Key developments since May 2004: The ROK cleared 8,800 mines around
military sites in 2004. The government increased its contributions to mine
clearance in Eritrea, Mozambique and, substantially, Iraq. The government
contributed $3.1 million to mine action in 2004, including $3 million for Iraq,
a sum three times all of its previous contributions.
Mine Ban Policy
The Republic of Korea (ROK)―South Korea―has not acceded to the
Mine Ban Treaty. It considers antipersonnel mines a military necessity so long
as the military threat from North Korea
persists.[1] South Korea is one of
the small number of countries that has abstained from voting on every pro-mine
ban UN General Assembly resolution since 1996, including UNGA Resolution 59/84
on 3 December 2004.
South Korea did not attend the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty
in Nairobi in November-December 2004, or the intersessional Standing Committee
meetings in Geneva in June 2004 and June 2005.
A government official made a brief comment in support of the US landmine
policy announced by the Bush administration in February
2004.[2] Under its new policy, the US
will retain non-self-destructing antipersonnel mines for use in Korea until
2010, and thereafter retain self-destructing antipersonnel mines for use
globally.[3] The Korean Campaign to
Ban Landmines (KCBL) issued a statement in March 2004 criticizing what it
described as the “disappointing retreat” in US landmine
policy.[4]
South Korea is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its
Amended Protocol II on landmines. It participated in the Sixth Conference of
States Parties to Amended Protocol II and other CCW meetings related to
antivehicle mines and explosive remnants of war in 2004 and 2005. On 17
September 2004, South Korea submitted its Amended Protocol II Article 13
national measures report.
Production and Transfer
South Korea maintains that it has not produced any antipersonnel mines,
including Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines, since 2000. The
government confirmed to Landmine Monitor that it did not produce any
antipersonnel mines in 2004.[5] In
the past, South Korea produced two types of Claymore antipersonnel mine,
designated KM18A1 and K440.[6] The
government has never made a policy statement, or enacted legal measures,
prohibiting production of antipersonnel mines; thus, Landmine Monitor has
continued to list South Korea as a producer.
In March 2004, the government stated that it has “faithfully enforced
an indefinite extension of its moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines
since 1997.”[7] The moratorium
does not include Claymore-type
mines.[8] South Korea is not known to
have exported any type of antipersonnel mine in the past.
In May 2005, South Korea informed Landmine Monitor that it did not import any
antipersonnel mines in 2004 or the beginning of
2005.[9]
Stockpiling
The South Korean military holds a stockpile of about two million
antipersonnel mines.[10] It
includes 960,000 M14 mines that were made detectable before July 1999 in order
to comply with the provisions of Amended Protocol II. In addition, South Korea
has an unknown number of self-destructing mines, apparently including more than
31,000 US ADAM artillery-delivered
mines.[11] South Korea destroyed
some stockpiled antipersonnel mines in
2004.[12]
The US military stockpiles approximately 1.1 million M14 and M16
antipersonnel mines for use in any future resumption of war in
Korea.[13] US Army documentation
indicates that the US stores nearly half of those mines in the continental
United States, not in South
Korea.[14] However, the government
in February 2003 told Landmine Monitor that the entire US stockpile of
non-self-destructing mines is in South
Korea.[15]
Most of the US landmine stockpile is part of the more extensive War Reserve
Stocks for Allies-Korea (WRSA-K), munitions stored in South Korea but kept under
US title and control, then made available to US and South Korean forces during
hostilities. The US has notified the South Korean military that it will
terminate WRSA-K “by December
2006.”[16] It is unclear how
the antipersonnel mine stockpile will be disposed of by the US military.
In addition to the non-self-destructing mines, the US military also holds in
South Korea self-destructing, scatterable antipersonnel mines. The South Korean
government has reported that the US holds 40,000 Gator, 10,000 Volcano and
unknown number of MOPMS
mines.[17]
Use
Mine-laying is reportedly one of ten specific missions that US Forces in
Korea are slated to hand over to South Korean troops by 2006. US and South
Korea forces have reportedly carried out mine-laying training exercises every
quarter for the last several years. In November 2004, media reported on a
training in “rapid mine emplacement” by the South Korean Army and
the 2nd Engineer Battalion of the US Army’s 2nd Infantry Division in an
army training area in the Western Corridor. This unit reportedly took on the
mine-laying duties temporarily after the 44th Engineer Battalion deployed to
Iraq in August 2004. The training involved Volcano antipersonnel and
antivehicle mine systems. A soldier told media that the system can emplace a
minefield within 17 minutes.[18]
Landmine and UXO Problem
The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), and the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ) immediately
adjoining the southern boundary of the DMZ, remain among the most heavily mined
areas in the world due to extensive mine-laying during the Korean War, and again
in the 1960s, 1978 and 1988.[19]
There are also other mined areas in “rear” locations of the country,
mostly laid as protection around military bases. Antipersonnel mines are often
swept away from these military sites by torrential rains, increasing the danger
to civilians in the area.
In April 2004, the Republic of Korea Mission to the UN in New York told
Landmine Monitor that 91 square kilometers of land in the country are
mined.[20] This is a significantly
smaller amount than reported by the Ministry of National Defense to the National
Assembly’s National Defense Committee in 2003, which included a total area
of some 90.7 square kilometers of unconfirmed mined areas and 21.8 square
kilometers of confirmed mined
areas.[21]
The South Korean Army defines unconfirmed minefields as areas that are
suspected to be mined, but for which there are no maps or other reliable
information. It marks unconfirmed minefields with Unconfirmed Minefield Danger
signs. According to the Ministry of Defense, confirmed mined areas contain
around 1,083,000 mines.[22]
Unexploded ordnance (UXO) is also present in many parts of the country,
another legacy of the Korean War.
Mine/UXO Clearance
Mine clearance was undertaken in the DMZ and the CCZ in 2002-2003, in order
to reconnect the cross-border Donghae highway and railway line with North Korea,
as well as in other rear military
sites.[23] Clearance operations are
undertaken mainly by the South Korean Army, and also by the commercial demining
company Korea Mine Action Group
(KMAG).[24]
South Korea reported to Landmine Monitor in May 2005 that 6,300 soldiers from
11 military units were deployed for mine clearance operations in 2004, and
removed 8,800 mines from the periphery of military sites in rear areas. It
completed clearance at nine sites in 2004, and stated that all the landmines
that were buried in 39 military sites in rear areas are scheduled to be removed
by the end of 2006. It also said that the Army planned to begin demining
operations gradually in 15 unconfirmed mined areas in the southern part of the
CCZ in 2005.[25]
In its October 2004 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 report, South Korea
provides different numbers, stating that it carried out landmine removal
operations in 11 rear area military bases in 2004, recovering 10,245
“rounds” and retrieving an additional 42 “lost
landmines,” apparently from
flooding.[26]
At the International Humanitarian Landmine Removal Seminar held on 18-24 July
2004, hosted in the US by the Department of Defense, South Korea
“introduced and disseminated information regarding the procedures and
methods of removing mines in a wooded area, as applied to the reconnecting
construction of East & West Corridors and rear area military base landmine
removal operations.”[27]
Mine Risk Education
The South Korean government again stated in 2005 that it conducts mine risk
education (MRE) programs for civilians residing in the CCZ through television,
radio and the circulation of information
pamphlets.[28] Interviews with
civilians in rear areas, however, indicate that no mine risk education takes
place there. In 2004, the Chungaram Media Publishing Company published Not
Mines, But Flowers, a Korean translation of a Japanese MRE book for
children.[29]
Funding and Assistance
In 2004, South Korea spent US$280,000 on the purchase of mine clearance
equipment and explosives.[30]
In 2004, South Korea requested that $3 million of the total funding it
contributed to the UN Development Group Iraq Trust Fund be designated for
demining operations in Iraq.[31]
The government also contributed $100,000 to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for
Assistance in Mine Clearance, designated for Mozambique and
Eritrea.[32]
This represented a major increase in mine action funding for South Korea; in
all previous years it gave a combined total of $1.06 million, including $50,000
in 2003.[33]
Landmine Casualties
In 2004, there were at least three people injured in landmine incidents,
including one man injured in January and another injured in March. The
government also reported that one soldier was severely injured at Chulwon,
Gangwondo, on 8 April.[34] This
represents a small decrease from the five mine casualties (two people killed and
three injured) reported in 2003. However, there is reportedly an average of 10
new landmine casualties annually in the
DMZ.[35]
Reported casualties increased in the first six months of 2005 with two people
killed (one civilian) and four others injured (three civilians), including an
incident on 3 March when an army officer was killed in a landmine explosion at a
military outpost. On 19 May, three civilians working at a military base in
Chulwon accidentally entered a minefield; one man was killed and the other two
men were injured.
There is no comprehensive official data on mine casualties in South Korea.
Between 1999 and 2003, at least 46 new mine casualties were recorded. The
Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines estimates that more than 1,000 civilians, and
2,000 to 3,000 military personnel have been killed or injured since the
war.[36]
Survivor Assistance and Disability Policy and Practice
South Korean civilian mine survivors are eligible for government compensation
through the State Compensation Act. The government paid approximately $300,000
in compensation for a deceased civilian in
2004.[37] Medical bills are covered
by the National Medical Insurance system. Soldiers injured while on duty
receive a pension and free medical services from the Veterans Hospital, in
accordance with the Veterans’ Pension Act and the Act on the Honorable
Treatment and Support for Persons of Distinguished Service to the
State.[38] Depending on the degree
of disability, the government also provides preferential treatments for military
survivors, such as tax cuts and employment advantages for their
children.[39] South Korea has
legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities: the 1989 Welfare
Law for Persons with Disabilities; the 1990 Act for the Promotion of Employment
of Persons with Disabilities; the 1994 Special Education Promotion
Law.[40]
While civilian landmine casualties are eligible for compensation, it seems
very few survivors are actually receiving any government benefits. The KCBL
claims that the national compensation law has several limitations, including
that a suit to claim compensation must be lodged within three years of the mine
incident. In September 2005, KCBL will submit a draft Special Act for
Compensation of Mine Victims to the National Congress. The draft Special Act
includes provision for compensation without the current limitations for mine
survivors and the families of those
killed.[41]
[1] For more details on South
Korean landmine policy and history, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp.
474-475, and Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 1020-1021.
[2] A ROK representative stated,
“I believe that this new policy strives to address the threat to human
victims from the lingering nature of persistent mines while preserving the
military necessity of mines for defensive purposes.” Statement by Park
Hee-Kwon, Minister-Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in Geneva,
Seventh Session of the Group of Governmental Experts of the State Parties to the
CCW, Geneva, 8 March 2004.
[3] US Department of State, Bureau
for Political-Military Affairs, “Fact Sheet: New US Policy on
Landmines,” 27 February 2004.
[4] KCBL Statement, 2 March 2004,
www.kcbl.or.kr.
[5] Response to Landmine Monitor
from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 25 May 2005.
[6] There has been conflicting
information about possible production of a copy of the US M16 antipersonnel
mine. For details, see Landmine Monitor Report 2002, pp. 680-681.
[7] Statement by Park Hee-Kwon,
Minister-Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in Geneva, Seventh
Session of the Group of Governmental Experts of the State Parties to the CCW,
Geneva, 8 March 2004.
[8] Response to Landmine Monitor
from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 25 May 2005.
[9] Response to Landmine Monitor
from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 25 May 2005.
[10] Response to Landmine Monitor
(KCBL) from Col. Gi-Ok Kim, Director, International Arms Control Division,
Ministry of National Defense, 13 May 2003. In May 2005, South Korea stated that
“there are about twice as many landmines in stockpile as those that are
buried.” The government has estimated one million buried mines. Response
to Landmine Monitor from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York,
25 May 2005.
[11] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2001, p. 544.
[12] It appears 679 stockpiled
mines were destroyed. In a response to Landmine Monitor South Korea reported
that in 2004 it destroyed “9,521 anti-personnel landmines which were in
stockpile, buried in the rear areas or washed away from military storage sites
by flooding.” It also reported removing 8,800 from the rear areas. In
its CCW Article 13 report, it noted that the Armed Forces cleared mines swept
away by floods and cited retrieval of 42 “lost landmines.” Response
to Landmine Monitor from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York,
25 May 2005; CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form G, 8 October
2004.
[13] See Response to Landmine
Monitor from ROK Mission to UN, New York, 14 April 2004; see also Landmine
Monitor Report 1999, p. 333.
[14] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2002, pp. 681-682; Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 333.
[15] Response to Landmine Monitor
from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 26 February
2003.
[16] “U.S. Told Seoul of
Plans to Dump Ammo Stocks,” Digital Chosunilbo, 8 April 2005.
[17] Response to Landmine Monitor
from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 25 May 2005.
[18] “Forces compete during
mine-laying training,” Stars and Stripes, 7 November 2004;
“Border Troops Trained in Mine-Laying,” Korea Herald, 8
November 2004.
[19] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, p. 1022.
[20] Response to Landmine Monitor
from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 14 April 2004.
[21] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, p. 1022.
[22] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, p. 1022.
[23] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, p. 1023.
[24] KMAG, contracted by the Army
and local governments, carried out limited clearance near the DMZ in 2003,
including areas around army camps no longer in use. In September 2004, KMAG
remained in discussion on possible deployment to Iraq where, in early 2004, it
had been requested to participate in the clearance of mines and UXO in Baghdad
and the north of Iraq.
[25] Response to Landmine Monitor
from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 25 May 2005.
[26] CCW Amended Protocol II
Article 13 Report, Form G, 8 October 2004.
[27] CCW Amended Protocol II
Article 13 Report, Form E, 8 October 2004.
[28] Response to Landmine Monitor
from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 25 May 2005.
[29] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, p. 1024.
[30] Response to Landmine Monitor
from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 25 May 2005. This
response also corrected information provided last year and published in
Landmine Monitor Report 2004; South Korea spent $230,000 on mine
clearance equipment and explosives in 2003, not $2.3 million.
[31] Response to Landmine Monitor
from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the UN in New York, 25
May 2005. The duration of the contribution is not known.
[32] Response to Landmine Monitor
from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 25 May 2005. In
addition South Korea reportedly contributed $54,000 to Lebanon for two demining
vehicles in 2004. See the Lebanon report in this edition of Landmine Monitor.
This amount has not been confirmed by South Korea and is not included in the
total.
[33] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, p. 1024.
[34] Unless otherwise noted, all
information in this section comes from the KCBL, which collects information on
landmine incidents from various sources, see www.kcbl.or.kr. See also Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, p. 1024; Lizette Potgieter, “Remote, Dramatic
Northernmost Island,” Korea Times, 28 April 2004
[35] “The future of the DMZ
rests on clearing mines,” Joins.com, 24 October 2004.
[36] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, p. 1024.
[37] Response to Landmine Monitor
from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 25 May 2005.
[38] Response to Landmine Monitor
from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 25 May 2005;
response to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire by Cdr. Song Chan An, Ministry of
National Defense, 31 May 2005.
[39] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, p. 1025.
[40] For details of the
legislation, see www.dredf.org/international/lawindex.html.
[41] Information provided by
KCBL, www.kcbl.or.kr.