Modern mine warfare in Burma began in 1969, and
over the past thirty years mine pollution has increased greatly. Today mines
are being laid on a near daily basis by both government forces and several armed
ethnic groups. The military government of Burma, formerly known as the State
Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), now calls itself the State Peace and
Development Council (SPDC).
Mine Ban Policy
The military government did not sign the Mine Ban
Treaty in December 1997, or even send an observer to the treaty signing
conference. It did not attend any of the Ottawa Process preparatory meetings,
did not endorse the pro-ban treaty Brussels Declaration of June 1997, and did
not participate in the treaty negotiations in September 1997. A Ministry of
Foreign Affairs official stated, "We respect the decision of the participants in
the Ottawa Process to conclude an international convention, placing a total ban
on APLs. Myanmar is, however, not in a position at present to associate itself
with those states."[1]
In December 1996, the SLORC voted in favor of U.N. General Assembly
Resolution A/RES/51/45/S calling on governments to pursue vigorously an
international agreement banning antipersonnel mines. However, shortly before
the change in government, then-SLORC Foreign Minister U Ohn Gyaw told the U.N.
in September 1997, "In our view, the real problem lies in indiscriminate use of
APLs and the export and trade in these weapons. It is the indiscriminate use of
APLs that is actually killing and maiming innocent children, women and men the
world over, and it is the export and trade in APLs that is causing the
proliferation of APLs, leading to their indiscriminate use. We should
effectively address these real issues, rather than reach out for an
indiscriminate and all-encompassing total ban on
APLs.”[2] Subsequently,
the SPDC government was one of the few that abstained on the December 1997 and
1998 pro-ban UNGA resolutions.
Burma has not signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons or its Landmine
Protocol. It is a member of the CD, and has indicated its support for
negotiating a ban on transfer in that forum, but not a comprehensive
ban.[3] In 1998, the government
of Burma sent official participants to two regional mine ban
forums.[4]
The National League for Democracy (NLD) won an overwhelming majority of the
popular vote in the 1990 elections, but has been prohibited from assuming power
by the previous and current military governments. The NLD has maintained its
right to form the government of the country. Numerous unanimous UN General
Assembly resolutions have called on Burma to implement the 1990 election
results. The NLD does not maintain an army. The NLD’s policy toward
landmines is unknown at this time.
Production--Government
Burma is a producer of antipersonnel mines. In the
past, the government produced a blast AP mine, sometimes referred to as a Ludyat
mine. This was used mostly in perimeter defense of military outposts. A Burmese
officer has said the mine was "of poor quality, little better than those used by
the insurgent groups. The trip plates were steel and tended to rust. It did not
last more than six years."[5]
Currently the government is manufacturing at least two types of mines. It
has been reported that the SPDC purchased mine production equipment from China
for making the POMZ-2 fragmentation stake mine and PMN blast
mine.[6] The Burmese
designation for these mines is MM1 and MM2, respectively. It appears that this
transfer has taken place within the last two years. According to one informed
observer, the ongoing manufacture of these mines is not possible without some
components being purchased from China, and Chinese technical
assistance.[7] The mines are
produced at State-owned arms factories near
Prome.[8] There is no official
information from the SPDC on its mine producing capacity, or the technical
characteristics of the mines it produces.
Landmine Monitor researchers have received allegations of production of other
mines, including Claymore-types, but have been unable to substantiate these
claims.
Transfer--Government
There is no evidence, or allegation, that the
government has ever exported antipersonnel landmines. The SPDC declares itself
supportive of a transfer ban, but has not instituted a formal moratorium or ban
on export.
The government has used several types of antipersonnel mines from other
countries in the past, indicating importation. These include Chinese, Russian,
and U.S.-designed mines.[9] The
government has released no official information regarding its imports of AP
mines.
Stockpiling--Government
There is no concrete information available about
the size or composition of the government’s antipersonnel mine stockpile,
beyond the assumption that it contains a mix of the domestically produced and
imported mines mentioned above.
Use--Government
Mine use is increasing in Burma today, both by the
government and by ethnic military
forces.[10]
Both sides use mines for both defensive and offensive purposes. The most
frequently mined areas are the perimeters of military bases. However, there have
also been reports of mining of roadways, rail lines, dams, pipelines and other
infrastructure projects, pathways and berms in rice paddies, on the outskirts of
villages, and in jungle areas.
A news account in January 1999 reported that Burmese troops admit to laying
7,000 mines since August 1998 along the Thai border at Kiu Phawok border pass,
to deter an anticipated advance of Shan armed forces of the SSA
faction.[11]
It has also been reported that Burmese soldiers are laying mines inside
Thailand. According to one news account, the first incident on Thai soil
involving Burmese laid mines was reported in July 1998. Kin Lungyong, age 70,
and Ser, age 30, from Baan Mailan in Tambon Pang Ma Pha, were both killed by an
antipersonnel mine one stepped on approximately 300 meters from the Burmese
border. When the Thai military came to mark and clear mines in the area, deputy
commander Captain Udom Khanthikul stepped on a MM2 (PMN type) mine and lost his
right leg. Later, 20 MM2 and 20 MM1 (POMZ-2 type) mines were discovered. The
area contains routes used by armed ethnic groups to attack the Burmese
military.[12]
Landmine Monitor researchers have encountered repeated examples of mine use
by the Tatmawdaw (government troops) directed against the civilian,
non-combatant population--notably in the mining of villages to prevent
resettlement and of border areas to prevent refugee flows. In these cases
landmines are apparently being used as a tool in a carefully planned campaign of
terror against the civilian population. In other instances, civilians are being
used as a mine removal tool--human mine-sweepers.
The Tatmawdaw is engaged in a massive operation in the central part of the
Shan State, in which it is forcibly removing the domestic population from an
area of several hundred square kilometers. To prevent people from returning to
their home villages, the Tatmawdaw has mined several of the
villages.[13] Similar actions
have occurred in Karen and Karenni states where villages have been burned and
mines laid in the ashes to prevent villagers from returning to their
homes.[14]
According to one report, “Soldiers have told the villagers that
landmines would be planted on the roads and paths surrounding the settlements
after the residents had been relocated to keep them from being
reoccupied.”[15]
A Shan woman forced to relocate from her village said, “I didn’t
go back to the old village as I didn’t know what I could do there, and as
mines had been planted in the old
village?.”[16] A Karen
refugee who found a landmine in the burned remains of his house said,
“They planted mines inside the burned houses to catch people searching
through the remains.”[17]
A Karenni refugee said, “SLORC deliberately burnt down the villages they
thought were important for the rebels. Some villages were not burnt down, but
landmines were laid. They passed through Baw Ghu Der township and also burnt
down some houses and put landmines
there.”[18] A former
ethnic commander said, “We ambushed a government patrol which was
returning from an operation on a village. After our ambush I took a notebook
from the Tat Maw Daw commander. It contained a note saying ‘seven mines
in market.’ We let the people of the village know there were mines in the
market and they went and found
them.”[19]
Certain border areas appear to have been mined specifically to stem refugee
flight or border violations. The most heavily mined area of the Burma-Bangladesh
border is the easiest place for refugees to cross on foot. It is a low-lying
area between two mountain ranges. The minefield is extensive, and has caused
the death of 30 migrating elephants in
1998.[20] Many traders, refugees
and soldiers have died
there.[21] Border passes
between Burma and Thailand have also been mined, most notably bordering Shan and
Karenni states.[22]
An Arakanese refugee in India said, “SLORC started planting landmines
in the tri-border junction area at the time when the first influx of Arakanese
refugees started pouring into the Indian side, around 1994-1995. The numbers of
landmines have significantly increased since 1997, because that year there were
more clashes between the Burmese Army and the CNA and the ALP. In 1994, they
used landmines mostly to protect their camp, but in 1997 they also used them to
protect their
operations.”[23]
Ethnic Armed Groups
Among the organizations which maintain military
forces operating within the confines of Burma, those currently involved in
military conflict with the central government are the Karen, Shan, Chin, Arakan,
Karenni, and Rohingya. The Karen and Karenni are both laying mines. The Shan
are believed to be laying mines. The Chin claim they only use command detonated
mines.
Other armed groups are operating under actual or defacto cease-fires, more or
less, with no reports of current mine use: Mon, Pao, Palaung, Wa, Lahu, Kachin,
Naga, and Arakan.
Production--Armed Ethnic Groups
All of the armed ethnic groups, through prior or
current military and political alliances, have shared information on production
of mines and Improvised Explosive Devices
(IEDs).[24] Mines manufactured
by the armed ethnic groups are found in almost all the border states of Burma,
with particularly heavy concentrations in Mon, Karen, Karenni, Shan and Kachin
states. All the armed groups are believed to be capable of building blast
mines. Materials for mine production are readily available. Explosives and
detonators are obtained commercially. Casings are typically bamboo, PVC pipe or
glass bottles. Many of the mines require batteries for operation, limiting the
mine’s life to that of the battery, usually said to be one year. Most of
the armed ethnic groups, as well as the militant Burman All Burma Students
Democratic Front (ABSDF) have, at one time or another, manufactured these simple
improvised blast mines. Some groups also make Claymore-type mines (usually
command detonated but sometimes rigged to a tripwire). Mortars of all sizes are
rigged to function as mines.[25]
Transfers--Ethnic Armed Groups
The Vietnam and Cambodian wars left ample
quantities of landmines on the regional black market. Until recent years, these
were purchased by ethnic armies on the Thai-Burma border through arm dealers in
Thailand.[26] Sometimes the
groups agree to make joint purchases. Occasionally one armed group will make a
purchase for transfer to another
group.[27]
Stockpiling--Ethnic Armed Groups
One knowledgeable source has said that two
stockpiles of landmines in the hands of ethnic military forces are estimated to
number in the thousands, mostly of indigenous
construction.[28]
Use--Ethnic Armed Groups
Mines have been used especially by armed ethnic
groups in the Karen, Karenni, Shan, and Chin states. There are also reports of
landmines in Kachin, Arakan, and Mon states, as well as in the Tenassarim
Division. Active mine laying is occurring in Karen and Karenni states, where
the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and the forces of the Karenni National
Progressive Party (KNPP) are attempting to maintain control or harass Tatmawdaw
troops. One source claimed that the KNLA is using mines to help keep routes for
refugees fleeing the interior open, and that the Tatmawdaw is reciprocating by
increasingly its use of
mines.[29]
A former military advisor said, “The KNLA use landmines to protect
supply routes which also act as escape routes for villagers fleeing to the
border. They also use mines to limit the movement of the Tat Maw Daw, who avoid
confrontation and areas known to be mined. The KNLA use landmines to make up
numbers between themselves and the Tat Maw Daw. They place them on paths known
to be used by government troops. The government and the DKBA retaliate by
mining destroyed villages, fields and around villages as well as to protect
their camps.”[30]
There are landmines planted along the Burmese
borders with Thailand and Bangladesh, as well as in many parts of the country
where armed conflict has been and is being waged between government troops and
ethnic armed groups, notably areas in eastern Burma. Mines are found widely in
Mon, Shan, Karen, Karenni and Arakan states, and the Tenassarim Division. There
are also reports of landmines in Kachin State. There are no reliable estimates
of the number of mines planted in Burma, or the amount of land affected.
The Thai military asserts that most--perhaps 70 percent--of its 2,000
kilometer border with Burma is mined. The Thai military found in its initial
survey of the border region that the total area of mined land was about
fifty-three square
kilometers.[32] The
Phuchatkan newspaper in Bangkok reported that 7,000 landmines were planted
around the Kiu Phawok pass along the
border.[33]
The government of Bangladesh has asked the government of Burma to demine a
25-50 kilometer stretch of border, which Bangladesh claims was mined by Burmese
border police (Na Sa Ka) in 1995-1996. Many people, as well as elephants,
have perished in this
minefield.[34] A woman living
in a village in Chin State near the Bangladesh border said, “There were
many landmines around our villages. So many animals blew up, especially at night
time. We had to be careful of landmines since 1988. The Burmese Army warned us
not to walk here and there, especially along the footpaths, the small footpaths,
not the main paths which the army and civilians are using for
traveling.”[35]
Mined areas are not marked in Burma. Maps of minefields are rarely kept by
soldiers of either side. Maps that are kept are not accessible to others. A
former military advisor said, “Maps? The (ethnic faction) don’t even
know what a map is.”[36]
In some cases ethnic organizations notify local villagers what areas and paths
they have mined without specifying exactly where the mines are. However,
villagers who are out tending their fields at the time, as well as neighboring
villagers, are not privy to the information and frequently step on these
mines.[37] In addition, if the
SPDC forces request accompaniment of villagers through a certain area known by
the villagers to be mined by opposition forces, villagers are reluctant to
inform the SPDC that the area is mined. If they do, they are considered
collaborators with the enemy and are often tortured and/or
executed.[38]
Mine Clearance and Mine Awareness
There are no humanitarian mine clearance operations
in Burma. Even in areas where groups have agreed to a cease-fire with the
central government, no demining has occurred, as substantial talks with the
government have yet to take place on issues of disagreement. Mine awareness
programs appear to be non-existent.
Human Mine-Sweepers
In a particularly reprehensible practice, the
Tatmawdaw has regularly seized people from villages and forced them to march
ahead of the military in areas suspected of being mined by the ethnic armed
forces.[39] This is an extension
of a common practice of forced labor and portering which is required by the
military of the local
population.[40] There have been
more and more cases of women and children being rounded up to march in front of
troops for the sole purpose of detonating landmines. Amnesty International
expressed concern about this practice as far back as 14 years
ago.[41] A recent report by the
International Labor Organization documented a large number of cases of forced
laborer (porters) being used as human
mine-sweepers.[42] Daw Aung San
Suu Kyi, Burmese Nobel Laureate, has said "...in many cases it has been claimed
that they are used as human mine-sweepers, they go ahead of the troops so that
if there are any landmines, those landmines will blow up under them and
therefore they clear the way. So [forced] portering is one of the most feared
things in Burma. People lose their health and even their lives if they are taken
to do a stint of portering."[43]
Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance
There is no centralized agency collecting
statistics on landmine survivors. Most information has come from a few
international non-governmental organizations, or through local medical
facilities and practitioners who operate limited assistance programs either
within Burma or along the common borders with Thailand and Bangladesh.
Medical assistance is received either in areas controlled by the SPDC or by
ethnic organizations, or at facilities in Thailand. Access to first aid and
surgical care is dependent on the victim's physical distance from health care
facilities and the prevailing security situation in the area at the time of the
accident. In a series of interviews with landmine survivors who received care
along the Burma-Thai border, the victims traveled from 1.5 hours to 10 days to
reach surgery facilities. Medical care received prior to surgery is primitive
and dependent upon whether a medic was on hand. Survivors spoke of sometimes
being able to receive treatments ranging from salt-water baths to blood-clotting
antibiotics.[44]
Medical care is sought in areas where the survivors feel safest. Survivors
in areas controlled by ethnic organizations may well seek care in medical
facilities located in SPDC-controlled areas. In contrast, some survivors in
SPDC-controlled areas may decide to seek assistance in a refugee camp along the
Thai border. However, several medical practitioners believe that 50% of all
people wounded by landmines die before receiving medical treatment, and at least
one close observer of the situation in Karen State believes that figure to be
conservative.[45] Both the
civilian and military health systems are believed to be chronically
under-resourced and corrupt, with the result that there are reported cases of
people not having access to prosthetic programs unless they can pay
bribes.[46]
Current data allows for no definitive demographic information on who is being
injured by landmines. However, figures from a joint prosthetic project run by
the ICRC, the Myanmar Red Cross and the Myanmar Ministry of Health provide some
indications. Over a 10-year period information was collected from more than
1,200 landmine survivors from border areas. Of these, 10% were children, 16%
were women and the remaining 74% were male and potentially former combatants in
the ethnic armies.[47] This
figure does not include survivors among SPDC forces. A monthly breakdown of
statistics for any given region of the country from any source is unavailable at
this time. However, the opinion of medics operating in Karen State is that the
rate of mine injuries is either remaining constant or increasing.
After surgery it can take anywhere from three months to nine years before a
person finds a facility where they can receive a prosthetic device. Information
uncovered seems to indicate that little knowledge is made available to landmine
survivors as to where they can obtain prosthetic devices. Prosthetic devices
are available through international assistance programs of Handicap
International and ICRC, as well as through the Myanmar Ministry of Health, the
Thai Government Hospitals and Thai Royal projects. The Myanmar Ministry of
Health has fitted over 12,000 prosthetic devices over a 12-year period (this
figure covers all types of prosthetic needs, not only landmine
victims).[48]
Prosthetics made on the Burma-Thai border have a 2-3-year life
span.[49] The the average life
span of the prosthetics made by the Myanmar Ministry of Health is not known.
Rehabilitation on the border is not extensive, as most people leave the program
soon after they are fitted. The Myanmar Ministry of Health program has a
duration of six months. There is little data available as to what happens to
landmine survivors after they are fitted with their prosthetics.
Psychological care appears non-existent. Very disturbingly, one landmine
survivor interviewed by Landmine Monitor researchers committed suicide the
following day. He had exhibited classic signs of psychological stress such as
listlessness, lack of social interaction and loss of appetite prior to
committing suicide.
[1] U Mya Than,
Representative of Myanmar to the Conference on Disarmament, Explanation of Vote
on Anti-Personnel Landmines, undated document.
[2] U Ohn Gyaw, Minister for
Foreign Affairs of the Union of Myanmar, Statement to the 52nd
Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, 26 September 1997.
[3] Interview with a ministry
officer, February 1999.
[4] SPDC and the National
League for Democracy in Exile both had representatives at a meeting in
Chachoengsao, Thailand in June 1998.
[5] Interview with Burmese
military officer, November 1999.
[6] Supadit Kanwanich,
“Caught in the Crossfire,” Bangkok Post, 30 August 1998.
[7] Interview with opposition
politician, Burma, February 1999.
[8] Bruce Hawke,
“Burma’s Weapons Industry,” Jane’s Intelligence
Review, December 1998, p. 8.
[9] Interview with Burmese
military officer, November 1999; photographic details supplied to LM researchers
by the Free Trade Union of Burma; Interview with mine victim in Bangladesh,
March 1999.
[10]Phuchatkan, 14
January 1999, and interviews with a Burmese militant, February 1999, a former
ethnic military commander, January 1999, a Burmese military officer, November
1998, and ethnic military officers, January 1999.
[11]Phuchatkan,
“Burmese Troops Said Plant Mines Along Thai Border,” 14 January
1999.
[12] The Post Publishing
Public Co., Supradit Kanwanich,“Burmese Landmines: Caught in the
Crossfire,” 30 August 1998.
[13] Interview with ethnic
human rights group, January 1999.
[14] KHRG, 5 March 1997;
BRC Newsletter, “The Year of Forced Relocation,”April 1997;
ABSDF 1997 Report; and interviews with an ethnic organization, January
1999, a refugee in Thailand, January 1999, and a human rights activist in
Thailand, January 1999.
[15] “Forced Relocation
and Human Rights Abuses in Karenni,” Burma ABSDF report.
[16] Interview with refugee
by ethnic human rights group, given to LM researchers.
[17] Interview with Karen
refugee in Thailand, January 1999.
[19] Interview with former
military commander, January 1999.
[20]The Newsletter
Monthly, “Mine Explosion In Burma-Bangladesh Border,” July
1998.
[21]The Asian Age,
“Mines Kill 5 Near Burma”; The Newsletter Monthly,
“Landmines in Arakan's Killing Zone,” June 1998 and “Mine
Explosion in Burma-Bangladesh Border,”July 1998; interview with
humanitarian assistance worker in Burma, February 1999.
[22] Supradit Kanwanich,
“Caught in the Crossfire”, Bangkok Post, 30 August 1999;
“Forced Relocation in Pa-an District”, documented by Health Workers
Union (Pa-an district), 19 September 1998; and interview with a Thai military
officer, January 1999.
[23] Interview with Arakanese
refugee in India, January 1999.
[24] Interview with former
ethnic military commander, January 1999.
[25] Interview with ethnic
military officer, January 1999, and a former military advisor, February
1999.
[26] Interview with Burmese
military official, November 1998, also ethnic military officers, January
1999.
[28] Interview with former
military advisor, February 1999.
[29] Interview with human
rights activist in Thailand, February 1999.
[30] Interview with former
military advisor, January 1999.
[31]The Asian Age,
“Mines Kill 5 Near Burma”, The Newsletter Monthly,
“Landmines in Arakan's Killing Zone”, June 1998, also “Mine
Explosion in Burma-Bangladesh Border”, July 1998 and interviews with a
hospital administrator in Thailand, January 1999, a representative of an ethnic
organization, January 1999, a humanitarian assistance worker in Burma, February
1999, a former ethnic military commander, January 1999, an ethnic human rights
group, January 1999, a former military advisor, February 1999, an ethnic
military officer, January 1999, an ethnic organization, January 1999, a former
military advisor, January 1999, a refugee in Thailand, January 1999, and an
ethnic government officer, January 1999.
[32] Interview with a Thai
military officer, January 1999.
[33]Phuchatkan,
“Burmese troops said to have planted mines along the Thai border”,
14 January 1999.
[34]The Asian Age,
“Mines Kill 5 Near Burma”, The Newsletter Monthly,
“Landmines in Arakan's Killing Zone”, June 1998, also “Mine
Explosion in Burma-Bangladesh Border”, July 1998.
[36] Interview with former
military advisor, January 1999.
[37] “Dooplaya Under
the SPDC: Further Developments in the SPDC occupation of south-central Karen
State”, Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG), November 1998; also interview
with a former military advisor, February 1999.
[39] International Labor
Organization, Forced Labor In Myanmar (Burma), Geneva, 2 July 1998; KHRG,
“Dooplaya Under the SPDC: Further Developments in the SPDC Occupation of
South-Central Karen State,” November 1998; KHRG, “Uncertainty, Fear
and Flight,” 18 November 1998; KHRG, “SLORC’s 1993 Offensive
Against Karen Civilians,”1993.
[40] See, for example, Human
Rights Watch, “Burma: The Rohingya Muslims, Ending a Cycle of
Exodus?,” September 1996., and “Burma: Entrenchment or
Reform?,” July 1995.
[44] Interviews with landmine
survivors now refugees in Thailand, January 1999.
[45] “Resume of
landmine Accidents situation in Mae Sot area,” Handicap International,
January 1999, also interviews with a hospital administrator and a human rights
activist in Thailand, January 1999.
[46] Interview with human
rights worker in Thailand, March 1999.