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Table of Contents
Country Reports
Mine Action, Landmine Monitor Report 2005

Mine Action

Landmine Monitor has identified at least 84 countries and eight areas contaminated with landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) in 2005.[1] Of the 84 affected countries, 54 are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.[2] Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) appears to represent a threat in at least 15 countries and one area.[3]

The mine action community has largely moved away from estimating the number of mines remaining in the ground. Earlier estimates of 100 million or more emplaced mines have been discredited. Efforts are now concentrated on identifying areas suspected or confirmed to be contaminated with mines, unexploded ordnance, or abandoned explosive ordnance.[4]

Landmine Monitor calculates that as of 2005, more than 200,000 square kilometers of the world’s landmass is suspected to be contaminated by mines and UXO.[5] Vietnam estimates 87,000 square kilometers of its territory are affected and Laos estimates 66,000 square kilometers are contaminated. For these two countries, nearly all of the contamination, which is largely UXO rather than mines, occurred during the Vietnam War in the 1960s and early 1970s as a result of massive aerial bombing. Among other heavily mine/UXO-affected countries, Iran reports that 24,000 square kilometers of its territory is affected, Iraq reports 8,000 square kilometers, Cambodia reports about 4,550 square kilometers, and Bosnia and Herzegovina reports some 2,300 square kilometers. In addition, Mauritania has claimed that 230,000 square kilometers of land―more than one-fifth of its national territory—is affected by mines and UXO, but the basis for this estimate is not known and the figure will likely fall substantially once surveys have been conducted.

Indeed, as more detailed surveys are conducted, most if not all of these estimates can be expected to fall sharply. In Cambodia, for instance, a 2004 evaluation of mine action suggested that only some 460 square kilometers―little more than 10 percent of the total estimate―may need systematic clearance.[6] In Afghanistan, an impact survey in 2004 reduced the suspected contaminated area by over 40 percent, to 715 square kilometers, from the previous estimate of 1,300 square kilometers. In Kosovo, the 1999-2000 estimate of 360 square kilometers of mine/UXO contamination was later shown by clearance operations to have been closer to 37 square kilometers.

Nine States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have officially declared that there are no mined areas under their jurisdiction or control, but Landmine Monitor continues to identify them as affected by mines and UXO: Bangladesh, Belarus, Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Liberia, Moldova, Namibia, the Philippines and Sierra Leone. It is not clear to what extent some of these countries remain affected by mines and UXO, particularly the Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone.


Landmine and UXO Problem in the World

Sub-Saharan
Africa
Americas
Asia/Pacific
Europe/
Central Asia
Middle East/
North Africa
Angola
Burundi
Chad
Djibouti
Rep. Congo[7]
DR Congo
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Guinea-Bissau
Liberia
Malawi
Mauritania
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone[8]
Somalia
Sudan
Swaziland
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Somaliland
Chile
Colombia
Cuba
Ecuador
Guatemala
Nicaragua
Perú
Suriname[9]
Venezuela
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Burma (Myanmar)
Cambodia
China
India
Korea, North
Korea, South
Laos
Nepal
Pakistan
Philippines
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Vietnam
Taiwan
Albania
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Croatia
Cyprus
Denmark
France (Djibouti)
FYR Macedonia
Georgia
Greece
Kyrgyzstan
Moldova
Poland
Russia
Serbia & Montenegro
Tajikistan
Turkey
Ukraine
United Kingdom (Falklands)
Uzbekistan
Abkhazia
Chechnya
Kosovo
Nagorno-Karabakh
Algeria
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Israel
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
Oman
Syria
Tunisia
Yemen
Palestine
Western Sahara

Bold: States not party to the Mine Ban Treaty

Italics: areas not internationally recognized as independent states

Main Achievements in Mine Clearance and Survey in 2004

In 2004, well over 135 square kilometers of mine-affected land were cleared in 37 countries and areas.[10] In addition, more than 170 square kilometers of land affected by explosive ordnance were cleared through battle area clearance. The true figure for total land cleared is certainly considerably higher, as many affected countries and areas did not report how much land was cleared in 2004.[11]

Afghanistan cleared the largest amount of mined land (33.3 square kilometers), followed by Cambodia (32 square kilometers). In addition, Afghanistan reported battle area clearance of almost 70 square kilometers of land. Other countries where more than five square kilometers of mined land were cleared in 2004 include Poland (21.4), Mozambique (11.8), Angola (10.7), Croatia (10.6), Ethiopia (7) and Iraq (5.4).

Iran claimed to have cleared the huge total of 528 square kilometers between March 2004 and March 2005, which has not been included in the Landmine Monitor global totals as it is likely that this includes large amounts of battle area clearance and technical survey. All clearance totals should be treated with caution as some programs include surveyed land as having been cleared and some do not distinguish between mine clearance and battle area clearance. Battle area clearance, carried out in areas known not to contain mines, can usually be conducted far more quickly than mine clearance.[12]

Over 190,000 emplaced mines, including at least 140,000 antipersonnel mines, were destroyed in clearance operations in 2004. In addition, Iran claims that it cleared some 290,000 landmines, including more than 250,000 antipersonnel mines, between March 2004 and March 2005, and Algeria reported that its army cleared 76,978 antipersonnel mines between 27 November 2004 and 19 April 2005. Many countries and areas did not report on the number of emplaced mines destroyed in 2004, and some did not identify how many landmines destroyed were antipersonnel.[13] Some three million items of UXO were disposed of in 2004, including almost 1.2 million in Iraq and more than 1 million in Afghanistan. This impressive total, however, probably includes some abandoned explosive ordnance, as some states have tended not to distinguish between the two in their clearance statistics.

Less mine-affected land was reported cleared in 2004 (135 square kilometers) than in 2003 (149 square kilometers), but Landmine Monitor believes that reporting by states and mine action programs in 2003 was less accurate than in 2004. In 2004, 140,000 antipersonnel mines were cleared (174,000 in 2003) and approximately 50,000 antivehicle mines (9,300 in 2003) and 3 million UXO (2.5 million in 2003) were also cleared and destroyed.

Technical survey holds enormous potential for speedy return of mined areas to communities.[14] In 2004, at least 250 square kilometers of land were covered by technical survey and area reduction techniques. Two countries and one area accounted for the overwhelming majority of technical survey: Afghanistan (about 65 square kilometers), Yemen (70 square kilometers) and Somaliland (almost 80 square kilometers). It is likely that other countries have carried out technical survey but not collated and reported on areas surveyed.

The table below contains reported clearance and survey data for major mine action programs in 2004. It contains a number of caveats owing to limitations and gaps in the information reported. The ICBL calls upon all states to systematically disaggregate and report clearly on the amount of land cleared and/or declared free of contamination by survey, area reduction, manual clearance, mine detection dogs, and machines, as well as to distinguish clearly between mine clearance and battle area clearance.


Reported Clearance Achievements for Major Mine Action Programs in 2004[15]

Country
Mined areas cleared (square kilometers)[16]
Battle area clearance (square kilometers)
Emplaced landmines destroyed
Emplaced antipersonnel mines destroyed
UXO destroyed[17]
Area covered by technical survey (square kilometers)
Afghanistan
33.3
68.7
5,762
5,244
1,017,566
65.0
Angola[18]
10.7
Not known
9,629
8,487
31,207
0.3
Azerbaijan[19]
2.0
4.8
Not known
Not known
Not known
0.4
Bosnia and Herzegovina
4.2
Not known
3,226
3,016
1,523
Not known
Cambodia
32.0
Not known
57,830[20]
56,088
154,163
17.9[21]
Croatia
10.6
Not known
9,810
4,453
40,850
24.0
Eritrea
3.6
Not known
1,420
1,327
3,865
Not known[22]
Ethiopia[23]
7
2
545
478
8,354
1.7
Guinea-Bissau
0.2
Not known
33
25
25,787
Not known
Iraq
5.4
56.0
22,127
13,321
1,170,478

Jordan
1.3
Not known
841
806
Not known
Not known
Laos
Not known
19.3[24]
32
Not known
82,433
Not known
Lebanon
2.1
Not known
3,216
2,929
5,991
1.1[25]
Mozambique
11.8
Not known
18,600
Not known
80,628
4.7[26]
Sri Lanka[27]
3.8
Not known
28,465
28,409
6,813
Not known
Yemen
2.7
Not known
667
464
10,594
69.3
Somaliland
0.6
21.6
407
304
25,154
79.5
Totals
131.3
172.4
162,610
125,351
2,665,406
263.9

In 2004, landmine impact surveys (LIS) were completed in three countries: Afghanistan, Eritrea and Ethiopia. In May 2005, an LIS previously delayed for security reasons was completed in the region of Puntland in Somalia. Data collection for the LIS in Armenia was completed at the end of August 2005. As of September 2005, impact surveys were ongoing or were being initiated in Angola, Colombia, Iraq and Vietnam. Plans were underway to conduct an impact survey in Jordan and in two states of Sudan, as well as to carry out preliminary opinion collection in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In previous years, LIS were completed in eight countries (Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Lebanon,[28] Mozambique, Thailand and Yemen), as well as most of Somaliland.

Typically an LIS will increase―often by a significant amount―estimates of total contamination. A notable and unique achievement was recorded in Afghanistan; the Landmine Impact Survey conducted November 2003 through November 2004 reduced the estimate of contaminated land by more than 40 percent to 715 square kilometers. It did this by including previous technical survey and clearance data, as well as general survey information of suspected areas collected during the last decade. The Afghanistan LIS was also successful in involving national and provincial authorities in the process, which generally brought forward better informed data.

During the reporting period there were also a number of troublesome developments in the survey process. In Angola, the Landmine Impact Survey came to a halt in May 2005 as funding ran out. In Ethiopia, the survey remained suspended during the reporting period as governmental concerns about the quality of some of the survey data were not addressed, despite community surveys being completed in early 2004. [29]

In Mozambique and Cambodia, mine action operators continued to raise concerns about the quality and utility of data in completed and certified surveys. In Mozambique, operators and governmental authorities maintain that the LIS overstated the problem. General and technical survey conducted during the four years since the LIS was carried out has decreased the amount of suspected land by more than 350 square kilometers from the LIS estimate of over 560 square kilometers. A number of new areas were also discovered that had not been identified in the LIS process.

In Cambodia, the 2002 LIS reported more than 4,500 square kilometers of hazardous land, but an evaluation of the mine action sector in 2004 claimed that only some 460 square kilometers would actually need to be cleared. However, there has also been widespread concern that the LIS missed many mined areas. The Cambodian Mine Action Authority noted in its 1992–2004 achievement report that the LIS data has to be regularly updated and checked.

A common misconception is that an LIS is capable of providing precise data on the extent of contaminated land. Only rarely has an LIS actually geographically recorded the location and size of actual suspected areas through physically measuring the polygon comprised of mined or suspected mined land.

Article 5, paragraph 2 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires that each State Party make “every effort” to identify mined areas and suspected mined areas. The co-chair of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies pointed out in June 2005 that this does not require that “each State Party must scour every square meter of its territory to find mines.”[30] Nonetheless, some form of national survey of contaminated areas (a general and/or impact survey) would presumably be necessary to meet this requirement.

Meeting Article 5 Mine Clearance Deadlines

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, each State Party undertakes “to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years” after becoming party to the treaty.

According to the Final Report of the First Review Conference, only three States Parties have reported completing clearance in accordance with the terms of Article 5: Costa Rica, Djibouti and Honduras.[31] However, Djibouti has only claimed to be “mine safe.”

In June 2005, the Organization of American States (OAS) told States Parties during a Standing Committee meeting that Suriname initiated clearance operations in February 2005, and completed them on 4 April 2005. According to the OAS, “mine clearance was conducted using appropriate technologies and methodologies and in accordance with accepted International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) such that the results conform to the requirements of Article 5” of the Mine Ban Treaty.[32]

It appears that a number of States Parties are not on course to meet their respective deadlines, as their strategic plans do not envisage clearance of emplaced antipersonnel mines in time. These include four of the 14 states with the earliest deadline of 1 March 2009―Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Denmark and the UK―as well as Cambodia with a deadline in 2010. It is clear that States Parties have a long way to go to fulfill their commitment made at the First Review Conference to “[s]trive to ensure that few, if any, States Parties will feel compelled to request an extension in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 5, paragraphs 3-6 of the Convention.”[33]

Another 10 states have deadlines later in 2009; of these states, there are concerns about Chad, Niger, Swaziland and Thailand meeting their deadlines.

Mine Clearance Deadlines (Article 5)

2009
(22 countries)
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, France (Djibouti), Guatemala, Jordan, FYR Macedonia, Malawi, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Perú, Senegal, Swaziland, Thailand, Uganda, United Kingdom (Falklands), Venezuela, Yemen, Zimbabwe
2010
(6 countries)
Albania, Argentina (Malvinas), Cambodia, Rwanda, Tajikistan, Tunisia
2011
(5 countries)
Colombia, Rep. Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Zambia
2012
(5 countries)
Algeria, Chile, DR Congo, Eritrea, Suriname
2013
(3 countries)
Afghanistan, Angola, Cyprus
2014
(5 countries)
Burundi, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro, Sudan, Turkey
2015
(1 country)
Ethiopia

The following States Parties have not declared mined areas under their jurisdiction or control, but Landmine Monitor identifies them as affected by mines and/or UXO: Bangladesh, Belarus, Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Liberia, Moldova, Namibia, Philippines and Sierra Leone.

Denmark has not initiated clearance of antipersonnel mines in the Skallingen peninsula in western Jutland, which is mine-contaminated from World War II. Skallingen is now a protected natural reserve, largely owned by the government. Mined areas are marked and there are no reports of mine incidents in the area. In its first Article 7 report in August 1999, Denmark stated that the area was being mapped and a plan for clearance would be developed. No further information has been given in later reports, which have indicated only that there were no mine clearance programs underway.

In June 2005, at an intersessional Standing Committee meeting, Denmark told States Parties, “The minefield is today reduced to only 250 acres, and the original number of mines was 16,000 antivehicle mines and 8,300 antipersonnel mines.... Over the years most of this area has been engulfed by the North Sea. During this process and after heavy storms many mines have surfaced and were picked up by the authorities and destroyed.... Furthermore, it is our feeling that over the years the mines have more or less proved to be self-destructive, as the detonators are not functioning and the explosives seem to be inactive.... On this background, it is our firm belief that no danger exists any longer in connection with whatever traffic and movements in the area of Skallingen...I am convinced that in the near future it will be possible to find ways and means to come back to this Committee and officially declare Skallingen a mine safe area.”[34] In September 2005, the Coastal Authority said, “The fencing of the southern part of Skallingen is long term and will be maintained until the minefield is cleared or the danger no longer exists.”[35]

Niger’s landmine problem dates back to World War II and more recently to the internal armed conflict of the 1990s. The government has reported that the mine problem affects tourism, transportation, and the local economy. While a 1998 peace agreement with the Front Democratique Revolutionnaire included mine clearance provisions, the government has not undertaken any demining due to a lack of resources and expertise. Since 2001, the government has sought international mine action assistance for survey and marking of the affected areas and clearance. In February 2004, Niger presented a draft mine action plan for 2004-2006 during an intersessional Standing Committee meeting. The plan includes marking and mapping of the affected areas, mine risk education, demining training, and the acquisition of new mine clearance equipment. In its Article 7 report for the period 31 March 2004 to 31 March 2005, however, Niger reported no clearance activity. Niger’s deadline for completion of clearance is 1 September 2009.[36]

Swaziland has a small minefield near the town of Mananga on the border with Mozambique. The Umbutfo Swaziland Defence Force (USDF) received training, support, and commitments of funding for demining from the United States, but in March 2003 the US Embassy in Swaziland noted a complete lack of progress on demining of the minefield, including a failure to use donated demining equipment. Swaziland did not submit a request to use funds allocated by the US for clearance of the minefield and the offer of support was subsequently withdrawn. Landmine Monitor has received no indication that Swaziland has made any subsequent efforts to initiate clearance operations. Swaziland has reported no progress to other States Parties; it has not submitted an Article 7 report since 2000. Swaziland’s deadline for completion of clearance is 1 June 2009.

The United Kingdom states that there are mined areas in the Falkland Islands that are under UK “jurisdiction or control” in the terms of the Mine Ban Treaty. The Falklands were mined by British and Argentine forces during the war of 1982. Argentina continues to claim sovereignty over the Falklands (Malvinas) and therefore responsibility under Article 5 for clearance of antipersonnel mines. At the First Review Conference in November 2004, the UK and Argentina jointly noted that “both countries agreed to continue to work together to enable the completion of the feasibility study.”[37] In February 2005, the UK sent a mission to the Falkland Islands. According to a media report, the feasibility study is expected to be completed by April 2006.[38]

In June 2005, the UK told the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, “In order to fulfill our obligations under Article 5 of the Convention we have, and continue to, work closely with the Argentinean government in finding a solution.” It said the Joint Working Party “meets regularly, the last meeting of which took place at the end of April in Buenos Aires.” The UK also said, “Our own studies have shown that there are approximately 100 mined areas on the Falkland Islands which most likely contain both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines.... [A]ll mined areas are fenced and marked to exclude civilians.... [T]here has never been a civilian casualty and all islanders, including children, are educated on how to avoid them.”[39]

Article 5 Declarations and Extensions

The ICBL has called upon States Parties to establish a detailed process for determining whether or not a state has met its Article 5 obligations and whether or not to grant a request for an extension to the deadline, and if so, under what specific conditions. The ICBL believes that the process by which a State Party declares that it has cleared all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control should be formalized. One way to do this would be for each state that believes it has met the Article 5 criteria to make a formal declaration to a Meeting of States Parties. This would enable the other States Parties to review the claim and request any clarification or further information necessary.

In the case of Suriname, the OAS stated, “We have likewise recommended to the Government of Surinam that they use a declaration format similar to those employed by Costa Rica and Honduras (and under consideration by Guatemala) to communicate compliance with the Convention. That format would declare that all known or suspected mined areas and minefields had been cleared; that the National Plan/Program had been successfully concluded; that a residual national capacity was in place to respond to any unforeseen circumstance related to mine clearance.”[40]

States Parties that cannot meet the 10-year deadline are entitled to request an extension from the other States Parties. This must be done at an annual Meeting of States Parties or a Review Conference. A majority of those present and voting will decide whether the extension is granted or not. States must make a decision; they cannot postpone it. No State Party has requested an extension, although several have informally indicated that they expect to do so, including Cambodia.

A State Party must submit a formal request for an extension that includes the following: the requested duration; an explanation for the request, including “preparation and status of the work of the national demining program,” the financial and technical means available for clearance, and circumstances impeding the ability to complete clearance within the specified 10 years; the “humanitarian, social, economic and environmental implications of the extension;” and, any other information.

A requesting State Party can be granted an extension of up to 10 years at a time (with no apparent limit to the number of extensions that can be requested and granted). There is no specific authority to the States Parties to grant a shorter extension than that requested or to grant an extension with other conditions attached, but there is also no apparent impediment. The ICBL believes that blanket, unconditional 10-year extensions are not desirable, and that specific performance conditions and the shortest possible timeframe should be attached to each request granted.

Overview of Mine Action Programs

It is generally agreed that the primary responsibility for mine action lies with the government of the mine-affected state; this principle underpins both the Mine Ban Treaty and the International Mine Action Standards. IMAS promotes a two-tier structure for the management and coordination of a national mine action program. A national mine action authority (NMAA) is typically―though not universally―an interministerial body that sets overall strategy and policy for the program and has the responsibility for its effective management. The NMAA is assisted in this endeavor by a mine action center (MAC, sometimes called a mine action coordination center), which focuses on operational coordination of mine action activities, especially demining and mine risk education.

It appears that most of the mine-affected countries, including most of those with major mine action programs, have largely followed this two-tier structure. Landmine Monitor has recorded 23 countries and two territories that formally have both an NMAA and a MAC.[41] In a small number of these at least one of the two structures does not appear to be active.[42] There are indications that Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Uganda are moving toward a similar two-tiered structure.

Some countries have adopted different coordination and management structures for their mine action operations, typically having either an NMAA or a MAC but not both. This is the case for 17 countries and one area, of which nine countries and one area have a MAC, and 10 have an NMAA.[43]

In addition, two significant clearance programs―Cambodia and Laos―have changed their management and coordination structure in recent years. In both cases, this has followed criticisms from donors and operators about inefficiencies in the management of their mine action programs, in which their MAC-like structure (the Cambodian Mine Action Center and UXO Lao) sought not only to coordinate other operators, but also implemented clearance and risk education programs directly. Laos is following Cambodia’s example in having an NMAA with overall responsibility for mine action and giving the former MAC the authority only to implement projects.[44]

Most mine action programs fall under civilian control, but the military is directly responsible for mine action management in a small number of countries, particularly where the country has received military-to-military support from the US and/or the Organization of American States. In Armenia, Chile, Mauritania, Rwanda and Thailand, MACs or similar structures are either part of or report directly to the Ministry of Defense. In Tunisia, the army is responsible for all clearance operations. In Venezuela, the Ministry of Defense will be responsible for clearing antipersonnel mines. In FYR Macedonia, the creation of a new Directorate in 2005 moved mine action out of the Ministry of Defense.

Only four countries are known to have adopted national legislation in support of mine action: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Croatia and Zambia.[45] Cambodia has set up or amended the responsibility of national mine action bodies through royal decrees and sub-decrees. Several other countries, including Afghanistan, Albania, Iraq, Nicaragua, Senegal and Uganda, are reported to be in the process of adopting, drafting or planning to draft such legislation. Azerbaijan has had legislation in draft form since 2002 but has not achieved its adoption.

At least 19 countries have drafted national mine action standards: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Lebanon, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Sri Lanka and Sudan.[46]

Despite persistent calls―notably by key donors and the United Nations―for mine action to be mainstreamed into broader reconstruction and development work, progress in this area remains generally disappointing. For example, the European Commission said, “What is becoming evident is that more attention than has been given in the past should be focused on integrating mine action into infrastructure rehabilitation (i.e., energy and water supply) as well as to the rehabilitation of roads and agricultural planning. Similarly, NGOs should be encouraged to incorporate socio-economic indicators in their programs to help increase the socio-economic impacts which can be linked to mine clearance.... When defining and agreeing a national program, the mine affected beneficiary countries often omit to reflect their mine problem strongly enough, either implicitly or explicitly, within their own development priorities. This prioritization must be evident in order to allow robust mine action assistance throughout these programs.”[47]

Significant steps have been taken by some. In Afghanistan, some 40 percent of all clearance work is in direct support of national reconstruction. Sri Lanka has given highest priority to resettlement as well as reconstruction and development projects in its priority setting for mine clearance.

In Eritrea, the national mine action program was halted in 2005 for the second time in three years when, on 8 April, government seized vehicles used by the demining teams and other UN equipment. The Minister of National Development indicated Eritrea does not require further UN technical assistance for its mine action program.

There is little evidence of the gender issues being mainstreamed into mine action programs, although UNMAS published Gender Guidelines for Mine Action Programs in February 2005. The Guidelines highlight a range of considerations that should be taken into account in mine clearance, mine risk education, victim assistance, and advocacy.[48]

Mine Action Components and Techniques

For a number of years, demining experts have referred to a toolbox of clearance techniques, generally agreed to be composed of manual clearance, ground preparation and clearance machines, and mine detection dogs (MDDs). The backbone of clearance remains that performed by manual deminers. Mine detection dogs are being used in at least 26 countries.[49] Machines are being utilized in demining in at least 25 countries and three areas.[50]

In September 2005, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) released a study of manual mine clearance conducted at the request of UNMAS. The study found that average clearance rates were “in the region of 15 to 20 square meters per deminer per day” and that since the end of World War II “the level of injuries to mine clearance personnel has decreased significantly.”[51] It concluded that the main areas for improving manual mine clearance were to be found at middle and senior management levels, “where significant wastage of time and resources were observed.”[52]

There is a growing debate in the demining industry regarding use of mine detection dogs. Critics point to concern about missed mines, and the clearance assets, time and expense tied up by a dog program, especially where ground has to be prepared for dogs to cover. The HALO Trust stopped using MDDs in Angola in 2004 because of seasonal variations in reliability and cost. Others continue to advocate the use of MDDs as quick and cost-effective, especially in low-density mined areas and for technical survey.[53]

Until recently, machines were used primarily as a ground preparation tool, to allow other clearance assets (manual deminers or MDDs) to follow on. A study of mechanical application in demining published by the GICHD in May 2004 concluded that “given suitable conditions, machines can be used as the primary clearance system.... The GICHD believes that machines are underused in demining, in large part due to a lack of understanding by the mine clearance community of their most suitable roles and applications, and particularly of recent improvements in design.”[54]

Safety

A total of 171 deminers were reported killed or injured in 2004 in accidents during operations and training exercises in 26 countries and four areas (see Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance section following). This is almost certainly an underestimate of the true figure, as many countries and operators did not provide information on demining accidents to Landmine Monitor. The greatest number of reported casualties among deminers in a single country was 51 in Iran.

It appears that there is some form of insurance for all deminers in only 12 countries and in Kosovo: Afghanistan, Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Croatia, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua and Sri Lanka. Individual operators in some other countries insure their own deminers, even though it may not be a national requirement.

Quality assurance of clearance is conducted in at least 29 programs: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Chad, Croatia, Cyprus, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Mozambique, Laos, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Perú, Russia, Rwanda, Serbia and Montenegro, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand and Yemen, as well as Kosovo and Somaliland. Of these, only two―Afghanistan and Sri Lanka―have formal quality assurance for mine risk education.

Village Demining

“Village” or “informal” demining (clearance by those who do not belong to an accredited organization) is a common practice in a number of countries.[55] This is especially true in southeast Asia, including in Cambodia, Laos and Sri Lanka, as well as in Iraq. Civilians clearing land they need is, and has always been, a livelihood coping mechanism, even if it has not been scientifically researched in more than a few countries. Some individuals clear land for farming and to ensure the physical and economic security of their families. Others hire a village deminer to clear land for them. Landmine Monitor researchers have met former members of clearance agencies who are now engaged as individuals in village clearance activities.

The debate on how to address mine clearance activities by villagers has gone on since the early 1990s and remains unresolved. Handicap International (HI) commissioned a study of village demining in Cambodia to determine how mine action organizations could best respond. The study was conducted by a team of four, led by an anthropologist, from September 2004 to January 2005, and published by HI in May 2005. The study questioned the mine action sector’s priorities and working methods and recommended that village demining be formally recognized as a legitimate and constructive component of the mine action sector.[56] The study has generated considerable controversy and criticism in Cambodia.

In October 2003, the Mines Advisory Group and local authorities started a pilot project in Battambang province, Cambodia, aimed at training people living in mine-affected communities to become deminers. In October 2005, MAG told Landmine Monitor that it had completed trials of this new approach, which is called “Locality Demining Teams.”[57]

Non-State Armed Groups and Mine Action

A few non-state armed groups have been involved in some aspects of mine action, including survey, marking, demining and MRE, either jointly with a national demining entity, or in cooperation with an NGO demining organization.

Recent bilateral agreements between the Movement for Democratic Forces of Casamance in Senegal and the government of Senegal, and also the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad and the government of Chad, require joint mine action.

In Sri Lanka, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) undertake demining through an LTTE-linked entity, the Tamil Relief Organization (TRO). The TRO has its own demining units, works with several NGOs, and is supported by several international donors.

In Colombia, in January 2005, the National Liberation Army cleared mines it had previously laid in order to benefit the local population. Also in Colombia, the Guardia Indígena (Network of Indigenous Guards that protect the civilian population) removed mines and UXO although not trained to do so, to prevent local children from tampering with them.

Risk Reduction Measures

In accordance with Article 5, paragraph 2 of the Mine Ban Treaty, mine-affected States Parties “shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all antipersonnel mines contained therein have been destroyed.” It appears that few States Parties have made serious efforts to mark and fence mined areas. In some countries, mine action program staff have complained that markings and especially fencing do not last very long, since local community members remove the materials (typically wooden stakes and barbed wire). The Final Report of the First Review Conference identified these challenges: “fencing off large swathes of territory and maintaining fencing and markings are expensive propositions...monitoring requires precious human resources, and...communities in resource-deprived areas have often procured the fencing used for their own day-to-day purposes.”[58]

Information Management

The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) remains the database of choice for the overwhelming majority of mine action programs. As of 2005, it was installed in 37 countries and four areas.[59] The only major mine action programs not yet using the IMSMA as the main database for mine action planning were Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, although the latter trialed the IMSMA in one regional office in 2004, and uses the system to store data from its landmine impact survey. In the last three months of 2005, a new, more flexible version of IMSMA was due to enter field testing in up to eight selected locations, with general distribution and fielding scheduled for 2006.

Over the years, mine action operators have criticized the reluctance of authorities in some countries to make the IMSMA database available to them. Access to and dissemination of IMSMA information remains problematic in some countries. Also, in certain countries, operators are skeptical about IMSMA due to apparent discrepancies in the information it holds. This is not due to problems with the system itself, but the quality of the data entry and editing. In Mozambique, for instance, clearance statistics reported to the National Demining Institute by at least one operator were not entered correctly into IMSMA. In Sri Lanka, one operator worked out clearance statistics manually because there was such a mismatch with those entered into IMSMA.

Evaluations of Mine Action Programs

A number of evaluations of mine action programs were conducted in 2004 and 2005, notably in Cambodia, Eritrea, Mozambique and Yemen.[60]

An evaluation of mine action in Cambodia was carried out for the Cambodia Donor Working Group on Mine Action. The major finding was that existing approaches to the problem seemed to be maximizing the time needed to eliminate the danger of mines, rather than utilizing a more result-oriented and cost-efficient approach. The existing funding mechanisms were judged as not generally promoting efficiency or accountability. The study found a positive development in the establishment of Mine Action Planning Units, as this supported the government’s decentralization policy and the provincial authorities’ capacities to plan and prioritize mine clearance in a transparent manner.[61]

A cost-benefit analysis of Cambodian mine clearance programs conducted in 2004–2005 for the Cambodian Mine Action Authority and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) indicated that mine clearance is contributing substantial value to the Cambodian economy and the country in general, and that mine clearance is fully justified on economic grounds.[62]

A 10-year review of mine action in Mozambique identified serious deficiencies in the mine action plan, limited ability to plan and prioritize mine action effectively, and a need to integrate mine action with national development. It described Mozambique’s mine problem as a constraint on economic development rather than a humanitarian emergency.[63]

In April 2005, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining conducted a mid-term evaluation of phase II of UNDP support to the Yemen mine action program. The evaluation concluded that the most striking characteristic of mine action in Yemen has been the strong support received from the highest levels of the Yemeni government. It said that the mine action program in Yemen is showing a “depth of maturity that is comparable to the best mine action programs in the world.”[64]

International Developments

Nairobi Action Plan

The Nairobi Action Plan was adopted by the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 2004. Part III of the Plan deals with implementation of Article 5 obligations. It states, “Successfully meeting these deadlines will be the most significant challenge to be addressed in the coming five years and will require intensive efforts by mine-affected States Parties and those in a position to assist them. The speed and manner with which it is pursued will have crucial implications for human security – the safety and well-being of affected individuals and communities.”

The following is from the Action Plan:

The States Parties will therefore:

Action #17: Intensify and accelerate efforts to ensure the most effective and most expeditious possible fulfillment of Article 5 (1) mine clearance obligations in the period 2005-2009.

The 49 States Parties that have reported mined areas under their jurisdiction or control, where they have not yet done so, will do their utmost to:

Action #18: Urgently identify all areas under their jurisdiction or control in which antipersonnel mines are known or are suspected to be emplaced, as required by Article 5 (2) and report this information as required by Article 7.

Action #19: Urgently develop and implement national plans, using a process that involves, where relevant, local actors and mine-affected communities, emphasizing the clearance of high and medium impact areas as a matter of priority, and ensuring that task selection, prioritization and planning of mine clearance where relevant are undertaken in mine-affected communities.

Action #20: Significantly reduce risks to populations and hence reduce the number of new mine victims, hence leading us closer to the aim of zero new victims, including by prioritizing clearance of areas with highest human impact, providing mine risk education and by increasing efforts to perimeter-mark, monitor and protect mined areas awaiting clearance in order to ensure the effective exclusion by civilians, as required by Article 5 (2).

Action #21: Ensure that mine risk education programs are made available in all communities at risk to prevent mine incidents and save lives, promote mutual understanding and reconciliation, and improve mine action planning, integrating such programs into education systems and broader relief and development activities, taking into consideration age, gender, social, economic, political and geographical factors, and ensuring consistency with relevant International Mine Action Standards, as well as national mine action standards.

Action #22: Make their problems, plans, progress and priorities for assistance known to other States Parties, the United Nations, regional organizations, the ICRC and specialized non-governmental organizations, the Implementation Support Unit at the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and other organizations, while specifying what resources they themselves have contributed to fulfill their Article 5 obligations.

States Parties in a position to do so will:

Action #23: Act upon their obligations under Article 6 (3) and 6 (4) to promptly assist States Parties with clearly demonstrated needs for external support for mine clearance and mine risk education, responding to the priorities for assistance as articulated by the mine-affected States Parties themselves and ensuring the continuity and sustainability of resource commitments.

All States Parties will:

Action #24: Ensure and increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their efforts in all of the above-mentioned areas, involving all relevant actors in mine action coordination, ensuring that coordination exists at the local level and involves mine clearance operators and affected communities, making the best possible use of and adapting to national circumstances information management tools, such as the Information Management System for Mine Action, and using the International Mine Action Standards as a frame of reference to establish national standards and operational procedures in order to be of benefit to national authorities in meeting their obligations under Article 5.

Action #25: Strengthen efforts to enable mine-affected States Parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of the Convention, in accordance with Article 6 (2) and to further close the gap between end users of technology and those developing it.

Action #26: Share information on – and further develop and advance – mine clearance techniques, technologies and procedures, and, while work proceeds on developing new technologies, seek to ensure an adequate supply and most efficient use of existing technologies, particularly mechanical clearance assets and biosensors, including mine detection dogs.

Action #27: Strive to ensure that few, if any, States Parties will feel compelled to request an extension in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 5, paragraphs 3-6 of the Convention.

Action #28: Monitor and actively promote the achievement of mine clearance goals and the identification of assistance needs, continuing to make full use of Article 7 reporting, Meetings of the States Parties, the Intersessional Work Program and regional meetings as fora for mine-affected States Parties to present their problems, plans, progress and priorities for assistance.

Other Developments

In 2004, two Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings were held in February and June. In 2005, in keeping with a decision made at the First Review Conference, one intersessional meeting was held, in June. Since the Review Conference, Algeria and Sweden have served as co-chairs of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, and Jordan and Slovenia have served as co-rapporteurs (they are expected to become co-chairs in December 2005). At the June 2005 meeting, 36 countries plus the OAS made statements or presentations to the Standing Committee, including all of the major mine action programs. For the first time, representatives of the ICBL Mine Action Working Group and UNDP acted as expert respondents. Twelve countries (including key donors), OAS, UNDP and GICHD made statements regarding cooperation and assistance.

On 6 June 2005, the Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action adopted a new UN policy on mine action, after prolonged negotiation between the various UN agencies and bodies engaged in mine action activities. The most significant change to the earlier policy is that henceforth, rather than sectoral responsibilities being pre-assigned by the policy, the Senior United Nations Official and the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) may, if the problem is of sufficient importance, designate a lead agency and then allocate responsibilities within the UNCT on a case-by-case basis, “taking into account the competencies and comparative advantages of the different United Nations partners.”[65]

The European Commission has stated, “The underlying principle for EC mine action is that efforts should be directly related to the goals set by the international community in the context of the Mine Ban Treaty, in particular at the Nairobi Summit, and in the context of other relevant international instruments and agreements related to disarmament.” The EC proclaims its “multi-pronged approach aimed at achieving more efficient and prioritized mine clearance of the high impact areas, flanked by an increased focus on marking and fencing of medium and low impact areas and mine risk education.”[66] In 2004, the EC asked the UN Institute for Disarmament Research to develop guidelines for a future strategy on explosive remnants of war.

The NGO Perspective on the Debris of War consists of a number of mine action operators who strive to maintain goal orientation in mine clearance.[67] It states that the problem is finite and in need of simple and effective solutions rather than costly and complicated externally coordinated and advised input for success. It also stresses the need for a transparent operational framework for priority setting of mine action implemented by international mine clearance organizations.

In March 2005, Landmine Action (UK), in cooperation with Mines Action Canada and Actiongroup Landmine.de, published a global survey of explosive remnants of war and mines other than antipersonnel mines. The project identified more than 90 countries or disputed territories that contain some level of ERW contamination.[68]

MINE RISK EDUCATION

Mine risk education (MRE) is defined as activities that seek to “reduce the risk of injury from mines/UXO by raising awareness and promoting behavioral change; including public information dissemination, education and training, and community mine action liaison.”[69]

Mine risk education has continued to evolve, both qualitatively and quantitatively. In June 2004, the ICBL and UNICEF stated, “Future thinking in MRE will require a more strategic approach in more countries, whereby MRE will need to be mainstreamed to ensure its sustainability. This will come through the inclusion of MRE in the school syllabus, into injury surveillance and public health planning, and by integrating MRE processes in community organizations and structures along with mine clearance.”[70]

In 2004 and 2005, an increasing number of MRE programs have established links with survey, marking and clearance, and worked within the framework of official school curricula. A particularly encouraging development has been the increased promotion of MRE through schools during this reporting period. In a number of key mine-affected countries, MRE has continued to evolve from the dissemination of mass media messages toward a process that is mainly community-based, that seeks to develop tailor-made solutions for individual mine-impacted communities, and that is integrated with other developmental inputs. This process has been furthered through the finalization of the MRE International Mine Action Standards and the development of a series of guides to accompany their effective implementation. The Nairobi Action Plan also reinforced the importance of mine risk education in effective mine action.

MRE Programs

Globally, Landmine Monitor recorded MRE programs or activities in 61 countries and six areas in 2004 and 2005.[71] This is two fewer countries and one less area than recorded in last year’s Landmine Monitor. Forty-one of the countries are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.[72] Twenty are not party to the treaty.[73]

The total number of direct MRE recipients globally dropped from 8.4 million people in 2003 to 6.25 million in 2004. This is the first year that Landmine Monitor has recorded a decline in MRE recipients globally, although the 2004 total compares favorably with that of 2002 (4.8 million) and earlier years. As in past years, the global total is only an estimate based on Landmine Monitor country reports with varying degrees of reliability. The 6.25 million total does not include recipients of MRE delivered by mass media, but many could be individuals receiving MRE from multiple sources. Five countries accounted for approximately four million of the recipients: Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia and Laos. MRE operators increasingly stress that the number of people reached with MRE is less important than the quality and impact of MRE.

The Mine Ban Treaty requires that States Parties report on measures taken “to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population” of mined areas. As of June 2005, 33 States Parties had reported on MRE in their 2005 Article 7 transparency reports.[74]

New MRE Activities

In 2004 and 2005, new mine risk education projects and activities were recorded in 15 countries and two areas. This includes 11 States Parties (Angola, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Mauritania, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda and Yemen) and four non-States Parties (Georgia, Nepal, Pakistan and Vietnam), as well as Palestine and Somaliland.

Significant MRE Programs

Thirty-one countries and four areas had significant MRE programs in place in 2004 and 2005.[75] Twenty-one countries with significant MRE programs are States Parties, including Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, DR Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Nicaragua, Senegal, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda and Yemen.

Ten non-States Parties have significant MRE programs, including Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iraq, Iran, Laos, Lebanon, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Vietnam. The four areas with significant MRE programs are Abkhazia, Chechnya, Palestine and Somaliland.

Notable challenges in MRE program implementation in 2004/2005 included the continuously deteriorating security situation in Iraq and funding shortfalls in DR Congo, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.

Limited MRE Activities

Basic or limited MRE activities were recorded in 30 countries in 2004 and 2005.[76] This included 20 States Parties (Bangladesh, Belarus, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Jordan, Latvia, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritania, Moldova, Mozambique, Namibia, Philippines, Rwanda, Serbia and Montenegro, Turkey, Zambia and Zimbabwe) and 10 non-States Parties (Armenia, Burma/Myanmar, India, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Somalia, South Korea, Syria and Ukraine). Limited MRE activities were also recorded in Kosovo and Nagorno-Karabakh.

No MRE Activities

In 2004 and 2005, no mine risk education activities were recorded in 25 mine-affected countries. Fifteen are States Parties: Algeria, Republic of Congo, Cyprus, Denmark, Djibouti, Greece, FYR Macedonia, Niger, Perú, Sierra Leone, Suriname, Swaziland, Tunisia, United Kingdom (Falkland Islands) and Venezuela. Ten are non-States Parties: China, Cuba, Egypt, Kuwait, North Korea, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Poland, and Uzbekistan. In addition, no MRE activities were recorded in Taiwan and Western Sahara. Formal mine risk education is not necessarily needed in all these countries.

Key Actors

Internationally, the principal MRE operators are the International Committee of the Red Cross, UNICEF, Handicap International, the International Save the Children Alliance (Save the Children Sweden, UK and US), Mines Advisory Group, DanChurchAid, and the HALO Trust. Other international NGOs involved in substantial MRE activities include the Mines Awareness Trust, NonViolence International and Intersos, as well as mine clearance organizations such as the Danish Demining Group.

International NGOs―predominantly mine action NGOs―carried out MRE activities in 20 countries in 2004 and 2005.[77] A total of 83 national NGOs conducted MRE activities in 32 countries during the reporting period.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Red Cross/Red Crescent National Societies conducted MRE programs in 25 countries in 2004 and 2005.[78] In 2005, ICRC developed a framework for its future preventive mine action operations, seeking to integrate mine action across all appropriate ICRC departments. The framework consists of three categories of operational mine action activity (incident data gathering, mine risk reduction and mine risk education) which can be flexibly combined depending on the operational scenario. The framework also deals with the issue of mine clearance through other organizations, laying out when and how this may take place. This document will guide all future ICRC mine action initiatives.[79]

In 2005, the United Nations launched a revised inter-agency policy on mine action, signifying a possible diversification in the UNICEF role in mine action, with the possibility for it to undertake injury surveillance, mined area marking and in exceptional circumstances mine clearance. UNICEF retains a primary role in the areas of MRE, survivor assistance and advocacy.

Decisions related to the activities of UNICEF and other UN agencies have been decentralized to the UN in-country team. In emergency situations, UNICEF may support the national coordination of MRE with UNMAS, and in the absence of UNMAS or UNDP, UNICEF may accept responsibility as the United Nations focal point for mine action in any given country. Such arrangements are to be consistent with its capacities and priorities at country level, determined by the UN Country Team and coordinated with the Mine Action Interagency Coordination Group.[80]

At-Risk Groups

The population most at risk from landmines and UXO varies by country and region, but in general the majority are male, either adolescents or of working age, and very often rural inhabitants.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, male farmers comprised the most at-risk group. More than one-third of all mine survivors admitted to consciously taking risks despite knowing the dangers. Children aged 18 years and under accounted for 20 percent of new casualties reported in 2003, and 16 percent in 2004.

In Cambodia, a 2004 study found that boys aged between 10 and 15 years and men aged between 25 and 35 years were most likely to be involved in accidents involving UXO or the handling of live ordnance. Just over half of the men and boys surveyed had handled or destroyed ordnance, most often to allow them to use land safely or to stop others (usually children) from encountering these items. The people undertaking such activities generally did so only rarely in response to specific circumstances.

In southern Iraq, an impact survey concluded in 2004 that male farmers and Bedouin nomads are particularly at risk owing to their income-generating activity of scrap metal collection. In central Iraq internally displaced persons are also considered a major at-risk group.

In Nepal, 57 percent of casualties between January and March 2005 were a result of deliberate handling of explosive devices, and 67 percent of those suffering casualties were under the age of 18. In Sri Lanka, adult males are the most at-risk group; they accounted for 38 of the country’s 53 recorded mine and UXO casualties in 2004.

MRE in Areas of Conflict or Natural Disaster

In a number of places with ongoing conflict and where humanitarian clearance cannot be undertaken, MRE is still carried out and is often instrumental in reducing casualties. In the case of Sri Lanka, the network of national and international MRE NGOs was instrumental in assessing the impact of the December 2004 tsunami on the landmine-affected areas.

In Chechnya, 10 focus groups have been created to promote safety and to identify appropriate ways to reduce the impact of mine/UXO contamination. Some 15 “letter-boxes” have been created in each district of Chechnya to ensure the effective gathering of information related to mine/UXO incidents, with people encouraged to submit information about dangerous areas. Non-state armed groups in Burma and Colombia allow MRE messages to be disseminated provided they focus only on prevention and do not discuss use or policies.

In Senegal, where ongoing conflict has prevented mine clearance from occurring, MRE―using mass media and community agents and community-based committees who mark suspected areas―has been credited as being the main reason for the large reduction in mine casualties. In Palestine, 15 safe play areas for children were established in Gaza during 2005, in part due to the threat from UXO and mines. Palestinian police undertake MRE sessions warning children of the dangers of UXO and telling them who to contact if they discover suspected devices.

Integration of MRE with Other Mine Action Activities

In 2004 and 2005, mainstreaming or integration of MRE into mine action activities and broader disciplines continued to be discussed and, more significantly, implemented. IMAS for MRE, finalized in December 2003, actively encourage MRE organizations to integrate their programs “with the other mine action, humanitarian and development activities to achieve a synergistic effect.” The standards state that “a mine action agency conducting MRE education and training activities may need to examine whether it should also become involved in public information dissemination or community liaison activities, or even non-MRE activities such as marking and fencing, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), or victim assistance.”[81]

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, an MRE strategy finalized in March 2004 aims to ensure that MRE activities complement and integrate into the country’s overall mine action strategy. In Cambodia, CMAC is moving from mine awareness teams to promoting the concept of community-based mine risk reduction in which staff use participatory techniques to identify how mines and UXO impact on villages, and then use this as a basis for prioritizing clearance plans and requests for development resources. Once areas for support are identified, the teams link with various agencies to request appropriate mine action services.

In Ethiopia, community liaison officers inform communities of planned clearance activities, obtain details of how mines and UXO impact on communities, and feed this into the clearance plans. The involvement of community liaison staff has resulted in improved cooperation with demining teams, reduced removal of minefield markers, improved respect for minefield fences and signs, and an increase in the number of suspect mines and UXO reported by communities.

In Sri Lanka, clearance teams reported that the community liaison role of the MRE teams has helped them to function more effectively, particularly in the Jaffna Peninsula. In Sudan, MRE teams undertook data gathering and needs assessments on mine-affected communities and mine victims, and liaised closely with clearance organizations to provide communities with details concerning planned and current clearance activities.

School-based MRE

Promotion of MRE through training in schools and through integration in school curricula has been a notable feature of MRE in 2004 and 2005. New programs training large numbers of teachers and/or the integration of mine risk education into school curricula were recorded in 10 countries: Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, Chad, DR Congo, Iraq, Jordan, Mauritania, Tajikistan and Thailand. Existing programs continued in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chechnya, Georgia, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Laos, Lebanon, Palestine, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Uganda and Vietnam, and to a lesser extent in Belarus, Mozambique, Nepal and Russia.

In Albania, training manuals have been developed and piloted in the Kukes prefecture in the northeast. If successful this program will be undertaken country-wide. In Angola MRE was integrated into a new nation-wide initiative of teacher training. Some 20,000 new teachers took part in a national teacher-training program and were trained to deliver MRE using participatory methodologies.

In Azerbaijan, a trilateral Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the Ministry of Education, UNICEF and the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action in May 2004, aimed at integrating MRE into the school curriculum in affected areas. In Iran, more than 600 schools in province of Kurdistan received MRE orientation from 2002 to April 2005; approximately 34,000 students have received some form of MRE.

In Mauritania, a national MRE program for teachers and children is being developed in partnership with the National Humanitarian Demining Office, regional authorities, and local and national education departments; it targets 20,000 students. In Sri Lanka, MRE was incorporated into school curricula in 2003, under a national school-based MRE program in collaboration with the Ministry of Education through the National Institute of Education. All schools in districts directly affected by the conflict and those bordering conflict areas provide MRE in both primary and secondary schools. By December 2004, 8,120 teachers from primary and secondary schools in north and east Sri Lanka had been provided with MRE training sessions. Teacher training for the north-central and north-western provinces started at the end of 2004.

MRE Methodologies and Indicators of Success

MRE has continued to evolve from “broad brush,” traditional, lecture-type presentations to a wider set of activities that are more targeted toward highly mine-affected communities. MRE providers are finding that changing behavior, rather than merely improving knowledge, is proving difficult; it is increasingly evident that they need to take into account the resource pressures that lead marginalized people to engage in high-risk behavior, and to propose realistic alternatives.

A number of MRE programs have continued to develop away from traditional models of message delivery toward a more targeted, participative and interactive process that also integrates MRE into mine action or wider developmental activity. This is the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia and Sri Lanka. In Croatia, the mine action center has concluded that MRE is more effective, in terms of reducing the number of mine casualties, when directly combined with the marking of suspected areas. The Cambodian Mine Action Center has revised its MRE strategy by reducing the number of mine awareness teams and developing community-based mine risk reduction, believing that quality rather than quantity in MRE is likely to produce behavioral change.

How to effectively measure impact remains a difficult issue. An evaluation of mine action in Cambodia published in December 2004 stated that “in the available literature and in interviews the team was unable to find any quantifiable justification for MRE activities.... After several years of MRE implementation, the mine action community has little idea about the impact of MRE interventions in any quantitative sense.... It would better inform the debate if more analysis was carried out on this issue.”[82]

The IMAS MRE Guides, which are scheduled for release by the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in November, draw on best practices from MRE programs globally to identify a series of possible indicators of impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability.[83]

Some agencies are seeking new indicators of success. In Afghanistan, four quality assurance teams and one training team have been deployed by the mine action center to monitor and evaluate MRE activities and provide implementing partners with refresher training and updated methodologies. In Nicaragua, the OAS program’s national coordinator reported that the success of the MRE program can be measured by the reduction in mine incidents, the number of mines collected from civilian homes, the creation of community-based MRE which enhances sustainability, progress with the national demining plan, and increased security in affected and formerly affected communities. In Sri Lanka, MRE is subject to quality assurance visits by the same staff who inspect clearance sites. MRE activities are selected randomly and receive regular external monitoring. School-based activities undertaken by the Ministry of Education are monitored through government channels.

Evaluations and Learning

In 2004 and 2005 evaluations, Knowledge, Attitudes, Practices (KAP) surveys and learning opportunities on aspects of the mine or UXO problem were recorded in Afghanistan, Burundi, Colombia, Ethiopia, Cambodia, Laos, and Sri Lanka.

In Afghanistan, LIS survey teams found that despite the huge numbers reported to have received MRE, only 27 percent of the 2,368 impacted communities reported some form of MRE within the previous 24 months. The LIS found that the most commonly used methodology was community meetings (55 percent), followed by posters and signs (49 percent). In 2004, the Monitoring, Evaluation and Training Agency conducted a KAP survey interviewing 600 participants in five regions of Afghanistan to determine the effectiveness and impact of MRE programs.

In Burundi, an evaluation was conducted of the DanChurchAid MRE program for refugees in camps on the Tanzanian border. It highlighted the impact to cost ratio (at $50,000, the project cost approximately one US dollar per refugee targeted). In Colombia, an MRE workshop held in March 2005 marked the first time that all national MRE actors had come together to share experiences.

In Ethiopia, an evaluation was initiated at the request of UNICEF, which found that their MRE program was one of the world’s “more mature mine risk education programs,” but called for overall coordination to be strengthened and project management skills to be reinforced. In Laos, UNICEF commissioned GICHD to conduct an evaluation of the Sport-in-a-Box and UXO primary school curriculum projects; release of the report was expected before the end of 2005.

In Sri Lanka, an ECHO evaluation found that MRE has played an important role as part of the wider mine action program, particularly through community liaison activities linking deminers to the communities in which they operate. The evaluation also stated that the development of a school-based MRE curriculum and incorporation of MRE as a functional element of the Sri Lanka mine action program are very good means of sustaining MRE capacity in Sri Lanka.

In Cambodia, a study commissioned on the deliberate handling and usage of live ordnance was completed in July 2004.[84] It concluded that the deliberate handling of ordnance was indicative of more fundamental problems (most commonly poverty) and the absence of structures to mitigate these problems. Another evaluation of the mine action sector in Cambodia highlighted the lack of firm impact indicators for MRE.[85] A study of informal village demining in Cambodia was completed in January 2005, with implications for the targeting, and content and credibility, of MRE messages.[86]

A regional workshop for the Mekong Sub-Region was held in November 2004 to develop regional programming and share learning. The workshop’s findings included: MRE initiatives have often been more successful at raising awareness than changing behavior; even after successful MRE interventions, poverty still leads many people to take risks in support of their livelihoods; the rising incidence of mine/UXO casualties relating to scrap metal and explosive collection is a particular challenge for MRE programs in this region; in some instances, MRE activities have been carried out without a clear strategy and often conflicting with other community priorities; and, the cooperation of local authorities, including law enforcement, is essential for MRE efforts to succeed. [87]

MRE Standards and Guides

The International Mine Action Standards for MRE, first released in December 2003, provide the basis on which national mine action authorities can, if they wish, develop national standards to ensure quality.[88] In December 2004, the ICBL expressed its strong concerns about the accreditation mechanism developed in IMAS.[89] In response, UNICEF undertook a review of the standard, with a view to amending it.[90] The results of the review are not yet known.

National MRE standards have been adopted or are under development in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethiopia, Iraq and Sri Lanka. In Afghanistan IMAS for MRE have been translated into the two national languages, and are being used by NGOs. The importance of the guides for ensuring quality was reinforced in the Nairobi Action Plan, with Action #21 stating that all MRE programs should ensure “consistency with relevant International Mine Action Standards, as well as national mine action standards.”[91]


[1] Because of their mine-affected status, Landmine Monitor monitors and reports on eight areas not internationally recognized as independent states: Abkhazia, Chechnya, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Palestine, Somaliland, Taiwan and Western Sahara.
[2] The total of 84 affected states is one more than reported in Landmine Monitor Report 2004. Djibouti, a party to the Mine Ban Treaty, has been returned to the list. Although Djibouti declared itself “mine safe” in 2004, it is clear that mined areas still exist which are under the jurisdiction or control of the Djibouti government.
[3] Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) is defined under Protocol V of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) as meaning “explosive ordnance that has not been used during an armed conflict, that has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed conflict, and which is no longer under control of the party that left it behind or dumped it. Abandoned explosive ordnance may or may not have been primed, fused, armed or otherwise prepared for use.” CCW Protocol V, Article 2, paragraph 3.
[4] AXO and UXO are both termed explosive remnants of war (ERW) under Article 2 of Protocol V of the Convention on Conventional Weapons.
[5] This is comparable to the entire surface of Senegal (196,190 square kilometers) and more than the total surface of Cambodia (181,040 square kilometers). CIA World Fact book, www.cia.gov/cia/publications/
factbook/geos/sg.html
[6] Robert Griffin and Robert Keeley, “Joint Evaluation of Mine Action in Cambodia for the Donor Working Group on Mine Action, Volume I,” Phnom Penh, 4 December 2004, p. 4.
[7] It is not clear to what extent the Republic of Congo remains affected by landmines and UXO; see Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 357-358.
[8] It is not clear to what extent Sierra Leone remains affected by landmines and UXO. An UNMAS assessment in 2000 that some antipersonnel and antivehicle mines remained (although UXO was the main problem) was reiterated by UNAMIL in 2002 and by a government official in 2004; no clearance has been reported.
[9] The Organization of American States reported in June 2005 that Suriname had completed clearance, but Landmine Monitor keeps mine-affected States Parties on its list of affected countries until they have officially declared completion of mine clearance programs and fulfillment of their Article 5 obligation
[10] There were 33 countries and five areas reporting the total amount of land cleared. Countries: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, China, Croatia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Poland, Rwanda, Serbia and Montenegro, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Vietnam, Yemen and Zambia. Areas: Abkhazia, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland and Taiwan.
[11] Those not reporting the total amount of land cleared include: Bangladesh, Belarus, Burma/Myanmar, Chile, Colombia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Georgia, Guatemala, India, Israel, Kuwait, Liberia, Malawi, Namibia, North Korea, Pakistan, Perú, Russia, Senegal, Somalia, South Korea, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Zambia and Zimbabwe, as well as Palestine.
[12] Battle area clearance (BAC) is defined as “the systematic and controlled clearance of hazardous areas where the threat is known not to contain mines.” Definition 3.18, IMAS 04.10, Second Edition, 1 January 2003 (Incorporating amendment number(s) 1 & 2 issued on 1 December 2004 and 23 July 2005, respectively).
[13] Those not reporting the total number of mines cleared include: Armenia, Bangladesh, Burma/Myanmar, China, Colombia, Georgia, Greece, India, Israel, Kuwait, Laos, Liberia, Malawi, North Korea, Pakistan, Perú, Russia, Somalia, Uganda, Uzbekistan and Zambia, as well as Chechnya and Palestine.
[14] Acceptable techniques for technical survey, and the definition of what constitutes technical survey and how that is distinguished from area reduction, remain a matter of debate within the demining community. According to IMAS (Definition 3.249), technical survey means “the detailed topographical and technical investigation of known or suspected mined areas identified during the planning phase. Such areas would have been identified during any information gathering activities or surveys which form part of the GMAA [General Mine Action Assessment] process or have been otherwise reported.” According to IMAS (Definition 3.16), area reduction means “the process through which the initial area indicated as contaminated (during any information gathering activities or surveys which form part of the GMAA process) is reduced to a smaller area.”
[15] Despite reporting very significant clearance of affected areas in 2004 (21.4 square kilometers), Poland is not included in this table as it is clearing World War II mines and UXO and does not have a formal mine action program.
[16] It is likely that some of the mined areas reported cleared were actually battle area clearance (especially where separate data is not reported for BAC).
[17] It is likely that some of these totals include not only UXO but also items of abandoned explosive ordnance.
[18] The totals for mines and antipersonnel mines destroyed are based on cumulative figures provided by mine action operators, and are greater than totals reported by Angola in its 2005 Article 7 report. The technical survey total is based on data provided by just two operators, and therefore likely understates the true total.
[19] Azerbaijan reports the destruction of 1,629 mines and UXO, but does not break this figure down.
[20] A total of 1,742 antivehicle mines were reported to have been destroyed in 2004, but it is not certain that all of these mines had been emplaced.
[21] These figures are for the Cambodia Mine Action Center only.
[22] Eritrea reported that 21,855 square meters of land were marked or surveyed.
[23] Ethiopia reported mine clearance of 10.9 square kilometers in 2004, but it appears that around two square kilometers were BAC and 1.7 square kilometers of land were reduced through technical survey.
[24] This includes an aggregated clearance figure for Mines Advisory Group, which reported BAC in 2004 and January 2005.
[25] These figures are for Mines Advisory Group only.
[26] Based on information provided by the HALO Trust and Norwegian People’s Aid; data from the National Demining Institute is not consistent with HALO and NPA data.
[27] IMSMA recorded in September 2005 that 28,537 emplaced antipersonnel mines, 58 emplaced antivehicle mines, and 6,276 UXO were destroyed in Sri Lanka in 2004. Email from Harshini Ranasinghe, Communications Officer, UNDP Mine Action Office, 28 September 2005.
[28] The survey was completed in 2003, certified by UNMAS in 2004, and the report was released in 2005.
[29] In late September 2005, it was reported that an agreement had been reached to re-survey 26 impacted communities before the end of 2005 to review the accuracy of survey data. This was intended to provide the basis for governmental approval and a formal request for UN certification of the survey.
[30] “The general status of the implementation of Article 5,” Statement by Sweden in its capacity as co-chair, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 13 June 2005, p. 3.
[31] Annex III of Part II, United Nations, “Final Report, First Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,” Nairobi, 29 November–3 December 2004, APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, p. 49.
[32] Organization of American States (OAS) intervention on “States Parties in the process of fulfilling obligations under Article #5 of the Convention (Suriname),” Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 13 June 2005, www.gichd.ch.
[33] Nairobi Action Plan, Action #27, Final Report of the First Review Conference, APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, p. 99.
[34] “Report by Denmark to the Intersessional Working Group,” Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 14 June 2005.
[35] “Traffic on the southern part of Skallingen is prohibited,” Danish Coastal Authority, www.kyst.dk accessed 24 September 2005.
[36] Médecins Sans Frontières has not encountered problems due to landmines in the course of its relief work addressing malnutrition problems in the Maradi, Tahaua and Zinder regions. Information provided by Johanne Sekkenes, Head of Mission, Médecins sans Frontières, Niger, 25 September 2005.
[37] “Information of the Argentine Republic and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the Implementation of the Ottawa Convention,” APLC/CONF/2004/MISC.3. 1 December 2004.
[38] A. Gillan, “How Falkland islanders plan to help the world by keeping their landmines,” Guardian, 11 June 2005, p. 10.
[39] Statement by John Freeman, UK Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 14 June 2005.
[40] OAS intervention on “States Parties in the process of fulfilling obligations under Article #5 of the Convention (Surinam),” Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 13 June 2005, www.gichd.ch.
[41] Those with an NMAA and MAC include Albania, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, DR Congo, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Malawi, Mozambique, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe, as well as Nagorno-Karabakh and Somaliland. For the latter two, the NMAA is not recognized as a national authority by the UN.
[42] This appears to be the case for the Iraq Mine Action Center, the DR Congo’s National Commission to Fight Antipersonnel Mines, the government of Sudan’s National Mine Action Technical Committee and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement’s New Sudan Authority on Landmines.
[43] Those with a MAC include Afghanistan, Burundi, Chile, Djibouti, Ecuador, Mauritania, Perú, Serbia (there are separate MACs for Serbia and for Montenegro), and Tajikistan, as well as Kosovo. Those with an NMAA include Algeria, Belarus, Egypt, Ethiopia, Greece, Guatemala, Jordan, Libya, Nicaragua and Uganda.
[44] In Laos, it is called the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) and in Cambodia, the Cambodian Mine Action Authority (CMAA). The NRA was not yet fully up and running as of September 2005, despite being established by decree in 2004.
[45] In the case of Colombia and Zambia, legislation includes penal sanctions for violation of the treaty provisions as well as mine action governance issues.
[46] Tunisia has, according to UNMAS, military demining procedures that meet the requirements of IMAS. This may apply to a number of other countries as well.
[47] European Commission, “The European Roadmap Towards a Zero Victim Target: The EC Mine Action Strategy & Multi-annual Indicative Programming 2005–2007,” Brussels, undated, p. 17.
[48] See UNMAS, “Gender Guidelines for Mine Action Programs,” New York, February 2005, www.mineaction.org.
[49] MDDs are used in Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Greece, Iraq, Lebanon, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Serbia and Montenegro, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey, Yemen and Zambia.
[50] Demining machines are used in Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Serbia and Montenegro, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey and Uganda, as well as Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Somaliland.
[51] GICHD, Main study conclusions and recommendations, “A Study of Manual Mine Clearance,” Geneva, September 2005, Section 1, pp. 2, 30.
[52] GICHD, Executive Summary, “A Study of Manual Mine Clearance,” Geneva, September 2005, Section 1, p. 7.
[53] Interviewed by Landmine Monitor in September 2005, Håvard Bach, a leading dog specialist, said it is difficult to set up a cost-effective mine detection dog program with fewer than 20 dogs because the fixed costs associated with such a program are high. He also noted that only a very small number of organizations and companies have the requisite knowledge to establish and manage an effective MDD program. Interview with Håvard Bach, Head, Operational Methods Section, GICHD, Geneva, 20 September 2005.
[54] GICHD, “Study of Mechanical Application in Demining,” Geneva, May 2004, pp. 4, 6.
[55] According to the IMAS Definition 3.271, village demining means “self-supporting mine and/or UXO clearance and hazardous area marking, normally undertaken by local inhabitants, on their own behalf or the behalf of their immediate community. Often described as a self-help initiative or spontaneous demining, village demining usually sits outside or in parallel with formal mine action structures, such as demining undertaken by militaries or humanitarian demining such as is supported by the UN, international and national non-governmental organizations, private enterprise and governments, among others.”
[56] Michael L. Fleisher, “Informal Village Demining in Cambodia an Operational Study,” HI, Phnom Penh, May 2005.
[57] Email from Tim Carstairs, Policy Director, MAG, 5 October 2004.
[58] Final Report of the First Review Conference, APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, p. 51. In many places, communities either learn to avoid the area or may use local, informal markings to help prevent injury.
[59] IMSMA is installed in Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Cyprus, DR Congo, Ecuador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, FYR Macedonia, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Perú, Rwanda, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Yemen and Zambia, as well as Chechnya/Ingushetia/Northern Ossetia, Kosovo, Somaliland and Western Sahara.
[60] The Eritrea report had not been made public as Landmine Monitor was going to press.
[61] Robert Griffin and Robert Keeley, “Joint Evaluation of Mine Action in Cambodia for the Donor Working Group on Mine Action,” Volume I, Phnom Penh, 4 December 2004.
[62] Bjorn Gildestad, “Cost-benefit Analysis of Mine Clearance Operations in Cambodia,” Nordic Consulting Group, February 2005, conducted for CMAA and UNDP, quoted in “Clearing for Results,” UNDP, 28 July 2005.
[63] GICHD, “A Review of Mine Action in Mozambique,” Final Draft, Geneva, August 2005.
[64] GICHD, “Mid-Term Outcome Evaluation for Strengthening National Capacity for Mine Action in Yemen – Phase II,” 2005, pp. V-VI, 1-2.
[65] UN, “Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The United Nations Inter-Agency Policy,” New York, 2005, p. 10.
[66] EC, “The European Roadmap Towards a Zero Victim Target: The EC Mine Action Strategy & Multi-annual Indicative Programming 2005–2007,” Brussels, undated, pp. 4 and 13.
[67] The group includes DanChurchAid, Danish Demining Group, HALO, Handicap International, Landmine Action and Norwegian People’s Aid. Mines Advisory Group is an observer.
[68] Landmine Action UK, Actiongroup Landmine.de and Mines Action Canada, “Explosive Remnants of War and Mines Other Than Anti-personnel Mines. Global Survey 2003-2004,” March 2005.
[69] IMAS 07.11: Guide for the management of mine risk education, First Edition, 23 December 2003, p. 2. In 2001, the term “mine risk education” replaced the term “mine awareness.”
[70] Statement by ICBL and UNICEF at the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 22 June 2004.
[71] The areas are Abkhazia, Chechnya, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Palestine and Somaliland.
[72] States Parties with MRE programs include Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, DR Congo, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Jordan, Latvia, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritania, Moldova, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
[73] Non-States Parties with MRE programs include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Burma/Myanmar, Georgia, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, Nepal, Pakistan, Russia, Somalia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Syria, Ukraine, and Vietnam.
[74] States Parties reporting on MRE in 2004 included Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Democratic Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Guatemala, Honduras, Jordan, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Perú, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda, Yemen and Zimbabwe.
[75] This figure differs considerably from the 46 significant MRE programs identified in Landmine Monitor Report 2004. Landmine Monitor decided to re-classify 14 MRE programs as limited rather than significant. This includes seven States Parties (Ecuador, Jordan, Mozambique, Namibia, Serbia and Montenegro, Zambia and Zimbabwe), five non-States Parties (Burma/Myanmar, India, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Syria) and two areas (Kosovo and Nagorno-Karabakh). In addition, three countries were dropped completely: Honduras declared itself mine-free in 2004, and Landmine Monitor is unaware of any MRE activities in FYR Macedonia and Perú during the reporting period.
[76] This figure differs considerably from the 17 limited MRE programs identified in Landmine Monitor Report 2004 primarily because Landmine Monitor decided to re-classify 14 MRE programs as limited rather than significant.
[77] International NGOs operated in Angola, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burma/Myanmar, Burundi, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Georgia, Iraq, Laos, Lebanon, Mauritania, Nepal, Pakistan, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Vietnam and Uganda as well as in Abkhazia, Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh and Palestine.
[78] The Red Cross operated in Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burma/Myanmar, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Georgia, India, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Northern Caucasus (Russian Federation) Mozambique, Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo), Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, as well as Palestine. ICRC, “Special Report Mine Action 2004,” Geneva 2005; telephone interview with Ben Lark, Head of Mine Action Sector, ICRC, 23 September 2005.
[79] ICRC, “Preventive Mine Action Operations Framework,” (undated) Geneva 2005.
[80] Email from Reuben McCarthy, Project Officer, Landmines and Small Arms Unit, UNICEF, New York, 26 September 2005. See also UN, “Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The United Nations Inter-Agency Policy,” New York, 6 June 2005.
[81] IMAS 12.10: Planning for mine risk education programs and projects, section 7.3. The IMAS for MRE First Edition, 23 December 2003, can be found at www.mineactionstandards.org/imas.htm.
[82] Robert Griffin and Robert Keeley, “Joint Evaluation of Mine Action in Cambodia for the Donor Working Group on Mine Action,” Volume I, Phnom Penh, 4 December 2004, p.11.
[83] For more information see www.gichd.ch/579.0.html.
[84] Richard Moyes, “Tampering: deliberate handling and use of live ordnance in Cambodia,” Phnom Penh, 2004.
[85] Robert Griffin and Robert Keeley, “Joint Evaluation of Mine Action in Cambodia for the Donor Working Group on Mine Action,” Volume I, Phnom Penh, 4 December 2004.
[86] Michael L. Fleisher “Informal Village Demining in Cambodia An Operational Study,” Handicap International, Phnom Penh, 2005.
[87] Final Statement of Workshop on Landmine and Unexploded Ordnance Risk Education in the Mekong Sub-Region, Siem Reap, November 2004.
[88] See wwww.mineactionstandards.org.
[89] “The International Mine Action Standards for MRE, despite a number of interesting conceptual ideas, develop an accreditation system that, in our view, is only going to add costs and create more bureaucratic layers on already fragile MRE operations.” Statement by the ICBL MRE Sub-Working Group, First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, Nairobi, 1 December 2004.
[90] Email to the International MRE Working Group from Reuben McCarthy, Landmines and Small Arms Team, UNICEF New York, 25 April 2005.
[91] Final Report of the First Review Conference, APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, p. 98.