capacity and funds to carry out comprehensive data collection.[63]

CODESA also records mine/ERW casualties in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara, although it similarly notes that it had “neither the sufficient staff nor the adequate equipment to collect data on landmines and their casualties.”[64] CODESA also called upon the Moroccan government to make casualty data public, to show the exact annual number of mine and ERW casualties in the area.[65] In 2008, for the first time, Moroccan authorities provided Landmine Monitor with casualty data.[66]

As part of its survey and clearance program in Western Sahara, Landmine Action planned to collect casualty data and establish a database in Rabouni near Tindouf, in Algeria.[67] This was postponed to late 2008 due to a lack of funds.[68]

The total number of mine/ERW casualties in Western Sahara is not known; many incidents may not be recorded. In the absence of a comprehensive data collection mechanism it is impossible to establish how many casualties occurred since 1975; estimates range from 200 to 2,400.[69] The SCBL has registered 345 mine/ERW survivors from the Tindouf refugee camps; it is not known if this data is reliable.[70] The Saharawi-Moroccan Association of Mine Victims in Dakhla (Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara) reported that it had registered 85 casualties in the Dakhla region between 1975 and 2008.[71] The Moroccan Association of Mine Victims in Smara reported that in 2007 at least 100 mine survivors were living in Smara, the area’s only city (Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara).[72]

Landmine/ERW Risk Education

Despite increased attention by Moroccan authorities to mine/ERW risk education (RE) in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara (see the Morocco report),[73] activities remained limited, especially in the Polisario-controlled part of Western Sahara.

MINURSO continued to emphasize the need for RE activities. Through its mine action cell, it coordinated activities with other stakeholders and organized awareness-raising events on both sides of the berm. MINURSO was in contact with UNDP in Mauritania to initiate regional RE programs.[74] No other RE activities during patrols or safety briefings by MINURSO were reported.[75]

In 2007, the SCBL was the only organization providing RE for the Saharawi population. It reached 1,280 people (753 children, 310 men and 217 women), more than double the number of people reached in 2006 (532). All trainers were volunteers. Activities were mainly carried out in schools or public areas and some RE materials were distributed. The SCBL reported continued funding and staff shortages.[76] The Moroccan Association of Mine Victims based in Smara organized RE activities for schoolchildren, farmers and nomads on both sides of the berm. Activities included conferences in Smara and lectures in schools. No reliable beneficiary statistics were available.[77]

Landmine Action did not carry out a formal RE program but it trained residents in its area of operation how to recognize and mark explosive ordnance.[78]

Victim Assistance

The Polisario authorities offer basic free healthcare for all Saharawis in each of the four refugee camps. People involved in mine/ERW incidents in remote areas are likely to die because there are no ambulances and they have to wait for a passing vehicle to take them to the nearest health facility, which may be hours away. Where health facilities exist they usually lack doctors and medical equipment.[79]

In Polisario-controlled Western Sahara, complex cases are transferred to Algeria. Survivors receive rehabilitation, vocational training and socio-economic reintegration services in the Chehid Cherif Centre, located in one of the refugee camps close to Rabouni. However, the center is under-staffed, under-equipped and lacks financial support.[80] Psychosocial support or pensions are not available. Socio-economic reintegration is one of the issues of greatest concern due to the general lack of employment opportunities in the camps.[81]

On the Moroccan side of the berm, there are medical facilities in La’Youn, Smara, and Ousserd. CODESA claimed that mine/ERW survivors in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara are “generally neglected by the Moroccan authorities as far as medical care is concerned.”[82] Survivors must pay for their own transport and medical costs in hospitals in Western Saharan cities or in Morocco. The physical rehabilitation center in the Belmehdi hospital in La’Youn is closed and people needing prosthetic devices must seek treatment in major Moroccan cities. Most disabled people in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara do not have sufficient resources to cover their daily expenses, medical costs and education.[83] Some mine/ERW survivors receive specialized treatment abroad, usually in Spain or Italy. Survivors often face difficulties obtaining the necessary travel documents.[84]

Several organizations work with mine/ERW survivors in the Moroccan-controlled part of Western Sahara; most are not operational due to financial constraints and poor support from the Moroccan authorities.[85] CODESA received several survivors who had incidents in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara in 2007. These survivors had to cover their own expenses and faced difficulties in obtaining documents proving that they were victims of landmines with which they could claim compensation.[86]

In 2007, the Chehid Cherif Centre assisted 153 people, including an unknown number of mine/ERW survivors.[87] In 2007, the International Committee of the Red Cross built a physical rehabilitation center in the Chehid Cherif complex,[88] but no prosthetic or orthotic appliances were produced.[89] Landmine Action provided a generator to the center in March 2008 and was discussing further cooperation.[90]

Triangle Génération Humanitaire (TGH) continued to provide assistance to the elderly and to persons with disabilities, including mine survivors, in four centers (Dakhla, La’Youn, Ousserd, and Smara); 18 mine survivors were assisted in 2007.[91]

Support for Mine Action

In 2007, two countries reported providing US$894,808 (€652,621) to mine action in Western Sahara. Reported mine action funding in 2007 was 49% more than reported in 2006. Landmine Monitor did not report funding for programs in Western Sahara in 2005. No international funding reported to Landmine Monitor since 2000 has specifically addressed victim assistance needs in Western Sahara.

International mine action funding to Western Sahara for calendar year 2007[92]

Donor

Implementing Agency/Organization

Project Details

Amount

Norway

Landmine Action

EOD

$768,600 (NOK4,500,000)

Japan

UNMAS

EOD

$126,208 (¥14,848,000)

Total

$894,808 (€652,621)


[1] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 1195.

[2] They may have acquired mines from other sources as well. Some of the stockpiled mines Polisario has destroyed are not known to have been in Morocco’s arsenal, such as those of Belgian, Portuguese and Yugoslav origin.

[3] Email from Landmine Action, “Observations made during field mission by Landmine Action UK,” 3 May 2006; see Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 1095; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 1196.

[4] Polisario response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 27 June 2002.

[5] Interview with Mohammed Fadel Sidna, Chief Engineer, Second Military Regiment, Tifariti (Second Military Region), 15 January 2006.

[6] SADR Ministry of Defense, “Relación de Minas Destinadas a Destruir el día 20 de mayo de 2008 (Tercera Etapa)” (“Relation of Mines Due for Destruction on 20 May 2008 (Third Stage)”), provided by email from Ahmed Sidi-ali, Deputy Programme Manager, Landmine Action, Western Sahara, 14 June 2008. This document is a SADR Ministry of Defense inventory of the numbers and types of mines destroyed.

[7] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 1095; and Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 1196.

[8] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 1096.

[9] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 1196; and Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 1096.

[10] Landmine Action, “Western Sahara 2007 Activities,” London, April 2008, p. 2; and email from Melissa Fuerth, Operations Officer, Landmine Action, 19 June 2008.

[11] MINURSO, “Mines and UXOs,” www.minurso.unlb.org; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 1096.

[12] Landmine Action, “Western Sahara 2007 Activities,” London, April 2008, p. 2.

[13] Ibid, p. 5.

[14] Email from Tammy Hall, Senior Technical Advisor for Mine Action, MINURSO, 16 June 2008.

[15] Email from Melissa Fuerth, Landmine Action, 19 June 2008.

[16] “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara,” (New York: UN Security Council, 14 April 2008), S/2008/251, para. 30.

[17] Landmine Action, “Western Sahara 2007 Activities,” London, April 2008, p. 5.

[18] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 1096.

[19] Landmine Action records areas with mines and/or ERW, including cluster strikes and minefields, as dangerous areas, and spot tasks as items of UXO. Email from Melissa Fuerth, Landmine Action, 26 June 2008.

[20] Landmine Action, “Western Sahara 2007 Activities,” London, April 2008, p. 5.

[21] Email from Tammy Hall, MINURSO, 16 June 2008.

[22] Ibid.

[23] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 1096.

[24] Email from Tammy Hall, MINURSO, 16 June 2008.

[25] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 1096.

[26] Email from Tammy Hall, MINURSO, 16 June 2008.

[27] Ibid; “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara,” (New York: UN Security Council, 14 April 2008), S/2008/251, para. 26; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 1096.

[28] UN Security Council Resolution 1813 (2008), 30 April 2008, Operative Para. 9.

[29] Email from Tammy Hall, MINURSO, 16 June 2008.

[30] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 1097.

[31] Email from Melissa Fuerth, Landmine Action, 19 June 2008.

[32] Email from Tammy Hall, MINURSO, 16 June 2008.

[33] Landmine Action, “Western Sahara 2007 Activities,” London, April 2008, p. 6.

[34] Email from Melissa Fuerth, Landmine Action, 19 June 2008.

[35] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 1098.

[36] “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara,” (New York: UN Security Council, 14 April 2008), S/2008/251, para. 28.

[37] Landmine Action, “Western Sahara 2007 Activities,” London, April 2008, p. 5.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Email from Melissa Fuerth, Landmine Action, 19 June 2008.

[41] “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara,” (New York: UN Security Council, 19 October 2007), S/2007/619, para. 29.

[42] Email from Tammy Hall, MINURSO, 16 June 2008.

[43] “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara,” (New York: UN Security Council, 14 April 2008), S/2008/251, para. 18.

[44] Landmine Action, “Western Sahara 2007 Activities,” London, April 2008, p. 5.

[45] Email from Tammy Hall, MINURSO, 16 June 2008.

[46] Email from Melissa Fuerth, Landmine Action, 19 June 2008.

[47] “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara,” (New York: UN Security Council, 14 April 2008), S/2008/251, para. 28.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Email from Tammy Hall, MINURSO, 16 June 2008.

[51] Email from Melissa Fuerth, Landmine Action, 19 June 2008; “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara,” (New York: UN Security Council, 14 April 2008), S/2008/251, para. 28; and Morocco voluntary Article 7 Report, Form F, April 2008.

[52] Email from Tammy Hall, MINURSO, 15 July 2008.

[53] Landmine Action, “Western Sahara 2007 Activities,” London, April 2008, p. 6.

[54] Email from Melissa Fuerth, Landmine Action, 19 June 2008.

[55] Unless noted otherwise casualty data is based on information provided by Boybat Cheikh Abdelhay, President, SCBL, 31 May 2008; email from Tammy Hall, MINURSO, 22 May 2008; “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara,” (New York: UN Security Council, 13 April 2007), S/2007/202, p. 5; CODESA, “Report on the violations of human rights in Western Sahara 2007,” La’Youn, 2008, p. 45, www.arso.org; letter to HI from the Mission of the Kingdom of Morocco to the European Communities, 23 July 2008; and media reports from 1 January 2007–20 June 2008.

[56] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 931. Moroccan media appear to consider people casualties only when the incident is fatal.

[57] Email from Tammy Hall, MINURSO, 16 June 2008.

[58] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 1099.

[59] See also “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara,” (New York: UN Security Council, 14 April 2008), S/2008/251, p. 7.

[60] See report on Morocco in this edition of Landmine Monitor.

[61] CODESA, “Report on the violations of human rights in Western Sahara 2007,” La’Youn, 2008, p. 44, www.arso.org.

[62] Email from Tammy Hall, MINURSO, 22 May 2008.

[63] Email from Boybat Cheikh Abdelhay, SCBL, 31 May 2008.

[64] CODESA, “Report on the violations of human rights in Western Sahara 2007,” La’Youn, 2008, p. 44, www.arso.org.

[65] CODESA, “Report on the violations of human rights in Western Sahara 2007,” La’Youn, 2008, p. 46, www.arso.org. The report refers to Landmine Monitor extensively.

[66] Letter to HI from the Mission of the Kingdom of Morocco to the European Communities, 23 July 2008.

[67] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 1100.

[68] Landmine Action, “Western Sahara 2007 Activities,” London, April 2008; and email from Melissa Fuerth, Landmine Action, 10 June 2008.

[69] Email from Gaici Nah Bachir, Director, Muro Minas Sahara, 29 May 2008; and see also Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 1100.

[70] Email from Boybat Cheikh Abdelhay, SCBL, 31 May 2008.

[71] Telephone interview with Ladeit Mahnam, Director, Saharawi-Moroccan Association of Mine Victims in Dakhla, 16 June 2008.

[72] M. El Hamraoui, “Entretien avec Nouredine Tarif, secrétaire général de l’association marocaine des victimes des mines à Smara” (“Interview with Nouredine Tarif, Secretary-General of the Moroccan Association of Victims of Mines in Smara”), Le Reporter (Morocco), 6 February 2007, www.lereporter.ma.

[73] See the Thailand report in this edition of Landmine Monitor.

[74] “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara,” (New York: UN Security Council, 2007), S/2007/619, 19 October 2007, p. 8.

[75] Email from Tammy Hall, MINURSO, 22 May 2008; and telephone interview with Sidi El Houcine El Alaoui, MRCS, 12 June 2008.

[76] Email from Boybat Cheikh Abdelhay, SCBL, 31 May 2008.

[77] M. El Hamraoui, “Entretien avec Nouredine Tarif, secrétaire général de l’association marocaine des victimes des mines à Smara” (“Interview with Nouredine Tarif, Secretary-General of the Moroccan Association of Victims of Mines in Smara”), Le Reporter (Morocco), 6 February 2007, www.lereporter.ma; email from Tammy Hall, MINURSO, 22 May 2008; and telephone interview with Nouredine Tarif, Secretary-General, Moroccan Association of Mine Victims of Smara, 16 June 2008.

[78] “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara,” (New York: UN Security Council, 2008), S/2008/251, 14 April 2008, p. 8.

[79] CODESA, “Report on the violations of human rights in Western Sahara 2007,” La’Youn, 2008, p. 42, www.arso.org.

[80] Emails from Gaici Nah Bachir, Muro Minas Sahara, 29 May 2008; and from Boybat Cheikh Abdelhay, SCBL, 31 May 2008.

[81] Email from Gaici Nah Bachir, Muro Minas Sahara, 29 May 2008.

[82] CODESA, “Report on the violations of human rights in Western Sahara 2007,” La’Youn, 2008, p. 42.

[83] Ibid.

[84] Email from Gaici Nah Bachir, Muro Minas Sahara, 29 May 2008.

[85] Telephone interview with Ladeit Mahnam, Saharawi-Moroccan Association of Mine Victims in Dakhla, 16 June 2008; and with Nouredine Tarif, Moroccan Association of Mine Victims of Smara, 16 June 2008.

[86] Telephone interview with Sidi El Houcine El Alaoui, MRCS, 12 June 2008.

CODESA, “Report on the violations of human rights in Western Sahara 2007,” La’Youn, 2008, p. 44, www.arso.org.

[87] Emails from Gaici Nah Bachir, Muro Minas Sahara, 29 May 2008; and from Boybat Cheikh Abdelhay, SCBL, 31 May 2008.

[88] ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme: Annual Report 2007,” Geneva, May 2008, p. 52.

[89] Emails from Gaici Nah Bachir, Muro Minas Sahara, 29 May 2008; and from Boybat Cheikh Abdelhay, SCBL, 31 May 2008.

[90] Landmine Action, “Western Sahara 2007 Activities,” London, April 2008, p. 5.

[91] Email from Anne Trehondart, Project Manager, TGH, 6 June 2008.

[92] Email from Yngvild Berggrav, Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 May 2008. Funding was reported for Algeria but was for projects specific to Western Sahara. Email from Yasuhiro Kitagawa, Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines, 22 May 2008. Information received by JCBL from the Humanitarian Assistance Division, Multilateral Cooperation Department, and Conventional Arms Division, Non-proliferation and Science Department.