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Georgia

Georgia

2008 Key Data

Mine Ban Treaty status

Not a State Party

Contamination

Scattered mines and significant UXO contamination following the armed conflict with Russia in August 2008

Estimated area of contamination

Unknown

Casualties in 2008

35 (2007: Unknown)

Estimated mine/ERW survivors

Unknown but at least 591

Demining in 2008

BAC: At least 7.89km2

Risk education recipients in 2008

44,000

Support for mine action in 2008

Ten-Year Summary

Georgia has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty, although it has expressed support for it and has voted in favor of every annual UN General Assembly resolution calling for universalization of the treaty. Georgia has had an official moratorium on the use of antipersonnel mines in place since September 1996. However, it appears that Georgian Armed Forces used antipersonnel mines every year from 2001 to 2004, and in 2006 in the upper Kodori Gorge.

Georgia remains contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) including cluster munition remnants. Contamination is primarily a result of conflict over the breakaway areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, most recently in August 2008, as well as from minefields around former Soviet military bases handed over to Georgia by Russia. As of 2009, a national mine action program was being established with international support.

The number of mine/ERW casualties decreased from more than 100 in 1999 to 35 in 2008. However, since Georgia has lacked a casualty data collection system, casualties are recorded from media sources, which is probably not reliable. Emergency risk education was conducted after the August 2008 conflict; previous activities were limited. Planned ICRC handover of the main prosthetics provider to local ownership was hampered by insufficient revenue and delayed state funding. There were no significant improvements in emergency medical care, psychological support, social or economic reintegration, or laws. Positive public policy measures were taken, however, to address the rights of persons with disabilities, including mine survivors. Most healthcare and other services to persons with disabilities were provided by the state, but were inadequate. Few victim assistance services were provided by NGOs.

Mine Ban Policy

Georgia has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Georgia has not made notable public statements regarding its landmine policy since April 2007, although it has continued to participate in Mine Ban Treaty meetings, including the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008 and the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009.

Over the years, Georgia has frequently stated its general support for a ban on antipersonnel mines. It has voted in favor of the annual UN General Assembly resolution calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty every year since 1997, including Resolution 63/42 on 2 December 2008. In April 2007, Georgia stated “Georgia is well aware that the negative impact of landmines far outweighs their military value, and tries to make its possible contribution in facilitation of the process of elimination and eradication of this threat…Georgia fully shares the principles and objectives of the Ottawa Convention and the concern of the international community regarding the challenge of anti-personnel landmines.”[1]

At the same time, Georgia has consistently said that it has refrained from joining the Mine Ban Treaty due to its inability to fulfill the treaty’s obligations in disputed territories not controlled by the government—Abkhazia and South Ossetia.[2] In a September 2008 meeting with the ICBL, and in March 2009 communications with Landmine Monitor, Georgian officials reiterated this as a reason for not acceding to the treaty.[3]

Georgia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, and joined Amended Protocol II on landmines on 8 June 2009 and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War on 22 December 2008.[4] It had previously said it could not adhere to Amended Protocol II for the same reasons as the Mine Ban Treaty.[5]

Georgia has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[6]

Use

Georgia has had an official moratorium on the use of antipersonnel mines in place since September 1996.[7] In April 2007, a representative from the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs told States Parties, “Since that time [1996] corresponding official structures of Georgia have been strictly refraining from use of anti-personnel mines. I have the chance to confirm my country’s firm resolution to keep this commitment in the future.”[8]

Despite its denial of past use, it appears that Georgian Armed Forces used antipersonnel mines every year from 2001 to 2004, as well as in 2006 (see below).[9] Opposition forces and Russian peacekeepers also alleged that Georgian forces laid mines in South Ossetia in 2006 and 2007. Landmine Monitor has not been able to confirm the allegations.[10]

There were allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by both Georgia and Russia during the heavy fighting related to South Ossetia in August 2008.[11] Each side has denied the allegations.[12] Human Rights Watch conducted extensive on-the-ground research in Georgia during and after the conflict in 2008, but was not able to confirm any use of antipersonnel mines. Both sides did, however, use cluster munitions, causing numerous civilian casualties.[13]

Upper Kodori Gorge

The Kodori Gorge is a narrow river valley in the Zemo-Abkhazia administrative region adjoining the Abkhazia breakaway region of Georgia. Paramilitary organizations allied with Georgia occupied the northern section of the gorge in mid-2006. In mid-July 2006 new conflict erupted after a paramilitary leader refused to disarm and declared autonomy from Georgia. Georgian security forces responded by invading the gorge and seizing control of its northern section. There were reports and allegations of mine use by both Georgian forces and paramilitary units.[14]

While not referring specifically to the Kodori Gorge operation, Georgia told Mine Ban Treaty States Parties in statements made in September 2006 and again in April 2007 that it had not used antipersonnel mines since 1996.

During the 2008 conflict, Abkhazian and Russian forces moved into the upper Kodori Gorge and retook it from Georgian forces. The British NGO HALO Trust has confirmed to Landmine Monitor that it encountered minefields suspected to be laid since 2006 containing antipersonnel mines in parts of the upper Kodori Gorge when it gained access to the area after the August 2008 conflict.[15]

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

Georgian officials maintain that Georgia has never produced, exported, or imported antipersonnel landmines since independence in 1991.[16] Georgia inherited what is believed to be a small stockpile of antipersonnel mines from the former Soviet Union, but the exact size and composition of that stock remains unknown.[17] Georgian officials have said in the past that the moratorium on use (see above) also covers production and transfer.[18]

South Ossetia

South Ossetia is a breakaway region of Georgia that shares a border and has very close ties with Russia.[19] South Ossetian officials have not made any public statements about a mine ban and have not taken any unilateral steps to ban antipersonnel mines. Prior to the 2008 conflict, South Ossetia was judged to have only a minor landmine problem. The armed conflict between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia lasted one week in August 2008. As noted above, there is no evidence that either side used antipersonnel mines during the conflict. However, both used cluster munitions and a wide variety of other weapons that left behind extensive ERW contamination in South Ossetia and other parts of Georgia.

Georgia and Russia are both party to CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War.[20] Under this instrument, the duties of user states include “provid[ing] where feasible” assistance for ERW clearance. Affected States Parties must also take “all feasible precautions” to protect civilians, including through risk education, and all States Parties “in a position to do so” must provide assistance for clearance and risk education.

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Georgia is affected by landmines and ERW, although the full extent of the problem was not yet publicly known, pending the completion of a General Mine Action Assessment (see below). Most of the contamination is a legacy of armed conflict over the breakaway areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The conflict in August 2008 added new ERW contamination, including cluster munition remnants.[21]

The bulk of the problem in Georgia comes from mines laid around former Russian military bases. HALO surveyed Georgia, where military restrictions permitted access, in 2004. HALO found an “immediate requirement for clearance” around Sagarejo military base about 45km east of the capital, Tbilisi, due to a remaining PFM-1 and PFM-2 mine threat in the woodlands surrounding the base used by locals.[22] As of July 2008, however, funding for the clearance project had not been secured.[23] All former Russian military bases on territory under Georgian control have been closed and transferred to Georgia: the last of these was handed over in November 2007.[24] According to the Georgian Ministry of Defense, suspected mined areas are located in Akhalqalaqi, Gonio Range, Kopitnari, Mtskheta, Osiauri, Sagarejo, Telavi, and Vaziani.[25] There is also contamination in areas around the “Red Bridge” on the border between Azerbaijan and Georgia.[26]

Assessments prior to the conflict had concluded that the mine problem in South Ossetia was minor and its impact low. Following the armed conflict in August 2008, there was evidence of a potentially significant problem with UXO in South Ossetia and elsewhere in Georgia, although its full extent was not known. A 20km-wide corridor between Gori and Tskhinvali where the bulk of the conflict took place was particularly affected. According to HALO, this area has been contaminated with cluster munition remnants, S-8 and BM-21 rockets, and abandoned ammunition.[27] HALO has found three types of unexploded submunitions: the AO-2.5 RTM, 9N210, and M095.[28] As of June 2009, HALO estimated that up to 9km2 of primarily agricultural land would require clearance.[29] HALO would like to undertake a detailed assessment mission in South Ossetia in 2009.[30] As of mid-August, however, it had not been granted access.[31]

In addition to the contamination centered on South Ossetia, other areas were bombed including the upper Kodori Gorge.[32] There is also a threat from UXO, including cluster munition remnants, in Poti harbor, which is used by the coast guard, and which was bombed during the conflict.[33]

Casualties

In 2008, Landmine Monitor identified new 26 casualties due to mines, submunitions, and other ERW in 13 incidents, including nine people killed and 17 injured. Most casualties were men (17), one was a woman, and the gender of one adult was unknown. The remaining eight were children (six boys, one girl, and one of unknown gender). Eight casualties were police and the other 18 civilian. No demining casualties were reported. Five casualties were caused by antipersonnel mines, two by an antivehicle mine, seven by unspecified mines, seven by submunitions, and five by unknown devices. The most common activities at the time of the incident were: collecting scrap metal (seven) and collecting wood and handling explosive devices (five each). Of the total, eight casualties were recorded in South Ossetia in four incidents. Six were police casualties (including five in one incident) and the other two were children. [34]

This is an increase compared to 2007 when only three people were injured by mines in South Ossetia. Due to a lack of comprehensive data collection, however, the total number of casualties in 2008 is not known.

In 2008, another 11 civilian casualties were reportedly injured in four mine incidents while crossing the border area of the Gali district of Abkhazia into Georgia. Casualties from at least from three of those incidents received medical care in Georgia.[35]

In addition, one Georgian soldier was killed by what appears to have been a landmine in Iraq in June 2008; it was not known if the device was command-detonated.[36]

According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), at least 16 civilians were killed and 54 injured during cluster munition strikes during the 2008 conflict.[37] These casualties of direct cluster munition use are not included in the total mine/ERW casualties for 2008.[38]

Casualties continued to occur in 2009, with six casualties reported to mid-June (three killed and three injured). Three casualties were men and three were women. Mines caused four casualties and ERW two.[39]

There is no complete account of casualties for the period since 1999. Between 2001—the start of ICBL Georgian Committee (ICBL-GC) data collection—and the end of 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 387 casualties (104 killed, 267 injured, and 16 unknown). ICBL-GC recorded 383 casualties based primarily on media coverage from 2001 to May 2007, when it ceased reporting. However, the reliability of the information gathered was questioned and no verification of the data was subsequently undertaken. HALO recorded 27 mine casualties in Georgia, excluding Abkhazia, between 2001 and 2005.[40] Casualties decreased from 111 in 2001 to 16 in 2005. After this period casualties appeared to be on the rise again but adequate reporting was not available.[41]

In 2009, the Georgian Foundation for Prosthetic and Orthopedic Rehabilitation (GEFPOR) reported that it had registered at least 591 amputee mine survivors, including survivors from past conflicts since World War II.[42] In 2007, GEFPOR provided details on 357 amputee mine/ERW survivors injured from past conflicts.

Risk profile

Since August 2008 the risk to people from ERW, particularly unexploded submunitions, has increased significantly. People engaged in “community clearance” are at risk but, according to HRW, “Despite the risk, locals say they are driven to clear by the need to protect their families and work in the field.”[43] People also remain at limited risk from mines, particularly near the Inguri river that divides Abkhazia from the rest of the country.[44]

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action

As of mid-2009, a formal mine action program was being established in Georgia, and coordination was somewhat confused, with a variety of national and international actors engaged in two, seemingly parallel initiatives.

On 9 October 2008, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the Georgian Ministry of Defense and the United States-based organization, the Information Management & Mine Action Programs (iMMAP).[45] iMMAP was tasked by the US Department of State to support the Georgian government, in particular by establishing an Explosive Remnants of War Coordination Center (ERWCC).

The official opening of the ERWCC was held on 25 February 2009 in Tbilisi.[46] According to Giorgi Muchaidze, Georgia’s Deputy Minister of Defense, who spoke at the launch, “It is more important to reorganize the above mentioned office as a national mine action centre, which would be [a] step forward for struggling with this problem.”[47] It is envisioned that the ERWCC will ultimately become a nationally owned endeavor, supported by international technical advisors, to address Georgia’s ERW problem. The future development of ERWCC will see the addition of a national director and other local managerial staff.[48] As of mid-2009, ERWCC/iMMAP was hosting weekly operational coordination meetings with mine action actors in Georgia.[49]

A second mine action coordination initiative is located within the Georgian Ministry of Defense, which was working to establish its Georgian Mine Action Center (GMAC) as a national entity.[50] The Georgian Ministry of Defense initially responded to the need for mine action coordination by setting up a mine action cell within Joint Staff of the Georgian Armed Forces in the J-3 Operations Department in October 2008. The Ministry of Defense planned to expand the national coordination capacity and transform the mine action cell from military to civilian oversight.

On 23 October 2008, a two-year Memorandum of Understanding on “humanitarian mine action assistance” was signed between the Georgian Ministry of Defense and the Slovenia-based International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF). The ITF initiated a national capacity-building program in January 2009. The ITF’s contributors—the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia—have supported a program to train staff and set up a national mine action center, in coordination with the Ministry of Defense and ERWCC/iMMAP.

Risk education and victim assistance

There was no coordination body for risk education (RE) or victim assistance (VA) in 2008. The ERWCC has a mandate to coordinate RE.[51] In early 2009, iMMAP made preparatory measures to also take on victim assistance coordination.[52] The Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Affairs (MoLHSA) of Georgia is responsible for coordination of disability issues.[53]

Data collection and management

Upon request from the Georgian Ministry of Defense, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) provided the ministry with the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). The installation of the system and adequate training of the national personnel was carried out by iMMAP.[54] GICHD trained two ERWCC staff in the latest version of the database. These two staff members (one local and one international) have in turn conducted training for Georgian counterparts in Tbilisi including the ministries of defense, internal affairs, and health, as well as a number of international organizations engaged in the mine action program.[55]

There was no mine/ERW data collection system in Georgia in 2008. In early 2009, iMMAP collected information on survivors from GEFPOR and the state prosthetic center, and was planning to standardize data for use in IMSMA.[56]

Mine action program operators

National operators and activities

Demining

RE

Casualty data collection

VA

Ministry of Defense (Engineering Battalion)

x

     

GEFPOR

     

x

ADW

     

x

ICBL-GC

     

x

Ministry of Internal Affairs

x

     

International operators and activities

Demining

RE

Casualty data collection

VA

iMMAP

x

 

x

x

ITF

     

x

HALO

x

x

   

NPA

x

x

   

ICRC

   

x

x

Plans

Strategic mine action plans

Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) implemented a four-month General Mine Action Assessment, which was due to be completed by end-2009. This information will assist the ERWCC to develop a strategic mine action plan and determine national priorities.[57] The assessment would be complemented by an underwater survey of Poti harbor.[58]

The short-term priority for the Georgian Ministry of Defense was to clear all areas contaminated during the August 2008 conflict. It then planned to establish a national mine action authority to manage mine action nationwide as well as to carry out quality management of clearance and issue the requisite certificates.[59]

The long-term aim is to develop demining capabilities in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) to clear all of Georgia, and to develop a stronger VA capacity.[60] In response to a request by Georgia for assistance in dealing with its ERW problem from the August 2008 conflict, as of March 2009, NATO’s Maintenance and Supply Agency was seeking to set up a project to be led by Estonia and Lithuania to develop the skills of the Military Engineer Brigade of the Georgian army in humanitarian demining and ERW clearance. The project, which was expected to start before the end of 2009, will involve provision of modern EOD training and equipment.[61]

In December 2008, the Georgian parliament reviewed a Concept Paper on the Social Integration of Persons with Disabilities as a first step toward signing the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the introduction of a national disability plan for Georgia. The government is required to develop a national disability action plan based on the articles of the paper and submit it to parliament by September 2009. It also needed to revise relevant legislation and propose actions for implementation of the plan by November 2009.[62] The concept paper had been developed by the Coalition for Independent Living, a national coalition of disabled persons’ organizations, in cooperation with MoLHSA.[63]

National ownership

Commitment to mine action and victim assistance

Georgia has stated its commitment to eradicating the mine threat in the country and has been cooperating with international organizations to address the threat from ERW.[64] On 10 October 2008, the Joint Staff of the Georgian Armed Forces (J-3) created a section to deal with the mine problem.[65] As of mid-2009, however, there was not yet a fully operational mine action program in Georgia, and no national authority responsible for mine action. Previously, the Ministry of Defense had announced plans to elaborate a mine action strategy and establish a mine action center, which would be managed in accordance with “the relevant principles of the Mine Ban Treaty and CCW Amended Protocol II.”[66]

National mine action legislation and standards/Standing operating procedures

As of June 2009, there was no national mine action legislation in Georgia.[67] Soviet standing operating procedures are currently used for demining by Georgian military personnel, which use a range of military breaching techniques, although personnel are said to have been trained to NATO standards as well. According to a Georgian Ministry of Defense official, in the future Georgia would like to adopt demining procedures that meet IMAS requirements.[68] No national standards had been adopted as of June 2009, although iMMAP had reported taking a lead in their development.[69]

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

Demining and battle area clearance were carried out in 2008 by Georgian military deminers and two international NGOs: HALO and NPA. Clearance of populated areas, roads, and railroads remains the responsibility of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, while the special engineering unit of the Ministry of Defense is responsible for clearing military areas. Both were engaged in clearance operations of cluster munition remnants and other UXO after the August 2008 conflict.[70] When Russian forces withdrew from Gori and Kareli districts, the Georgian military stepped in with an engineering unit of 80 deminers.[71] Georgian clearance personnel reportedly focused on surface clearance, handing over affected areas to international deminers to do subsurface clearance.[72]

As of February 2009, however, Georgian military clearance personnel had ceased operations, but NPA was training 26 national deminers to start work in March 2009.[73] NPA signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Ministry of Defense in September 2008[74] and an implementing agreement was signed between the two parties on 20 February 2009.[75] To expedite the process, NPA brought in experienced deminers who had worked previously in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Lebanon. The MoU was due to expire in September 2010 and the implementing agreement to conduct battle area clearance will expire on 12 December 2009. NPA is not conducting mine clearance in Georgia, only battle area clearance (BAC).[76] NPA clears submunitions to a depth of 30cm.[77] It expected to continue clearance in Georgia until at least September 2009.[78]

HALO started clearance operations immediately after the conflict because it had already established a demining program in Abkhazia.[79] A new MoU between the Georgian Ministry of Defense and HALO was signed on 5 September 2008.[80] As of February 2009, HALO had 40 teams of 6 deminers working in Georgia.[81]

Battle area clearance in 2008[82]

Demining operators

BAC (km2)

Unexploded submunitions destroyed

Other UXO destroyed

NPA

1.11

35

2

HALO Trust

6.78

631

94

Ministry of Defense

N/R

687

more than 2,200

N/R = not reported

Other international demining personnel were also involved in BAC following the August 2008 conflict. According to the Georgian Ministry of Defense, before their withdrawal, Russian military forces conducted clearance of mined areas around their checkpoints. Civilians reported clearance by Russian troops in Disti, Kvemo Khviti, Meurneoba, Tirdznisi, Variani, Varianis, and Zemo Khviti.[83] They have not reported in detail on their clearance as of 1 July 2009, although statements to the CCW cited clearance by EMERCOM personnel of 3,000 items of ERW from 3 August to 16 September 2008. [84]

On 6 September 2008, five Estonian explosive ordnance disposal specialists were deployed in the east and south of Georgia to help locate and disarm UXO left over from the conflict. The Estonian personnel cleared a number of items of UXO before leaving the same month.[85] In addition to demining activity the specialists helped Georgia in building the mine clearance system and carried out relevant training sessions.[86]

Local people have also tried to clear items of UXO. Despite the risks, locals say they are driven to clear by the need to protect their families and to work in their fields.[87]

Quality management

One of the biggest initial challenges facing deminers was said to have been a lack of coordination among the demining operators, which used different methods of clearance. As described above, the Georgian military focused on (faster) surface clearance, while the international organizations adopted a slower, more thorough approach, including proper record keeping.[88]

Both HALO and NPA have their own internal quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) procedures. NPA has requested the ERWCC to conduct QA/QC prior to handover of land.[89] As of June 2009, the ERWCC was said to be conducting external QA and QC activities and was in the process of establishing and developing a national quality management capacity.[90]

Risk Education

In response to the August 2008 conflict and the new ERW contamination, two emergency RE programs were launched by the ICRC and HALO, together with UNICEF and the Ministry of Education. Activities included mass media broadcasts; RE presentations in communities, centers for internally displaced persons, and schools; and distribution of materials. Until 10 October 2008, the ICRC was the only organization able to implement RE in the “buffer zone” (the zone between the north of Gori and South Ossetia, controlled by Russia in August until 10 October 2008). Once the buffer zone opened up, HALO also started activities there.[91] More than 44,000 people were reached, including in 180 schools.[92] HRW noted that, “Witness testimony and the limited number of civilian casualties from duds suggest that these programs may have been successful in at least some cases.”[93]

A hotline number to report contamination to police was aired on television and printed on flyers.[94] At the request of several mine clearance organizations, the ICRC supplied signs to mark contaminated areas.[95]

Limited RE was conducted between 1999 and 2006 by the ICBL-GC, Ministry of Education, and HALO, with support from UNICEF and the ICRC. In 1999, the ICBL-GC began a campaign working with the local government in the western Zugdidi region. In 2001, Georgia reported that RE was conducted in schools, but the ICBL-GC found that only very limited RE was conducted, without support. In 2003, HALO started an RE program particularly targeting people illegally crossing the border with Abkhazia, then expanding to focus on areas around former military bases. Information gathered by HALO in 2004 found that many people had not received RE and were unaware, uninformed, and at times reckless. In early 2006, HALO ended its activities due to lack of funding.

Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW survivors is not known but reportedly numbers at least 591.[96] The medical and rehabilitation sectors in Georgia continued to suffer from lack of funding, poor infrastructure and equipment, inadequate and low-quality services, and additional payments for services. Psychological support and economic reintegration opportunities were lacking. Little progress was made in enforcing legislation or implementing plans to improve the lives of persons with disabilities including mine survivors. However, progress was made in NGO-government coordination and policy making.[97]

Persons with disabilities, including landmine survivors, have little access to adequate quality medical services or community-based alternatives.[98] Since 2006, health system capacity was being enhanced with World Bank loans, which were extended to the end-2010. However, government privatization of the health sector posed a substantial risk to equal availability of services.[99] In response to the 2008 conflict, the ICRC supported two hospitals in central and western Georgia assisting weapon-injured patients. The ICRC also provided minor repairs to Tskhinvali hospital, located within the 2008 conflict zone.[100]

Access to rehabilitation and prosthetics services and other necessary devices is generally insufficient.[101] GEFPOR provides services including prostheses free of charge to landmine survivors. People from isolated areas pay for their transport and there is limited accommodation at the center for them. GEFPOR has the only technicians trained to the International Society for Prosthetics and Orthics’ category II in Georgia; one is a mine survivor. Due to ongoing financial difficulties and delayed government funding, some 130 people were on a waiting list for devices in May 2009. There was no reported increase in beneficiaries requiring prostheses as a result of the recent conflict. In accordance with its sustainability planning, GEFPOR produces devices using ICRC technology. In addition, Otto Bock brand prostheses are sold as part of a cost recovery system. Technicians received training from the ICRC and the Otto Bock company in 2008.[102] The ICRC continued to cover approximately one-third or more of GEFPOR’s costs and continued to cover prosthetic treatment costs at the Vladikavkaz Orthopedic Center in Russia. The ICRC also provided training on psychological support to physiotherapists.[103]

There is a recognized shortfall of specialized personnel in the field of psychological support and social reintegration, including social workers, occupational therapists, and psychological assistance workers. There is little access to inclusive education, continuing education, and vocational training. Georgia lacks teachers with experience in addressing the needs of persons with disabilities and no special training is available.[104]

The Law on the Social Protection of the Disabled was not fully implemented and persons with disabilities faced discrimination in employment, education, and access to services.[105] The mobility and social participation of persons with disabilities was inadequate.[106] Many persons with disabilities, including amputees and mine survivors, rarely leave their homes.[107]

In May 2009, the MoLHSA hosted a three-day regional workshop organized by the ICRC and the ITF on comprehensive approaches to rehabilitation and reintegration services for mine victims and other persons with disabilities. Participants attended from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Tajikistan and well as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Slovenia. One of the objectives of the workshop was to initiate discussions on developing comprehensive national VA program in Georgia. The ITF planned to initiate a socio-economic reintegration for mine survivors’ project in late 2009.[108]

Victim assistance activities

The NGO Association of Disabled Women and Mothers of Disabled Children (ADW) continued in 2008 to provide assistance to persons with disabilities and their families, including mine/ERW survivors in the Zugdidi region. In 2008, ADW provided school textbooks for six children, including two survivors and two family members, and provided wheelchairs to two mine survivors and assisted a mine survivor’s child with disabilities to access pre-primary school education. In cooperation with the Swiss NGO Geneva Call, ADW undertook a socio-economic needs assessment survey of landmine survivors in the Zudidi and Tskhinvali regions of Georgia in June 2008. In cooperation with the Ministry of Education and Science, ADW supported one mine survivor in continuing college education.[109]

GEFPOR reported providing services to 23 amputee mine/ERW survivors in 2008; at least 16 survivors received prostheses.[110]

In 2008, the ICBL-GC continued its vocational training project providing small business opportunities to some 20 mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities; part of the project funding was carried over to 2009 to provide opportunities for new beneficiaries.[111]

Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of comprehensive cost estimates for overall clearance, RE, or VA in Georgia. No comprehensive estimates have been reported for mine action in South Ossetia.

As a result of ERW and cluster munition remnants contamination left by the August 2008 conflict, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) included a mine action component in its August 2008 flash appeal for humanitarian assistance to Georgia. Funds requested for mine action included US$125,000 to the UN Mine Action Service for coordination of emergency mine action, and $350,000 to UNICEF for RE. After a review of the humanitarian situation, OCHA issued a revised appeal in October 2008, in which only the $350,000 RE appeal remained, which had already been surpassed by contributions and commitments totaling $394,926.[112] OCHA reported that no additional or separate funding was needed for the mine action sector because HALO operations in Georgia were fully covered during the period covered by the revised appeal.[113]

National support for mine action

Georgia did not report contributions to mine action operations in 2008. No national funding was reported in 2007.

International cooperation and assistance

Eight countries and the European Commission (EC) reported contributing $8,705,885 (€5,911,914) to mine action in Georgia. No international funding was reported in 2007.

2008 International Mine Action Funding to Georgia: Monetary[114]

Donor

Implementing Agencies/Organizations

Project Details

Amount

US

HALO, government of Georgia

Emergency survey and response, mine action coordination

$5,200,000

Canada

iMMAP

Capacity-building, cluster munitions/ERW clearance

$906,842 (C$966,679)

European Commission

HALO

Cluster munitions/ERW clearance

$736,300 (€500,000)

Austria

UNICEF

Psychosocial support and RE

$515,410 (€350,000)

Norway

NPA

Cluster munitions/ERW clearance

$443,249 (NOK2,498,587)

United Kingdom

HALO

Cluster munitions/ERW clearance

$370,900 (£200,000)

Germany

HALO

Unspecified

$294,520 (€200,000)

Czech Republic

ITF

Unspecified

$227,272

Slovenia

ITF

Rehabilitation training

$11,392 (€7,736)

In October 2008, the ITF and the Georgian Ministry of Defense signed a two-year MoU to support development of Georgia’s mine action capacities, starting in January 2009. The agreement covers management, quality assurance, assessment, standing operating procedures, and victim assistance, and may be extended to other mine action activities. The ITF reported the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia as contributors to the project. The ITF supported training of Georgian rehabilitation specialists in 2008, with Slovenia reported as the sole donor.[115]

In addition to its specific monetary contributions in 2008 to national mine action initiatives, the European Commission reported in May 2009 a €39 million ($57,431,400) general commitment during 2008 to mine action in a number of countries. Georgia was among the states named as recipients within the overall commitment.


[1] Statement by George Dolidze, Deputy Director, Department for Security Policy and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 23 April 2007.

[2] For example, in September 2006, Georgia told States Parties, “Over the years, one of the principle reasons for not acceding to the Convention has been the existence of...territories uncontrolled by the central authorities of the state and therefore, incapability to fulfill the obligations put forward in the convention. However…discussions concerning the possibility of reconsideration of the above-stated position have started.” Statement of Georgia, Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 21 September 2006.

[3] Internal Report on ICBL Meeting with the Permanent Mission of Georgia to the UN in Geneva, 23 September 2008; email from George Dolidze, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 March 2009; and email from Kartlos Koranashvili, Deputy Head of Administration, Department of International Relations and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Ministry of Defense, 23 March 2009.

[4] Each protocol enters into force for Georgia six months after these dates on which it formally gave its consent to be bound.

[5] Statement by George Dolidze, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 23 April 2007.

[6] For details on cluster munitions policy and practice see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice, Mines Action Canada, May 2009, pp. 205–207.

[7] The moratorium was proclaimed by President Eduard Shevdarnadze at the UN in September 1996 and has been repeated by officials many times since. See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 792; and Note Verbale to the OSCE, 17 January 2001.

[8] Statement by George Dolidze, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 23 April 2007. Georgia has made similar statements previously. See Statement of Georgia, Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 21 September 2006; and Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 890. In May 2005, the Ministry of Defense stated that the operational plan of the Georgian Armed Forces does not include mine use. ICBL meeting with David Sikharulidze, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Defense, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005.

[9] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, pp. 706–707; and Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 968–969.

[10] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, pp. 826–827. In June 2008, South Ossetian authorities blamed Georgia for laying a mine which killed a boy outside Tskhinvali. Georgian authorities responded that the Russian mine type in the incident is not one held in their arsenal. “Separatists Accuse Georgia of Placing Mines in Conflict Zone,” Georgian Mze TV, 15 June 2008, georgiandaily.com.

[11] For allegations on both sides, see politicalminefields.wordpress.com. Georgia provided the ICBL and others with a document titled “Bombed and Mined Areas During Russian Occupation (from August 7, 2008),” dated 26 August 2008, that alleges Russian use of antipersonnel mines in at least eight locations from 7 August to 21 August 2008. See also, Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “RF delays in the withdrawal of its military forces,” 18 August 2008, georgiamfa.blogspot.com; “Russian Troops Remain, But with Lighter Presence,” Washington Post, 21 August 2008, www.washingtonpost.com; and HRW interview with Batu Kutelia, First Deputy Minister, Ministry of Defense, Tbilisi, 22 August 2008.

[12] An official from the Georgian Ministry of Defense said that the Georgian Armed Forces did not use mines during the conflict. Email from Kartlos Koranashvili, Ministry of Defense, 23 March 2009. An official from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote, “Despite Georgian aggression in South Ossetia, the Russian Federation did not employ the use of cassette [cluster] bombs or antipersonnel landmines.” Letter from Andrei Kelin, Director, Fourth Department of CIS Countries, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 30 January 2009.

[13] HRW, “A Dying Practice: Use of Cluster Munitions by Russia and Georgia in August 2008,” April 2009, www.hrw.org.

[14] At the time, Russian peacekeepers alleged that Georgian forces laid new mines near a new Georgian checkpoint, on the northern side of Broken Bridge, the point of separation between Abkhazian and Georgian controlled sections of the gorge. Abkhazian officials accused Georgian troops of mining roads and bridges in the upper part of the gorge.

[15] Emails from HALO, 7 August 2009 and 9 July 2009.

[16] Statement by George Dolidze, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 23 April 2007. Georgia has said this many times in the past.

[17] ICBL meeting with David Sikharulidze, Ministry of Defense, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005. In August 2007, Georgia said that it had recovered an undisclosed number of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines from a former Russian Army base in Akhalkalaki. Pavel Belov, “Russians Leave Cesium and Landmines Behind in Georgia,” Kommersant, 17 August 2007, www.kommersant.com.

[18] Statement to the ICBL-Georgia Committee by David Nardaia, Head, Department on International Cooperation, Ministry of Defense, Tbilisi, October 2006. A similar statement was made during the international workshop “Regional Cooperation and Confidence Building through Mine Action,” Tbilisi, 4–6 October 2005.

[19] During the Soviet era, South Ossetia was an autonomous region of the Georgian SSR. In autumn 1990 it proclaimed full sovereignty within the USSR. Georgia’s government reacted by abolishing the autonomous status of South Ossetia in December 1990, leading to armed conflict in 1991–1992. The conflict culminated with South Ossetia’s de facto secession from Georgia in 1992. In June 1992 a cease-fire brokered by Russia created a Joint Control Commission and Joint Peacekeeping Forces, with Georgian, Russian, and Ossetian units. Tensions escalated in 2004 after Georgia decided to prioritize the restoration of its territorial integrity, with increased instability and occasional skirmishes. Relations between Georgia and Russia also became increasingly strained. See HRW, “Up in Flames: Humanitarian Law Violations and Civilian Victims in the Conflict over South Ossetia,” January 2009, pp. 16–20.

[20] Russia formally submitted its consent to be bound by the Protocol on 21 July 2008, and the instrument took effect for it on 21 January 2009. Georgia gave its consent to be bound on 22 December 2008, and it entered into force on 21 June 2009. After agreeing to be bound, the countries must not “defeat the object and purpose” of the Protocol, even prior to entry into force.

[21] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 839; and “UN warns Georgia returnees of uncleared land mines,” AP (Geneva), 26 August 2008, www.iht.com.

[22] Email from Matthew Hovell, HALO, 6 September 2009.

[23] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 839; and email from Matthew Hovell, HALO, 2 July 2008.

[24] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 840; and telephone interview with Kartlos Koranashvili, Ministry of Defense, 23 June 2008.

[25] Email from Irakli Kochashvili, Deputy Head, International Relations and Euro-Atlantic Integration Department, Ministry of Defense, 6 September 2009.

[26] Interview with George Dolidze, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Geneva, 28 May 2009. HALO’s survey of the area found a barrier minefield approximately 7km long.

[27] HALO, “Caucasus & Balkans, Georgia, The Problem,” www.halotrust.org; and email from Matthew Hovell, HALO, 6 September 2009.

[28] HALO, “An Introduction to the Ammunition Threat in the Gori-Tskhinvali Corridor,” www.halogeorgia.org. The submunitions are stamped M095 but are said to be identical to the M85 submunition.

[29] HALO, “Caucasus & Balkans, Georgia, The Problem,” www.halotrust.org.

[30] HALO, “Caucasus & Balkans, Georgia, Requirement for Continued Clearance,” www.halotrust.org.

[31] Email from Matthew Hovell, HALO, 11 August 2009.

[32] HALO, “Caucasus & Balkans, Georgia, The Problem,” www.halotrust.org.

[33] “NPA Georgia Operations Overview,” Presentation by Jonathon Guthrie, Program Manager, Georgia BAC, NPA, 31 March 2009.

[34] Information based on Landmine Monitor media monitoring between 1 January and 31 December 2008.

[35] These casualties have been included in the total for Abkhazia for 2008. See report on Abkhazia in this edition of Landmine Monitor.

[36] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 841.

[37] HRW, “A dying practice: use of cluster munitions by Georgia and Russia in August 2008,” New York, April 2009, pp. 1, 40, 54.

[38] Landmine Monitor total casualty figures include only individuals killed or injured in incidents involving explosive devices unintentionally detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person. Casualties of other weapons of war and targeted weapons, including cluster munitions during strikes have not been included in totals. The future entry into force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions may result in a reassessment of how cluster submunition casualties are defined.

[39] Information based on Landmine Monitor media monitoring between 1 January and 15 June 2009.

[40] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 829; and Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 973.

[41] Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 972–973; Landmine Monitor Report 2005, pp. 711–712; Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 829; and Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 842.

[42]Email from Marika Kalmakhelidze, Public Relations Manager, GEFPOR, 24 April 2009.

[43] HRW, “A dying practice: Use of cluster munitions by Russia and Georgia in August 2008,” April 2009, p. 74.

[44] Information based on Landmine Monitor media monitoring between 1 January and 31 December 2008.

[45] “Americans will help to demine the territory of Georgia,” Newsru.com, 10 October 2008, www.newsru.com.

[46] iMMAP, “Establishing the New Georgian Explosive Remnants of War Coordination Centre (ERWCC),” Press release, 25 February 2009.

[47] Ministry of Defense, “Presentation of the New Office at the Hotel Tbilisi – Marriott,” 25 February 2009, www.mod.gov.ge.

[48] Email from Dave Armitt, Program Manager, iMMAP, 26 June 2009.

[49] Email from with Randy Kerel, Operations Manager, iMMAP, 26 June 2009.

[50] Email from Irakli Kochashvili, Ministry of Defense, 30 June 2009.

[51] iMMAP, “Establishing the New Georgian Explosive Remnants of War Coordination Centre (ERWCC),” Press release, 25 February 2009.

[52] Interview with Lela Rekhviashvili, Operations Assistant, ERWCC/iMMAP, Tbilisi, 3 May 2009.

[53] Interview with Loilita Shengelia, Senior Specialist, Social Protection Department, MoLHSA, Tbilisi, 2 May 2009.

[54] Email from Irakli Kochashvili, Ministry of Defense, 6 September 2009.

[55] Email from Randy Kerel, iMMAP, 26 June 2009.

[56] Interview with Lela Rekhviashvili, ERWCC/iMMAP, Tbilisi, 3 May 2009.

[57] Email from Jonathon Guthrie, NPA, 8 September 2009.

[58] “NPA Georgia Operations Overview,” Presentation by Jonathon Guthrie, NPA, 31 March 2009.

[59] Email from Irakli Kochashvili, Ministry of Defense, 30 June 2009.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Email from Gvantsa Kvinikadze, Project Manager, NATO Partnership for Peace Trust Fund Project Georgia, 23 March 2009.

[62] Parliament of Georgia, “Concept Paper on Social Integration of the People with Disabilities,” p. 3, www.parliament.ge; Coalition for Independent Living (CIL), “Concept Paper on Social Integration Unanimously Passed by Parliament,” disability.ge.

[63] Interview with Loilita Shengelia, MoLHSA and Rati Ionatamishvili, Public Relations Manager, CIL, Tbilisi, 2 May 2009.

[64] Email from Irakli Kochashvili, Ministry of Defense, 30 June 2009

[65] Telephone interview with Col. Zurab Gabunia, Ministry of Defense, 25 June 2009.

[66] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 840; and email from Kartlos Koranashvili, Ministry of Defense, 16 May 2008.

[67] Email from Irakli Kochashvili, Ministry of Defense, 30 June 2009.

[68] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 840; and email from Kartlos Koranashvili, Ministry of Defense, 16 May 2008.

[69] Telephone interview with Randy Kerel, IMMAP, 25 June 2009.

[70] HRW, “A Dying Practice, Use of Cluster Munitions by Russia and Georgia in August 2008,” April 2009, p. 71.

[71] Ibid, p. 70.

[72] Ibid p. 71.

[73] Ibid, p. 71.

[74] “Memorandum of Understanding “On Humanitarian Mine Action Assistance,” 17 September 2008, www.mod.gov.ge; and “Norway will help Georgia with works on mine clearing,” 19 September 2008, www.norge.ru.

[75] Email from Vasili Rubashvili, First Secretary, Department for Security Policy and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 March 2009.

[76] Email from Jonathon Guthrie, NPA, 23 March 2009.

[77] HRW, “A Dying Practice, Use of Cluster Munitions by Russia and Georgia in August 2008,” April 2009, p. 73.

[78] Telephone interview with Jonathon Guthrie, NPA, 2 July 2009.

[79] HALO, “HALO Emergency Response in Georgia,” www.halotrust.org.

[80] Email from Vasili Rubashvili, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 March 2009.

[81] HRW, “A Dying Practice, Use of Cluster Munitions by Russia and Georgia in August 2008,” April 2009, p. 72; and email from Matthew Hovell, HALO, 6 September 2009.

[82] “NPA Georgia Operations Overview” Presentation by Jonathon Guthrie, NPA, 31 March 2009 and email from Jonathon Guthrie, 8 September 2009; and email from Andrew Moore, Program Manager, HALO, 14 August 2009. HALO also reported 67,889m2 of subsurface BAC as well as the destruction of 694 items of stray ammunition and 300 items of small arms ammunition. The Georgian Ministry of Defense has reported that the Engineering Battalion of the Georgian Armed Forces has disposed 687 unexploded submunitions and more than 2,200 other items of UXO, but did not specify the period during which clearance took place. Email from Irakli Kochashvili, Ministry of Defense, 6 September 2009.

[83] HRW, “A Dying Practice, Use of Cluster Munitions by Russia and Georgia in August 2008,” April 2009, p. 62.

[84] Statements of Russian Federation, CCW Group of Governmental Experts on Cluster Munitions, Geneva,
1 September 2008, and CCW Group of Governmental Experts on Protocol V, 23 April 2009 (Notes by Landmine Action); see also Russian Embassy to Cambodia, “An update on the humanitarian relief efforts of the Russian Federation aimed at providing assistance to civilian population of the South Ossetia affected by the conflict in the region,” undated, www.embrusscambodia.mid.ru; and UN OCHA, “Situation Report No. 7 on the Situation in Georgia,” 25 August 2008, www.reliefweb.int.

[85] Email from Kartlos Koranashvili, Ministry of Defense, 23 March 2009; and telephone interview with Lela Potskhverashvili, Ministry of Defense, 2 July 2009.

[86] “Estonian mine-clearance team receives medals for their mission in Georgia,” 10 October 2008, www.baltic-course.com.

[87] HRW, “A Dying Practice, Use of Cluster Munitions by Russia and Georgia in August 2008,” April 2009, p. 74.

[88] Ibid, p. 75.

[89] “NPA Georgia Operations Overview,” Presentation by Jonathon Guthrie, NPA, 31 March 2009.

[90] Email from Randy Kerel, iMMAP, 26 June 2009.

[91] Email from Narine Berikashvili, Researcher, Landmine Monitor, 26 June 2009.

[92] HRW, “A dying practice: Use of cluster munitions by Russia and Georgia in August 2008,” April 2009, p. 77; Pamela Renner, “Educating children about unexploded ordnance through art and drama in Georgia,” UNICEF, 3 April 2009, www.unicef.org; ICRC, “Georgia/South Ossetia: Remote areas lack food, proper access to health care,” Relief Web, 22 October 2008, www.reliefweb.int; Women’s Information Centre, “Current activities: Visit to Nikozi Public School,” undated, www.wicge.org; ICRC, “Facts and Figures - Explosive Remnants of War,” January–December 2008; Georgia Red Cross, “ICRC session on mine risk education,” redcross.ge; and Office of the UN Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator in Georgia, “Situation Report No. 36 on the Situation in Georgia,” 13–20 November 2008, pp.1, 4.

[93] HRW, “A dying practice: Use of cluster munitions by Russia and Georgia in August 2008,” April 2009, p. 78.

[94] Office of the UN Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator in Georgia, “Situation Report No. 36 on the Situation in Georgia,” 13–20 November 2008, p. 4.

[95] ICRC, “Georgia/South Ossetia: Remote areas lack food, proper access to health care,” Relief Web, 22 October 2008, www.reliefweb.int.

[96] Email from Marika Kalmakhelidze, GEFPOR, 24 April 2009. However, this figure reflects the number of registered mine survivors that are in need of some orthopedic device. Casualties that do not need for example an amputation might never visit the GEFPOR centre and thus would never be registered.

[97] Interview with Loilita Shengelia, MoLHSA, and Rati Ionatamishvili, CIL, Tbilisi, 2 May 2009.

[98] Parliament of Georgia, “Concept Paper on Social Integration of the People with Disabilities,” p. 3, www.parliament.ge.

[99] World Bank, “Project Paper Georgia–Primary Health Care Development Project: Restructuring,” 5 March 2009, www-wds.worldbank.org; and World Bank, “Data Sheet Template for Project Paper Georgia: Primary Health Care Development Project (Credit No.3702),” 5 March 2009, www-wds.worldbank.org.

[100] ICRC, “Annual Report 2008,” Geneva, 27 May 2009, p. 256.

[101] Parliament of Georgia, “Concept Paper on Social Integration of the People with Disabilities,” p. 3, www.parliament.ge.

[102] Interview with Marika Kalmakhelidze, GEFPOR, Tbilisi, 30 April 2009.

[103] ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme: Annual Report 2008,” Geneva, 7 May 2009, p. 53

[104] Parliament of Georgia, “Concept Paper on Social Integration of the People with Disabilities,” p. 3, www.parliament.ge.

[105] US Department of State, “2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Georgia,” Washington, DC, 25 February 2009.

[106] Parliament of Georgia, “Concept Paper on Social Integration of the People with Disabilities,” p. 3, www.parliament.ge.

[107] Interview with Marika Kalmakhelidze, GEFPOR, Tbilisi, 30 April 2009.

[108] Email from Luka Buhin, Project Manager, ITF, 4 September 2009.

[109] Email from Madona Kharebava, Head, ADW, 18 March 2009; and email from Nicholas Florquin, Program Officer, Geneva Call, 4 September 2009.

[110] Email from Marika Kalmakhelidze, GEFPOR, 23 March 2009; and data provided by Didier Reck, Regional Head of Physical Rehabilitation Programmes, ICRC, 28 April 2009.

[111] Interview with Maia Buchukuri, Coordinator, ICBL-GC, Tbilisi, 3 May 2009.

[112] UN OCHA, “Georgia Crisis Flash Appeal: Revised,” October 2008, p. 52.

[113] Ibid, p. 18.

[114] Emails from Willian Schlossberg, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, US Department of State, 29 June 2009; Kim Henrie-Lafontaine, Second Secretary, Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada, 6 June 2009 and 19 June 2009; Mari Cruz Cristóbal, Policy Assistant, Directorate-General for External Relations, 28 May 2009; Daniela Krejdl, Humanitarian Aid, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 March 2009; Ingunn Vatne, Senior Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 June 2009; Amy White, Deputy Program Manager, DfID, 17 March 2009; Gregor Kaplan, Security Policy Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 June 2009; and Matthew Hovell, HALO, 6 September 2009. Germany Article 7 Report, Form J, submitted 27 April 2009; and Czech Republic Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form J. A total of $1.17 of from the US contribution of $5.2 million was for mine action in Abkhazia.

[115] ITF, “Annual Report 2008,” p. 63.