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Table of Contents
Country Reports
Russian Federation, Landmine Monitor Report 2004

Russian Federation

Key developments since May 2003: Russian forces continued to use antipersonnel mines in Chechnya. The rebels who seized the school in Beslan, North Ossetia with disastrous consequences emplaced both antipersonnel mines and improvised explosive devices throughout the school. Landmine Monitor was told that Russia destroyed 1.85 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines in 2003.

Key developments since 1999: Russia has used antipersonnel mines in Chechnya, Dagestan, Tajikistan, and on the Russia-Georgia border since 1999. CCW Amended Protocol II was submitted to the State Duma for ratification in May 2000, but has not been approved. Still, Russia maintains it is complying with letter of the law. Russia stated that it stopped production of blast mines in 1997. Russia’s five-year moratorium on transfer of non-detectable and non-self-destructing mines expired in 2002, but officials have stated that it is still being observed. In 2003, Russia surprisingly reported that it had destroyed more than 16.8 million antipersonnel mines from 1996 through 2002. New information in 2004 indicates Russia’s antipersonnel mine stockpile may number 22-25 million, rather than the previously estimated 50 million. Russia has been increasingly involved in international demining operations.

Mine Ban Policy

Russia has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Its long-held reservations to joining the treaty include its perception of the utility of antipersonnel mines and of the lack of viable alternatives, and its potential inability to meet the financial commitment to destroy the country’s considerable stockpile of antipersonnel mines within four years, as required by the treaty.[1]

On several occasions, Russia has stated its strong preference for dealing with controls on antipersonnel mines through the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and the Conference on Disarmament (CD), rather than the Mine Ban Treaty.[2] In November 2003, Ambassador A. Antonov stated that while “Russia fully shares the concern of the world community” over the use of certain inhumane weapons, Russia believes in “the balance of humanitarian, military and financial interests initially built into the CCW.”[3]

Russia has on endorsed the goal of the eventual elimination of antipersonnel mines. In 1997, then-President Boris Yeltsin stated his support for Russia to sign the Mine Ban Treaty.[4] In March 1998, representatives spoke of Russia’s “positive approach” to the treaty and its willingness to accede “in the foreseeable future.”[5] President Vladimir Putin issued a press release in 1999 in which he spoke of a policy “aimed at the banning of landmines.”[6] In a November 2003 statement at the Fifth Conference of States Parties to the Amended Protocol II to the CCW, the head of the Russian delegation said that “the world without mines remains to be our goal. However, as we repeatedly pointed out, the movement to that noble goal should be realistic, we should proceed stage-by-stage while ensuring the necessary level of stability.”[7]

Russia participated in the Ottawa Process as an observer, and unlike other major powers China and the United States, Russia has since participated in every intersessional Standing Committee meeting since 2000 and every annual meeting of States Parties, except one (September 2000). It has, however, abstained on each annual United Nations General Assembly vote supporting a global ban on landmines and the Mine Ban Treaty since 1996. Regionally, a large Russian government delegation attended a seminar hosted by the International Committee of the Red Cross in Moscow on landmines and explosives remnants of war in November 2002, and a landmines conference held in Moscow by ICBL and IPPNW-Russia in May 1998. It also sent representatives to regional landmines meetings held in Georgia in December 1999.

Russia is a State party of the CCW and its original Protocol II. In May 2000, Amended Protocol II was submitted to the State Duma for ratification.[8] In March 2001, the ratification package was withdrawn for review, and there has been no further progress since then.[9] However, Russia insists that it is complying with the letter of the protocol, even if not legally bound.[10] Thus on 27 November 2003, Ambassador Antonov stated that ratification was “a matter of the nearest future,” and that “the Russian Federation fully complies with the provisions of the Amended Protocol II.”[11] On 30 September 2004, the State Duma’s Defense Committee recommended that the Duma ratify Amended Protocol II.[12]

In April 2001, the Federal Working Group for Mine Action was formed under the direction of the Chief of the Russian Federal Agency of Munitions, Zinoviy Pak. The organization includes as members representatives from both governmental and non-governmental organizations, and works for progress toward mine action and deeper integration of Russia into the Mine Ban Treaty process.

Production

The Soviet Union was one of the world’s largest producers of landmines. There were over 20 landmine production or assembly enterprises in the Soviet Union, but some 90 percent of engineer ammunition and armament production facilities were outside of Russia in other Soviet republics.[13] Between 1995 and 2000, however, a landmine production capacity was created within Russia.[14]

Russia has reportedly produced at least ten types of antipersonnel mines since 1992, including blast mines (PMN, PMN-2, PMN-4 and PFM-1S) and fragmentation mines (OZM-72, MON-50, MON-90, MON-100, MON-200, and POMZ-2).[15] In May 1998, however, representatives of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that the Russian Federation had stopped producing blast landmines,[16] a report that was later confirmed by the Russian military.[17] In December 2000, it was announced that Russia was decommissioning production facilities for blast landmines,[18] and a year later Russia stated that it had not manufactured blast mines in four years.[19] On November 2002, it was stated for the first time that Russian troops had not been provided with PFM-1, PMN, PMN-2, or PMN-4 type mines in the previous eight years.[20]

The Russian Federation has been researching alternatives to landmines since at least 1997, working to create new landmines and to modernize old ones.[21] Development and production of alternatives acceptable under the Mine Ban Treaty was projected in 2000 to cost 3.2 billion rubles.[22]

Transfer

The Soviet Union was one of the world’s largest exporters of antipersonnel mines. To date, a total of approximately 1.06 million antipersonnel mines of Soviet or Russian origin have been declared in the stockpiles of 20 States Parties of the Mine Ban Treaty.[23] Antipersonnel mines of Soviet origin are found emplaced in at least 28 mine-affected countries.[24] The PMN-type mines (known as the Black Widow) are, along with the Chinese Type 72, the most widely found mine in the world. The PFM-type mine (known as the Butterfly or Green Parrot) was used in huge quantities by the USSR in Afghanistan and volatile PFM stockpiles pose particular destruction challenges for Mine Ban Treaty members Belarus and Ukraine.

Successor states and Mine Ban Treaty States Parties Belarus, Lithuania, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan collectively inherited 11.3 million antipersonnel mines from the Soviet Union.[25] Treaty signatory Ukraine has voluntarily declared that it inherited another 6.4 million antipersonnel mines.

On 1 December 1994 Russia announced a three-year moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines that are not detectable or not equipped with self-destruction devices. On 1 December 1997 the moratorium was extended for another five years, until December 2002.[26] The export moratorium expired on 1 December 2002, but a Russian military official told Landmine Monitor in April 2003 that it was still being observed and that a new version was being prepared; this was confirmed in a NATO-Russia meeting the same month.[27] In November 2003, Russia told CCW States that it still observing the expired moratorium.[28]

Russia is not known to have made any state-approved transfers of any type of antipersonnel mine since 1994. However, since 1999, Chechen officers have claimed that Chechen insurgents obtained their landmines in part through the Russian military, either through criminal arms trafficking and partly from arms depots handed over to Chechens in 1991-1992.[29]

Stockpiling and Destruction

Official information on the number of antipersonnel mines stockpiled by Russia is not publicly available. Landmine Monitor previously estimated a stockpile of 60-70 million antipersonnel mines, the world’s second largest stockpile.[30] After Russia surprisingly reported that it had destroyed 16.8 million antipersonnel mines from 1996 to 2002, Landmine Monitor reduced its estimate of Russia’s stockpile to 50 million antipersonnel mines in 2003. According to new information received by Landmine Monitor in 2004, which has yet to be confirmed, Russia’s stockpile could total closer to 22-25 million antipersonnel mines.[31]

Russian officials have acknowledged antipersonnel mine stockpiles at the disposal of Russian military units in other CIS states, notably Georgia and Tajikistan. In February 2003, Mine Ban Treaty State Party Tajikistan officially declared that Russian forces stockpile 18,200 antipersonnel mines of different types on Tajik territory and that bilateral negotiations concerning the disposition of these stockpiles are ongoing.[32]

In 2003, Russia publicly claimed for the first time that it destroyed more than 16.8 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines from 1996 through 2002. While inconsistent with past statements and documents (which indicated about 1 million antipersonnel mines destroyed since 1996), this claim appeared to be the result of changes in the counting methods for some mines. Russia originally counted destruction of KSF-1 and KSF-1S mines as one each; however, each KSF-1 contains 72 PFM-1 mines, and each KSF-1D contains 64 PFM-1S mines. Thus, while destruction of less than 150,000 PFM-1 and PFM-1S mines had been reported before 2002, the new figures showed more than 13.8 million PFMs destroyed from 1999 through 2002.[33] Russian military sources told Landmine Monitor that in 2003, Russia destroyed 1.85 million antipersonnel mines.[34] This brings the total destroyed from 1996-2003 to nearly 18.7 million antipersonnel mines.

Antipersonnel Mine Stockpile Destruction in Russia 1996-2003[35]

Type of Mine
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Total Destroyed
PMN

9,908
61,400

40,771
609,000
3,675
390,000
1,114,754
PMN-2


65,100


800,000

800,000
1,655,100
PMN-4


50,000





50,000
OZM-72


25,700


94,100
107,639

227,439
MON-100
22,200
8,000
22,500

7,799
111,600
11,766
120,000
303,865
MON-200
11,100
5,369
12,000

9,036
76,600
298
115,000
229,403
POMZ-2M


197,000
350,000

275,000

444,000
1,266,000
PFM-1 in KSF-1



1,615,680
3,117,600
2,592,000


7,325,280
PFM-1S in KSF-1S



2,788,288
2,554,496
640,000
512,000

6,494,784
Other types






3,049

3,049
Total
33,300
23,277
433,700
4,753,968
5,729,702
5,198,300
638,427
1,865,000
18,679,674

By 2001 most of Russia’s PFM stockpiles had reached the end of their shelf life, increasing the risk of explosive degradation of the mines.[36] Russia stated at a March 2001 seminar in Budapest that it would need to build four destruction complexes to destroy its PFM stockpiles.[37] Between 2002 and early 2003, Russian Foreign and Defense Ministry representatives held consultations with the NATO Partnership for Peace fund aimed at developing an agreement to demilitarize PFM-type antipersonnel mines using the Russian cementation disposal method. Preliminary talks were also held on the same issue with technical experts from the European Commission.[38] Stockpile destruction is currently being assisted by Ecodem (Ecological Demilitarization), a scientific production association established in 2001 that includes the Ministry of Defense and the Russian Federal Agency of Munitions.[39]

At a meeting between European Union representatives and officials of MoD, MoFA and Center for Mine Action and Munitions Disposal on 27 March 2003, Russian officials lauded a Russian cementation method—developed by the state-owned Bazalt enterprise[40]—that they maintain irreversibly deprives PFM-1/1S mines of the landmine function, secures safe transportation and storage, and allows further use of “converted” cluster mines as industrial explosive charges with no way of using them as mines.[41] According to a May 2003 media report, five to seven facilities equipped with the new technology could destroy “all such mines within a year.”[42] The scope of the statement was unclear. In November 2003, a Russian official referred to the “possibility of developing and implementing a joint project with the NATO aimed at the destruction of ten million most dangerous anti-personnel mines of the PFM-1 type....”[43]

Use

During this Landmine Monitor reporting period, Russia has continued to use antipersonnel mines in Chechnya. Russia has used mines continuously since 1999, primarily in Chechnya, but also at times in Dagestan, Tajikistan, and on the border with Georgia. Mines have been emplaced by hand, air-scattered, and artillery-scattered. Russia has generally argued that its mine usage has been necessary to stop flows of terrorists, weapons and drugs, and has been in full compliance with CCW Amended Protocol II.[44]

As Landmine Monitor Report 2004 went to print, on 3 September at least 338 people died when rebels seized a school in Beslan, North Ossetia.[45] The hostage-takers emplaced both antipersonnel mines and improvised explosive devices (IED) throughout the school, including in a gymnasium crowded with over 1,000 children and their parents. Various sources have indicated that the mines used included PMN blast mines and MON-50, MON-100, OZM-72, and POMZ fragmentation mines.[46] At least 127 improvised explosive devices were reportedly laid in the school.[47] After the siege, Russian EOD teams located and destroyed approximately 70 antipersonnel mines and a 50-kilogram IED.

Chechnya

Russian forces have used mines extensively in Chechnya since the renewal of armed conflict in September 1999. Federal troops have laid mines around and leading up to bases, checkpoints, commanders’ offices, governmental buildings, factories and power plants; on roads, including the main road between Grozny and Nazran in March 1995; on mountain paths in the rebel-dominated south; in fields running from Grozny to Alkhan-Kalu; in the estuary of the River Sunzha; along various borders; and in areas deemed “suspicious.”[48] A representative of the break-away Chechen government estimated the Russians used three million mines during the second Chechen war.[49] Russian officials have repeatedly claimed that all minefields are mapped, marked, and removed when troops relocate.[50] These assertions have been contradicted by statements from both civilians and military officers. For more information on Russian mine use in Chechnya, see the relevant section in the Chechnya report in this Landmine Monitor Report 2004.

Tajikistan

Russian forces are known to have used antipersonnel mines in Tajikistan between 1995 and 2001. In 1995, Russia laid six minefields in the Rushan region of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast. In 2003, Russia provided Tajikistan with records for four of these minefields.[51] In 1995, Russian forces emplaced another seven other minefields in the Vanch region and eight minefields in the Darvoz region. PFM-1 scatterable mines were used in one minefield in the Rushan region and one minefield in the Vanch region.[52]

In 2000, Russian forces emplaced nine more minefields in “regions subordined (sic) to the central government” using PMN, PMN-2, POMZ-2, and OZM-72 antipersonnel landmines. These latter minefields are located on parts of the Tajik-Afghan border that are under the control of the Russian border guard forces.[53] The last time Russian authorities informed Tajik authorities of mine use by Russian forces in Tajikistan was October 2001.[54]

In December 2001, a senior official in the Russian Federal Border Service confirmed to Landmine Monitor that Russian troops had laid antipersonnel mines inside Tajikistan. He said that the mine-laying operations had been carried out with the full knowledge and consent of the Tajikistan government, and in accordance with a military cooperation agreement signed in 1993. After Landmine Monitor pointed out that this could constitute a violation of the Mine Ban Treaty by Tajikistan, he said that mines were laid prior to October 1999 when Tajikistan acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty.[55]

In keeping with its general stance on landmine use, Russia has maintained that it has complied fully with Amended Protocol II of the CCW in deploying landmines in Tajikistan.[56] In a November 2003 statement, Ambassador A. Antonov said that records pertaining to the minefields on the Tajik-Afghan border were being transferred to the government of Tajikistan.[57] An August 2001 Foreign Ministry letter stated, “Mines are emplaced in observance of requirements to prohibit or restrict the use of anti-personnel mines...as set forth in the supplemented ‘mine’ Protocol II, with the exception of requirements in point 2a of Article 5 Restrictions on the use of anti-personnel mines other than remotely delivered mines in that part relating to perimeter-marked areas; anti-personnel mines are marked and fenced along the entire perimeter of the area except the part of the perimeter on the side of the state border.”[58] Use of mines is cast as a necessary protective measure, for small-scale defenses around bases and posts, as well as to halt the flow of weapons, terrorists and drugs across international borders.[59]

Georgia

Russia has used mines in Georgia-Abkhazia conflict, has mined the Georgia-Russian border, and in at least one incident “accidentally” mined Georgia territory. In April 2000, it was reported that the “military leadership and border services of Russia and Georgia have adopted the decision to mine several stretches of the border” in order to stop the flow of men and materiel between Georgia and Chechnya. The types of mines used were not disclosed, but officials said that over twenty mountain passes and dozens of pathways would be mined along an 80 kilometer-long stretch of the border near the southern Chechen Argun gorge.[60] Russian officials claimed that the mining was carried out in compliance with CCW Protocol II and mainly involved remote controlled devices, which it said were permissible under the Mine Ban Treaty.[61] In May 2001 a Georgian official stated that there have been cases of Russian mining of the Chechen stretch of the Russian-Georgian border.[62] On 16 October 2002, there was a landmine incident involving a 14-year-old boy in the upper part of the Kodori gorge (on the border between Georgia and Russia), allegedly planted by Russian peacekeepers during their patrolling of the gorge.[63] The press secretary of the CIS Peacekeeping Force, Aleksander Tretyakov, rejected these claims.[64]

Landmine Monitor Report 1999 reported that mines were used by the CIS peacekeeping force in the Georgia-Abkhazian conflict starting from June 1994, but there was no new evidence as of 2001. In August 2001 Russian officials said that no mines had been emplaced in Abkhazia since May 2000.[65]

At least a portion of the mines laid by Russia on the Russia-Georgia border were delivered by aircraft. In December 1999, a Georgian officer noted that air-scattering of mines had been going on for two months, and that once a 20-kilometer stretch was mined in one day.[66] On 9 August 1999, two Su-25 aircraft entered Georgian airspace from Dagestan, where Russia was fighting against rebels, and bombed in and around the village of Zemo Omalo; three people were wounded, one severely.[67] The Georgian military was able to identify the weapons used as KSS-1S cluster bombs, containing PFM-1S antipersonnel mines.[68] This was later said to have been a mistake.[69] A US government official told the ICBL that there was a second incident in which a Russian helicopter dropped mines inside Georgia.[70]

Landmine Problem and Clearance

World War II left the USSR heavily infested with mines and unexploded ordnance. The problem was most serious in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and the Caucasus. One Russian official recently stated that tens of thousands of UXO from WWII are removed annually from Russian territory,[71] while another put the figure at 100,000.[72] According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, between 1946 and 2002 more than 153 million items of UXO and mines were cleared and destroyed in the USSR/Russian Federation.[73] The overall cost for these activities has been estimated at tens of billions of US dollars.[74]

Mine clearance is currently the responsibility of three governmental organizations: the Engineer Forces of the Ministry of Defense; the Russian National Corps of Emergent Humanitarian Operations of the Ministry for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Disaster Resources; and demining brigades of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.[75] Non-governmental enterprises also conduct demining activities, such as the company “Fort” in Moscow and the company “Iskatel” in St. Petersburg. Employees of these companies are mainly retired officers of engineer forces.[76]

In 2003, engineers from the Moscow Military District carried out 326 mine-clearance operations, removing a total of 4,959 explosives in 19 regions.[77] The Ministry of Emergencies reported that 1,381 WWII mines were found and destroyed in the Novgorod region over a five-day period in August 2004, and that a total of 8,000 mines had been cleared so far that year.[78] In August 2004, rail workers discovered a weapons cache including 80 WWII landmines near St. Petersburg.[79] In 2002, bomb disposal experts reportedly responded to 159 calls in and around St. Petersburg, removing nearly 15,000 WWII-era UXO and mines.[80] After violent floodwaters swept through a region on the Black Sea coast in August 2002, explosive removal experts cleared some 50 World War II-era mines and explosives found on the shore.[81]

Mines and UXO are reemerging as an issue for a number of reasons. There is increased demand for economic development of lands that were never cleared of UXO, including former battlefields. Moreover, before 1999 clearance operations never probed deeper than 30-40 cm, while UXO buried deeper has moved upwards to the surface making previously cleared territories now unsafe.[82] This aggravation of the mine and UXO problem is shown in the progression of estimates for clearance completion: according to a 1998 estimate, clearance would not be complete for 10-15 years,[83] while in April 2003 it was estimated that clearance would take 15-20 years providing “all means and resources are utilized.”[84]

Mine Action Assistance

Russia has become increasingly engaged in demining operations abroad. In November 2003, during a UN Security Council discussion on mine action, Russia reported the government had “enacted a measure entitled ‘Measures to facilitate the Russian Federation’s participation in humanitarian mine-clearance programs, projects and operations,” which “regulates the provision of assistance to other States in the area of mine action.”[85] The Russian Ministry of Defense works with other governments through bilateral agreements or through the Rosvooruzheniye (State Company for the Export and Import of Armaments and Military Equipment) and Promexport (Industry Export). Russian officials noted in 2000 and 2001 that the government is broadening its participation in international humanitarian mine clearance in an attempt to address the “compelling humanitarian issues” resulting from mine contamination.[86]

In 2000, the government formed a Federal Working Group for Mine Action and appointed a special coordinator on humanitarian demining to coordinate activities within various state agencies related to international humanitarian mine clearance. In June 2003, it was reported that a new Counter Mine Danger Service had been established under the Russian Federation Engineer Forces to integrate military and civilian mine action-related elements.[87] A Russian official stated in November 2003 that a Center of Demining had been established “on the basis of the Moscow University of Military Engineers in order to train experts in detecting and clearing of explosive devices.”[88] In June 2003 it was reported that the Russian Minister of Emergency Situations had called for the creation of a Russo-Spanish anti-mine center to train engineers for “civilian purposes.”[89]

Russia has not made any contributions to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for the Assistance of Mine Clearance, nor has it received any funds for mine action programs within Russia. However, at a Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee meeting in May 2001, the executive secretary of the Working Group noted that the Russian government was prepared to offer training of humanitarian demining personnel; to offer means of mine/UXO surveillance, detection and clearance; to conduct joint research and development on demining equipment; and to offer personnel for mine clearance operations, among other things.[90]

Russia has sent deminers to over 20 countries, including major operations in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, and many CIS countries. In July 2003, the Kyrgyz border service invited Russian sappers to assist in demining the border with Uzbekistan.[91]

Since 1994, the special engineering unit of the Russian Ministry of Defense has been demining in Abkhazia as a part of the CIS peacekeeping force. Roads, land and infrastructure in Abkhazia and the south bank of the Inguri River have been surveyed and demined by the Russians. As of December 2002, the Russians had cleared 25,000 mines and UXO from Georgia and Abkhazia.[92]

From 6 August to 15 November 1999, a demining team of twenty engineers and four mine dogs from the Ministry of Emergent Situations and Catastrophes conducted operations in Kosovo; they surveyed 85,309 square meters of land and detected ten minefields. Another team of 28 deminers and 11 mine detecting dogs carried out a six-month mission in Kosovo in the second half of 2001. The team surveyed 324,213 square meters of territory and cleared 467 antipersonnel mines, 17 antivehicle mines, and 109 UXO.[93]

In late November 2001, Russia sent demining experts to Afghanistan to establish a humanitarian center in Kabul, as well as to reopen the Russian Embassy.[94] Russian engineers reportedly destroyed 8,000 explosives in Afghanistan from late 2001 to mid-2002. In April 2002, specialists from Russia’ Ministry of Emergency Situations began a three-month training course for 50 Afghan sappers in Madrid, Spain. All costs were paid by Spain. Russian engineers have removed approximately 35,000 mines from Afghanistan.[95]

Russian forces have reportedly cleared some 35,000 pieces of ordnance in Tajikistan,[96] and 15,000 in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[97]

From February through March 2002, the non-governmental company “Fort” participated in humanitarian demining operations in Croatia under a contract with Heinrich Hirdes GmbH. It checked and cleared over 156,000 square meters of land.[98]

Mine Risk Education

During the Soviet era, district military recruiting offices disseminated Mine Risk Education (MRE) information in mine-affected areas.[99] The compulsory secondary education program included a course of primary military training providing information on mine danger to students living in mine-affected areas. After the disintegration of the USSR and the ensuing economic crisis, these activities halted, although the secondary school courses have been reinstated.[100] Since 2000, instead of the Soviet-era primary military training, a new compulsory course has been introduced in the secondary education entitled “Basics of Life Safety.”[101]

In the North Caucasus, where there are no federal mine risk education programs, the International Committee of the Red Cross and UNICEF are responsible for the bulk of MRE activities. In 2001, the ICRC began to provide MRE in Ingushetia, which houses most IDPs escaping the conflict in Chechnya; activities included distribution of posters and leaflets, organizing presentations and a workshop, and unveiling the star of mine awareness puppet shows for years to come, Cheerdig.[102] By May 2003, the puppet theater, the ICRC “Child to Child” program (in which children inform their own families and other children of the dangers of mines), similar “Child to Child puppet” shows and “Teenager to Teenager programs,” and various media campaigns were all well established.[103]

The ICRC launched a mine risk education program in Dagestan in January 2002 after a needs assessment revealed a low level of mine awareness there. The program was carried out in the Botlikh and Novolak regions of Dagestan, and targeted resident and IDP children.[104]

The ICRC also runs mine risk education programs in North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and the south of Russia. It initiated MRE in these regions in March 2001.[105] Activities now include mine awareness seminars, the Child to Child program, a game sheet called “Find the Safest Way,” drawing books, and crossword puzzles. Posters and comics are also used, and leaflets are given to teachers accompanying the children.[106]

UNICEF began to sponsor mine risk education activity in Ingushetia, Dagestan and Chechnya in 2000, in cooperation with the UNHCR, distributing leaflets and posters. In 2002 UNICEF launched a program in the North Caucasus in conjunction with the UNHCR, ICRC, Danish Demining Group (DDG) and local NGOs, including Voice of the Mountains (VoM) and Let’s Save the Generation (LSG).[107] Classes are held regularly in Ingushetian IDP camps and spontaneous settlements, which have reached at least 1,700 IDP children since January 2003.[108]

MRE in Ingushetian camps has lessened in 2004 as official camps have been closed by authorities and the IDP population has decreased due to returns to Chechnya. In 2002, UNICEF began to sponsor MRE drama presentations in Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia, through its implementing partner, LSG.[109] LSG provided transportation for Chechen children to Vladikavkaz, and distributed MRE materials after the shows. By the time the program was moved to Grozny in September 2003, these presentations had reached some 11,000 children.[110]

Mine risk education programs in Chechnya have proliferated since 1999, when there were almost none. Both the ICRC and UNICEF are currently implementing a wide range of programs through various local NGO partners. Children are the targeted population in Chechnya. Major achievements include the formal incorporation of MRE into the Chechen school curriculum; the creation and regular performance of mine awareness drama presentations and drama circles through LSG; a five-part television series entitled “Beware Mines,” broadcast in 2003; and the opening of a Landmine Café in Grozny. Since January 2003, over 138,000 schoolchildren have been reached in Chechnya through formal education classes, and tens of thousands more have been reached through other programs. From January to November 2003, UNICEF distributed 240,000 MRE items (posters, notebooks, pens, leaflets, T-shirts) in Chechnya and Ingushetia.

Landmine Casualties

There is no comprehensive official information on landmine casualties in Russia. On 29 June 2003, an eight-year-old boy was seriously injured after stepping on an antipersonnel landmine in the Novosibirsk district near the site of a former military settlement.[111] In April, May and July 2003, a total of 12 soldiers were killed and another three injured in three separate incidents involving landmines or improvised explosive devices in the southern republic of Ingushetia.[112]

There have been substantial numbers of mine casualties in parts of the Russian Federation, particularly in Chechnya since 1994 and Dagestan since 1999. Two major landmine blasts in Dagestan claimed close to 50 lives in the first half of 2002. The first blast came on 18 January 2002, when a car carrying servicemen set off a landmine in Makhachkala, the capital of Dagestan, killing seven of the servicemen.[113] The second, more deadly blast came during Victory Day celebrations in Kaspiysk, near the border with Chechnya on 9 May 2002. Dagestani pro-Chechen rebels reportedly detonated a MON-90 mine via remote control, killing 42 people and seriously injuring at least 30 others.[114] Mines continue killing and maiming people more than half a century after WWII ended. In September 2002, five boys were killed after tampering with a World War II landmine at the site of the Stalingrad battle near Volgograd.[115] There is limited official data on mine casualties in these regions.

There is no complete official data on mine casualties or incidents among the Russian soldiers fighting in Chechnya, or for civilians. According to various media and military sources, there were over 1,300 mine incidents involving Russian federal forces, including police and internal forces, in Chechnya from 1999 to March 2003, resulting in 2,500 military casualties, including more than 600 killed and 1,700 injured. Not all military casualties were the result of rebel mine use; accidents and improper handling or storage of mines also caused many casualties.[116]

Landmine Monitor recorded at least 246 new casualties (126 killed and 120 injured) caused by landmines, UXO and improvised explosive devices (IED) in Chechnya from international media sources in 2003, including 170 military personnel, militants, sappers and police, and four women and five children.[117] International media sources reported 298 mine/UXO/IED casualties (119 killed and 179 injured), including 187 military personnel, militants, sappers and police, in Chechnya in 2002.[118] In 2001, Landmine Monitor collated data on 1,153 mine/UXO/IED casualties (367 killed and 786 injured); 137 were civilians (62 killed and 75 injured) including 23 children.[119] (See Chechnya report for more information on civilian mine casualties.)

In April 2003, a Russian UN Military Observer was killed when his vehicle detonated an antivehicle mine in the DRC.[120] On 8 June 2002, a Russian peacekeeper was killed in the Kodori Gorge in Georgia.[121] On 13 November 2003 a Russian official said that 10 Russian soldiers had been killed by mines in Georgia-Abkhazia peacekeeping operations.[122]

The total number of landmine casualties in Russia over time is not known but there are believed to be significant numbers of mine/UXO survivors from casualties caused by mines and UXO left from World War II, the 1980s war with Afghanistan, and from the conflict in Chechnya.

Survivor Assistance

Russian military medical practice has accumulated enormous experience in the treatment of blast injuries. Medical, surgical, prosthetic, rehabilitation, and reintegration services are available for landmine survivors in Russia. There are about seventy specialized federal prosthetic enterprises operating in the Russian Federation. Some mine survivors receive assistance in Moscow and others travel to Baku (Azerbaijan) within the framework of a joint program of the Ministries of Social Insurance of both republics; details on the number of mine survivors benefiting from this program was not available. Russia manufactures about 600 types of prosthetic devices. Lower limbs comprise about 90 percent of all prostheses produced.[123] Medical assistance was also provided by the All-Russian Center of Medicine of Catastrophies “Zaschita” (Protection) under the RF Ministry of Health.[124] In 1999-2002 alone the mobile hospitals of the All-Russian Center of Medicine of Catastrophies “Zaschita” in Chechnya provided medical assistance to 170,000 persons including 63,000 children and conducted more than 4,400 surgical operations.[125]

The International Institute for the Prosthetic Rehabilitation of Landmine Survivors (IPRLS) and its Russian partner, the St. Petersburg Institute of Prosthetics, have been assisting mine survivors with surgical and rehabilitation assistance, vocational training and socio-economic reintegration since 1998.[126] An Ice Hockey-On-Prostheses Team, the “St. Petersburg Elks,” was formed under the program, and in April 2003 the team participated in the first-ever World Standing Amputee Ice Hockey Championships in Helsinki.[127] Members of the team, which included seven mine survivors, participated in the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration in Geneva in February 2003, following a demonstration ice hockey match in Geneva the previous weekend.

Many international agencies and local and international NGOs are working to strengthen the health infrastructure in Ingushetia and other regions of the Northern Caucasus with medicines, hospital supplies, expertise and training for local staff at hospitals and health posts. Others have supported mobile clinics, psychosocial support services, transportation to medical facilities, and other humanitarian aid activities, often aimed at internally displaced persons from Chechnya. Organizations that engage in survivor assistance-related activities include Agency for Rehabilitation and Development, Center for Peacemaking and Community Development, Danish Refugee Council/Danish Peoples Aid, Hammer Forum e.V., Handicap International, International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Initiative, International Medical Corps, Islamic Relief, Médecins du Monde, Médecins sans Frontières, Memorial, Saudi Red Crescent Society, Save the Generation, Serlo, UNICEF, WHO, and World Vision.[128]

Disability Policy and Practice

Since 1995, mine survivors in Russia have been under the protection of the Federal Law “On Social Security of Disabled.” The law guarantees multilevel rehabilitation programs aimed either at complete physical rehabilitation and socio-economic reintegration, or compensation for physical and social limitations and the provision of financial independence. All issues of disability are under the control of the Ministry of Labor and Social Development.

Since 2002, the All-Russian Public National Military Foundation has been focusing its efforts on the support of military personnel injured in Chechnya. In February 2002, two major directions for the Foundation’s efforts were identified: the purchase of flats for the families of the servicemen killed in Chechnya; and ensuring medical aid to servicemen injured in Chechnya, especially to those who need prosthetic aid. According to the Chairman of the Council, state agencies including the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs will provide the Foundation with verified lists of persons needing medical or other aid, and the Foundation will arrange and finance the necessary aid.[129]

In May 2001 the “International Complex Program on the Rehabilitation of War Veterans, Participants of Local Conflicts, and Victims of Terrorism for 2001-2005” was approved by a resolution of the Council of the Heads of Government of the CIS countries.[130] In 2001, prioritized targets of Section I on “Medico-Social Aid” included: facilitating the work of rehabilitation centers in ensuring qualified and effective medical, social, psychological, and professional rehabilitation of war-wounded; medical examinations, consultations of specialists, verification of medical diagnosis, hospitalization, elaboration of individual rehabilitation programs; provision of prostheses, wheelchairs, rehabilitation means and medicine; and, medical and psychological rehabilitation and treatment in specialized sanatoria.[131]

Within the framework of the Program, support was provided to 45 veterans’ organizations. About 2.5 million people in 17 countries have benefited from the Inter-State Program’s support from 2001 through early 2003.[132]


[1] See, for example, Vladimir P. Kuznetsov, “Ottawa Process and Russia’s Position,” Krasnaya Zvezda Daily, 27 November 1997; Maj. General Alexander Averchenko, Ministry of Defense, “Making the Ottawa Convention a Reality: Military Implications,” in proceedings of the Regional Conference on Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War, organized by the ICRC, Moscow, 4 November 2002, pp. 43-49. See Landmine Monitor 2000, pp. 835-836.
[2] Boris Schiborin and Andrei Malov, “Russia and Antipersonnel Mines,” 26 February 1999; Interviews with Counselor Andrei Malov, 29 November 2000, 18 December 2000, and 23 January 2001.
[3] Statement by A. Antonov, Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation, Annual Meeting of the States Parties to the CCW, Geneva, 27 November 2003.
[4] New York Times, 11 October 1997.
[5] Statement by Boris Schiborin, Representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry at the Budapest Seminar, 26-28 March 1998.
[6] Press release, AP RF Division of Governmental Information/Information Analytical Materials, No. 177, 9 March 2000.
[7] Statement of Amb. Anatoly Antonov, Fifth Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 26 November 2003.
[8] “Putin Urges Ratification of Protocol Limiting Mines,” ITAR-Tass, 7 May 2000.
[9] Interview with Counselor Andrei Malov, 30 April 2000. See Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp.895 for more information.
[10] Press release of the Chief Division of Engineer Forces at the opening of the 1998 Moscow conference “New Steps to a Mine-Free Future,” IPPNW-ICBL, 27-28 May 1998; Working Materials, Second International Conference on Landmines in Russia and FSU, IPPNW-Russia, Tbilisi, Georgia, 5-7 December 1999; Statement by the Russian Federation to the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, 10 December 2001.
[11] Statement by Russia, CCW Annual Meeting, 27 November 2003.
[12] “Parliamentary committee recommends Russia ratify land mines protocol,” Interfax-AVN (Moscow), 30 September 2004.
[13] Interview with Andrei Malov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 February 1999; Vladimir Kuznetsov, “S uchetom boevogo opyta zivut i uchatsya ingenernie voiska,” Krasnaya Zvezda (The Red Star), 21 January 1998; A. Yarlyan, “Like a Phoenix From its Ashes,” Armeysky Sbornik (magazine), No. 1, 1998, p. 64-65.
[14] Vladimir Kuznetsov, “Novyi oblik ingenernych voisk,” (New outlook of the Engineer Troops), Armeysky Sbornik (Army’s journal) No. 1, 1998, p.11.
[15] Russia’s Arms Catalogue, Volume 1, Army 1998-1997, published by “Military Parade,” JSC, under general supervision of Anatolyi Sitnikov, Chief of the Armed Forces, Ordnance, Moscow, 1996, pp.276-83. See also, “Landmines: Outlook from Russia,” Report prepared by the Chief Division of Engineer Forces of the RF Ministry of Defense for IPPNW-Russia, 25 February 1999. For more on these mines and other mines produced by Russia in the past, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 805.
[16] Presentations by Boris Schiborin, then-chief counselor of the Department for Security and Disarmament, Russian Foreign Ministry, and A. Nizhalovsky, then-deputy-commander of Engineering Forces, Ministry of Defense, at IPPNW-ICBL Moscow Conference, 27 May 1998.
[17] Lt. Col. Mikhail Nagorny, Senior Officer, Division of Engineer Forces, Tbilisi Conference 5-7 December 1999. At the CCW Protocol II Conference in Geneva on 16 December 1999, Col. Vladimir Bobkov, Adviser, Ministry of Defense, confirmed this, noting that PMN-1 and PMN-2 mines were no longer produced.
[18] Oral remarks of Russian delegation, Second Annual Meeting of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 11 December 2000. Landmine Monitor notes.
[19] Statement by Russia, Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, 10 December 2001.
[20] Presentation by Maj. General Alexander Averchenko, Ministry of Defense, “Making the Ottawa Convention a Reality: Military Implications,” in proceedings of the Regional Conference on Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War, organized by the ICRC, Moscow, 4 November 2002, pp. 43-49.
[21] A. Averchenko, “Traditional and New Tasks,” Amreysky Sbornik Magazine, No. 1, 1997.
[22] “Landmines: Outlook from Russia”, IPPNW-Russia information analytical report, 1999, Moscow; see also Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p. 837.
[23] The following States parties have declared mines of Soviet origin in their transparency measures reports required by Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty: Algeria, Angola, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Congo-Brazzaville, Ecuador, Guinea-Bissau, Jordan, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Peru, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
[24] Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Cuba, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Honduras, Iraq, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
[25] Although State Party Estonia has yet to submit a transparency report, it has declared in its Article 13 Report for CCW Amended Protocol II that it does not possess a stockpile of antipersonnel mines.
[26] Presidential Decrees No. 2094 of 1 December 1994, and No. 1271 of 1 December 1997.
[27] Telephone interview with a representative of the Russian Ministry of Defense, 7 April 2003; Presentation by the Russian Federation delegation to a NATO-Russia Group of Experts Meeting, Brussels, 29 April 2003.
[28] Statement by Russia, CCW Amended Protocol II Conference, 26 November 2003.
[29] Interview with Col. M. Arsaliev, engineer at “Krasny Molot” plant, Grozny, December 1999; interview with I. T. Tauzov, Assistant Commander of the Southwestern Front of the Chechen forces, 20 February 2001; interview with a group of Chechen fighters, 15 January 2001.
[30] See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 805-806, 809.
[31] Russian military sources and independent military analysts told Landmine Monitor in 2004 that the 50 million figure is not accurate, and that the true number is less than half that total. Landmine Monitor is in the process of trying to confirm new details on types and numbers of mines still in stock. It is possible that the original estimate of 60-70 million may have been based on total holdings in the former Soviet Union, and not just the Russian Federation. Landmine Monitor based the original estimate on a published report in the Russian military trade press, and interviews with Russian Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry officials, as well as knowledgeable officials from other governments.
[32] Tajikistan Article 7 Report, Form B, 3 February 2003.
[33] Presentation by Russia, NATO meeting, 29 April 2003. For more on Russia’s conflicting statements, see Landmine Monitor Report 2003, pp. 668-669.
[34] Information provided by the Ministry of Defense.
[35] Presentation by Russia, NATO meeting, 29 April 2003; supplemented with information for 2003 received from the Ministry of Defense.
[36] Presentation by Canada, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 31 January 2001. A Russian company involved in PFM destruction stated that “in the year 2000 the guaranteed shelf life of existing stocks of cluster ammunitions KSF-1 based on PFM-1 APL mines expired.” Research and Production Association “Ecodem,” “Appeal for a Credit Emergency Humanitarian Appeal,” received by Landmine Monitor on 15 August 2001.
[37] Presentation by Yuri P. Osipovitch, “Demilitarization of APMs with Cementation Method,” made at the Budapest Seminar “Destruction of PFM-1 mines,” March 2001.
[38] Interviews with Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, January-March 2003.
[39] Presentation by Yuri P. Osipovitch, Executive Secretary, Federal Working Group for Mine Action, Standing Committee Meeting, Geneva, 9 May 2001.
[40] “Russia patents new technology for scrapping antipersonnel mines,” Interfax, 29 May 2003.
[41] Vladimir Korenkov, General Director of FGUP GNPP “Bazalt,” at the meeting between EU representatives and officials of MoD, MoFA and Center for Mine Action and Munitions Disposal, 27 March 2003.
[42] “Russia patents new technology for scrapping antipersonnel mines,” Interfax, 29 May 2003.
[43] Statement by Russia, CCW Amended Protocol II Conference, 26 November 2003.
[44] For the most recent example, see the statement by Amb. Anatoly Antonov, to the CCW Group of Government Experts, “On the Landmines Other Than Antipersonnel Mines (MOTAPM),” Geneva, 18 November 2003.
[45] In a letter published on the Internet, Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev subsequently claimed responsibility for the siege. “Excerpts: Basayev claims Beslan,” BBC News, 17 September 2004.
[46] Many types of mines could be clearly seen in television footage of the event.
[47] "127 Home-made Explosives Laid in Beslan School," Novosti Rossii, 9 September 2004.
[48] See past editions of Landmine Monitor Report.
[49] Umar Khanbiev, Minister for Health of the Chechen republic, citation translated from Russian by Landmine Monitor, 18 July 2002, www.chechenpress.com .
[50] See, for example, Deputy Chief of the Military Engineering University, Maj. Gen. A. Nizhalovskii’s report during a virtual roundtable discussion of engineer equipment of military operations in Chechnya, Armeyskiy sbornik (Army collection), No. 6, June 2000, pp.35-40.
[51] Tajikistan Article 7 Report, Form C, 4 February 2004.
[52] Tajikistan Article 7 Report, Form C, 3 February 2003.
[53] From Tajikistan Article 7 Report, Form C 3 February 2003.
[54] Interview with Johnmahmad Rajabov, Deputy Head of the Board of the Constitutional Guarantees of Citizens Rights, Executive Board of the President of Tajikistan, Geneva, 5 February 2003.
[55] Meeting with Col. Mikhail Zenkin, Federal Border Service, and Vladimir Kurikov, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation, at the Second CCW Review Conference, Geneva, 13 December 2001.
[56] Georgiy Mekhov, “How to Solve the Mine Problem: Russia Supports the Aspirations of the World Community to Ban Anti-Personnel Mines, But is not Ready for it,” Moscow Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, November 2000; Interview with Boris Kvok, Deputy Director, Department of Security and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Geneva, 13 December 2000; Statement by the Russian Federation to the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, 10 December 2001.
[57] Statement of Russia, CCW Amended Protocol II Conference, 26 November 2003.
[58] Response by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation, 16 August 2001.
[59] Andrei Malov, Counselor, Department for Security and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, presentation to IPPNW-Russia, 19 January 2001. Also, interviews with Senior Counselor Malov, 29 November 2000, 18 December 2000, and 23 January 2001; Response by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 August 2001.
[60] Aleksandr Igorev and Georgiy Dvali, “Minefields Will Separate Russia from Georgia,” Moscow Kommersant, 12 April 2000; “Federals to Mine 80Km of Chechnya-Georgia Border,” AVN, 11 April 2000.
[61] Interview with Andrei Malov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 May 2000.
[62] Interview with Sergo Gumberidze, Security Council Staff, 23 May 2001.
[63] Black Sea Press Information Agency, 15 October 2002; “Rustavi-2” TV company, 15 October 2002; APSNYPRESS Information Agency (Abkhazia), #210, 15 October 2002.
[64] APSNYPRESS Information Agency (Abkhazia), #210, 15 October 2002.
[65] Response to Landmine Monitor by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, sent by fax to Landmine Monitor (HRW) by Vassily V. Boriak, Counselor, Embassy of the Russia to US, 16 August 2001.
[66] Lt-Gen. Guram G. Nickolaishvili, “Peaceful Caucasus: Toward a Future Without Landmines,” Regional Landmine Conference, Tbilisi, Georgia, 5-7 December 1999.
[67] Prime-News (television), Tbilisi, Georgia, 10 August 1999.
[68] “Georgian Deputy Says Type of Russian Bomb Established,” RIA News Agency, 1 August 1999.
[69] “Sources Say Russian Air Force to Apologize to Georgia,” Interfax, 17 August 1999.
[70] ICBL meeting with US delegation to CCW Protocol II meeting, Geneva, 13 December 1999.
[71] Statement of Alexander Konuzin, UN Security Council 4858th meeting, New York, 13 November 2003.
[72] Statement of Russia, CCW Amended Protocol II Conference, 26 November 2003.
[73] Presentation by Russian Federation Ministry of Defense to a Russia-UK meeting on anti-terrorism measures within the international military cooperation program, London, April 2003.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Presidential Decree #1010 of 13 November 1995, “On Russian National Corps for Emergent Humanitarian Operations.”
[76] A. Kostiukov, demining commercial enterprise “Fort”: verbal statement at the working group meeting, 10 November 1998.
[77] “Moscow sappers detail 2003 mine clearing operations,” Interfax, 21 Jan 2004.
[78] “WWII mines cleared in Northwestern Russia,” RIA Novosti, 21 August 2004.
[79] “Russian rail workers unearth World War II explosives,” Agence France-Presse, 6 August 2004.
[80] “15,000 WWII shells and mines found in 2002 in St Petersburg,” AFP, 30 December 2002.
[81] “At least 58 dead in Black Sea floods,” Agence France-Presse, 11 August 2002.
[82] IPPNW-Russia, “Materials of the First International Conference on APMs in Russia-CIS, 27-28 May 1998,” Moscow, 1998, p. 30.
[83] Ibid.
[84] Presentation by Russian Ministry of Defense to anti-terrorism meeting, April 2003.
[85] “The Importance of Mine Action for Peacekeeping Operations,” UN Security Council 4858th meeting, New York, 13 November 2003
[86] Interviews with Andrei Malov, 29 November 2000, 18 December 2000, and 23 January 2001.
[87] Official response to Landmine Monitor (IPPNW-Russia) by General of Army Nikolai Kormiltsev, Chief Commander, Ground Forces of the Russian Federation and Deputy Minister of Defense, Ref. #565/2507, 27 June 2003.
[88] Statement by Russia, CCW Amended Protocol II Conference, 26 November 2003.
[89] “Russian minister calls to create Russo-Spanish anti-mine center,” ITAR-Tass, 27 June 2003.
[90] Statement by Yuri P. Osipovitch, Standing Committee Meeting, Geneva, 9 May 2001.
[91] “Russian Sappers to Help Kyrgyz Colleagues to Demine Border,” ITAR-Tass, 14 July 2003.
[92] Statement by Russian Delegation to the OSCE, 23 December 2002.
[93] Russian Information Agency RIA “OREANDA,” 6 December 2001.
[94] Steven Mufson, “U.S. Talks to Moscow About Force in Kabul,” Washington Post, 29 November 2001, p. A25.
[95] Statement by Russian Delegation to the OSCE, 23 December 2002.
[96] Ibid.
[97] Statement by the Russian Federation to the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, 10 December 2001.
[98] Interview with Andrei Kostiukov, Director, Fort, Moscow, 23 March 2003.
[99] The so-called “District Military Committee” – “raivoenkomat.”
[100] Lt. Gen. (Rt.) V. Vasiliev, Ministry of Disaster Resources, 10 November 1998.
[101] Landmine Monitor Report 2002, pp.738.
[102] ICRC, “Emergency action of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement for the North Caucasus and the South of Russia Jan 2001,” 14 March 2001.
[103] See, for example, ICRC, “Facts and Figures: The North Caucasus and the South of Russia,” 6 May 2003.
[104] ICRC, “Emergency action of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement for the North Caucasus and the South of Russia,” March 2002.”
[105] Ibid, Mar 2001.
[106] ICRC, “Northern Caucasus and southern Russia: facts & figures on recent ICRC action (Apr - May 2002),” 8 July 2002.
[107] Landmine Monitor Report 2002, pp.804.
[108] UNICEF, “Northern Caucasus,” Situation Report, 4 November 2003.
[109] Landmine Monitor Report 2003, pp.739.
[110] UNICEF, “Northern Caucasus,” Situation Report, 1 September 2003.
[111] “Child seriously injured in mine explosion in Novosibirsk region,” Itar-Tass (Russia), 30 June 2003.
[112] “Four Russian soldiers killed in Caucasus landmine blast,” AFP (Moscow), 1 April 2003; “3 army servicemen die in explosion in Ingushetia,” Itar-Tass (Moscow), 16 May 2003; “Death Toll from Truck Explosion in Ingushetia Reaches Five,” Interfax (Russia), 30 July 2003.
[113] “Investigation Of Blast In Makhachkala Continues,” RosBusiness Consulting (Russia), 21 January 2002.
[114] “Three arrested for Dagestan landmine blast,” AFP (Russia), 11 May 02; “A car bomb defused in Dagestan,” AFP, 17 May 2002.
[115] “Second World War mine kills five boys in Russia,” Reuters, 14 September 2002. For details on post-WW II casualties, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 814.
[116] For more details see Landmine Monitor Report 2003, p. 740.
[117] Data collated by Landmine Monitor from 54 media reports between 9 January and 2 December 2003. Media reports often listed several people killed or injured without giving a specific number. It was often not possible to differentiate between incidents caused by landmines and improvised explosive devices.
[118] Data collated by Landmine Monitor from 60 media reports between 8 January and 31December 2002.
[119] For more details see Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 805.
[120] “UN Envoy Condemns Violence in Wake of Historic Meeting in Capital,” UN News Service, 30 April 2003.
[121] “Russian peacekeeper killed in breakaway Georgian province,” Associated Press, 9 June 2002.
[122] Statement by Alexander Konuzin, UN Security Council 4858th Meeting, New York, 13 November 2003.
[123] For more information see Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp. 907-908.
[124] “MChS: Major Operations in 2003,”; Irina Krasnopolskaya, “Zhizn v zone bedy” (“Living in the zone of calamity”) Rossiyskaya gazeta, 4 February, 2004.
[125] “Organization of Medical Aid to Population,” Part 3, available at http://
medafarm.ru/php/content.html?group=4&id=1275, accessed 12 October 2004.
[126] For more details see Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 908.
[127] Christopher Hamilton, “Amputation No Handicap for These Hockey Players,” St. Petersburg Times, 29 April 2003.
[128] For more information on the activities of these organizations, see World Health Organization, “Health Sector Field Directory: Republics of Chechnya and Ingushetia, Russian Federation,” Nazran, June 2004.
[129] RIA NOVOSTI, 21 February 2002.
[130] Resolution of the Council of the Heads of Government of the CIS countries, 31 May 2001.
[131] Report on the fulfillment of the “International Complex Program on the Rehabilitation of the War Veterans, Participants of Local Conflicts and Victims of Terrorism for 2001-2005” in 2001.
[132] Letter to Landmine Monitor (IPPNW-Russia) from Prof. Galina Z. Demchenkova, Doctor of Medical Science, Deputy Chairman of the Committee for War Veterans Affairs under the CIS Council of Heads of Governments, 25 June 2003. For more details see Landmine Monitor Report 2003, pp. 674-675.