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uk

United Kingdom

2008 Key Data

State Party since

1 March 1999

Contamination

Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, submunitions, booby-traps, other UXO

Estimated area of contamination

13km2 of mined and battle areas

Article 5 (clearance of mined areas)

Deadline: 1 March 2019
Original deadline: 1 March 2009

Demining in 2008

Ten-Year Summary

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 March 1999, and national legislation implementing the treaty entered into force the same day. The UK completed destruction of its stockpile of more than two million antipersonnel mines on 19 October 1999. Initially, the UK retained close to 5,000 mines for training purposes, but decided the number was excessive in 2003 and reduced it to less than 2,000. At the end of 2008, it retained 903 mines, an increase from the previous year: after entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty, there were allegations of attempted transfers of antipersonnel mines in the UK by Pakistani, Romanian, and UK companies. The UK served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies from 1999–2000, and as coordinator of the Sponsorship Programme for many years.

The UK has not initiated clearance operations despite being a State Party since 1 March 1999. In November 2008 at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, the UK requested, and was granted, a 10-year extension to its Article 5 deadline to clear mined areas from the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, and pledged to begin clearance of three mined areas close to urban areas. As of May 2009, the UK had begun soliciting tenders from companies to conduct the demining and to run a mine action center on the islands.

The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have led to an increase of British casualties since 2001 due to mines, explosive remnants of war, and victim-activated improvised explosive devices.

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

The United Kingdom is affected by mines and UXO, including cluster munition remnants, by virtue of its control and assertion of full sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which were contaminated during the armed conflict between the UK and Argentina in 1982. In addition, UK troops continue to be confronted with the threat of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) in military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The 1982 armed conflict between Argentina and the UK resulted in many thousands of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines being laid on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, most by Argentina. The UK has reported that 117 mined areas remain, covering a total area of some 13km2 and containing “just over” 20,000 mines.[1] Of these areas, 113 are minefields totaling 7.35km2 and the other four (5.78km2) are only suspected of containing mines.[2]

There is also UXO, including an unknown number of areas believed to contain cluster munition remnants as a result of use of BL755 cluster bombs by the UK against Argentine positions. The size of the affected areas is not known.

In February 2009, in a letter to Landmine Action, the Ministry of Defence stated the following: “According to historical records either 106 or 107 Cluster Bomb Units (CBU) were dropped by British Harriers and Sea Harriers during the conflict. Each CBU contains 147 BL755 sub-munitions and using the higher CBU figure (107), a total of 15,729 sub-munitions were dropped. Using a 6.4% failure rate assessed during in-service surveillance over 15 years, we would estimate that 1,006 would not explode. Given that 1,378 BL 755s were cleared in the first year after the conflict and that a further 120 have been found and disposed of since (totalling 1,498), clearly there was a slightly higher failure rate. Even if the rate had been closer to 10% and 1,573 had failed, we can only estimate that some 70 remain but that due to the very soft nature of the peat found on the islands, many of these will have been buried well below the surface. We believe that the majority of those remaining are now contained within existing minefields and these will be cleared in due course.”[3]

The precise extent of other ERW contamination on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas is not known. The UK has also noted the presence of booby-traps on the islands.[4]

Casualties

No human casualties from mines or UXO have been reported in the Falkland Islands/Malvinas since 1984. The UK has reported that six military personnel were injured in 1982 and a further two injured in 1983. Most military accidents took place while clearing/lifting the minefields in the immediate aftermath of the 1982 conflict or in the process of trying to establish the extent of the minefield perimeters, particularly where no detailed records existed.[5]

No civilian mine casualties have ever occurred on the islands.[6] Over the years, however, there have been numerous instances where civilians have deliberately or inadvertently entered a minefield. The Ministry of Defence has reported “infringement” of minefields by a total of six locals and 15 foreign fishermen or tourists between March 2000 and December 2008.[7]

In the latest incident, three crew members of a Belgian yacht inadvertently entered a minefield at Kidney Cove on East Falklands on 6 December 2008 but left without incident. [8] In October 2002, a Falkland Islander was fined £1,000 (then US$1,503) for entering a minefield on Goose Green. It is a criminal offense on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas to enter a minefield.[9]

This record of infringements indicates that people are occasionally entering the minefields either deliberately or unwittingly and livestock deaths (see Socio-economic impact section below), indicate that mines in these minefields are still functioning. Such evidence should warn against complacency in efforts to tackle this contamination as soon as possible.

In 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 30 new British military casualties in Afghanistan (15 killed and 15 injured) from mines, ERW, or improvised explosive devices (IEDs). At least 11 casualties (one woman and 10 men) were reported to be due to antipersonnel mines.[10] These figures are incomplete, as, for example, another 24 casualties in Afghanistan could not be confirmed and no new casualties were identified in Iraq.

British mine and UXO casualties abroad between 1999 and 2008 were mostly military and occurred mostly in Iraq and Afghanistan,[11] but there were also several humanitarian demining casualties. For example, in 2001, a British deminer was injured when a grenade detonated during demining training in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.[12] In 2002, a British deminer was injured in a demining accident in southern Lebanon.[13] In 2007, another British deminer was killed in Lebanon.[14] However, total figures are incomplete and Landmine Monitor does not have a total number of casualties from 1999 to 2008. Non-governmental sources tracking casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq have criticized the Ministry of Defence for the lack of transparency and accuracy in reporting British casualties.[15]

Socio-economic impact

The impact of contamination in the Falkland Islands/Malvinas is said to be minimal. All 117 areas are reported to have been “perimeter-marked and are regularly monitored and protected by quality stock proof fencing, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians.”[16] According to the UK, the 13km2 of suspected hazardous area represent “only 0.1% of land used for farming. The mined areas cover a wide range of terrain including sandy beaches and dunes, mountains, rock screes, dry peat, wet swampy peat, and pasture land.”[17] A number of instances of cattle, sheep, or horses entering the minefields have been recorded since 2000, some of which resulted in the animal’s deaths.[18]

In a statement on 9 May 2008, the Falkland Islands government stated that the mined areas “present no long term social or economic difficulties for the Falklands.” Indeed, Falkland Islanders are reported to have expressed concern about the negative socio-economic impact that a demining operation would have—with disruption and strain on the infrastructure of their small community caused by an influx of a large number of deminers and heavy machinery for an extended period of time, and interference to their growing tourism industry (one of three major industries on the islands).[19]

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action

In November 2008, the UK pledged to begin work on establishing a “mine action coordinating committee.”[20] Subsequently, a National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) composed of both the UK and the Falkland Islands governments was established to oversee clearance of mined areas on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas. As of May 2009, the NMAA was reviewing national mine action standards for the clearance operations.[21]

In May 2009, the UK issued a request to tender for the Falkland Islands Demining Programme Office (DPO). The role of the DPO will be to execute the policies of the NMAA and to coordinate mine action activities on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas.[22] The Ninth Meeting of States Parties noted the UK’s undertaking to provide regular reports on the establishment of a NMAA “and other implementation bodies.”[23]

Data collection and management

The UK’s Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment for the Islands and other staff completed training in the Information Management System for Mine Action in April 2008. Subsequently, personnel were engaged in digitizing all information about the mines and their location.[24]

Plans

On 26 November 2008, the UK announced to the Ninth Meeting of States Parties its intention to begin demining of three mined areas: Fox Bay 8 (West), Goose Green 11, and Stanley Area 3 (m25). Fox Bay 8 is estimated to measure 24,500m2; Goose Green 11, 20,600m2; and Stanley Area 3 (m25), 5,400m2. A BL755 cluster munition strike reported to the south of the minefield in Stanley was slated for clearance.[25] Thus, the total area of this intended clearance is less than 0.5% of the total mined area on the islands. The UK stated that the areas had been chosen because of their proximity to urban areas and because the variety of terrain would serve as a test of the environmental and ecological impact of demining.[26] A Statement of Requirement was being drafted and it was planned to put the work out to tender “in the next few months.”[27] As of May 2009, the UK planned to issue invitations to tender to up to six companies with the aim that work would start before the end of 2009.[28]

In a May 2008 statement, the Falkland Island government made clear that it would “have to pay close attention to the environmental implications of complete clearance.”[29] The UK has stated that the clearance of all mined areas will be subject to an environmental impact assessment in the planning process under forthcoming Falkland Islands domestic law.[30]

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

No clearance operations had been initiated as of 1 March 2009, the expiry of the UK’s Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline for clearance. In 2008, one antipersonnel mine was destroyed when it came to the surface in a known minefield.[31] In May 2009, the UK announced its intention to invite around four to six companies to tender for demining three mined areas on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas.[32]

According to information provided by the Ministry of Defence in 2009, no unexploded submunitions were cleared in 2008, but a BL755 submunition was destroyed in November 2007.[33]

Progress since becoming a State Party

Under Article 5 of the treaty, the UK is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2009. On 31 May 2008, the UK submitted to the President of the Eighth Meeting of States Parties a request for an extension of its deadline of 10 years (until 1 March 2019). The UK’s extension request stated that the following circumstances had impeded the fulfillment of its Article 5 deadline:

  • mined areas have a variety of terrain types and thus a single clearance method cannot be used;
  • distance from the UK makes strategic logistics very challenging;
  • almost 40% of mined areas are in very isolated locations that can be accessed only with specialized vehicles;
  • a wide range of environmental issues affect the flora and fauna, requiring an environmental impact assessment prior to clearance;
  • there are a number of environmental remediation protocols associated with every different terrain; and
  • climatic conditions restrict work to 10 months of each year and make the use of dogs unlikely.[34]

The Analysing Group of States Parties, chaired by the President of the Eighth Meeting of States Parties, noted that the UK had made no clear commitment through its extension request to start mine clearance operations and ultimately comply with its obligations. The group noted that the Mine Ban Treaty as a whole would benefit if the UK provided an unequivocal commitment to implement Article 5 as soon as possible. It further noted that “it is unfortunate that after almost ten years since entry into force a State Party is unable to specify how remaining work will be carried out and that a two year trial is still required to obtain all necessary information and to confirm the timescale of the overall project.”[35]

Following opposition from a number of States Parties,[36] as well as the ICBL and ICRC, to the UK’s blanket 10-year extension request at its initial presentation, the UK revised its request to make it explicit that Scenario 5 of the Field Survey (part of the Feasibility Study conducted by Cranfield University) was its clearance plan for fulfillment of its Article 5 obligations.[37] Scenario 5 proposed clearance of all mined areas on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas within a 10-year period, beginning with the establishment of a project office on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas; the development of mine action standards, procedures for environmental impact assessments and remediation, and for external quality assurance and quality control; a trial of the effectiveness of clearance methods; and ending with the handover of all cleared land to a fully fledged mine action center.[38] The UK decided to disregard the Field Survey’s recommendation for trials of clearance methods and to proceed directly to full clearance.[39]

While “a number of substantive concerns were raised,” the Ninth Meeting of States Parties decided to grant the request for an extension until 1 March 2019, taking into account a number of considerations.[40] These included taking note of the UK’s confirmation that Scenario 5 of the Field Survey served as the UK government’s “indicative Clearance Plan, containing clear priorities, timeframes for action and projected milestones for clearance over the period of the extension and as such formed a basis for future work.” The meeting also took note of the UK’s agreement to provide as soon as possible, but not later than 30 June 2010, a detailed explanation of how demining is proceeding and the implications for future demining in order to meet the UK’s obligations under Article 5.[41]

The meeting also took note that the UK will keep under annual review the possibility of reducing the time necessary to fulfill its obligations. A number of States Parties expressed the wish that the UK proceed with the implementation of Article 5 much faster than suggested by the amount of time requested.[42]

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors since 1999 is unknown. The Ministry of Defence provides compensation to soldiers injured overseas or to the families of deceased soldiers, including mine/ERW casualties, through the Armed Forces Compensation Scheme (AFCS). On 15 December 2008, the ministry announced the doubling of the maximum payment available through the AFCS to £570,000 ($1,057,065). This would apply retroactively to soldiers who had received compensation since the creation of the scheme in 2005. The ministry stated that more than £10 million ($18.5 million) in additional compensation would be paid to approximately 2,700 injured service personnel.[43] While many veterans welcomed the change, some continued to call for broader reforms so that the AFSC would “take into account the cumulative impact of a soldier’s injuries, their care needs and loss of earnings.”[44]

Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of any comprehensive long-term cost estimates for completion of mine clearance in the Falkland Islands/Malvinas. The UK has not reported on cost estimates associated with the joint UK/Argentina “Field Survey to Examine the Feasibility of Clearing Landmines in the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas),” or with its calls for tenders issued in 2009 for the DPO and for clearance operations. In March 2009, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) reported that funding for demining in the Falkland Islands/Malvinas would come from the FCO.[45]

International support to mine action

The UK reported providing mine action funding totaling £13,451,597 ($24,945,987/€16,940,097) in 2008–2009, an increase of approximately 7% compared to 2007–2008.[46] This represents the highest level of funding by the UK since 2000–2001.

At the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, the UK stated that it had decided to maintain “current levels of funding” for mine, cluster munitions and ERW clearance until 2013.[47]

2008 International Mine Action Funding by the UK: Monetary[48]

Recipient

Implementing Agencies/Organizations

Project Details

Amount

Afghanistan

HALO Trust

Mine clearance

$7,762,805 (£4,185,929)

Cambodia

HALO

Mine clearance

$3,510,359 (£1,892,887)

Angola

HALO, Mines Advisory Group (MAG)

Mine clearance

$3,407,698 (£1,837,529)

Sudan

MAG, UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), UNDP

Capacity-building,

mine clearance,

emergency response

$1,919,982 (£1,035,310)

Global or Other

UNMAS, UNICEF, Geneva Call

Capacity-building,

mine clearance,

emergency response

$1,755,816 (£946,787)

Lebanon

UNMAS, MAG

Capacity-building,

mine clearance,

emergency response

$1,102,882 (£594,706)

Democratic Republic of the Congo

MAG

Mine clearance

$911,561 (£491,540)

Vietnam

MAG

Mine clearance

$741,800 (£400,000)

Lao PDR

MAG

Mine clearance

$727,678 (£392,385)

Nagorno-Karabakh

HALO

Capacity-building,

mine clearance

$681,256 (£367,353)

Georgia

HALO

Mine clearance

$370,900 (£200,000)

Mozambique

HALO

Mine clearance

$366,486 (£197,620)

Guinea-Bissau

UNDP

Capacity-building,

mine clearance

$280,957 (£151,500)

Albania

UNDP

Capacity-building,

mine clearance

$280,645 (£151,332)

Somaliland

HALO

Mine clearance

$214,662 (£115,752)

Tajikistan

UNDP

Capacity-building,

mine clearance

$200,416 (£108,070)

Somalia

UNMAS

Capacity-building,

mine clearance,

emergency response

$185,450 (£100,000)

Azerbaijan

UNDP

Capacity-building,

mine clearance

$163,005 (£87,897)

Nepal

UNMAS

Capacity-building,

mine clearance,

emergency response

$92,725 (£50,000)

Eritrea/Ethiopia

UNMAS

Capacity-building,

mine clearance,

emergency response

$92,725 (£50,000)

Sri Lanka

MAG

Mine clearance

$92,725 (£50,000)

Ethiopia

UNDP

Capacity-building,

mine clearance

$83,453 (£45,000)

The UK added Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Nepal, and Sri Lanka as mine action funding recipients in 2008 and discontinued funding to Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Uganda.


[1] UK Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 May 2008, p. 2. The estimate of the number of mines remaining to be cleared was higher than the 16,000 reported by Argentina in 2006. See Argentina Article 7 Report, Form C, 4 May 2006.

[2] UK Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 May 2008, Tables B.3 and B.4.

[3] Letter from Lt.-Col. Scott Malina-Derben, Ministry of Defence, 6 February 2009.

[4] See, for example, Article 7 Report, Form C, 2 April 2007.

[5] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 1070.

[6] Statement of the UK, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 27 May 2009.

[7] Letter from Permanent Joint Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence to Landmine Action, 16 February 2009.

[8] Lisa Johnson, “Lucky minefield incident for landing crew in Falklands,” MercoPress, 9 December 2008, www.mercopress.com.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Landmine Monitor media monitoring from 1 January 2008–30 April 2009.

[11] See previous editions of Landmine Monitor; and Casualty Monitor, “Monitoring and analysis of data on civilian and military casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan” 10 February 2009, www.casualty-monitor.org.

[12] See Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 515.

[13] See Landmine Monitor Report 2003, p. 489.

[14] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 734.

[15] Casualty Monitor, “Monitoring and analysis of data on civilian and military casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan” 10 February 2009, www.casualty-monitor.org.

[16] UK Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, 14 November 2008, p. 1.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Letter from Permanent Joint Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence to Landmine Action, 16 February 2009.

[19] UK Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, 14 November 2008, p. 2.

[20] Statement of the UK, Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 26 November 2008.

[21] Statement of the UK, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 27 May 2009.

[22] FCO, “UK-London: mine sweeping services 2009/S 97-140126, Contract Notice,” 19 May 2009.

[23] Decision on the UK Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 28 November 2008.

[24] Statement of the UK, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 26 November 2008.

[25] UK Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 May 2008, pp. 124–129.

[26] Statement of UK, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 26 November 2008.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Statement of the UK, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 27 May 2009.

[29] UK Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, 14 November 2008, p. 3.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form G.

[32] Statement of the UK, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 27 May 2009.

[33] Letter from Lt.-Col. Scott Malina-Derben, Ministry of Defence, 6 February 2009.

[34] Analysis of the UK Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the Eighth Meeting of States Parties on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyze requests for extensions, 14 November 2008, pp. 1–2.

[35] Ibid, p. 2.

[36] These countries were: Cambodia, Canada, France, Norway, and Switzerland.

[37] Decision on the UK Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 28 November 2008.

[38] Cranfield University, “Field Survey to Examine the Feasibility of Clearing Landmines in the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas),” 9 July 2007, Executive Summary.

[39] Statement of the UK, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 26 November 2008.

[40] Decision on the UK Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 28 November 2008.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid.

[43] “Defence News: Compensation for Injured Personnel Increased,” Ministry of Defence News, 15 December 2008, www.mod.uk.

[44] Matthew Hickley, “Justice for wounded heroes: Payouts at last to double for our badly hurt soldiers” Daily Mail, 15 December 2008, www.dailymail.co.uk.

[45] “Demining challenges ‘not new’ in Falklands”, MercoPress, 6 March 2009, en.mercopress.com.

[46] Email from Amy White, Deputy Programme Manager, DfID, 17 March 2009.

[47] Statement of the UK, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 26 November 2008.

[48] Email from Amy White, DfID, 17 March 2009.