Key
developments since May 2001: Although the United Nations records that
Tajikistan acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 12 October 1999, it is not clear
that Tajikistan considers itself a State Party formally bound by the treaty.
Russia has reconfirmed that it has laid antipersonnel mines inside Tajikistan,
reportedly with the consent of the Tajik government. Following the completion
in July 2001 of a needs assessment, the Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan has
initiated a mine risk education program with the help of the ICRC. Uzbek-laid
antipersonnel mines continued to kill and injure civilians and livestock in
Tajikistan in 2001.
MINE BAN POLICY
Tajikistan acceded to
the Mine Ban Treaty on 12 October
1999.[1] The treaty entered
into force for Tajikistan on 1 April 2000. However, there seems to be some
question about whether Tajikistan considers itself to be formally bound by the
Mine Ban Treaty.
In a January 2002 response to a questionnaire on landmines from the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Tajikistan said that
President Rakhmanov “signed a decree on Tajikistan’s accession to
the Ottawa Convention” on 22 September 1999. But Tajikistan seemed to
suggest that its parliament had not yet ratified the convention. The
questionnaire asks: “If the Convention was signed, but not ratified, what
phase is the process of formal ratification in?” Tajikistan answered that
“the given act must be ratified by the country’s parliament, about
which the depository of the Convention—the Secretary-General of the United
Nations—was informed at the time. Consultations in Parliament are now
occurring regarding this
issue.”[2]
The Head of the Treaty Law Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Tajikistan claimed in June 2001 that Tajikistan had merely given notification of
its intention to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty and had not deposited its instrument
of ratification.[3] The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed to have informed the United Nations Treaty
Section in New York of the alleged
error.[4] Subsequently, at a
July 2001 roundtable of government ministries organized by the United Nations
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in Dushanbe, the Head of the Treaty Law
Department informed participants that the Tajik parliament was concerned about
the impact of the Mine Ban Treaty on mine use along the border with
Afghanistan.[5]
A neighboring government has expressed its belief that Tajikistan has
withdrawn from the Mine Ban Treaty. Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of
Foreign Affairs has stated, “Tajikistan withdrew its participation from
the Ottawa Convention because it couldn’t fulfill its conditions and also
because of the presence of threats to national
security.”[6]
Previously, at the January 2000 summit of the CIS states, the Tajik
government reportedly indicated a possible review of its decision to join the
treaty, based on an evaluation of the consequences of clearing minefields from
the Tajik-Afghan border.[7] At
the April 2000 CIS summit in Moscow, the Tajik Minister of Defense and Tajik
President Emomali Rakhmonov apparently again expressed doubts about the Mine Ban
Treaty. In May 2000, a Russian official said that Tajikistan had communicated
these same views regarding the Mine Ban Treaty in correspondence with the
Russian Foreign Ministry.[8]
Tajikistan is not known to have enacted any domestic legislative
implementation measures for the Mine Ban Treaty, as required by Article 9.
Tajikistan has not submitted its transparency reports to the United Nations, as
required by Article 7. Its initial Article 7 Report was due by 28 September
2000, and annual updated reports were due 30 April 2001 and 30 April 2002.
Tajikistan has not participated in any of the three annual meetings of States
Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty. It has not attended any of the intersessional
Standing Committee meetings, nor any of the other international and regional
diplomatic landmine meetings in 2000 and 2001.
Tajikistan was absent during the November 2001 vote on UN General Assembly
Resolution 56/24M calling for universalization and full implementation of the
Mine Ban Treaty, but had previously co-sponsored the draft resolution.
On the same day it acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty, 12 October 1999,
Tajikistan acceded to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its
original and Amended Protocol II on landmines. In June 2001, the Head of the
Treaty Law Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Tajikistan
had adhered to both protocols after a law on ratification had been duly passed
by the Tajik Parliament in accordance with internal
procedures.[9]
PRODUCTION, TRANSFER, AND STOCKPILING
Tajikistan is not
believed to have produced or exported antipersonnel mines. It appears that
Tajikistan has stockpiles of antipersonnel mines that the former Soviet Union
stored in the republic. It is not known to be taking any steps toward
destruction of those stocks. The Mine Ban Treaty mandated deadline for
Tajikistan to complete its stockpile destruction is 1 April 2004.
Based on the use of antipersonnel mines by Russian border guards and
peacekeeping forces, it would appear that Russia maintains a stockpile of
antipersonnel mines inside Tajikistan.
USE
Landmine Monitor has not received reports of use
of antipersonnel mines by Tajik forces in recent years. However, as reported in
Landmine Monitor Report 2001, Russian forces have used antipersonnel
mines inside Tajikistan, as have Uzbek forces.
Russia
In August 2001, Russia again acknowledged that its
troops stationed along the Tajik border with Afghanistan have emplaced
antipersonnel mines inside
Tajikistan.[10] A Foreign
Ministry letter to Landmine Monitor indicated that mines had been laid during
the Landmine Monitor reporting period, since May 2000. In December 2001, a
senior official in the Russian Federal Border Service confirmed to Landmine
Monitor that Russian troops had laid antipersonnel mines inside Tajikistan. He
said that the mine-laying operations had been carried out with the full
knowledge and consent of the Tajik government, and in accordance with a military
cooperation agreement signed in 1993. After Landmine Monitor pointed out that
this could constitute a violation of the Mine Ban Treaty by Tajikistan, he said
that the mines were laid prior to October 1999 when Tajikistan acceded to the
Mine Ban Treaty.[11]
It was first reported in October 2000 that Russian border guards were
deploying antipersonnel landmines on the Tajik side of the Pyandge River to
protect the Tajik-Afghan border from invasion by the
Taliban.[12] When asked about
this, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledged use of antipersonnel
mines in Tajikistan, in order to stop real and potential “terrorist
attacks” and to block illegal drug
trafficking.[13]
In addition to use by Russian border guards on the Afghan border, Russian
peacekeeping forces have also used antipersonnel mines to protect their posts
and for other purposes. A November 2000 report stated that “the
peacekeeping forces of Russia in Tajikistan employ mine weaponry in accordance
with the provisions of international law, and primarily for the protection of
border outposts.”[14]
In August 2001, Russia described its mine use in Tajikistan and Chechnya to
Landmine Monitor: “Mine barriers have been laid to blockade specific base
areas used by [rebel] units and to close movement routes and convoy paths across
the state border, using fragmentation-action antipersonnel mines with
self-destruction mechanisms and control options that comply with requirements in
[Amended Protocol II].... Mines are emplaced primarily on sectors of the border
where difficult physical and geographical conditions do not permit other forces
or methods to be employed effectively, where there are virtually no local
inhabitants and to protect and guard positions and places where border divisions
are stationed.”[15]
As a party to the Mine Ban Treaty, Tajikistan is obliged under Article 9 to
“to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under
this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or
control.” In addition, Article 1 of the Mine Ban Treaty states that a
State Party may not “assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to
engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party.”
Despite requests for clarification of its position from Landmine Monitor,
Tajikistan has made no public statements about Russian mine use. It would
appear, at the least, that Tajikistan has acquiesced to use of antipersonnel
mines by the Russian Federation inside Tajikistan. In contrast, Tajikistan has
protested the use of antipersonnel mines by Uzbekistan, allegedly inside Tajik
territory.
Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan began to mine border areas with
Tajikistan in 2000 and continued mining until at least June
2001.[16] While there have been
no confirmed instances of landmine use by Uzbekistan since June 2001, a media
report in March 2002 included a claim “by a government source” that
Uzbekistan would “continue mining its
borders.”[17] Uzbekistan
has previously justified the use of antipersonnel mines along its borders as a
defense against the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and to prevent drug
traffickers and weapons traders from entering Uzbek
territory.[18]
Uzbekistan’s borders with Tajikistan remain in dispute; consequently,
the location of the landmines is also contested. Tajikistan claims that Uzbek
antipersonnel mines have been laid up to 500 meters inside Tajik
territory.[19]
LANDMINE/UXO PROBLEM
Tajikistan’s landmine problem stems
primarily from Uzbek-laid minefields along border areas, and mines and
unexploded ordnance (UXO) left over from the Tajik civil war. There have also
been past allegations of limited use of mines by criminals and other armed
elements.[20]
According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the more
recently laid minefields around the Uzbek-Tajik border are of greater concern as
they pose a direct threat to people living in the area, where land is used for
grazing livestock, hunting, and collecting wood, and to people traveling through
on their way to visit relatives on the other side of the
border.[21] Minefields laid
during the civil war are located in less populated areas, primarily in mountain
passes.
Border Areas With Uzbekistan
A local media report claimed in May 2001 that 70
percent of the Tajik-Uzbek border was mined, with mines laid along, and possibly
within, the following Tajik districts: Isfarinskii, Kanibadamskii, Zafarabadski,
Ashtski, Pendzhikentski, Shakhristanski, and
Nauski.[22] A mission carried
out by the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) found
that the more mountainous regions in southern areas of the border in the
Tursanzade district are particularly contaminated; this includes the villages of
Shulum, Noabad, Chuzhaley, and
Samarkhand.[23] The US State
Department and the GICHD report that some Uzbek mines were laid on Tajik
territory.[24]
Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Defense claims that all minefields are marked
clearly and that it has informed the Tajik government of their
location.[25] However, the
GICHD mission concluded that Uzbekistan has so far only sporadically marked
minefields laid by its armed
forces.[26] The US State
Department has reported that Uzbek mine-laying along the border with Tajikistan
“included some populated areas and is not demarcated clearly in most
places.”[27] The mother
of an Uzbek mine casualty told a journalist in July 2001: “The small
boards with the word ‘mines’ cannot be seen—they are hidden
with grass.”[28]
Tajikistan, too, has not systematically marked mine-affected border areas
with Uzbekistan. The GICHD writes that “thereis a generalized
reluctance on the part of all actors in Tajikistan to mark affected areas, on
the basis that it is the responsibility of Uzbekistan to mark the minefields it
lays.”[29]
Shepherds and people engaged in hunting, collecting wood, and traveling to
visit relatives on the Uzbek side of the border are most at
risk.[30] Adult males usually
carry out these activities, although women collect firewood as well.
Cross-border travel is a particularly complex problem. Uzbek restrictions on
travel between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan create an incentive for crossing the
border illegally, increasing the danger from antipersonnel mines. In addition,
Uzbekistan has closed some major border checkpoints. A senior Tajik border
official said that the closure of the Panjakent-Samarkand highway in 2001 was a
reason for an increase in the number of mine
casualties.[31] The GICHD
stressed the need for better mine risk education efforts, especially in border
communities, to avoid this risky
behavior.[32]
The GICHD reports that Uzbekistan has laid OZM-72 bounding fragmentation
mines along its border with Tajikistan, and that there are reports of Uzbek-laid
POMZ fragmentation mines and PMN blast mines as
well.[33] Italian mines
produced in 1948 were reportedly found in a minefield in the Shakristan
district.[34]
Civil War
Tajikistan is still affected by mines and UXO
resulting from the 1992-1997 civil war. The major areas affected by landmines
are the central Tavildara region, the Garm Valley, Khalaikhum, and the border
with Afghanistan.[35]
The minefields laid during the civil war are situated in less
populated areas in central Tajikistan, predominantly mountain passes, and do not
pose as significant a threat to the civilian population as those on the border
with Uzbekistan.[36] However,
the US State Department reports that landmine explosions in some unmarked
minefields in the Karetegin Valley killed civilians during
2001.[37] The ICRC has
initiated data collection in this area, using a form from
Azerbaijan.[38]
MINE ACTION COORDINATION
There is as yet no
national mine action center in Tajikistan, and no clear division among
ministries of mine action tasks. The GICHD reported in mid-2001, “There
is a general need to consolidate all mine action data in Tajikistan in an
electronic database that will be open to all concerned ministries and
organizations.”[39] The
GIHCD suggested that the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) or the
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) facilitate the establishment and
maintenance of such a
database.[40]
UNDP subsequently reported in July 2002 that it has been working closely with
Tajikistan to establish a “mine action cell” and “develop a
framework for a comprehensive program that will include setting up information
management systems and supporting mine awareness activities as priority
tasks.”[41]
MINE CLEARANCE
Limited mine clearance has taken place on both the
Uzbek and Afghan borders. Tajik border guards have conducted demining in Uzbek
border areas near or in the Nauski region of Tajikistan; they reportedly have
some mine clearance expertise, but are not equipped with metal
detectors.[42] The head of the
border guard committee, Anoyatbek Sulaimonbekov, believes that landmines are no
longer necessary. He said, “The threat of infiltration by Afghan
terrorists into Tajikistan and Uzbekistan has almost been
eliminated.”[43]
There have been occasional reports of ad hoc mine clearance on the
Afghan border of mines laid by elements hostile to the Russian presence on the
border. For example, on 28 February and 1 March 2002, Russian border guards
reportedly defused two mines. One was an antipersonnel fragmentation mine,
discovered two meters away from a Russian border guard facility. The next day,
an officer found a PFM-1 antipersonnel mine by the entrance to the headquarters
of a Russian border guard educational
center.[44]
There is no indication that demining of Russian-laid mines on the
Tajik-Afghan border has occurred.
MINE RISK EDUCATION
The ICRC/Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan
(ICRC/RCST) has initiated mine risk education in Tajikistan. Following a July
2001 needs assessment by the ICRC, RCST, and the Ministry of Emergency
Situations and Civil Defense (MESCD), a mine/UXO risk education strategy was
developed. It will be implemented by the RCST volunteer network with help from
the MESCD and border guards. The program was developed with a
“community-based approach” in mind. During initial stages of the
program, ideas were collected from the community to determine how activities
should be carried out and how materials should be used.
The ICRC and the RCST identified the following target groups for mine risk
education: affected communities living with the danger of mines (group at
greatest risk); people traveling through mined areas; the border guards (group
at risk and channel of information); the MESCD (responsible for mine action and
channel of information); local administrations, or hukhomats (channel of
information); and, the local media (channel of
information).[45]
The ICRC/RCST then developed, field-tested, produced, and distributed
teaching aids. Two posters (one version for adults, another for children)
were developed for the program with community input, then the RCST printed and
distributed 1,000 copies of each poster. Jamoat village authorities, schools,
border guards, and local MESCD representatives served as the main
distributors.[46]
The MESCD appointed a coordination officer to serve as the
focal point for data collection and mine/UXO risk
education.[47] Border guards,
who carry out mine awareness activities where accidents occur, have reportedly
requested the provision of materials and activities to continue informing people
of the mine threat. According to the ICRC, border guards “are aware that
they have a key role to play in marking mined
areas.”[48]
Following the assessment mission conducted on its behalf by the GICHD in the
summer of 2001, UNICEF was expected to start mine risk education activities in
Central Asia in January 2002. But as of July 2002, there were no reports of
UNICEF mine risk education activity in the region.
LANDMINE/UXO CASUALTIES
Uzbek-laid antipersonnel mines continued to kill
and injure civilians and livestock in Tajikistan in 2001. However, there is no
reliable information on the precise number of casualties as there is no national
mechanism for collecting data on landmine incidents. Information on mine
incidents is collected by various ministries, and by the Red Crescent Society of
Tajikistan; however, overall responsibility for data collection lies with the
Ministry of Emergency Situations and Civil
Defense.[49]
In 2001, at least 15 people were killed and another 14 injured in reported
landmine incidents in Tajikistan near the Tajik-Uzbek
border.[50] The majority of
landmine casualties are believed to be civilians who were killed or injured
while tending livestock, farming, hunting, collecting firewood, or trying to
cross the border to trade. The ICRC collected information on around 40
mine-related incidents in 2001; no details were available on the number of
people killed or injured.[51]
Other media reports suggest that as many as 50 Tajik citizens have been killed
as a result of Uzbek-laid
mines.[52]
Between January and April 2002, at least two people were killed and three
injured in reported landmine
incidents.[53] However, the
ICRC reports at least 15 incidents from January to July 2002. In the last six
months of 2000, it was reported that 19 people had been killed in 26 mine
incidents involving civilians; the number of people injured in these incidents
was not reported.[54]
There have been no reported mine casualties along Tajikistan’s border
with Afghanistan.
SURVIVOR ASSISTANCE
Tajikistan has historically been one of the
poorest republics in Central Asia. The health care system has few resources,
with run-down facilities, equipment in poor condition, and medicine and
materials in short supply. The ICRC provided five health-care facilities with
medicines and supplies. In 2001, these hospitals treated 35 mine
survivors.[55]
The Ministry of Health in the northern province of Sughd Oblast has trained
local communities in first aid management for mine injuries, and has provided
first aid kits to rural medical facilities. Transport to medical facilities is
reportedly available to mine casualties if they lack the appropriate transport.
The facilities and skills to treat mine casualties in Tajikistan, including in
surgical amputation, are also reported to be adequate. Health care is free of
charge, but patients are sometimes asked to pay for drugs and medicine, as there
is a chronic shortage of such
products.[56]
The Dushanbe Orthopedic Center, run jointly by the ICRC and the Ministry of
Labor and Social Protection (MLSP), under the management of the Canadian Red
Cross, is the only center producing prostheses for an estimated 3,000 amputees
in Tajikistan. In 2001, the center provided physical rehabilitation services
and fitted 444 lower limb prostheses, 53 of which were for mine survivors. The
RCST and MLSP organized four regional orthopedic seminars and two technicians
completed a one-year training course in the repair of polypropylene prostheses.
There are also orthopedic satellite centers in Khojent (in the north), Kuliab
(in the center), and Khorog (in the south) run by the Ministry of Labor and
Social Protection.[57] The
ICRC plans to assess the capacity of these centers to perform minor repairs to
prostheses. The RCST communicates with those who need prostheses, informs
patients of the availability of artificial limb-fitting, and pays for round-trip
travel to the Center. As of May 2002, all landmine survivors registered with
the Center needing prostheses have either been fitted or soon will
be.[58]
Mine survivors are eligible for a disability pension, as are other people
with disabilities who are unable to work. There are three different levels of
pensions, depending on the extent and nature of the
disability.[59]
[1] According to the treaty section of the
United Nations, Tajikistan notified the depositary of its consent to be bound on
12 October 1999.
http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf. [2]
Response to OSCE Questionnaire, Permanent Mission of Tajikistan to the OSCE,
Vienna, 23 January 2002. In Russian, translated by Landmine
Monitor. [3] “Mine Awareness and
Advocacy Mission to Central Asia, A Report for UNICEF,” Geneva
International Centre For Humanitarian Demining, 12 September 2001, p.
26. [4]
Ibid. [5] Ibid., p.
27. [6] “Position of the Kyrgyz
Republic on the question of joining the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Use, Stockpiling, Production And Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their
Destruction,” letter to the ICBL from the Division of UN Affairs,
Department of International Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz
Republic, undated, received 29 June 2001. Unofficial translation by Landmine
Monitor. [7] Interview with Andrei
Malov, Senior Counselor, Department of International Security, Disarmament and
Arms Control, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 May
2000. [8]
Ibid. [9] “Mine Awareness and
Advocacy Mission to Central Asia, A Report for UNICEF,” Geneva
International Centre For Humanitarian Demining, 12 September 2001, p. 26.
However, in its OSCE response, indicated it had not signed or ratified CCW
Protocol II. Response to OSCE Questionnaire, Permanent Mission of Tajikistan to
the OSCE, Vienna, 23 January 2002. [10]
Response to Landmine Monitor by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian
Federation, sent by fax to Landmine Monitor Coordinator by Vassily V. Boriak,
Counsellor, Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United States, 16 August
2001. Original in Russian, translated by Global Communications, LLC,
Washington, DC. It states, “From May 2000 to date the Russian Federation
has employed anti-personnel mines (hereinafter ‘APMs’) in the
Chechen Republic and on the Tajik-Afghan border but APMs have not been emplaced
in Abkhazia (Georgia).” The response arrived after Landmine Monitor
Report 2001 went to print, and thus could not be included in the
report. [11] Meeting with Col. Mikhail
Zenkin, Federal Border Service, and Vladimir Kurikov, Counsellor, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation, at the Second Review Conference of the
Convention on Conventional Weapons, Geneva, 13 December 2001. Notes by Stephen
Goose, Landmine Monitor/Human Rights
Watch. [12] Yuri Golotyuk, “Russia
is just a river-far from new war,” Vremya Novostey online (News-Time
online), № 137, 2 October 2000; Patrick E. Tyler, “Russia Hardens
Its Positions along a Tajikistan Border,” New York Times, 3 October
2000. [13] Andrei Malov, Counselor of
the Department for Security Arms Control and Disarmament of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, presentation to IPPNW-Russia, 19
January 2001. [14] Georgiy Mekhov,
“How to Solve the Mine Problem: Russia Supports the Aspiration of the
World Community to Ban Anti-Personnel Mines, But is not Ready for it,”
Moscow Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, November
2000. [15] Response to Landmine Monitor
by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation, sent by fax to Landmine
Monitor Coordinator by Vassily V. Boriak, Counsellor, Embassy of the Russian
Federation to the United States, 16 August 2001. Original in Russian,
translated by Global Communications, LLC, Washington,
DC. [16] Landmine Monitor Report 2001,
p. 809. See also the report on Uzbekistan in this edition of Landmine
Monitor. [17] Malik Mansur,
“Uzbekistan: Calls for End to Mine Policy Rejected,” Institute For
War and Peace Reporting, Tashkent, 22 March 2002, accessed
at: www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/rca/rca_200203_109_5_eng.txt on 1 July
2002. [18] Landmine Monitor Report 2001,
p. 816. [19] “Mine Awareness and
Advocacy Mission to Central Asia, A Report for UNICEF,” Geneva
International Centre For Humanitarian Demining, 12 September 2001, p. 17.
[20] For example, on 18 June 2000, two
“anti-infantry” mines were discovered and neutralized on a railway
bridge near the Dushanbe textile factory. The Tajik interior ministry said
criminal elements were responsible. The next day, a mine blew up near the
entrance of an apartment building. There were no casualties. A mine was also
reportedly discovered in the doorway of the neighboring building. “Two
anti-infantry mines have been discovered on the railway bridge in
Dushanbe” and “A mine has been blown up in a block of flats
doorway,” AP Blitz, News In Brief #114, Dushanbe, 19 June 2000, accessed
at: www.internews.ru/ASIA-PLUS/blitz/527.html on 1 July
2002. [21] International Committee of
the Red Cross, “Mine/UXO risk education in Tajikistan,” May 2002,
available at: www.icrc.org. [22]
Viktoriya Panfilova, “Mine War Continues,” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, No.
186, 5 October 2001. [23] “Mine
Awareness and Advocacy Mission to Central Asia, A Report for UNICEF,”
Geneva International Centre For Humanitarian Demining, 12 September 2001, p.
19. [24] US Department of State,
“Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—Tajikistan,” March
2002, available at: www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/eur/8353.htm;
“Mine Awareness and Advocacy Mission to Central Asia, A Report for
UNICEF,” Geneva International Centre For Humanitarian Demining, 12
September 2001, p. 18. [25] US
Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices—Tajikistan,” March
2002. [26] “Mine Awareness and
Advocacy Mission to Central Asia, A Report for UNICEF,” Geneva
International Centre For Humanitarian Demining, 12 September 2001, p.
20. [27] US Department of State,
“Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—Tajikistan,” March
2002. [28] Bukharbaeva, Galima,
“Uzbek Mines Killing Their Own,” Institute For War And Peace
Reporting, Tashkent, 19 July 2001, accessed at:
www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/rca/rca_200107_61_1_eng.txt on 1 July
2002. [29] “Mine Awareness and
Advocacy Mission to Central Asia, A Report for UNICEF,” Geneva
International Centre For Humanitarian Demining, 12 September 2001, p.
20. [30] International Committee of the
Red Cross, “Mine/UXO risk education in Tajikistan,” May 2002,
available at: www.icrc.org. [31]
“Closure of major checkpoint on Tajik-Uzbek border creates new
problems,” Asia Plus, Dushanbe, 30 October 2001, accessed at:
www.eurasianet.org/resource/uzbekistan/hypermail/200110/0060.html. [32]
“Mine Awareness and Advocacy Mission to Central Asia, A Report for
UNICEF,” Geneva International Centre For Humanitarian Demining, 12
September 2001, pp. 19, 28. [33] Ibid.,
pp. 17-18. [34] ICRC, “Mine/UXO
risk education in Tajikistan,” May
2002. [35] Landmine Monitor Report 2001,
p. 810. [36] ICRC, “Mine/UXO risk
education in Tajikistan,” May
2002. [37] US Department of State,
“Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—Tajikistan,” March
2002. [38] ICRC, “Mine/UXO risk
education in Tajikistan,” May
2002. [39] “Mine Awareness and
Advocacy Mission to Central Asia, A Report for UNICEF,” Geneva
International Centre For Humanitarian Demining, 12 September 2001, p.
22. [40]
Ibid. [41] UNDP, “Mine Action For
Resettlement and Reintegration. Post-Crisis Recovery and the Obstacle of
Landmines,” accessed at:
www.undp.org/erd/archives/brochures/mine_action/reintegration.htm on 2 July
2002. [42] Nezavisimaia Gazeta, No. 186,
5 October 2001. [43] “Dushanbe
advocates neutralization of landmines on Tajik-Uzbek border,” Interfax
(Tashkent), 8 January 2002. [44]
“2 Mines Defused on Tajik-Afghan Border,” RIA Novosti, 1 March
2002. [45] ICRC, “Mine/UXO risk
education in Tajikistan,” May
2002. [46]
Ibid. [47]
Ibid. [48]
Ibid. [49]
Ibid. [50] Landmine Monitor analysis of
10 media reports between January and December
2001. [51] “Tajikistan: Mine
awareness still needed,” IRIN UNOCHA, 15 July 2002, accessed at
www.irinnews.org. [52] In October
2001, RIA Novosti reported that according to the Tajik government press center,
Uzbek mines have killed more than 50 people and injured about 50 other since
September 2000. NG, a Russian journal, reported in October 2001 that 48 people
had been killed and 14 injured by Uzbek mines in 2001. In March 2002, IWPR
reported that Dushanbe estimates the number of Tajik fatalities at 40 and the
number of injured at 42. In April 2002, the Varoud news agency reported that 53
Tajik civilians have been killed and dozens injured by Uzbek mines. It is not
clear, however, whether that figure refers to just Tajik casualties or both
Tajik and Uzbek casualties. [53]
Landmine Monitor analysis of 3 media reports between January and 10 April
2002. [54] For more details see Landmine
Monitor Report 2001, pp. 811-812. [55]
“ICRC Special Report, Mine Action 2001,” ICRC, Geneva, July 2002, p.
26. [56] “Mine Awareness and
Advocacy Mission to Central Asia, A Report for UNICEF,” Geneva
International Centre For Humanitarian Demining, 12 September 2001, pp.
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