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Nepal

Nepal

2008 Key Data

Mine Ban Treaty status

Not a State Party

Contamination

Antipersonnel mines, IEDs, ERW

Estimated area of contamination

3.25km2 of mined and battle/IED areas

Casualties in 2008

73 (2007: 104)

Estimated mine/ERW survivors

Unknown but at least 550

Demining in 2008

Clearance of 13,200m2 of mined areas

Risk education recipients in 2008

100,000

Support for mine action in 2008

Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of Nepal has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Since 1999, some of Nepal’s most senior officials have expressed support for a ban on antipersonnel mines and various leaders have regularly stated that Nepal is carefully studying accession to the Mine Ban Treaty. Nepal voted in support of every pro-ban UN General Assembly resolution from 1996 to 2006, then abstained the past two years. Both Maoist rebels and government forces used antipersonnel landmines and/or improvised explosive devices, including victim-activated devices, in the decade-long conflict that ended in 2006. Mine use was prohibited under the May 2006 cease-fire agreement and subsequent November 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

Since the end of its internal armed conflict and despite not being party to the Mine Ban Treaty, Nepal has made slow but steady progress towards clearance of mined areas with UN support.

Landmine Monitor identified a total of 756 casualties from victim-activated devices (205 killed and 551 injured) between 2003 and 2008. From 1999 to 2002, the Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines reported 1,326 casualties (522 killed and 804 injured), but these were unconfirmed and include incidents involving command-detonated devices.

Since 2004, a large number of NGOs—with the Nepal Red Cross Society, the army, and the police—have been involved in delivering risk education (RE), coordinated by UNICEF. Community-based RE is delivered through thousands of volunteers, supported by village facilitators. In 2009, a program was established to introduce more systematic RE into schools.

The armed conflict left state services at a minimum in affected areas. The health sector remains severely lacking in government funding, trained medical staff, and material resources. Yet there have been improvements, particularly since the end of the conflict. With the support of NGOs, rehabilitation services have improved to international standards. The government and victim assistance stakeholders, with support from UNICEF and Handicap International, developed a National Victim Assistance Strategic Framework in August 2009.

Mine Ban Policy

Nepal has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. The November 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) committed the government and the Unified Communist Party of Nepal/Maoist (UCPN/M)[1] rebels to halt the use of landmines, and required the parties to assist each other to mark and clear mines and booby-traps within a certain time.[2]

After registering to participate, Nepal did not attend the Ninth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in November 2008 in Geneva. On 2 December 2008, Nepal abstained from voting on the annual UN General Assembly Resolution 63/42 calling for universalization and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. This was the second consecutive year that Nepal abstained, after voting in favor of all previous pro-ban resolutions since 1996.

A Ministry of Foreign Affairs official told a visiting ICBL delegation in December 2008 that the decisions not to participate in the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, and to abstain on the UNGA vote, reflected the current government thinking that Nepal should not associate itself with treaties of which it was not a member. He added that there was a lack of convergence of views on the question of accession among major stakeholders such as the Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and the army.[3]

The ICBL mission to Kathmandu from 14–16 December 2008 met with the Army Commander-in-Chief, Minister of Peace and Reconstruction, Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Secretary, Defense Secretary, leaders from major political parties, and others. Subash Chandra Nembang, the Chair and Speaker of the Constituent Assembly, stated that the time was right to act on this issue and promised to extend his full support.[4] It appears, however, that the army wishes to retain the option to use landmines again to protect its defense posts in case of renewed insurgency.[5]

Nepal attended the Bangkok Workshop on Achieving a Mine-Free South-East Asia held 1–3 April 2009, the second in a series of regional meetings convened in the lead-up to the treaty’s Second Review Conference, but did not make any statements. It did not attend the May 2009 intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva.

It is likely that progress toward accession has been slowed by the stalemate on integration of the Maoist rebels into Nepal’s army, as well as the resignation of the Maoist Prime Minister and change of government in May 2009.

On 10 August 2008, the Minister of Peace and Reconstruction, Ram Chandra Poudel, signed the August Declaration on Mine Action and the Ottawa Treaty, prepared by the Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines (NCBL) which stated, “We will make efforts to create an environment conducive to making the Nepal government sign the Mine Ban Treaty and enforce it immediately on our respective behalf.” The declaration set the short-term goal of accession prior to the Second Review Conference in November 2009.[6] Also in August 2008, the NCBL received signatures from 13 out of 25 political parties in the Constituent Assembly to a “Letter of Commitment” to pursue accession to the Mine Ban Treaty.[7]

Nepal is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

No new use of antipersonnel mines by the Nepal Army has been reported since the 2006 cease-fire. Previously, the Nepal Army used antipersonnel mines as well as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) assembled in-country around military installations, police posts, and infrastructure. The Nepal Army has stated that it started using mines in 2002, and estimates it deployed around 14,000 antipersonnel mines (including 11,000 PMD-6 mines and 3,000 POMZ-2 and NMM 14 mines). It also estimates that it used about 25,000 command-detonated IEDs.[8]

In December 2008, General Rukmang Katwal, the army’s Chief of Staff, told an ICBL delegation that Nepal had never used landmines on its borders, and could not conceive of a situation which might necessitate their use. He acknowledged that the few thousand mines in Nepal’s stockpile could hardly afford any protection.[9]

A Nepal Army spokesperson said in 2007 that the army had a stockpile of about 3,000 antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, including POMZ-2 and PMD antipersonnel mines. Nepal imported its mines from China, India, and the former Soviet Union, mostly in the 1980s.[10] Nepal is not known to have exported antipersonnel mines.

In 2003 and 2005, Nepali officials told Landmine Monitor that Nepal produced antipersonnel mines.[11] Since the 2006 cease-fire and CPA, army officials have insisted that there has never been any production of antipersonnel mines. In 2007, an army officer denied any antipersonnel mine production, while acknowledging that soldiers frequently made command-detonated IEDs at barracks using munitions such as mortar shells, rockets, bombs, and antivehicle mines.[12] In March 2008, another army official told Landmine Monitor that Nepal did not produce or use any victim-activated mines or IEDs.[13] In December 2008, General Rukmang Katwal told the ICBL that Nepal had no capacity to produce landmines, nor did it ever have such capacity.[14] No Nepali-produced antipersonnel mines have been found in minefields.

It does not appear that Nepal is currently producing antipersonnel mines, but the conflicting information about past production remains to be clarified. Landmine Monitor will continue to list Nepal as a producer until Nepal makes an official, formal statement that it does not produce antipersonnel mines and does not intend to do so in the future.

Non-state armed groups

Although the former rebel Communist Party of Nepal/Maoist (CPN/M) became a part of the interim government in April 2007, its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) still exists and is being demobilized. In the past, the PLA was expert at the manufacture and use of a variety of IEDs, including victim-activated, time-delayed, and command-detonated types.[15] There have been no reports of new use of antipersonnel mines, victim-activated IEDs, or booby-traps by the PLA since the May 2006 cease-fire.[16]

In December 2008, Shree Ram Dhakal (also known as Prasanta), Secretary of the CPN/M central office, told ICBL representatives said that the struggle is not over yet and nobody knows what may happen in the future. Under the terms of the CPA and the Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies agreement, the PLA was cantoned at seven sites and obligated to turn in all IEDs at designated storage locations a safe distance from the sites. Some observers believe some PLA cadres, and their arms, remain outside the UN camps. Shree Ram Dhakal said that all weapons and explosives were handed over to the UN, but that some might have been inadvertently left out.[17]

Rebel armed groups still exist in Nepal, especially in the Terai region. There is no evidence that any of them have used or possessed antipersonnel mines. Many use command-detonated IEDs (see Casualties section below).

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Nepal is affected by landmines, almost all antipersonnel, as well as by ERW. The decade of internal armed conflict that ended in November 2006 left Nepal contaminated by IEDs, used by both Nepal’s army and police, and by the CPN/M. More recent violence involving autonomy-seeking groups in Nepal’s southern Terai region is adding IED contamination, albeit not yet on a large scale.[18]

The Security Forces, which include both the Nepal Army and the Armed Police Force, laid 53 antipersonnel minefields, and a further 300 or so areas are protected with command-detonated devices (including IEDs),[19] as defensive perimeters around military installations, police posts, and infrastructure.

As of July 2009, the Nepal Army had cleared 17 minefields and 90 IED fields.[20] That left 36 minefields covering an estimated 3.25km2. On the basis of existing clearance capacity (two to three demining platoons), the UN Mine Action Team (UNMAT) projected that all mined areas could be cleared by mid-2011.[21]

In July 2008, the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) concluded destruction of all Category 1 (unstable) IEDs at Maoist cantonment sites in accordance with the CPA. In excess of 7,250kg of explosive items were destroyed in nine locations.[22] UNMAT continued destruction of Category 2 (safe to store) IEDs in 2009. As of July, 7,926 IEDs had been destroyed and a further 18,308 items remained to be destroyed.[23]

A UN interagency mine action assessment conducted in late 2007 was still awaiting comment by the government as of December 2008.[24]

Casualties

In 2008, the Nepali NGO Informal Service Sector Center (INSEC) recorded 73 new mine/ERW casualties (four killed and 69 injured) from victim-activated explosions in 38 incidents.[25] Boys accounted for the majority of casualties (33 casualties), followed by men (17), girls (13), and women (10). Most casualties were caused by tampering with explosive devices (60), followed by collecting wood and water (four). Children were 72% (43) of all the casualties that occurred while tampering with explosive devices. In addition, there was one demining accident in August 2008, which resulted in a deminer losing several fingers.[26]

The number of casualties in 2008 decreased by 29% from the 104 casualties (13 killed and 91 injured) reported in 2007: the number of incidents decreased by 7% (from 42 in 2007).[27] Despite the overall decrease in incidents, there was an increase in incidents related to armed groups in the Terai region.

The total number of casualties from victim-activated devices in Nepal is unknown, owing to the late onset of data collection. Landmine Monitor identified a total of 756 confirmed casualties from victim-activated devices (205 killed and 551 injured) between 2003 and 2008, using information provided by INSEC, UNICEF, and media reports. However, the data for 2003 and 2004 is only partial, gathered retrospectively by UNICEF from 2005 onwards. Casualties are certainly under-reported by INSEC, as from 2006 to 2008 only non-combatant casualties were included in their database. From 1999 to 2002, the NCBL reported 1,326 unconfirmed casualties (522 killed and 804 injured). However, as this data includes casualties from targeted attacks, this does not represent an accurate picture of the numbers killed and injured by victim-activated weapons. [28]

Casualties continued to occur in 2009. By 23 June, 15 incidents caused 32 casualties, killing eight and injuring 24. Nineteen casualties were boys, six men, four women, and three girls.[29]

In 2009, with UNICEF support, a separate database was established by INSEC for incidents caused by intentional (command) detonation of explosive devices. The database is based on secondary sources, such as historical INSEC data and media reports.[30] As of July 2009, the database contained 254 casualties (including 21 killed) for 2008,[31] from 76 intentional explosions in 20 districts, including one incident that caused 41 casualties. Casualties from intentional explosions amounted to 78% of all casualties from explosions in Nepal in 2008.[32]

There are no comprehensive statistics on people injured and killed in the conflict or on persons with disabilities. The National Federation of the Disabled planned to conduct a nationwide disability survey to address the lack of data once funding has been secured.[33]

Risk profile

The greatest risk comes from IEDs.[34] The majority of casualties occurred in Terai and an increasing number were caused by the activation of IEDs placed by new armed groups.[35] Tampering and handling were the main causes of explosions. Children accounted for 63% of casualties in 2008.[36] In November 2008, the UN claimed that, “[a]s the situation is now more stable, the return of internally displaced people and the increased number of abandoned barracks surrounded by minefields could lead to an increase in casualties.”[37]

Socio-economic impact

Despite the limited extent of contamination, the benefits of clearance could be considerable—opening up power delivery to communities that in many areas go unserved for most of the day, and permitting the construction of more cell phone towers, in addition to increasing land available for cultivation.[38]

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action

Nepal’s cabinet decided in June 2007 to set up a National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), consisting of an interministerial Steering Committee with strategic policy responsibility and an implementing Technical Committee, both under the auspices of the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MOPR).[39] As of July 2009, however, the Steering Committee had met only once. Restructuring underway at the MOPR was expected to lead to the establishment of a mine action office to serve as a focal point for coordinating mine action.[40]

In the meantime, a Mine Action Joint Working Group, an informal committee which meets every four to six weeks and is chaired by UNMAT, addresses all mine action issues, including mine/ERW risk education (RE) and victim assistance (VA). The Joint Working Group’s 26 members included the MOPR, the army and police, UN agencies, Nepal Red Cross Society (NRCS), NCBL, various national and international NGOs, and the ICRC as an observer.[41]

The Nepal Army set up a Mine Action Center (NAMAC) in 2007 in the Army Engineers Directorate, but this coordinates only the work of army engineers.[42]

Victim assistance

The NMAA’s Steering Committee and Technical Committee are tasked with coordinating mine action, including VA, but as of July 2009 had not become operational and did not have terms of reference.[43] Moreover, neither committee included the Ministry of Women, Children and Social Welfare, the lead ministry for people with disabilities, nor the Ministry of Health and Population.[44] UN agencies continued to interact with the government on the need for an operational national mine action authority.[45]

Data collection and management

NAMAC operates a database equipped with the latest version of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).[46] The database was accidentally wiped out in 2008, and in 2009 work started repopulating it with clearance records.[47]

RE activities are not entered into IMSMA and all organizations maintain their own records. As of July 2009, UNICEF was working on gathering these records, but the data was not available to Landmine Monitor.[48]

The MOPR is officially responsible for collecting and managing mine action data, but since June 2006, INSEC has been the de facto source of casualty data for the mine action sector in Nepal. Working in partnership with 50 organizations, the INSEC surveillance system of mine/ERW/IED explosions monitors all 75 districts of Nepal. At the Joint Working Group in December 2008, the Nepal Police, Armed Police Force, and Nepal Army agreed to provide INSEC with data on casualties in their own ranks from 2008 onwards.[49]

Data is collected by INSEC in a standardized form, with case definition, differentiation of device types and detonation mechanisms, incident location, and casualty information.[50] The INSEC database allows for ongoing prioritization of RE, VA, advocacy, and clearance programs in Nepal. Members of the Joint Working Group used the data from INSEC in planning and prioritizing of their work in 2008.[51]

The definition for “casualties from victim-activated devices” was revised by the Joint Working Group in 2008 and was to be used by members, including INSEC, from 2009 onwards. The revised definition includes “casualties injured or killed…when they have activated an Explosive Device (ED) unknowingly, or without the intention to harm, hurt or terrorize.” EDs are defined as IEDs, including booby-traps, antipersonnel mines, other explosive munitions, and ERW. The definition was also widened from that previously used by INSEC to include military and security personnel, in addition to civilians.[52]

UNICEF did not maintain a database for ERW casualties in 2008, although it continued to monitor media reports and support the development of the INSEC surveillance system.[53]

Mine action program operators

National operators and activities

Demining

RE

Casualty data collection

VA

INSEC

 

x

x

 

NCBL

 

x

 

x

Nepal Army

x

     

International operators
and activities

Demining

RE

Casualty data collection

VA

Handicap International

   

x

x

ICRC/NRCS

 

x

 

x

UNICEF

 

x

   

UNMAT

x

     

Plans

Strategic mine action plans

Nepal had no comprehensive national mine action strategy as of December 2008.[54] The army has set a target of completing clearance of all minefields within five years.[55]

In August 2009, the MOPR, Handicap International (HI), UNICEF, and VA stakeholders developed a first national VA strategic framework. On this occasion the participants decided to create a new VA Working Group under MOPR leadership. The new group was to be operational by November 2009.[56]

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development

There has been some effort by the army to coordinate demining with reconstruction needs.[57] The Nepal Army is said to prioritize tasks in accordance with the wishes of local people but no formal mechanism links mine clearance to national development.[58]

National ownership

Nepal has demonstrated commitment to mine action by initiating clearance of affected areas without international legal obligations to do so. The Nepal Army’s work is supported by UNMAT, which represents the first country deployment by the UN’s Inter-agency Standing Committee on Mine Action.

Mine clearance is conducted exclusively by the Nepal Army while IED clearance is conducted by the Nepal Army and the Armed Police Force (see Demining section below), but in October 2008, the government requested UN support in a letter which stated “this activity is likely to take a couple of years.”[59]

UN support to clearance was initially provided through the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) and was originally due to terminate at the end of 2008. After the government’s request for continuing mine action support in October 2008, responsibility transferred on 1 January 2009 to UNMAT, comprising the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and UNICEF. ArmorGroup provided operational supervision and some capacity-building support under an UNMIN contract awarded through a process of international tender, which ended in July 2008. ArmorGroup support was replaced by three UN technical advisors who focused mainly on providing capacity development of Nepal Army demining teams.[60]

National mine action legislation and standards/Standing operating procedures

Mine action is governed by a 2007 cabinet decree.[61] Standing operating procedures for demining were drafted based on the International Mine Action Standards and training provided by ArmorGroup, and their further development was ongoing as of December 2008.[62]

UNMAT developed national technical guidelines and safety standards for RE, and the draft was under discussion with the Joint Working Group as of July 2009.[63]

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

The Nepal Army’s 14th Brigade is the only demining operator in Nepal, with two 20-person platoons operating in 2008. Two other platoons have been trained but have yet to be equipped or deployed for operations. The army intended to deploy a third platoon in 2009. Nepal’s Armed Police Force, which works independently of the Nepal Army, deployed one EOD team in 2008, and in 2009 had a further EOD section in each of the six brigade headquarters .[64]

Identification of hazardous areas

The Nepal Army provided the UN with details of 53 minefields, including maps described as of a “good standard” for 44 of them. The army also identified some 300 security posts protected by command-detonated explosive devices.[65]

The extent of residual ERW contamination remains unclear. A 2007–2008 assessment that visited 117 locations, including 37 sites of clashes between the army and insurgents, found a limited threat, mostly isolated items of UXO or remnants of old stockpiles of IEDs in communities.[66]

Mine and IED clearance in 2008

All clearance of mines and ERW in Nepal is by manual means. In 2008, the army cleared six minefields covering an area of about 13,200m2, destroying 1,136 antipersonnel mines. In 2009, before the onset of the monsoon season in July, the Nepal Army had cleared a further 10 minefields covering 20,700m2 and destroying 1,482 antipersonnel mines. The total amount of land released amounted to 1.1km2 in 2008 and 0.6km2 in the first seven months of 2009.[67]

After clearance operations in Kopche Community Forest in Siraha district, media reports cited a Nepal Army officer as saying deminers had been able to clear 98 mines of the 202 that had been emplaced there and that the others had been destroyed by fire or swept away in landslides. Clearance certificates for the task were reportedly presented to local residents by the United Kingdom’s ambassador to Nepal, Andrew Hall.[68]

The Armed Police Force reported in 2009 that it had completed clearance of all 3,041 IEDs laid around its police posts, although this had not been verified.[69]

Demining and battle area clearance from 2004–2009

Systematic clearance operations began in 2007, following the end of the armed conflict. The army reported clearing three minefields and 25 battle areas in 2007 although the UN had reports of only one minefield cleared in 2007; the area cleared has not been reported.[70]

Risk Education

RE was implemented through two types of activity in 2008: emergency RE and community-based RE. In 2009, systematic RE was introduced into the school system.[71] It is estimated that the total number of beneficiaries in 2008 was approximately 100,000.[72] This is a significant increase from 2007, when the number of beneficiaries reported was 7,508.[73] Although UNICEF considers that RE is adequate in terms of messages and prioritization, coverage is inadequate due to lack of funding.[74]

RE has been conducted by NGOs since 2003 and is now delivered through a network of organizations, too numerous to mention all by name. The major implementing organizations were the NRCS, army, police, and the Armed Police Force, NCBL, the NGO Himalayan Human Rights Monitors (HimRights), Save the Children, UNMIN, and the Ministry of Education, with UNICEF playing a coordinating role.[75] A UNICEF/GICHD needs assessment in 2005 resulted in a strategic framework which integrated RE within the social mobilization campaign.[76] Emergency RE was conducted from 2006 as a result of new explosive incidents.[77]

Casualty data is used to inform RE and to select and prioritize districts for RE programs. A 2008 Knowledge, Attitude and Practices survey commissioned by UNICEF and conducted by the Center for Research on Environment Health and Population Activities (CREHPA) in six of the most mine-affected districts of Nepal found exposure to RE negligible in all districts, despite a nationwide RE campaign.[78] It found that people were unaware of where explosive devices could be encountered and how to practice safe behavior. However, their actual exposure to ERW was moderate and communities had other priorities. The survey concluded that there was a need for a systematic RE campaign that favored electronic media and direct training in the community through existing networks, for example through the school system. It also recommended that a “climate” conducive for reporting be established as some people expressed fear of reporting contamination to the police.[79] A baseline study by Partnership Nepal in June 2008, found that at-risk groups were not aware of the dangers of IEDs.[80]

A national emergency RE network of 409 governmental, NRCS, and NGO focal points had the capacity to deploy prevention activities in 68 affected districts in a timely manner.[81] In 2008, UNICEF trained 250 RE focal points in 30 districts in emergency RE.[82] They delivered RE following incidents, at the request of communities or where risk was identified. UNICEF monitored the delivery of RE. Some of the organizations also provided standard RE, in addition to emergency RE.[83] The Ministry of Education was involved in emergency RE in about 20 districts through 20 RE trainers.[84]

A network of hundreds of village facilitators, paid by the government and UNICEF, works with thousands of volunteer community mobilizers[85] and they conduct RE alongside their other work in all UNICEF programs—health, nutrition, water and sanitation, education, and other protection issues.[86] UNICEF further developed the community network in 2008 by training 38 district level trainers and 149 village facilitators in 14 districts.[87] The network has a separate monitoring system, run by the UNICEF district officers, that covers all issues, not only RE.[88]

In September 2008 four video clips were broadcast through six TV channels, and radio spots were aired through 35 national and local radio stations.[89]

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors is unknown, but is at least 550. HI criticized VA in Nepal in 2009, saying it was the weakest of the five pillars of mine action and that there was an “absence of a national strategy, no data on total numbers of victims and casualties, poor coordination, a lack [of] clear policies and procedures for emergency response, limited tertiary healthcare, and almost-absent psychosocial care.”[90] Services offered were often concentrated in urban centers. The majority of facilities are operated by NGOs.[91] Government funding was provided to a small number of NGOs for support services to persons with disabilities, but the majority of those with a disability relied almost exclusively on family for assistance.[92]

Citizens are eligible to access basic healthcare free of charge at government facilities. However, in 2008, government clinics were reportedly poorly equipped and few in number. Some health clinics in rural areas were forced to close due to Maoist intimidation.[93] There was also a severe lack of trained primary healthcare staff.[94]

Emergency medical care was available at eight well-equipped government hospitals, all located in larger cities, as well as at private and NGO-run medical centers. The majority of facilities were located in the Kathmandu valley, forcing most survivors to travel long distances to access them. Poor roads, irregular public transport and high travel fares (which increased by 60% in 2008) often made it impossible to access services.[95]

Evacuation of severely injured casualties, particularly from poor, rural areas impacted by mines/ERW, remained difficult due to unclear emergency procedures and inability to pay costs. The ambulance system has been criticized for inadequately equipping vehicles with medical supplies and paramedics.[96] NRCS ambulances charged for emergency evacuation according to the distance traveled, while others required a “donation” of no set amount.[97] In 2008, HI provided training for INSEC district representatives on how to access emergency medical attention immediately after an incident.[98]

Nepalese district and regional hospitals have been criticized as “poor in terms of infrastructure, equipment, manpower and management.”[99] In 2008, the construction of a trauma center at Bir Hospital in Kathmandu was completed. Although it was not yet operational as of February 2009, it had already been criticized for its inaccessibility due to the hazardous and overcrowded surrounding roads.[100]

Physical rehabilitation services were provided through centers in five regions of Nepal and through mobile camps. The vast majority of physical rehabilitation services in Nepal are provided by international and national NGOs.[101] As a result of the efforts of international NGOs, facilities improved and meet international standards.[102] The government-run Aerahiti National Rehabilitation Centre in Kathmandu began providing services to people with spinal cord injuries in June 2008.[103] Managed by the army, it is the first government-run rehabilitation center in Nepal and provides services to both military personnel and civilians.[104]

The Ministry of Women, Children and Social Welfare provides free education and medical care for persons with disabilities, and it encourages other government and NGO agencies to provide rehabilitation services and assistance in employment.[105]

There were no counseling programs in Nepal to assist mine/ERW victims and their family members, but the NCBL provides some ad hoc counseling assistance.

Economic reintegration of mine/ERW survivors and families of victims remained marginal in 2008. Financial compensation, pensions, and training were available for security force casualties. Families of people killed during the conflict are eligible for a one-time payment; those injured or killed after the peace accords are not eligible.[106] Post-conflict casualties can receive assistance if their injuries happened at or near military posts. The process to acquire the necessary documentation to access free services often takes months.[107]

Nepalese law mandates access to employment, education, transportation, and other state services for persons with disabilities, but there are no laws prohibiting discrimination. In 2008, discrimination against persons with disabilities was reportedly common in healthcare, employment, education, and provision of other state services.[108] Nepal signed the UN Convention of the Rights of People with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol on 3 January 2008: it had not ratified either instrument as of 1 July 2009.

Victim assistance activities

Since 2005, HI has operated a physical rehabilitation project targeting persons with disabilities caused by the conflict. The project supported five centers and three satellite units managed by local partners in 2008. In total, the services provided physiotherapy to 5,013 people, including three mine/ERW survivors, and provided 2,044 orthopedic devices. HI also helped 516 of the poorest rehabilitation beneficiaries to access treatment through a Socio-Economic Fund. The cost of surgery for five survivors of victim-activated explosions was covered by the fund, in addition to the cost of emergency medical treatment for two other casualties of victim-activated explosions. HI operated seven mobile camps in 2008 in remote areas, bringing rehabilitation services to isolated communities and areas affected by the most recent conflict.[109] This was a decrease from the 16 mobile camps operated by HI in 2007.[110]

Although the need for physical rehabilitation in remote areas continues, the decrease in service provision was due to a lack of funding.[111] HI also supported community-based rehabilitation programs in 13 districts in 2008, which assisted 144 persons with disabilities to make significant improvements in their physical mobility, and 203 to improve their ability to perform daily activities.[112] From June 2008 to January 2009, HI also provided 2,160 persons with disabilities with information on health, education, and economic, social, and political involvement. The number of mine/ERW survivors was not specified. [113]

The ICRC continued to collaborate with Green Pasture Hospital in Pokhara and the NRCS in providing rehabilitation services to more than 1,098 people and produced 97 prostheses and 174 orthoses in 2008. Four mine/ERW survivors received prostheses and one received an orthosis.[114] The center began providing artificial upper limbs for clients in 2008.[115] In response to the increase in travel costs in 2008, the ICRC increased its reimbursement of transportation costs by over 70% compared to 2007. Outreach visits were also organized through the partnership.[116] The Micro-Economic Initiative program, supported by the ICRC and implemented through the NRCS, provided financial assistance to survivors to start small businesses.[117]

The NGO Friends of the Disabled managed the Hospital and Rehabilitation Centre for Disabled Children, assisting under-privileged children with physical disabilities. The hospital’s community-based rehabilitation program mobilized local resources to improve beneficiaries’ quality of life in a large number of districts and facilitated mobile camps in six districts.[118]

The NCBL provided scholarships to 170 children who were direct survivors of conflict, including 50 survivors of explosions, and vocational training to 25 mine/ERW/IED survivors in 2008.[119] The NCBL is also the ICBL’s VA focal point, advocating for the rights of survivors with the government and raising awareness of VA.m

In 2008, HimRights covered the costs of emergency medical assistance to five new casualties of victim-activated explosions in four districts.[120]

Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of any comprehensive long-term cost estimates or resource mobilization strategies for fulfilling mine action needs (including RE and VA) in Nepal. The interministerial Steering Committee within the NMAA holds responsibility for setting strategic mine action policy.[121] UNMIN and UNICEF coordinated UN assistance according to a strategic agreement between the two agencies for the period 2007–2008.[122] In November 2007, a UN assessment was completed in response to Nepal’s request for assistance in mine action, as of December 2008, the draft report was still awaiting comment by the government.[123]

National support for mine action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of funding for mine action from the national budget of Nepal in 2008. No national funding was reported in 2007.

International cooperation and assistance

In 2008, three countries, Australia, Canada and the UK, as well as the European Commission (EC) reported providing $1,051,395 (€713,972) to mine action in Nepal. Reported mine action funding in 2008 was roughly 40% less than the $1,756,621 reported for 2007. There are no strategic plans or baseline cost estimates against which to judge the adequacy of 2008 funding levels in fulfilling Nepal’s mine action needs.

2008 International Mine Action Funding to Nepal: Monetary[124]

Donor

Implementing Agencies/Organizations

Project Details

Amount

Canada

UNDP

Mine clearance

$437,492 (C$466,360)

EC

UNICEF

Support for mine action

$265,068 (€180,000)

Australia

UNICEF

Support for mine action

$256,110 (A$300,000)

UK

UNMAS

Capacity-building, mine clearance

$92,725 (£50,000)

As of June 2009, the UN reported that no funding or pledges had been received for mine action projects within the 2009 Nepal Humanitarian Transition Appeal. The original request for mine action within the appeal was $572,608, but as of June 2009 had been revised downward to $236,334.[125] No reasons were specified for the change in required funding.


[1] It was formerly known as the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN/M). It changed its name in January 2009 when it absorbed another Nepalese communist political party.

[2] Comprehensive Peace Agreement between Government of Nepal and CPN/M, 21 November 2006, points 5.1.1(i), 5.1.2 and 5.1.4. Earlier, the May 2006 bilateral cease-fire between the government of Nepal and the CPN/M, and accompanying Code of Conduct, committed both sides to forego use of landmines.

[3] ICBL meeting with Gyan Chandra Acharya, Foreign Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kathmandu, 14 December 2008. Notes by Landmine Monitor.

[4] ICBL meeting with Subash Chandra Nembang, Chair and Speaker, Constituent Assembly, Kathmandu, 16 December 2008. Notes by Landmine Monitor.

[5] ICBL meeting with Gen. Rukmang Katwal, Chief of Staff, Nepal Army, Kathmandu, 14 December 2008. Notes by Landmine Monitor.

[6] NCBL, “August Declaration on Mine Action and the Ottawa Treaty,” 10 August 2008.

[7] NCBL, “Letter of Commitment by Political Parties,” signed during a National Seminar on Our Declaration for Envisioning Peaceful Mine-Free Nepal, Kathmandu, 10 August 2008.

[8]See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, pp. 936–937. Landmine Monitor reported indicators of mine use by government forces as early as 1999.

[9] ICBL meeting with Gen. Rukmang Katwal, Nepal Army, Kathmandu, 14 December 2008. Notes by Landmine Monitor.

[10] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 936.

[11] Ibid; and Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 1,022. In 2003, Brig.-Gen. Kul Bahadur Khadka told a visiting ICBL delegation that Nepal produced antipersonnel mines. In August 2005, a former government official told Landmine Monitor that landmines were produced at the weapons factory at Sunchari in Makwanpur district south of Kathmandu.

[12] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 936. In April 2007, Brig.-Gen. Lok Bahadur Thapa, Head of the Engineers Directorate, told Landmine Monitor that Nepal does not have the capacity to produce factory-made landmines, and that the Sunchari factory only produces plastic grenades.

[13] Interview with Maj. Prabin Khadka, Operations Officer, MAC, Engineers Directorate, Nepal Army, Kathmandu, 23 March 2008.

[14] ICBL meeting with Gen. Rukmang Katwal, Nepal Army, Kathmandu, 14 December 2008. Notes by Landmine Monitor.

[15] Presentation by Brig.-Gen. Lok Bahadur Thapa, Nepal Army, “Mine Action in Nepal,” Mine Action and Implications for Peace and Development Conference, Phnom Penh, 12 March 2007.

[16] In December 2006, nine Maoists were reportedly injured while assembling IEDs inside the Maoist cantonment in Surkhet. The CPN/M has refused to disclose any details about the incident. “9 Maoists injured in cantonment in Surkhet,” Rajdhani (newspaper), 18 December 2006.

[17] ICBL meeting with Shree Ram Dhakal “Prasanta,” Secretary, CPN/M, Kathmandu, 15 December 2008. Notes by Landmine Monitor.

[18] Telephone interview with Stephen Robinson, Program Manager, UNMAT, 28 July 2009. The UN provided mine action support through UNMIN until the end of 2008, when that role transitioned to UNMAT.

[19] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 958.

[20] The Nepal Army reported 99 IED fields cleared in a 9 July 2009 meeting organized by the NCBL on ‘Mine Action and Budget.’ Email from Purna Shova Chitrakar, Coordinator, NCBL, 28 August 2009.

[21] Email from Stephen Robinson, UNMAT, 11 May 2009; and telephone interview with Stephen Robinson, UNMAT, 28 July 2009. ncb: delete

[22] UN, “Portfolio of Mine Action Projects 2009,” New York, November 2008, p. 270.

[23] Email from Stephen Robinson, UNMAT, 29 July 2009.

[24] Interview with Stephen Robinson, UNMIN, Kathmandu, 19 December 2008.

[25] Unless specified otherwise, all information in this section is based on casualty data provided by email from Prashannata Wasti, Coordinator, INSEC, 23 June 2009.

[26] Interview with Stephen Robinson, UNMIN, Kathmandu, 19 December 2008.

[27] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 962.

[28] See Landmine Monitor Report 2003, p. 657; and Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 564.

[29] Casualty data provided by email from Prashannata Wasti, INSEC, 23 June 2009.

[30] Interview with Nir Lama, Surveillance Coordinator, INSEC, Kathmandu, 25 March 2009.

[31] Landmine Monitor was unable to determine how many in the database were classified as “injured.”

[32] Email from Hugues Laurenge, Mine Action Officer, UNICEF, 15 July 2009.

[33] Ibid, 14 July 2009.

[34] Ibid, 13 July 2009.

[35] Ibid, 27 August 2009.

[36] INSEC, “Report on Civilian Casualties of Victim Activated Explosions,” Nepal, January–December 2008.

[37] UN, “Portfolio of Mine Action Projects 2009,” New York, November 2008, p. 270.

[38] Interview with Stephen Robinson, UNMAT, in Bangkok, 3 April 2009.

[39] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 959.

[40] Interview with Stephen Robinson, UNMIN, Kathmandu, 19 December 2008.

[41] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 960.

[42] Telephone interview with Stephen Robinson, UNMAT, 28 July 2009; and MASG, “MASG Newsletter, 1 March to 18 May 2009,” Washington, DC, p. 7.

[43] Interview with Hugues Laurenge, UNICEF, Kathmandu, 2 April 2009.

[44] HI, “National Assessment on Rights, Care and Rehabilitation of Survivors of Explosive Devices,” Kathmandu, 31 January 2008, p. 4; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 968.

[45] MASG, “MASG Newsletter, 1 October 2008–28 February 2009,” Washington, DC, p. 20. 

[46] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 960.

[47] Telephone interview with Stephen Robinson, UNMAT, 28 July 2009.

[48] Email from Danee Luhar, Project Officer, Mine Action, UNICEF, 22 July 2009.

[49] Minutes of Mine Action Joint Working Group meeting, Kathmandu, 11 December 2008, provided by Hugues Laurenge, UNICEF, 14 July 2009.

[50] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 963; and Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 1030.

[51] Interview with Hugues Laurenge, UNICEF, Kathmandu, 2 April 2009; and MASG, “MSAG Newsletter, 1 October 2008–28 February 2009,” Washington, DC, 28 February 2009, p. 20.

[52] Minutes of Mine Action Joint Working Group meeting, Kathmandu, 11 December 2008, provided by Hugues Laurenge, UNICEF, 14 July 2009; and INSEC, “New Casualties Victim-Activated Explosions–2009,” update 16 June 2009, www.inseconline.org.

[53] Interview with Hugues Laurenge, UNICEF, Kathmandu, 2 April 2009.

[54] Interview with Stephen Robinson, UNMIN, Kathmandu, 19 December 2008; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 960.

[55] Interview with Stephen Robinson, UNMAT, in Bangkok, 3 April 2009.

[56] Email from Hugues Laurenge, UNICEF, 27 August 2009.

[57] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 960.

[58] Email from Stephen Robinson, UNMAT, 29 July 2009.

[59] Ibid, and 4 August 2009.

[60] Interview with Stephen Robinson, UNMIN, Kathmandu, 19 December 2008 and email from Stephen Robinson, UNMAT, 4 August 2009.

[61] Email from Stephen Robinson, UNMAT, 29 July 2009.

[62] Interview with Stephen Robinson, UNMIN, Kathmandu, 19 December 2008; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 960.

[63] Email from Hugues Laurenge, UNICEF, 13 July 2009.

[64] Interview with Stephen Robinson, UNMAT, in Bangkok, 3 April 2009; telephone interview with Stephen Robinson, UNMAT, 28 July 2009; and emails from Stephen Robinson, UNMAT, 29 July 2009 and 4 August 2009.

[65] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 961.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Email from Stephen Robinson, UNMAT, 29 July 2009.

[68] “Siraha forest demined,” eKantipur (Rautahat), 29 January 2009, www.kantipuronline.com.

[69] Telephone interview with Stephen Robinson, UNMAT, 28 July 2009; and email, 4 August 2009.

[70] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 961.

[71] Email from Hugues Laurenge, UNICEF, 13 July 2009; email from Danee Luhar, UNICEF, 22 July 2009; and email from Stephen Robinson, UNMAT, 4 August 2009.

[72] Email from Hugues Laurenge, UNICEF, 13 July 2009.

[73] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 964.

[74] Email from Hugues Laurenge, UNICEF, 13 July 2009.

[75] Email from Danee Luhar, UNICEF, 22 July 2009; see also Landmine Monitor Report 2003, p. 657; Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1,080; Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 832–833; Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 1,027; Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 940; and Landmine Monitor Report 2007, pp. 964–965.

[76] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, pp. 832–833; and Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 1,027.

[77] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 1,028; and Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 940.

[78] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 965.

[79] CREHPA/UNICEF, “Knowledge, Attitude and Practice Survey, improvised explosive devices, landmines and other explosive remnants of war,” Nepal, January 2008.

[80] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 965.

[81] Email from Hugues Laurenge, UNICEF, 13 July 2009.

[82] Ibid.

[83] Interview with Hugues Laurenge, UNICEF, Kathmandu, 2 April 2009.

[84] Email from Danee Luhar, UNICEF, 22 July 2009.

[85] Email from Hugues Laurenge, UNICEF, 13 July 2009; and email from Danee Luhar, UNICEF, 22 July 2009.

[86] Email from Danee Luhar, UNICEF, 24 July 2009.

[87] Email from Hugues Laurenge, UNICEF, 13 July 2009.

[88] Ibid.

[89] UNICEF, “2008 Annual Report,” provided by Hugues Laurenge, UNICEF, 13 July 2009.

[90] Dariusz Dziewanski, “Terms of Reference for National Strategic Workshop on Victim Assistance,” HI/UNICEF, 10 July 2009, pp. 2–3.

[91] Ibid

[92] US Department of State, “2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Nepal,” Washington, DC, 25 February 2009.

[93] Ibid.

[94] Kul Chandra Gautam, “Rollback Violence in Nepal,” Nepal Monitor, 10 July 2009, www.nepalmonitor.com.

[95] ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme: Annual Report 2008,” Geneva, May 2009, p. 42.

[96] Dr. Shishir Lakhey, “Preventable pandemic,” eKatinpur, 16 February 2009, www.kantipuronline.com; and HI, “National Assessment on Rights, Care and Rehabilitation of Survivors of Explosive Devices,” Kathmandu, 31 January 2008, p. 5.

[97] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 967.

[98] Email from Christine Smerdon, Disability Coordinator, HI, 22 April 2009.

[99] Dr. Shishir Lakhey, “Preventable pandemic,” eKatinpur, 16 February 2009, www.kantipuronline.com.

[100] Ibid.

[101] ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme: Annual Report 2008,” Geneva, May 2009, p. 42.

[102] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 967

[103] ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme: Annual Report 2008,” Geneva, May 2009, p. 42.

[104] UNICEF, “Mine Action in Nepal – Fact Sheet,” 4 April 2008, www.unmin.org.np.

[105] Ministry of Women, Children and Social Welfare, “Policy,” www.mowcsw.gov.np; and Asia-Pacific Center on Disability, “Country Profile–Kingdom of Nepal, Current Situations for Persons with Disabilities,” 10 October 2008, www.apcdproject.org.

[106] Minutes of Mine Action Joint Working Group meeting, Kathmandu, 28 May 2008, provided by Hugues Laurenge, UNICEF, 14 July 2009; and ICRC, “Annual Report 2008,” Geneva, May 2009, p. 195.

[107] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 967.

[108] US Department of State, “2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Nepal,” Washington, DC, 25 February 2009.

[109] Email from Christine Smerdon, HI, 22 April 2009.

[110] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p.969.

[111] Email from Christine Smerdon, HI, 14 July 2009.

[112] Ibid, 22 April 2009.

[113] Ibid.

[114] ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme: Annual Report 2008,” Geneva, May 2009, p. 42.

[115] Email from Jagadish Shrestha, Head, Health Department, ICRC, 17 April 2009.

[116] ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme: Annual Report 2008,” Geneva, May 2009, p. 42.

[117] Ibid.

[118] Hospital and Rehabilitation Centre for Disabled Children, “Achievements,” www.hrdcnepal.org.

[119] Email from Purna Shova Chitrakar, NCBL, 30 June 2009.

[120] Minutes of Mine Action Joint Working Group meeting, Kathmandu, 1 July 2008, provided by Hugues Laurenge, UNICEF, 14 July 2009.

[121] UN Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on the request of Nepal for United Nations assistance in support of its peace process,” S/2007/612, New York, 18 October 2007, daccessdds.un.org.

[122] UN, “Country Summary: Nepal,” www.mineaction.org.

[123] Emails from Grant Milthorpe, Senior Mine Action Advisor, UNMIN, 4 April and 23 June 2008; and UN Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on the request of Nepal for United Nations assistance in support of its peace process,” S/2008/313, New York, 12 May 2008, daccessdds.un.org.

[124] Emails from Kim Henrie-Lafontaine, Second Secretary, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 6 June 2009 and 19 June 2009; Mari Cruz Cristóbal, Policy Assistant, Directorate-General for External Relations, 28 May 2009; Amy White, Deputy Program Manager, DfID, 17 March 2009; and Hugues Laurenge, UNICEF, 27 August 2009.

[125] UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian Appeal: Mid-Year Review,” 2009, p. 33, ochadms.unog.ch.