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Turkey

Turkey

2008 Key Data

State Party since

1 March 2004

Contamination

Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, UXO, IEDs

Estimated area of contamination

Unquantified

Casualties in 2008

21 killed (2007: 28)

79 injured (2007: 73)

Estimated mine/ERW survivors

Unknown, at least 2,317

Article 5 (clearance of mined areas)

1 March 2014

Demining in 2008

Area cleared not reported, 999 mines reported destroyed

Risk education recipients in 2008

Unknown

Progress towards victim assistance aims

Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of Turkey became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 March 2004. It has not enacted domestic legislation, but has indicated that existing measures give effect to the treaty obligations. Turkey failed to destroy its stockpile of nearly three million antipersonnel mines by its 1 March 2008 deadline, and as of April 2009 still had more than 1.3 million mines in stock. Turkey decided to retain 16,000 mines for training and research purposes and at the end of 2008 still had 15,125 left. Turkey has regularly accused the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan) of using landmines.

Turkey is affected by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). It has started clearance of mines along its border with Syria, but at a slow pace and without sufficient transparency. Turkey still needs to set out concrete plans for clearance of all affected areas under its jurisdiction or control to meet the requirements of Article 5. This includes its responsibilities for areas under its control in northern Cyprus.

Landmine Monitor has reported 831 victim-activated mine/ERW casualties in Turkey between 1999 and 2008, including 250 killed and 581 injured. Little progress has been made on developing a sustainable risk education (RE) program in Turkey over the past 10 years, despite the government reaffirming its commitment to building awareness of the risks. NGOs have conducted only limited RE, predominantly due to lack of funds.

Services to assist mine/ERW survivors in Turkey remained inadequate. In October 2008, the parliament established a new social insurance system that should enable some persons with disabilities to access more services, although it would not cover total costs. There is no government coordination of victim assistance in Turkey, nor a national strategic plan. Physical rehabilitation is available to military personnel injured by mines/ERW and a limited number of civilian survivors through military and government rehabilitation centers.

Mine Ban Policy

Turkey acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 25 September 2003, becoming a State Party on 1 March 2004. Turkey has not enacted domestic implementation legislation, but has indicated that its constitution and criminal code, and directives from the army general staff, give legal effect to the treaty’s provisions.[1]

Turkey submitted its sixth Article 7 report in 2009, covering calendar year 2008.[2] The report includes voluntary Form J with information on casualties and victim assistance (VA).

Turkey attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, where it made remarks during the general exchange of views and also made statements on universalization, stockpile destruction, mine clearance, and VA. At the meeting, Turkey was named co-rapporteur of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration. At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2009, it made statements on mines retained for training, stockpile destruction, mine clearance, and VA.

With respect to key matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1 and 2, Turkey has stated, “Turkey does not use mines with sensitive fuses and/or anti-handling devices.”[3] It has also stated that Turkey considers the stockpiling or transit of foreign antipersonnel mines on its territory as a breach of the Mine Ban Treaty, and that it will not permit the use of antipersonnel mines in Turkey by other states during joint military operations.[4]

With respect to Article 3, in May 2009 Turkey said that, “We agree with the rationale of Article III which recognises specific and different needs of States Parties by not fixing numbers or ceilings for training purposes.”[5] In a similar statement on the issue in 2006, Turkey stated that “countries with varying geographies, incongruous terrain, different sizes of armed forces, more mines emplaced than others and countries that are simply in parts of the world where there are more anti-personnel mines, which would require more training, should not have artificial numbers or ceilings imposed on them for the number of mines to be retained under Article 3.”[6]

Turkey is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. Turkey submitted its annual report required by Article 13 on 12 November 2008. Turkey is not party to CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War.

Turkey has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[7]

At Turkey’s invitation, the ICBL and Landmine Monitor undertook a mission to Turkey from 22–23 May 2008, following Turkey’s failure to meet its stockpile destruction deadline on 1 March 2008 (see Stockpiling and destruction section below).[8]

In July 2006, the NGO Geneva Call reported that the Kurdistan People’s Congress (Kongra Gel) and its armed wing, People’s Defense Forces (Hezen Parastina Gel, HPG), also known as the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) and formerly as the Kurdish Freedom and Democracy Congress (Kongreya Azad z Demokrasiya Kurdista, KADEK), had unilaterally halted antipersonnel mine use by signing the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment.[9] Turkey stated that the “signing took place without the prior information and consent of the State Party concerned, the Republic of Turkey. Consequently, it contradicts the understanding of a number of States Parties, including Turkey…and, therefore, is inappropriate and unacceptable.”[10]

Production and transfer

Turkey halted production of antipersonnel mines concurrently with a moratorium on the sale and transfer of antipersonnel mines in January 1996.[11] Turkey’s production facilities for antipersonnel mines were then gradually phased out of service.[12] Turkey is not known to have exported antipersonnel mines. Turkey appears to have imported mines from Germany and the United States.

Use

The Chief of General Staff issued a directive banning the use of antipersonnel mines by the Turkish armed forces on 26 January 1998.[13] There have been no confirmed instances of use of antipersonnel mines by Turkish forces since that time.[14]

According to Turkey’s latest Article 7 report covering calendar year 2008, 37 military personnel and civilians were killed and 121 were injured in 2008 by landmines used by the PKK/KADEK/Kongra Gel. The report does not differentiate between casualties caused by antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines or improvised explosive devices (IEDs), nor between victim-activated and command-detonated mines/IEDs.[15] In its Article 7 report covering calendar year 2007, Turkey reported that 53 military personnel and civilians were killed and 204 injured by landmines used by the PKK/KADEK/Kongra Gel.[16]

The Turkish General Staff reported that in 2008 it recovered 55 antipersonnel mines, one antivehicle mine, and 85 other explosive devices from separatist groups in 2008. It also reported 27 incidents in 2008 where separatist groups set off munitions or mines.[17] The General Staff reported that between January and July 2009, it seized 30 mines (the type was not identified) and that there had been 44 incidents involving IEDs.[18] During the ICBL’s May 2008 mission to Turkey, army officials showed photos of VS-50 antipersonnel mines they said were seized by the army as recently as March 2008.[19]

Landmine Monitor has not been able to obtain from Turkey specific dates and locations, or other concrete details, of PKK/KADEK/Kongra Gel use of antipersonnel mines, or of incidents that led to casualties from antipersonnel mines. The PKK/KADEK/Kongra Gel has admitted to use of command-detonated mines, but denied any use of mines or other explosive devices which can be activated by a person or a vehicle.[20] In 2008, Geneva Call submitted to the PKK/KADEK/Kongra Gel a list of reported mine incidents in areas where it operates, and requested a response. In late 2008, the HPG, the armed wing of the PKK, repeated that it uses only command-detonated explosive weapons in attacks on security personnel. It admitted that this has resulted in some civilian casualties. The HPG invited Geneva Call to send a verification mission. Geneva Call said this did not occur as the Turkish government in July 2008 refused Geneva Call’s request for such a mission.[21]

In this reporting period, there were at least three incidents reported in the media that appear to have involved use of antipersonnel mines, all attributed to the PKK. Landmine Monitor has not been able to verify who laid the mines or when. In July 2008, it was reported that two Turkish soldiers died when they stepped on landmines while patrolling a mountainous rural area in Tunceli province.[22] In August 2008, a Turkish soldier reportedly died when he stepped on a landmine near the town of Semdinli in Hakkari province.[23] In September 2008, a Turkish soldier reportedly died when he stepped on a mine in the Beytussebap district of Sirnak province.[24]

Stockpiling and destruction

Turkey did not meet its 1 March 2008 treaty-mandated deadline to complete destruction of its antipersonnel mine stockpile. Turkey is therefore in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty and will remain so until stockpile destruction is completed. Turkey’s latest Article 7 report stated that it had 1,702,982 antipersonnel mines in its stockpiles at the end of 2008.[25]

In early 2006, Turkey indicated it had a stock of 2,866,818 antipersonnel mines to destroy.[26] It subsequently destroyed 94,111 mines in 2006, 250,048 mines in 2007, 913,788 mines in 2008, and 377,573 mines in January–April 2009, for a total of 1,635,520 destroyed. At the end of April 2009, Turkey said it had 1,325,409 mines left to destroy.[27] In September 2009, Turkey informed Landmine Monitor that as of 26 August 2009, it had destroyed 1,765,779 mines and had 1,195,069 left to destroy.[28]

As of April 2009, it had still not destroyed any of its ADAM mines.[29]

Throughout 2007 Turkey had assured States Parties that it would meet its deadline. As late as 19 November 2007, Turkey said that “unless unforeseen technical difficulties occur due to the operation of the Turkish Armed Forces Munitions Disposal Facility, we hope to be able to fulfill our obligation under Article 4, using if necessary other available methods.”[30] In April 2007, Turkey told States Parties that “we are confident that we will be able to fulfill our obligation by destroying stockpiled APMs by 2008.”[31] It also reported in April 2007 that the disposal facility would become operational on 4 July 2007, and run at full capacity as of that date.[32]

Turkey first announced its plans for the disposal facility in 2005.[33] In mid-July 2007, Turkey informed Landmine Monitor that the facility was “finished as planned,” and that “qualification/certification activities are continuing.”[34] It was not officially inaugurated until 8 November 2007.[35]

In a note verbale dated 28 February 2008 (two days before its deadline), and addressed to the “Presidency” of the Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Turkey stated, “At present it is difficult to make an estimate on when the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines could be accomplished. However, this process will be pursued with the utmost care.” It noted that the Turkish Munitions Disposal Facility was inaugurated on 8 November 2007, and that the “certification and qualification process took longer than foreseen.” The other explanation offered for missing the deadline was the following: “With a view to meet the deadline, other ways and means to destroy the stockpiled anti-personnel mines have also been considered. However, bearing in mind their negative impact on the environment, as well as the risks they pose for human life, these methods were disregarded.” The note requested that the Presidency circulate the information to States Parties and interested organizations.[36]

Turkey began destroying its stocks at the Turkish Munitions Disposal Facility in Yahsihan in Kirikkale province in November 2007, and by its 1 March 2008 deadline had destroyed 35,488 mines there, in addition to 319,276 mines destroyed by open detonation in 2006 and 2007.[37]

In June 2008, Turkey told States Parties that it had removed and destroyed the fuzes of all remaining mines.[38] It said, “Those remnant parts of the anti-personnel mines cannot be used. This is an important and irreversible step accomplished within the destruction process, the stockpiled landmines are not useable.”[39] It went on to note, “However, the whole destruction process has not yet been completed.” It was unable to give a timetable for completion, saying, “At this stage, I will refrain from making any predictions for the completion of the destruction of the remaining parts…When we have an accurate estimate of our daily average destruction capacity, we will be able to give you an accurate time-frame for the completion of the process.”[40]

Turkey told the ICBL in August 2008 that it could not estimate a completion date because the munitions disposal facility was still not operating at full capacity, since procedures were still being perfected. Further, a new static furnace to destroy DM11 and M14 mines to address a capacity shortfall had been added, but was not yet operational.[41]

In November 2008, Turkey told States Parties that it hoped to finish the destruction by early 2010. It also said it was working on increasing the productivity of its disposal facility, but that safety and environmental considerations were constraining elements.[42]

In the past Turkey also reported possession of 18,236 M18 Claymore mines, but in its Article 7 report submitted in April 2007 Turkey stated that “M18 Series APM were removed from destruction list, due to their specific technical features. Turkey has already declared that M18 series APMs will not be used as victim activated.”[43] In May 2008, officials told the ICBL that the tripwires for M18s had been destroyed and the mines were only used in command-detonated mode.[44]

Mines retained for research and training

In 2004, Turkey initially retained 16,000 antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes.[45] In its Article 7 report submitted in 2009, Turkey indicated it was retaining 15,125 mines.[46] This constituted the highest total of retained mines among States Parties. The total includes DM-11, m2, M14, and M16 mines. Turkey for the first time specified the exact number of each type of mine.[47]

Turkey consumed 25 of its retained mines in 2008, although it did not identify the types.[48] In the previous two years the number of retained mines was unchanged at 15,150 mines.

In its Article 7 report submitted in 2009, Turkey also for the first time used the expanded Form D on retained mines agreed by States Parties in 2004. It indicated that the mines had been used in training 1,834 people in four different courses, as well as for research (a modification project for mine-proof boots).[49]

Turkey stated in May 2009, “The large size, as well as the different types of mine action units necessitate the Turkish Armed Forces to retain a certain number of APLMs [antipersonnel landmines] for training purposes…. Besides Turkey has been facing a terrorist threat which includes the use of APLMs. Mines laid by terrorists have to be seized and secured as they are detected.”[50]

In May 2006, Turkey stated that “after covering some more ground in mine clearance, Turkey may review the number of mines retained for training purposes.”[51] In June 2005, Turkey said, “This figure [16,000 mines] may be reassessed as the process of downsizing the armed forces progresses.”[52]

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Turkey is contaminated with antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, and ERW, primarily UXO, as well as IEDs. Mines were laid from 1956–1959 along 510km of the border with Syria, and on some sections of the borders with Armenia, Iran, and Iraq to prevent illegal border crossings, and around security installations.[53] It has been stated that all the mines laid on the Turkish side of Turkey’s borders with Greece, Bulgaria,[54] and Georgia have been cleared.[55]

Landmines were also emplaced by government forces during the 1984–1999 conflict with the PKK in the southeast of the country. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, these mines have been progressively cleared since 1998.[56] New contamination may result from use of mines and IEDs by the PKK from 2007–2008 (see Use section above).[57]

Turkey reported in 2009 that a total of 981,778 mines remained emplaced on its territory as of the end of 2008, of which 817,312 were antipersonnel mines, and 164,466 were antivehicle mines.[58] This represents a small reduction on the figures given in the report covering calendar year 2007 (818,280 antipersonnel mines and 164,497 antivehicle mines). Turkey did not report on the locations of these mines or mined areas.[59]

During the 1974 occupation of northern Cyprus, antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were used extensively by Turkish armed forces to create the buffer zone which divides the island, and in areas adjacent to the buffer zone.[60] Most of the minefields have been maintained since then.[61]

Casualties

Landmine Monitor analysis of 2008 media reports collected by the Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey (IMFT) identified at least 100 new casualties due to mines, ERW, and victim-activated IEDs, including 29 people killed and 71 injured.[62] Of these, 72 were members of security forces and 28 were civilians. Of the civilians, there was one female adult, four boys, six children of unknown gender, 12 males of unknown age, one female of unknown age, and four of unknown gender and age. Of the civilian casualties, five were traveling, five were bystanders, three were herding, one was farming, and one collecting firewood, water, or food. The activities of the 13 remaining civilian casualties at the time of the incident were unknown.

The number of casualties in 2008 was very similar to that collected by the IMFT in 2007 (101 casualties; 28 people killed and 73 injured).[63] The media did not consistently identify the device type, often incorrectly identifying command-detonated IEDs as landmines. News reports also focused more on military casualties than civilians, resulting in possible under-reporting of civilian casualties.[64]

Turkey reported 158 antipersonnel mine casualties in 2008 (37 killed and 121 injured). It was not specified how many of the casualties were civilian, or if any civilians were “village guards” or members of other security forces.[65] This total represented a significant decrease from 257 casualties (53 killed and 204 injured) reported for 2007. It was a return to similar casualty numbers reported in 2006 (155 casualties; 24 killed and 131 injured).[66]

Casualties continued to occur in 2009 with at least 48 new casualties of victim-activated devices (27 killed and 21 injured), as of 29 June 2009. All but one of the casualties were male (the gender of one casualty was unknown). The 47 male casualties included 42 men, one boy, and four casualties of unknown age.

The total number of mine casualties in Turkey is unknown. Landmine Monitor has reported 831 victim-activated mine/ERW casualties in Turkey between 1999 and 2008, including 250 killed and 581 injured.[67]

Turkey has reported that between 1993 and 2003 landmines caused 2,905 casualties, including 588 people killed and 2,317 injured. It was reported that more than 3,000 people (mostly civilians) have been killed and another 7,000 injured by mines along the Turkish-Syrian border since the 1950s. There are no recent or comprehensive statistics on persons with disabilities and questions on disability were not included in the most recent national census in 2007.[68]

Risk profile

Turkey reports that all mined areas are fenced and clearly marked according to international standards.[69] However local authorities and civil society groups have reported unmarked areas with no fencing, particularly in mountainous areas. They report that children regularly enter these areas to tend to animals. [70]

Casualty data collected by the IMFT indicate that rural populations living near the mined border areas are most at-risk and in urgent need of risk education.[71]

Socio-economic impact

Most land near the Turkish-Syrian border falls under legal category of “Forbidden Military Zone in the First and Second Degrees” (i.e. public land administered by the Turkish military). Some of it is formerly privately owned farmland which was nationalized during the 1956 border demarcation. The Syrian military has reportedly cleared mines on the Turkish side of the border and in the buffer zone totaling 250km2, where they have planted cotton and olive trees.[72]

Program Management and Coordination

As of July 2009, there was no national mine action authority or mine action center in Turkey,[73] despite earlier pronouncements that steps were underway to create mine action management structures.[74]

While the government of Turkey stated in 2008 that it “remains determined to end the suffering” of mine/ERW casualties,[75] there was no coordination of VA or RE activities. The Administration for Disabled People, under the Prime Minister, is responsible for protecting the rights of persons with disabilities, but lacks resources.[76]

Data collection and management

There is no comprehensive casualty data collection system in Turkey, though the government has provided annual casualty figures in its in Article 7 reports.[77]

The IMFT maintains a database of casualties identified in national media reports and by volunteers and partner institutions in affected areas.[78] Since 2006, the IMFT has differentiated casualties from mines, ERW, and victim-activated and command-detonated devices more systematically. This remains difficult, however, as the media often do not provide sufficient detail on the devices causing the incidents or incorrectly identify command-detonated devices as landmines.[79] Due to a lack of funding, the IMFT did not expand its casualty data and needs assessment pilot project from 2007–2008, so figures might be under-reported.[80]

Plans

Strategic mine action plans

Turkey and Syria reportedly agreed in 2003 to demine their common borders.[81] According to Turkey’s mine action plan,[82] the 510km-long minefield on the Syrian border will be cleared under the supervision of the Directorate General for National Real Estate Affairs of the Ministry of Finance.[83] According to information provided to Landmine Monitor in 2005, Turkey’s mine action plan also includes clearing the minefield along 42km of the border with Iraq (containing 75,115 mines), the minefield along 109km of the border with Iran (containing 191,428 mines) and the minefield along 17km of the border with Armenia (containing 21,984 mines).[84]

National ownership

Commitment to mine action and victim assistance

Turkey has been slow to implement its obligations under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty and is currently not on course to meet its 2014 deadline for clearance of all antipersonnel mines from mined areas under its jurisdiction or control. Turkey reaffirmed its commitment to victim assistance at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties[85] but it has made minimal progress in providing assistance to survivors of mine/UXO over the past 10 years and there are few resources and opportunities available. 

National mine action legislation and standards

On 16 June 2009, the President of Turkey ratified Law No. 5903 on demining of minefields along the Syrian border. The law stipulates that initially the Ministry of National Defense will invite tenders for demining, and if this process does not work the Ministry of Finance will have the minefields cleared through the “service procurement method” (the meaning of this is not clear). If this method also fails, according to the law, the government will invite companies to tender for demining, in exchange for the right to cultivate lands suitable for agriculture for up to 44 years.[86]

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

In the past, demining in Turkey has been conducted by the Specialized Mine Clearance Unit of the Turkish army.[87] In addition to its manual demining teams, the unit has mine detection dogs and machines available. In 2008, a commercial company was awarded a demining contract by tender.[88] A Turkish company, Tusan Corporation, together with its German partner Tauber, initiated demining operations in June 2008 in an area near Nusaybin, where a new border crossing into Syria will be built.[89] The estimated area of contamination was 200,000m2.[90]

Turkey’s latest Article 7 report stated that 999 mines were cleared in 2008.[91] The locations and area cleared were not specified. Turkey has not included in its Article 7 reports the destruction of antipersonnel mines emplaced by the PKK/KADEK/Kongra Gel, but the Turkish General Staff website has reported clearance of IEDs. In 2008, the Turkish General Staff reportedly destroyed 55 antipersonnel mines and in 2009 it reportedly destroyed a further 27 antipersonnel mines.[92]

Progress since becoming a State Party

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Turkey is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2014. At the June 2008 Standing Committee meetings, Turkey stated that, “The mine clearance obligation of Article 5 is one of the central provisions of the Convention and Turkey will spare no effort in order to meet her 2014 deadline.”[93] In May 2009, Turkey stated that it continued its efforts to comply with the obligation under Article 5.[94] Yet Turkey still needs to set out concrete plans for clearance of all affected areas under its jurisdiction or control to meet the requirements of Article 5. This includes its responsibilities for areas under its control in northern Cyprus.

Risk Education

RE in Turkey was reported to be very limited and inadequate in 2008, as in previous years. The government reported that their efforts to increase the awareness of the population regarding the dangers of mines and ERW remained “unchanged” since 2007.[95] When asked in a parliamentary question in December 2007 what was being done in the mine/ERW affected region of Igdır to protect civilians, the Minister of Internal Affairs responded that “the citizens in the region are being warned periodically that they should inform the security forces when they encounter suspicious things”.[96] This is the extent of the information Landmine Monitor was able to source regarding government RE activities in Turkey.

In 2008, the IMFT hosted meetings in Batman, Gaziantep, Mardin, and Urfa with the participation of NGOs, parliamentary representatives, and mine survivors on the problems of mines and dangers to civilians. The IMFT also organized an educational workshop in January 2009 in Diyarbakir with the assistance of the Diyarbakir Branch of the Human Rights Association that was attended by some 15 people.[97]

In 2008, Landmine Monitor reported that the Turkish Grand National Assembly had announced RE messages were to be screened on national television in 2008 but general elections in 2008 led to personnel changes in government and it is unclear if the messages were aired.[98]

Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW survivors in Turkey is unknown, but is at least 2,317.[99] Despite the government reaffirming its commitment to the principles of VA at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008, the government made little progress in the provision of services for mine/ERW survivors in 2008.[100] There were few facilities and opportunities available to persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors. Available services were inadequate to address the needs of persons with disabilities.[101] There was also a lack of awareness of available services among survivors. Access was limited due to physical and financial barriers.[102] The government does not distinguish between mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities in the provision of services or in laws.[103] The European Commission criticized the government of Turkey for its lack of research and data on the situation of persons with disability which had reportedly resulted in uninformed government policymaking.[104]

There was some progress in government provision of healthcare, through the creation of a new social security system in Turkey under the Social Insurance and General Health Insurance Law which entered into force in October 2008. The new law provides basic healthcare services to those who pay the insurance premium. Persons with disabilities and those who cannot afford the premium remain eligible for a “green card,” qualifying them for government coverage of the cost of their insurance premium.[105] People under the age of 18 receive free healthcare under the new law.[106] However, the Law of Central and Local Administrations Budget, passed by the National Assembly in 2009, stated that those eligible for the green card should pay for part of their medical expenses.[107] Thus survivors who are unable to afford any financial contribution to their medical care cannot access the services.[108]

Through the new social insurance law, all have the right to access free first-aid services at public and private healthcare centers. However, the number of healthcare centers equipped with the trained staff and material supplies required to provide emergency care in the case of severe injuries, such as those caused by mines and ERW, was very limited.[109] Adequate emergency transport only exists in the cities, not in rural areas where the majority of incidents occur.[110]

Disability groups in Turkey reported no progress in 2008 in the improvement of rehabilitation services.[111] Services remain insufficient and inadequate medical treatment continues in rehabilitation centers. Community-based rehabilitation continued to receive much fewer financial and human resources than institutional care for persons with disabilities.[112]

The Gulhane Military Medical Academy and the Turkish Armed Forces Rehabilitation and Care Center (TAF-RCC) in Ankara have specialized facilities to assist mine/ERW survivors. In its Article 7 report, Turkey noted that rehabilitation was ongoing at military centers for 121 antipersonnel mine survivors throughout 2008. The number of civilians among those receiving treatment was not specified.[113] Turkey reported that TAF-RCC reserves 30% of its quota for civilian patients (including police) and accepts applications for additional civilian casualties if regional hospitals have insufficient capacity to address the patients’ needs. The service is free but the cost of travel is not covered and is beyond the means of some survivors.[114]

The Orthopedics and Traumatology Center and the Prosthetic Center of the Dicle University Research Hospital in Diyarbakir both provided prosthetics (below-knee only) to survivors in 2008 free of charge. Eight civilian landmine survivors were fitted with prosthetics at the Dicle Prosthetic Center in 2008.[115] Many mine survivors are not aware that prosthetics are provided at the Dicle University Research Hospital. Only survivors with a green card were eligible for services.[116]

Only limited psychological support was available to people affected by mines and ERW, and no psychosocial programs were run for mine/ERW survivors or families of victims of mines/ERW.[117]

Turkey noted in its Article 7 report that 152 military personnel had received indemnities, 15 had received salaries, and 48 had been assisted in finding employment in 2008.[118]

Healthcare reform includes a policy that exempts employers from paying insurance premiums for persons with disabilities as the government will pay the premiums.[119] It is too early to determine if this has increased employment with people with disabilities.[120] Previous government quotas remained in effect, with employment quotas stipulating that 3% of employees in the public sector and 4% in the private sector should be persons with disabilities. Neither of these quotas was met in 2008. In the public sector, less than 20% of the employment quota for persons with disabilities was filled in 2008.[121]

From 7 July 2004 until it expired on 30 July 2008, 341,429 people applied for financial compensation under Law 5233 (on the Compensation of Losses Resulting from Terrorist Acts and the Measures Taken Against Terrorism). At the end of the program, one-third of the applications had been processed. Data on the number of mine/ERW survivors who applied for or obtained compensation was not provided.[122] Mine/ERW survivors were also able to apply for compensation through the Damage Detection Commissions. However, the financial compensation the law prescribes does not cover the full financial cost of permanent injury. The amount of compensation is determined by the degree to which the survivor lost the ability to work. The maximum compensation payment is €5,000 (US$7,363).[123]

The new social security system provides a monthly payment to persons with disabilities who are unable to work or who have not been able to find employment. The payment given in 2009 has been TRY250 ($155.40) a month. According to Turkish disability groups, the required monthly income for a family of four for food and basic goods was TRY953 ($592.38) at the beginning of 2009.[124]

As of July 2009, the Disability Act, which came into force in 2005[125] and related regulation on the rights of persons with disabilities have not been fully implemented. Disabled people’s organizations have criticized the Act as weak, and inadequate in the provision of social reintegration and healthcare services.[126] Discrimination against persons with disabilities is illegal in Turkey, with regards to employment, education, access to health care, and the provision of other state services. The government reportedly enforced the law relatively effectively. The law does not mandate disability access to public transport and public buildings.[127]

The Turkish Grand National Assembly ratified the UN Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on 3 December 2008. It had not signed the convention’s Optional Protocol as of 1 July 2009.

Victim assistance activities

In 2008, the IMFT worked with limited funding to raise awareness of the needs of mine/ERW/IED victims.[128] In 2008, the IMFT organized prosthetic services for four survivors at the Prosthetic Center of the Dicle University Research Hospital.[129] The Disabled People’s Association of Turkey supported awareness-raising activities on VA.[130]

Support for Mine Action

Turkey did not report national funds allocated to mine action in 2008.

During 2008 and 2009, Turkey has remained the lead nation in the NATO Partnership for Peace project to clear mines and ERW from a former military base at Saloglu village in Agstafa district in Azerbaijan.[131] The total budget for the project from 2005 to 2011 is estimated to be €3.1 million ($4.6 million).[132] Turkey contributed to the first phase of the project in 2006, budgeted at €1.16 million ($1,708,216), and was reported by Azerbaijan to have provided an additional €50,000 ($73,630) for the second phase of the project starting in April 2007.[133] In 2008, Turkey assigned a technical advisor to the Saloglu project[134] but did not report other contributions. In addition to Azerbaijan, Turkey has provided personnel, training, and financial support to mine clearance activities in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Lebanon. It did not report the value of this in-kind support during 2008.


[1] Article 7 Reports, Form A and Annexes A, B and C, 1 October 2004 and 10 May 2005. Article 174 of the criminal code includes penal sanctions regarding explosives.

[2] The report is not dated. Previously, Turkey submitted Article 7 reports in 2008 (for calendar year 2007), on 23 April 2007, 30 April 2006, 30 April 2005, and 1 October 2004 (due 28 August 2004).

[3] Letter No. 649.13/2005/BMCO DT/8805 from Vehbi Esgel Etensel, Counselor, Permanent Mission of Turkey to the UN in Geneva, to Landmine Monitor (HRW), 3 October 2005. It went on to say that “bearing in mind that some of Turkey’s neighbours have anti-vehicle mines placed on their border with Turkey, Turkey in principle, is in favour of a prohibition also of anti-vehicle mines, provided that these neighbours also share the same view.”

[4] Turkey’s additional response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, Permanent Mission of Turkey to the UN in Geneva, 30 May 2004. The response said Turkey “will never permit stockpiling or transfer of any type of antipersonnel landmine on its territory,” and denied that, as previously reported, the US has a stockpile of 1,100 Air Force Gator antipersonnel mines in Turkey. See Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p. 848. In 2005, Turkey said, “With respect to joint military [operations], Turkey has committed herself to act in conformity with the spirit of the Ottawa Treaty, under all circumstances.” Letter No. 649.13/2005/BMCO DT/8805 from Vehbi Esgel Etensel, Permanent Mission of Turkey to the UN in Geneva, to Landmine Monitor (HRW), 3 October 2005.

[5] Statement of Turkey, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 25 May 2009.

[6] Statement of Turkey, “Article 3 Update,” Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 12 May 2006. A similar statement was made in 2005, see Letter No. 649.13/2005/BMCO DT/8805 from Vehbi Esgel Etensel, Permanent Mission of Turkey to the UN in Geneva, 3 October 2005.

[7] For details on cluster munition policy and practice, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice, Mines Action Canada, May 2009, p. 246–249.

[8] Representatives of the ICRC and the Mine Ban Treaty’s Implementation Support Unit also participated in the mission. The group visited the new disposal facility and held discussions with officials from the ministries of defense and foreign affairs and General Staff officers, as well as the Prime Minister’s office, regarding the missed deadline and mine action issues. They also visited a rehabilitation center. Email from Tamar Gabelnick, Treaty Implementation Director, ICBL, 25 May 2008; and ICBL, “Internal Mission Report,” provided by email from Tamar Gabelnick, ICBL, 25 May 2008.

[9] The PKK/KADEK/Kongra Gel is listed as a terrorist organization by the European Union, NATO, the US, Canada, United Kingdom, and Australia. As a matter of practice, Landmine Monitor does not apply the term “terrorist” to any individual or organization except within an attributed quotation.

[10] “Turkey’s Views on the Universalization of the Mine Ban Convention and the Complementary Role of Non-Governmental Organizations,” APLC/MSP.7/2006/MISC.4, 16 January 2007. This paper was introduced as an official document of the Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 18–22 September 2006. According to Geneva Call, it informed Turkey about its engagement with Kongra Gel/HPG. Email from Katherine Kramer, Program Director, Geneva Call, 25 August 2008. For several years, Turkey has expressed concern about what it characterizes as NGO activities to engage non-state armed groups deemed to be terrorist organizations in the effort to ban antipersonnel mines, without the knowledge or consent of the concerned State Party. At the Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Turkey stated that it welcomes “all non-legitimising efforts to ensure that these indiscriminate weapons are not used by anyone,” but that NGOs “have the obligation to conduct their work in a responsible and acceptable manner.… Otherwise, this will not only diminish their credibility and tarnish their own reputation, but also place countries that support them in an inappropriate position.” Statement of Turkey, Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Dead Sea, 18 November 2007.

[11] The export moratorium was renewed in 1999 and made permanent in March 2002.

[12] Letter No. 649.13/2005/BMCO DT/8805 from Vehbi Esgel Etensel, Permanent Mission of Turkey to the UN in Geneva, 3 October 2005. Previously, Turkey had produced both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines. The Turkish company, Makina ve Kimya Endustrisi Kurumu (MKEK), produced copies of two US antipersonnel mines (M14 and M16). See Turkey’s additional response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, Permanent Mission of Turkey to the UN in Geneva, 30 May 2004.

[13] Statement of Turkey, Fifth Meeting of States Parties, Bangkok, 17 September 2003.

[14] There have been a number of allegations over the years, but no concrete evidence of use has ever been produced.

[15] Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form J. The Mine Ban Treaty does not prohibit the use of antivehicle mines/IEDs, or command-detonated antipersonnel explosive devices.

[16] Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2007), Form J.

[17] Turkish General Staff, “The cases of usage of explosives and mines by the separatist terrorist group in 2008 (01 January–31 December 2008),” tsk.mil.tr.

[18] Turkish General Staff, “The number of IED and mine incidents perpetrated by the members of the terror organization in 2009: 1 January–31 July 2009,” 31 July 2009, www.tsk.tr.

[19] Meeting with representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and the Prime Minister’s Office at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, 22 May 2008. Internal notes by the ICBL.

[20] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 732–733, and Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 698.

[21] Geneva Call, “Annual Report 2008,” p. 23; and email from Katherine Kramer, Geneva Call, 25 August 2008.

[22] “Four killed in Turkey violence,” Peninsula (Diyarbakir), 13 July 2008, www.thepeninsulaqatar.com.

[23] “One Soldier Dies In Landmine Blast,” Turkish Press (Hakkari/Ankara), 17 August 2008, www.turkishpress.com.

[24] “One Turkish soldier killed in landmine explosion,” Hurriyet, 15 September 2008, www.hurriyet.com.tr.

[25] Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form B. At the end of 2008, the stockpile consisted of the following mines: 584,742 DM-11; 974,040 M14; 96,173 m2; 25,239 M16; and 22,788 ADAM.

[26] Turkey reported different numbers and types in its stockpile, prior to the start of destruction, at different times. See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 733, and Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 688.

[27] Article 7 Reports, Form G, (for calendar year 2008), (for calendar year 2007), and 23 April 2007; and Government of Turkey, “Stockpile Destruction Carried Out at the Turkish Armed Forces Munitions Disposal Facility During 2007–2009 (As of 30 April 2009),” document distributed at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings, Geneva, 25–29 May 2009.

[28] Email from Malike Selçuk Sancar, Counselor (Disarmament), Permanent Mission of Turkey to the UN in Geneva, 9 September 2009.

[29] During the ICBL visit in May 2008, officials at the destruction facility said they were still working with engineers to see if it would be possible to destroy the ADAM mines there. Email from Tamar Gabelnick, ICBL, 25 May 2008; and ICBL, “Internal mission report,” provided by email from Tamar Gabelnick, ICBL, 25 May 2008.

[30] Statement of Turkey, Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Dead Sea, 19 November 2007.

[31] Statement of Turkey, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 24 April 2007.

[32] Article 7 Report, Form F, 23 April 2007.

[33] Statement of Turkey, Standing Committee on Mine Action, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 13 June 2005. This cited a target date of 2006 for completion of construction. See also Article 7 Report, Form F, 30 April 2005. In May 2006 Turkey stated “a company has been awarded the contract for the…facility. An agreement was signed between the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA)—through which this facility will be established, albeit with Turkey’s own resources—and the successful company on the 20th of December 2005. Efforts are continuing to get the facility up and running by July 2007, so that stockpiled mines can be disposed of by the 1st of March 2008 deadline.” Statement of Turkey, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 11 May 2006.

[34] Email from Malike Selçuk Sancar, Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 July 2007.

[35] Statement of Turkey, Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Dead Sea, 19 November 2007.

[36] Note Verbale Ref. 649.13/2008/BMCO DT/1764, from the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the UN in Geneva, to the Presidency of the Eighth Meeting of States Parties, 28 February 2008.

[37] Government of Turkey, “Stockpile Destruction Carried Out at the Turkish Armed Forces Munitions Disposal Facility During 2007–2009 (As of 30 April 2009),” document distributed at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings, Geneva, 25–29 May 2009.

[38] Statement of Turkey, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 2 June 2008. It said this again in November 2008, noting that the fuzes had all been destroyed by April 2008. Statement of Turkey, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 26 November 2008. Turkish officials also told the ICBL delegation in May that all of the fuzes for stockpiled mines had been destroyed “a few months ago.” Email from Tamar Gabelnick, ICBL, 25 May 2008; and ICBL “Internal mission report,” provided by email from Tamar Gabelnick, ICBL, 25 May 2008.

[39] Statement of Turkey, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 2 June 2008.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Email from Tamar Gabelnick, ICBL, 25 August 2008.

[42] Statement of Turkey, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 26 November 2008.

[43] Article 7 Report, Form B, 23 April 2007. Use of victim-activated Claymore mines is prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty, but use of command-detonated Claymore mines is permitted. In May 2006, Turkey stated that “the victim activation components of M18 Claymore mines have recently been added to the list of mines to be destroyed and the necessary steps have been taken to stock only command detonated M18 Claymore mines.” Statement of Turkey, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 11 May 2006.

[44] Email from Tamar Gabelnick, ICBL, 25 May 2008; and ICBL, “Internal mission report,” provided by email from Tamar Gabelnick, ICBL, 25 May 2008.

[45] Article 7 Report, Form D, 1 October 2004. This included 4,700 each of DM-11 and M14, and 2,200 each of M16, M18, and m2 mines. In 2006, Turkey reported the number of mines retained for training had decreased to 15,150 “because 850 mines have been used for mine detection, mine clearance and mine destruction programmes carried out to train military personnel involved in mine action, as well as for related training at various military training institutions.” Statement of Turkey, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 11 May 2006. This information was also indicated in Article 7 Report, Form D, 30 April 2006. However, neither document specified how many of each type of mine were destroyed, and how many remained.

[46] Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2007), Form D.

[47] Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form D. The retained mines consist of 3,897 DM11; 5,815 m2; 3,697 M14; and 1,716 M16.

[48] Ibid, Form D; and statement of Turkey, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operations of the Convention, Geneva, 25 May 2009.

[49] Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form D. It provided this information during the May 2009 intersessional meetings as well. This included 867 people in the Mines and Booby-Traps Course, 603 people in the Mines and IED Course, 322 people in the Engineer Corps Basic Course, and 42 people from 21 countries in the Mines and EOD Course.

[50] Statement of Turkey, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operations of the Convention, Geneva, 25 May 2009.

[51] Statement of Turkey, “Article 3 Update,” Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 12 May 2006. It made a similar statement in October 2005. Letter No. 649.13/2005/BMCO DT/8805 from Vehbi Esgel Etensel, Permanent Mission of Turkey to the UN in Geneva, to Landmine Monitor (HRW), 3 October 2005.

[52] Statement of Turkey, Standing Committee on Mine Action, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 13 June 2005.

[53] Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 690.

[54] Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 701.

[55] Statement of Turkey, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 28 May 2009.

[56] Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 701.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form C.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 826.

[61] See report on Cyprus in this edition of Landmine Monitor.

[62] Unless otherwise stated, data supplied by Muteber Öğreten, Coordinator, IMFT, 29 June 2009. IMFT also reported 63 casualties (25 killed and 38 injured) by command-detonated devices. These are not included in Landmine Monitor’s totals.

[63] Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 703.

[64] Email from Muteber Öğreten, IMFT, 21 July 2009.

[65] Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form J.

[66] Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 703.

[67] Ibid; Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 694; Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 741; Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 590; and Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 828. The figures for 2003 reported in Landmine Monitor Report 2004 are somewhat unclear—no total figures were reported. For this report, Landmine Monitor used the figures reported by Geneva Call and the Turkish Human Rights Association for 2003 (22 killed and 45 injured). For 2002, the higher Geneva Call figures of 15 killed and 25 injured, rather than the lower Landmine Monitor figures, were used in this report. See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 828.

[68] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 705.

[69] Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Cover page; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 692.

[70] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 702; and Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 692.

[71] Data supplied by Muteber Öğreten, IMFT, 29 June 2009.

[72] Ali M. Koknar, “Turkey Moves Forward to Demine Upper Mesopotamia,” Journal of Mine Action, Issue 8.2, www.maic.jmu.edu.

[73] Telephone interview with Elif Comoglu Ulgen, Head, Disarmament and Arms Control Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 July 2009.

[74] See, for example, Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 737. According to its Article 7 report of April 2006, “work for the establishment of a ‘National Mine Action Center’ commenced in 2005. Studies in this context are continuing.” Article 7 Report, Form A, 30 April 2006.

[75] Statement of Turkey, Ninth Meeting of States Party, Geneva, 24 November 2008.

[76] Administration for Disabled People, Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry, “About Us,” undated, www.ozida.gov.tr; and email from Ergun Işeri, General Director, Disabled People’s Foundation, 26 March 2009.

[77] Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form J; and Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 704.

[78] Email from Muteber Öğreten, IMFT, 16 June 2009.

[79] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 704.

[80] Email from Muteber Öğreten, IMFT, 21 July 2009.

[81] Ali M. Koknar, “Turkey Moves Forward to Demine Upper Mesopotamia,” Journal of Mine Action, Issue 8.2, www.maic.jmu.edu.

[82] It was not possible to obtain a copy of the plan from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Telephone interview with Elif Comoglu Ulgen, 5 August 2009.

[83] Statement of Turkey, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 28 May 2009.

[84] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 737.

[85] Statement of Turkey, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 24 November 2008.

[86] “President Gul Ratıfıes Law On Demining Of Mıne Fıelds Along Syrıan Border,” Turknet (Ankara), 16 June 2009, www.haber.turk.net.

[87] Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form F.

[88] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 702.

[89] “Cleared Land Should Go to Mine Victims,” BIANET, 27 May 2009, www.bianet.org.

[90] Statement of Turkey, Standing Committee on Mine Action, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 28 May 2009.

[91] Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form G.

[92] Turkish General Staff, “The number of IED incidents perpetrated by the members of the terror organizations in 2008,” www.tsk.tr; and Turkish General Staff, “The number of IED incidents perpetrated by the members of the terror organizations in 2008 (for the period 1 January–17 July 2009),” www.tsk.tr.

[93] Statement of Turkey, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 5 June 2008.

[94] Ibid, 28 May 2009.

[95] Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Cover page; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 705.

[96] “Measure against Mine: Warning the Public,” Radikal, 30 December 2007, www.radikal.com.tr.

[97] Email from Muteber Öğreten, IMFT, 16 June 2009.

[98] Ibid; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 693.

[99] Number of injured casualties reported by Turkey for the period 1993–2003. See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 705.

[100] Statement of Turkey, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 24 November 2008.

[101] Email from Ergun Işeri, Disabled People’s Foundation, 26 March 2009; and European Commission (EC), “Turkey 2008 Progress Report,” Brussels, Commission Staff Working Document, 5 November 2008, p. 21.

[102] EC, “Turkey 2008 Progress Report,” Brussels, Commission Staff Working Document, 5 November 2008, p. 21.

[103] Email from Muteber Öğreten, IMFT, 16 June 2009.

[104] EC, “Turkey 2008 Progress Report,” Brussels, Commission Staff Working Document, 5 November 2008, p. 21.

[105] Ibid; and email from Muteber Öğreten, IMFT, 16 June 2009.

[106] EC, “Turkey 2008 Progress Report,” Brussels, Commission Staff Working Document, 5 November 2008, pp. 21.

[107] Email from Ergun Işeri, Disabled People’s Foundation, 26 March 2009.

[108] Ibid.

[109] Ibid.

[110] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 706.

[111] Email from Ergun Işeri, Disabled People’s Foundation, 26 March 2009.

[112] EC, “Turkey 2008 Progress Report,” Brussels, Commission Staff Working Document, 5 November 2008, p. 23.

[113] Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form J.

[114] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 707.

[115] Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form J.

[116] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 707.

[117] Email from Ergun Işeri, Disabled People’s Foundation, 26 March 2009.

[118] Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form J.

[119] EC, “Turkey 2008 Progress Report,” Brussels, Commission Staff Working Document, 5 November 2008, p. 62.

[120] Email from Ergun Işeri, Disabled People’s Foundation, 26 March 2009.

[121] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 706; and EC, “Turkey 2008 Progress Report,” Brussels, Commission Staff Working Document, 5 November 2008, p. 62.

[122] Parliamentary question from Gultan Kisank, Diyarbakir Representative of DTP to Beşir Atalay, Minister of Interior Affairs, Ankara, 1 December 2008.

[123] Email from Tahir Elci, Attorney, Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, 27 March 2008.

[124] Email from Ergun Işeri, Disabled People’s Foundation, 26 March 2009.

[125] Administration for Disabled People, Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry, “Legislation on Disability,” undated, www.ozida.gov.tr.

[126] Email from Ergun Işeri, Disabled People’s Foundation, 26 March 2009.

[127] US Department of State, “2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Turkey,” Washington, DC, 25 February 2009.

[128] Email from Mutebar Ogreten, IMFT, 16 June 2009.

[129] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 708.

[130] Email from Ergun Işeri, Disabled People’s Foundation, 26 March 2009.

[131] NAMSA, “Azerbaijan UXO: Donors’ Meeting To Support Final Phase,” March 2009, www.namsa.nato.int.

[132] NAMSA, “Latest News, facts and Figures”, www.namsa.nato.int.

[133] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 691.

[134] Telephone interview with Nigar Vagabova, Planning and Development Officer, Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action, 22 July 2008.