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Table of Contents
Country Reports
United States of America, Landmine Monitor Report 2004

United States of America

Key developments since May 2003: The Bush Administration announced the results of a two-and-one-half year policy review on 27 February 2004, abandoning the objective of joining the Mine Ban Treaty eventually and declaring its intent to retain antipersonnel mines indefinitely. In fiscal year 2003, the US provided $93 million to mine action programs in 37 countries, an increase of nearly $17 million from the previous year. Private organizations raised hundreds of thousands of dollars for mine action. At least two research and development programs are now underway, which by March 2007 could result in the resumption of antipersonnel mine production. The number of US military mine casualties increased markedly in 2003: fifteen military personnel were killed and 37 injured in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere.

Key developments since 1999: The US apparently did not use antipersonnel mines in Yugoslavia (Kosovo) in 1999, or in Afghanistan since October 2001, or in Iraq since March 2003. It reserved the right to use antipersonnel mines during each of these conflicts, and deployed mines to the region at least in the cases of Kosovo and Iraq. Landmine Monitor has identified 74 mine casualties among US military personnel between 2001 and 2003.

US mine action funding totaled $421.4 million between fiscal years 1999 and 2003, the largest total for any government. In addition, the State Department reports that in the last five years several hundred thousand US citizens have contributed more than $14 million to mine action programs around the world. The Department of Defense spent over $250 million from 1999-2003 to identify and field alternatives for landmines. The RADAM program, which would have combined existing antipersonnel and antivehicle mines into a new “mixed system,” was cancelled in 2002. The Pentagon reported in May 2002 that it “will not be able to meet” the 2006 target date to develop and field alternatives to antipersonnel mines.

Congress has extended the 1992 legislative moratorium on export of antipersonnel mines several times, most recently until 23 October 2008. US antipersonnel mines stockpiled in Italy, Norway, and Spain were removed to comply with their Mine Ban Treaty obligations. The US cleared its protective minefields at the Guantanamo Bay naval base in Cuba in 1999, and now claims not to maintain minefields anywhere in the world. However, protective minefields from the Soviet era are incorporated into the perimeter defense at locations US forces occupy in Afghanistan. The US ratified CCW Amended Protocol II in May 1999.

Mine Ban Policy

The United States has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Following a two-and-one-half year review, the Bush Administration announced a new landmine policy on 27 February 2004 that abandons the long-held US objective of joining the Mine Ban Treaty eventually and instead allows the military to retain antipersonnel mines indefinitely. This reverses the previous policy announced by the Clinton Administration to join the Mine Ban Treaty by 2006, as long as suitable alternatives to antipersonnel mine had been identified and fielded. According to the Department of State which was charged with presenting the new policy:

The United States will not join the [Mine Ban Treaty] because its terms would have required the US to give up a needed military capability.... Landmines still have a valid and essential role protecting United States forces in military operations.... No other weapon currently exists that provides all the capabilities provided by landmines.[1]

The new US policy characterizes landmines according to their active lifespan or “persistence” and reframes the focus from only antipersonnel mines to all types of landmines, both antipersonnel and antivehicle. The use of landmines that self-destruct and/or self-deactivate is permitted indefinitely without any geographic restriction.[2] Authority to use this type of landmine resides with the Secretary of Defense and may be delegated downward in the rules of engagement normally to a Major General as a Division Commander.[3] The use of non-self-destructing antipersonnel mines is permissible until 2010 and then only in Korea. The use of non-self-destructing antivehicle mines globally will be allowed until 2010.[4] Only the US President can authorize the use of non-self-destructing landmines and this authority cannot be delegated.[5]

Other elements of the policy include a pledge to increase mine action funding, a commitment to negotiate a ban on the sale or export of non-self-destructing landmines, and a renewed effort to research and develop new self-destructing/self-deactivating landmines (these elements are described in greater detail below).[6]

The United States Campaign to Ban Landmines (USCBL) denounced the new policy for “sending the wrong message” by providing “a dangerous, isolationist example” to mine-using countries.[7] The USCBL’s parent organization, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) said that despite the policy rejection, “... the Mine Ban Treaty has been extraordinarily successful at alleviating the global landmine problem without US support for many years, and no doubt will continue to do so in the future.”[8] USCBL chair, Human Rights Watch, released a fact sheet on “smart” mines and said the US “stands alone in this position that there can be a technological solution to the global landmine problem.”[9]

In September 1994, the United States became the first nation to call for the “eventual elimination” of antipersonnel mines. On 16 May 1996, President Clinton said the US would “seek a worldwide agreement as soon as possible to end the use of all antipersonnel landmines.”[10] Instead of endorsing the Ottawa Process, on 17 January 1997 the Clinton Administration announced that the US would seek negotiations on a worldwide mine ban treaty in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, Switzerland.[11] As action in the CD floundered, the US attended as an observer every preparatory meeting of the Ottawa Process. The US participated in the ban treaty negotiations in Oslo in September 1997, but laid out a series of prerequisites for its support that were rejected by others.[12] On 17 September, President Clinton announced that the US would not be signing the treaty, but he also stated that the US would unilaterally stop using antipersonnel mines everywhere but Korea by 2003 and in Korea by 2006; officials later clarified that this would not apply to antipersonnel mines contained in mixed munitions as the US no longer considered these to be antipersonnel mines, but rather submunitions.

The US had not officially participated in any Mine Ban Treaty-related meetings held since entry into force in 1999, until June 2004, when it officially attended and delivered a statement at an intersessional Standing Committee meeting.[13] The US has abstained on every annual pro-Mine Ban Treaty UN General Assembly resolution since 1997, including UNGA Resolution 58/83 on 8 December 2003. While it has in the past consistently supported annual resolutions by the Organization of American States (OAS) that promote an antipersonnel mine-free hemisphere, the US refused to join consensus on a June 2004 resolution, calling its mine-free goal, “an unnecessary action regardless of whether or not the mine generates any adverse impacts or poses a threat to civilians.”[14] Landmine Monitor has found no evidence to indicate that the US has actively sought to persuade countries against ratifying or acceding to the Mine Ban Treaty.

The US is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and ratified Amended Protocol II on 24 May 1999. It attended the Fifth Annual Conference of States Parties in November 2003 and submitted a national report, as required under Article 13, on 27 November 2003. In the work of the Group of Governmental Experts since November 2002, the US has taken the lead in promoting a new protocol on “mines other than antipersonnel mines” (MOTAPM).

In a statement to the final session of the Conference on Disarmament on 29 July 2004, the US announced its intent to pursue negotiations on an international ban on the sale or export of “persistent” non-self-destructing landmines in the CD.[15] Canada noted that the 42 CD member states that are already part of the Mine Ban Treaty “will not be in a position to enter negotiations on a lesser ban, aimed at arresting trade in one category of antipersonnel mines alone but implying the acceptability of trade in other categories of these weapons.”[16] The CD has not been able to agree on its agenda since 1997.

Use

The United States last acknowledged using antipersonnel mines in 1991 in Kuwait and Iraq, scattering 117,634 self-destructing/self-deactivating landmines mostly from airplanes.[17] In a September 2002 report, the US General Accounting Office (GAO) stated that it did not receive any data from the US Department of Defense to indicate, either directly or indirectly, that any enemy casualties, equipment loss, or maneuver limitations were caused by the use of mines by the US The GAO also reported that there was reluctance among some US commanders to use mines because of their impact on mobility, fratricide potential, and safety concerns.[18] According to official annual mine and UXO clearance reports by the Kuwait Ministry of Defense, air-delivered Gator antipersonnel and antivehicle mines continue to be found and destroyed in Kuwait.[19]

US forces did not use antipersonnel mines in Yugoslavia during the Kosovo crisis from 24 March to 10 June 1999. However, the US reserved the right to use antipersonnel mines if it deemed it necessary, and deployed them to the region, including to Albania, then a signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty.[20] There is no evidence that the United States has used antipersonnel mines in its combat operations in Afghanistan since October 2001.[21] It is not known whether US forces deployed to Afghanistan with antipersonnel mines or their delivery systems, but US Special Operations Forces have one type of antipersonnel mine at their disposal: the Pursuit Deterrent Munition (PDM).[22]

Protective minefields from the Soviet era are incorporated into the perimeter defense at locations US forces occupy in Afghanistan.[23] The US does not accept that military advantage is derived from these minefields and it is not obligated to comply with CCW Amended Protocol II to mark and monitor these minefields to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians. According to the Department of State, “The US believes that twenty-year-old minefields are more a liability than an asset and while the US has cleared vast areas of the existing Soviet-era minefields, not being in a position to clear all minefields does not automatically trigger obligations under the CCW.”[24]

US forces have apparently not used antipersonnel mines in Iraq since launching the invasion in March 2003. The US has not publicly confirmed that it has not used antipersonnel mines in the conflict.[25] The Pentagon refused to rule out landmine use in Iraq, saying its forces might use mines in case they needed to prevent access to suspected chemical weapons storage sites.[26] At least 90,000 antipersonnel mines were stockpiled in the region prior to the conflict. US forces used Claymore directional fragmentation munitions during combat operations in Iraq in 2003.[27]

According to the State Department, the US “maintains no minefields anywhere in the world, including Korea. The mines along South Korea's section of the DMZ belong to South Korea.”[28] The use of landmines in protective minefields at the US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba ended in 1999 and according to the Pentagon, all of the antipersonnel mines and antivehicle mines have been removed from the Guantanamo minefields and destroyed.[29]

Stockpiling

The US stockpiles 10.4 million antipersonnel mines and 7.5 million antivehicle mines making it the world’s third largest stockpiler of landmines after China and Russia. Included in this 17.9 million landmine stockpile are 1.5 million non-self-destructing antipersonnel mines and 1.3 million non-self-destructing antivehicle mines.[30] Mixed systems that contain both self-destructing/self-deactivating antipersonnel and antivehicle mines constitute only 11 percent of the overall stockpile.

US Antipersonnel Landmine Stockpile[31]

Munition
Number of Antipersonnel Mines
Artillery Delivered Antipersonnel Mine (ADAM)
8,366,076
M14
696,800
M16
465,330
Claymore
403,096
Gator
281,822
Volcano (M87 only)
134,200
Ground Emplaced Mine Scattering System (GEMSS)
32,900
Pursuit Deterrent Munition (PDM)
15,100
Modular Pack Mine System (MOPMS)
8,824
Total
10,404,148

The U.S claims that its self-destructing/self-deactivating landmines are highly reliable: “We have tested over 67,000 landmines under a wide range of conditions, with no failures of the self-destruct system. If the self-destruct mechanism should fail, the self-deactivation system would make sure the landmine could not function after no more than 90 days.”[32] This level of reliability only applies only to activated mines.[33] These assurances are inconsistent with the cautions contained in Army field manuals, the findings of ammunition testing data, and experiences in the 1991 Gulf War.[34] The Department of Defense provided the US General Accounting Office in 2002 with test records that documented reliability problems with eight of its self-destructing/self-deactivating landmine systems; among other problems, some landmines did not self-destruct as intended. The reports cited by the GAO indicated at least one test produced hazardous dud mines.[35]

Landmine Monitor has previously reported that the US stored antipersonnel mines in at least 12 countries (Bahrain, Germany, Greece, Japan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Turkey, and the United Kingdom at Diego Garcia), but it is not possible to confirm current locations or numbers of US antipersonnel mines in foreign countries, following the movements of equipment and ammunition preceding the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. While officials acknowledge that the US stores mines outside the US, they state, “For security reasons, we routinely do not discuss the specific types, quantities or locations of munition stores.”[36]

The US completed destroying over 3.3 million non-self-destructing M14 and M16 antipersonnel mines in 1998.[37] The US has not reported destroying any stockpiled mines since then, but landmines may have been included in the number of submunitions destroyed annually. In fiscal year 2003, the US funded the destruction of 1,267 tons of submunitions.[38] Additionally, contractors outside the US have destroyed some stocks of US antipersonnel mines. For example, Germany reports destroying 36,351 GEMSS mines and 38,959 M18A1 Claymore mines in 2001.[39]

Production

The US has not produced antipersonnel mines since 1997 and is one of just fifteen countries left in the world that either actively produces them or reserves the right to do so. The new landmine policy announced in February 2004 states, “The United States will continue to develop non-persistent anti-personnel and anti-tank landmines.”[40] At least two research and development programs are now underway, which by March 2007, could result in the resumption of antipersonnel mine production.

The United States produced 628,200 antipersonnel mines between fiscal years 1983 and 1992 for a total cost of $1.7 billion.[41] This included nine different mine types. The last non-self-destructing antipersonnel mines were procured in 1990 when the US Army bought nearly 80,000 M16A1 antipersonnel mines for $1.9 million. The last self-destructing/self-deactivating antipersonnel mines were produced between 1992 and 1997 when 450,000 ADAM and 13,200 CBU-89/B Gator mines were bought for $120 million.

Research and Development

The new landmine policy announced in February 2004 states, “The United States will continue to research and develop enhancements to the current technology of self-destructing/self-deactivating landmines to develop and preserve military capabilities that address our transformational goals.”[42] Additionally, “future tactical barriers may include a new generation of landmines or alternative systems, most likely incorporating improvements to our current SD/SDA technology to provide more flexibility and control of the devices once emplaced.”[43]

New US landmines will apparently have a variety of ways of being initiated, both “man-in-the-loop” and autonomous or traditional victim-activation. US officials have noted that self-destruct features will limit the time that the munitions will be able to be in a victim-activated mode. According to budget documents released in February 2004, the Department of Defense has requested over $704 million in funds for the research, development, and production of landmine systems.

The Department of Defense spent over $250 million between fiscal years[44] 1999 and 2003 to identify and field one-for-one alternatives for landmines as part of programs put into place by presidential direction in 1996.[45] One landmine alternatives program, RADAM, which would have combined existing antipersonnel and antivehicle mines into a new “mixed system,” was cancelled in fiscal year 2002. The RADAM program cost $12.1 million, but no munitions were produced.

While the new landmine policy will radically alter the landmine alternatives program described in previous Landmine Monitor reports, the scope of these changes are not readily apparent, in part because the fiscal year 2005 presidential budget request was published prior to the announcement of the new landmine policy. However, it appears that the Department of Defense research and acquisition community is pursuing two programs to develop new landmine systems: the Spider program and the Intelligent Munitions System (IMS). It is not yet possible to determine if these systems will be compliant with the Mine Ban Treaty definition of an antipersonnel mine. The final system configuration of Spider will be determined in June/Dec 2005, and this milestone will not be reached for IMS until after FY 2009

Spider is the result of the Non-Self-Destruct Alternative (NSD-A) program.[46] The US Army spent $93 million between fiscal years 1999 and 2003 to research and develop Spider.[47] Another $30 million has been requested to complete research and development in fiscal years 2004 and 2005. The Spider system consists of a control unit capable of monitoring up to 84 hand-emplaced unattended munitions that deploy a web of tripwires across an area. Once a tripwire is activated, a man-in-the-loop control system allows the operator to activate either lethal or non-lethal effects. Early in its development, Spider contained a feature that removed the man-in-the-loop and allowed for target-activation – a so-called “battlefield override” switch. The status of this feature at this stage is unknown; a system allowing for target-activation would be prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty. A decision whether to produce Spider is scheduled for June 2005 and the first units are scheduled to be produced in March 2007.[48] The Department of Defense has requested $390 million to produce 210,000 Spider systems. Textron Systems Corporation (Wilmington, Massachusetts) and Alliant Techsystems (Plymouth, Minnesota) are jointly developing Spider. Day and Zimmerman (Parsons, Kansas) and General Dynamics (Taunton, Massachusetts) will be primary subcontractors.

The Intelligent Munitions System (IMS) is a new program combining the previous efforts under the Track 2 and Track 3 of the landmine alternatives programs into a research and development program titled Close Combat Capabilities.[49] The previous Self Healing Minefield, APL-A Mixed Systems, and APL-A landmine alternatives programs are being consolidated into the IMS program. A total of $145 million of research and development funding was spent on these landmine alternatives between fiscal years 1999 and 2003.[50] While the future funding profile for the IMS is somewhat unclear, $274 million has been set aside for its research and development between fiscal years 2004 and 2009.[51] According to budget documentation, the IMS is “an integrated system of effects (lethal, non-lethal, anti-vehicle, anti-personnel, demolitions), software, sensors/seekers, and communications that may be emplaced by multiple means and is capable of unattended employment for the detection, classification, identification, tracking and engagement of selected targets.” It would appear that “unattended employment for...engagement of selected targets” implies that target-activation is possible, which would make this system incompatible with the Mine Ban Treaty.

Claymore and Antivehicle Mines

In February 2004 the Pentagon requested $20.2 million to produce 40,000 M18A1E1 Claymore munitions. Mohawk Electrical Systems, Inc (Milford, Delaware) is scheduled to produce the munitions between June 2005 and March 2006.[52] The M18A1E1 will incorporate a new triggering system that does not rely on either the victim-activated mechanical tripwire fuze or command-detonated electrical initiation provided with the M18A1. Instead, the munitions are planned to be command detonated by a new generation of modernized demolition initiators that use explosives to trigger the munition.[53] The US first produced Claymore mines in 1960 and has since bought 7.8 million of them for a cost of $122 million.[54]

Production of M87A1 Volcano antivehicle mines continued in 2004. This procurement reflects an increase of $2.5 million by Congress for fiscal year 2004. An additional 2,000 canisters, each containing six antivehicle mines, are being produced.[55]

Transfer

US law has prohibited the export of antipersonnel mines since 23 October 1992. This moratorium has been extended several times, most recently until 23 October 2008. The US exported over 5.6 million antipersonnel mines to 38 countries between 1969 and 1992.[56] A total of 20 Mine Ban Treaty States Parties have so far declared possessing 1.7 million antipersonnel mines of US origin in their stockpiles, prior to their destruction.[57] Deminers in at least 28 mine-affected countries or regions have reported the presence of nine different types of US-manufactured antipersonnel mines, including non-self-destructing and self-destructing/self-deactivating types.[58]

US agencies have been active in acquiring and providing landmines for testing and research purposes. Romania transferred 3,265 antipersonnel mines to the US Department of the Navy sometime between April 2003 and April 2004.[59] In 2002, Ecuador transferred 1,644 antipersonnel mines to the US Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division (Indian Head, Maryland).[60] The US provided 140 M14 antipersonnel mines to Canada for testing of personal protective equipment for deminers in 2001.[61]

Mine Action Funding

The US remains the largest single donor country to humanitarian mine action programs worldwide. According to figures compiled by Landmine Monitor, in fiscal year 2003, the US provided $93 million to mine action programs in 37 countries. The total for fiscal year 2003 was nearly $17 million more than the previous year’s total of $76.9 million, stopping a two-year downward trend. The US has provided approximately $640.7 million in mine action assistance between fiscal years 1993 and 2003, including $433.6 million from FY1999-FY2003. (See below for different figures cited by the US government).

Landmine Monitor Estimate of US Mine Action Funding,
Fiscal Years 1999-2003 ($ in millions)


FY 1999
FY 2000
FY 2001
FY 2002
FY 2003
State Department (NADR)[62]
35.0
39.5
39.9
40.0
49.0
Defense Department (OHDACA)[63]
16.0
28.9
16.6
6.7
6.2
Slovenian International Trust Fund[64]
12.1
14.0
12.7
14.0
10.0
Defense Department Research & Development[65]
18.2
18.2
12.6
13.2
12.6
Emergency Supplemental Funding (Afghanistan)
--
--
--
3.0
3.0
Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund[66]
--
--
--
--
12.2

81.3
100.6
81.8
76.9
93.0

The initial US government funding estimates for fiscal years 2004 and 2005, of $75.5 million and $93.6 million, respectively, are likely to significantly increase because of additional resources provided in supplementary funding and a broader increase in US foreign assistance related to the clearance of mines, explosive remnants of war, and abandoned ammunition. The landmine policy announced in February 2004 pledged, “Funding for the State Department’s portion of the US Humanitarian Mine Action Program will be increased by an additional 50 percent over [fiscal year 2003] baseline levels to $70 million a year.”[67]

Supplemental assistance to Afghanistan and Iraq contains very significant funding that include a mine action component as a necessary precondition for the implementation of larger development programs, such as road building and the restoration of electric power. The 2004 supplemental bill provides $100 million to the Department of Defense to secure and destroy conventional munitions in Iraq. Another $61 million is allocated to the State Department for munitions clearance in Iraq and another $23 million is provided to the US Agency for International Development (USAID) for road building in Afghanistan.[68] Moreover, the US Department of Defense awarded a $317 million contract to the US Army Corps of Engineers in fiscal year 2003 to secure and destroy abandoned enemy ammunition in Iraq, whose vast quantities and widespread presence constitute a major humanitarian threat there.[69]

While Landmine Monitor relies on official US sources for its mine action figures, in some official publications and public remarks by officials, the US government cites different figures for its mine action funding than those presented by Landmine Monitor.[70] According to the Department of State, the US has provided over $900 million in mine action funding since fiscal year 1993.[71] At the intersessional meeting in June 2004, the head of the State Department’s office responsible for mine action funding stated, “This year alone, our country will -- including special supplementary funds for Iraq and Afghanistan -- provide nearly $200 million to support Humanitarian Mine Action.”[72]

The annual totals for fiscal years 1993 to 2004 provided by the Department of State reflect the difference: approx. $191.9 in 1993-1998; $82.2 million in 1999; $110.7 million in 2000; $91.1 million in 2001; $106 million in 2002; $118.1 million in 2003; and, approx. $200 million in 2004.[73]

There are a number of reasons for this difference. One factor is the addition of emergency wartime supplemental funding noted above. Another factor is that mine action assistance figures cited by Landmine Monitor do not include annual funding of approximately $10-11 million dedicated for war victims assistance programs, which are accounted for separately in Landmine Monitor under the survivor assistance section.[74] Additionally, Landmine Monitor’s knowledge is limited regarding some programs within the US government, like those within USAID and the Centers for Disease Control, that have some element of mine action included within a larger international assistance program, but are not identified as such or do not receive specific mine action appropriations.

The countries receiving State Department NADR and Defense Department OHDACA mine action funding, as well as the mine action-specific supplemental funding for Afghanistan and Iraq, in fiscal year 2003 is detailed in the following table:[75]

Mine Action Funding by Country, Fiscal Year 2003


State Dept.
Defense Dept.
2003 Total
Afghanistan
8,300,000
--
8,300,000
Angola
3,500,000
--
3,500,000
Armenia
250,000
--
250,000
Azerbaijan
1,600,000
1,590,946
3,190,946
Cambodia
2,765,000
157,808
2,922,808
Chad
500,000
161,335
661,335
Djibouti
300,000
149,588
449,588
Egypt
--
783,000
783,000
Eritrea
2,400,000
--
2,400,000
Estonia
235,000
--
235,000
Ethiopia
300,000
--
300,000
Georgia
1,050,000
--
1,050,000
Guinea-Bissau
225,000
--
225,000
Iraq
2,950,000
--
18,150,000
Jordan
893,000
--
893,000
Laos
1,200,000
--
1,200,000
Lebanon
1,475,000
489,475
1,964,475
Mauritania
--
595,204
595,204
Mozambique
2,632,000
--
2,632,000
Namibia
600,000
--
600,000
Nicaragua
--
200,000
200,000
OAS
1,511,000
--
1,511,000
Peru
--
422,182
422,182
Rwanda
142,095
--
142,095
Somalia
450,000
--
450,000
Sri Lanka
2,400,000
24,247
2,424,247
Sudan
896,000
--
896,000
Vietnam
2,427,000
--
2,427,000
Yemen
750,000
92,754
842,754
Zambia
450,000
--
450,000

An additional $8.5 million of State Department NADR funding was allocated to global programs which include activities such as landmine impact surveys, cross-cutting initiatives and research and training. Also in fiscal year 2003, the US supported mine action programs in six countries through the Slovenian International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims’ Assistance: Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia FYR, and Serbia and Montenegro.[76] Since 1998, the US has provided $52 million in matching contributions and $10.6 million in unilateral contributions to the trust fund.[77] In addition, the US Department of State funds and operates the world’s only Quick Reaction Demining Force, based in Mozambique, which has been deployed to Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Iraq.

In fiscal year 2003, US mine action assistance was applied to the following types of activities in programs in these countries (see individual country reports for details):[78]

  • Mine Clearance: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Croatia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Estonia, Georgia (in Abkhazia), Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Laos, Lebanon, Macedonia , Mozambique, Namibia, OAS (Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, Peru), Rwanda, Serbia and Montenegro, Somalia (Somaliland), Sri Lanka, Sudan, Vietnam, Yemen, and Zambia.
  • Mine Detecting Dogs: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Eritrea, Iraq, Lebanon, Mozambique, OAS (Honduras, Nicaragua), Rwanda, Sri Lanka, and Sudan.
  • Training and Equipment: Afghanistan, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Djibouti, Ecuador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Macedonia , Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, OAS, Peru, Rwanda, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam, Yemen, and Zambia.
  • Support to National Demining Offices/Mine Action Centers: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Chad, Djibouti, Eritrea, Estonia, Iraq, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Yemen, and Zambia.
  • Mine Risk Education: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Croatia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Iraq, Laos, Lebanon, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, OAS (Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Peru) Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo), Sri Lanka, Vietnam and Zambia.
  • Landmine Impact Surveys: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Djibouti, Vietnam, Yemen and Zambia.

Mine Action Policy and Structure

The State Department’s Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs was incorporated into the newly formed Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement on 6 October 2003. In addition to administering the State Department’s humanitarian mine action assistance program and the Public-Private Partnerships program, the new office also manages programs related to eliminating small arms and light weapons.[79] The mine action policy coordination group met on 13 March 2003 and 11 December 2003.

Concurrent with the formation of the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, a set of “revitalized goals” for how the US as a donor treats requests for humanitarian mine action assistance from affected countries and the “measurable goals” by which programs are evaluated have been articulated. During the review process leading to the new landmine policy, President Bush directed the State Department to develop a new strategic plan for the US Humanitarian Mine Action Program. The US humanitarian mine action strategic plan will serve to advance humanitarian interests and protect the US by promoting regional security. It uses four factors to determine to whom and to what degree the US provides assistance: humanitarian need, foreign policy interests, efficiency and transparency of the recipient’s national mine action program, and the recipient’s commitment to demining.[80]

Public-Private Partnerships

Initiated in late 1997 this program has developed a network of public-private partnerships to bring new energy, ideas, and resources to the efforts to make the world safe from landmines, other types of weapons, and remnants of war. The partnership program, which numbers over 50 participants, including US and foreign organizations, promotes the entire spectrum of humanitarian mine action. Partners include civic associations, charitable foundations, corporations, non-governmental and international organizations, and educational groups from middle school through university-level.

According to the State Department’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, which administers the Public-Private Partnership program, in the last five years, several hundred thousand US citizens have contributed more than $14 million to mine action programs around the world, including through partner organizations.[81] There is also a competitive grant process whereby these partners can apply for funding for their proposals and programs. Some public-private partnerships include the United Nations Association of the USA (UNA-USA) and its Adopt-A-Minefield program, Warner Bros., DC Comics, the HALO Trust, the Polus Center for Social and Economic Development, Global Care Unlimited, Grapes for Humanity (a Canadian NGO), Marshall Legacy Institute, Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF), Landmine Survivors Network (LSN), Humpty Dumpty Institute, Roots of Peace, People-to-People International, Clear Path International, and Freedom Fields USA, to name a few.[82]

Some examples of fundraising in 2003 by partner organizations from private sources in the US include: UNA-USA Adopt-A-Minefield received $3,632,545 of which $423,796 was from the Department of State; the HALO Trust raised $660,787 from private sources in the US; People-to-People International raised $126,987 from private sources; in Grapes for Humanity’s first year of operation $150,000 was raised in the US with the proceeds going to projects in Nicaragua, Honduras, Angola, and Ethiopia, and the Children of Armenia Fund is raising $400,000 to fund a team of six mine detecting dogs with a 3-to-1 dollar match by the United States government and the International Trust Fund.[83]

Department of Defense Humanitarian Demining Research and Development

Since the beginning of the program in 1996, a total of $129 million has been allocated by the Department of Defense to test, develop, and validate equipment and technologies to assist deminers engaged in humanitarian mine action. In fiscal year 2003, a total of $12.6 million was provided for these purposes. Demining equipment and technologies were developed and tested at several locations worldwide. Mechanical mine/vegetation clearance equipment was tested in Angola, Djibouti, Georgia, Honduras, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. Site surveys and equipment needs assessments were conducted in Angola, Azerbaijan, Honduras, and Mozambique.[84]

Over the life of the program, the Department of Defense has tested demining equipment and technologies in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chile, Croatia, Cuba (at Guantánamo Bay), Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, Israel, Jordan, Kosovo, Laos, Lebanon, Namibia, Nicaragua, and Thailand. It goal is to provide equipment for “the international demining community to assess equipment capabilities in actual demining conditions. Equipment developed under this program also has many uses for military applications as several pieces of equipment are being evaluated under the Joint Area Clearance Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration.”[85]

Landmine Casualties

The number of US military mine casualties increased markedly in 2003. A total of 15 military personnel were killed and 37 injured in 2003 by landmines, based on an analysis of media reports and official casualty announcements of the incidents. In Afghanistan, seven US military personnel were killed and five injured in mine incidents.[86] At least seven US soldiers were killed and 30 injured in 2003 in landmine incidents in Iraq. One US Army Special Operations soldier was killed and two others injured in a training accident with a Claymore directional fragmentation mine in Puerto Rico in January 2003.[87] An additional six were killed and nineteen injured in UXO incidents in Iraq.[88]

Landmine Monitor has also identified 22 mine casualties among US military personnel in 2001 and 2002, five killed and 17 injured. In 2002 there were 15 mine casualties; five were killed and seven injured in Afghanistan, and three were injured in a mine incident in Kuwait. In 2001, seven mine casualties were reported, none fatal, five in Afghanistan and one each in South Korea and Kosovo.

Casualties continue to be reported in 2004, particularly in Iraq. In April and July 2004, two US soldiers were killed when their vehicles hit landmines.[89] There were eight other cases where relatives say that a US soldier was killed by a landmine.[90]

The number of casualties attributed to improvised explosive devices (IED) in Iraq and Afghanistan is much higher. The US military uses the term IED to describe nearly all explosive devices encountered by US forces. In reporting casualties, US military officials make no distinction made between target-activated or command-detonated IED.[91] One source estimates that 200 US military personnel have been killed by IEDs in Iraq from the beginning of the fighting until the end of June 2004.[92] The number of injured is not known. In addition to the military casualties, two US civilian contractors were killed and one was wounded when their car hit an IED in November 2003.[93] Target-activated IEDs are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.

Between 1990 and 2000, 14 US military personnel were killed by landmines and 89 were injured. The majority of these casualties occurred in the 1991 Persian Gulf War (12 killed and 69 injured). There were 22 other landmine casualties (two killed and 20 injured) elsewhere, including two in Egypt, ten in Germany, seven in South Korea, and three in the US[94] During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, more US casualties were caused by cluster munition UXO and other unidentified UXO (22 killed and 74 injured) than were caused by landmines.

Survivor Assistance

The primary vehicle for US government funding for landmine survivor assistance is the Patrick J. Leahy War Victims Fund (LWVF) administered by the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Expenditures for landmine survivors are not separated out from those for war victims overall, thus it is not possible to give a precise value to US spending on mine survivor assistance programs. The LWVF supports programs for the physical rehabilitation and socio-economic reintegration of those with landmine and other war-related injuries. Since 1989, the LWVF has provided more than $116 million in support for victims of war in 30 countries. Between 1999 and the end of fiscal year 2003, $51.9 million was provided, including $11.9 million in 2003. The estimated budget for fiscal year 2004 is $11.93 million.[95]

Leahy War Victims Fund
Fiscal Years 1989-2004 ($ in millions)

1989-1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
52.878
10
10
10
10
11.9
11.9

The LWVF is dedicated to improving the mobility, health, and social integration of adults and children who have sustained physical disabilities as a direct or indirect result of war or civil strife. Related services, such as gaining access to education and employment opportunities are also funded to promote the economic and social reintegration of the victims.

In fiscal year 2003, new projects funded by the LWVF started in Afghanistan, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Senegal, and Sierra Leone.[96] Specific LWVF projects include:[97]

  • Afghanistan: $2.8 million was allocated between 2003-2006 to UNDP to provide assistance to survivors of landmines and other war-related injuries.
  • Angola: $6 million was granted to the VVAF for the period 1996-2004 for survivor assistance,” which includes a rehabilitation center in Luena that provides orthopedic devices.
  • Cambodia: From 1996 to 2004, approximately $13 million was obligated to improve the rehabilitation and reintegration of civilian victims of war. LWVF partners receiving these funds included: the American Red Cross, the Disability Action Council, HI and VVAF.
  • Central America: For the period 2000-2005, $1.2 million was allocated to PAHO in support of the “Central American Tripartite Land Mine Initiative” for survivor assistance in El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua.
  • Laos: $3.2 million was granted to “The Consortium” (World Education and World Learning) for the War Victims Assistance Project from June 2000 to October 2004.
  • Lebanon: $5 million was allocated to the World Rehabilitation Fund from June 1998 to December 2004 for the “Preventing Land Mine Injuries and Managing the Social Burden of Land Mines in Lebanon” project. The project assisted in the creation of the Landmine Resource Center at the University of Balamand in Beirut and in 2001 a war victims’ cooperative was founded in the district of Jizzine.
  • Liberia: $1.7 million was allocated to the United Methodist Committee on Relief from September 2000 to September 2003. An orthopedic workshop was constructed in 1998 with funding provided to UNICEF. The workshop was revitalized and integrated into the management structure of Ganta United Methodist Hospital. The Ganta workshop was destroyed during fighting in March 2003 and UMCOR was forced to cease operations.
  • Mozambique: Between July 2000 and May 2002, $1.25 million was provided to Prosthetic and Orthotic Worldwide Education and Relief for their “Prosthetics Assistance Project.”
  • Pan-Africa: $2.75 million was granted to the ICRC Special Fund for Disabled for the period 2002-2007 to ensure the continuity of physical rehabilitation projects in war-affected countries and support similar programs in other African countries, including in Cameroon, India, Kenya, Lebanon, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Syria, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
  • Senegal: $499,751 was allocated to HI from July 2000 to July 2003 to strengthen rehabilitation services for people in the Casamance region. $1 million was granted for another three-year period to extend rehabilitation efforts into the region of Zinguinchor.
  • Sri Lanka: $3.75 million was granted to Motivation for its “Mobility Disabilities Project” for the period 2002-2007. The project centers on increasing the availability of appropriate prosthetics and orthotics; and providing training and job placement assistance. A war-damaged orthotics workshop has been renovated in Jaffna and a wheelchair and tricycle production workshop facility had been refurbished in Colombo.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa: $8 million was provided to the Omega Initiative from 2001-2006 to provide funding and technical support for a broad range of rehabilitation services for war disabled civilians in Sub-Saharan Africa. VVAF received a four-year, $2.45 million sub-grant to work in Ethiopia. Handicap International received $792,024 for a three-year project in DR Congo and $1 million for a three-year project in Sierra Leone. Christian Aid for Under-Assisted Societies Everywhere (CAUSE) was granted $347,940 for a two-year project in Sierra Leone and Medical Care Development International (MCDI) received $1 million for a 28-month project in South Sudan.
  • Vietnam: $3.3 million was allocated from April 1999 to December 2006 to the Health Volunteers Overseas organization for its “Vietnam Rehabilitation Project.” From September 1998 to December 2005, $4 million will be given to Viet-Nam Assistance for the Handicapped for the “Prosthetic, Rehabilitation and Barrier-Free Accessibility Project.” From April 2002 to April 2005, $2 million was granted to the VVAF for the “Sustainable Benefits for the Mobility Impaired Program” which is implemented in partnership with two hospitals and includes a mobile Outreach Program brings basic rehabilitation services directly to the countryside. $301,559 was allocated to Prosthetic Outreach Foundation for 2002-2005 to advance the standards for orthopedic component technology in Vietnam. $400,000 was allocated to University Research Corporation for 2002-2005 to provide training and technical assistance in quality assurance and improved techniques.

Funding for survivor assistance is also provided through the Slovenian International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims’ Assistance. In calendar year 2003, approximately $1.5 million of US Department of State funding was spent on mine survivor assistance programs in the Balkans via the ITF.[98] Landmine Monitor has identified 23 organizations in the United States that fund or operate survivor assistance programs in mine-affected countries: ADRA International, American Red Cross, American Refugee Committee, Clear Path International, Center for International Rehabilitation, Children of Armenia Fund, Grapes for Humanity, Health Volunteers Oversees, International Institute for Prosthetic Rehabilitation of Landmine Survivors, International Rescue Committee, Julia Burke Foundation, Kids First, LSN, Peace Trees Vietnam, People to People International, Polus Center for Social and Economic Development, Project RENEW (VVMF), Prosthetics Outreach Foundation, Refugee Relief International, Save the Children-USA, United Nations Foundation, VVAF, and the World Rehabilitation Fund.

Some rely entirely on private charitable sources; however, most are using a mix of private and public funds in their programs. Many are also associated with the US Department of State’s Public-Private Partnership Program for mine action. The biggest source of public funds is USAID through the LWVF. Some organizations in the US raise funds and then pool resources at an international level to support programs that may or may not be administered from the original US group.

No legislative action has occurred on the “International Disability and Victims of Warfare Civil Strife Assistance Act of 2003” introduced in the US Congress on 27 March 2003. This was essentially a reintroduction of similar legislation, the “International Disability and Victims of Landmines, Civil Strife and Warfare Assistance Act of 2001.”


[1] US Department of State (DOS), Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “Fact Sheet: New United States Policy on Landmines: Reducing Humanitarian Risk and Saving Lives of United States Soldiers,” 27 February 2004.
[2] This eliminates the 1998 US commitment to cease using antipersonnel mines, except those contained in “mixed systems” with antivehicle mines, everywhere in the world except for Korea by 2003. If this commitment were maintained, 8.4 million antipersonnel mines would not be eligible for use anymore, except in Korea.
[3] Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Richard Kidd, Director, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, Department of State, 20 August 2004.
[4] Under the policy, the US will immediately cease the use of low metal content non-self-destructing antivehicle mines and destroy these mines within one year.
[5] Email from Richard Kidd, Department of State, 20 August 2004.
[6] Documents on the new US landmine policy can be found at www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/c11735.htm, accessed 12 October 2004.
[7] US Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Mine Ban Advocates Denounce White House Decision to Retain Landmines and Abandon Mine Ban Treaty,” Press Release, 27 February 2004.
[8] ICBL, “Nobel Laureates Condemn US Decision to Keep Antipersonnel Mines,” Press Release, 1 March 2004.
[9] Human Rights Watch, “Bush Administration Abandons Landmine Ban: Reversal Means US Can Use Mines Indefinitely, Anywhere,” Press Release, 27 February 2004. See also, Human Rights Watch Position Paper on “Smart” (Self-Destructing) Landmines: www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/02/27/7681.htm, accessed 12 October 2004, and New US Landmine Policy: Questions and Answers, at www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/02/27/usint7678.htm, accessed 12 October 2004.
[10] Under the 1996 policy, the US would no longer use non-self-destructing mines, except in Korea. It would no longer produce non-self-destructing mines and would destroy most of its stockpile of these mines, but it would maintain the right to use self-destructing/self-deactivating mines anywhere in the world, until an international ban took effect. The US would also retain the right to continue producing self-destructing/self-deactivating mines. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President, 16 May 1996.
[11] Other major elements of the policy announcement were that the US would observe a permanent ban on the export of antipersonnel mines (moving beyond the existing temporary moratorium), and that the US would cap its antipersonnel landmine stockpile at the current level of inventory. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the Press Secretary, 17 January 1997.
[12] Chief among these were a geographic exception for continued use of antipersonnel mines of all types in Korea; a change in the treaty’s definition of antipersonnel mine so that US antipersonnel mines contained in “mixed” systems with antivehicle mines would not be banned; and an optional nine-year deferral period for compliance with the treaty’s key prohibitions.
[13] US government officials have been physically present at some intersessional meetings and at the First and Second Meetings of States Parties in September 2000, but not as part of an official registered delegation.
[14] “Statement by the Delegation of the United States,” Organization of American States AG/RES.2003 (XXXIV-O/04), “Americas as an AP Landmine-Free Zone,” 8 June 2004.
[15] UN Office in Geneva, Press document: “Conference on Disarmament Hears Statement by United States on Landmines and Fissile Material,” 29 July 2004.
[16] Statement by Amb. Paul Meyer, Canada, to the Conference on Disarmament, 29 July 2004.
[17] Of these, 27,967 were antipersonnel mines and 89,667 were antivehicle mines. The Marine Corps used a small number of artillery-delivered self-destructing/self-deactivating antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, 432 of each. US General Accounting Office, “GAO-02-1003: MILITARY OPERATIONS: Information on US Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War,” September 2002, pp. 8-9.
[18] Ibid, p. 10.
[19] Kuwait Ministry of Defense, Headquarters Land Forces Command, “Monthly Ammunition and Explosive Destroyed/Recovery Report,” Annex A, 21 December 2002.
[20] See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 345. Army engineer units were deployed to Albania with antipersonnel mines and their delivery systems (MOPMS and Volcano mixed mine systems) as part of Task Force Hawk to support operations in Kosovo. Similar units were also deployed to Afghanistan. Major Scott C. Johnson, “Strategic Mobility, the Force Projection Army, and the Ottawa Landmine Treaty: Can the Army Get There?” A student monograph submitted to fulfill the requirements of the School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, 15 February 2001.
[21] Two publications have alleged US use of antipersonnel mines in Afghanistan. Richard Matthew and Ted Gaulin, “Time to Sign the Mine Ban Treaty,” Issues in Science and Technology, Spring 2003, p. 72, states that “special forces units...regularly deployed self-deactivating APLs and antitank systems to augment their defenses.” Michael Byers, “The Laws of War, US-Style,” London Review of Books, Vol. 25: 4, 20 February 2003, states, “In 2001, Canadian soldiers operating in Afghanistan were ordered by their American commander to lay mines around their camp. When they refused to do so, US soldiers–who were not subject to the restrictions–laid the mines for them.”
[22] Dept. of the Army, Field Manual 20-32, Mine/Countermine Operations, 29 May 1998, Chapter 4.
[23] Landmine Monitor (HRW) conducted several interviews in 2002 and 2003 with US and international military personnel, US civilian officials, and international mine action personnel who have visited US air bases at Bagram and Kandahar. In both locations, US defensive positions on the perimeter of these facilities are behind Soviet-era minefields.
[24] Email from John Stevens, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, US Department of State, 23 September 2004. The State Department also reports that “due to US demining operations, those legacy minefields have been significantly reduced... For example, 15 square kilometers of Bagram’s Soviet-era minefields have been cleared.”
[25] According to Arms Control Today, in response to email questions, US Central Command Public Affairs stated that US forces did not use or deploy antipersonnel mines in Iraq. Wade Boese, “US Military Did Not Use Landmines in Iraq aWar,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2003.
[26] US Department of Defense, “Background Briefing On Targeting,” 5 March 2003.
[27] US Central Command, “CENTCOM Operation Iraqi Freedom Briefing,” 31 March 2003. Since 1996, US policy and doctrine restricts the use of Claymore mines with victim-activated tripwires to Korea. Pentagon officials have not replied to questions about the status of target-activated Claymores under the new US landmine policy announced in February 2004.
[28] US DOS, “Fact Sheet: Frequently Asked Questions on the New United States Landmine Policy,” 27 February 2004.
[29] Letter from Dr. George R. Schneiter, Director, Strategic and Tactical Systems, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, to Human Rights Watch, 21 March 2000. The fact that antitank mines were also to be removed was disclosed at a Defense Department News Briefing on 20 January 1998. Beginning in 1961, the US emplaced approximately 50,000 antipersonnel and antivehicle mines along the perimeter of its facilities at Guantanamo Bay. Quality assurance and quality survey of the clearance were completed in May 2000.
[30] Low metal content M14 mines remaining in the US Stockpile were made compliant with CCW Amended Protocol II by the permanent attachment of metal washers. CCW Article 13 Report, Form C, 27 November 2003.
[31] Information provided by the US Armed Services in the Spring/Summer of 2002 cited in US General Accounting Office, “GAO-02-1003: MILITARY OPERATIONS: Information on US Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War,” September 2002, Appendix I, pp. 39-43.
[32] US DOS, “Frequently Asked Questions,” 27 February 2004.
[33] Written responses to questions submitted by Landmine Monitor (HRW) to Department of Defense members of the US Delegation to the Eighth Session of the CCW Group of Government Experts, Geneva, 6 July 2004. According to the US Army’s Field Manual on Mine Warfare, up to 10 percent of the mines fail to arm properly.
[34] The time when these mines are armed and when they self-destruct or fully self-deactivate can be as long as 19 weeks. Mines can also be damaged during delivery; according to the US Army’s Field Manual on Mine Warfare, two-to-five percent of self-destruct mechanisms fail and up to 10 percent of the mines fail to arm properly. This means that a proportion of these US mines would always remain intact on the surface of the ground without any indication whether the mine is live or not. From a deminer’s perspective, all mines encountered must be treated as though they are live. The mines must be cleared one-at-a-time using the same procedures used to clear all mines. The humanitarian impact is still present regardless of whether the mine has a self-destruct mechanism.
[35] US GAO, “Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War,” September 2002, pp. 24, 27, 29.
[36] US DOS, “Frequently Asked Questions,” 27 February 2004. The US used to stockpile mines in Italy, Norway and Spain, but had to remove the mines due to their Mine Ban Treaty obligations. Other Mine Ban Treaty States Parties have said any stockpiled US mines are not under their jurisdiction or control.
[37] Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), News Release: “Destruction of Last Non-Self-Destructing Anti-Personnel Landmines in US-Based Stockpile,” 25 June 1998.
[38] Dept. of the Army, “Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book, FY 2005 Budget Estimates, Procurement of Ammunition, Army, Conventional Munitions Demilitarization,” February 2004, p. 542-544.
[39] Germany, Article 7 Report, Form D.2, 16 April 2002.
[40] US DOS, “Fact Sheet: New US Policy on Landmines,” 27 February 2004.
[41] US Army, SARD-ZCA, Enclosure titled “Historical Quantities and Value of AP Land Mine Procurements,” to “Information Paper, Subject: Mines,” 21 July 1992.
[42] US DOS, “Fact Sheet: New US Policy on Landmines,” 27 February 2004.
[43] US DOS, “Fact Sheet: Landmine Policy White Paper,” 27 February 2004.
[44] The US government fiscal year is 1 October to 30 September (e.g., FY 2003 is 1 October 2002 to 30 September 2003).
[45] According to US government comments on this report in draft form, this figure was reported to be “about $227 million.” Email from John Stevens, Department of State, 23 September 2004. The $250 million figure is derived from: Office of the Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller), “Descriptive Summaries of the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Army Appropriation, Budget Activities 4 and 5,” February 2004, pp. 1096-1101; Department of the Army, “Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book, FY 2005 Budget Estimates, Procurement of Ammunition, Army,” February 2004, pp. 406-411; Office of the Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller), “Descriptive Summaries of the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Army Appropriation, Budget Activities 4 and 5,” February 2004, p. 74-79, 1079-1087; Office of the Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller), “Descriptive Summaries of the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Army Appropriation, Budget Activities 1,2, and 3,” February 2004, p. 463.
[46] Unless otherwise noted, all information on the Spider Program is sourced from: Office of the Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller), “Descriptive Summaries of the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Army Appropriation, Budget Activities 4 and 5,” February 2004, pp. 1096-1101; Department of the Army, “Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book, FY 2005 Budget Estimates, Procurement of Ammunition, Army,” February 2004, pp. 406-411.
[47] According to US government comments on this report in draft form, the figure is “about $86 million.” Email from John Stevens, Department of State, 23 September 2004.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Unless otherwise noted, all information on the IMS Program is sourced from: Office of the Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller), “Descriptive Summaries of the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Army Appropriation, Budget Activities 4 and 5,” February 2004, p. 74-79, 1079-1087; Office of the Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller), “Descriptive Summaries of the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Army Appropriation, Budget Activities 1,2, and 3,” February 2004, p. 463.
[50] According to US government comments on this report in draft form, this figure is $115 million. Email from John Stevens, Department of State, 23 September 2004.
[51] According to US government comments on this report in draft form, this figure is $234 million. Email from John Stevens, Department of State, 23 September 2004.
[52] Department of the Army, “Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book, FY 2005 Budget Estimates, Procurement of Ammunition, Army,” February 2004, pp. 386-392. This procurement includes $16 million in supplemental funding from the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003.
[53] US Army Field Support Command, “Sources Sought Amendment: M18A1 Claymore Antipersonnel Mine; M18A1E1 Claymore Antipersonnel Mines, a Variant that uses a Non-Electrical Initiation System; its Trainer (MM68E1); and the M5 Modular Crowd Control Munition (MCCM),” 12 May 2004.
[54] Dept. of the Army, “Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book, FY 2005 Budget Estimates, Procurement of Ammunition, Army,” February 2004, p. 388.
[55] The US Army has bought a total of 191,000 M87A1 Volcano antivehicle mine canisters. The Volcano system once was produced with antipersonnel mines, but this was changed in 1996. It is described by the US Army as “Ottawa compliant” and has been developed to “replace the use of hand emplaced conventional minefields.” Department of the Army, “Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book, FY 2005 Budget Estimates, Procurement of Ammunition, Army,” February 2004, pp. 393-394.
[56] Of this total, 4.14 million were non-self-destructing mines and approximately 80,000 were self-destructing mines. The remaining 1.36 million were Claymore mines. These figures do not include direct commercial sales. A total of 16 of these countries are considered to be mine-affected. Human Rights Watch obtained this information in August 1994 through a Freedom of Information Act request to the Defense Security Assistance Agency and US Army Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command concerning US landmine deliveries under the Foreign Military Sales Program and Military Assistance Program.
[57] Australia, Austria, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Greece, Honduras, Japan, Jordan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Thailand, Tunisia, Venezuela. While it has not formally submitted a transparency measures report, a portion of Turkey’s 3 million antipersonnel mine stockpile will likely also be of US origin.
[58] Mine threat files maintained by demining organizations and mine action centers in mine-affected countries contain information on the types of mines encountered. Human Rights Watch has cross-referenced this primary source data with secondary sources such as annual editions of Jane’s Mines and Mine Clearance and databases compiled and maintained by the Canadian, French, and US militaries.
[59] Romania, Article 7 Report, Form D.2, April 2004. Four types were transferred: MAI-75 (1,300), MAI-68 (1,300), MAI-6 (620), and MAI-2 (45).
[60] Ecuador, Article 7 Report, Form D.2, 31 May 2002.
[61] Canada, Article 7 Report, Form D.2, 24 April 2002.
[62] US DOS, “Congressional Budget Justifications: Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2005, Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related programs (NADR) appropriation,” 10 February 2004, pp. 154-158.
[63] US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program of the Department of Defense for Fiscal Year 2003,” Report to Congress submitted on 1 March 2004, pp. 4-6; Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “FY 2005 Budget Estimates, Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA),” February 2004.
[64] US DOS, “FY 2005, NADR appropriation,” 10 February 2004, p. 159.
[65] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “FY 2005 Budget Justification Materials, RDT&E, Program Element 0603920D8Z, Humanitarian Demining,” February 2004.
[66] Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004.
[67] US DOS, “Fact Sheet: New US Policy on Landmines,” 27 February 2004.
[68] Section 1121 of the “Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004.”
[69] Email from John Stevens, Department of State, 23 September 2004.
[70] In some cases, US documents match closely. The National Annual Report for CCW Amended Protocol II submitted by the US in November 2003 states, “In Fiscal Year 2003, US humanitarian mine action assistance totaled over $85 million, including more than $12 million for research and development, and $7.5 million from USAID’s Leahy War Victim Fund for survivor assistance. Fiscal Year 2004 funding is expected to be approximately the same.” CCW Article 13 Report, Form B, 27 November 2003.
[71] US DOS, “Fact Sheet: New US Policy on Landmines,” 27 February 2004.
[72] Statement by US, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk, Education, and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 22 June 2004.
[73] Information provided to Landmine Monitor by the US DOS, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, 25 June 2004. The information noted that the figures for fiscal year 2004 remain tentative until all projects are completed and accounts reconciled.
[74] The Leahy War Victims Fund (LWVF), which in part provides aid to mine survivors, is the primary source for US government funding in this area. Since 1989, the LWVF has provided more than $116 million in support for victims of war in 30 countries. The approximate fiscal year 2004 budget is $11.9 million. For details see survivor assistance section below.
[75] US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program of the Department of Defense for Fiscal Year 2003,” Report to Congress submitted on 1 March 2004, pp. 4-6; US DOS, “FY 2005, NADR appropriation,” 10 February 2004, pp. 154-158. Note that these figures do not include all of the supplementary and emergency funding that may include some mine action component.
[76] US DOS, “FY 2005, NADR appropriation,” 10 February 2004, p. 159.
[77] CCW Article 13 Report, Form B, 27 November 2003.
[78] As the Landmine Monitor Report 2004 went to press, the US Department of State’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement provided a pre-print copy of the 5th edition of “To Walk the Earth in Safety: The US Commitment to Humanitarian Mine Action.” This report details US humanitarian mine action efforts in over 40 countries. Please consult this publication for additional details of US funded programs. See www.state.gov/t/pm/wra.
[79] US DOS, Office of the Spokesman, “Media Note: Formation of Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement,” 6 October 2003.
[80] Statement by Richard Kidd, US DOS, Mine/UXO Workshop, Kunming, 27 April 2004.
[81] Information provided to Landmine Monitor by the US DOS, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, 16 August 2004.
[82] For an inclusive list of all partner organizations, see: US DOS, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “Synopsis of Public-Private Partnerships,” 20 April 2004.
[83] All information in this paragraph was provided to Landmine Monitor by the partner organizations, August 2004.
[84] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “FY 2005 Budget Justification Materials, RDT&E, Program Element 0603920D8Z, Humanitarian Demining,” February 2004. For more information see: www.humanitarian-demining.org .
[85] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “FY 2004-2005 Budget Justification Materials, RDT&E, Program Element 0603920D8Z, Humanitarian Demining,” February 2003.
[86] Landmine Monitor Analysis of media reports and official Department of Defense casualty reports. See also: “Afghan Land Mine Injures US Soldier,” Associated Press, 4 January 2003; “American Soldier Loses Foot in Mine Explosion,” American Forces Press Service, 10 January 2003; “GI Loses Foot in Afghan Land-Mine Blast,” Fox News, 19 February 2003; “US probes Afghan mine blast,” BBC, 20 February 2003; “US troops kill one, detain seven in Afghan raid,” Reuters, 22 April 2003.
[87] Frank Griffiths, “US soldier in Puerto Rico dies,” Associated Press, 27 January 2003.
[88] DoD casualty reports; CENTCOM news releases; Landmine Monitor analysis of media reports.
[89] DoD casualty report.
[90] Official casualty reports issued by the Department of Defense only speak of hostile or enemy action.
[91] Telephone interviews with military public affairs officers from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Washington, DC) and Central Command (Tampa, Florida, Baghdad, Iraq, and Kabul, Afghanistan), 10 June 2004.
[92] Main Action Information Center, James Madison University, “Landmine Situation in Iraq,” 22 June 2004. This source also attributes 100 fatalities among coalition forces to landmines and UXO.
[93] “Two from Knox firm die in Iraq,” Knoxville News-Sentinel, 4 November 2003.
[94] US GAO, “US Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War,” September 2002, pp. 11-20, p. 20, footnote 13. Official casualty data was provided to the GAO by the US Army Safety Center.
[95] USAID, Office of Democracy and Governance, “Congressional Budget Justification FY 2005, Special Programs to Address the Needs of Survivors,” 932-005, February 2004.
[96] There are global programs as well: Prosthetics and Orthotics Training and Technologies through International Society for Prosthetics and Orthotics (ISPO)- schools in Cambodia, El Salvador, Pakistan, Tanzania, Vietnam ($3,654,339). A similar program through WHO ($1,190,848). Provision of wheelchairs - Afghanistan (HI $207,984), Albania (Albania Disability Rights Foundation $387,950), Honduras, Nicaragua Guatemala (Polus Center for Social and Economic Development $1,030,000), Philippines (HI $750,000), worldwide (Motivation Charitable Trust $2.373.515).
[97] All subsequent descriptive summaries of WVF programs taken from United States Agency for International Development, “Patrick J. Leahy War Victims Fund, Portfolio Synopsis,” Spring 2004. Available at: www.dec.org/pdf_docs/PDACA160.pdf, accessed 12 October 2004.
[98] Email from John Stevens, Department of State, 23 September 2004.