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Table of Contents
Country Reports
REPUBLIC OF KOREA, Landmine Monitor Report 2005

Republic of Korea

Key developments since May 2004: The ROK cleared 8,800 mines around military sites in 2004. The government increased its contributions to mine clearance in Eritrea, Mozambique and, substantially, Iraq. The government contributed $3.1 million to mine action in 2004, including $3 million for Iraq, a sum three times all of its previous contributions.

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Korea (ROK)―South Korea―has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. It considers antipersonnel mines a military necessity so long as the military threat from North Korea persists.[1] South Korea is one of the small number of countries that has abstained from voting on every pro-mine ban UN General Assembly resolution since 1996, including UNGA Resolution 59/84 on 3 December 2004.

South Korea did not attend the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Nairobi in November-December 2004, or the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in June 2004 and June 2005.

A government official made a brief comment in support of the US landmine policy announced by the Bush administration in February 2004.[2] Under its new policy, the US will retain non-self-destructing antipersonnel mines for use in Korea until 2010, and thereafter retain self-destructing antipersonnel mines for use globally.[3] The Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines (KCBL) issued a statement in March 2004 criticizing what it described as the “disappointing retreat” in US landmine policy.[4]

South Korea is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. It participated in the Sixth Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II and other CCW meetings related to antivehicle mines and explosive remnants of war in 2004 and 2005. On 17 September 2004, South Korea submitted its Amended Protocol II Article 13 national measures report.

Production and Transfer

South Korea maintains that it has not produced any antipersonnel mines, including Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines, since 2000. The government confirmed to Landmine Monitor that it did not produce any antipersonnel mines in 2004.[5] In the past, South Korea produced two types of Claymore antipersonnel mine, designated KM18A1 and K440.[6] The government has never made a policy statement, or enacted legal measures, prohibiting production of antipersonnel mines; thus, Landmine Monitor has continued to list South Korea as a producer.

In March 2004, the government stated that it has “faithfully enforced an indefinite extension of its moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines since 1997.”[7] The moratorium does not include Claymore-type mines.[8] South Korea is not known to have exported any type of antipersonnel mine in the past.

In May 2005, South Korea informed Landmine Monitor that it did not import any antipersonnel mines in 2004 or the beginning of 2005.[9]

Stockpiling

The South Korean military holds a stockpile of about two million antipersonnel mines.[10] It includes 960,000 M14 mines that were made detectable before July 1999 in order to comply with the provisions of Amended Protocol II. In addition, South Korea has an unknown number of self-destructing mines, apparently including more than 31,000 US ADAM artillery-delivered mines.[11] South Korea destroyed some stockpiled antipersonnel mines in 2004.[12]

The US military stockpiles approximately 1.1 million M14 and M16 antipersonnel mines for use in any future resumption of war in Korea.[13] US Army documentation indicates that the US stores nearly half of those mines in the continental United States, not in South Korea.[14] However, the government in February 2003 told Landmine Monitor that the entire US stockpile of non-self-destructing mines is in South Korea.[15]

Most of the US landmine stockpile is part of the more extensive War Reserve Stocks for Allies-Korea (WRSA-K), munitions stored in South Korea but kept under US title and control, then made available to US and South Korean forces during hostilities. The US has notified the South Korean military that it will terminate WRSA-K “by December 2006.”[16] It is unclear how the antipersonnel mine stockpile will be disposed of by the US military.

In addition to the non-self-destructing mines, the US military also holds in South Korea self-destructing, scatterable antipersonnel mines. The South Korean government has reported that the US holds 40,000 Gator, 10,000 Volcano and unknown number of MOPMS mines.[17]

Use

Mine-laying is reportedly one of ten specific missions that US Forces in Korea are slated to hand over to South Korean troops by 2006. US and South Korea forces have reportedly carried out mine-laying training exercises every quarter for the last several years. In November 2004, media reported on a training in “rapid mine emplacement” by the South Korean Army and the 2nd Engineer Battalion of the US Army’s 2nd Infantry Division in an army training area in the Western Corridor. This unit reportedly took on the mine-laying duties temporarily after the 44th Engineer Battalion deployed to Iraq in August 2004. The training involved Volcano antipersonnel and antivehicle mine systems. A soldier told media that the system can emplace a minefield within 17 minutes.[18]

Landmine and UXO Problem

The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), and the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ) immediately adjoining the southern boundary of the DMZ, remain among the most heavily mined areas in the world due to extensive mine-laying during the Korean War, and again in the 1960s, 1978 and 1988.[19] There are also other mined areas in “rear” locations of the country, mostly laid as protection around military bases. Antipersonnel mines are often swept away from these military sites by torrential rains, increasing the danger to civilians in the area.

In April 2004, the Republic of Korea Mission to the UN in New York told Landmine Monitor that 91 square kilometers of land in the country are mined.[20] This is a significantly smaller amount than reported by the Ministry of National Defense to the National Assembly’s National Defense Committee in 2003, which included a total area of some 90.7 square kilometers of unconfirmed mined areas and 21.8 square kilometers of confirmed mined areas.[21]

The South Korean Army defines unconfirmed minefields as areas that are suspected to be mined, but for which there are no maps or other reliable information. It marks unconfirmed minefields with Unconfirmed Minefield Danger signs. According to the Ministry of Defense, confirmed mined areas contain around 1,083,000 mines.[22]

Unexploded ordnance (UXO) is also present in many parts of the country, another legacy of the Korean War.

Mine/UXO Clearance

Mine clearance was undertaken in the DMZ and the CCZ in 2002-2003, in order to reconnect the cross-border Donghae highway and railway line with North Korea, as well as in other rear military sites.[23] Clearance operations are undertaken mainly by the South Korean Army, and also by the commercial demining company Korea Mine Action Group (KMAG).[24]

South Korea reported to Landmine Monitor in May 2005 that 6,300 soldiers from 11 military units were deployed for mine clearance operations in 2004, and removed 8,800 mines from the periphery of military sites in rear areas. It completed clearance at nine sites in 2004, and stated that all the landmines that were buried in 39 military sites in rear areas are scheduled to be removed by the end of 2006. It also said that the Army planned to begin demining operations gradually in 15 unconfirmed mined areas in the southern part of the CCZ in 2005.[25]

In its October 2004 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 report, South Korea provides different numbers, stating that it carried out landmine removal operations in 11 rear area military bases in 2004, recovering 10,245 “rounds” and retrieving an additional 42 “lost landmines,” apparently from flooding.[26]

At the International Humanitarian Landmine Removal Seminar held on 18-24 July 2004, hosted in the US by the Department of Defense, South Korea “introduced and disseminated information regarding the procedures and methods of removing mines in a wooded area, as applied to the reconnecting construction of East & West Corridors and rear area military base landmine removal operations.”[27]

Mine Risk Education

The South Korean government again stated in 2005 that it conducts mine risk education (MRE) programs for civilians residing in the CCZ through television, radio and the circulation of information pamphlets.[28] Interviews with civilians in rear areas, however, indicate that no mine risk education takes place there. In 2004, the Chungaram Media Publishing Company published Not Mines, But Flowers, a Korean translation of a Japanese MRE book for children.[29]

Funding and Assistance

In 2004, South Korea spent US$280,000 on the purchase of mine clearance equipment and explosives.[30]

In 2004, South Korea requested that $3 million of the total funding it contributed to the UN Development Group Iraq Trust Fund be designated for demining operations in Iraq.[31] The government also contributed $100,000 to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, designated for Mozambique and Eritrea.[32]

This represented a major increase in mine action funding for South Korea; in all previous years it gave a combined total of $1.06 million, including $50,000 in 2003.[33]

Landmine Casualties

In 2004, there were at least three people injured in landmine incidents, including one man injured in January and another injured in March. The government also reported that one soldier was severely injured at Chulwon, Gangwondo, on 8 April.[34] This represents a small decrease from the five mine casualties (two people killed and three injured) reported in 2003. However, there is reportedly an average of 10 new landmine casualties annually in the DMZ.[35]

Reported casualties increased in the first six months of 2005 with two people killed (one civilian) and four others injured (three civilians), including an incident on 3 March when an army officer was killed in a landmine explosion at a military outpost. On 19 May, three civilians working at a military base in Chulwon accidentally entered a minefield; one man was killed and the other two men were injured.

There is no comprehensive official data on mine casualties in South Korea. Between 1999 and 2003, at least 46 new mine casualties were recorded. The Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines estimates that more than 1,000 civilians, and 2,000 to 3,000 military personnel have been killed or injured since the war.[36]

Survivor Assistance and Disability Policy and Practice

South Korean civilian mine survivors are eligible for government compensation through the State Compensation Act. The government paid approximately $300,000 in compensation for a deceased civilian in 2004.[37] Medical bills are covered by the National Medical Insurance system. Soldiers injured while on duty receive a pension and free medical services from the Veterans Hospital, in accordance with the Veterans’ Pension Act and the Act on the Honorable Treatment and Support for Persons of Distinguished Service to the State.[38] Depending on the degree of disability, the government also provides preferential treatments for military survivors, such as tax cuts and employment advantages for their children.[39] South Korea has legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities: the 1989 Welfare Law for Persons with Disabilities; the 1990 Act for the Promotion of Employment of Persons with Disabilities; the 1994 Special Education Promotion Law.[40]

While civilian landmine casualties are eligible for compensation, it seems very few survivors are actually receiving any government benefits. The KCBL claims that the national compensation law has several limitations, including that a suit to claim compensation must be lodged within three years of the mine incident. In September 2005, KCBL will submit a draft Special Act for Compensation of Mine Victims to the National Congress. The draft Special Act includes provision for compensation without the current limitations for mine survivors and the families of those killed.[41]


[1] For more details on South Korean landmine policy and history, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 474-475, and Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 1020-1021.

[2] A ROK representative stated, “I believe that this new policy strives to address the threat to human victims from the lingering nature of persistent mines while preserving the military necessity of mines for defensive purposes.” Statement by Park Hee-Kwon, Minister-Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in Geneva, Seventh Session of the Group of Governmental Experts of the State Parties to the CCW, Geneva, 8 March 2004.

[3] US Department of State, Bureau for Political-Military Affairs, “Fact Sheet: New US Policy on Landmines,” 27 February 2004.

[4] KCBL Statement, 2 March 2004, www.kcbl.or.kr.

[5] Response to Landmine Monitor from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 25 May 2005.

[6] There has been conflicting information about possible production of a copy of the US M16 antipersonnel mine. For details, see Landmine Monitor Report 2002, pp. 680-681.

[7] Statement by Park Hee-Kwon, Minister-Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in Geneva, Seventh Session of the Group of Governmental Experts of the State Parties to the CCW, Geneva, 8 March 2004.

[8] Response to Landmine Monitor from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 25 May 2005.

[9] Response to Landmine Monitor from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 25 May 2005.

[10] Response to Landmine Monitor (KCBL) from Col. Gi-Ok Kim, Director, International Arms Control Division, Ministry of National Defense, 13 May 2003. In May 2005, South Korea stated that “there are about twice as many landmines in stockpile as those that are buried.” The government has estimated one million buried mines. Response to Landmine Monitor from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 25 May 2005.

[11] See Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 544.

[12] It appears 679 stockpiled mines were destroyed. In a response to Landmine Monitor South Korea reported that in 2004 it destroyed “9,521 anti-personnel landmines which were in stockpile, buried in the rear areas or washed away from military storage sites by flooding.” It also reported removing 8,800 from the rear areas. In its CCW Article 13 report, it noted that the Armed Forces cleared mines swept away by floods and cited retrieval of 42 “lost landmines.” Response to Landmine Monitor from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 25 May 2005; CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form G, 8 October 2004.

[13] See Response to Landmine Monitor from ROK Mission to UN, New York, 14 April 2004; see also Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 333.

[14] See Landmine Monitor Report 2002, pp. 681-682; Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 333.

[15] Response to Landmine Monitor from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 26 February 2003.

[16] “U.S. Told Seoul of Plans to Dump Ammo Stocks,” Digital Chosunilbo, 8 April 2005.

[17] Response to Landmine Monitor from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 25 May 2005.

[18] “Forces compete during mine-laying training,” Stars and Stripes, 7 November 2004; “Border Troops Trained in Mine-Laying,” Korea Herald, 8 November 2004.

[19] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1022.

[20] Response to Landmine Monitor from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 14 April 2004.

[21] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1022.

[22] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1022.

[23] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1023.

[24] KMAG, contracted by the Army and local governments, carried out limited clearance near the DMZ in 2003, including areas around army camps no longer in use. In September 2004, KMAG remained in discussion on possible deployment to Iraq where, in early 2004, it had been requested to participate in the clearance of mines and UXO in Baghdad and the north of Iraq.

[25] Response to Landmine Monitor from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 25 May 2005.

[26] CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form G, 8 October 2004.

[27] CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form E, 8 October 2004.

[28] Response to Landmine Monitor from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 25 May 2005.

[29] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1024.

[30] Response to Landmine Monitor from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 25 May 2005. This response also corrected information provided last year and published in Landmine Monitor Report 2004; South Korea spent $230,000 on mine clearance equipment and explosives in 2003, not $2.3 million.

[31] Response to Landmine Monitor from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the UN in New York, 25 May 2005. The duration of the contribution is not known.

[32] Response to Landmine Monitor from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 25 May 2005. In addition South Korea reportedly contributed $54,000 to Lebanon for two demining vehicles in 2004. See the Lebanon report in this edition of Landmine Monitor. This amount has not been confirmed by South Korea and is not included in the total.

[33] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1024.

[34] Unless otherwise noted, all information in this section comes from the KCBL, which collects information on landmine incidents from various sources, see www.kcbl.or.kr. See also Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1024; Lizette Potgieter, “Remote, Dramatic Northernmost Island,” Korea Times, 28 April 2004

[35] “The future of the DMZ rests on clearing mines,” Joins.com, 24 October 2004.

[36] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1024.

[37] Response to Landmine Monitor from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 25 May 2005.

[38] Response to Landmine Monitor from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 25 May 2005; response to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire by Cdr. Song Chan An, Ministry of National Defense, 31 May 2005.

[39] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1025.

[40] For details of the legislation, see www.dredf.org/international/lawindex.html.

[41] Information provided by KCBL, www.kcbl.or.kr.