Angola

2008 Key Data

Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of Angola acknowledged using antipersonnel mines as a signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty from December 1997 to April 2002. Angola became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 January 2003. Angola has not enacted national legal measures to implement the treaty. Angola completed destruction of its stockpile of 88,117 antipersonnel mines in December 2006. As of 2007, it reported retaining 2,512 mines for training purposes.

Landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) in Angola are the legacy of four decades of armed conflict which ended in 2002. Although mine clearance began in 1994 during the UN Angola Verification Mission, a national baseline of the extent of the problem was not known until a Landmine Impact Survey was completed in 2005. In 2008, the Angolan mine action program included national and international demining operators working in all 18 provinces of the country.

Since April 2002, UNDP has provided support to develop the capacities of the Inter-sectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (CNIDAH), the national mine action coordination body, and the National Demining Institute (INAD), the government’s operational arm for mine action. Significant problems in coordination of the mine action program and reporting on its achievements have persisted, largely as a result of insufficient government commitment to mine action. As of June 2009, it looked unlikely that Angola would meet its January 2013 Article 5 deadline for clearance of mined areas.

There is no complete and reliable set of casualty data in Angola, but between 2000 and 2008 Landmine Monitor identified at least 2,664 casualties (no data was available for 1999). Total casualty estimates run as high as 80,000.

Risk education (RE) has been conducted since 1999 by more than 15 organizations, including UNICEF, international and national NGOs, the ICRC and INAD, and through the mass media and schools, coordinated by CNIDAH. Since 1999, emergency RE has gradually moved to a more community-based approach focusing on risk reduction. In 2006, a development approach using participatory methods was introduced. By the end of 2008, the level of RE had decreased significantly, becoming inadequate.

While overall services for mine/ERW survivors improved after the end of the conflict in 2002, services for survivors and other persons with disabilities remained limited as of 2009. In some sectors, deterioration has been noted since 2005. As part of its commitment to the Nairobi Action Plan 2005−2009, Angola created a victim assistance plan, but it remained largely unimplemented due to a lack of funds and capacity.

Mine Ban Policy

Angola signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 5 July 2002, becoming a State Party on 1 January 2003. Angola has not formally reported any legal measures to implement the Mine Ban Treaty.

As of July 2009, Angola had not submitted its annual updated Article 7 transparency report, due 30 April 2009. Angola did not provide a report in 2008. It has submitted four previous reports.^[1]

Angola attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, where it commented on the Article 5 deadline extension request submitted by Zimbabwe, and made statements on victim assistance and mine clearance. It also attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, where it made statements on mine clearance and victim assistance.

Angola has not made known its views on key issues of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 (joint military operations with states not party, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training). It is particularly notable that Angola has not spoken on these issues, given its history of mine use and participation in joint military operations.^[2]

Angola is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions in December 2008, but had not ratified as of 1 July 2009.^[3]

Production, transfer, use, stockpile destruction, and retention

Angola states that it has never manufactured antipersonnel mines.^[4] It is not believed to have exported them in the past. While Landmine Monitor has not confirmed any instances of use of antipersonnel mines since Angola ratified the Mine Ban Treaty, the government has acknowledged using antipersonnel mines while it was a signatory to the treaty, from December 1997 to April 2002, when a peace agreement was signed with the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola, UNITA).^[5]

Angola completed destruction of its stockpile of antipersonnel mines on 28 December 2006, just ahead of its 1 January 2007 treaty deadline. It destroyed 81,045 mines between October and December 2006, in addition to 7,072 antipersonnel mines of 12 types apparently destroyed between September and December 2003.^[6]

In its most recent Article 7 report, Angola reported retaining 2,512 antipersonnel mines under Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty.^[7] Angola has not provided an update on mines retained since 2007, and has yet to provide details on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines, as agreed by States Parties at the First Review Conference in 2004.

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Angola is heavily contaminated with landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), including cluster munition remnants. Contamination is the result of more than four decades of armed conflict, which ended in 2002. More than 40 different types of mines from 15 countries have been found during clearance operations.^[8]

Estimates of the extent of the mine problem in 1993 spoke of millions of landmines littering one-third of the country’s land.^[9] It was not until June 2007, following completion of the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), that a more measured and realistic description of contamination in each of the country’s 18 provinces (all of which are contaminated) was achieved.^[10]

The LIS identified 3,293 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) in 1,988 mine/ERW-impacted communities in 383 of Angola’s 557 comunas (districts). These impacted communities represent 8% of the 23,504 communities in the country, affecting an estimated 2.4 million people. Three-quarters of all impacted communities and casualties were in just eight provinces: Benguela, Bié, Cunene, Kuando-Kubango, Kuanza Sul, Malanje, Moxico, and Uíge, with Moxico the most heavily impacted province. Cabinda, Luanda, and Namibe provinces were found to have the least impact from mines.^[11] As of March 2009, the national database managed by the Inter-sectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária, CNIDAH) showed that 998 SHAs from the LIS—30% of the total—had been released (through cancellation, technical survey, or clearance) or clearance was either ongoing or CNIDAH had not received a completion report.^[12]

Yet the extent of residual contamination is not known with any precision, and different operators have contrasting views on estimates of the total size of mined and battle areas in the country. In the four provinces where it carried out survey for the LIS (Benguela, Bié, Huambo, and Kuando-Kubango), HALO Trust applied a more rigorous methodology for measuring suspected areas, which resulted in an average SHA size only one-ninth of those measured by the other LIS operators.^[13] The results from the LIS show that HALO identified 35% of the total number of SHAs, but as a result of polygon mapping (more precise delineation of the perimeters of suspected areas) measured only 6.4% of the total suspect area.^[14] Furthermore, in June 2008, HALO, based on data from its polygon-mapped areas and from its own past clearance records, indicated that on average only one-quarter of the SHAs required physical clearance.^[15]

CNIDAH, for planning purposes, based on the results of HALO’s polygon mapping, estimated the total area might be as little as 242km² compared to the 1,239km² measured by the LIS.^[16] The former UNDP Information Management Advisor, Mohammad Qasim, however, could not see any consistent pattern when analyzing tasks completed by all demining operators since the LIS and he concluded it was “premature” to estimate there was as little as 242km² of contaminated area.^[17] Moreover, despite the extensive coverage of the LIS, which included all but 19 of the 563 comunas, the community-based survey did not identify contamination on all of the bridges, roads, and other infrastructure not directly associated with local villages. CNIDAH planned to survey the 19 comunas in 2009 that were not accessible during the LIS, pending funding for the project.^[18] The return of internally displaced persons and refugees may also lead to the discovery of new SHAs that were not recorded by the LIS. Demining operators believe that many mined areas remain to be identified.^[19]

The extent to which Angola continues to be affected by cluster munition remnants is also unclear. Prior to 2009 at least two types of cluster munitions had been found in Angola: the Russian-made PTAB-2.5 K0 and the AO-2.5 RT. As of February 2008, according to data and completion reports from NGO operators in the national database at CNIDAH, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) had reported clearing 13 submunitions in the municipality of Ebo in Kuanza Sul province; Mines Advisory Group (MAG) had reported clearing 140 submunitions in Moxico province; and HALO had reported clearing 230 submunitions in Kunhinga municipality in Bié province.^[20] As of 29 June 2009, demining NGOs in Angola reported they had not found more submunitions since those reported in February 2008.^[21]

Casualties

As in previous years, there is no reliable and complete data on the number of casualties in 2008 in Angola. Landmine Monitor received “nationwide” information from CNIDAH and the National Demining Institute (Instituto Nacional de Desminagem, INAD); data for Moxico province from CNIDAH, MAG, and DanChurchAid (DCA); and demining accident information from NPA, HALO, and Santa Barbara Foundation (StB). However, the formats made available did not allow cross-checking and assembling a cumulative total. In addition, CNIDAH information provided in 2009 did not match the January−June 2008 casualty data CNIDAH provided in July 2008, reportedly because the date in the files received was said to be the date of entry and not the date of incident.^[22]

INAD provided summary data on 67 new mine/ERW casualties in 2008 (12 killed and 55 injured). At least 40 casualties were men, seven women, 18 boys, and two girls. INAD declined to provide incident dates, locations, civilian-military status, device type, or activity at the time of the incident to allow cross-checking with other data sources.^[23]

From other sources, Landmine Monitor was only able to verify 52 new mine/ERW casualties in Angola in 2008 (23 killed and 29 injured); information that could not be cross-checked was excluded and casualties are certainly higher. At least 41 of the casualties identified by Landmine Monitor were civilian, including 17 boys, 12 men, four girls, three women, and four females and one male of unknown age. Four were military and three were deminers; all age/gender/status were unknown for four casualties. Antipersonnel mines caused 16 casualties, antivehicle mines eight, ERW 15, and unknown devices 13.

In 2008, CNIDAH stated that annual casualties had decreased from some 250 per year in 2002−2005 to 50 per year due to increased demining and RE efforts. It was further added that most casualties were children and the majority of incidents were caused by ERW.^[24]

According to the United States Department of State, CNIDAH reported 18 people killed and 43 injured in 2008.^[25] However, national data provided to Landmine Monitor by CNIDAH only included 26 casualties in 2008 (13 killed and 13 injured),^[26] which did not include at least 16 of 19 casualties recorded by CNIDAH in Moxico (9 killed and 10 injured).^[27] MAG in Moxico recorded three injured casualties that were not included in CNIDAH Moxico data (two soldiers and one civilian).^[28] DCA recorded eight casualties in Moxico, which were all included in the regional CNIDAH data.^[29] In July 2008, CNIDAH reported 47 casualties to the end of June 2008 (10 killed and 37 injured); these were all excluded by Landmine Monitor from casualty totals because the incident data could not be re-verified.^[30]

Additionally, NPA recorded one person injured in a demining accident in 2008^[31] and HALO recorded one deminer injured when a vegetation cutter set off a fragmentation mine in Bié. StB reported one accident in Kuanza Sul when one deminer was injured due to a failure to follow procedures.^[32] None of these casualties were recorded in CNIDAH data. Landmine Monitor also identified one incident in the media when on 6 October 2008 two people were killed and two injured in an antivehicle mine incident when their car drove off the main road in Kibala, Kuanza Sul province.^[33] The US Department of State further reported landmine incidents involving “construction workers, mostly Chinese, while rebuilding roads and railroads.”^[34] None of the casualty data received included foreign nationals.

Due to the incompleteness of the data, comparisons with previous years are impossible. For 2007, casualty figures ranging between 48 and 127 were reported.^[35]

Casualties continued to occur in 2009 with at least eight casualties (four killed and four injured) to the end of May. In Moxico, CNIDAH recorded five casualties and MAG recorded one additional person injured. CNIDAH in Luanda recorded two additional casualties in Lunda Sul.^[36] INAD recorded one woman killed and one man injured.^[37]

The cumulative number of mine/ERW casualties is not known. Angola has stated several times that there are an estimated 80,000 survivors.^[38] In 2006, however, the Ministry of Assistance and Social Reintegration (MINARS) stated that 70% of 89,170 registered persons with disabilities were mine/ERW survivors.^[39] This would amount to approximately 62,500 people. The media reported in 2008 that the UN estimates there are some 23,000 mine survivors.^[40]

The LIS data is considered to be the most reliable source of casualty information; it identified 341 recent casualties (168 killed, 159 injured, and 14 unknown) in 173 communities.^[41] The number of non-recent casualties is unknown. Most casualties were male (232 or 68%), which is also below the international average of about 80%. Some 75% of casualties were aged between 15 and 44 years. Of total casualties, 15% were military. The most common activity at the time of the incident was traveling (30%), followed by collecting wood/water (17%), and farming (11%). One-third of casualties occurred in Moxico province (111), followed by Bié (58).^[42] Most of those killed or injured while traveling were not from the communities where the incidents occurred, which resulted in a lack of detail about these casualties.^[43]

In addition to the LIS, fewer than 300 casualty records were entered into the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database at CNIDAH in Luanda. The first casualties were entered at the start of the LIS and “almost no data before that.”^[44] Landmine Monitor identified at least 2,664 mine/ERW casualties between 2000 and 2008 (no data is available for 1999), including 877 people killed, 1,644 injured, and 143 of unknown status.^[45]

Risk profile

People are at most risk in Moxico, followed by the provinces in northern Angola.^[46] While there is a high level of awareness, people are at risk while conducting livelihood activities including collecting water and food, firewood, making charcoal, and hunting.^[47] Most mined areas are not marked.^[48]

Socio-economic impact

Landmines affect the daily lives of the people of Angola in many ways. The LIS identified access to drinking water, housing, and public services as problems related to mines and ERW. Lack of access to drinking water is a problem nationwide but is particularly acute in Kuanza Norte, Kuanza Sul, Lunda Sul, Malanje, and Moxico provinces. Water and electricity distribution for much of the country is also affected, due to the widespread practice of mining high-voltage electricity pylons, reservoirs, and dams during the years of conflict.^[49]

Two World Bank papers on Angola address the impact of landmines. The Environmental and Social Management Framework Final Report concludes that the presence of landmines throughout the country inhibits access to land and is an environmental limitation that undermines development.^[50] The areas cleared are being primarily used for housing and farming: sometimes construction and farming begins before formal handover tasks with local officials are completed.^[51] An unpublished World Bank study on the economic impact of landmines reports that although economic models show that mines have affected the overall economy, in Angola there is largely a lack of evidence and studies to back up general statements about that impact.^[52]

Landmines also have an environmental impact in Angola. Mine contamination in Kuando-Kubango province was cited as one of the obstacles to creating the new Kavango Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area, the world’s largest game park on the borders of Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. National Geographic reported that “since the end of the war in 2002, elephants have begun to go back to the Luiana Partial Reserve in Angola’s sparsely populated Kuando-Kubango province that borders southwest Zambia and Namibia. When the initial migration began a number of elephants had their trunks and legs blown off by mines, condemning the animals to agonizing deaths. But the elephants that followed have since avoided those areas.” According to Elephants Without Borders, “in order to re-establish and sustain wildlife communities in Luiana Partial Reserve, it is critical that the area be declared a national park and that the land mines are cleared.” More than 130,000 elephants are waiting to be allowed to move from Botswana through the park. This process has been held up until the park is free of the threat of mines.^[53]

Mine action has created thousands of jobs in rural areas where in March 2009 unemployment was reported to be as high as 48%.^[54] With dozens of international and national organizations and commercial demining companies^[55] operating in Angola, mine clearance projects provide “a good number of jobs” in the rural areas. This has created a dynamic and competitive labor market in which turnover among deminers, in particular with some NGOs, is high as a result of commercial demining companies offering higher salaries. NGOs reported the turnover causes disruptions in operations and lower outputs as more time is needed for recruiting and training.^[56]

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action

The mine action structure in Angola has evolved into a complicated mix of government bodies that coordinate poorly, if at all, and which lack financial transparency. CNIDAH, created in 2001 by presidential decree 54/2001,^[57] is responsible for mine action policy development, planning, priority-setting, coordination, and management of the implementation of Angola’s obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty, and reports directly to the Council of Ministers. CNIDAH is also responsible for the accreditation of commercial demining companies and, in principle, these companies send their clearance reports to CNIDAH.^[58] CNIDAH’s 18 provincial operations offices (one in each province) determine annual priorities based on NGO priority tasks, the LIS, provincial plans, and requests from traditional leaders and other NGOs.^[59]

In order to separate coordination and operational responsibilities, in 2002 the government of Angola also created INAD as a public institute responsible for demining and training operations under the auspices of the Minister of Assistance and Social Reintegration.^[60] INAD takes directions from the government rather than CNIDAH. Araújo Kapapelo Nunda, the general assistant to the director of INAD’s Technical Department, declared in February 2008: “Our priorities are defined by the central Government. At the moment, we are demining the railways, enlarging the roadsides and intervening on places where undertakings helping with the process of reconstruction and development of the country will be built or rehabilitated.”^[61] In May 2009, INAD stated that they were fully funded by the government and had “everything” they needed, but the director general would not provide any figures for the level of support it was receiving.^[62]

Coordination problems have seemingly been compounded since the establishment of the Executive Commission for Demining (Comissão Executiva de Desminagem, CED) in December 2005 to coordinate and manage mine clearance by INAD, the Angolan Armed Forces (Forças Armadas Angolanas, FAA), and the National Reconstruction Office (Gabinete de Reconstrução Nacional, GRN).^[63] The CED is composed of representatives from the three operators, reports to the President of Angola, and is managed by the Minister of Assistance and Social Reintegration. It functions exclusively at the operational level and participates in the planning process with the same status as other mine action operators. The CED does not have a fixed budget for mine action.^[64]

Two reports suggest that the GRN has ample assets to carry out its mission and maintain some independence from CNIDAH. The Ministry of Finance reported the GRN reconstruction budget for 2007 was AOA8,693,107,667 (approximately US$118 million). It was also reported by Le Monde diplomatique in June 2008 that the GRN raised its own money, estimated to be in the billions of dollars, using future oil revenues as leverage.^[65]

According to CNIDAH, the work performed by certain commercial companies does not follow the priorities set out in CNIDAH’s annual workplan. Private contractors take orders from their client, the GRN, whose mandate is funding infrastructure projects such as roads, railways, bridges, dams, hospitals, schools, and other buildings under the national development plan.^[66]

In 2008, the Council of Ministers was scheduled to vote on legislation that would clarify the roles of the CED, INAD, FAA, and CNIDAH. Under the proposed legislation the CED and CNIDAH would remain separate entities. Under Angolan law, a commission has only a temporary life. The proposed legislation would change CNIDAH’s status from a commission to an agency, thereby granting CNIDAH a more permanent status.^[67] However, as of May 2009 the Council of Ministers had not voted on the legislation.^[68]

Risk education

CNIDAH is responsible for the management, coordination, and monitoring of RE. It was supported by UNICEF until the end of 2008. Three national coordination meetings were held in 2008.^[69] RE is also coordinated at the provincial level, through regular meetings run by the CNIDAH provincial offices. UNICEF reported that coordination is variable, and NPA reported that the frequency of meetings had decreased in Malanje province.^[70] Organizations are accredited to carry out RE activities by CNIDAH.^[71]

National standards for RE exist, and it is conducted according to a methodology developed in 2006 with UNICEF and NGOs called the Solution Based Methodology (SBM). SBM involves the establishment of community focus groups, consisting of community leaders and members, with whom NGOs meet to discuss the mine/ERW problem and to come up with solutions. Participatory Rural Appraisal techniques such as community mapping and seasonal calendars are used. This is a shift from the previously used message-based methodology. A guidebook for SBM has been produced.^[72]

RE activities are recorded in IMSMA,^[73] although data provided to Landmine Monitor does not include all RE activities.^[74]

Victim assistance

CNIDAH is responsible for the planning, coordination, and monitoring of all victim assistance (VA) activities through its Sub-commission for Assistance and Reintegration. The Sub-commission is made up of relevant ministries, the UN, and NGOs.^[75] However, CNIDAH’s VA coordinator noted that coordination had been difficult due to internal reorganization and logistical challenges at CNIDAH. Coordination meetings had been irregular, partly because of the elections in 2008.^[76] Overall coordination within ministries and with civil society was weak.^[77]

MINARS is responsible for disability issues in general and, in the context of VA, it is responsible for reintegration services. The Ministry of Health (MoH) is responsible for medical care for survivors and for one of the main programs coordinating assistance to survivors and persons with disabilities, the National Program for the Rehabilitation of People with Physical and Sensorial Disability (PNR).^[78]

CNIDAH is responsible for producing an annual VA progress report to monitor assistance provided to survivors.^[79] In 2008, it produced two reports covering its own coordination efforts but not implementation achievements in the sector.^[80] CNIDAH stated that it needed technical support and increased cooperation from ministries and implementers to compile this kind of information.^[81]

Due to the increased decentralization, the National VA Plan 2007–2011 (see Strategic mine action plan section below) needs to filter down to provincial authorities. The vice-governors are responsible for provincial coordination, and local authorities are responsible for allocating relevant budgets,^[82] but VA is often not seen as a priority and budget allocations vary accordingly.^[83]

Data collection and management

Data collection and management are also at the heart of problems with Angola’s mine action program. In Geneva in May 2009 at the Standing Committee meetings, CNIDAH stated it did not have all of the clearance data because of a rapid expansion of commercial companies and INAD’s increased capacity. CNIDAH requested assistance from other States Parties in information management, though it did not specify the type of assistance it was seeking.^[84] As a result of database problems, Angola decided not to submit an Article 7 report for 2008.^[85]

The data collection system begins in the provinces where mine clearance operators send their reports each month to the CNIDAH provincial office. The provincial offices do not enter the data into IMSMA, which Angola uses to record mine action information. Instead they forward it to CNIDAH in Luanda where it is entered into the database. Some NGOs also email duplicate copies of their data directly to CNIDAH in Luanda each month. However, all of the information does not seem to arrive in Luanda. The NGO operators reported that they are often requested to resend data weeks or months after having submitted it to the provincial CNIDAH office and sending it direct to Luanda. Based on the requests, the NGOs assume the previously sent data had been lost.^[86]

Luanda then sends each provincial office an updated “read-only” database.^[87] In turn, however, the provincial offices do not always receive the updated database. For example, according to Chile Manuel Chicanha, the Liaison Officer at CNIDAH in Luena, the “read-only” database in Moxico in May 2009 did not show any change from the LIS data—even though for more than three years MAG, DCA, and others have been clearing high and medium-impact communities. “Luanda is still working on it,” Chicanha told Landmine Monitor.^[88] INAD, based in Luanda a short distance from CNIDAH, also reported not receiving an updated database as promised.^[89] According to UNDP, the return time could take “a couple of months,” leaving the provincial offices with a frequently outdated database on which to base its planning.^[90]

Despite all these problems, on 31 March 2009 the UNDP capacity-building project ended, leaving CNIDAH without an international advisor for the database.^[91] In May 2009, however, it was reported that UNDP was restructuring its support for mine action in Angola within a broader framework that combined work on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, and small arms and light weapons. A key component of the new structure would be efforts to secure and disseminate mine action data between CNIDAH at the national level, its provincial offices, and all mine action operators.^[92]

As evidenced above, casualty data collection in Angola remains incomplete and inconsistent and has possibly deteriorated compared to previous years. It is believed that casualties remain under-reported.^[93] CNIDAH is responsible for storing casualty data in IMSMA, which was reportedly functioning properly. However, only casualties since 2004 that were received on IMSMA forms were entered. Data from some organizations was not included in IMSMA because it was incomplete or not submitted for inclusion in the IMSMA database.^[94] Analysis of national and regional CNIDAH IMSMA data shows many discrepancies. Landmine Monitor received, as in previous years, information submitted to CNIDAH, which did not appear to be included in the data provided by CNIDAH.^[95]

Mine action program operators

In 2008 and 2009, Landmine Monitor field visits noted that sources traditionally aware of incidents, such as the police and village chiefs, did not report incidents to CNIDAH.^[96] CNIDAH noted that challenges in collecting data included the fact that CNIDAH only played a coordinating role and depended on operators for information while not one operator was assigned to collect the information.^[97] INAD also records casualty data but it was not known if this was shared with CNIDAH in 2008.

Analysis of the data provided to Landmine Monitor shows unsystematic information provision by data collectors as well as a lack of person, device type, and activity information. Database fields are often not filled, are completed unsystematically, and are contradictory.^[98] It was also noted that the incident date was not the actual date of the incident but the date the report was entered into IMSMA, sometimes years later. This would include all the information provided to Landmine Monitor previously,^[99] making the data’s reliability even more questionable.

In May 2009, CNIDAH reported that it had started a nationwide survivor survey, which would be completed in 2011.^[100]

Plans

Strategic mine action plan

LIS data (interim results from 12 provinces) served as the basis for developing Angola’s latest strategic mine action plan.^[101] On 6 September 2006, the National Mine Action Strategic Plan for 2006–2011 was approved by the Council of Ministers.^[102] Within the time period it aims to resolve the mine issues in all high-impact communities and half of the medium-impact communities.^[103]

CNIDAH planned to review the strategic plan in October 2009 with the help of an international consultant.^[104] In preparation for the strategy review, a second annual meeting on demining was held in Luanda on 14 May 2009 at the army’s General Headquarters to review the results of clearance operations from 2006–2008 and identify activities that would support the implementation of Angola’s development plan.^[105] According to Engineer Leonardo Sapalo, INAD’s director general, the meeting concluded that more time was needed to clear all mines and this would be reflected in the revised strategic plan.^[106]

As part of its commitment to the Nairobi Action Plan 2005–2009, Angola developed a set of objectives in 2005, which were reworked in 2007 to become the national VA plan (Action Plan on National Integrated Action 2007–2011).^[107] One version was published in 2007 in the Mid-Term Review of the Status of Victim Assistance in the 24 Relevant States Parties,^[108] but Landmine Monitor received a more detailed version from CNIDAH in 2008.^[109] A final version had not been presented as of May 2009.

Overall, the aim of the plan was to improve service provision for all components of VA for 80% of mine/ERW survivors and/or affected communities. Given that there could be up to 80,000 mine/ERW survivors, this is a challenging target. In addition, many of the objectives focused on capacity-building and institutional strengthening, awareness-raising, and information gathering, rather than service provision.^[110] In 2008, it was reported that full implementation of the plan was scheduled to start in 2009,^[111] but due to a lack of capacity and financial means, CNIDAH had not been able to operationalize the plan or monitor relevant activities as of May.^[112] CNIDAH has met with several ministries and operators to discuss how they envisioned implementing their responsibilities under the plan. It also had several fundraising meetings and visited projects to assess their needs.^[113] VA is also included in the Strategic Mine Action Plan 2006–2011 as one of its strategic goals.^[114]

Priority-setting

Provincial authorities are responsible for annual operational workplans.^[115] At the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Angola stated its priorities as: clearing agricultural areas, schools, hospitals, and recreation areas, and demining and rebuilding roads and bridges.^[116] CNIDAH provincial offices provide a priority task list to demining NGOs from which the NGOs then select the tasks they will undertake during the year.^[117] According to NPA, many of the provincial priority tasks focus on roads, houses, and official buildings.^[118]

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development

In its 2007 annual report on Angola, UNDP cited the incorporation of mine action operations into the government’s development plans at both the national and provincial levels as one of its main challenges in 2008.^[119] From 2008–2010, government priorities include making more land accessible to expand agricultural output in order to diversify national revenue that relies mostly on oil and minerals; developing an infrastructure for the 2010 African Cup of Nations football tournament, which will be hosted in Angola; and building one million houses and improving communication networks throughout Angola.^[120] In two positive developments towards achieving these targets, agricultural production increased 28% in 2007, and 2008 clearance results from INAD indicate they verified and cleared 160km² to permit the laying of fiber-optic cables.^[121]

National ownership

Commitment to mine action and victim assistance

Angola has demonstrated some commitment to mine action, in particular through its adoption of a five-year strategic plan and by providing funding to mine action (even though the exact amount is unknown). Nevertheless, as this report indicates, there are significant problems with issues such as financial transparency, information management, and technical capacity within the key national institutions, seemingly with no ready solutions.

At the ministerial level, there appears to be a lack of progress in creating national ownership on VA/disability issues. The government was said to have other priorities, and 2008 elections diverted attention elsewhere.^[122] Yet some awareness was raised to include disability in the national political agenda, to improve legislative frameworks, and to more actively involve persons with disabilities. Even though service provision remained fragmented and was mainly carried out by non-governmental operators, the number of persons with disabilities visibly living in undignified conditions decreased and they were more able to assert their rights.^[123]

As part of its commitment to the Nairobi Action Plan 2005−2009, CNIDAH has worked on improving coordination on VA/disability issues. It organized broad stakeholder meetings and created thematic working groups in 2006−2007,^[124] with the help of a short-term international consultant who also stimulated the development of the VA plan.^[125] CNIDAH acknowledged that, without international technical support, these efforts had slowed in 2008 and that longer-term technical assistance was needed to improve its coordination efforts. CNIDAH continued to raise the importance of VA with the relevant ministries, but it does not have the mandate to direct ministries responsible for implementation of VA/disability activities.^[126]

National management

Angola is fully in charge of its mine action program although its management of the program is plagued with persistent problems, with overlapping or unclear mandates between the different government institutions that have responsibilities for mine action. Moreover, Angola still relies heavily on international advisors and organizations for key parts of its mine action program. UNDP has supported mine action through three separate projects, of which one remained ongoing as of June 2009.^[127]

In May 2005, UNDP established the Rapid Response Fund (RRF) in order to have a mechanism to quickly access funding for mine action after the departure of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in 2004. The RRF provided funds to 23 projects in mine clearance, RE, and VA as well as for the LIS, with mixed results. The evaluation team granted “highly successful” status to only eight of the 23 projects. The RRF ended in 2008 after three extensions.^[128]

UNDP supported CNIDAH through an 18-month project that ended on 31 March 2009 to train the management, planning, quality control, and data processing departments, as well as the staff for 18 provincial offices and the funding of national technical advisors. At the end of the project CNIDAH was left without technical support for its national mine action database.^[129]

As of May 2009, the remaining UNDP mine action support project was the three-year direct execution project with funding from Japan. The aim of the project, which includes six technical advisors, was to enhance INAD’s role as the national mine clearance operator.^[130]

In 2008−2009, the PNR, one of main disability programs, was increasingly dysfunctional (see Victim assistance section below) due to a lack of involvement from the responsible ministry (MoH). Since its inception, the PNR has not been able to function without support from international technical advisors. Its main challenges are related to budgeting, management, staff training and retention, and ensuring quality.^[131] It was added that sufficient budget should be available for VA/disability issues, but that it was unclear if it was actually used.^[132]

National budget

There is no centralized reporting for government of Angola allocations to mine action. Instead any knowledge of government funding to national mine action operators since 2002 has been sporadic, although funding appears substantial. The FAA received $7 million for mine action from the government in the period immediately following the signing of April 2002 peace accords.^[133] On 8 September 2004, the media reported a government announcement that it was investing $16 million in mine clearing equipment and the training of nine new demining brigades for INAD.^[134] In 2005, the government reportedly allocated $3 million for mine action to INAD.^[135] All mine clearance and verification for national development is now said to be funded by the government through the GRN, but the amount of this support is unknown.^[136]

National mine action legislation and standards/Standing operating procedures

National mine action legislation to clearly define the roles and responsibilities of CNIDAH, the CED, INAD, FAA, and government ministries, and to provide the framework for funding policies and regulations was drafted in 2007.^[137] As of May 2009, the Council of Ministers had not approved it.^[138]

Angola has not developed national mine action standards. Each demining operator uses its own standing operating procedures (SOPs).^[139] INAD, which also has its own SOPs, does not conduct clearance to international standards.^[140]

Program evaluation

No evaluation of Angola’s mine action program has yet been conducted. In 2008, UNDP commissioned an evaluation of the 2005–2008 RRF and found that the RRF provided positive but limited outcomes. Among its contributions was funding to complete the LIS, mine clearance of more than 500,000m², and the marking of 92km of suspected roads. It also funded some RE and VA projects. The RRF was established as a means to rapidly respond to a need. However, the evaluation deemed the RRF ineffective, with limited impact when compared to its original aims, owing to disorganization, insufficient staff, and inadequate monitoring.^[141]

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

Demining in Angola began in 1994 in the midst of armed conflict. International NGOs were the predominant demining operators until 2007, when INAD greatly expanded its operational capacities and commercial companies were formed to benefit from significant government funding for mine action through its infrastructure reconstruction projects. The international NGOs largely concentrate on provincial priorities based on the LIS results while INAD, the FAA, and the commercial companies are tasked by the government to clear and verify areas tied to national development priorities. As of March 2009, 89% of the work reported to CNIDAH had been done by seven NGOs (DCA, HALO, MAG, MgM, NPA, StB, and INTERSOS, which closed its demining operations in 2007).^[142]

INAD is the government’s operational arm for mine action. It conducts clearance in every province and, somewhat unusually, reports its results as well as the results of the police and army demining units to the Ministry of Assistance and Social Reintegration. ^[143] INAD also operates a training center in Viana, a town outside Luanda, with technical support from UNDP. INAD certifies the graduates of the school as deminers. INAD reported they asked a number of NGOs to send their new deminers to the school for training.^[144]

CNIDAH’s list of demining operators in Angola in 2008 included INAD, the FAA, and 46 registered national commercial and NGO mine clearance companies, of which CNIDAH had accredited 21.^[145] The bulk of clearance has been conducted by international NGOs.

Demining by NGOs in 2008

In November 2008, at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Angola reported clearance of 5.4km² of SHAs, 423km of road, and 19.3km of railway between January and July 2008. During these operations, 91,311 antipersonnel mines, 74 antivehicle mines, and 915,177 items of UXO were said to have been destroyed.^[146] In comparison, NGO operators reported to Landmine Monitor 4.56km² cleared and another 34.96km² either cancelled or reduced for calendar year 2008 (see table below) and found many fewer mines and UXO than reported by Angola at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties.^[147]

Demining in 2008 by NGO operators (not including roads)

N/R= not reported

INAD reports clearance according to the type of task (e.g. whether it was clearance of a road, school, or powerline). In 2008, INAD conducted clearance or verification on nine different kinds of SHA. Landmines (or other ordnance) were found at only seven of the 29 work sites. The majority of INAD’s work was in clearing 1.4km² of land and verifying another 159km² in order to lay fiber-optic cables as part of Angola’s national development program. Although almost 250km² of land was said to have been verified or cleared (see table below), INAD found just 102 mines and 336 items of UXO. INAD also conducted clearance at five airports, including in Benguela, where 76 mines were found. No mines were found at the other airports.^[148]

Demining in 2008 by INAD

Demining by commercial companies

Commercial demining operators are contracted by other companies working on construction, communications, energy, and diamond projects.^[149] It is believed much of the work is verifying land as being free from mines, rather than conducting full clearance to remove mines.^[150] The little data available on the work of the commercial companies seems to indicate that the output does not contribute very much to clearing SHAs according to the National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2006–2011.

CNIDAH conducts quality assurance on commercial demining projects and determines when the cleared land should be handed over to the community for use.^[151] INAD reported, however, that in agreement with CNIDAH they certify their own clearance work on electricity towers, railways, roads, and other infrastructure as it is difficult for CNIDAH to keep up with the work. If not, according to INAD, clearance would come to a stop. However, it is planned that CNIDAH will eventually certify all infrastructure projects.^[152]

Battle area clearance in 2008

In 2008, NPA reported battle area clearance (BAC) on 270,000m² of land.^[153] No other operator, including government and national NGOs and commercial companies, reported BAC in 2008.

Explosive ordnance disposal

In March 2009, CNIDAH for the first time provided data on the extent of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations conducted from 2004 to April 2009. During this period CNIDAH recorded 5,225 EOD tasks, in which 85,507 items of UXO and 287,954 items of abandoned explosive ordnance were found, most reportedly in Zaire province.^[154] MAG, in Moxico, is said to be responsible for more than 20% of completed EOD tasks. According to MAG’s technical operations manager, it conducts EOD tasks nearly every day.^[155] In 2008, HALO responded to 301 EOD callouts, and destroyed 7,843 items of UXO and 2,004 items of stray ammunition. Between 2004 and April 2009 HALO responded to 1,150 EOD callouts and destroyed a total of 18,553 items of UXO and 9,556 items of stray ammunition.^[156]

Road clearance

The LIS identified blocked roads as a nationwide problem with a particularly high impact in Bié, Huambo, and Moxico provinces.^[157] According to INAD, all major roads have been cleared and were being paved with asphalt as planned by the Ministry of Public Works and Road Institute of Angola, who are responsible for the road project. The clearance of secondary roads over the next four years is one of the current reconstruction priorities.^[158] At the end of 2008, NPA stopped clearing roads, because the government had declared that commercial companies and INAD would conduct these tasks, and began clearing only SHAs.^[159]

Angola reported 423km² of road had been cleared or verified in 2008.^[160] HALO reported that investment in rebuilding roads and bridges has vastly improved movement for its mine clearance teams and improved logistics in the Benguela, Bié, and Huambo provinces, a region known as Plano Alto.^[161]

Land release

Angola has been trying—so far without success—to adopt a land release policy since the completion of the LIS in 2007. Data from the LIS indicated that the Angolan landmine problem could take decades to resolve if clearance capacity was not increased and if the same methods of operation continued.^[162] Although CNIDAH did not adopt a land release policy in 2008 as it planned, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) assisted NPA in developing and implementing the Land Release Concept, a model for non-technical survey methods to release land. CNIDAH has endorsed NPA as a partner for developing the Land Release Concept in Angola.^[163]

Using the Land Release Concept, NPA conducted 125 non-technical surveys on SHAs identified by the LIS, covering 24.3km², and cancelled 29 SHAs, measuring 4.8km² in total.^[164] Similarly, in Moxico province MAG cancelled 28km² in 27 communities using their own methodologies. In the process, 43 SHAs that originally measured 33km² in the LIS were reduced by 85% to 5km². Another 18 SHAs were cancelled because the land had been in use for more than two years for construction and three years for farming without a mine incident. All cancellation reports were submitted to CNIDAH.^[165]

HALO cancelled 88 SHAs from its database in 2008. Cancellation criteria for HALO includes: land that has been farmed for three years or more without any incidents, land that is being used for other purposes (housing and infrastructure) with no incidents reported for three years, and SHAs that have been cleared by another operator which follows the same safety practices and clearance standards. If a SHA meets the criteria, both the beneficiaries and the local authorities must sign a statement declaring the area is not mined and is safe to use. CNIDAH is provided with a copy of the statement. Periodically, HALO also uses technical survey and mechanical assets for area reduction.^[166]

INAD has not adopted a land release policy, although UNDP advisors have introduced the concept to them.^[167] In recognition of the importance of land release in meeting its Article 5 obligations, at the Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, Angola requested assistance from other States Parties to adopt a land release policy.^[168]

Marking and fencing

A CNIDAH workshop on area reduction and marking, held in Benguela province in February 2008, decided that concrete pillars should be placed every 15m and linked with barbed wire. It was suggested that national institutions should buy and place the pillars, but this marking system was considered too expensive by the demining operators.^[169] In general, fencing and marking is not widely practiced in Angola. For example, HALO does not mark low-impact SHAs because marking materials are often taken by local residents and end up as roofing tiles or building materials. As tasks are surveyed, HALO marks the perimeter with red paint or stones in order to indicate that the area within is a SHA, especially in areas that are close to villages or areas of activity. This marking is explained to the local authorities and the community, who are often already avoiding the area.^[170]

Progress since becoming a State Party

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Angola is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2013. It is difficult to measure the progress being made in Angola. The government, through the CED, FAA, and INAD, has substantially increased clearance assets since 2005, but data on their achievements is scarce and of poor quality. INAD, for example, believes the lack of a complete database of known mined areas will prevent Angola from meeting its Article 5 deadline for the clearance of mined areas.^[171]

Demining from 2003–2008 (includes only international NGOs)

N/A = not available

At the Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Angola stated that it had allocated human and financial resources to tackle the mine problem in the whole country, but the target set was achievable only if technical and operational demining capacity was doubled by the government and NGOs. The statement did not mention the likelihood of a need to request a deadline extension.^[172]

In the UN 2008 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, published in November 2007, Angola’s entry states, “The strategic plan is a basis for fulfilling the Government’s commitment to the anti-personnel mine-ban treaty. If it is achieved on time, the Government will have one more year to remove all marked SHAs, thus meeting the mine clearance deadline of 1 January 2013.”^[173] However, after a meeting in Luanda in May 2009 convened to review demining achievements in 2006–2008 and to prepare for a revision of the previous five-year strategy, participants from INAD and CNIDAH stated their belief that it would be difficult to meet the current Article 5 deadline.^[174]

Risk Education

The level of mine/ERW RE activity had reduced significantly by the end of 2008, even though the need is high. RE was implemented by 14 national and international NGOs in 15 provinces. INAD also has an RE team in each of its 15 brigades operating throughout the country,^[175] although its activities are limited and the teams do not appear to be active everywhere.^[176] Some national NGOs were supported by UNICEF and Handicap International (HI) until December 2008. UNICEF phased out RE because it was no longer a national program priority, they had been working on it for 10 years, and casualties had been reduced.^[177]

Most national NGOs, including those supported by UNICEF and HI, use the SBM methodology, although some also conduct emergency message-based RE. International NGOs implementing clearance activities conduct community liaison, including non-technical survey.^[178] Materials are used sparingly in Angola, and mainly as visual aids to support RE sessions. DCA does not give out leaflets or other materials to communities, as they are not found to be useful.^[179]

RE is not integrated into the school curriculum because it was developed in 2002, and it was not possible to include RE at the time. RE is conducted in schools in high-impact areas, and training and resources are provided to teachers.^[180] UNICEF reported that more than 200,000 primary school students were reached in 2008.^[181]

In some provinces RE was conducted through radio^[182] but not in Moxico, because it was expensive and the radio frequency did not reach the areas required.^[183]

RE is now closely integrated with mine action. Organizations carrying out RE liaise closely with CNIDAH provincial offices and provide information to communities on how to report contamination and casualties, generally to municipality offices, as the information will then go to the CNIDAH provincial office. RE teams gather information on contamination and casualties and record it on IMSMA forms to provide to CNIDAH provincial offices (see Data collection and management section above). They also liaise directly with clearance organizations and VA organizations in their locale.^[184] MAG, DCA, and HALO respond to reports of contamination.^[185] MAG’s community liaison (CL) teams are mainly engaged in survey and impact assessment. MAG acquired a geographic information system capacity in 2008, which is managed by the CL department. Community marking is included in the SBM, and NGOs supported by UNICEF and HI implement this, as well as Angola Red Cross (Cruz Vermelha de Angola, CVA) volunteers.^[186] CNIDAH provides paint to communities for this purpose.^[187] DCA does not encourage community marking, and Exame de Abelhas reported that they do not have the capacity to do it.^[188] A GICHD CL workshop was conducted in early 2008.^[189]

In 2008, UNICEF conducted regular monitoring visits to its partners, and was always accompanied by CNIDAH personnel, who also conducted their own separate monitoring visits. Both CNIDAH and UNICEF reported that they were happy with the way RE was being implemented according to the new methodology developed.^[190] HI monitored the work of its partners, and the international NGOs have their own internal monitoring system.

As well as a shortage of funding, RE also faces logistical challenges. Although UNICEF lent its partners vehicles, they were often damaged by the poor road conditions.^[191]

Through the national coordination meetings, CNIDAH and UNICEF’s NGO partners discussed the achievements of RE, noting that implementation of the SBM had allowed more communities to be reached (allowing better identification of risk areas), that there was a decrease in casualties, but that the decrease in funding meant an uncertain future for RE, data collection, and reporting of casualties.^[192] No other evaluations have been conducted.

RE Activities in 2008^[193]

N/A = not available

UNICEF has tried to help national NGOs with fundraising to continue their work into 2008, but only two received funding to continue work into 2009.^[194] CNIDAH and the CVA have a draft agreement in place to conduct RE in 2009, but in May 2009 they were waiting for approval to work.^[195] MAG was gathering knowledge, attitude, and practice data in mid-2009, planning to issue a report in August.^[196]

RE has been conducted in Angola for more than 10 years by UNICEF, international and national NGOs working in partnership. ICRC worked with the CVA, INAD, and school teachers. Some 20 organizations have been involved, with RE reaching a peak of over 800,000 beneficiaries in 2003, after which it decreased in scale.^[197] The LIS reported that some areas were under-provided with RE.^[198]

UNICEF supported the national coordination body—the National Institute for Removal of Obstacles and Explosive Devices (Instituto Nacional de Remoção De Obstáculos E Engenhos Explosivos, INAROREE) until 2001, and then CNIDAH—in providing capacity-building to NGOs, supporting school-based RE programs, conducting mass media RE, and financial support. RE planning became decentralized to the provincial CNIDAH office level in 2004.^[199] In 2004, community mine action committees were introduced. The committees were reported to be challenging to maintain, however, as the members asked for incentives.^[200] In 2006, RE shifted to a development approach. New participatory methods were introduced in order to consider local threats and risk-taking behavior.^[201]

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors is unknown, but there are many thousands. In May 2009, CNIDAH said that the situation of mine/ERW survivors had improved in recent years, mainly due to better medical and socio-economic services.^[202] It was further noted that improvements to the road network enabled survivors to reach existing services.^[203] Nevertheless, most survivors and persons with disabilities had limited access to services, particularly in rural areas, due to insufficient transportation and financial means.^[204] Some of the main challenges noted were: providing comprehensive assistance to survivors/persons with disabilities, utilizing improved infrastructures/mechanisms to actually enhance service provision, and reinforcing coordination.^[205]

Despite fast economic growth, Angola’s health indicators remained among the worst in the world and social infrastructure, including health centers, schools and human resource capacity, remained “extremely poor.”^[206] The US Department of State reported that “in many areas, health care was limited or nonexistent.”^[207] In 2008, Angola reported that several provincial hospitals had been upgraded and health centers had been constructed in several mine-affected areas, which also received ambulances.^[208]

Angola also said in May 2009, that it “continued its efforts to guarantee the quality, sustainability and accessibility” of services by providing qualified staff and equipment.^[209] But it acknowledged that this was the area with the least progress.^[210] In reality, access to physical rehabilitation seems to have deteriorated compared to 2007 and definitely compared to 2005. As of August 2008, all international organizations had withdrawn support to the physical rehabilitation sector for which the MoH is responsible through the PNR. The program aimed to create a national sustainable physical rehabilitation capacity, and was increasingly dysfunctional as a result of a lack of involvement by the ministry.^[211] In 2009, the program was still functioning though with more logistical constraints and a reduced capacity to respond after the end of European Commission funding in 2007.^[212] None of the centers are fully operational, salaries are not paid, and materials are not available.^[213]

Since the departure of the international supporting organizations, the rehabilitation centers have seen patient numbers decrease rapidly, as no one covers their transportation costs^[214] and the government does not buy materials or components. It was also noted that international organizations pulled out of Angola without ensuring that sustainable alternatives were in place.^[215] Services were said to be only available for those who could afford to receive treatment abroad.^[216] All this would appear to contradict the situation Angola portrayed in its VA plan covering 2007−2011, which stated, “almost always survivors have access to [rehabilitation] services.”^[217]

For psychosocial support, the government mainly relied on the activities of national NGOs and disabled people’s organizations (DPO), and on the survivors’ family networks.^[218] The government also maintained that the “Miss Landmine Beauty Pageant” contributed to raising awareness about the issue.^[219] Services remained limited, due to the non-existence of formal counseling infrastructure and a lack of trained staff.^[220]

Economic reintegration of mine/ERW survivors is a priority area for Angola and several government-sponsored and NGO initiatives exist, which are said to have more than 10,000 beneficiaries.^[221] Angola also reported this figure of 10,000 beneficiaries reached in 2007 and June 2008.^[222] Despite more employment of young persons with disabilities in 2008, educational and employment opportunities for persons with disabilities remained limited.^[223] Survivors rarely had access to vocational training and employment schemes because they were not aware these services existed; the government rarely provided incentives to promote economic opportunities for persons with disabilities; and services were not accessible and limited in rural areas.^[224] In November 2008, Angola reported the development of a Strategy for Special Needs Education 2009−2015 and the construction of five accessible schools.^[225] Mine/ERW survivors do not appear to benefit from this plan, which was originally developed in 2006 (with a 2007−2015 timeframe).^[226]

Angola has fragmented legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities, but the government did not effectively enforce it.^[227] Work on the compilation and unification of existing disability legislation has stalled due to election-related legislative work.^[228] In November 2008, the National Assembly reportedly started the approval procedure of the Protection Law for Disabled Persons created in 2000;^[229] no further progress was reported as of May 2009.^[230] As of 1 July 2009, Angola had not signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities or its Optional Protocol.

An HI impact assessment showed that while people still feel “pity” for persons with disabilities, people are more aware of equal rights for persons with disabilities, increased community participation, employment, and education rather than just charity.^[231]

An evaluation of the UNDP Angola RRF between 2005 and 2008 noted that the VA component of the RRF had been “relatively cost efficient provided that the intended target groups in remote rural areas with little access… actually were the main beneficiaries.”^[232] The evaluators were not able to visit beneficiaries and the evaluation had to be based on information provided by the implementers, which was sometimes missing and did not always include beneficiary statistics. It was also concluded that the support provided was not comprehensive.^[233]

Progress in meeting VA26 victim assistance objectives

Angola is one of 26 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation, and reintegration of survivors.^[234] Angola presented its 2005–2009 objectives at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in 2005 and revised them in 2006 and 2007. The latest revision was to be used as the National VA Plan 2007–2011 (see Strategic mine action plan section above). Most of the deadlines have been set for 2011 and objectives were not focused on service provision.^[235] Due to a lack of capacity impeding implementation and coordination of the plan, most of the objectives due for completion in 2009 do not appear to be on track:

• Data collection: No reliable data collection mechanism is functional, and comprehensive data is not available; despite a temporary improvement in 2007 there was no noticeable coordination and capacity improvement.
• Medical care: New health centers were constructed, but no progress was reported on improving first responder capacity and access to services.
• Physical rehabilitation: None of the objectives were achieved, notably improved national sustainability; increased training; increased repair/replacement capacity; and assumption of financial and technical responsibility for producing three-quarters of the mobility devices to assist 80% of survivors needing them.
• Psychosocial support: No progress was reported on expanding psychosocial services to rehabilitation centers and hospitals,^[236] strengthening capacity, the creation of a survivor network or projects at the regional level;^[237] the only area of progress might be in the inclusion of survivors in special education.
• Economic reintegration: Some cooperatives were created and small business projects started in cooperation with the private sector and multinational companies, and more young persons with disabilities were employed. But economic reintegration remained a weak point.^[238]
• Laws and public policy: Disability legislation had not been approved and strengthened as scheduled. Advocacy efforts did take place (including the Miss Landmine Beauty Pageant).

The Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit undertook one process support visit in 2007. Angola included a VA/disability expert on its delegation at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2009, and at each Meeting of States Parties and reported on VA at all meetings. Angola provided VA information in its annual Article 7 transparency reports submitted in 2005 and 2006.^[239]

Victim assistance activities

CNIDAH was not able to provide reliable and complete statistics on the number of survivors assisted in 2008. Due to the PNR’s poor functioning, rehabilitation statistics were no longer available. MINARS stated that 21,350 persons with disabilities received socio-economic reintegration services in 2008.^[240] The ministry also claimed that it supported 89,170 out of an estimated 150,000 persons with disabilities in the country.^[241] CNIDAH in Moxico province reported that the Luena rehabilitation center had assisted 480 survivors in 2008.^[242]

The Angolan Association of Disabled Persons (Associação dos Deficientes de Angola, ANDA) reported supporting 1,500 persons socio-economically through the “Come with me” project in 2008. ANDA also distributed 248 motor-taxis in partnership with the local NGO Causa Solidaria.^[243] The Center for the Promotion and Development of Communities (CAPDC) suffered financial challenges and had to lay off most of its staff. ^[244]

In 2008, the German Society for Technical Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, GTZ), present in Angola since 1995, ended its collaboration agreement on physical rehabilitation with the MoH in August 2008, and also ended its support to the community-based rehabilitation (CBR) project of the NGO League for the Reintegration of Disabled Persons (Liga de Apoio à Integração dos Deficientes). It started a new collaboration with the Institute of Socio-Professional Reintegration of Former Combatants for vocational training in Gabela, Kuanza Sul province; two cooperatives for disabled persons were also created in Porto Amboim, Kuanza Sul province.^[245]

In 2008, HI continued its support for two disabled people’s organizations in Huambo in conducting socio-economic reintegration activities benefiting 102 persons with disabilities (30% mine survivors). It also supported 17 disabled people’s organizations or local NGOs in Benguela, Huíla, and Huambo provinces with training and with raising awareness of disability in public and private institutions. HI also continued its CBR projects and conducted 4,263 peer support home visits for persons with disabilities in Benguela, Huíla, and Namibe provinces; 309 people received medical care, 404 socio-economic support, 300 material support, and 853 were referred to other appropriate services (146 survivors). In 2008, HI conducted an impact assessment of its CBR activities and it was noted that perceptions of disability had improved in the target area after two years of implementation. Since HI started its activities in Angola in 1995, it has moved from direct implementation and support for physical rehabilitation (facing challenges similar to those explained above) to support of local associations, community-based and socio-economic activities. ^[246]

In July 2008, the ICRC ended its support to the physical rehabilitation sector after nearly 30 years in Angola, “believing that the country has all the necessary means to provide effective physical rehabilitation services.”^[247] Over the years, it constructed the rehabilitation centers in Huambo and Kuito, renovated the main center in Luanda, donated materials and components, provided institutional support to CNIDAH and the PNR, trained staff, and covered transport costs for patients. In 2008 to the end of June, the three centers supported by the ICRC produced 420 prostheses (72% for mine/ERW survivors) and 80 orthoses (1% for mine/ERW survivors); in total 3,048 people were assisted. Since 1979, the ICRC has produced 33,041 prostheses (41% for mine/ERW survivors) and 962 orthoses (7% for mine/ERW survivors).^[248] It was reported that the centers’ productivity and capacity decreased after the ICRC’s departure.^[249]

Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of long-term comprehensive cost estimates for meeting mine action needs (including RE and victim assistance) in Angola. The National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2006–2011 includes among its five primary goals the establishment of a national mine action capacity “sustainable by national resources” after the end of major international assistance.^[250] The plan projects an overall decline in international mine action funding from 2006 to 2011.^[251]

CNIDAH distributes and manages some funds allocated by national and international donors; advises the Angolan government on national funding issues; and liaises with government and donors on the impact on mine action of national development projects, and inclusion of mine action costs in relevant project budgets.^[252] CNIDAH coordinates with the Council of Ministers on national development priorities, and acts as a strategic partner of the Ministry of Finance in coordinating the national budget for mine action.^[253]

National support for mine action

Angola did not report national funding to mine action in 2008. It did not report national funding in 2007, but stated that the national government had allocated “both human and financial resources” to fulfill its Article 5 obligations, without specifying funding amounts.^[254] The National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2006–2011 commits the Angolan government to providing substantial funds “from 2006 onwards” to resource, equip and train manual and mechanical demining brigades.^[255]

International cooperation and assistance

In 2008, 12 countries reported providing $22,136,622 (€15,032,278) to mine action in Angola. Reported mine action funding in 2008 was 12% more than reported in 2007.

At the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Angola reported on the need for additional international assistance to support its VA programming.^[256] At the Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, Angola reported increasing difficulties in gathering and reporting information on mine action results due to the large number of operators conducting programs in the country. It called for assistance in support of land release and Article 7 reporting, citing the obligations under Article 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty.^[257]

Without adequate reporting of cost estimates or national support to mine action programs, it is not possible to evaluate the sufficiency of funds in meeting Angola’s mine action needs. Nevertheless, 2008 funding levels were relatively strong, and funds committed by the European Commission (EC) in 2009 (see below) will further strengthen Angola’s capacity to fulfill its treaty obligations.

Norwegian funding to NPA in Angola is part of a NOK24 million (approximately $4.26 million) funding agreement signed in January 2008 and covering the period 2008 to 2010.^[258]

HALO reported funding in 2008 from the United States, the European Commission (EC), the United Kingdom, Finland, Japan, Switzerland and Ireland.^[259] No funding to HALO was reported by Finland, Japan, or the US in 2008; the EC also did not report funding to Angola in 2008.

In addition to its specific monetary contributions in 2008 to national mine action initiatives, the EC announced in May 2009 that it had committed €39 million ($57 million) during 2008 to mine action in a number of states. Although states receiving aid were specified, the amounts and projects supported were not differentiated, and as of June 2009 were still to be determined. The EC stated simply that funds are “to support future action” in recipient states.^[260] Angola was among the states named as recipients within the overall commitment. However, in June 2009 the EC reported to Landmine Monitor that the commitment “can be subject to changes” before its final adoption by the EC.^[261]

2008 International Mine Action Funding to Angola: Monetary^[262]

2008 International Mine Action Support to Angola: In-Kind^[263]

In April 2009, the EC and the Angola Ministry of Planning signed an agreement securing €20 million ($29.5 million) in EC funding for mine clearance over a period of four years, starting in 2010.^[264] Although the agreement evidently fulfills part of the above general commitment, as of June 2009 no specific project details or annual funding amounts were available.