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Russia

Russia

Ten-Year Summary

The Russian Federation has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Russia has not attended a Mine Ban Treaty meeting since May 2003. It has consistently abstained in voting on the annual UN General Assembly resolution calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. In the past decade, Russia has used antipersonnel mines in Chechnya, Dagestan, Tajikistan, and on its border with Georgia. It is not believed to have used antipersonnel mines in the August 2008 conflict with Georgia over South Ossetia. Russia stated it stopped production of blast mines in 1997. It is not known to have exported any antipersonnel mines since 1994. In November 2004, Russia for the first time revealed that it had a stockpile of 26.5 million antipersonnel mines, stating that it had destroyed 19.5 million since 2000. It has apparently been destroying about one million mines per year since 2005. Russia ratified the Convention on Conventional Weapons Amended Protocol II on landmines on 2 March 2005 and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War on 21 July 2008.

Russia is heavily contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). The mine problem, especially in Chechnya, remains to be addressed effectively by the authorities. In July 2009, federal and regional leaders pledged to speed up demining of the republic.

Landmine Monitor identified 2,795 casualties in Russia from 1999 to 2008, of which 2,609 (616 killed and 1,993 injured) occurred in Chechnya and 186 (63 killed, 120 injured, and three unknown) in the rest of the country.

UNICEF, the ICRC, Danish Demining Group, and Voice of the Mountains were the most significant providers of risk education (RE) over the last ten years, which was largely focused on Chechnya. A lack of funds has reduced RE coverage in the last three years. Attempts to transfer responsibility for data collection and RE from UNICEF to a Chechen Mine Information Center have been stymied by a lack of local government funds.

Emergency and continuing medical care, rehabilitation, and reintegration services are available for persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, throughout Russia, but quality and coverage varies across regions. The healthcare system is reportedly understaffed and suffering from widespread corruption. Benefits for persons with disabilities improved somewhat in 2008, but remained inadequate. Despite legal prohibitions against discrimination, persons with disabilities faced widespread social exclusion.

Healthcare in Chechnya improved in 2007 and 2008, with increased government funding. However, considerable challenges remained, exacerbated by ongoing instability. Victim assistance (VA) in Chechnya improved from 2001 to 2004, with UNICEF support to prosthetics production, physical rehabilitation, and vocational training. However, due to lack of funds, UNICEF has progressively reduced its involvement in VA in Chechnya. There were thus few opportunities for psychosocial support or economic reintegration in 2008.

Mine action, particularly RE, VA, and advocacy in Chechnya faced a major setback with the murder of Zarema Sadulayeva, head of the NGO Let’s Save the Generation, and her husband in August 2009.

Mine Ban Policy

Russia has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. It has often cited the military utility of antipersonnel mines, the lack of viable alternatives, and the financial difficulties in destroying its large stockpile within four years as reasons for not joining.[1]However, Russia continues to express support for the treaty’s humanitarian objectives.[2] In November 2007, Russia said that “movement along the road towards peace without mine weapons should be realistic and consistent….”[3] In November 2008, Russia repeated the need for progress to be “realistic and consistent.”[4] In June 2009, a Russian official told Landmine Monitor that Russia is committed to the objective of a mine-free world, but reiterated that any prohibition must take into account national security considerations.[5] According to the official, Russia’s accession to the Mine Ban Treaty is dependent on “solving a number of technical, financial and other tasks” related to implementation.

On 2 December 2008, Russia abstained from voting on UN General Assembly Resolution 63/42 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it has done on every annual pro-ban General Assembly resolution.

Russia did not attend the Ninth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in November 2008, or the May 2009 intersessional Standing Committee meetings. The last time Russia attended a Mine Ban Treaty meeting was in May 2003.

Russia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines.[6] It submitted a national annual report as required by Article 13 on 30 October 2008. Russia used Amended Protocol II’s optional nine-year extension to defer (until 3 December 2007) its compliance with the protocol’s technical requirements for self-destruct and self-deactivation mechanisms for remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines and detectability for antipersonnel mines. In November 2007, Russia said, “By the end of this year a set of measures to implement requirements of the Protocol…will be nearing its completion.”[7] In November 2008, Russia said it had “fine-tuned and adopted for execution a national system for technical standards of landmines, including [antipersonnel mines] APMs.”[8]

Russia has provided few details about how it is complying with the protocol’s technical requirements.[9] In June 2009, a Russian official told Landmine Monitor that an array of measures have been undertaken including destruction and disposal of outdated landmines and deployment of new mine detection and clearance devices.[10]

Russia ratified CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War on 21 July 2008. As of 15 August it had not yet provided a national report as required by the protocol (due 20 July 2009).

Russia has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[11]

Production, transfer, stockpiling, and destruction

Russia has produced at least 10 types of antipersonnel mines since 1992, including blast mines (PMN, PMN-2, PMN-4, and PFM-1S) and fragmentation mines (POMZ-2, OZM-72, MON-50, MON-90, MON-100, and MON-200). Russia has stated on several occasions that its production of blast mines stopped in 1997.[12] Russia has been conducting research on modifications to existing landmines, new landmines, and alternatives to landmines since at least 1997.[13]

Russia has had a moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines that are not detectable or equipped with self-destruct devices since 1 December 1994. The moratorium formally expired in 2002, but Russian officials have stated, most recently in June 2009, that it is still being observed.[14] Russia is not known to have made any state-approved transfers of any type of antipersonnel mine since 1994.

In November 2004, Russia for the first time released official information on the number of antipersonnel mines in its stockpiles, when Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov cited a figure of 26.5 million. The minister forecast that approximately 23.5 million of these antipersonnel mines would be destroyed between 2005 and 2015. He said that in 2000 Russia stockpiled 46 million antipersonnel mines, but had since destroyed or disposed of about 19.5 million of them.[15]

It appears that in recent years, Russia has been destroying about one million stockpiled antipersonnel mines per year. Russia has provided varying numbers and time periods for the total number of stockpiled antipersonnel mines that it has destroyed. In November 2008, Russia stated that “about 10 million anti-personnel mines” had been destroyed in “recent years.”[16] In November 2007, an official said “around 9 million anti-personnel mines” had been destroyed in “previous years.”[17] In November 2006, a Russian official said, “more than 8 million” antipersonnel mines had been destroyed over “recent years.”[18] In January 2005, a Russian official said more than seven million stockpiled antipersonnel mines had been destroyed.[19]

Russian officials have acknowledged that Russian military units in other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States maintain antipersonnel mine stockpiles, such as 18,200 in Tajikistan and an unknown number in Georgia (Abkhazia).[20]

Use

The government of Georgia accused Russia of using antipersonnel mines during the August 2008 conflict over South Ossetia.[21] Investigations by Human Rights Watch (HRW) found that Russian forces fired cluster munitions into populated areas of Georgia causing civilian casualties, but found no evidence of antipersonnel mine use by either Russia or Georgia.[22] In a 30 January 2009 letter to HRW, a Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official denied Russian use of either antipersonnel mines or cluster munitions in the conflict.[23]

Over the past decade, Russia has used antipersonnel mines on a regular basis, primarily in Chechnya, but also at times in Dagestan, Tajikistan, and on the border with Georgia.[24]

In June 2006, Russian officials confirmed to Landmine Monitor that Russian forces continued to use antipersonnel mines in Chechnya, both newly emplaced mines and existing defensive minefields, noting, “Antipersonnel mines are used to protect facilities of high importance.” They indicated that forces of the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and Border Guards used mines.[25] In discussions with Landmine Monitor since 2006, Russian officials have not stated that use of antipersonnel mines has stopped. Landmine Monitor will continue to cite Russia as an ongoing and active user of antipersonnel mines until an official denial is made and confirmed by the facts on the ground.

Russia has generally argued that its mine use has been necessary to stop flows of weapons, drugs, and terrorists, and maintained that it has been in full compliance with CCW Amended Protocol II.[26]

The Russian domestic media regularly reports stories of bombings and attacks against state structures conducted by insurgent, separatist, or criminal groups in the Caucasus regions of Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and other locations. While many reports referred to “landmines,” it appears that in most cases armed groups used command-detonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs), time-delay bombs, or antivehicle mines, according to available information in media reports.[27]

Chechen insurgents are considered expert at the manufacture and use of explosives, and regularly claim credit on the internet for the use of command-detonated IEDs and suicide bombs.[28] In June 2009, Russian officials told Landmine Monitor that Russia needed international assistance to conduct a full-scale humanitarian mine clearance operation in Chechnya due to the “active use” of antipersonnel mines by “Chechen rebels.”[29]

Landmine Monitor has not conclusively identified any new use of antipersonnel mines by armed groups in Russia since 2007.[30] Casualties from antipersonnel mines continue to occur, but the date of placement of the mine, or who did so, is not certain.

In May 2009, a militia member was killed by a tripwire mine in the Urus-Martan district forest.[31] In March 2009, a civilian in Dargo, Vedeno district of Chechnya, was killed by a landmine that was believed to be recently placed.[32] Also in March, a Russian soldier was killed by a mine while on patrol in the Sunzhensk district of Ingushetia.[33] On 30 November 2008, two Russian soldiers were killed by a landmine near the village of Elistanzhi. In December 2008, it was reported that the Russian military must methodically clear mines, laid frequently by militants, in order to travel on the Elistanzhi-Vedeno highway.[34]

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Russia is heavily contaminated with mines and ERW, much of it resulting from World War II as well as conflict in the north Caucasus since the early 1990s. In addition to Chechnya, mine/ERW incidents have been reported in Dagestan, Ingushetia, and North Ossetia. ERW remain an acute problem in Dagestan, specifically in Botlikh, Buynaksk, and Novolaksky districts.

Mines have been used quite extensively in the two major conflicts in Chechnya. Estimates of the number vary greatly, because there has been no effort to comprehensively survey or catalogue the impact or scope of the problem.[35] In 2008, Chechen officials estimated that 24.5km2 of land was affected—approximately one third of the contaminated areas were forest and the remainder was farmland.

Casualties

Landmine Monitor identified 45 mine/ERW/victim-activated IED casualties (10 killed, 32 injured, and three unknown) in Russia in 2008. Of these, 18 (five killed and 13 injured) were in Chechnya. Twelve (five killed and seven injured) of these were recorded by UNICEF, the rest were identified by Landmine Monitor from media reports.[36] The other 27 casualties (five killed, 19 injured, and three unknown) were from other regions of Russia.[37]

Of the casualties in Chechnya, 10 were men, six boys, and two of unknown gender. Five casualties were military, and the civil status of the remaining 13 was unknown. Four casualties were caused by antipersonnel mines, one by an antivehicle mine, two by ERW, and one by a victim-activated IED; ten casualties were caused by unknown devices. The most common activity at the time of the incident was playing/recreation (six casualties), travel (four), handling ERW (two), collecting wood, water, or food (one), and herding (one); the activities of four casualties were unknown. Ten casualties had not received RE; it was not known whether the other eight had.[38]

Of the casualties in the rest of Russia: five were men; one was a woman; one was a girl; the gender of two children was unknown; and the gender and age of the remaining casualties was unknown. Most of the casualties were civilians (23), three were security forces, and the civil status of one casualty was unknown. Three casualties were caused by victim-activated IEDs, one by ERW, one by an unspecified mine, and the devices causing the remainder of casualties were unknown.[39] Fifteen casualties were caused by an unknown device on Loo Beach, Lazarevsk district, Sochi, which exploded when a girl unwrapped a package she had found.[40]

The 45 casualties in 2008 represent a decline from 2007, when Landmine Monitor identified a total of 53 casualties (21 killed and 32 injured), 44 (19 killed and 25 injured) of which were in Chechnya and nine (two killed and seven injured) in the rest of Russia.[41] However, due to probable under-reporting of casualties, this is not necessarily indicative of a trend.

The total number of mine/ERW/victim-activated IED casualties in Russia is unknown. Landmine Monitor identified 2,795 casualties (679 killed, 2,113 injured, and three unknown) in Russia from 1999 to 2008, of which 2,609 (616 killed and 1,993 injured) occurred in Chechnya and 186 (63 killed, 120 injured, and three unknown) in the rest of the country.[42] UNICEF reported a total of 3,106 casualties in Chechnya (725 killed and 2,381 injured) from 1994 to 2008.[43] Landmine Monitor Report 2005 reported a total of 5,321 casualties (857 killed and 4,464 injured) in Chechnya reported by the Chechen Center of Catastrope Medicine between 2002 and 2005. However, it is likely that this total included many casualties of command-detonated devices.[44]

Of the casualties reported by UNICEF in Chechnya from 1994 to 2008, the majority were men (1,894), followed by boys (636), women (442), and girls (134). Antipersonnel mines caused the most casualties (1,030), followed by ERW (913), antivehicle mines (234), and victim-activated IEDs (220); 709 were caused by unknown devices. Most casualties were bystanders/passers-by at the time of the incident (752), other activities included travel (685), handling or tampering with explosive devices (322), collecting wood, water, or food (303), agriculture (221), herding (197), playing/recreation (180), fishing or hunting (19), or scrap collection (13); the activities of 414 casualties were unknown. Only 52 casualties had received RE and 2,084 had not; it was unknown whether the remaining 970 had.[45]

Landmine Monitor identified 38 casualties (16 killed, 20 injured, and two unknown) in Russia in 2009, as of 16 June. Of these, 14 (three killed, nine injured, and two unknown) occurred in Chechnya; 24 (13 killed and 11 injured) occurred in other parts of Russia. UNICEF provided no confirmation of the casualties that occurred in Chechnya in 2009.[46]

There were an estimated 15 million persons with disabilities in Russia[47] and 110,613 in Chechnya.[48]

Risk profile

Chechnya continues to be the most at-risk region of Russia, though there has been a significant decrease in casualties, which has been attributed to RE efforts.[49] The reduction may also be due to an increased use of gas, removing the need to collect firewood for fuel from dangerous areas.[50] Within Chechnya, mountainous areas, forests, and areas where military confrontations took place are the most dangerous. Casualties are usually men aged 15–40 and incidents tend to be clustered in the spring and summer period. People engaged in seasonal labor, such as grazing livestock or gathering wood, hay, berries or wild garlic are particularly at risk.[51]

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action and risk education

There is no formal, civilian mine action program in Russia and no national mine action authority. A special committee to deal with mine and ERW problems has, though, been set up within Chechnya, comprising different ministries.[52] In 2008, UNICEF continued to act as the focal point for coordination of mine action in the North Caucasus.[53] UNICEF conducts occasional, ad hoc coordination meetings, which are attended by Laman Az (Voice of the Mountains, VoM), Danish Demining Group (DDG), and the ICRC.[54]

Victim assistance

There are no coordination structures or plans for VA in Russia in general, or Chechnya in particular. The Ministry of Health and Social Development is responsible for programs and benefits for persons with disabilities.[55] On 19 December 2008, President Dmitry Medvedev signed a decree establishing a Council for the Disabled, which will develop proposals for implementing government policy on persons with disabilities and drafting changes in Russian law to ensure equal rights and opportunities.[56]

Data collection and management

There is no comprehensive and publicly available casualty data collection mechanism in Russia. UNICEF has collected information on civilian casualties in all administrative districts of Chechnya since 2001. It uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) through its local partner NGO, VoM, to store data on mine incidents.[57] The latest version had been due for installation in June 2007, but this date was postponed until mid-2008. As of mid-August 2009, however, no updated version had been installed.[58] Casualties in the rest of Russia are not systematically reported and the media remains the main source of information.

Until 2008, RE activity data was managed by VoM.[59] This data was shared at the coordination meetings to avoid duplication of effort. However, due to a lack of funds in 2009, VoM no longer collected RE data.[60] UNICEF originally planned to hand over data gathering and RE components to local authorities in 2008, but the Chechen authorities were not able to fund such programs.[61]

Plans

Strategic mine action plans

There is no known strategic mine action plan either for Russia as a whole, or for Chechnya in particular. Since 2008, however, Russia has stated that “planned” demining operations have been “ongoing” in Chechnya.[62] Through the end of 2009, it was reportedly planned to clear some 1.2km2 of mined areas in Chechnya.[63]

National ownership

Commitment to mine action and victim assistance

Russia has previously demonstrated insufficient commitment to clearing mines and ERW from Chechnya. In 2009, however, there were signs that this might be changing. On 22 July 2009, the Minister of Emergency Situations, Sergey Shoygu, officially stated that “within 10 days” the ministry would set up “special groups” to demine agricultural land in Chechnya.[64] Following this statement, the president of Chechnya claimed that all mines and ERW would be cleared from the territory of the republic in “a short time.”[65]

National mine action legislation and standards/Standing operating procedures

On 29 December 2008, the Russian government issued a decree on the use of federal vehicles during emergency demining operations.[66] On 10 June 2009, the parliament of Kaliningrad adopted a law governing clearance of mines and ERW left over from World War II.[67]

EMERCOM has stated that all its operations are implemented in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards.[68]

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

Mine clearance continues to be carried out by the federal Engineering Troops of the Ministry of Defense, demining brigades of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES), through its specialized demining units, EMERCOM Demining, and the “Leader” Center for Special Tasks.[69]

No comprehensive reporting of demining in Chechnya has been made public. For 2008, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs reported the destruction of 9,085 explosive devices in the Chechen republic,[70] while the Russian Engineering Forces from the North Caucasus Military District Armed Forces reported the destruction of some 96,000 explosive devices.[71]

In April to May 2009, MES deminers from “Leader” conducted demining operations on “Zarya” state agricultural land near Grozny. As a result some 500,000m2 of agricultural land was cleared and approximately 170 ERW were destroyed.[72]

Before Russian military forces withdrew from the buffer zone adjoining South Ossetia on 10 October 2008, Russian military forces reportedly conducted extensive clearance of unexploded submunitions. Civilians reported clearance by Russian troops in Disti, Kvemo Khviti, Meurneoba, Tirdznisi, Variani, Varianis, and Zemo Khviti.[73] They have not reported in detail on their clearance as of 1 July 2009, although statements to the CCW cited clearance by EMERCOM personnel of 3,000 ERW from 3 August to 16 September 2008. [74]

Risk Education

In 2008, RE was only reported in Chechnya. UNICEF stated that, “Regardless of the fact that fortunately there is a significant decrease in casualty rate, there is still a need to continue informing people about the existing threat.” However, UNICEF also reported that a reduction of funds had resulted in a decrease in RE activity, and that there was a lack of government programs for RE. [75] UNICEF stated that RE efforts had “undoubtedly…contributed to the overall decrease of casualties among civilians, especially among the children in Chechnya.”[76]

RE was implemented by DDG, VoM with UNICEF support, and the ICRC. Together, they reached 76,324 beneficiaries (21,864 adults and 54,460 children)—a similar number as in 2007 (72,000) but a significant decrease from 2006 (110,000).

Risk education activities in 2008[77]

Organization

Type of activity

Geographical location

No. of beneficiaries

DDG

RE to schoolchildren, seasonal workers, people reconstructing their war-damaged homes and agricultural workers. Regional festival “Children against Mines.” Establishment of 23 safe play areas.

Groznenskiy, Urus-martanovskiy, Shalinskiy, Nozhay-Yurtovskiy and Vedenskiy regions

Safe play areas in: Kurchaloevskiy, Nozhay-Yurt, Vedenskiy, and Urus-Martanovskiy regions

44,324 people, 27,460 of whom were schoolchildren and 16,864 were adults (9,230 men and 7,634 women)

VoM

Direct RE presentations, leaflets, posters, and training school teachers.

Vedenskiy district, Urus-Martanovskiy, Shatoiskiy and Grozny

Some 25,000 people (approximately 20,000 children and 5,000 adults)

ICRC

Direct RE and support to RE activities: school teachers’ and journalists’ competition, media articles, youth groups, billboards, murals, safe play areas (32 rehabilitated out of 56 built). Microeconomic projects for safe economic activities for families vulnerable to weapon contamination.

Chechnya urban and rural areas

139 teachers, 20 journalists, and over 20,000 children

UNICEF monitored the work of DDG and VoM in 2008. In both cases it found increased community awareness after people had attended the NGOs’ presentations.[78]

A UNICEF needs assessment in 2000 found low levels of awareness about mines/ERW in Chechnya and limited local capacity for implementing RE programs. UNICEF initially sponsored RE programs focusing on Chechen internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Ingushetia.[79] Also in 2000, DDG started implementing RE within Chechnya itself, as did a variety of local NGOs.[80] Since then, DDG has reached out to a wide variety of target audiences, including both children and adults.[81] In 2001 and 2002, UNICEF worked with the Chechen Ministry of Education to develop an RE school curriculum, distributing 304,000 RE textbooks and 5,000 teacher’s guides. In 2002, the first 770 teachers were trained in RE by DDG and VoM.[82] UNICEF revised and improved the curriculum in 2007. From 2004–2005, UNICEF partnered with the Chechen State Drama Theater to develop RE dramas and deployed teams of instructors to provide interactive RE presentations in rural and mountainous areas. Since 2005, UNICEF has sponsored the creation of RE “focus groups” comprising local officials, medical personnel, education professionals, religious, and youth leaders to increase community ownership of RE provision at the community level.[83] Many of UNICEF’s activities, especially those at the community level have been implemented through its local partner VoM, which was the first local NGO to address the issue of mines/ERW in 2000.

The ICRC has partnered with the Chechen branch of the Russian Red Cross Society, the republic and districts Houses of Children’s Creativity, and local authorities in providing a variety of RE activities, often reaching out to teachers and journalists, as well as constructing safe play areas. Until 2003, in addition to Chechnya, the ICRC also provided RE for the Chechen IDPs in Ingushetia, both children and adults, for the Chechen IDPs and resident population of the Botlikh and Novolak regions in Dagestan, as well as for Chechen children that underwent rehabilitation in sanatoriums in North Ossetia and Kabardino-Balkaria.[84]

Let’s Save the Generation, a local NGO, has also engaged in RE activities, such as distributing materials, producing mine awareness videos, drama in partnership with the Chechen State Drama Theater, and a televised game show.

Victim Assistance

There are an unknown number of mine/ERW survivors in Russia. However, there have been at least 2,386 mine/ERW injured casualties within Chechnya since 1994[85] and 129 in Russia outside Chechnya since 1999.[86]

Emergency and continuing medical care, rehabilitation, and reintegration services are available for persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, throughout Russia, but quality and coverage varies across regions. The Russian military has extensive medical experience in dealing with blast injuries. Healthcare is provided free of charge, though according to media reporting, “hospitals are understaffed, poorly equipped and rife with corruption.”[87] A 2008 study on disability in Russia found many persons with disabilities had negative experience with the healthcare system, citing “long queues, large waiting times, red tape and even humiliation…by medical and social examination personnel.”[88]

The ICRC supplied hospitals in North Ossetia, Ingushetia, and Chechnya with emergency supplies for the surgeries of 275 patients. It also provided ad hoc assistance to the Ingush Republican Hospital to help treat casualties of an explosion in Nazran in June 2008. The ICRC partnered with the Saint Petersburg Military Medical Academy, North-Ossetian State Medical Academy, and Chechen State University in an emergency surgery seminar in June 2008, which attracted participants from Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.[89]

A 2008 study found that “most individual rehabilitation programmes currently designed for disabled people are totally inadequate….”[90] In October 2008, a new policy on physical rehabilitation came into force, aimed at broadening and simplifying access, and improving the quality and efficiency of services.[91] There are at least five major rehabilitation centers specifically equipped to address the needs of disabled Russian war veterans, including amputee mine/ERW survivors. War veterans are eligible for free treatment, including prosthetics, rehabilitation, and psychosocial support. However, service provision was not consistent in all regions.[92] The ICRC provided an orthopedic training seminar to 33 doctors from 15 republican hospitals and polyclinics in 2008.[93]

The European Union (EU) continued to support the Russian government in its “Rehabilitation System: Services for the Disabled” program at the federal level and in four pilot locations: Kostroma, Moscow, and Saratov regions and in St. Petersburg. The project aims to improve disability law, train rehabilitation specialists, and encourage the use of NGOs and companies in service provision.[94] In November 2008, the project sponsored a research conference in St. Petersburg on “Social support to disabled people in St. Petersburg,” which presented a variety of policy recommendations for improving accessibility for and social integration of persons with disabilities.[95] The project also supported the first ever survey on disability issues in Russia, released in 2008.[96]

Opportunities for economic reintegration were limited and President Medvedev admitted in April 2009 that persons with disabilities were particularly vulnerable to the recent economic crisis.[97] While government benefits, including a disability pension, existed for persons with disabilities and for caregivers,[98] they were not adequate to meet needs.[99] Some regions, such as Moscow, had better benefits than others.[100] On April 7, 2008, the federal government issued amendments to the regulations on recognizing persons with disabilities.[101] The amendments aimed to simplify legal procedures for receiving the status of a person with disabilities and subsequent care and support.[102] In May 2008, the Russian government extended additional support to certain veterans with disabilities in 2008, offering a free car or lump sum of RUB100,000 (US$4,040).[103]

In 2008, the Ministry of Health and Social Development continued to support several local NGOs—the All-Russian Society of Disabled Persons, All-Russian Society of the Blind, All-Russian Society of the Deaf and Disabled War Veterans of Afghanistan—in the provision of assistance for the creation of new businesses, job opportunities and rehabilitation for persons with disabilities.[104] The EU study found that local disability NGOs were viewed favorably by persons with disabilities and their families.[105]

Employment quotas for persons with disabilities were mandated by law, but employment discrimination continued and there were no penalties for failing to comply with quotas. NGO advocacy reportedly succeeded in convincing some international companies to consider hiring persons with disabilities and local authorities in Moscow reportedly encouraged employment of persons with disabilities.[106]

Russian laws prohibit discrimination against and mandate accessibility for persons with disabilities, but were inadequately enforced. Discrimination was reported in education, employment and services in 2008.[107] The EU study found that persons with disabilities lacked sufficient information on the legal framework for disability.[108]

The EU-supported disability survey found broad acceptance among the general population for inclusion of persons with disabilities.[109] However, the United States Department of State stated that in Russia, “Persons with disabilities were generally excluded from the social and political life of their communities and isolated from mainstream society.”[110] Institutions for persons with disabilities were allegedly “poor, with unqualified staff and overcrowding….”[111] In May 2008, President Medvedev admitted that disability was “an issue we did not talk about at all for a long time.”[112]

Young persons with disabilities were often discouraged by authorities from attending school.[113] UNICEF and Perspectiva, a local NGO, promoted inclusive education in 2008, raised funds for improving school accessibility, and held seminars with teachers on including children with special needs in the classroom.[114] In March 2009, children and youth NGOs and community organizations wrote an appeal to the Republic of North Ossetia’s Ministry of Construction and Architectural Policy calling for laws mandating accessibility to businesses and public buildings.[115]

Russia signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on 24 September 2008, but not its Optional Protocol. As of 1 August 2009, Russia had not ratified the convention.

Victim assistance in Chechnya

Healthcare in Chechnya received increased federal and local government funding, allowing the ICRC scale down its medical assistance.[116] Health infrastructure improved in 2007 and 2008.[117] Nonetheless, health needs in Chechnya were reportedly “extensive” and healthcare provision was hindered by ongoing instability.[118] Many international humanitarian agencies had withdrawn by 2008.[119] There were few opportunities for psychosocial support or economic reintegration. Many persons with disabilities in Chechnya were living in Temporary Accommodation Centers, but, according to Amnesty International, faced forced evictions, even in winter.[120]

The ICRC made a donation of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies to six hospitals in Chechnya in 2008. It concluded its seven years of support to the Grozny Prosthetic-Orthopedic Center in 2008 and provided training to Chechen prosthetic/orthotic technicians. The ICRC also supported two courses organized by the Pirogov Medical Surgical Centre in Moscow and the Scientific Research Work Institute of Traumatology and Orthopedics in St. Petersburg for seven surgeons and four traumatologists from Chechnya.[121]

On 3 April 2008, VoM, in partnership with UNICEF, Handicap International (HI), and several government agencies, organized a marathon for persons with disabilities to raise awareness of the mine/ERW threat and disability issues.[122] VoM and UNICEF continued to support a football team of mine and UXO survivors.[123] UNICEF also continued to support a network of 19 psychosocial school programs and rehabilitation centers for children traumatized by war in Chechnya.[124]

From 2008–2009, the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) supported HI in a livelihood project targeting persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, in Chechnya. The project benefited 110 households, all of which had at least one person with disabilities.[125]

Due to ongoing insecurity, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) continued to implement a “remote control” program of medical assistance in Chechnya, managed and monitored from Moscow. In particular, they supported the trauma department and reconstructive surgery department for war-injured at Grozny’s Hospital 9, which have benefited mine/ERW survivors.[126]

The World Health Organization provided support to two local NGOs, Let’s Save the Generation and Association of Chechen Women Doctors, to provide medical, rehabilitation, and psycho-social support to children and teenagers with disabilities.[127] Let’s Save the Generation’s work faced a major setback with the murder of their director Zarema Sadulayeva in August 2009.[128]

In October 2008, the families of three Chechen mine casualties received compensation of €20,000–35,000 ($36,815–51,541), following a European Court of Human Rights decision that the Russian government had failed to adequately protect them from the threat of mines.[129]

Support for Mine Action

In April 2008, the MES signed an agreement with the Serbian Ministry of Trade to carry out demining operations in Serbia starting in 2008. Russia was to cover the full cost of the operations, estimated at around $35 million.[130] In July 2008, the MES sent 60 demining personnel to Serbia to clear an airfield near Niš and the adjoining area: cluster submunition clearance at the airport began in August 2008.[131] Clearance operations continued as of August 2009.[132] Russia has not reported a value for its contributions to international mine action during 2008 or 2009.

In August 2009, Russia announced approximately $6 million in bilateral funding to the government of Nicaragua to cover mine clearance operations until May 2010. Of the total contribution, approximately $3 million is reportedly a combination of in-kind contributions of equipment and monetary contributions to purchase equipment, including mine detectors and road building machinery to improve accessibility to mine-affected areas: roughly $3 million will cover the costs of clearing the remaining mined areas. Nicaragua planned to set aside a small portion of the contribution to fund a rapid response clearance team until the end of 2010.[133] In December 2008 the rapid response teams had ceased operations due to a funding shortage.[134]


[1] At a January 2007 press conference, the chief of Russia’s engineering troops, Col.-Gen. Nikolay Serdtsev, stated, “The Russian armed forces cannot allow themselves to give up the use of landmines, which for a long time will remain one of the most effective and inexpensive types of defensive weapon.” “Russia needs landmines: army general,” Agence France-Presse, 19 January 2007.

[2] Russia stated in November 2006 that “a mine-free world remains our common goal. Nonetheless, we have noted on several occasions that our movement towards this goal has to be realistic and gradual, sustaining the necessary level of security and stability.” Statement of Russia, Eighth Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 6 November 2006.

[3] Statement of Russia, Ninth Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 6 November 2007.

[4] Statement of Russia, Tenth Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 12 November 2008.

[5] Interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Moscow, June 2009.

[6] Russia submitted a series of declarations with its ratification instrument that will guide its national implementation of Amended Protocol II. For details of the declarations, see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, pp. 854–855.

[7] Statement of Russia, Ninth Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 6 November 2007.

[8] Statement of Russia, Tenth Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 12 November 2008.

[9] In November 2008, Russia said, “Information on implementation of Protocol II by Russia has been submitted in a question-answer form to the Secretariat of our Conference.” Statement of Russia, Tenth Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 12 November 2008.

[10] Interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Moscow, June 2009.

[11] For details on cluster munition policy and practice see HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice, Mines Action Canada, May 2009, pp. 230–235.

[12] See for example, Statement of Russia, Tenth Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 12 November 2008; statement of Russia, Ninth Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 6 November 2007; and statement of Russia, Third Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II, 10 December 2001. In January 2005, Russia said it had not developed, produced, or supplied blast mines to its armed forces for more than nine years. Statement by Amb. Leonid Skotnikov, Plenary Meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 27 January 2005.

[13] Maj.-Gen. Alexander Averchenko, “Traditional and New Tasks,” Amreysky Sbornik, No. 1, 1997. In 2004, Russia said it has spent or plans to spend RUB3.33 billion on research, development, and production of new engineer munitions, including alternatives to antipersonnel mines. Statement by Sergei Ivanov, Minister of Defense, parliamentary hearings on ratification of Amended Protocol II, 23 November 2004.

[14] Interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Moscow, June 2009. In November 2006, Amb. Anatoly I. Antonov stated, “Starting from 1994 we have been observing the moratorium on the export of the most dangerous APMs.” Eighth Annual Conference of States Parties of CCW Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 6 November 2006. In August 2006, Russia told the Conference on Disarmament, “We are interested in working out a universal international agreement on banning the transfer of the most dangerous antipersonnel mines.” Statement by Amb. Valery Loshchinin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, Plenary Meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 10 August 2006.

[15] Statement by Sergei Ivanov, parliamentary hearings on ratification of CCW Amended Protocol II, 23 November 2004.

[16] Statement of Russia, Tenth Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 12 November 2008. Perhaps contradicting this trend, an official asking not to be identified told Landmine Monitor in June 2009 that Russia had destroyed “more than 8 million” antipersonnel mines during “the last few years.” Interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Moscow, June 2009.

[17] Statement of Russia, Ninth Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 6 November 2007.

[18] Statement of Russia, Eighth Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 12 November 2006.

[19] Statement by Amb. Leonid Skotnikov, Plenary Meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 27 January 2005.

[20] Tajikistan has reported that bilateral negotiations concerning Russian stockpiles of antipersonnel mines in Tajikistan are ongoing. Tajikistan Article 7 Report, Form B, 3 February 2008. Russia has apparently destroyed the stockpile of antipersonnel mines it had in the disputed Transnistria region of Moldova. See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 535.

[21] For example, Georgia provided the ICBL and others with a document titled “Bombed and Mined Areas During Russian Occupation (from 7 August 2008),” dated 26 August 2008, that alleges Russian use of antipersonnel mines in at least eight locations from 7 August to 21 August 2008.

[22] See, HRW, A Dying Practice: Use of Cluster Munitions by Russia and Georgia in August 2008 (New York: HRW, April 2009); and HRW, Up In Flames: Humanitarian Law Violations and Civilian Victims in the Conflict over South Ossetia (New York: HRW, January 2009).

[23] “Despite Georgian aggression in South Ossetia, the Russian Federation did not employ the use of cassette [cluster] bombs or antipersonnel landmines.” Letter to HRW from Andrei Kelin, Director, Fourth Department for CIS Countries, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 January 2009.

[24] For a summary of past use, see Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 1,186–1,187.

[25] Interview with Russian delegation, CCW Group of Governmental Experts, Geneva, 23 June 2006. Translation by Russian delegation and notes by HRW. They insisted that all use of antipersonnel mines “complies with Amended Protocol II,” that “all necessary documentation for minefields is retained,” and that all minefields “are fenced and the civilian population informed.” Russia has regularly acknowledged using antipersonnel mines in Chechnya in the past.

[26] See, for example, Statement by Amb. Anatoly I. Antonov to the CCW Group of Governmental Experts, Geneva,
18 November 2003. The Ministry of Defense has developed guidelines on laying minefields in compliance with the protocol’s requirements. These are taught at the military schools and at special training courses in the armed forces. Statement of Russia, Eighth Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 6 November 2006.

[27] See, for example, “Militiamen got ambushed in Kabardino-Balcaria,” Lenta.ru Information Agency, 11 June 2009, www.lenta.ru; “Terror act in the capital of North Ossetia,” Kavkazsky Uzel Information Agency, 6 November 2008, www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru; “In Dagestan, armoured Khasavyurt SIZO vehicle blown up,” Kavkazsky Uzel Information Agency, 1 May 2009, www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru; and “Explosion in Ingushetia was aimed to kill best sappers, militia says,” Kavkazsky Uzel Information Agency, 7 March 2009, www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru.

[28] See for example, “Details of mining operation in Jokhar,” Kavkaz-Center News Agency, 21 December 2008; “Sabotage action in Jokhar,” Kavkaz-Center News Agency, 25 April 2009; “Sheikh Sayeed Abu Saad: Reminder for Muslims,” Kavkaz-Center News Agency, 23 May 2009; “Pro-Russian collaborators blown up in Jokhar,” Kavkaz-Center News Agency, 10 June 2008; and “Martyr attacks a base of puppet police in Nazran,” Kavkaz-Center News Agency, 17 August 2009.

[29] Interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Moscow, June 2009.

[30] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 967.

[31] “Chechen MoI reports 19 militants and nine militiamen killed during one month,” Kavkazsky Uzel Information Agency, 25 May 2009, www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru.

[32] “In Chechnya, mine explosion kills a youngster of 19,” Kavkazsky Uzel Information Agency, 13 March 2009, www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru.

[33] “Russian soldier killed in Ingushetia,” Lenta.ru Information Agency, 7 March 2009, www.lenta.ru .

[34] Mairbek Vatchagaev, “Chechen Interior Minister Tries to Play Down the Insurgency,” in North Caucasus Weekly, Volume IX, Issue 48, 19 December 2008, georgiandaily.com.

[35] UN, “2009 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, 2008, p. 284.

[36] Casualty statistics provided by email from Eliza Murtazaeva, Project Officer, Child Protection, UNICEF, 28 July 2009; and Landmine Monitor media monitoring, January 2008–June 2009.

[37] Landmine Monitor media monitoring, January 2008–June 2009.

[38] Casualty statistics provided by email from Eliza Murtazaeva, UNICEF, 28 July 2009; and Landmine Monitor media monitoring, January 2008–June 2009.

[39] Landmine Monitor media monitoring, January 2008–June 2009.

[40] “Explosion on Sochi beach kills two persons,” Caucasian Knot, 7 August 2008, www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru.

[41] This includes the media reports of casualties reported in Landmine Monitor Report 2008 and UNICEF casualty statistics for Chechnya. Note that in July 2009, UNICEF reported an additional casualty for 2008, unreported in Landmine Monitor Report 2008. See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 992; and casualty statistics provided by email from Eliza Murtazaeva, UNICEF, 28 July 2009.

[42] These figures were compiled from UNICEF figures for Chechnya from 1999 to 2008 (in the July 2009 version of the database, which sometimes differs from figures reported in previous Landmine Monitor reports due to verification and quality assurance of the data), plus additional reports in the media for Chechnya in 2006 and 2007 reported in Landmine Monitor Reports 2007–2008 and media reports for the rest of the Russian Federation from 2002 to 2007, reported in Landmine Monitor Reports 2003–2008. The figures for 2005 reported in Landmine Monitor Report 2006 were not reliable as they included many command-detonated devices; the statistics for 2005 from Landmine Monitor Report 2007 are used here. For 2002, Landmine Monitor Report 2003 reported five boys killed near Volgograd and Landmine Monitor Report 2004 reported seven military personnel killed in Dagestan. Therefore, for this report Landmine Monitor has counted 12 killed for 2002. Figures for 1999–2001 in Landmine Monitor Reports 2000-2003 are not reliable and probably contain many command-detonated devices. Therefore, they have been omitted from this total. Casualty statistics provided by email from Eliza Murtazaeva, UNICEF, 28 July 2009; Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 992; Landmine Monitor Report 2007, pp. 963, 969, 1,048; Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 1,057–1,058, 1,142; Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 862; Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1,104; Landmine Monitor Report 2003, p. 673; Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 738; Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp. 906–907; and Landmine Monitor Report 2000, pp. 844–845.

[43] Casualty statistics provided by email from Eliza Murtazaeva, UNICEF, 28 July 2009.

[44] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 947.

[45] Casualty statistics provided by email from Eliza Murtazaeva, UNICEF, 28 July 2009.

[46] Landmine Monitor media monitoring, 1 January 2009–16 June 2009.

[47] US Department of State, “2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Russia,” Washington, DC, 25 February 2009.

[48] Letter from Z.A. Alemkhanova, Deputy Minister, Ministry for Labour, Employment, and Social Development of the Chechen Republic, 1 June 2009.

[49] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Eliza Murtazaeva, UNICEF, 28 July 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Alkhazov Anzor Sultanovich, Manager, Department for Mine Risk Education, DDG, 20 May 2009.

[50] Vadim Udmantsev, “Minefields-Obstacles to Socio-Economic Reconstruction in Chechnya,” VPK (Military Industrial Courier, Nalchik-Moscow), No.19 (235) 14, 20 May 2008, www.vpk-news.ru; and Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 993.

[51] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Alkhazov Anzor Sultanovich, DDG, 20 May 2009.

[52] UN, “2009 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, 2008, p. 284.

[53] Ibid, p. 285.

[54] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Alkhazov Anzor Sultanovich, DDG, 20 May 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Eliza Murtazaeva, UNICEF, 28 July 2009.

[55] Ministry of Health and Social Development, “Social Protection of Disabled Persons,” 2009, www.minzdravsoc.ru.

[56] “President of the Russian Federation established the Council for the Disabled,” Lenta.ru Information Agency, 19 December 2008, www.lenta.ru.

[57] Telephone interview with Zarema Djamaldinova, Program Assistant, Child Protection, UNICEF, 16 August 2009.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Email from Eliza Murtazaeva, UNICEF, 4 August 2009.

[61] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Eliza Murtazaeva, UNICEF, 28 July 2009; and email from Eliza Murtazaeva, UNICEF, 4 August 2009.

[62] CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form B, 30 October 2008.

[63] “Mine clearance of farmland has started in Chechnya,” YUGA, 21 April 2009, www.yuga.ru.

[64] “Shoygu agreed to demine Chechnya,” Newsland, 22 July 2009, www.newsland.ru.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Russian Government Decree No. 1041 “Requirements for transport vehicles of federal service of security, which could be used for emergency demining operations, to prevent terrorist act and illegal crossing of the frontier,” KADIS, www.kadis.ru.

[67] “Organization of and rules for clearance of explosive ordnance on the territory of Kaliningrad.” See “Six decades for a minefield,” Nezavisimay Gazeta, 11 June 2009, www.ng.ru.

[68] EMERCOM, “Center of humanitarian demining and special blasting operations,” www.emercom-d.com.

[69] “It is planned to establish special groups for demining of lands within MES,” Kavkazskiy Uzel, 23 July 2009, www.kavkaz-uzel.ru.

[70] “In one month in Chechnya destroyed more than 360 explosive devices,” Kavkazskiy Uzel, 12 March 2009, www.kavkaz-uzel.ru.

[71] “Engineering forces of NCMD cleared more than 96,000 explosive devices in Chechnya,” Slujiviy, 21 January 2009, www.arnero.ru.

[72] “Deminers of MES completed their task in Chechnya,” Kavkazskiy Uzel, 29 May 2009, www.kavkaz-uzel.ru.

[73] HRW, A Dying Practice, Use of Cluster Munitions by Russia and Georgia in August 2008 (New York: HRW, April 2009), p. 62.

[74] Statements of Russian Federation, CCW Group of Governmental Experts on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 1 September 2008; and CCW Group of Governmental Experts on Protocol V, 23 April 2009. Notes by Landmine Action; see also Russian Embassy to Cambodia, “An update on the humanitarian relief efforts of the Russian Federation aimed at providing assistance to civilian population of the South Ossetia affected by the conflict in the region,” undated, www.embrusscambodia.mid.ru; and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,, “Situation Report No. 7 on the Situation in Georgia,” 25 August 2008, www.reliefweb.int.

[75] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Eliza Murtazaeva, UNICEF, 28 July 2009; email from Eliza Murtazaeva, UNICEF, 4 August 2009; and Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 994.

[76] Email from Eliza Murtazaeva, UNICEF, 4 August 2009.

[77] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Alkhazov Anzor Sultanovich, DDG, 20 May 2009; emails from Eliza Murtazaeva, UNICEF, 4 and 7 August 2009; response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Eliza Murtazaeva, UNICEF, 28 July 2009; ICRC, “Russian Federation: ICRC activities from January to March 2008,” 29 April 2008, www.icrc.org; ICRC, “Russian Federation: ICRC activities from April to June 2008,” 24 July 2008, www.icrc.org; ICRC, “Russian Federation: ICRC activities from July to December 2008,” 24 March 2009, www.icrc.org; and email from Krisztina Huszti Orban, Legal Attaché, Arms Unit, Legal Division, ICRC, 4 September 2009.

[78] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Alkhazov Anzor Sultanovich, DDG, 20 May 2009; and email from Eliza Murtazaeva, UNICEF, 4 August 2009.

[79] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Eliza Murtazaeva, UNICEF, 28 July 2009.

[80] See Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p. 873; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Alkhazov Anzor Sultanovich, DDG, 20 May 2009.

[81] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Alkhazov Anzor Sultanovich, DDG, 20 May 2009.

[82] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Eliza Murtazaeva, UNICEF, 28 July 2009.

[83] Ibid.

[84] Email from Krisztina Huszti Orban, ICRC, 4 September 2009.

[85] This includes the UNICEF cumulative total from 1994–2008, plus the injured casualties in 2009.

[86] This includes the 1999–2008 cumulative total, plus the injured casualties in 2009.

[87] Alex Rodriguez, “Russian health-care system badly ailing: Graft is rife, staffing short in the nation’s poorly equipped hospitals, and it shows in death rates,” Chicago Tribune (Maloyaroslavets), 26 February 2008, archives.chicagotribune.com.

[88] Saratov Center for Social Policy and Gender Studies, “Key findings of the survey on disability and disabled people in Russia,” 2008, p. 3, rehabsys.ru.

[89] ICRC, “Russian Federation: ICRC activities from January to March 2008,” 29 April 2008, www.icrc.org; ICRC, “Russian Federation: ICRC activities from April to June 2008,” 24 July 2008, www.icrc.org; and ICRC, “Russian Federation: ICRC activities from July to December 2008,” 24 March 2009, www.icrc.org.

[90] Saratov Center for Social Policy and Gender Studies, “Key findings of the survey on disability and disabled people in Russia,” 2008, p. 3, rehabsys.ru.

[91] Irina Innocent, “Prostheses For Persons with Disabilities,” April 15, 2008, Rossiyskaya Gazeta (Moscow), www.rg.ru.

[92] “Strategy of Mercy: The support of the state is necessary for those disabled in military operations,” Red Star: The Army and Society, 28 May 2008, www.redstar.ru.

[93] ICRC, “Russian Federation: ICRC activities from January to March 2008,” 29 April 2008, www.icrc.org.

[94] EU-Russia Cooperation Programme, “The Project: Project Components,” 12 August 2009, rehabsys.ru.

[95] EU-Russia Cooperation Programme, “Resolution of a research conference ‘Social support to disabled people in St. Petersburg. Accessible environment’,” 3 December 2008, rehabsys.ru.

[96] Saratov Center for Social Policy and Gender Studies, “Key findings of the survey on disability and disabled people in Russia,” 2008, rehabsys.ru.

[97] Dmitry Medvedev, “Transcript of the Meeting of the Council of the Disabled,” 7 April 2009, www.kremlin.ru.

[98] Ministry of Health and Social Development, “Additional measures of social support for caregivers of disabled citizens,” 13 May 2008, www.minzdravsoc.ru; Ministry of Health and Social Development, “On some measures of social support for people with disabilities,” 6 May 2008, www.minzdravsoc.ru; and Ministry of Health and Social Development, “On approval of the timing of payment of lump-sum compensation for certain categories of disabled persons,” 3 November 2008, www.minzdravsoc.ru.

[99] US Department of State, “2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Russia,” Washington, DC, 25 February 2009; Peter Finn, “Russia Looks for Ways to End Isolation, Invisibility of Disabled,” The Washington Post (Moscow), 26 June 2008, www.washingtonpost.com; and US Social Security Administration, “Social Security Programs Throughout the World: Europe, 2008: Russia,” 2009, www.ssa.gov.

[100] Ibid.

[101] “On amendments to the rules of recognition of disabled persons,” Medreestr.Ru, 26 May 2008, medreestr.ru.

[102] Irina Krasnopolskaya, “A Person with Disability? – Evidence Is Not Required,” 11 April 2008, Rossiyskaya Gazeta (Moscow), www.rg.ru.

[103] Ministry of Health and Social Development, “On some measures of social support for people with disabilities,” 6 May 2008, www.minzdravsoc.ru.

[104] Ministry of Health and Social Development, “On through the federal budget subsidies for public organizations of persons with disabilities within the federal target program ‘Social support for people with disabilities in 2006 – 2010’,” 26 December 2008, www.minzdravsoc.ru.

[105] Saratov Center for Social Policy and Gender Studies, “Key findings of the survey on disability and disabled people in Russia,” 2008, rehabsys.ru.

[106] US Department of State, “2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Russia,” Washington, DC, 25 February 2009.

[107] Ibid; and Peter Finn, “Russia Looks for Ways to End Isolation, Invisibility of Disabled,” The Washington Post (Moscow), 26 June 2008, www.washingtonpost.com.

[108] Saratov Center for Social Policy and Gender Studies, “Key findings of the survey on disability and disabled people in Russia,” 2008, p. 5, rehabsys.ru.

[109] Ibid, p. 2.

[110] US Department of State, “2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Russia,” Washington, DC, 25 February 2009; and Peter Finn, “Russia Looks for Ways to End Isolation, Invisibility of Disabled,” The Washington Post (Moscow), 26 June 2008, www.washingtonpost.com.

[111] US Department of State, “2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Russia,” Washington, DC, 25 February 2009.

[112] Peter Finn, “Russia Looks for Ways to End Isolation, Invisibility of Disabled,” The Washington Post (Moscow), 26 June 2008, www.washingtonpost.com.

[113] US Department of State, “2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Russia,” Washington, DC, 25 February 2009; and Peter Finn, “Russia Looks for Ways to End Isolation, Invisibility of Disabled,” The Washington Post (Moscow), 26 June 2008, www.washingtonpost.com.

[114] Masha Gorbachova, “UNICEF initiative helps children with special needs receive an education in Moscow,” UNICEF, 11 April 2008, www.unicef.org.

[115] Emma Marzoeva, “NGOs of North Ossetia state poor care of invalids,” Caucasian Knot, 28 March 2009, www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru.

[116] ICRC, “Russian Federation: ICRC activities from January to March 2008,” 29 April 2008, www.icrc.org.

[117] Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, “Health system slowly recovering in Chechnya,” 2008, www.internal-displacement.org.

[118] MSF UK, “MSF Chechnya Programme Update,” 8 August 2008, www.msf.org.uk.

[119] Ibid.

[120] Amnesty International, “Amnesty International Report 2009, State of the World’s Human Rights: Russia,” 2009, thereport.amnesty.org; and Dmitry Florin, “AI is concerned that TACs are liquidated in Chechnya,” Caucasian Knot, 23 June 2009, www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru.

[121] ICRC, “Russian Federation: ICRC activities from January to March 2008,” 29 April 2008, www.icrc.org; ICRC, “Russian Federation: ICRC activities from April to June 2008,” 24 July 2008, www.icrc.org; and ICRC, “Russian Federation: ICRC activities from July to December 2008,” 24 March 2009, www.icrc.org.

[122] UNICEF, “Grozny celebrates International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action,” 3 April 2008, www.unicef.org.

[123] Email from Eliza Murtazaeva, UNICEF, 7 August 2009; and Andrei Muchnik, “Against the odds, Chechen landmine survivors score goals on the football pitch,” UNICEF, 31 October 2008, www.unicef.org.

[124] Bela Tsugaeva, “Help for children psychologically affected by war in Chechnya,” UNICEF, 3 March 2008, www.unicef.org.

[125] Email from Carlos Afonso, Head, ECHO Moscow, 7 August 2009; and email from Omar Gamdullaev, North Caucasus Projects Coordinator, HI, 1 September 2009.

[126] MSF UK, “MSF Chechnya Programme Update,” 8 August 2008, www.msf.org.uk.

[127] WHO, “Health sector meeting (Northern Caucasus region),” 4 March 2008, www.internal-displacement.org.

[128] ICBL, “Nobel Peace Laureate Campaign Denounces Killing of Chechen Activist,” 12 August 2009, www.icbl.org; and Tony Halpin, “Head of Chechen children’s charity found shot dead with husband,” Times (London), 12 August 2009, www.timesonline.co.uk.

[129] “European Court finds Russia unable to protect citizens from AP landmines in Chechnya,” Caucasian Knot, 9 October 2008, www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru; and European Human Rights Advocacy Centre, “Annual Report 2008,” 2009, p. 12, www.londonmet.ac.uk.

[130] “Russia to clear landmines in Serbia,” Russia Today, 19 April 2008, www.russiatoday.ru.

[131] “The specialists of MES of Russia arrived in Serbia to demine Serbian land,” MES, 24 July 2008, www.mchs.gov.ru; and “Cluster bombs removed in Niš,” B92, 6 August 2008, www.b92.net.

[132] “EMERCOM of Russia continues mine-neutralization works in the Republic of Serbia,” 12 August 2009,
www.mchs.gov.ru.

[133] Telephone interview with Dr. Juan Umaña, Technical Secretary, National Demining Commission (Comisión Nacional de Desminado), 18 August 2009; and email from Carl Case, Director, Office of Humanitarian Mine Action, Organization of American States (OAS), 18 August 2009. The OAS reported slightly different figures, citing $6.5 million overall funding with $3.5 million to support clearance operations and at least $1.9 million earmarked for equipment purchases.

[134] Interview with Carlos J. Orozco, Regional Coordinator, OAS Assistance Program for Demining in Central America, Managua, 2 March 2009.