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Table of Contents
Country Reports
GERMANY, Landmine Monitor Report 1999

GERMANY

Mine Ban Policy

Germany, a leader in the development of landmines since the Second World War, began a shift in policy in 1994 to work toward a ban on antipersonnel mines, largely because of enormous public pressure from NGOs and engaged citizens. Its first step was a unilateral export moratorium on AP mines that year; in January 1996 the government prolonged the moratorium indefinitely; in April 1996 the Federal Armed Forces (FAF) renounced the use of AP mines and in December 1997 the last AP mine stockpiles were eliminated.[1]

While taking these steps domestically, initially Germany favored international negotiations toward a ban within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament and Convention on Conventional Weapons over the Ottawa Process. The government believed that negotiating within the CD and CCW would result in agreements of a more binding character and force internationally because all the main producers of landmines and superpower nations (i.e., USA, Russia, and China) were convened in these bodies.[2]

With the lack of movement in the CD in Geneva in 1996, Germany warmed to the initiative of Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy to force the negotiation of a treaty banning AP mines outside normal UN procedures.[3] In ban negotiations, Germany sought the inclusion of strong verification mechanisms and to make the definition of AP mines as narrow as possible to exclude AT mines and other mine-like weapons. Germany hosted an Ottawa Process-related conference near Bonn on 24-25 April 1997, the focus of which was discussions of verification measures in the context of an international treaty banning AP mines.

7-Point Action Plan

Prior to the beginning of the Ottawa Process, on 18 July 1996, then Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr Klaus Kinkel presented the government’s "Seven-Point Action Program on Antipersonnel Mines.”[4] He noted that, “The Federal Government has taken action. In January 1996 it imposed a unilateral unlimited moratorium on all exports of anti-personnel mines. In April 1996 the Federal Armed Forces relinquished totally and unconditionally the use of anti-personnel mines. Existing stocks will be destroyed. The conference to review the UN Conventional Weapons Convention which ended on 3 May 1996 agreed on more extensive prohibitions and restrictions on landmines. This was not enough. I therefore propose a seven-point action program on antipersonnel mines."[5]

The essential elements of the action program included: 1. a call for an international ban on AP mines; 2. a summary of German efforts to help with mine clearance; 3. an outline of the contribution of the Federal Armed Forces (FAF) toward training experts in mine detection and clearance; 4. a request that NATO and WEU support efforts to clear mines; 5. a call for the speediest and widest possible application of the revised Mine Protocol adopted on 3 May 1996; 6. establishing that contributions of mine-afflicted countries to resolve their mine problems would be a criterion for support from German financial and technical cooperation programs; and 7. urging the United Nations to make mine clearance part of UN peace-keeping missions.[6]

This program demonstrated that the requests of many NGOs and of the mine afflicted countries influenced the policies of the government and it focused not only on the disarmament aspect of a ban on AP mines but also on humanitarian mine action.[7]

Ratification and Implementation Laws

Germany signed the Mine Ban Treaty in Ottawa on 3 December 1997. On this occasion in his speech to the delegates, then Foreign Minister Kinkel noted that the verification mechanism of the Mine Ban Treaty was a ”great improvement.”[8] He also announced that Germany would hold a conference on modern demining technology in June 1998.[9] In concluding, he reflected on the post war situation in Europe after the Second World War, when “80 % of the scattered mines were cleared after a few years, because there was the political good will and financial resources.”[10]

Within a week after signing the German parliament debated the ban treaty.[11] All parliamentary parties agreed that the ban of AP mines is an important step toward a more humane world and that the parliament had to ratify the convention before summer of 1998.[12] But differences arose as to the nature of the role Germany had played within the Ottawa Process. The Green Party and the Party of Democratic Socialism deputies disputed that the German government had played a leadership role since the government coalition parties - Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union and Liberal Democratic Party had failed to do anything about AT mines.[13] Both deputies also pointed out that the decisive pressure group for a ban of mines had been the NGO community, especially the German Initiative to Ban Landmines.[14] In contrast the deputies of Christian Democratic Union and Liberal Democratic Party stressed German efforts to ban AP mines since 1993: with the establishment of a mine documentary center followed by stopping all exports of AP mines in 1994.[15] Neither saw any chance to ban AT mines, as there is no international consensus to stop using AT mines, given their military utility. They concluded that, if at all, a ban of AT mines would be a long term goal.[16]

Another issue at question was if the government had provided enough funds to aid landmine survivors and for mine action. The deputies of governmental parties argued that the government had been spending a sufficient amount for these issues, including the provision of military demining technology.[17] But the deputies of the Green Party and Party of Democratic Socialism noted the difference between military and humanitarian demining and that the Government should focus its efforts on humanitarian mine action and decrease allocations for research and development of mines and military mine clearance technology.[18]

The suggestion of the deputy of Social Democratic Party to suspend all support to those states who are not willing to sign the convention met with approval of the government coalition.[19] This means that in support of the efforts of Germany to establish a strong verification mechanism within the treaty, German policy reserves the right to stop support for mine clearance and survivor assistance if a state does not sign the ban treaty or violates its treaty obligations.

Finally, the Minister of Foreign Affairs summed up the government’s view of next steps: 1. To ratify the Convention as soon as possible and to urge non-signatories to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty; 2. to support more mine awareness in the afflicted countries; 3. to offer extensive aid to the landmine survivors from the provision of prostheses to medical and social care; and 4. to intensify the research on demining technology.[20] The deputy of the Green Party outlined the demands of the party as follows: 1. To prohibit worldwide development, production and export of mines, including technology transfer of mines with self-destruct mechanisms; 2. to make public all research projects and exports, all military mission plans and all stockpiles within Germany; and 3. to be transparent in the destruction of all existing mines.[21]

Germany ratified the Mine Ban Treaty in several phases. The first phase was the transformation of the Mine Ban Treaty into national law on 12 May 1998.[22] The second phase was the development of implementing legislation.[23] The third phase was the deposit of the instruments of ratification at the United Nations in New York on 27 July 1998. Apparently, there was no vote against the ratification of the ban treaty.[24]

Memorandum of Understanding

The government bill presented to the Upper House contains a remarkable memorandum,[25] representing the official and binding policy of the German government and comments in detail on each article of the Mine Ban Treaty. Generally the treaty is assessed “to establish new standards within international law as there is set a sweeping prohibition of all types of AP mines accompanied by humanitarian measures.”[26] Of concern is the memorandum’s language on the treaty’s Article 1: “The commitments of the Convention concerns all AP mines of a State Party. In addition to this are also AP mines which are stored within foreign territory. A state party is possibly not accountable for those AP mines which another state keeps within the territory of a state party. If these AP mines are not under its authority and control, then the state party is not bound by law to destroy them.”[27] This argument is taken up again in the interpretation of treaty Article 4: “Stocks from foreign armed forces do not come under definition of article 4 if they are not under one's authority and control of a State Party.”[28] These interpretations are clearly intended to address U.S./NATO mines on German soil.

With regard to the treaty’s Article 6 on international cooperation, the memorandum states: “Article 6 contains essential provisions of the treaty. Their inclusion was decisive to get approval of many African and Latin American states to join the Convention. Furthermore the regulation expresses one of the crucial requests of nongovernmental organizations.... Getting this passage NGOs and Third World Countries had their way above all. Donor countries - among them the Federal Republic of Germany - made their countermove to demand not to impose inappropriate restrictions on provision of equipment and information for humanitarian purposes (paragraph 8).”[29] The memorandum also notes, “From the beginning the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany took the view that the Convention...has important disarmament-oriented meaning and therefore verification has to be a central aspect to prohibit these weapons.”[30]

The implementing legislation of the Mine Ban Treaty (phase 2) was accomplished without any vote against it (according to available sources)[31] and came into force at 6 July 1998.[32] One notable provision is the breadth of application: "Offenses out of the territory of this law...count as offenses irrespective of the national law of the scene of the crime...if the perpetrator is German."[33]

Ratification documents were deposited at the UN on 23 July 1998.[34] With this the process of ratification was completed. One day after deposit, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press release which emphasized,“One priority of German efforts within this issue [mine clearance] is the support of mechanical demining technology to clear mines faster and safer than before. It is absurd that humankind is able to fly to the moon while clearance of huge mine fields still is done by manual work!”[35]

CCW and CD

Germany ratified revised Protocol II of the CCW on 23 April 1997 and deposited its instruments of ratification on 2 May 1997.[36] Germany was one of the first states to do so, but on the occasion then-Foreign Minister Kinkel remarked that the Protocol is unsatisfactory as it does not include a general ban on AP mines worldwide.[37]

Germany’s Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control, Ambassador Dr Rüdiger Hartmann, clearly summed up his government’s position on the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on 30 July 1998: "The primordial task is now to make acceptance of the Ottawa Convention or its objectives as universal as possible. We are aware that a number of states, including some large military powers and major regional powers with huge APL stockpiles and significant production capabilities, have decided not to adhere to the Ottawa Convention immediately. Many of them, however, have expressed their willingness to contribute to the resolution of the humanitarian aims of the Ottawa Convention by banning APL transfers. Germany therefore strongly supports the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on APL by the CD and an early start to negotiations on a universal ban on APL transfers. We should like to emphasize here that this agreement will have to be fully compatible with the Ottawa Convention and that it must not detract from its objectives."[38] This statement was renewed by Ambassador Hartmann in 25 March 1999.[39]

Antitank Mine Ban

The German ban campaign has long called for a ban on all landmines, both antitank and antipersonnel. The Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer has asked for the possibility of a ban of antitank mines, but the Federal Minister of Defense Rudolf Scharping signaled that the Federal Armed Forces are not willing to give up the use of antitank mines.[40] Over 700,000 people in Germany have signed the demand to ban all landmines without exceptions.[41]

Production[42]

In the late 1950s, the Armed Forces began to procure their first AP and AT mines, under license from foreign countries.[43] Germany has procured five types of antipersonnel mines: DM-11, DM-31, DM-51, DM-39, and MUSPA. The government does not categorize the DM-51, DM-39, or MUSPA as antipersonnel mines. It has procured eight types of antitank mines: DM-21, AT-1, At-2, DM-31, PARM-1, PARM-2, COBRA, and MIFF.

Antipersonnel Mines

The DM-11 was the first AP mine produced by Germany. It was a product of the Swedish company LIAB - a metal-free blast mine whose explosive charge is strong enough to damage vehicles.[44] This landmine was produced under license by Diehl, a German company with headquarters in Nürnberg/Röthenbach, in its factory of Mariahütte (Saarland). According to government sources, the FAF bought a huge number of these landmines until 1964 at a cost of 19.2 million DEM (U.S. $10.9 million).[45] Specific data is classified even though these landmines were removed from stockpiles in 1994. It is estimated, though, that the total number of procured mines could be three million.[46]

The DM-31 AP mine was produced from 1962-1967 by the company Industriewerke Karlsruhe (later: Industriewerke Karlsruhe Augsburg, IWKA) for the Federal Armed Forces. This mine is a bounding device which, upon explosion of its bursting charge, showers the surrounding area with small fragments of chopped steel rod.[47] According to government sources these procurements cost 49.2 million DEM (U.S.$ 27.9 million).[48] The German government keeps the number of procured mines secret. [49] It has been estimated that the the total number of procured mines could be between one and one and a half million mines.[50] According to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense 3,000 DM-31 mines have been retained for training purposes by the Federal Armed Forces.[51]

In the early 1990s, the DM-51 AP mines were acquired from the disintegrated Armed Forces of Former East Germany. With this mine the Federal Republic of Germany gained a so-called Claymore mine for the first time. According to government sources, some 33,000 mines were inherited from the former East Germany.[52] The DM-51 is based on the Russian MON-50 AP mine. It has a plastic body with rows of imbedded fragments on the side facing the target. On the top center of the mine is a peep sight with a fuse well on either side. These fuse wells will accommodate a variety of fuses, including tripwire, breakwire, and command detonation.[53] Although there is no independent verification, it has been assumed that they were eliminated in December 1997.

The Armed Forces also has DM-39s, which it calls "explosive charges" ("Sprengkörper"). However, other sources, including the U.S. Department of Defense, classify the DM-39 as an antipersonnel mine.[54] DM-39 are designed to protect DM-11 and DM-21 AT mines from neutralization. In other words, this "explosive charge" is used as an anti-handling-device.[55] If anybody tries to clear an AT mine fitted with a DM-39, a pressure release fuse is activated, causing an explosion powerful enough to detonate the AT mine.[56] The plastic-bodied DM-39 is available in a sheet-metal version, the DM-39A1.[57] The costs and number of these devices are unknown.

The MUSPA is made by Rheinmetall/Daimler Benz Aerospace/Thomson-Dasa-Wirksysteme. Even though the Ministry of Defense and its producers consider MUSPA to be a ”submunition,” the U.S. Department of Defense classifies the weapon as an AP mine: "The MUSPA is an antimaterial/antipersonnel fragmentation minelet dispensed as a submunition from the former West German MW-1 weapon system. The mine is a heavy fragmentation munition with 2,100 steel pellets as the primary lethal mechanism. Once it has been parachute delivered, the MUSPA self-rights and arms. An acoustic sensor then actively senses for an aircraft engine signature. A nearly identical submunition, the MUSA, differs only in that no fuse is present; instead it self-destructs at a preset time."[58] Remotely deliverable with fighter jets or dispenser systems, MUSPA can be deployed by the thousands and extremely quickly over long ranges, greatly enhancing the offensive aspect of mine warfare. The number of MUSPAs in stock is classified.[59] According to reliable estimates the number of procured MUSPA is 90,000, at a cost of around 210 million DEM (U.S. $119.3 million).[60]

Antitank Mines and Delivery Systems

The company Industriewerke Karlsruhe (IWK, later: IWKA) developed for production a new, improved German AT mine, called the "Panzermine II." This metal bodied mine weighs less than 10 kilograms[61] and is scatterable by helicopter. An ignition canal exists at the bottom of the mine, which is able to be connected with DM-31 anti-handling devices.[62] IWK sold it facilities to Diehl, which produced this mine for the FAF under the designation DM-21 from 1980-1982.[63] According to government sources, the cost of procurement amounted to 88.1 million DEM (U.S. $50 million[64]).[65] The number of mines has been estimated at 150,000.

In 1970 , the FAF introduced the LARS (Light Artillery Rocket System - Leichte Artillerie Raketen System) rocket launcher, which also could be used to scatter AT-1 mines.[66] From 1970 to 1972 the Federal Armed Forces procured 209 of these landmine delivery systems, at a cost of 72.2 million DEM.[67] According to government sources, between 1978 and 1980, 108.6 million DEM were spent to buy 15,000 LARS each fitted with eight AT-1 mines.[68] Approximately 65 of these mine delivery systems are still in use.[69]

AT-1 antitank mines were procured by the Federal Armed Forces in about 1978. The AT-1 is first generation scatterable mine. It is a plastic stake mine with a mechanical vibration fuse which responds to sustained pressure driving over it. The mine is equipped with an antihandling device and a self-destruct mechanism.[70] Approximately 120,000 AT-1 were procured at a cost of DEM 108.6 million (U.S. $61.7). According to government sources these mines were transformed to rockets for exercise purposes between 1990 and 1993.[71]

The AT-2 antitank mine was introduced in the 1980s.[72] The AT-2 is an armor-penetrating belly-attack mine that uses a shaped-charge of pressed RDX/TNT. In addition to the explosive train, the system includes an impact sensor, fuse, timer, and lithium battery. Six selectable self-destruct times are available.[73] Government sources indicate that between 1981 and 1986, 564.7 million DEM were spent on AT-2 mines, designed to be scattered by the LARS mine layer.[74] These acquisitions included 60,000 LARS each fitted with five AT-2 mines from Dynamit Nobel for a total of 300,000 mines.[75] Between 1984 and 1992, 763 million DEM were spent on AT-2 mines usable with the ”Skorpion” mine layer system from Dynamit Nobel, as well.[76] At least 32,000 magazines of mines were procured each consisting of twenty AT-2 mines for a total of 640,000 mines.[77] And finally between 1993 and 1995, 783.6 million DEM were spent on AT-2 mines usable with the MARS/MRLS rocket launcher.[78] For this the Federal Armed Forces bought 9,360 rockets each consisting of twenty-eight AT-2 mines, for a total of 262,080 mines.[79] This means from 1981 until 1995 a total of more than 2.11 billion DEM (U.S.$1.2 billion) were spent for more than 1.2 million AT-2 mines.

From 1985 on the FAF procured the mechanical mine delivery system 85. It is a trailer with an integrated plough developed in Sweden, which allows the laying of the DM-31 AT mine on the surface or under the ground. The DM-31 was produced in Sweden by the company FFV. The DM-31 is a shaped charge ATM with a magnetic fuse. The fuse contains 2 magnetized balls that sit in a path under the edge of the mine lid functioning as an antilift device. The DM-31 can be laid mechanically or by hand.[80] Government sources indicate 125,000 mines were procured between 1988 and 1992. [81] Information on the cost of these procurements is inconsistent. In information given to the parliament the Ministry of Defense specified the costs at 160 million DEM in 1995 , while in the media the costs were quoted as 182.2 million DEM. Finally, at the time of order in 1985, the costs were calculated to be merely at 141.2 million DEM.[82]

From 1996 to 1998, the PARM 1 anti-armor system was offered by Daimler Benz Aerospace together with THOMSON (France) by joint venture with Thomson-DASA Armaments or Thomson-Dasa-Wirksysteme.[83] Government sources indicated that 12,000 PARM-1s had been procured at a cost of 99.6 million DEM (U.S.$56.6 million) by 1998.[84] This figures differs from the information provided by DASA, which indicated a cost of 100.5 million DEM.[85] The PARM-1 stand on an adjustable tripod, with 360 degrees of movement and an elevation of -45 to +90 degrees. A reel of fiber-optic cable is laid along the aimed line of sight, the timer is activated, and the mine is armed following a 5-minute delay. When the PARM 1 warhead is fired, a counterweight is ejected out the back and stabilizing fins extend to guide the warhead to the target. The warhead contains a shaped-charge lethal mechanism that penetrates the target with an impact of up to 40 km/h.[86] After public pressure generated by shareholders of Daimler-Benz, the Director of Daimler Benz Jurgen Schrempp announced in late 1998 that production of PARM-1 would be stopped by the end of the year as well as the development of PARM-2.[87] About 50,000 DEM was planned to be allocated to PARM-2 and a total of DEM 278.0 (U.S. $157.9) for its research and development.

But similar new high-tech mines are still under development in other European joint-ventures – such as the ARGES, developed by Dynamit Nobel (Germany)/Honeywell (Germany)/GIAT (France)/Hunting (Great Britain). It is a rival product of the PARM-2 and one of the most modern off-route mines offered to the European market. The one mine costs approximately 12,000 DEM. ARGES will be used as a standard NATO weapon, but is not expected to be introduced before 2000. ARGES, like the PARM 2, is an autonomous, sensor-controlled anti-armor weapon, which destroys the target from the side with a hollow charge warhead. The acoustic alarm sensor of the ARGES mine, which can make out close- and long-range targets, can “hear around corners” and therefore also be deployed in confined areas. A microprocessor calculates the distance, direction, speed and the length of the target vehicle. The length of the vehicle is crucial in deciding whether it is a combat target or not. There is the obvious question of how capable the system will be at differentiation of civilian and military vehicles.

Area defense mines, such as the COBRA area-defense mine from Rheinmetall Industrie, constitute another example in high-tech mine category. Government sources indicate that 310 million DEM (U.S. $176.1) are projected to be spent on the system over the next few years and 45 million DEM has already been spent.[88] This autonomous, “intelligent” mine symbolizes the future technology of European high-tech mines Equipped with the Smart 155 munitions from the German companies Rheinmetall Industrie and Diehl, the COBRA is a ”top attack” weapon. The target is recognized through seismic and acoustic sensors and the mine when activated is fired to a height of approximately 150 meters. There, suspended from a parachute, it searches, finds and finally fires the sensor fused munitions on the target over a radius of more than 300 meters. "False targets, e.g. light commercial vehicles, can therefore be reliably identified and not targeted" assure official sources. No comment is forthcoming on how the mine reacts to large commercial vehicles. Military publications report that warnings should be issued against the current risks associated with this development, especially with remote delivery by missile.[89]

Another antitank mine is the MIFF, which can be used with an antihandling device. Some 125,000 were procured. These are stockpiled but their status is unknown.

Provision of funds for landmines and landmine dispenser systems are subject to a cycle of research and development followed by procurement. For example in 1990-1995 a total amount of 2,367.6 million DEM (US$1,345.2 million) was spent for the procurement of landmines, while in the same period an amount of 34.5 million DEM (US$19.6 million) was allocated for research and development of landmines. From 1996-1998 ”just” an amount of 107.0 million DEM (US$60.8 million) was spent for the procurement of landmines, while 67.7 million DEM (US$38.5 million) was spent on research and development. This means at the present, Germany is in a phase of research and development of new landmines (especially the area defense mines COBRA and ARGES) and it is foreseeable that an extensive procurement will follow in the near future.[90]

Mine Status

AP

DM-11 Destroyed

DM31 Destroyed (3,000 stored for training purposes)

DM-51 (Claymore) Destroyed

DM-39 (antihandling device) Stockpiled

MUSPA (“submunition”) Stockpiled

AT

DM-21 (AHD poss) Stockpiled

AT-1 (AHD poss) Changed into warheads for exercise purposes

AT-2 (AHD is possible) Stockpiled

DM-31 Stockpiled

PARM-1[91] Stockpiled

PARM-2 under development but stopped since end of 1998[92]

COBRA (Surface defense mine) under development

MIFF (AHD is possible) Stockpiled

Transfer

German landmine exports are classified, so verifying them is difficult. One official document contained detailed information on just one sale: twenty AP-2 antitank mines to the Armed Forces of the Netherlands on 17 September 1993.[93] Other official information indicates: between 1985 and 1990 three authorizations for a total of 262 landmines; between 1991 and 31 July 1995 ten authorizations for a total of 45,139 landmines.[94] According to the magazine ”Wehrdienst,” 87,024 AT-2s were delivered to United Kingdom in 1995.[95]

In spite of the difficulties in obtaining data on exports of landmines, the following transfers of landmines seem certain:

1. Until 1994 Italy received MIFF, MUSPA and MUSA mines, together with one hundred MW 1 submunition dispensers for the combat aircraft Tornado;

2. In 1994 Finland got probably more than 100,000 TM-62 antitank mines from the stockpiles of the former Armed Forces of East Germany;

3. At the end of 1990 and beginning of 1991, the United Kingdom obtained four Skorpion mine delivery systems and 15,000 AT-2 mines as German military support for the Gulf War. These weapons were returned after the war;

4. Also during Gulf War, Israel got around one hundred of several types of landmines from stockpiles of the former Armed Forces of East Germany to use for research;

5. In the same context and for the same purposes, the United States obtained 552 PMP 2, TM 46 and TM 63 mines (all from the Former East Germany). Later, additional mines were provided;

6. Saudi Arabia received twenty antitank mines in 1996;[96]

7. In 1997 Norway procured 468 Mars rocket launchers fitted with AT-2 mines from Germany;[97]

German mines have been found elsewhere, including conflict zones. In answer to the question of how DM-11 antitank mines could have shown up in Somalia and DM-31 antipersonnel mines in Angola, the German government answered on 5 September 1995, that no permission for such transfers had been given, so they do not know how these transfers could have taken place.[98] This demonstrates the difficulties of enforcing national prohibitions of weapons if the arms are developed and produced by multilateral joint ventures, and is something that needs to be addressed.[99]

Known mine transfer from Former West Germany:[100]

DM-11 AP - France and Somalia;

DM-31 AP - Sweden, Angola, Zambia;

AT-2 (AHD is possible) - United Kingdom, France, Italy and Norway;[101]

MUSPA AP (submunitions) - Italy;

MIFF AT (AHD is possible) - Italy;

PARM-1 Off-route AT - Sweden.

Known mine transfer from Former East Germany:[102]

PMP 71 AP mine - Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia;

POMZ-2 AP mine - Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Cambodia, China, Cuba, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Former East Germany, Former Soviet Union, Iraq, Libya, Nicaragua, Somalia, South Africa, Mozambique, Namibia, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe;

POMZ-2M AP mine - Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Cambodia, China, Cuba, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Former East Germany, Former Soviet Union, Iraq, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, North Korea, South Africa, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe;

PPM-2 AP mine - Angola, Cambodia, China, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Former East Germany, Iraq, Mozambique, Namibia, Somalia, South Africa, Zambia;

PM 60 AT mine - Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia;

TM-46 / AT mine - Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Former Soviet Union, Former East Germany, Iraq, Israel, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Somalia, Cambodia, Zambia;

TM-62P3 AT mine - Egypt, Former Soviet Union, Poland;

TMN-46 AT mine - Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Former Soviet Union, Former East Germany, Iraq, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Poland, South Africa, Somalia, Zambia.

Stockpiling

According to official information from the government, the Federal Armed Forces finished the elimination of all of their AP mines in December 1997, destroying about 1.7 million antipersonnel mines.[103] The destruction was carried out by private companies, observing environmental standards, at a cost of 4.2 million DEM.[104] The exact names of the companies, their methods of destruction or their kinds of environmental standards are not available.

A total of 3,000 DM-31 antipersonnel mines are being retained, under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense, to train demining personnel and to test demining technology.[105]

On one controversial issue, stockpiling and transfers of U.S. antipersonnel mines are still allowed within Germany. The German government argues that according to the “Status on Forces Agreement” (SOFA), weapons of foreign forces within Germany are not covered by German law and control.[106]

Use

The German campaign is concerned that use of MUSPA, DM-39, and antitank mines with antihandling devices, such as the AT-2, may not be consistent with the Mine Ban Treaty. Furthermore the area defense mine COBRA is still under development, and will be fitted with antihandling devices.[107] The diplomatic record of the Oslo treaty negotiations shows that governments consider that such devices, if they explode from innocent, unintentional acts, are considered to be APMs and thus, illegal under the Mine Ban Treaty.[108]

Mine Action Funding

Funding for mine action programs comes from different ministries. The principal budget for mine action is under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The projects it supports include the following:

- concrete projects of mine and UXO's clearance;

- training of local demining personnel;

- strengthening national mine clearance structures with the support of German experts;

- testing of modern mine clearance technology and detection/sensor technology;

- procurement of technical equipment for mine clearance;

- supporting of mine awareness projects within afflicted communities.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs plays the lead role in funding for humanitarian demining, while the Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development takes the lead on funds for survivor assistance.[109] These measures are concentrated on physical and psychological therapy as well as orthopedics and fitting of prostheses.[110] In its assistance for landmine survivors, the Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development favors efforts to reintegrate landmine survivors into social and economic structures and to support the acceptance of landmine survivors within the society.[111]

Support for humanitarian mine action is concentrated on the technical aspects of mine clearance and on mine awareness of the afflicted communities. In comparison with this, survivor assistance and development-oriented mine action have less support. Between 1993 and 1998 the Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development support amounted to around 31.22 million DEM (around US$17.94 million), while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs allocated approximately 51.28 million DEM (around US$29.47 million) over the same period.

Ministry of Foreign affairs (AA) Mine Action Funding 1992-1998[112]

1992 - DEM 100,000 (U.S. $57,471)

Nicaragua

1993 - TOTAL: DEM 590,000 (U.S. $339,080)

Mozambique

1994 - DEM 796,491 (U.S. $457,753)

Afghanistan, Georgia, Cambodia, Mozambique

1995 - DEM 2,210,300 (U.S. $1,270,287 )

Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovnia, Cambodia, Mozambique, Nogorno-Karabach

1996- DEM 17,850,228 (U.S. $10,625,135)

Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guatemala, Honduras, Laos, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Sudan

1997 - DEM 17,794,768 (U.S.$10,226,878)

Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Guatemala, Laos, Mozambique.

1998 -: DEM 18,970,000 (U.S. $10,902,298)

Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovnia, Cambodia, Chechnya, Croatia, Egypt, Georgia & Abkazia, Laos, Mozambique, Somalia, Vietnam.

TOTAL from 1993 - 1998: DEM 58,311,787 (U.S. $33,878,902)

In addition, between 1993 and 1998, the Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development spent DEM 31,223,233 (U.S. $17,944,386) on mine action in countries including Angola, Cambodia, Laos, Mozambique and Vietnam. This was spent on activities including survivor assistance, mine clearance and training and reconstruction.

One of the important goals of the policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is support for the development of modern mine clearance technology to speed up mine clearance operations.[113] The Foreign Ministry also supports the use of dogs to detect mines in some regions. This technique, according to the Foreign Ministry, is very effective and cheap. Therefore they would like to strengthen mine detection by using dogs in Afghanistan and other suitable regions.[114]

Funding for procurement and development of mines and mine clearance technology continues to dwarf that for humanitarian mine action-- 60 million DEM versus 20 million DEM in the draft 1999 budget. From 1993 to 1998, the goverment spent 1,207 million DEM (US$686 million) on procurement, research and development of landmines;[115] 250 million DEM (US$142 million) on

mine clearance and dismantling frontier fortifications at the former German-German frontier;[116] and 82.5 million DEM (US$47 million) on humanitarian mine action.[117]

The German ban campaign has expressed concern over support to companies which have been involved in mine production. In particular, it has noted that in 1997 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported the field testing of “Rhino” in Cambodia.[118] This mine clearance device has been developed by the company MAK-System, which belongs to the joint-stock company ”Rheinmetall Industrie,”[119] which is the former producer of MUSPA and a developer of the new COBRA area defense mine. A second example is the mine clearance device “Minebreaker 2000,” whose field trial in Bosnia-Herzegovina was supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1998. ”Minebreaker 2000” was developed by Flensburger Fahrzeugbau Gesellschaft (FFG), which belongs to the armament company Diehl.[120] The German campaign has said these are examples of ”double dipping,” in which landmine producers want to make profit twice – to make money on the problem they helped create.

Mine Clearance

From 1961 until 1985 the Former German Democratic Republic laid approximately 1,322,700 mines along the German-German frontier. In 1985 Former East German leader Erich Honecker agreed to clear the mines in return for a financial aid package from West Germany. These mines would be cleared by soldiers of the GDR from 1985 on, but after reunification of Germany the scrutiny of the mine protocols showed that the elimination of 33,864 mines had not been verified. Since 1995, some 943 of these mines were found by German mine detection teams. It is estimated that 17,992 of the mines, which are shown to have been laid but not verified as having been cleared, are so called wood box mines, PMD-6 (”Holzkastenminen”). As it is likely that most of them deteriorated completely, there is currently no search underway for these mines. Regarding the rest of the 17,992 mines which were not founded, it is believed that most of them have been triggered by weather influences or game and that in fact they are already cleared and the documentation of the soldiers of Former East Germany was deficient.[121]

By 30 March 1995, 83.1 million DEM (around US$47.76 million) had been earmarked for the mine detection of the former German-German frontier in 1994-1995.[122] On 5 December 1995, a press release of the Federal Ministry of Defense announced that all mine affected areas on the old east-west divide had been cleared and that the last zone, near the Bavarian town of Hof, was reopened to the public. In the press release the total cost for mine clearance as well as for dismantling former frontier fortifications was put at more than US$142.04 million.[123]

Note to readers: A longer, more detailed version of this report is available from Landmine Monitor and can also be found at www.landmine.de

<FRANCE | HOLY SEE>

[1]Auswärtiges Amt, Referat Öffentlichkeitsarbeit (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Division of Public Relations), Weltweite Ächtung von Antipersonenminen. Der Vertrag von Ottawa - Eine Herausforderung für die Zukunft (Worldwide Ban on AP Mines – the Treaty of Ottawa - A Challenge for the Future), June 1998, pp. 55.

[2]Interview with Jörg Alt SJ, 23 February 1999.

[3]Ibid.

[4]www.auswaertiges-amt.de, Seven-Point Action Program on AP Mines, presented by Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr Klaus Kinkel (English Version), Bonn, 18. July 1996.

[5]Ibid., p. 1.

[6]Ibid., pp. 1-3.

[7]Please find an assessment of these efforts in the Mine Action section.

[8]Speech on the occasion of Signing Conference of ,Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of antipersonnel mines and on their destruction, Speech of Federal Minster of Foreign Affairs in Ottawa, 3. December 1997; p. 1. www.auswaertiges-amt.de

[9]Ibid., p. 2.

[10]Ibid., p. 2 f.

[11]DIP - Das Informationssystem für Parlamentarische Vorgänge (Information System on Parliamentary Proceedings), Deutscher Bundestag – 13. Wahlperiode – 210. Sitzung, Bonn, den 11. Dezember 1997, (Plenary Protocol 13/210, Bonn, 11 December 1997), pp. 19189.http://dip.bundestag.de

[12]Ibid., pp.19190.

[13]Ibid., p. 19190; p. 19195.

[14]Ibid., p. 10190; p. 19195.

[15]Ibid., p. 19191.

[16]Ibid., p. 19192; p. 19194.

[17]Ibid., p. 19192; p. 19195.

[18]Ibid., p. 19191; p. 19196.

[19]Ibid., p. 19194.

[20]Ibid., p.19197.

[21]Ibid., p.19190.

[22]Bundesgesetzblatt Teil II (Federal Law Gazette, Part II), 11 May 1998, pp. 778, Gesetz vom 30.04.98 (Law from 30 April 1998).

[23]Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I (Federal Law Gazette, Part I), 09 July 1998, pp. 1778, Ausführungsgesetz zum Übereinkommen über das Verbot des Einsatzes, der Lagerung, der Herstellung und der Weitergabe von Antipersonenminen und über deren Vernichtung vom 3. Dezember 1997 (Law of application of the Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of antipersonnel mines and on their destruction from 3 December 1997).

[24]DIP - Das Informationssystem für Parlamentarische Vorgänge (Information System on Parliamentary Proceedings): Bundesrat Plenarprotokoll (Upper House of the Federal Parliament, plenary protocol) 721, 06 February 1998, p. 23B, 37C-38D; Bundestag Plenarprotokoll (Lower House of the Federal Parliament, plenary protocol) 13/219, 12 February 1998, p. 20061C-D20073C-20077D; Deutscher Bundestag (Lower House of the Federal Parliament), Document 13/10197, 25 March 1998; Bundesrat Plenarprotokoll (Upper House of the Federal Parliament, plenary protocol) 723, 27 March 1998, p. 148. http://dip.bundestag.de

[25]Bundesrat, Drucksache 34/98, Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung vom 16.01.1998 (Upper House of the Federal Parliament, Document 34/98, bill of the Federal government from 16 January 1998).http://dip.bundestag.de

[26]Ibid., p. 24.

[27]Ibid., p. 26.

[28]Ibid., p. 28.

[29]Ibid., p. 28.

[30]Ibid., p. 29; p. 30.

[31]DIP - Das Informationssystem für Parlamentarische Vorgänge (Information System on Parliamentary Proceedings), Ausführungsgesetz zum Übereinkommen über das Verbot des Einsatzes, der Lagerung, der Herstellung und der Weitergabe von Antipersonenminen und über deren Vernichtung vom 3. Dezember 1997 (Law of application of the Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of antipersonnel mines and on their destruction from 3 December 1997). http://dip.bundestag.de

[32]Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I (Federal Law Gazette, Part I), No. 43, 9 July 1998, pp. 1778.

[33]Ibid., p. 8.

[34]www.auswaertiges-amt.de, press release from 24 July 1998, Auswärtiges Amt: Deutsche und französische Ratifikationsurkunde zum internationalen Übereinkommen für das Verbot von Antipersonenminen in New York hinterlegt (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: German and French Ratification document on Conventon on Ban of AP mines is deposit in New York).

[35]Ibid., p. 1.

[36]DIP - Das Informationssystem für Parlamentarische Vorgänge (Information System on Parliamentary Proceedings), GESTA: XA012, Gesetz zum Protokoll II in der am 3. Mai 1996 geänderten Fassung und zum Protokoll IV vom 13. Oktober 1995 zum VN-Waffenübereinkommen (Law concerning Protocol II, revised version of 03 May 1996 and Protocol IV from 13 October 1995 concerning UN armament convention). http://dip.bundestag.de

[37]Press release, 2 May 1997.http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de

[38]Third Session of the Conference on Disarmament 1998, Statement by the Federal Government Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control, Ambassador Dr Rüdiger Hartmann, Geneva, 30 July 1998 (Original version in English), p. 4. http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de

[39]Statement by Ambassador Dr Rüdiger Hartmann, Commissioner of the Federal Government for Disarmament and Arms Control, Geneva, 25 March 1999.

[40]Welt am Sonntag, 24 January 1999.

[41]AP (Associated Press), 25 February 1999.

[42]There is currently no detailed information available on production of landmines in Former East Germany. Therefore the following chapter concentrates on landmines in the Federal Republic of Germany.

[43]Thomas Küchenmeister, "Gute Mine" zum bösen Spiel: Landminen made in Germany (Idstein: KOMZI-Verlag, 1995), p. 30.

115Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksache 13/1[4]73; 13/1023; 13/11322 (German Parliament, Document 13/1473; 13/1023; 13/11322).

[45]Auswärtiges Amt, Referat Öffentlichkeitsarbeit (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Division of Public Relations), June 1998; Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 13/1473 (German Parliament, Document 13/1473), 22 May 1995, p. 3. Http://dip.bundestag.de

[46]Thomas Küchenmeister (1995), pp. 30-31; Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 13/1473 (German Parliament, Document 13/1473), 22 May 1995, p. 3. Http://dip.bundestag.de

[47]U.S. Department of Defense: http://www.demining.brtrc.com, data set DM-31.

[48]Using 1999 exchange rate: DEM 1.76 = U.S. $ 1.

[49]German Parliament, Document 13/1473 (Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 13/1473), pp. 3-4.

[50]Thomas Küchenmeister (1995), p. 33.

[51]Federal Ministry of Defense, Bonn 14 February 1997.

[52]Thomas Küchenmeister (1995), p. 46; see also: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 13/1473 (German Parliament, Document 13/1473), p. 1.

[53]U.S. Department of Defense: http://www.demining.brtrc.com, data set MON-50.

[54]See U.S. Department of Defense (http://www.demining.brtrc.com, data set DM-39).

[55]Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 13/1473 (German Parliament, Document 13/1473), p. 3; see also: Thomas Küchenmeister (1995), p. 35.

[56]Thomas Küchenmeister (1995), p. 35.

[57]Ibid.

[58]U.S. Department of Defense: http://www.demining.brtrc.com, data set MUSPA.

[59]Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 13/1473 (German Parliament, Document 13/1473), p. 8.

[60]Thomas Küchenmeister (1995), pp. 50-51.

[61]Ibid.

[62]Ibid., p. 39.

[63]Ibid., p. 38.

[64]Federal Ministry of Defense, Bonn, 14 February 1997.

[65]Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 13/1473 (German Parliament, Document 13/1473), p. 4.

[66]Ibid., p. 39.

[67]Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 13/1473 (German Parliament, Document 13/1473), p. 7.

[68]Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 13/1473 (German Parliament, Document 13/1473), p. 8; see also: Thomas Küchenmeister (1995), p. 40.

[69]Ibid.

[70]Thomas Küchenmeister (1995), p. 40; see also: U.S. Department of Defense: http://www.demining.brtrc.com, data set AT 1.

[71]Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 13/1473 (German Parliament, Document 13/1473), p. 8.

[72]Ibid.

[73]U.S. Department of Defense: http://www.demining.brtrc.com, data set AT-2.

[74]Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 13/1473 (German Parliament, Document 13/1473), p. 4; see also: Thomas Küchenmeister (1995), p. 42.

[75]Küchenmeister (1995); p. 41.

[76]Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 13/1473 (German Parliament, Document 13/1473), p. 4.

[77]Küchenmeister (1995), p. 43.

[78]Bundesdrucksache 13/1473 (German Parliament, Document 13/1473), p. 4. http://dip.bundestag.de

[79]Küchenmeister (1995), p. 43.

[80]U.S. Department of Defense: http://www.demining.brtrc.com, data set DM-31 AT.

[81]Federal Ministry of Defense, letter to Marcel Pott (Journalist), Bonn, undated (May 1995), as cited in Thomas Küchenmeister (1995), p. 45

[82]Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 13/1473 (German Parliament, Document 13/1473), p. 4; Federal Ministry of Defense, letter to Marcel Pott (Journalist), Bonn, undated (May 1995), as cited in Thomas Küchenmeister (1995), p. 45, "Wehrdienst" ("Military Service" - magazine), No. 185, 1985, as cited in Thomas Küchenmeister (1995), p. 45.

[83]This joint venture ended in early 1998 and TDW is again 100 % a subsidiary company of DASA (source: Soldat und Technik (Soldier and Technology), October 1998, p. 654).

[84]Federal Ministry of Defense, Bonn, undated (December 1997).

[85]KNA (Catholic News Agency), 29 May 1998.

[86]U.S. Department of Defense: http://www.demining.brtrc.com, data set PARM-1.

[87]RIB-Rundbrief (RIB information letter), No. 21, November 1998.

[88]Federal Ministry of Defense, Bonn, undated (December 1997).

[89]Thomas Küchenmeister, 1998.

[90]According to a report of KNA (Catholic News Agency) from 29 May 1998 ARGES will go into production in 2005. But it seems that ARGES is already produced: According to governmental sources of Norwegian Defense Department a contract was signed for AGRES in 1997. The contract sum is said to be around 65 million. DEM (around US$ 36.9 million ) (source: odin.dep.no/fd/publ/anskaffelser/eng/contracts.html).

[91]Federal Ministry of Defense, Bonn, undated (December 1997).

[92]RIB-Rundbrief (RIB information letter), No. 21, November 1998.

[93]Bundesdrucksache 13/2252 (German Parliament, Document 13/2252), pp. 3-4.

[94]Bundesdrucksache 13/2432 (German Parliament, Document 13/2432), pp. 1-2.

[95]Wehrdienst (magazine: Military Service) as cited by Thomas Küchenmeister (1995), p. 119.

[96]All data from Thomas Küchenmeister (1995), p. 119.

[97]Report of international conventional arms transfers, 1997. www.auswaertiges-amt.de

[98]Bundesdrucksache 13/2252 (German Parliament, Document 13/2252), p. 3.

[99]Auswärtiges Amt, Referat Öffentlichkeitsarbeit (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Division of Public Relations), June 1998, p. 55.

[100]All data (with one exception) from U.S. Department of Defense: http://www.demining.brtrc.com.

[101]Report of international conventional arms transfers, 1997. www.auswaertiges-amt

[102]All data from U.S. Department of Defense: http://www.demining.brtrc.com.

[103]Auswärtiges Amt, Referat Öffentlichkeitsarbeit (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Division of Public Relations), June 1998, p. 57.

[104]Europäische Sicherheit (European Security), 3/1998, editor: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, p. 5.

[105]Federal Ministry of Defense, Bonn, 14 February 1997.

[106]Spiegel, 21/1998, p. 20; see also: Federal Ministry of Defense, Bonn, 02.12.1997; ”Wie alle andern Waffen unterliegen auch die US Landminen aufgrund obiger Bestimmungen nicht der Kontrolle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.” ("Due to regulations mentioned above [SOFA; M.H.] US landmines like all other weapons do not fall under control of the Federal Republic of Germany.")

[107]Ibid.

[108]International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Statement to the Closing Plenary of the Oslo Diplomatic Conference on a Treaty to Ban Antipersonnel Landmines, 18 September 1997.

[109]Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development, Bonn, 15. January 1999.

[110]Ibid..

[111]Ibid..

[112]Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bonn, 22 November 1995.Exchange rate: DEM 1.76 = US-$ 1.

[113]Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bonn, 2 February 1999.

[114]Ibid.

[115]Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksache 13/1473; 13/1023; 13/11322 (German Parliament, Document 13/1473; 13/1023; 13/11322).

[116]Federal Ministry of Defense, Press Release, 5 December 1995.

[117]Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bonn, 22 November 1995; Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bonn, 17. September 1997; Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bonn, 2 February 1999; Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development, Bonn, 15 January 1999.

[118]Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bonn, 2 February 1999.

[119]www.rheinmetall.com/html/struktur.htm (promotion of the company itself).

[120]http://www.diehl-gruppe.de/diehl_1.htm; see also ”Das Geschäft der Allesfresser” (”The deal of omnivores”), Süddeutsche Zeitung, 5 November 1998.

[121]http://dip.bundestag.de, Bundesdrucksache 13/1023 (German Parliament, Document 13/1023), p. 1.

[122]Ibid, p. 2.

[123]Federal Ministry of Defense, Press Release, 5 December 1995.