Key
developments since May 2001: In 2001 the ROK cleared about 4,700 landmines
from around military bases in the rear area. It also cleared 840 mines and
850,000 square meters of land in the inter-Korean transportation routes south of
the DMZ. The ROK ratified CCW Amended Protocol II on 9 May 2001. Landmine
Monitor’s Asia-Pacific researchers held their regional meeting in Seoul in
October 2001. Information came to light that nearly half of the 1.1 million US
“dumb” mines for fighting in Korea are stored in the US, and that
the US plans to transfer more than 560,000 mines already stored in South Korea
to ROK forces at the outset of conflict.
MINE BAN POLICY
The Republic of Korea (ROK) has not acceded to the
Mine Ban Treaty. South Korea abstained from voting on the UN General Assembly
resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in November 2001, as it had in
previous years. South Korea did not participate as an official observer at the
Third Meeting of States Parties in Nicaragua in September 2001. However, the
ROK has regularly attended the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional Standing Committee
meetings, including January and May 2002. It also participated in the regional
seminar on landmine stockpile destruction hosted by Malaysia in August 2001.
The ROK ratified Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Conventional
Weapons (CCW) on 9 May 2001, and it entered into force six months
later.[1] A South Korean
representative attended the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended
Protocol II, as well as the Second CCW Review Conference, in December 2001. The
ROK submitted its first annual report as required by Article 13 of Amended
Protocol II.
Members of the ICBL from the Asia-Pacific region came together in Seoul from
25-29 October 2001 to discuss their research for Landmine Monitor Report
2002 and their campaigning plans and priorities for 2002. The Korean
Campaign to Ban Landmines (KCBL) hosted the meeting, which included a field trip
to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) for an ROK military briefing. In the nearby
village of Daekwang-ri they met with civilians injured by landmines from the DMZ
while farming their rice
paddies.[2]
The campaigners also sent an open letter to President Kim Dae-Jung urging his
government to join the Mine Ban Treaty as soon as possible. The meeting
coincided with a visit by Nobel laureate Jody Williams to Chungbuk National
University, south of Seoul. On 30 October 2001, Williams met with the leader of
ROK’s majority party (Grand National Party), Chairman Lee Hoi-Chang, who
expressed sympathy for the humanitarian work of the campaign, but at the same
time, stated that antipersonnel mines in the DMZ served a specific purpose as a
deterrent. He indicated that if North Korea acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty, the
ROK would also, and expressed interest in interim steps short of joining the ban
treaty.[3]
PRODUCTION
South Korea has produced two
“Claymore” type directional fragmentation antipersonnel mines,
designated KM18A1 and K440. The Hanwha Corporation has reported the production
of a total of 21,016 KM18A1 Claymore mines from
1993-1997.[4] The ROK has
acknowledged production of 4,287 KM18A1s in 1998, 1,363 in 1999, and 7,088 in
2000.[5] A Ministry of Defense
official told Landmine Monitor that South Korea has not produced any
antipersonnel mines, including Claymore mines, after
2000.[6]
A standard reference work on landmines has reported that Hanwha also produces
the M16A2, a licensed copy of the US bounding fragmentation mine. It is listed
as in production and in use in the Demilitarized
Zone.[7] However, according to
the Information Desk of Hanwha, a licensed copy of the US M16A2 was developed in
1987, but has not been produced for military
use.[8]
TRANSFER
In 1997, the government extended a one-year
moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines for an indefinite
period.[9] Apparently the
moratorium does not include Claymore-type mines, as South Korea in 2001 offered
to sell K440 Claymore-type mines to New Zealand, Malaysia, and
Singapore.[10]
In the event of a renewed war in Korea, the United States plans to transfer
more than 560,000 M14 and M16 non-self-destructing (“dumb”) mines
that are stockpiled in South Korea to the ROK Army, for their immediate
deployment.[11] Questions have
been raised about the applicability of the U.S. global transfer moratorium in
place since 1992.
STOCKPILING
South Korea is believed to possess some two
million non-self-destructing antipersonnel mines in its stockpile. The estimate
is based on the South Korean government statement that its antipersonnel
landmine stockpile is “about twice as many as those that are
buried;” the government has said the number of buried mines is around one
million. (See below). In addition, South Korea holds an unknown number of
self-destructing landmines, including US ADAM artillery-delivered
mines[12] and, according to one
source, some US GEMMS
mines.[13]
South Korea reported that by July 1999 it completed the modification of all
low metal content M14 mines in its stockpiles, by attaching 8 grams of
iron.[14] This modification, to
make the mines more easily detected, is required by Amended Protocol II. An
official of the Ministry of National Defense indicated that a total of 960,000
M14 mines were modified.[15]
The US has long made it known that it is stockpiling more than one million
M14 and M16 non-self-destructing antipersonnel mines, to be used in any future
resumption of war in Korea.[16]
However, surprising information has recently come to light that nearly half of
those mines are not in South Korea, but stored in the continental United States.
According to information provided to Human Rights Watch by the US Army, as of
August 2001, the US has 1,138,600 non-self-destructing mines for use in Korea.
A total of 510,600 mines (45) are stored in the continental United States, and
would likely take weeks or months to get to Korea. Another 564,300 mines (50)
are stored in the ROK, as “war reserves,” and would be handed over
to the ROK Army at the outset of conflict. The remaining 63,700 mines (five
percent) are also stored in the ROK, for use by US
forces.[17]
In addition to the non-self-destructing mines, the US also stockpiles
remotely-delivered self-destructing antipersonnel mines in South Korea.
LANDMINE PROBLEM
During the Korean War, the US Army and the ROK
Army heavily mined the area along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Additional
landmines were planted in the 1960s, 1978, and 1988 in the DMZ and within the
Civilian Control Zone (CCZ), which is a restricted area of three-to-twelve miles
immediately below the southern boundary of the
DMZ.[18]
The Demilitarized Zone and the adjacent CCZ are among the most heavily mined
areas in the world. The ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade recently
estimated the number of emplaced mines at
1,150,000.[19] The US State
Department in November 2001 estimated
1,125,000.[20] The South Korean
military has used a figure of about 1.2
million.[21] The Ministry of
National Defense stated that 1,368 million square meters are mined in the DMZ
and CCZ.[22]
The Ministry of National Defense has also reported the deployment of 49,149
landmines in 39 minefields located at 32 anti-aircraft sites and six US Army
bases in the so-called “rear areas.” Seven of the 39 minefields
have been cleared.[23] However,
there is a growing concern about the danger of landmines because of a public
disclosure that more than 1,000 landmines have been lost since 1998, after being
washed out from the minefields or military bases due to heavy
rains.[24]
In a joint initiative, two South Korean civic organizations surveyed
minefields in 36 areas in South Korea and identified 13 as “highly
dangerous areas exposed to possible landmine explosion.” These are mostly
located on mountains or in villages near military bases.[25]
In April 2002, the ROK told Landmine Monitor that
“about 4,700 M14 AP mines” were removed from military sites in rear
areas in 2001.[26] Previously,
in December 2001, the ROK stated it had “cleared 4,532 landmines from the
periphery of military camps and bases of the rear area in 2001. These landmines
were buried to protect military camps and bases from a surprise attack by
special forces of North Korea in war situation. ROK will continue to clear
landmines for the sake of civilians safety from the periphery of some military
camps and bases of the rear area which were buried in the ground before
1997.”[27] In July 2001,
the Ministry of National Defense announced the completion of clearance of five
minefields in the rear area,[28]
and in April 2002, the ROK told Landmine Monitor two more minefields in the rear
had been cleared.[29]
Other mine clearance operations were conducted as part of the inter-Korean
transportation project, which South Korea and North Korea agreed during the
Second Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks in July 2000. The September 2000 First
Defense Ministerial Talks agreed that the ROK Armed Forces had the
responsibility to clear an area spreading 9.2 kilometers south of the DMZ and
north of the Imjin River.[30]
In 2001, 840 landmines were removed from the construction sites of the
Seoul-Shinuiju railway and Kaesong-Munsan
highway.[31] As of 20 November
2001, the ROK Armed Forces reported to have successfully cleared 850,000 square
meters of minefields in the transportation linkage sites south of the DMZ
without any accidents.[32]
South Korea stated that it would continue to clear mines in the transportation
corridor within the DMZ, only if North Korea signs the February 2001 agreement
governing the conduct of troops working in the
DMZ.[33]
The ROK government has not conducted any mine risk education campaigns for
civilians. According to the survey in the rear area made by KCBL, the residents
of 36 mine-affected districts have not received any mine risk education from the
military or the local government. KCBL conducted mine risk education in primary
schools near the DMZ using videos. In 2001, it reached 1,100 school
children.
In 2001, the ROK government contributed US$150,000 for mine clearance abroad:
US$30,000 to the International Trust Fund for Bosnia and Herzegovina and
US$120,000 to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund, earmarking US$70,000 for Cambodia and
US$50,000 for Laos.[34]
LANDMINE CASUALTIES
In 2001, four new casualties of landmine incidents
were reported. Three were civilians: a 40-year-old man stepped on an M14 mine
while at the beach with his family and suffered a leg injury; a 30-year-old man
injured his leg while working on the sand bank of Hantan
River;[35] and a 35-year-old man
was injured by an M16 mine as he rode on a small tractor in
Chulwon.[36] The fourth
casualty was a US Army soldier, who also suffered a leg
injury.[37]
Casualties continue to be reported in 2002. In April, at Kegok-ri in
Kyunggi-do, six people including a 5-year-old boy were injured by a mine in a
rice field.[38] And in a
separate incident in April in the DMZ, three Korean soldiers were injured by a
landmine while trying to recover the body of a man who had been killed in an
earlier mine explosion.[39] The
man, who has been living close to the DMZ for 30 years, apparently entered a
prohibited military area to pick herbs.
Although there is no reliable data, the Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines
estimates that since the end of the war, there have been more than 1,000
civilian mine casualties, and 2,000-3,000 military mine casualties in South
Korea.[40]
SURVIVOR ASSISTANCE
While the government states that it pays
compensation to civilian casualties of landmines through the State Compensation
Act, it seems very few survivors are actually receiving any government benefits.
On 27 October 2001, Landmine Monitor researchers from the Asia-Pacific region
visited a Korean village in the vicinity of Yoncheon, near the DMZ, and met with
five landmine survivors; all stated that they did not get any government
benefits.
The KCBL claims that the national compensation law has several limitations,
such as a three-year statute of limitation, a low ceiling on the maximum amount
of compensation, and burden of proof on claimants, which discourages mine
survivors’ legitimate requests. The KCBL intends to sue the Korean and US
governments and ask for compensation for the survivors who could not request it
due to the three-year statute of limitation.
In June 2001, the Special Compensation Board of the National Defense Ministry
denied the claim of two civilian survivors on the basis that they were injured
by “unknown landmines which Korean Army has not
used.”[41] The claimants
were injured by landmines on 11 September and 2 October 2000 at Kangwhado
Island. The ROK government has reported to Landmine Monitor that two civilian
mine survivors filed compensation claims with the government in 2001, and that
one was granted and one
denied.[42]
KCBL provided financial support to 20 landmine survivors from March to
December 2001. The survivors received 100,000 Won (around US$80) per month for
ten months.
[1] On 26 April 2001, the National Assembly
passed Public Law 6476 implementing Amended Protocol II.
[2] Notes taken by Landmine Monitor
(HRW), 27 October 2001. [3] Notes taken
by Landmine Monitor (HRW), 30 October
2001. [4] CISJD, “Campaign to Ban
Landmines: the Task and Reality,” Minjung-sha, 1998, p. 71.
[5] The figures for 1998 and 2000 are
from: Response of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, to KCBL and ICBL,
Seoul, 11 April 2002. The figure for 1999 is from Response of ROK Mission to
the UN (NY), to Landmine Monitor, 21 March
2000. [6] Response of Lt. Col Su-yong
Song, Deputy Manager of Armaments Control Department, Ministry of National
Defense, to KCBL, Seoul, 14 May
2002. [7] Jane’s Mines & Mine
Clearance, 2000-2001, pp. 483-484. [8]
Response from the Information Desk of Hanwha Corporation to Landmine Monitor
questionnaire, 28 February 2000. [9]
Statement by Ambassador Chung Eui-yong, Permanent Representative of the Republic
of Korea to the UN to the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended
Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, Geneva, 10 December
2001. [10] The sales efforts were
abandoned. See Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp. 453-454 for more
details. [11] Human Rights Watch press
release, “Landmines: Almost Half of Korea Mines in U.S.,” 3 December
2001. Information provided to Human Rights Watch by the US Army, dated 20
September 2001. [12] The US sold 31,572
ADAM mines to South Korea during
1986-88. [13] Caleb Rossiter, Winning in
Korea Without Landmines (Washington, DC: VVAF Monograph Series, 2000), p.
34. [14] Article 13 Report, submitted 5
December 2001, p. 6. [15] Response from
Lt. Col Su-yong Song, Ministry of National Defense, to KCBL, 14 May 2002.
[16] See Landmine Monitor Report 1999,
p. 333. [17] Letter from Headquarters,
US Army Material Command, to Human Rights Watch, 20 September 2001. Of the
mines stored in the ROK, 534,300 are M14s. Of those in the US, 348,100 are
M16s. [18] Saegae Ilbo, 25 August 2000;
Jeon Ick-Jin, “Rail Trip Offers View of North,” Joongang Ilbo (South
Korean daily newspaper), 24 January 2002. The Civilian Control Zone is also
known as the “Military Control Zone.” See Landmine Monitor Report
2001, p. 545, for further information about the CCZ. Nearly all the
antipersonnel mines planted in these areas are US M16 or US M14 mines. Other US
landmines used in Korea include M2, M3, and M26 mines. Jane’s Mines &
Mine Clearance, 2000-2001 (Alexandria, VA: Jane’s Information Group), p.
661. [19] Written response from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, to KCBL and ICBL, 11 April
2002. [20] US Department of State,
“To Walk the Earth in Safety,” Appendix F, November 2001, p.
A-52. [21] Kang Seok-Jae, “Air
Force Removing Landmines at Air Defense Units,” Korea Herald, 2 April
2001. [22] Response of Ministry of
National Defense to Lawmaker Sung-ho Kim, National Congress, Seoul, 10 October
2000. [23] ROK government response to
Landmine Monitor, 24 April 2002. [24]
“1,000 Land Mines Unaccounted For,” Korea Times, 17 September
2001. [25] Park Min-sun, “Civic
Group Highlights Land Mine Danger in World Cup Cities,” Digital Chosun, 26
July 2001; Soh Ji-young, “Civil Group to Investigate Landmines Near US
Bases,” Korea Times, 6 August 2001. The survey was conducted by the Korea
Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Japanese Campaign to Ban
Landmines. [26] ROK government response
to Landmine Monitor, 24 April 2002. [27]
Article 13 Report, Amended Protocol II, CCW, 5 December 2001, p.
5. [28] Joongang Ilbo (South Korean
daily newspaper), Seoul, 26 July 2001. The five minefields were Mt. Joong-ri,
and Haeundae in Pusan, Keumo-ri in Hadong, Mt. Geomdan, and Kwangjoo in
Kyongi-do. Also response of the ROK government, 24 April 2002.
[29] ROK government response to
Landmine Monitor, 24 April 2002. [30]
Article 13 Report, 5 December 2001, p.
5. [31] Ibid.; Response of ROK
government, 24 April 2002. [32] Article
13 Report, 5 December 2001, pp.
10-11. [33] Ibid., p.
11. [34] Response of ROK government to
Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 24 April
2002. [35] KCBL database on mine
casualties. [36] ROK government response
to Landmine Monitor, 24 April 2002. [37]
See Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p.
548. [38] KCBL database on mine
casualties. [39] “Three South
Korean soldiers hurt in search near DMZ,” Reuters, Seoul, 25 April
2002. [40] See Landmine Monitor Report
1999, p. 480. [41] Joongang Ilbo, 28
June 2001. KCBL recognizes that the incident may have been caused by North
Korean mines shifted by flooding on Kangwhado Island.
[42] ROK government response to
Landmine Monitor, 24 April 2002.