Key developments since May 2005: On 17 October 2005, Guinea-Bissau
completed destruction of its stockpile of 10,654 antipersonnel mines, just ahead
of its 1 November 2005 treaty deadline. In March and April 2006, a faction of
the Senegal-based Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance laid antipersonnel
and antivehicle mines in northern Guinea-Bissau, causing civilian casualties and
significant socioeconomic disruption. Casualties in 2005 fell by almost half
from 2004, but by June 2006 had risen again to double the 2005 level. As of
June, there were 37 new casualties, mostly the result of one incident causing 28
casualties. The capital, Bissau, became free of mined areas by the end of June
2006.
Mine Ban Policy
The Republic of Guinea-Bissau signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997,
ratified on 22 May 2001 and became a State Party on 1 November 2001. In
December 2004, the Foreign Minister said Guinea-Bissau was planning to enact
domestic legislation to implement the treaty, but as of May 2006 the legislation
had not yet been drafted. A government official said the July 2005 presidential
elections were partly responsible for the
delay.[1] The government had
previously said that domestic legislation was unnecessary because the treaty
automatically becomes national law under the constitution, making mine-related
crimes subject to existing penal
sanctions.[2]
As of 1 July 2006, Guinea-Bissau had not submitted its annual Article 7
transparency report, due by 30 April 2006. Four previous reports were
submitted.[3]
Guinea-Bissau attended the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in Zagreb, Croatia
in November-December 2005, where it made statements during the General Exchange
of Views and stockpile destruction sessions. It also participated in the
intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in June 2005 and May 2006.
In the May meetings it made presentations on mine clearance and victim
assistance.
Guinea-Bissau has not engaged in the extensive discussions that States
Parties have had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to
Articles 1, 2 and 3. Thus, Guinea-Bissau has not made its views known on issues
related to joint military operations with non-States Parties, foreign
stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive
fuzes or antihandling devices, and the permissible number of mines retained for
training.
Guinea-Bissau is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.
Production, Transfer, Stockpiling and Destruction
Guinea-Bissau has reported that it never produced or exported antipersonnel
mines.[4]
On 17 October 2005, Guinea-Bissau completed the destruction of its stockpile
of 10,654 antipersonnel mines, just ahead of its 1 November 2005 treaty
deadline. The country’s final 4,943 stockpiled mines were destroyed on
that day, in a process undertaken by national army engineers in partnership with
the National Mine Action Coordination Center (Centro Nacional de
Coordenação da Acção Anti-Minas, CAAMI), the two
national demining NGOs, and the UN Development Programme
(UNDP).[5] The event took place by
open detonation at an isolated site outside the city of Gabú in the east
of the country, in the presence of three ministers, high-ranking military
officials, and representatives of UN agencies, international organizations, NGOs
and the media. UNDP, UNICEF and Canada provided funding for the
destruction.[6]
Previously, Guinea-Bissau destroyed 4,711 stockpiled antipersonnel mines in
February 1998, before it signed the Mine Ban Treaty, and another 1,000
antipersonnel mines in September 2002.[7] Guinea-Bissau had originally intended to destroy the remaining stockpiled
antipersonnel mines before the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in
November-December 2004.[8]
In announcing the completion of destruction, Guinea-Bissau also informed
States Parties that it would retain 67 mines for training purposes, as permitted
under Article 3. However, this included 50 POMZ-2 and eight PMD-6 mines whose
explosive charges and fuzes were destroyed in the 17 October event. States
Parties are not required to declare inert mines as retained mines. The other
retained antipersonnel mines were six PMN2, two M969 MAPS and one 409
MAPS.[9]
There is a difference of 1,013 antipersonnel mines between the number of
stockpiled mines Guinea-Bissau declared in its 2003, 2004 and 2005 Article 7
reports (3,997) and the number destroyed in October 2005 (4,943) and retained
for training purposes (67).[10] According to CAAMI, additional mines were discovered during an inventory
check.[11] Guinea-Bissau destroyed
517 more PMD-6 mines than previously declared and 587 PMD-6M mines that have
never been declared, but also destroyed 91 fewer POMZ-2 mines than previously
declared. The discrepancy on the POMZ-2 mines has not been explained.
Guinea-Bissau Stockpile of Antipersonnel
Mines[12]
PMD-6
PMD-6M
POMZ-2
PMN
PMN2
M969
M409
Total
June 05 declared
2,951
0
1,037
6
0
2
1
3,997
October 06 destroyed
3,460
587
896
0
0
0
0
4,943
October 06 retained
8*
0
50*
0
6
2
1
67
[* = inert]
At the Standing Committee meetings in May 2006, Guinea-Bissau told States
Parties that, in addition to its landmine contamination, it also has an
explosive remnants of war (ERW) problem, which includes “abandoned or
improperly stored stockpiled
ordnance.”[13]
Use
In March and April 2006, a faction of the Senegal-based Movement of
Democratic Forces of Casamance (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la
Casamance, MFDC) laid both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines in northern
Guinea-Bissau. The MFDC has waged an independence struggle for the Casamance
region of southern Senegal since 1982. An MFDC faction led by Salif Sadio fled
into northern Guinea-Bissau after a conflict with another MFDC faction led by
Cesar Badiate. Badiate allied his faction with the military forces of
Guinea-Bissau, which launched attacks on Sadio-occupied areas in
mid-March.[14] Guinea-Bissau
declared on 21 April that the fighting was over and it had ousted all of the
rebel forces.[15]
A Guinea-Bissau army official, Colonel Antonio N’daye, told media that
rebels of the Sadio MFDC faction had laid mines on the road linking Varela on
the coast with São Domingos in Cacheu province, forcing the road to be
closed.[16] N’daye blamed the
Sadio MFDC faction for laying a landmine that exploded under a minibus taxi
outside São Domingos on 16 March, killing 12
people.[17] On 23 March, a landmine
blew up a Guinea-Bissau army truck killing three soldiers and injuring four
more.[18] On 24 March,
Guinea-Bissau troops and Badiate MFDC forces called off an attack against the
Sadio faction after suffering “many” landmine casualties. An army
spokesman said Sadio’s troops had laid mines on all the approaches to his
stronghold.[19]
The conflict caused an estimated 6,000-8,000 people to flee into Senegal and
to areas south of the Cacheu River in Guinea-Bissau. Some refugees voiced fears
about returning to their home areas if mines have been laid in their croplands.
At the end of March 2006, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
said, “the acute risk of mines” was making it difficult to help
people displaced by the fighting.[20] On 11 April, media reported that at least three people had died from
treatable illnesses as the road that links the farming communities of Suzana,
Varela, and the surrounding villages to the nearest hospital in São
Domingos remained closed due to
mines.[21]
On 16 May, UN agencies launched a joint appeal for over US$3.6 million to
help some 20,000 people affected by the fighting in northern Guinea-Bissau; the
funds were needed mainly for food aid, but the second largest amount, $727,000,
was allotted to mine clearance. UN agencies said that antipersonnel and
antitank mines are the main safety concern in the region, and prevent residents
from accessing their homes and farms. The UN’s Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) said mines had recently killed some
13 civilians and injured others along the main roads close to the Senegal
border.[22] OCHA also said,
“The issue of mines represents a grave threat also to the economic
performance of the country, as the cashew season is well underway and many areas
in the northern regions are not being harvested due to mine contamination....
Most IDPs [internally displaced persons] will not have access to their land to
cultivate food crops during the upcoming rainy season (June-October), either due
to the loss of seeds and tools or by fear of
landmines.”[23]
In April 2006, the ICBL condemned the antipersonnel mine use in northern
Guinea-Bissau.[24] It noted that,
in 1999, the MFDC and the Senegalese government signed the Banjul Declaration,
which among other things, committed the group to cease using landmines. While
the MFDC continued to use mines through 2001, according to Landmine Monitor,
there have been no confirmed reports of the MFDC using mines since that time.
Senegal is a State Party to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty.
Landmine and ERW Problem
Guinea-Bissau is affected by landmines and ERW, largely as a result of three
distinct armed conflicts.[25] Contamination first resulted from the so-called War of Liberation
(1963-1974), with mines being used for border defense and the protection of
military bases. More significant mine and unexploded ordnance (UXO)
contamination came from the internal conflict of 1998-1999, which affected
primarily the capital, Bissau, and to a limited extent, other areas of the
country, notably in the south. Mines were reportedly laid by both parties to
the conflict, as well as by foreign troops involved in the
conflict.[26]
There is also mine contamination resulting from military activity on
Guinea-Bissau’s borders, primarily with the Casamance region of Senegal.
The MFDC allegedly used the border area inside Guinea-Bissau as a rear base,
while the Senegalese Armed Forces were active in Guinea-Bissau during the
1998-1999 civil war and in their subsequent military operations against real or
suspected MFDC bases.[27] The March
2006 flare-up, when mines were laid by an MFDC faction to block Guinea-Bissau
forces trying to oust them from villages in the north, led to the UN reporting
that, “fighting and the planting of lethal landmines in the northwest of
Guinea-Bissau has isolated some 20,000 people who are struggling to survive on
dwindling food reserves and occasional deliveries of food and medicines by
canoe.”[28]
There is also believed to be contamination along the border with Guinea
resulting from mines laid by Portuguese armed forces for defensive purposes
during Guinea-Bissau’s War of
Liberation.[29]
Guinea-Bissau’s National Mine Action Coordination Center (CAAMI)
previously identified 27 “sectors” (administrative areas) outside
the capital as being mined.[30] However, this data was due to be updated from the results of a landmine
impact survey initiated in March
2006.[31]
According to CAAMI, Guinea-Bissau has a considerable challenge to meet in
terms of ERW contamination. Four major sites of contamination have been
identified within, and surrounding, the capital, pointing to “a more
intense ERW problem than was previously acknowledged.” In particular, one
zone (Paiol de Brá) within the city-limits of Bissau, where an army
arsenal exploded in June 1998, is the site of the destruction of more than 20
ammunition storage areas. This caused an extensive area of ERW contamination of
more than three square kilometers; residential areas around the site have been
contaminated with explosive
ordnance,[32] which is said to pose
an “extreme threat to civilians.” In addition, other sites in the
south of the country are affected by large amounts of
ERW.[33]
Landmine and ERW contamination primarily affects the poorest segment of
Guinea-Bissau’s population. It affects land that could be cultivated for
subsistence agriculture or for cashew harvesting, and is in areas where people
have few alternative options to sustain their
livelihoods.[34] However, according
to the UNDP’s chief technical advisor in Bissau, the remaining minefields
have mostly been there since the colonial period and people have either learned
to live around them, or in certain cases, have undertaken demining
themselves.[35]
Mine Action Program
National Mine Action Authority: On 10 September 2001, following an
earlier decree,[36] the government
created the National Commission for Humanitarian Demining (Comissão
Nacional para Desminagem Humanitária, CNDH) as a steering committee for
mine action in the country. In theory, the CNDH should meet three times a year,
but it did not meet in 2005 as a result of elections, change in government, and
then the dissolution of parliament.[37] In 2006, it met for the first time on 7 March, and CAAMI presented its
program update for 2005. This included updates on completion of stockpile
destruction, the impending completion of mine clearance in Bissau, the
introduction of mechanical demining assets and the planned landmine impact
survey. A summary of donor support was also
provided.[38]
Mine Action Center: In March 2001, the government set up the National
Mine Action Coordination Center (CAAMI) to coordinate mine action operations in
the country. Operating under the aegis of the State Secretary of
Veterans’ Affairs, CAAMI’s mandate was to plan and coordinate all
mine action activities, mobilize the resources necessary for the implementation
of the National Humanitarian Mine Action Program and monitor all mine-related
activities.[39] UNDP has continued
to support the mine action program in Guinea-Bissau, with a chief technical
advisor located in the CAAMI offices.[40] The center has a technical group working on area cancellation.
CAAMI has used version 3 of the Information Management System for Mine Action
(IMSMA) for storing mine action information, but because Guinea-Bissau has never
had a significant impact survey, the IMSMA database has not been used to its
full potential. There have also been some challenges in terms of building
sufficient capacity to ensure that the tool can be used for planning and not
simply to print out maps.[41] It
was expected that version 4 of IMSMA would be installed before the end of
2006.[42]
Apart from the 2001 decree, no national legislation governing the mine action
program has been adopted. CAAMI adopted the International Mine Action Standards
(IMAS) and approved standing operating procedures (SOPs) that combined those
used in Mozambique and Angola.[43] In 2006, CAAMI was in the process of developing more specific national
guidelines based on IMAS, and worked with mine operators to review SOPs for mine
clearance and develop SOPs for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and battle area
clearance.[44]
Strategic Planning and Progress
CAAMI’s plan for mine clearance and survey for 2004-2009 was developed
in 2004 to meet Guinea-Bissau’s obligations under Article 5 of the Mine
Ban Treaty.[45] In the plan
submitted to the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, Guinea-Bissau
claimed that, “Although accurate impact and technical surveys need to be
completed, it is estimated that, with a modest budget of US$8-9 million, all of
the high and medium priority areas can be cleared within a period of
approximately five years, rendering Guinea-Bissau the first post-conflict
African country free from the impact of landmines and unexploded
ordnance.”[46]
The increase in casualties from ERW has led to an increased focus on EOD
capacity and rapid response to ERW in
Guinea-Bissau.[47] In August 2005,
the first formal training of EOD teams was carried out in Bissau. Both national
clearance NGOs and two CAAMI personnel participated in the initial training,
which was conducted by Handicap International (HI). Twelve basic EOD
personnel―six from each clearance NGO―moved on to the next phase of
practical training in February 2006.[48]
During 2006, a second phase of strategic planning was to be carried out using
new survey data.[49] In order to
address concerns about the reliability of casualty data for planning purposes, a
nationwide census of mine/ERW casualties was carried out in May 2006 through a
joint initiative of CAAMI and the World Health Organization (WHO), to help form
the basis of strategic planning in the area of victim
assistance.[50]
The Public Sector Reform Program was revised in 2005, and was factored into
mine action planning.[51]
Mine clearance priorities for Bissau were said to be defined in conjunction
with the city council and national government, and to be related to economic
priorities.[52] The conflict zone
in the north was a major priority, in order to prevent accidents in contaminated
primary and secondary roads, and to allow refugees and internally displaced
people (IDPs) to return to their homes and receive assistance from the
international community.[53] Other
priorities for clearance of mined areas outside the capital were due to be set
in 2006, after the landmine impact survey was
completed.[54]
Summary of Efforts to Comply with Article 5
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Guinea-Bissau must destroy all
antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as
possible, but no later than 1 November 2011. In March 2006, CAAMI was
optimistic that it would meet the deadline if funding was maintained; it
believed that the primary problem addressed in future years would be ERW rather
than mines. The only other major obstacle would be if the conflict in the north
had long-term repercussions.[55]
However, a funding crisis in the mine action program in April 2006 forced
HUMAID, one of the two national demining NGOs, to cease operations for some two
months. According to CAAMI, a shortage of long-term resources threatens the
chances of Guinea-Bissau completing its Article 5 requirements within the treaty
deadline.[56]
Demining
There are two national mine action NGOs in Guinea-Bissau, LUTCAM (Lutamos
Todos Contra As Minas) which has been active since February 2003, and HUMAID
(Humanitarian Aid) which began operations in early 2000. HI has operated as a
technical advisor to HUMAID for clearance operations since January
2005.[57] It completed a European
Commission-funded project at the end of March 2006, but maintained a technical
advisor in the region to continue assisting Guinea-Bissau on a case-by-case
basis.[58]
There have never been any demining injuries or deaths in
Guinea-Bissau’s mine action
program.[59] All deminers in
Guinea-Bissau are insured for a maximum of CFA6 million (about
$11,400).[60]
The extent to which HIV/AIDS is prevalent among deminers is not known. Two
deminers died in 2005, but the cause was not identified as AIDS. An HIV/AIDS
awareness session for deminers during the rainy season in 2006 was under
consideration by CAAMI.[61]
Identification of Mined Areas: Surveys and Assessments
Technical survey and marking of high priority areas are said to have been
completed only in Bissau city.[62] In 2005, an assessment of areas in Guinea-Bissau affected by ERW was
carried out by the British NGO, Cleared Ground Demining. The report highlighted
the urgent need to address the ERW problem and made recommendations, including
the need to create EOD capacity and battle area clearance teams, with SOPs and
training material. The report was used by CAAMI to plan a strategy for
responding to the significant ERW contamination in the country; CAAMI determined
that international technical advisors will be required to initiate this phase of
the program, in order to build the necessary capacity for the national program
to conduct operations over the longer
term.[63]
Additional survey data was due to be collected in 2006, through a landmine
impact survey.[64] CAAMI started
preliminary opinion collection in March 2006, with the results expected by the
middle of the year. It was hoped that the full survey could start by April
2006, before the rainy season, but this was delayed by the conflict in northern
Guinea-Bissau. It was estimated that the total cost would be around $500,000,
of which some $200,000 had been provided by donors by early June
2006.[65] Survey of other high
contamination areas, such as the northern border with the Casamance region of
Senegal, was said to be a high
priority.[66]
Following the military encounters in the north, the UN Mine Action Service
(UNMAS) conducted an assessment on the border with Senegal from 24 April to 9
May 2006. It was not thought likely that the mine-laying had been extensive, in
part because of the condition of the soil, which was heavily baked, making it
hard to dig. However, UNMAS suspected that areas occupied by the rebels to the
northeast of São Domingos could also have been contaminated by the heavy
fighting, and because the rebels had at least a week before they knew they would
have to retreat. By May 2006, tenders had gone out for a supervisory contractor
to help the national NGO LUTCAM to check the
area.[67]
Marking and Fencing
There has been no permanent marking of mined or ERW-contaminated areas; the
program believes it is not likely to have the budget to do so. According to the
UNDP chief technical advisor, “Sites are marked with signs in the areas,
many of which were put in place in the very early days of the program. There
are difficulties with ensuring that signs are not taken in many
cases–perimeter marking tape is almost always removed right away. Some
‘Danger Mines’ or ‘Perigo Minas’ signs are made of
cloth, but the newer ones are plastic. The ERW area used to be a military base,
but the fence has been destroyed. It is unlikely that we will build a fence
around the area (which is very costly here), instead if we can identify the
funding, we should be moving very quickly to get rid of the surface
contamination.”[68]
Mine and ERW Clearance
According to CAAMI, in 2005 substantial progress was made, “not only in
operational terms, but also in terms of capacity building and in increasing
operational effectiveness.” However, 2005 represented a second
consecutive year of decreases in productivity, with the mine action program
reporting clearance of 119,464 square meters, destroying 26 antipersonnel mines,
three antivehicle mines and 29,722 items of
ERW.[69] In 2004, the program
reported clearance of 215,872 square meters, while in 2003, 283,470 square
meters were cleared.
The drop in productivity during 2005 has been ascribed to a number of
factors. According to UNDP, both demining NGOs have been working on battle
areas heavily contaminated by metal, which have required considerable
excavation. In addition, HUMAID had a month-long refresher training when its
partnership with HI started.[70]
Mine clearance in Bissau was due to be completed by the end of March 2006,
with clearance of ERW by the end of the
year.[71] Through increased use of
area reduction techniques, mine clearance was actually completed in
June.[72] In 2005 and to July 2006,
HUMAID reduced 982,218 square meters of land and LUTCAM reduced 50,504 square
meters.[73]
The Guinea-Bissau military informed UNMAS, which was undertaking a
post-conflict assessment in the north of the country in April-May 2006, that it
had demined the 42 kilometers of the road which had been mined by MFDC rebels;
UNMAS carried out “targeted verification” of the
road.[74]
The mine action program has tried new approaches in order to improve
productivity; these have substantially reduced the suspected areas in the
capital, many of which have been under cultivation for a number of years. These
areas were resurveyed, and cancelled where no evidence of contamination was
uncovered. Technical survey through information gathering and manual clearance
significantly reduced the total area remaining to be cleared in Bissau,
eliminating four suspected hazard areas and greatly reducing another two. The
cancellations of suspected areas are approved by a technical working group of
CAAMI, the UNDP chief technical advisor and the clearance operators. Area
reduction began in 2005 and continued in
2006.[75]
In 2005, the program had only manual demining capacity. In February 2006, it
received one demining machine, the MAXX mini-excavator multi-tool that cuts
vegetation and has a variety of ground preparation tools. This asset was
provided by the US Department of Defense for one year, with technical advisors
to assist in its use throughout the time. Local personnel to operate the
machine, fuel and transport were provided by
UNDP.[76]
Quality control of clearance operations is conducted by CAAMI staff, which
includes an operations manager and two quality control officers trained in
Mozambique. In August 2005, the CAAMI quality control officers took an EOD
training course provided by HI.[77] When an area is cleared, a report and a clearance certificate are handed
to the local authorities. According to the UNDP chief technical advisor,
“The reality is that immediately when deminers are finished, or even
before, people are already trying to use the
land.”[78]
An initial survey of post-clearance land use was undertaken by a joint
CAAMI/UNDP team in July 2005; all the cleared sites were visited to assess land
use. Less than five percent of cleared land was found not to be in productive
use; more than two-thirds was used for cashew nut production, a major export
crop for Guinea-Bissau. CAAMI would like to engage in a more comprehensive
evaluation of land-use. [79]
Informal (“village”) demining is known to have taken place,
although the extent to which this has occurred is unclear: “We have had
many cases in Bissau where people have taken mines out of the ground and have
brought them to the home of someone at CAAMI, or mines have been found tossed in
some area, adjacent to a mined area. In the regions, of course no clearance has
reached them yet, so people get frustrated and take risks in order to use the
land. ... One village told us about 325 cows that had been killed due to mines.
They demined part of their land themselves―the part they judged to be most
valuable.” The mine action program is planning to respond to this problem
by refocusing its mine risk education
efforts.[80]
Mine Risk Education
CAAMI continued it role as coordinator at national and regional levels of the
mine risk education (MRE) program (Programa de Educação para a
Prevenção de Acidentes com Minas, PEPAM). IMAS have been used as
the national standard for PEPAM, which targeted IDPs and the overall
population.[81]
In 2006, a major shift in geographic focus has taken place in PEPAM,
following the completion of mine clearance in Bissau. MRE will focus on areas
outside Bissau and primarily on the risks associated with ERW. The landmine
impact survey was expected to improve the targeting of MRE
efforts.[82]
MRE has been conducted on two levels in Guinea-Bissau. The first has been
community liaison in support of the two demining groups, LUTCAM and HUMAID.
The second is community MRE, conducted by “MRE activists” and by
“MRE animators.” Since January 2006, there were 23 MRE activists
and 17 animators. By mid-2006, activists and animators were based predominantly
in the São Domingos sector, with a few in the south in
Quinara.[83] This compares to 111
MRE activists/educators (89 in Bissau) and with 310 animators (160 facilitators
work in Bissau), during 2004/2005.[84] Between June 2005 and June 2006, 25 MRE sessions were conducted throughout
the country, reaching 16,118
people.[85]
The animators hold MRE sessions with the people in the village and collect
information about mines in the community, including people engaging in risky
behavior and mine-related accidents; they share this information with the
activists, who serve as the link between the community and CAAMI. Activists may
also conduct information sessions with the community. They report to a
supervisory activist who is responsible for distributing and receiving the IMSMA
forms and for passing on teaching
aids.[86] CAAMI coordination
meetings with the MRE activists were suspended during 2005, due to a shortage of
funding.
Funding for MRE in 2005-2006 improved from the situation in 2004. A Swedish
donation of $30,000 through UNICEF was used to produce educational material and
pay five months of allowances to the MRE activists in Bissau and São
Domingos. UNICEF provided additional funding for workshops, training and
materials upon request.
Some of the UN emergency funding in response to the March-April 2006 fighting
with MFDC rebels was intended to provide MRE in the post-conflict
area.[87] When UNMAS undertook an
emergency assessment in April-May, it recommended that an MRE specialist be
included in the Rapid Response Plan; a consultant started in
June.[88]
MRE has been included in the primary school curriculum. During 2005, 81
schoolteachers provided MRE; 40 in Bissau to 1,400 students, and 41 in the
regions to 1,200 students.[89] In
mid-2006, Radio Kassumi in São Domingos was the only community
radio station broadcasting MRE programs. Between June 2005 and June 2006, 36
sessions were held at schools reaching 4,926 pupils. By July 2006, there were
78 teachers teaching MRE in their
classes.[90]
Funding and Assistance
Two countries reported providing $349,187 for mine action in Guinea-Bissau in
2005, a sharp decrease from 2004 ($998,771 contributed by three
donors).[91] Donors in 2005
were:
Canada: C$287,631 ($237,417), consisting of C$125,000 ($103,178) to the
World Health Organization (WHO) for survivor assistance, C$7,473 ($6,168) to
UNDP for stockpile destruction, C$57,000 ($47,049) to UNDP for landmine impact
survey and C$98,158 ($81,022) to UNDP for pre-survey
assessment;[92]
Germany: €89,782 ($111,770) to UNDP/LUTCAM for
demining.[93]
The government provided working space to CAAMI, a contribution that has not
been costed.[94]
Guinea-Bissau appealed for $2,271,675 through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for
Mine Action in 2005, and reported receiving $944,824 (about 42 percent). This
was an increase from 2004, when Guinea-Bissau received $371,000 (about 15
percent) of its
appeal.[95]
The donor roundtable planned for October 2005 was postponed
indefinitely as a result of the change of government in
Guinea-Bissau.[96] In mid-2006,
UNDP reported that a roundtable was expected to take place at the end of the
year.[97]
Landmine/ERW Casualties
In 2005, CAAMI recorded 16 new landmine/ERW casualties in six incidents,
including seven people killed and nine injured; five were women, and there were
two girls and five boys under 18
years.[98] This represented almost
half of the 30 new casualties recorded in 2004 (six killed and 24
injured).[99]
Three casualties were caused by antipersonnel mines and 13 by ERW. Most
casualties were recorded in the Northern Province in the Mansaba, São
Domingos and Prabis sectors (11 casualties). Three children were killed in a
UXO incident in Cacine sector, Southern Province while playing. Bissau and
Pitche (Eastern Province) recorded one casualty each. In total, five children
were injured or killed while playing with
UXO.[100]
Landmine Monitor was told informally of at least one incident in São
Domingos that may have involved a landmine, when a person was allegedly
attempting to make an illegal border crossing into Guinea-Bissau from
Senegal.[101] CAAMI was informed
of another incident on the border with Senegal, near Farim, in which 14 people
were injured by mines. There were allegations that this involved illegal
activity.[102]
From January to June 2006, CAAMI recorded a total of 37 new mine/UXO
casualties, including 16 killed and 21 injured in three mine/ERW incidents; 14
were women, one was a baby girl, 10 were boys, and the gender and age of six
casualties were unknown. While this is a significantly higher number compared
to the totals recorded in 2004 and 2005, 28 of the casualties resulted from one
incident. On 16 March, on the road between Varela and São Domingos in
Cacheu region, Northern Province, a bus drove over an antivehicle mine killing
12 people and injuring 16 others; most casualties were women (14). In January,
in Bedanda/Caboxanque, Tombali region, Southern Province, three boys were killed
while playing with UXO. In March, in Empada, Oio region, Southern Province, an
incident occurred when a 16-year-old manipulated a UXO killing him and injuring
five other boys. Overall, there has been an increase in casualties from
tampering with UXO (nine of the 10 boy
casualties).[103]
Landmine Monitor recorded one more incident, which caused six military
casualties, on 23 March 2006. A vehicle transporting military personnel drove
over a mine, killing two soldiers and injuring four others, on the road between
Suzana to São
Domingos.[104]
The increase in 2006 in new mine/UXO casualties, including military and
civilians, has been attributed to incursions of separatist groups from the
Casamance region of Senegal into
Guinea-Bissau.[105]
Between 28 May and 14 June 2006, CAAMI conducted a revision of the mine/UXO
casualty database to compile comprehensive and complete information on survivors
from all mine/UXO registries based on the upgraded IMSMA form. Information was
verified and survivors revisited, with the support of local NGOs. Preliminary
data identified 841 mine/ERW survivors, including 116 in Bissau, 195 in the
regions of Biombo, Cacheu and Oio, Northern Province, 154 in the regions of
Bafata and Gabú, Eastern Province, and the highest number, 376, in the
regions of Tombali and Quinará, Southern
Province.[106] The revision was
conducted with the support of
WHO.[107] Due to the relative
inaccessibility of many areas and the poor communication infrastructure, it is
possible that not all mine/UXO casualties have been
reported.[108]
Survivor Assistance
At the First Review Conference in Nairobi, Guinea-Bissau was identified as
one of 24 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors and
“the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and
expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care,
rehabilitation and reintegration of
survivors.[109]
Guinea-Bissau participated in the Workshop on Advancing Landmine Victim
Assistance in Africa, held in Nairobi from 31 May-2 June
2005.[110] Guinea-Bissau prepared
its 2005-2009 objectives for the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in
November-December 2005. The objectives included: develop and maintain a
landmine/UXO surveillance system integrated into a nationwide surveillance
mechanism by 2009; develop a strategy improving support to mine casualties and
their families through a strengthened National Hospital and community-based
rehabilitation capacity by 2007; improve access to and national capacity in
physical rehabilitation by 2009; develop capacity for psychological assistance
by 2008; continue to support sports activities in 2006-2009; create a strategy
to reduce economic discrimination by 2007 and provide economic reintegration
opportunities to 50 percent of known survivors of working age; develop a
comprehensive strategy to ensure legal and social rights of people with
disabilities by 2006; raise awareness on disability by 2007; and enact
legislation so that landmine/UXO survivors can access compensation schemes for
war victims by 2009.[111]
At the Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2006, Guinea-Bissau
presented progress made in achieving these objectives, and included a victim
assistance expert on its delegation. Guinea-Bissau highlighted that a
delegation from CAAMI and NGOs visited the hospital in Zinguinchor to identify
mine survivors from the recent conflict between local armed forces and Casamance
separatists. Also, funds for victim assistance donated by Canada through the
WHO had provided external consultations for orthopedics, which made possible the
purchase of surgical equipment at the National Hospital, free of charge surgical
medication, clinical assessment, prostheses, physiotherapy and financial support
during the treatment for survivors. Funds from ICRC provided 300 prostheses for
military and civilian survivors. UNICEF and local NGO ARTISOL started
vocational training and income-generating opportunities. The main challenges
were said to include: continuing to provide emergency care and physical
rehabilitation, and raising awareness within the government and society at large
to create economic reintegration opportunities and psychological
support.[112]
The 2006 UN Portfolio of Mine Action Projects included two proposals for
victim assistance activities in Guinea-Bissau, including a project to assist 20
mine/UXO survivors in the creation of income-generating opportunities, and a
project to review the legal framework and services for
survivors.[113]
Capacities for the care and rehabilitation of mine/ERW casualties have been
severely limited. Emergency and first aid has been almost non-existent. Health
coverage has remained poor, with only 40 percent of people living within five
kilometers of the nearest health center, one doctor per 7,230 inhabitants and
one nurse per 717 people. There were only two functioning hospitals, the
National Hospital Simão Mendes and the Air Base Military Hospital, both
in Bissau, as well as a few clinics in Canchungo, Bafatá, Gabu, Mansoa,
Cumura and Catio; all lacked qualified staff and resources. Nearly 70 percent
of all doctors and health staff are located in the capital, Bissau. Generally,
landmine casualties have been treated at Simão Mendes Hospital or the
military hospital. Poor transport―only nine healthcare facilities have
ambulances―and infrastructure, and the cost of treatment have further
limited access to services for mine
survivors.[114] These constraints
and prioritization of other health issues has resulted in a lack of support for
survivors and difficulties for CAAMI in finding victim assistance
partners.[115]
Confrontations between the Casamance separatist movement and Guinea-Bissau
armed forces in March-April 2006 limited the access of the population in
northwestern Guinea-Bissau to the closest hospital in São Domingos. ICRC
provided medicines to the population of Suzana and Varela and health posts in
Cacheu and São Domingos in
2006.[116]
In 2005, Cuba restarted its assistance to Guinea-Bissau by sending a group of
45 doctors, including local medical students who studied in Cuba and were
finishing their practical work in
Guinea-Bissau.[117] By June 2006,
there were 15 Cuban medical staff in
Guinea-Bissau.[118]
The World Health Organization mine victim assistance program aimed to
coordinate efforts to respond effectively to landmine and other traumatic
injuries, and to address the needs of mine casualties and their families by
providing basic social services. WHO, with CAAMI playing an active role,
started implementing the project in
2005.[119] Results of the program
included: purchase of air-conditioning for pre-surgery operation rooms, and a
surgery room and appropriate clothing for the National Hospital Simão
Mendes and Air Base Military Hospital; a 25-day training course in general
surgery and severe trauma intervention for 10 medical doctors (five from Bissau
and five from regions with high numbers of incidents) and 15 technical personnel
(eight nurses, two orthopedists, three anesthetists and two assistants); and
nationwide identification of survivors and their needs. Based on the survey,
103 orthopedic consultations, 29 surgeries and 11 ophthalmology sessions for
survivors were planned in 2006. In the first half of June 2006, 67 orthopedic
consultations, 11 ophthalmology sessions, 12 shrapnel extractions, 40
prostheses, 40 pairs of crutches and two wheelchairs were
provided.[120] The project was
scheduled to conclude by the end of June 2006. There was no clear follow-up or
continuation strategy.[121]
The main functioning rehabilitation center to serve people nationwide has
been the Friendly House for the Disabled (Casa Amiga dos Deficientes), run by
the local NGO ANDES. Most other facilities have been closed since the war. The
ANDES center has provided physiotherapy, orthopedic devices and psychosocial
support, and has the capacity to produce approximately 16 prostheses and provide
physiotherapy services for 26 people per
month.[122] In 2005, the center
worked significantly below its capacity, delivering only 34 prostheses and 11
orthoses. In 2005, the ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD) signed an
agreement with the center, whereby it would pay 15 percent of the costs for
prosthetic and orthotic services for 300 people and provide polypropylene
components and raw materials; the center’s director also participated in a
one-week, SFD-sponsored management course in Addis
Ababa.[123] The 300 patients had
not started the process of fitting devices as of May 2006, because some
survivors needed to first undergo corrective surgery to be able to wear a
prosthesis.[124]
CAAMI has also provided physical treatment for survivors through the
government-run Joao Boana Orthopedic Center and the private physical
rehabilitation center Associacão da Ordens dos Medicos
(AMEDICA).[125] The Ministry of Former Combatants has responsibility for the
rehabilitation of at least 399 disabled military personnel. However, an
agreement between ANDES and the Secretary of State for Former Combatants, signed
in September 2002, has not been implemented and some former combatants have not
received rehabilitation services.[126] The scheduled rehabilitation of the specialized Center for Surgery and
Rehabilitation in Bissau, destroyed during the civil war, to increase the
national capacity for physical rehabilitation, had not been carried out by June
2006.[127]
In Guinea-Bissau there has been no formal capacity to provide psychosocial
support. In the past there was a department in the National Hospital, but this
was destroyed in the last war.[128] The ANDES center has provided ad hoc support to people during
rehabilitation.[129]
Economic reintegration of mine/ERW survivors is “a significant
challenge” and opportunities for survivors and other people with
disabilities have been very limited in a country where the population as a whole
faces high unemployment and significant challenges in ensuring that their
children have access to education.[130] In 2005, CAAMI, with the support of UNICEF, initiated a vocational
training program. UNICEF donated four sewing machines and all the materials for
a vocational training course in dressmaking, to benefit a total of eight
survivors. However, training was suspended because three of the eight survivors
needed to undergo surgery to ensure appropriate fitting of the prosthesis before
continuing the course. The three survivors were on a waiting list for their
physical rehabilitation, but there has been no specific date for interventions.
The course will resume once the eight survivors can
continue.[131]
CAAMI, together with the NGO ARTISOL, has initiated a small training and
income-generating project making handicrafts with support of the European Union.
The center, located in Quinhamel will have accommodation for survivors taking
part in the training. CAAMI has identified eight survivors to participate, but
no specific starting date has been
set.[132]
HI has continued to provide organizational support to organizations for
people with disabilities, including war disabled. Support has included the
provision of office supplies, and assistance with report and proposal
writing.[133]
Other organizations working with people with disabilities have included the
Guinean Association for the Promotion of People with Physical Disability, the
Guinean Association for Assistance to People with Disability and the National
Union of Physically Disabled.[134]
Disability Policy and Practice
There are no laws or decrees to assist civilians with disabilities in
Guinea-Bissau, and there have been no developments at the legislative level in
2005.[135] Legal, institutional
and organizational structures for survivors and people with disabilities in
general have been limited and disability awareness has been hampered by the lack
of communication structures to distribute information on disabilities.
The government assists disabled military veterans with pensions, but this
assistance is reportedly insufficient to meet health, housing and food needs.
Mine survivors are not explicitly included in the category of “war
victims” in Guinea-Bissau, and therefore do not receive the same level of
support. As part of its commitment towards achieving the goals of the Nairobi
Action Plan, Guinea-Bissau stated in its 2005-2009 objectives that it would
“enact legislation to reinforce Article 5 of the National Constitution by
2009, in order to include landmine/UXO victims in the category of ‘war
victims’ so that they can access the same rights for compensation, and
ensure non discrimination between the victims of the Liberation war and the
victims of the 1998-99
conflict.”[136]
The Ministry of Health has been the lead ministry for survivor assistance;
however, it has many competing priorities in providing healthcare for the
population. The Ministry of Social Affairs has a very limited budget, and no
resources to engage in survivor assistance
activities.[137]
The Poverty Reduction Strategy Program for the first phase, 2005-2007,
contained specific actions for people with disabilities, including the
improvement of legislation and protection of people with disabilities against
discrimination, promotion of education and training of people with disabilities,
and promotion of social and economic integration of people with
disabilities.[138] Additionally,
Guinea-Bissau stated in its 2005-2009 objectives it would “develop a
complete and comprehensive national plan which includes awareness campaigns on
the needs of people with disabilities by 2007” and “develop a
strategy to ensure legal and social recognition of the rights of the disabled
within society in Guinea-Bissau in
2006.”[139]
[1] Statement by Soares Sambu,
Minister of Foreign Affairs, First Review Conference, Nairobi, 2 December 2004
(translation by Landmine Monitor); interview with César de Carvalho,
National Director, National Mine Action Coordination Center (CAAMI), Geneva, 9
May 2006. [2] Article 7 Report, Form A, 14
June 2005. The report cites Articles 85.1, para. h), and 68, para. e), of the
Constitution as making the treaty national law, and Article 206 of the Penal
Code, which allows sentencing of crimes. Penal Code Article 206, Number 1,
prohibits the use of explosives. See also, CAAMI, “Action de la
Guinée-Bissau concernant la mise en oeuvre de la Convention
d’Ottawa pour l’élimination des mines antipersonnel,”
January 2004. [3] Article 7 reports were
submitted on 19 June 2002, 13 May 2003, 13 May 2004 and 14 June 2005. [4] Article 7 Report, Form E, 14
June 2005. [5] The 4,943 Russian-manufactured
antipersonnel mines destroyed were 3,460 PMN-6, 587 PMD-6M and 896 POMZ-2. [6] Letter to Kerry Brinkert,
Implementation Support Unit (ISU), Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD), from César de Carvalho, CAAMI, 20 October 2005. The
head of the national demining center noted, “We are extremely proud to
announce this important step” and emphasized “Guinea-Bissau’s
support for the humanitarian principles contained within the Convention.”
See presentation by César de Carvalho, CAAMI, Standing Committee on Mine
Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 10 May
2006. [7] Article 7 Report, Form B, 13
May 2003. [8] “Meeting Report,”
Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 24 June 2004. [9] Letter to Kerry Brinkert,
ISU, from César de Carvalho, CAAMI, 20 October 2005. Guinea-Bissau had
made inconsistent statements about its intent to retain mines for training
purposes. Guinea-Bissau told the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction in
June 2004 and June 2005 that it would not retain any mines for training
purposes, yet on other occasions it has said it would retain a small quantity,
and in its June 2005 Article 7 report it stated, “A very limited number of
AP mine (not yet defined) may be retained in the next reporting period for
training courses.” In August 2005, a UNDP official told Landmine Monitor
that Guinea-Bissau would retain 100 antipersonnel mines. See Landmine
Monitor Report 2005, p. 377. [10] Article 7 Reports, Form B,
14 June 2005, 13 May 2004, 13 May 2003; letter to Kerry Brinkert, ISU, from
César de Carvalho, CAAMI, 20 October 2005. [11] Interview with César
de Carvalho, CAAMI, Geneva, 9 May 2006. [12] Article 7 Report, Form B, 14
June 2005; letter to Kerry Brinkert, ISU, from César de Carvalho, CAAMI,
20 October 2005. [13] Presentation by César
de Carvalho, CAAMI, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education
and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 10 May 2006. [14] Alberto Dabo, “Bissau
army hits mines, halts Senegal rebel attack,” Reuters (São
Domingos), 25 March 2006. [15] Alberto Dabo, “Bissau
army says chased Senegal rebels over border,” Reuters, 22 April
2006. [16] Alberto Dabo, “Bissau
troops try to flush out Senegalese rebels,” Reuters, 20 March 2006;
“Clashes leave villagers cut off as rebels lay fresh mines,”
IRIN, 21 March 2006. [17] Alberto Dabo, “Guinea
Bissau troops pound Senegal rebels on border,” Reuters, 19 March
2006. [18] “Senegalese rebel
factions intensify fighting,” PANA, 24 March 2006. [19] Alberto Dabo, “Bissau
army hits mines, halts Senegal rebel attack,” Reuters (São
Domingos), 25 March 2006. [20] ICRC Press Release,
“Senegal: ICRC aids people displaced by fighting,” 31 March 2006.
[21] “Not Enough Aid
Reaching Communities Stranded by Fighting,” IRIN (Suzana), 11 April
2006. [22] “Guinea-Bissau: UN
launches emergency appeal after fighting in north,” IRIN (Dakar),
16 May 2006. [23] UNOCHA, “OCHA
Guinea-Bissau: Report on humanitarian situation 17 May 2006,” 17 May 2006.
[24] ICBL Press Release,
“Nobel Peace Prize Organization Urges Senegalese Rebels to Stop Laying
Landmines in Guinea-Bissau,” 3 April 2006. [25] UN, “Country Profile:
Guinea-Bissau,” 29 December 2005, www.mineaction.org, accessed 20 January
2006; see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, pp. 377-378. [26] Article 7 Report, Form C, 14
June 2005. [27] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 378. [28] “Guinea-Bissau-Senegal:
Not enough aid reaching communities stranded by fighting,” IRIN
(Suzana), 11 April 2006; “UN launches aid appeal after Guinea-Bissau
fighting,” Agence France-Presse (Geneva), 16 May 2006; “U.N.
says it needs US$3.64 million to help victims of fighting in
Guinea-Bissau,” Associated Press (Geneva), 16 May 2006. [29] UN, “Country Profile:
Guinea-Bissau,” 29 December 2005; email from Tammy Hall, Chief Technical
Advisor, UNDP, Bissau, 23 March 2006. [30] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 378. [31] Email from Tammy Hall, UNDP,
Bissau, 5 June 2006. [32] CAAMI, “Guinea-Bissau
Mine Action Update 2005,” 5 March 2006, p. 6. [33] Ibid; emails from Tammy
Hall, UNDP, Bissau, 5 and 12 June 2006. A 2002 Handicap International (HI)
report found ordnance as far as five kilometers away from the site of the blast.
See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 479, footnote 23. [34] UN, “Country Profile:
Guinea-Bissau,” 29 December 2005. [35] Emails from Tammy Hall,
UNDP, Bissau, 3 March and 5 June 2006. [36] Decree No. 4 of 2001, which
was published in the Official Bulletin on 17 September 2001. See Article 7
Report, Annex 2, 14 June 2005. [37] Email from Tammy Hall, UNDP,
Bissau, 23 March 2006. [38] Email from Tammy Hall, UNDP,
Bissau, 5 June 2006. [39] “Guinea-Bissau: Five
Years National Humanitarian Mine Action Program, Preparing for the AP Mine Ban
Convention First Review Conference,” 15 July 2004, p. 7; Article 7 Report,
Form A, 14 June 2005. Decree No. 4 of 2001 formally mandated both CAAMI and
CNDH. [40] Guinea-Bissau first
requested support from UNDP to address the mine problem in 1999. See
Portfolio of Mine Action Projects 2006, Ninth Edition, UNMAS/UNDP/UNICEF,
New York, November 2005, p. 180. [41] Emails from Tammy Hall,
UNDP, Bissau, 23 March and 12 June 2006. [42] Interview with Jean-Paul
Rychener, IMSMA Regional Coordinator for Central and Southern Africa, Geneva
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, Geneva, 12 May 2006. [43] Email from Tammy Hall, UNDP,
Bissau, 23 March 2006. [44] Emails from Tammy Hall,
UNDP, Bissau, 23 March and 5 June 2006. [45] Article 7 Report, Form J, 14
June 2005. [46] “Guinea-Bissau: Five
Years National Humanitarian Mine Action Program, Preparing for the AP Mine Ban
Convention First Review Conference,” 15 July 2004, p. 2. [47] UN, “2006 Portfolio of
Mine Action Projects,” New York, p. 181. [48] CAAMI, “Guinea-Bissau
Mine Action Update 2005,” 5 March 2006, p. 6; email from Fanny Aubrun, HI,
11 May 2006. [49] UN, “2006 Portfolio of
Mine Action Projects,” New York, p. 180. [50] Email from Tammy Hall, UNDP,
Bissau, 5 June 2006. [51] Ibid. [52] “Guinea-Bissau: Five
Years National Humanitarian Mine Action Program, Preparing for the AP Mine Ban
Convention First Review Conference,” 15 July 2004, p. 3. [53] Email from Tammy Hall, UNDP,
Bissau, 5 June 2006. [54] “Guinea-Bissau: Five
Years National Humanitarian Mine Action Program, Preparing for the AP Mine Ban
Convention First Review Conference,” 15 July 2004, p. 3; email from Tammy
Hall, UNDP, Bissau, 5 June 2006. [55] Email from Tammy Hall, UNDP,
Bissau, 23 March 2006. [56] Emails from Tammy Hall,
UNDP, Bissau, 5 and 12 June 2006. [57] UN, “2006 Portfolio of
Mine Action Projects,” New York, p. 179; email from Fanny Aubrun, HI, 11
May 2006. [58] Email from Tammy Hall, UNDP,
Bissau, 23 March 2006; email from Fanny Aubrun, HI, 11 May 2006. [59] UN, “2006 Portfolio of
Mine Action Projects,” New York, p. 181. [60] Emails from Tammy Hall,
UNDP, Bissau, 23 March and 12 June 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1 =
(CFA Franc) XOF527.73842. Landmine Monitor estimate based on www.oanda.com. [61] Email from Tammy Hall, UNDP,
Bissau, 23 March 2006. [62] UN, “2006 Portfolio of
Mine Action Projects,” New York, p. 180. [63] CAAMI, “Guinea-Bissau
Mine Action Update 2005,” 5 March 2006, p. 6; email from Tammy Hall, UNDP,
Bissau, 5 June 2006. [64] CAAMI, “Guinea-Bissau
Mine Action Update 2005,” 5 March 2006, p. 10. [65] Emails from Tammy Hall,
UNDP, Bissau, 23 March and 5 June 2006. [66] UN, “2006 Portfolio of
Mine Action Projects,” New York, p. 180. [67] Telephone interview with
Justin Brady, Planning Officer, UNMAS, New York, 24 May 2006. [68] Email from Tammy Hall, UNDP,
Bissau, 23 March 2006. [69] CAAMI, “Guinea-Bissau
Mine Action Update 2005,” 5 March 2006, pp. 2, 5. [70] Email from Tammy Hall, UNDP,
Bissau, 3 March 2006; see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 380. [71] CAAMI, “Guinea-Bissau
Mine Action Update 2005,” 5 March 2006, p. 6. [72] Email from Tammy Hall, UNDP,
12 June 2006. [73] Ibid. [74] Telephone interview with
Justin Brady, UNMAS, New York, 24 May 2006. [75] Emails from Tammy Hall,
UNDP, Bissau, 3 March and 5 June 2006. [76] Ibid. [77] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 381. [78] Information provided by
Irene Laval, MRE Officer, CAAMI, Bissau, in email from Jennifer Mason, MRE
consultant, UNDP Guinea-Bissau, 1 July 2006. [79] CAAMI, “Guinea-Bissau
Mine Action Update 2005,” 5 March 2006, p. 9; information provided by
Irene Laval, CAAMI, Bissau, in email from Jennifer Mason, UNDP Guinea-Bissau, 1
July 2006. [80] Information provided by
Irene Laval, CAAMI, Bissau, in email from Jennifer Mason, UNDP Guinea-Bissau, 1
July 2006. [81] UN, “Guinea Bissau,
Flash Appeal 2006, Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP),” p. 5. [82] Information provided by
Irene Laval, CAAMI, Bissau, in email from Jennifer Mason, UNDP Guinea-Bissau, 1
July 2006. [83] Ibid. [84] Ibid; presentation by
Guinea-Bissau, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and
Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 10 May 2006; see Landmine Monitor Report
2005, p. 382. [85] Information provided by
Irene Laval, CAAMI, Bissau, in email from Jennifer Mason, UNDP Guinea-Bissau, 1
July 2006. [86] Ibid. [87] Ibid; UN, “Guinea
Bissau, Flash Appeal 2006, Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP),” pp. 5-8,
18. [88] Email from Justin Brady,
UNMAS, 25 May 2006. [89] Presentation by César
de Carvalho, CAAMI, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education
and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 10 May 2006; see Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 382. [90] Information provided by
Irene Laval, CAAMI, Bissau, in email from Jennifer Mason, UNDP Guinea-Bissau, 4
July 2006. [91] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 382. [92] Mine Action Investments
database, www.mineactioninvestments.org; email from Carly Volkes, DFAIT, 7 June
2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1 = C$1.2115. US Federal Reserve,
“List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006. [93] Germany Article 7 Report,
Form J, 27 April 2006; Mine Action Investments database. [94] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 382. [95] UNMAS, “2005 Portfolio
End-Year Review,” p. 2; UNMAS, “2004 Portfolio Overview,” p.
2, www.mineaction.org, accessed 20 May 2006. [96] UN Security Council,
“Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and on
the activities of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in
Guinea-Bissau,” S/2005/752, 2 December 2005; see Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 382. [97] Email from Tammy Hall, UNDP,
Bissau, 5 June 2006. [98] Information provided by
Maria Santa, Monitor of CAAMI Database, CAAMI, Bissau, 12 June 2006. [99] For details see
Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 383. [100] Information provided by
Maria Santa, CAAMI, Bissau, 12 June 2006. [101] Landmine Monitor informal
talks with community radio staff, São Domingos, 20 and 21 April 2005. [102] Email from Tammy Hall,
UNDP, Bissau, 8 August 2005. These casualties were not included in the CAAMI
database. [103] Information provided by
Maria Santa, CAAMI, Bissau, 12 June 2006; and telephone interview, 16 June
2006. [104] “Guinea-Bissau:
Explosão de uma mina faz vitimas” (“Mine explosion causes
victims”), Radio Renascença, Bissau, 22 March 2006. [105] Interview with Irene
Laval, CAAMI, Geneva, 11 May 2006. [106] Information provided by
Maria Santa, CAAMI, Bissau, 19 June 2006. [107] Telephone interview with
Maria Santa, CAAMI, Bissau, 21 June 2006. [108] Email from Tammy Hall,
UNDP, Bissau, 8 August 2005. [109] UN, “Final Report,
First Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel
Mines and on Their Destruction,” Nairobi, 29 November-3 December 2004,
APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, p. 33. [110] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, pp. 383-384. [111] “Final Report of
the Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V,
“Victim Assistance objectives of the States Parties that have the
responsibility for significant number of landmine survivors,” Zagreb, 28
November-2 December 2005, pp. 164-167. [112] Presentation by Irene
Laval, CAAMI, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic
Reintegration, Geneva, 8 May 2006. [113] UN, “2006 Portfolio
of Mine Action Projects,” New York, pp. 184-185. [114] “Final Report of
the Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V,
Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, p. 165; UNOCHA, “Briefing Pack:
Guinea-Bissau,” April 2005, pp. 4-5. [115] UN, “2006 Portfolio
of Mine Action Projects,” New York, p. 181. [116] UN, “Guinea Bissau,
Flash Appeal 2006, Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP),” p. 5; “Not
enough aid reaching communities stranded by fighting,” IRIN
(Suzana), 1 April 2006. [117] Email from Tammy Hall,
UNDP, Bissau, 8 August 2005. [118] Emails from Maria Santa,
CAAMI, Bissau, 13 and 15 June 2006. [119] Telephone interview with
Maria Santa, CAAMI, Bissau, 16 June 2006. [120] Emails from Maria Santa,
CAAMI, Bissau, 13 and 15 June 2006. [121] Telephone interview with
Maria Santa, CAAMI, Bissau, 16 June 2006. [122] “Final Report of
the Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V,
Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, p. 165. [123] ICRC, “Special Fund
of the Disabled, Annual 2005 Report,” Geneva, 10 March 2006, p. 15; ICRC,
“Special Report-Mine Action 2005,” Geneva, May 2006, p. 26. [124] Presentation by Irene
Laval, CAAMI, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic
Reintegration, Geneva, 8 May 2006. [125] Telephone interview with
Maria Santa, CAAMI, Bissau, 16 June 2006. [126] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 385. [127] Telephone interview with
Maria Santa, CAAMI, Bissau, 16 June 2006. [128] “Final Report of
the Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V,
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the Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V,
Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, pp. 165-166. [131] Presentation by Irene
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Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V, Zagreb, 28 November-2
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UNDP, Bissau, 8 August 2005. [138] “Poverty Reduction
Strategy Program 2005-2007 (Document de Stratégie National de
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the Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V,
Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, p. 167.
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