This section reviews the major successes and challenges in the planning,
implementation and management of programs around the world that are seeking to
address contamination from landmines and explosive remnants of
war.[39 ]It is based primarily on
an analysis of data amassed by Landmine Monitor in the course of research on 101
mine/ERW-affected countries and areas in 2005 and the first half of 2006.
Reports on each of these countries describe, as relevant, the mine and ERW
problem, the coordination and management of the mine action program, and
progress in demining during the reporting
period.[40 ]
Particular attention is paid to monitoring the progress of States Parties
towards meeting their (time-limited) obligations under Article 5 of the Mine Ban
Treaty. Full and timely compliance with this obligation represents the greatest
challenge to the integrity of the treaty over the coming five years. The first
Article 5 deadlines for States Parties to complete the clearance of
antipersonnel mines in mined areas under their jurisdiction or control are less
than three years away―yet financial resources are becoming scarcer.
Maximizing effectiveness and efficiency, making the best use of available
resources, should be the aim of every mine action program.
Major Achievements of Mine Action Programs
A total of more than 740 square kilometers―an area larger than the
entire territory of some countries―was demined by mine action programs in
2005.[41 ]This means that more
hazardous and suspected hazardous land was freed from contamination in a single
year than at any time since the start of modern demining in the late
1980s.[42 ]This was spearheaded by
increased efforts by several mine action programs to achieve more “area
reduction” (the identification of land suspected to be contaminated that
does not in fact contain either mines or ERW, without resorting to
time-consuming and expensive clearance operations). In 2005, just three major
mine action programs―Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia and
Yemen―reduced the extent of suspected contamination by almost 340 square
kilometers. Area reduction in all programs for which figures were available
accounted for 55 percent of the total area demined worldwide in
2005.[43 ]
In terms of actual mine clearance, a total of almost 145 square kilometers of
mined areas and 190 square kilometers of battlefields were cleared in 2005;
however, these figures are likely to include an element of area reduction as
some do not appear to disaggregate between the different demining techniques.
Over 470,000 landmines―of which the overwhelming majority, around
450,000, were antipersonnel mines―and more than 3.75 million explosive
devices were removed and destroyed.[44 ]The table below sets out the achievements of major mine action programs in
2005.
Progress in Demining (square kilometers) in 2005 in Major Mine Action
Programs[45]
Country or territory
Total area demined
Area reduction
Mine clearance
Battle area clearance
Afghanistan
139.3
1.4
39.7
99.5
Angola
12.44
0.2
12.2
0.04
Bosnia and Herzegovina
158
154
4
0
Cambodia
125.6
85
40.6
0
Croatia
27.5
17.5
10
0
Ethiopia
11.3
7
4.3
0
Lao People’s Democratic Republic
17
0
0
17
Somaliland
18.6
0
0.3
18.3
Sri Lanka
19.5
9
1.5
9
Yemen
103.3
101.7
1.6
0
These figures reflect particular successes in a number of programs. Four
programs, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Yemen, each
released more than 100 square kilometers of land during the year.
In Cambodia, the area cleared by humanitarian demining agencies in
2005 increased by more than 63 percent from the previous year, mainly as a
result of the efforts of the Cambodian Mine Action Center, which doubled the
area it cleared. Other operators in Cambodia developed a new strategy to
accelerate area reduction, recognizing land previously designated as
mine-suspected, but which had been put under cultivation by villagers, as
low-risk if no mine incidents/casualties had occurred. The government endorsed
this strategy in May 2006 and said it wanted operators to focus efforts on
clearing the most densely contaminated land. By the end of 2005, HALO Trust had
mapped more than 50 square kilometers of land in productive use that the
Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) agreed to remove
from the database of suspect land. Reform and restructuring in the CMAA in 2005
were also seen by donors as supporting the trend to higher productivity.
Progress by local communities in returning land formerly considered suspect
to productive use and the narrow geographic distribution of mine incidents has
sharpened debate about how long it will take Cambodia to be free from the impact
of mines. HALO Trust believes that priority areas identified by affected
communities may be cleared within five years―but only if clearance
resources are concentrated in those areas. Furthermore, a study undertaken for
the CMAA on explosive remnants of war, which was completed in 2006, projected a
sharp decline in mine casualties in future years and emphasized the need to
tackle the residual long-term threat from ERW as well as mines.
In Afghanistan, the pace of demining also accelerated during 2005: the
total area demined increased by more than one-third (compared with 2004) to
almost 140 square kilometers, according to the UN Mine Action Center for
Afghanistan (UNMACA). Notably, this increase was achieved despite the greater
constraints imposed by deteriorating security.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, systematic survey released an impressive
147 square kilometers of suspected hazardous land in 2005, albeit less than the
annual target set by the strategic plan (170 square kilometers). Systematic
survey is a non-technical general assessment involving comparative analysis of
data collected by the mine action center over more than 10 years, the design of
polygons (the more precise mapping of the perimeters of mined areas) and the
production of precise geographical data on contaminated areas, thereby reducing
suspected land.
In Yemen, by April 2006, survey and clearance operations had
eliminated mines and ERW from 12 out of 14 high-impact communities, 62 out of 86
medium-impact communities and 107 low-impact communities, out of the total 594
identified by the landmine impact survey in 2000 and subsequent surveys.
Demining in 2005 released more than 100 square kilometers of land—a record
for the country.
Guatemala and Suriname also reported important achievements in
2005–the completion of clearance of all mined areas containing
antipersonnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (see
below). They join the only two States Parties to have previously and
unequivocally declared to have met their Article 5 obligations: Costa
Rica and
Honduras.[46 ]
Other notable achievements during 2005 and early 2006 were reported in:
Abkhazia - the amount of land cleared and reduced by HALO Trust, more than
2.5 square kilometers, was a record for its program there; during 2005, HALO
declared the Gali region and the Gumista river valley near Sokhumi mine
impact-free.
China - a project to clear landmines from its border with Vietnam was
launched in 2005.
Jordan - to accelerate mine clearance, the national mine action authority
brought in an international demining NGO, Norwegian People’s Aid, in
October 2005.
Laos - the national operator UXO Lao reported a sharp increase in
productivity in 2005, demining 15.7 square kilometers of land, 25 percent more
than the previous year.
Libya - a national program for demining and land reclamation was started in
April 2005.
Peru and Ecuador - initiated clearance operations in the Chira river area in
April 2006.
Rwanda - after several years of inactivity, the demining program was given a
kick-start by the training and equipping of 140 deminers in early 2006, and
deployment of three technical advisors from an international NGO, Mines
Awareness Trust.
South Korea - troops started clearance of three minefields in the Civilian
Control Zone and seven military bases.
Sri Lanka - operators demined 19.5 square kilometers, more than five times
as much as in 2004, as a result of increased area reduction efforts and
increased manual and mechanical clearance capacity.
Taiwan – a law was enacted in June 2006 with a seven-year deadline for
completing clearance of all landmines from Kinmen and Matsu islands.
Thailand - the mine action center initiated area reduction in 2005 in a bid
to accelerate demining, and the area released (5.9 square kilometers) nearly
tripled compared to 2004. Rapid acceleration in clearance of land was also
reported in the first quarter of 2006, mostly through area reduction―4.3
square kilometers was area-reduced in the first three months, almost as much as
in the whole of 2005.
Ukraine - an interagency working group to prepare a national mine action
program was formed in January 2006.
Major Challenges for Mine Action Programs
Despite the achievements of many mine action programs, major challenges
confront all programs. Three of these challenges are: responding effectively to
the needs of affected communities; fulfilling the requirements of Article 5; and
ensuring national ownership and good governance of the mine action program.
These challenges are outlined below.
Responding Effectively to Community Needs
Assessing the Mine Problem: Identifying the nature and extent of mine
and ERW contamination and its impact on the civilian population is a
pre-requisite for an effective national mine action response. If the relevant
actors do not agree on this, they are unlikely to adopt coordinated and
effective responses. Some states have been more adept than others at accurately
determining the problem to be addressed.
Landmine Monitor research indicates that 78 states and eight other areas are
affected by mined areas. There are an additional 14 states and areas primarily
affected by explosive remnants of war; some may also have a residual level of
mine contamination.[47]
The Global Landmine Problem in 2005-2006
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Americas
Asia/Pacific
Europe/
Central Asia
Middle East/
North Africa
Angola
Burundi
Chad
Djibouti
Democratic Republic of Congo Republic of Congo
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Guinea-Bissau
Malawi
Mauritania
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Rwanda
Senegal
Somalia
Sudan
Swaziland
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Somaliland
Chile
Colombia
Cuba
Ecuador
Nicaragua
Peru
Venezuela
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Cambodia
China
India
Korea, North
Korea, South
Laos
Burma (Myanmar)
Nepal
Pakistan
Philippines
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Vietnam
Nagorno-Karabakh
Taiwan
Albania
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Croatia
Cyprus
Denmark
France (Djibouti)
FYR Macedonia
Georgia
Greece
Kyrgyzstan
Moldova
Russia
Serbia & Montenegro
Tajikistan
Turkey
Ukraine
UK (Falklands)
Uzbekistan
Abkhazia
Chechnya
Kosovo
Algeria
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Israel
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
Oman
Syria
Tunisia
Yemen
Palestine
Western Sahara
Bold: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty; italics: areas not
recognized as states by the UN.
Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires each State Party to make
“every effort” to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or
control that contain antipersonnel mines, prior to and in preparation for
clearance.[48 ]This implies that a
State Party should carry out an appropriate survey of suspected mined areas.
Until recently, the most widely used form of “needs assessment” was
the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), as promoted by the Survey Working Group. It
appears that the LIS is falling out of favor with some mine action
programs.[49 ]This is due to a
number of factors, including accuracy, cost, time and resources used. Many
Landmine Impact Surveys have led to excessive estimates of the extent of
contaminated land.
In Mozambique, for example, the accuracy of the 2001 LIS was
questioned from the outset. It produced an estimate of the area affected, 562
square kilometers, that several key operators considered exaggerated. A new
estimate of 149 square kilometers was produced by the National Demining
Institute, based on the LIS results and taking into account subsequent
re-surveys and mine clearance, at the end of 2005. Mine clearance since the LIS
accounted for only a small portion of this decrease. The new estimate may still
significantly overstate the extent of contamination. Extrapolation from
re-surveys by three clearance operators indicated that the actual extent of
affected areas is far lower. According to a UN Development Programme (UNDP)
official in Mozambique, “given that since 2001, of the 423 square
kilometers visited by operators in the 1,047 LIS-identified areas, only 17.5
square kilometers of land needed clearance, it can be assumed, with caution,
that the remaining 149 square kilometers which need clearance may turn out to be
only six square kilometers.”
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, similarly, official claims based on the
2003 LIS are that the total area potentially contaminated by mines and UXO is
about 2,100 square kilometers. However, in November 2005, the deputy director
of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center referred to the need to clear
only some 400 square kilometers. Confirmation that the contaminated area had
been significantly overestimated also came from a study of survey and a UNDP
mid-term review, which noted that systematic survey has reduced the size and
number of suspected hazardous areas by 50 percent in the Federation entity of
Bosnia and Herzegovina.[50 ]
In Angola, also, a LIS ongoing since 2004 and uncompleted has
estimated that there are approximately 2,900 suspected hazardous areas covering
some 1,300 to 1,400 square kilometers. However, according to UNDP, this
estimated can be significantly reduced by technical survey and area reduction.
The effectiveness of a LIS may be greatly increased by combining it with
existing survey data. In Afghanistan, the LIS incorporated survey data
that operators had amassed over the years, thereby confirming or discrediting
data from the LIS preliminary opinion collection. This resulted in a
significant reduction, from 1,350 to 715 square kilometers, in the estimate of
contaminated land. The more focused impact survey also found that
Afghanistan’s mine and ERW contamination is more geographically
concentrated than previously thought. All but one of the 32 provinces are
mine-affected, but three-quarters of suspected hazardous areas and of recent
casualties are in only 12 provinces; half the suspected hazardous areas are in
six provinces and nearly half the recent casualties are in three provinces.
Survey information such as this has obvious and significant implications for the
targeting of demining resources.
However, not every excessive estimate of contamination can be ascribed to an
impact survey. Mauritania, for example, has previously claimed that one
quarter of its territory is mine-suspected, although none of the areas have been
mapped. Mauritania expects a forthcoming impact survey, focusing only on
communities in the north suspected to be mine-affected, to provide a more
realistic estimate of the extent of the problem and specifics of the locations
and nature of the mine contamination.
Kosovo is an example of initial overestimation of the mine problem
and, possibly, later underestimation. Estimates in 2000 of contamination
covering 360 square kilometers were reduced greatly, although demining
operations accounted for only 41 square kilometers of the reduction from 1999 to
the end of 2005. As to the extent of the remaining mine problem, the UN and a
major mine action operator continue to disagree forcefully: the UN describes
this as “residual” on the level of western European countries, while
HALO Trust is convinced that there are many more than the 15 known dangerous
areas and 51 suspect areas at the end of 2005.
Village Demining: A second component in efforts to respond
effectively to the needs of affected communities is resource allocation,
including the targeting of demining resources. So-called “village,”
or “spontaneous” demining continues to receive a great deal of
attention, especially in southeast Asia. Previously, mine action programs have
tended to eschew formal recognition of such initiatives. That is beginning to
change. There may be formal recognition of voluntary efforts by villagers to
clear mines from land needed for local sustainability, with the provision of
some training, equipment and oversight. At a minimum, there is a growing
appreciation that such intentional risk-taking is a reasoned and
economically-driven response by communities who do not expect that professional
deminers will assist them in the near future. This re-emphasizes the need to
target resources effectively.
In Cambodia in 2005, HALO Trust deployed three survey teams for two
months to investigate local land reclamation initiatives in three districts of
two provinces. They found that farmers had reclaimed 34.53 square kilometers of
land, cleared 3,371 mines and 2,222 pieces of UXO, sustaining only one injury.
HALO concluded, “This initiative was equivalent to tens of millions of
dollars worth of clearance work by demining operators, and therefore deserves
serious attention.”
Marking and Fencing: One frequently overlooked requirement of Article
5 is that, prior to clearance operations, each affected State Party should
ensure, as soon as possible, that mined areas are “perimeter-marked,
monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective
exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained there-in have
been destroyed.”
Few if any mine-affected States Parties are known to have fulfilled this
obligation comprehensively, and few have reported adequately in Article 7
reports on their efforts to meet this treaty obligation. Denmark, France (in
respect of its base on Djibouti), and the United Kingdom (Falklands) appear to
have taken adequate measures to ensure the exclusion of civilians from mined
areas under their jurisdiction or control.
Fulfilling the Requirements of Article 5
Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires the destruction of all
antipersonnel mines in mined areas within the jurisdiction or control of a State
Party as soon as possible, and no later than 10 years from entry of force of the
treaty for each State Party.
Landmine Monitor research indicates that at least 29 States Parties with
Article 5 deadlines in 2009 (24 States Parties) or 2010 (five States Parties)
have mined areas containing antipersonnel mines under their jurisdiction or
control: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Denmark,
Djibouti, Ecuador, France (a French military base in Djibouti), Jordan, FYR
Macedonia, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Niger, Peru, the Philippines,
Rwanda, Senegal, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, the United
Kingdom (Falkland
Islands),[51 ]Venezuela, Yemen and
Zimbabwe.
States Parties likely to be able to meet their Article 5 deadlines include:
Albania, Djibouti, France, Jordan, FYR Macedonia, Malawi, Namibia, Nicaragua,
Rwanda, Swaziland, Tunisia, Uganda and Venezuela. Also, Ecuador and Peru have
publicly affirmed their determination to meet their respective deadlines.
However, at least 13 of the 29 States Parties with Article 5 deadlines in
2009/2010 are not currently on course to meet their treaty obligation.
Collectively, greater efforts are required to fulfill the commitment made by
States Parties at the First Review Conference to “strive to ensure that
few, if any, States Parties will feel compelled to request an extension in
accordance with the procedure set out in Article 5, paragraphs 3-6 of the
Convention.”[52]
Article 5 Status of Mine-Affected States Parties with 2009-2010
Deadlines[53]
Declared compliance/completion of clearance
Compliance/ completion of clearance
uncertain
Indications currently on-track to meet deadline (or clear statements of
intent to do so)
Indications not on-track to meet deadline (or no clear statement of intent
to do so)
Costa Rica
Djibouti
Albania
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Guatemala
Namibia
Ecuador
Cambodia
Honduras
Philippines
France (Djibouti)
Chad
Suriname
Jordan
Croatia
FYR Macedonia
Denmark
Malawi
Mozambique
Nicaragua
Niger
Peru
Senegal
Rwanda
Tajikistan
Swaziland
Thailand
Tunisia
UK(Falkland Islands)
Uganda
Yemen
Venezuela
Zimbabwe
Initiating and Completing Demining Operations As Soon As Possible:
Article 5 requires each State to make “every effort” to identify
areas under its jurisdiction or control that contain antipersonnel mines and to
destroy all the antipersonnel mines in any such areas as soon as
possible. Thus, immediately upon entry into force of the treaty, Article 5
obligations are formally engaged for any State Party for which it is known, or
suspected, that areas under its jurisdiction or control may contain
antipersonnel mines.
It appears that not all States Parties have accepted that they have mined
areas under their jurisdiction or control that contain antipersonnel mines,
despite prima facie evidence. For example:
ThePhilippines has denied that that there are mined areas on
its territory, but occasional reports suggest otherwise.
Bangladesh has claimed in its Article 7 reports that there are no
known or suspected mined areas on its territory. However, there are believed
to be mines on its 208-kilometer border with Burma (Myanmar) and in the
Chittagong Hill tracts. The Bangladeshi Army, commenting in 2005 on earlier
Landmine Monitor findings, said it had also “learned that mines were laid
by the Na Sa Ka [Burmese border security forces] but they [the Na Sa Ka] denied
the existence of any landmines along the border.” Bangladesh has an
Article 5 deadline of March 2011.
Moldova reported that it had completed the destruction of all
antipersonnel mines in mined areas by August 2000. However, people in some
communities remain skeptical about the results of past demining operations and
still avoid entering certain suspected areas. For example, there are claims by
the head of Dubasari district that mines remain in a number of wooded areas that
Moldovan deminers did not find. There are also suspicions that other areas, not
subject to earlier clearance, are also contaminated. Moldova also has an
Article 5 deadline of March 2011.
Republic of Congo has not stated unequivocally that it has mined
areas. Its Article 7 reports stated that “no mined area has yet been
identified” but then indicated the location of a possible mined area,
which UN information confirms. Republic of Congo has an Article 5 deadline of
November 2011.
There are, in the view of Landmine Monitor, some notable cases where States
Parties have accepted that they have obligations under Article 5, but have not
acted “as soon as possible” to plan and conduct a demining program.
These States Parties include Denmark, France, Niger, Swaziland, Venezuela and
the United Kingdom.
Denmark’s deadline for clearance of its mined areas is 1 March
2009. Although its first Article 7 report in August 1999 stated that the mined
area on Skallingen peninsula was being mapped and a plan for clearance would be
developed, no action was reported until 2005. Significant progress was made in
late 2005. Denmark announced at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties that it had
allocated more than $14.5 million for clearance activities in 2006-2008.
However, in a statement on compliance with Article 5 to the Standing Committee
meetings in May 2006, Denmark did not indicate its intention or ability to meet
the 2009 deadline.
France has an Article 5 responsibility with respect to antipersonnel
mines remaining around its ammunition depot close to the town of La Doudah in
Djibouti; its deadline for completion of clearance operations is 1 March 2009.
Despite two assessment missions, France had not begun to clear antipersonnel
mines as of May 2006, more than seven years after becoming a State Party.
France announced that it planned to initiate demining in October 2006, but
warned that “administrative constraints” could further delay the
process.
United Kingdom has an Article 5 responsibility with respect to
antipersonnel mines in extensive mined areas on the Falkland Islands; its
deadline is 1 March 2009. Since becoming a State Party in 1999, the UK’s
progress towards meeting its Article 5 obligations is confined to an agreement
in October 2001 with Argentina to carry out a feasibility study, and a joint
working group which had met eight times as of May 2006. The feasibility study
has not been initiated; a plan and timetable for clearance operations have not
been formulated. No mine clearance has been initiated. In its statements to
Standing Committee meetings and in its Article 7 reports, the UK has not
indicated its intention or capacity to meet the Article 5 deadline.
Niger had not initiated clearance operations as of mid-2006. Since
presenting a draft mine action plan to Standing Committee meetings in February
2004, Niger has not reported any preparations for clearance operations nor its
intention or ability to meet its Article 5 deadline of 1 September 2009.
Swaziland, similarly, had not initiated clearance operations as of
mid-2006. However, in May 2006 it did report to the Standing Committee meetings
preparations for clearance operations intended to meet its Article 5 obligation
(deadline 1 June 2009).
Venezuela has also not yet begun clearing its mined areas. In July
2005, it provided for the first time a timetable for clearance; in May 2006,
Venezuela declared that it would not initiate operations before 2007 due to lack
of equipment and training. Its Article 5 deadline is 1 October 2009.
In other cases, States Parties have initiated demining operations but made
slow progress, to the extent that completion of operations before the Article 5
deadline appears to be in doubt, or in some cases is questioned by
officials.
Thailand’s Foreign Minister warned the Prime Minister in March
2006 that the progress of demining was slow and as a result, Thailand would not
meet its Article 5 deadline of 1 May 2009. Reasons given for the slow progress
included that mine action had not been a government priority, inadequate
financial support, and the military structure of mine action in Thailand.
Successful Completion of Clearance Operations: The goal set by
Article 5 for treaty-compliance is the destruction of all antipersonnel mines in
mined areas. The Mine Ban Treaty does not make provisions for any lesser degree
of clearance, such as “mine-safe” or “impact-free”
(where, for example, a mined area which is judged to pose no danger and to have
no socioeconomic effect may be fenced and marked but not cleared).
Namibia is not yet in a position to declare fulfillment of its Article
5 obligations. In December 2005, the Chief of Mine Action of the Ministry of
Defense stated that he will make sure that all suspected areas are visited
before declaring the country mine-free. In March 2006, he added that
“Namibia does not want to rush to the declaration. It will do so when the
time is ripe to do so,” meaning after the completion of an ongoing survey.
Similarly, some other States Parties which have completed clearance
operations may not yet be in a position to declare with confidence that they
have complied with Article 5.
Djibouti made several statements about completion of mine clearance
and fulfillment of its Article 5 obligations, including declaring itself
“mine-safe” (but not “mine-free”). Details of mined
areas, survey and clearance operations have not been reported fully in
Djibouti’s Article 7 reports. There is some evidence that mines may
remain in the north and possibly also the south of the country.
The treaty does not specify how a State Party should make known its
completion of clearance operations and Article 5 compliance (other than through
transparency reporting under Article 7), nor what information States Parties
collectively should require in this respect. The ICBL recommends that all
States Parties make a formal declaration of full compliance to an annual Meeting
of States Parties or to a review conference, so that its compliance can be
assessed.
Suriname’s clearance operation was reported to the Standing
Committee meetings in June 2005 by the Organization of American States (OAS).
It reported that on 4 April 2005, clearance operations and quality control of
the remaining mined area in Suriname were completed: “It is our view that
the mine clearance was conducted using appropriate technologies and
methodologies and in accordance with accepted International Mine Action
Standards (IMAS) such that the results conform to the requirements of Article 5
of the Convention.”
The OAS recommended that the government of Suriname “use a declaration
format similar to those employed by Costa Rica and Honduras (and under
consideration by Guatemala) to communicate compliance with the Convention. That
format would declare that all known or suspected mine areas and minefields had
been cleared; that the National Plan/Program had been successfully concluded;
that a residual national capacity was in place to respond to any unforeseen
circumstances related to mine
clearance.”[54 ]In November
2005, in a document sent to the Implementation Support Unit for the Mine Ban
Treaty, Suriname claimed that it had fulfilled its obligations under Article 5.
Guatemala’s Article 7 report for 2005 declared that clearance of
all known antipersonnel mines and ERW had been completed, and that no mined
areas remained on its territory.[55 ]Guatemala also made a statement of full compliance to the Standing
Committee meetings in May 2006. Costa Rica had announced the completion
of the mine clearance program at intersessional Standing Committee meetings in
February 2003.
The final report of the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty noted
simply that Honduras had reported completion of clearance operations, but
does not refer to a formal statement of compliance. According to the OAS,
clearance operations were completed in October 2004.
Article 5 requires the identification of “known or suspected”
mined areas and destruction of all antipersonnel mines within those areas.
However, it may be that identification and clearance operations are carried out
effectively, but further mined areas or scattered antipersonnel mines are
discovered at some future date. In that eventuality, it is consistent with the
treaty that those mines are destroyed promptly and details reported fully in the
State Party’s next Article 7 annual update report.
In case there are new discoveries of emplaced antipersonnel mines, several
States Parties have taken steps to maintain a “residual” clearance
capacity. This prudent measure can be recommended to all affected States
Parties. In Guatemala, a mobile demining unit was created in December 2005 to
respond to reports of residual mines and explosive remnants of war. Similarly,
the OAS recommended to Suriname that a residual national capacity be in place to
respond to any unforeseen circumstances related to mine clearance.
Granting Extensions to the Article 5 Deadline: The treaty contains a
specific set of conditions and a procedure for the possible granting of
an extension to the Article 5 deadline for States Parties that are unable to
complete clearance within 10 years.
The ICBL supports the appropriate granting of an extension period for a
heavily mine-affected State Party following careful consideration of the
particular circumstances that have prevented it from completing the destruction
of all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as
well as a detailed plan on how it will ensure completion of destruction of
antipersonnel mines within a new timeframe.
However, the ICBL calls on States Parties not to accord a blanket extension
to any State Party. It is consistent with Article 5 that each extension granted
by States Parties should be for the shortest possible time period and should be
subject to the requirements for regular reporting by the requesting State Party
and the achievement of reasonable milestones within that time period. Moreover,
the obligation to complete clearance of antipersonnel mines in mined areas
“as soon as possible” demands that demining planning and operations
have been initiated in a timely fashion and carried out expeditiously. A
situation in which a State Party has delayed the start of clearance operations
until close to the Article 5 deadline, or otherwise has made little progress
within the initial 10-year period, does not accord with the provisions of
Article 5, which states, “If a State Party believes that it will be
unable to...” (emphasis added). The wording of Article 5 does not
provide the option of applying for an extension to States Parties that have
simply not addressed the clearance obligation in a timely manner.
National Ownership and Good Governance of Mine Action
The primary responsibility for implementing Article 5 rests with the affected
State Party, according to Article 5. In seeking to address mine contamination
and comply with the treaty, each affected State Party should assume effective
responsibility for the mine action program.
As regards good governance, every mine action program is only as good as its
management.
Funding: Central to national ownership and good governance of mine
action is ensuring that adequate resources, national and international, are
mobilized by the affected State Party to sustain the mine action program at a
reasonable level. Article 6 of the treaty, however, requires other States
Parties in a position to do so to support the efforts of each affected State
Party. It therefore calls on donors to continue providing sufficient support
for the implementation of effective mine action programs.
Several programs were threatened by lack of funding during the reporting
period:
In Afghanistan, mine clearance operations ran into severe funding
shortfalls in mid-2006, causing UNMACA to announce the lay-off of 1,130 demining
personnel in July and to plan to cut 2,800 more jobs in August and
September.
Croatia declared in May 2006 that its “likelihood of meeting
the 2009 Convention deadline for demining is, indeed, very, very slim.”
Parliamentarians called on the government to earmark more funds to the mine
action program. Croatia already self-funds some 57 percent of its mine action
program.
In Guinea-Bissau, a funding crisis in the mine action program in
April 2006 forced one of the two national demining NGOs to cease operations for
two months. A shortage of long-term resources threatens the chances of
Guinea-Bissau completing its Article 5 requirements within the treaty
deadline.
In Iraq, 15 explosive ordnance disposal teams operated by MineTech
International under contract to the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) were
disbanded in mid-2005 when the contract was terminated because of lack of
funds.[56 ]
In Mauritania, mine clearance was suspended for the whole of 2005 due
to lack of funds, resuming in 2006.
In Tajikistan, shortfalls in donor support and the non-arrival of
pledged funds jeopardized plans to achieve higher productivity in 2006.
Tajikistan warned that international assistance “is needed now if
we are to meet our obligations to the treaty.”
Greater efforts are needed from many States Parties, both affected and non
mine-affected, in order to comply with their obligations under Articles 5 and 6
of the Mine Ban Treaty. The ICBL urges all States Parties with Article 5
obligations to do everything possible to ensure that they meet the treaty
deadlines, and urges other States Parties to provide assistance to the best of
their abilities.
Civilian Control of Mine Action: In seeking to ensure good governance
of mine action, some programs believe they will be more productive, transparent
and attract more international funding if they are under civilian rather than
military management.
Lebanon’s National Demining Office initiated a medium-term
project in 2005 to formalize the involvement of a broader representation of
national and local institutions into planning and coordination of mine action,
thereby allowing greater oversight from civilian institutions. This aimed to
give “mine action in Lebanon the robust structure and documentation set
necessary to fulfill mine action requirements in a transparent and
cost-effective manner.”
In Mauritania in 2006, discussions were initiated within the
ministries of national defense and economic affairs and development to transfer
the National Humanitarian Demining Office to the control of a civilian
ministry.
Rwanda’s National Demining Office remains under the auspices of
the Ministry of Defense, despite a 2003 assessment which recommended that it
should be headed by a civilian, to attract international donors.
Thailand Mine Action Center proposed to the cabinet in 2005 that it
should convert from a military organization to become a civilian organization.
A high-level review in January 2006 endorsed this suggestion and requested a
formal proposal for a transfer to the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister’s
Office.
Integration into Development: A number of donors believe that
integration of mine action into development will help to mobilize resources and
maximize the effectiveness of the sector. Examples of efforts, some more and
some less successful, to undertake such integration include:
Angola claims to have integrated mine action into its development
plan. Mine action is identified as a specific goal in its Strategy to Combat
Poverty 2004-2006. One of the Strategy’s goals is to “guarantee
basic physical security through demining, disarmament and the upholding of law
and order throughout the country.”
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Mid-Term Development Strategy
2004-2007 included mine action as a priority sector; however, only a few
development sectors included mine action as a priority. Revision in mid-2006
was said to embrace mine action as a priority for more strategic development
sectors, and increase access for mine action to financial resources allocated to
development programs.
Guinea-Bissau’s Public Sector Reform Program was revised in
September 2005 and factored into mine action planning; these documents were due
to be presented to a donor roundtable at the end of 2006.
Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Center reported that as casualties in
northern Iraq fall its clearance priorities were changing from purely
humanitarian tasks towards projects that support economic growth.
Jordan’s National Mine Action Plan 2005-2009, drafted over a
10-month period of consultation with government, civil society, mine-affected
communities and the private sector, was said to conform to the goals of the
government’s Social Economic Transformation Plan and Millennium
Development Goals.
Mozambique’s second Poverty Reduction Strategy, approved in May
2006 by the Council of Ministers, included mine action both as a crosscutting
issue and as a sectoral issue. It was claimed that the incorporation of mine
action into the Strategy will encourage all development projects to include a
demining component.
Zambia announced at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties that it had
incorporated mine clearance strategies into its new five-year national
development plan 2006-2010. The objective is for development needs to drive
humanitarian demining.
Improving Program Performance: A number of evaluations of mine action
projects and programs have been conducted during the reporting period, with the
intention of improving the performance of mine action programs.
In Abkhazia, the mine action center and the HALO program were
evaluated twice in 2005 by representatives from the US Department of State. The
evaluations found that, “The program was considered to be efficient,
well-run and on course to declare Abkhazia mine-safe during 2007.”
In Azerbaijan, an evaluation in late 2005 of the Azerbaijan National
Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) was prepared by the World Bank at the request of
the Cabinet of Ministers. According to ANAMA, the evaluation found that the
organization was “an efficiently structured and well-functioning
organization operating in accordance with international standards for demining
activities... ANAMA can reasonably be expected to achieve the objectives of the
current Mine Action Plan, namely certifying by the end of 2008 that all land in
the ‘liberated territories’ is mine-free, provided the necessary
funding is provided during the next three years.”
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) conducted a mid-term evaluation in June 2006 of
the UNDP Integrated Mine Action Program and concluded that, overall, the program
has been successful in supporting the emergence of national capacities for
planning and coordinating the mine action program.
In Chad, a joint UNDP/UNOPS mine action assessment was conducted in
June 2005 in order to review UN efforts to develop mine action managerial and
technical capacities, to determine the need for more donor support and how this
could be achieved, and to advise how the UN program could be improved. The
mission recommended a review of the National Demining Office’s human
resources to ensure that staff are properly qualified for their positions, and a
comprehensive training plan for national staff. The mission stated,
“further reorganization, reduction and simplification of structures are
required to improve efficiency and rationalize costs.”
In Laos, two one-year pilot projects undertaken by Norwegian
People’s Aid were due for completion in June 2006. They attracted
attention as providing a basis for improving deminer efficiency and
productivity. UXO Lao said the reviews could lead it “to completely
modify its approach to its humanitarian mandate.” NPA’s studies
included an “enhanced” technical survey study, intended to improve
task assessment and planning, and to set guidelines for area reduction, enabling
UXO Lao to achieve greater efficiency and productivity.
In Mozambique, the GICHD undertook a comprehensive review of the mine
action program. Its main recommendations included the need to better quantify
the remaining humanitarian and development challenges (through re-survey and
improvements in IMSMA updates and accuracy) and to make stronger links between
mine action on the one hand, and development and reconstruction on the other.
As of the end of April 2006, IND still had to discuss the review’s
recommendations made in October 2005 and to plan for their implementation.
In Sri Lanka, UNDP commissioned an independent evaluation of its role
and operations in 2006.
In Yemen, an evaluation of UNDP support to the mine action program in
April 2005 was conducted by the GICHD. The report concluded, “significant
progress had been achieved in mine action and that the YEMAC [the Yemen Mine
Action Center] has an organizational structure capable of addressing all
components of a mine action program.” It also highlighted several gaps
such as the lack of training, lack of munitions destruction facilities and the
need to enhance post-clearance community rehabilitation. In March 2006, YEMAC
and the GICHD started a socioeconomic and livelihood study to assess the overall
socioeconomic returns from mine clearance investment.
Ensuring Safety of Deminers: Landmine Monitor has recorded more than
100 casualties among deminers in accidents during clearance operations in 2005.
Afghanistan and Cambodia together account for more than half of the total
recorded casualties. (Details of deminer casualties are given in the section on
Landmine Casualties).
Some mine action programs have responded to concerns about HIV/AIDS among
deminers. In Mozambique, a 10-year review by the GICHD reported that
high rates of long-term illnesses among demining teams give cause for concern.
It found that a significant percentage of the staff of some operators were
unable to work because of illnesses often associated with AIDS, citing two
operators as having lost eight percent of operational capacity to what was
believed to be AIDS-related diseases in 2003. The review concluded that,
“there is every reason to fear that deminers serve as a vector of
transmission, both to communities in mine-affected areas and to their wives or
sexual partners at home.”[57 ]More research needs to be conducted in this area.
Mine Risk Education
The UN’s Inter-Agency Mine Action Strategy 2006-2010 declares,
“More effective tools to reduce risk have contributed to steadily
declining casualty levels.” Mine risk education (MRE) is one of the tools
to mitigate risk from landmines and explosive remnants of war. MRE is defined
as activities that seek to “reduce the risk of injury from mines/UXO by
raising awareness and promoting behavioral change; including public information
dissemination, education and training, and community mine action liaison.”
MRE is an integrated component of mine action, needed to provide warnings and
advice on safe behavior, but also to mobilize the community to report on
dangerous areas and unexploded or abandoned ordnance. MRE can promote the
sharing of information between mine action operators and local people. MRE
teams are often involved in data collection for mine action, and can help to
identify mine survivors and their needs, as well as provide relevant information
to survivors. MRE is also a good tool to advocate for a ban on landmines.
A particularly encouraging development in 2005-2006 has been the increased
promotion of community-based MRE. As noted by one expert,
“Community-based approaches involve local people in the provision of MRE
messages to their own communities, an approach that can be cost effective,
ensure good coverage, build competencies and create some expectation of
sustainability.”[58 ]
In another welcome development, an increasing number of MRE programs have
established links with survey, marking and clearance efforts, and worked within
the framework of official school curricula. Stand-alone MRE projects are
decreasing.
The biggest challenge to MRE providers is intentional risk-taking behavior.
The most frequently noted example is collection of mines and explosive remnants
of war as lucrative scrap metal, but intentional risk-taking also entails daily
livelihood activities such as knowingly entering dangerous areas to collect
firewood, to farm, to graze animals or for other economic
activities.[59 ]To address this,
MRE operators have developed comprehensive risk reduction approaches involving
local stakeholders to identify concrete alternatives to risk-taking behavior.
These include incorporating geographically-specific messages into MRE sessions
to explain where safe areas are located, constructing safe play-areas for
children, and specific projects targeting scrap metal collectors and dealers.
MRE Programs
Landmine Monitor recorded MRE programs or activities in 60 countries in 2005
and the first half of 2006, one less country than recorded in last year’s
report.[60 ]Thirty-nine of the
countries are States Parties to the Mine Ban
Treaty.[61 ]Twenty-one are not
party to the treaty.[62 ]There were
also MRE programs or activities in eight of the nine non-state areas covered by
Landmine Monitor.[63 ]
The total number of direct MRE recipients increased to 6.4 million people in
2005, from 6.25 million in 2004.[64 ]As in past years, the global total is only an estimate based on many
sources providing information to Landmine Monitor. The total of 6.25 million
does not include recipients of MRE delivered by mass media, but many could be
individuals receiving MRE from multiple sources. Five countries accounted for
over four million of the recipients: Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Sri Lanka
and Thailand.[65 ]However, MRE
operators stress that the number of people reached with MRE is less important
than the quality and impact of MRE.
The Mine Ban Treaty requires that States Parties report on measures taken
“to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population” of
mined areas. As of June 2006, 23 States Parties had reported on MRE in their
2005 Article 7 reports, considerably less than the 33 noted last
year.[66 ]A number of States
Parties that either do have or should have MRE activities did not make use of
Form I of the Article 7 reporting format to identify MRE activities (Belarus,
Cambodia, Honduras, Latvia, Namibia, Ukraine and Zambia). Some other States
Parties that either do or should have MRE activities stated in Form I that the
topic is not applicable to them (Bangladesh, Republic of Congo, Côte
d’Ivoire and Moldova).
In the view of Landmine Monitor, new or additional MRE programs and
activities are most needed in Algeria, Burma/Myanmar, Colombia, Egypt, India,
Kuwait, Laos, Mozambique, Pakistan, Turkey and Ukraine.
New MRE Activities
In 2005 and 2006, new mine risk education projects and activities were
recorded in 28 countries, a notable development that builds on the new MRE
recorded in 15 countries last year. For the first time, MRE activities were
recorded in China; in other countries, there were new MRE providers,
significantly expanded activities, and/or new geographic areas covered.
Of the 28 countries, 18 are States Parties (Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chile, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, DR Congo,
Ecuador, Ethiopia, Liberia, Peru, Senegal, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda and
Zimbabwe) and 10 non-States Parties (Armenia, China, Iran, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan,
Nepal, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria and Vietnam). There were also new MRE
activities in Palestine and Western Sahara.
Adequate MRE Programs
Twenty-three countries and five areas had adequate MRE programs in place in
2005 and the first half of 2006. “Adequate” means that an MRE
program or a sizeable project was in place that was capable of providing MRE in
terms of need and quality in relation to the actual mine/ERW threat. In
countries or areas with a limited mine/ERW problem, a limited MRE program may be
adequate as long as the number of casualties remains very low or zero. However,
in most of these countries additional MRE capacity would be justified to achieve
a more comprehensive provision of services.
Fifteen countries with adequate MRE programs are States Parties, including
Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Ecuador, Eritrea,
Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Nicaragua, Senegal, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand,
Uganda and Yemen.
Eight non-States Parties have adequate MRE programs, including Azerbaijan,
Iran, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Nepal, South Korea and Sri Lanka. The five
areas with adequate MRE programs are Abkhazia, Chechnya, Falkland Islands,
Kosovo and Somaliland.
Inadequate MRE Activities
Landmine Monitor recorded inadequate MRE activities in 37 countries in
2005-2006. “Inadequate” means that the MRE approach taken was too
basic, or that MRE was on a too limited scale or did not reach some geographical
areas in need.[67 ]This included 24
States Parties (Albania, Belarus, Burundi, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Côte
d’Ivoire, Croatia, DR Congo, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Jordan, Liberia,
Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Tunisia, Turkey,
Ukraine, Zambia and Zimbabwe) and 13 non-States Parties (Armenia, Burma/Myanmar,
China, Georgia, India, Israel, Laos, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Somalia, Syria
and Vietnam). Inadequate MRE activities were also recorded in Nagorno-Karabakh,
Palestine and Western Sahara.
No MRE Activities
In 2005 and 2006, no mine risk education was recorded in 30 countries
affected by mines or explosive remnants of war. In some of these countries, an
initial mine/ERW assessment has not been undertaken to allow for a proper
judgment of whether risk education is needed; in some, formal risk education may
not be necessary. Of the 30 countries, 20 are States Parties: Algeria,
Bangladesh, Republic of Congo, Cyprus, Denmark, Djibouti, Estonia, Greece,
Honduras, Kenya, Latvia, FYR Macedonia, Malawi, Moldova, Niger, Panama, Serbia
and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Swaziland and Venezuela. Ten are not States
Parties: Cuba, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Mongolia, Morocco, North Korea,
Oman and Uzbekistan. In addition, no MRE activities were recorded in
Taiwan.[68 ]
Key Actors
Thousands of community volunteers—including those from Red Cross and
Red Crescent National Societies, children from Child Clubs, and
“student-teachers” (child-to-child and child-to-parents
approach)—and tens of thousands of teachers in primary and secondary
schools are the key actors undertaking MRE within their own communities,
including in camps for refugees and internally displaced people.
The staff of national mine action centers and security forces (including army
personnel, border guards, police and firefighters) provide warnings to the
population; in some countries they have been trained to provide quality MRE as
an integral component of the national mine action program.
A total of 121 national NGOs conducted MRE in 30 countries and three areas
during the reporting period.[69 ]National NGOs often work with mobile teams of MRE educators to reach
mine-affected communities and to train and monitor community-based volunteers
and teachers.
Internationally, the principal MRE operators are the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC), UNICEF, Handicap International, Mines Advisory Group,
DanChurchAid, Danish Demining Group, INTERSOS, HALO Trust and Norwegian
People’s Aid. Other international NGOs involved in substantial MRE
activities include the International Save the Children Alliance (Save the
Children Sweden, UK and US), World Vision, AVSI (Associazione Volontari peril
Sevizio Internazionale), World Education, World Rehabilitation Fund, Islamic
Relief and Mines Awareness Trust.
International NGOs—predominantly the mine action NGOs listed
above—carried out MRE in 25 countries and four areas in
2005-2006.[70 ]The International
Committee of the Red Cross and the national Red Cross/Red Crescent societies
conducted MRE programs in about 27
countries.[71 ]In 2005, ICRC
developed a framework for its future preventive mine action operations, seeking
to integrate mine action, including MRE, across all appropriate ICRC
departments.
Within the UN, UNICEF retains a primary role in the areas of MRE, survivor
assistance and advocacy. In 2005 and 2006, UNICEF provided financial and
technical support for mine action in 30 countries and two areas. This support
was directed predominantly to MRE and advocacy, but also to data collection and
survivor assistance.[72 ]As noted
in Landmine Monitor Report 2005, the UN launched a revised inter-agency
policy on mine action in 2005, and decisions related to the activities of UNICEF
and other UN agencies have been decentralized to UN in-country
teams.[73]
The UNDP, UNMAS and OAS help integrate risk education into mine action, and
provide regular landmine and ERW safety
briefings.[74 ]Commercial demining
companies normally do not engage in MRE or in community liaison, except for
RONCO which has taken on MRE in Sudan.
At-Risk Groups
People most at risk from landmines, unexploded and abandoned ordnance vary by
country and region, but in general the majority are male, either adolescents or
of working age, and very often rural inhabitants. Returnees, both refugees and
internally displaced people, are also at great risk, especially those who are
unfamiliar with the local threat (as seen in Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi,
Colombia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and elsewhere). Casualty data show that children
are more at risk from UXO than adults, while adults are more likely to fall
victim to landmines. Nomads and semi-nomads are a specific at-risk group in
various countries.
In Afghanistan, males are particularly at risk. In Albania, mine incidents
are decreasing but casualties due to explosive remnants of war are on the rise.
In Croatia, hunters continue to be particularly at risk; they were targeted with
specific MRE activities in a joint effort by the Croatian Red Cross and the
Croatian Hunting Association.
In Lebanon, the major at-risk groups are males and those older than 20 years
(72 percent of casualties were aged 21 to 50 years). In Nepal, unexploded IEDs
are the most common cause of incidents; children represented 56 percent of total
civilian casualties in 2005. In Sri Lanka, risk is affected by seasonality.
Risk is greatest in September when the cycle of planting and harvesting begins,
and a mine action week is organized prior to the harvest season. In Yemen,
women and children are most vulnerable while doing their daily chores (herding,
collecting wood and fetching water), even if they are aware of the risks.
MRE in Areas of Conflict
In a number of places where humanitarian clearance cannot be undertaken, due
to ongoing conflict or other reasons, MRE is still carried out and is often
instrumental in reducing casualties. In 2005 and 2006, emergency MRE was
undertaken in Chad, Sri Lanka and Guinea-Bissau/Senegal after renewed fighting
that at times involved the use of landmines.
In Iraq, including the central area, local staff continued to provide MRE,
reaching at least 85,000 people in 2005. There were ongoing MRE activities in
Burma, Chechnya, Colombia and Nepal despite continued conflict, albeit with
great limitations in each case. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, MRE was
integrated with HIV/AIDS awareness in conflict zones in Northern Katanga and
South Kivu. In Tajikistan, MRE remains the only viable option to mitigate risk
from landmines in the contaminated areas bordering Uzbek enclaves, pending
negotiations with Uzbekistan that may permit clearance.
Integration of MRE with Other Mine Action Activities
Continuing a positive trend of recent years, MRE was increasingly integrated
into other forms of mine action and broader disciplines in 2005-2006, in many
countries. The International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) on MRE state that
“projects and programmes should be integrated... with other mine action,
relief and development activities.” Community liaison teams are a key
instrument to promote improved integration. However, one expert has pointed out
that they have seldom been used to liaise with development
activities.[75]
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, MRE is an integral component of the Community
Impact Mine Action Plans guiding the country’s overall mine action
strategy. Some MRE operators assist in erecting mine warning signs. In South
Lebanon, community liaison has helped ensure that clearance proceeds smoothly
and given landowners confidence to use cleared land; more generally it has
helped build trust among communities. In Somaliland, demining operators provide
MRE, and community liaison personnel have convinced locals to hand in mines
stored at home.
In Sri Lanka, clearance teams reported that the community liaison role of the
MRE teams has helped them to function more effectively. MRE organizations are
the main source of information on new dangerous areas and isolated UXO. For
instance, in the LTTE-controlled areas of Vanni and Jaffna, local MRE NGOs
provided 86 percent of the 158 dangerous areas reports sent to the district mine
action office in Jaffna in 2005.
Community-based MRE
Community-based approaches involve local people in the provision of MRE
messages to their own communities. Most often, professional MRE operators
identify and train local volunteers, and at times provide incentives or
compensation for expenditures. Twenty-two countries and four areas implemented
some type of community-based MRE during the reporting
period.[76 ]School-based MRE is not
included in this number as teachers usually receive a salary, but it can be
considered a subset of community-based MRE as most teachers are members of the
community. There are two serious challenges to the community-based approach:
keeping volunteers motivated over a long period of time, particularly if the
mine risk is fairly low, and ensuring the quality and consistency of messages.
In Afghanistan, ICRC and the Afghan Red Cross Society have identified and
trained more than 100 community volunteers from villages in 10 provinces to
conduct MRE. In Angola, 318 MRE community committees or community networks
(typically 12 community leaders and volunteers each) have been formed. They
provide MRE to newcomers and returnees, share information about dangerous areas
and incidents, link with mine action operators and local governmental and NGO
bodies, and support mine survivors. In Azerbaijan, 59 MRE committees with 512
members have been established. The committees are tasked with determining
at-risk groups in their localities and providing MRE.
In Cambodia, volunteers in 422 community-based mine risk reduction networks
use participatory techniques to identify how mines and UXO affect villages, and
then use this information as a basis for prioritizing clearance plans and
requests for development resources. In Kosovo, the local Red Cross Society held
regular meetings with MRE volunteers to gather information about areas affected
by mines and UXO. It had seven field offices covering 26 of the 30
municipalities, and 60 to 65 volunteers who served as a link between communities
and the field offices.
In Kyrgyzstan, local NGOs, community leaders, civil society actors and
teachers were targeted for training of trainers workshops. The trainings
included 39 staff members from 26 NGOs and 13 community/village leaders from
affected villages. In Sri Lanka, to reach out-of-school children, UNICEF
established some 130 children’s clubs with an average of 60 members in
Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara districts in 2004 and 2005. In 2005, 2,605
community liaison MRE activities were conducted in support of mine action.
Evaluations and Learning
In 2005-2006, evaluations, Knowledge, Attitudes, Practices (KAP) surveys and
learning opportunities on aspects of the mine or UXO problem were recorded in
Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia,
Laos, Liberia, Mauritania, Nepal, Pakistan and Uganda.
The IMAS MRE Best Practice Guidebooks, prepared by the UN and the Geneva
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, were released in November 2005.
These draw on best practices from MRE programs globally to identify a series of
possible indicators of impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and
sustainability. The 10 guidebooks cover the following topics: an introduction
to MRE; data collection and needs assessment; planning; public information
dissemination; education and training; community mine action liaison;
monitoring; evaluation; emergency mine risk education; and coordination.
In March 2006, the Mine Action Program Afghanistan published a comprehensive
MRE impact monitoring study, presenting and analyzing two surveys undertaken in
2004-2005. The surveys showed that the MRE knowledge level among boys and young
men was higher than among women and girls, yet the large majority of mine/UXO
incidents involve boys and young men, demonstrating that MRE as a stand-alone
activity is not sufficient to change dangerous behavior: “Economic
necessity leads to this subconscious ignoring of danger.”
In Albania, a study showed that the country faces a serious problem from
explosive remnants of war that has not been addressed by its mine action
program, which is focused on the mine-affected Kukës region while ignoring
other areas suffering from ERW. Countries that recently started developing a
new MRE strategy like Jordan are taking this ERW factor into account.
In Angola, Handicap International undertook an external evaluation of its MRE
project in Huambo in 2005. Some of the main findings were that volunteers need
close monitoring, supervision and refresher training to stay motivated, and that
unless MRE was seen as a long-term requirement, other approaches may be more
suitable and less time-consuming than a community-based approach. Training for
agents in participatory methods was
recommended.[77 ]
In Laos, UNICEF and GICHD published a study on the impact of the scrap metal
economy on children, in response to an increase in the number of reported
casualties. They concluded that lucrative prices on the scrap metal market make
it difficult to identify alternative income sources; safety messages could be
improved; and, greater emphasis should be placed on supporting communities to
manage these risks for themselves.[78 ]UNICEF and GICHD also released an evaluation of UNICEF’s UXO risk
education projects in Laos.[79]
In Cambodia, a study published in December 2005 summarized the strengths and
weaknesses of community-based approaches. It concluded that “mine action
and development agencies have their own mandate and agenda and are not always
responsive to community generated requests for assistance.” It said that
the Mines Advisory Group’s approach improved understanding between mine
action teams and local populations, but noted that community liaison could be
“a relatively transitory approach which does not last beyond the demining
operations; can be time consuming... [and] is a consultation process rather than
a process to build local competencies.” The Cambodian Mine Action
Center’s approach was low cost, allowed large areas to be covered,
developed local competencies and promoted local decision making; however, it
constituted little more than basic information gathering and basic community
liaison, and required intensive training of district focal
points.[80]
[39] Under Protocol V to the
Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war (ERW) are defined
as unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO). Mines are
explicitly excluded from the definition. [40] This overview summarizes
detailed information in country reports in this edition of Landmine Monitor.
Unless otherwise indicated, see the relevant country report for sources of
information. [41] In accordance with the
definition laid down by the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), the area
demined includes that released by survey as well as through mine and battle area
clearance. [42] Moreover, the figure of 740
square kilometers does not fully reflect the extent of demining as Iran, one of
the world’s largest demining programs, declined to provide statistics for
2005, as did some others. [43] “Demining”
refers collectively to the activities of survey, assessment, area reduction,
marking and fencing and all other activities preparatory to
“clearance,” as well as post-clearance survey. Mine
“clearance” refers to the destruction of mines in situ, or
their removal from the ground and subsequent destruction elsewhere. [44] This total combines UXO and
AXO but does not include, where known, pieces of small arms ammunition, which
would increase the total significantly. [45] The figures given in Table 1
have been disaggregated based on the available evidence and input from
operators.
The figures presented are those given by the operators where they differ from
the mine action center. In the case of Ethiopia, the figures are those provided
by the Ethiopian Mine Action Centre. [46] In Honduras in November
2005, however, a mine was reported to have killed a farmer in the municipality
of El Paraíso, in an area on the Honduran side of the border with
Nicaragua that had previously been demined. It is not known what action has
been taken by the Honduran authorities to verify the area is safe, nor whether
this was a newly laid mine or one that had been missed by earlier demining
operations. El Salvador claims to have freed its territory from mine
contamination to international standards in 1994, before becoming a State Party
to the Mine Ban Treaty. [47] Belarus, Côte
d’Ivoire, El Salvador, Estonia, Indonesia, Kenya, Latvia, Liberia,
Mongolia, Panama, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone and the US. A number of
other countries also have explosive remnants of war from World Wars I and
II. [48] Article 5 of the Mine Ban
Treaty applies to States Parties regardless of when antipersonnel mines were
emplaced, or by whom, and will similarly apply to any antipersonnel mines that
may be laid in the future. [49] For example, Guinea-Bissau
and Jordan appear to have eschewed the full LIS in favor of a cheaper and more
lightweight impact survey. [50] Bosnia and Herzegovina is
made of two entities, Republika Srpska and the Federation (the larger of the
two), and Brcko District. [51] Argentina also asserts its
jurisdiction over the Falklands (Malvinas) and therefore accepts obligations
under Article 5. [52] Nairobi Action Plan, Action
#27, “Final Report of the First Review Conference,”
APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9
February 2005, p. 99. [53] This summary of the status
of mine-affected States Parties, as of May 2006, is based on results of research
conducted for Landmine Monitor Report 2006, including but not restricted
to official statements. Clarifications in response to this table are welcomed.
[54] Statement by the OAS on
Suriname, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine
Action Technologies, Geneva, 13 June 2005. [55] Article 7 Report, Form C, 30
April 2006. The report actually claims that Guatemala is “free of
antipersonnel mines.” It does not refer to antivehicle mines, although it
has reported finding and destroying antivehicle mines in the past. [56] Iraq is not a State Party to
the Mine Ban Treaty, but since 2004 government officials have said that they are
favorably inclined to joining the treaty. [57] GICHD, “A Review of
Mine Action in Mozambique,” Final Report, October 2005, p. 25. [58] Ruth Bottomley, Norwegian
People’s Aid, “Community Participation in Mine Action, A Review and
Conceptual Framework,” December 2005, p. 4. [59] A Knowledge, Attitudes,
Practices (KAP) study undertaken in Afghanistan asked locals: “Some people
take risks and go to dangerous areas. Why do they do so?” The generic
reply, “because of economic and financial problems,” received 45
percent, and the three main specific activities mentioned were grazing cattle,
collecting firewood and collecting scrap metal. Mine Action Program for
Afghanistan (MAPA), “KAP Analysis 2004/2005, Mine Risk Education Impact
Monitoring in Afghanistan,” Kabul, 2006, p. 25. [60] Six countries were dropped
from last year’s list because no MRE activities were reported (Bangladesh,
Estonia, Latvia, Malawi, Moldova, and Serbia and Montenegro) and five were added
due to new activities (China, Côte d’Ivoire, Peru, Tunisia and
Ukraine). [61] States Parties with MRE
programs include Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, DR
Congo, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau,
Jordan, Liberia, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Peru, Philippines,
Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine,
Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe. [62] Non-States Parties with MRE
programs include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Burma/Myanmar, China, Georgia, India,
Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, Nepal, Pakistan, Poland, Russia,
Somalia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Syria and Vietnam. [63] The areas are Abkhazia,
Chechnya, Falkland Islands/Malvinas, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Palestine,
Somaliland and Western Sahara. [64] Landmine Monitor recorded
8.4 million people in 2003, 4.8 million in 2002, and smaller numbers in previous
years. [65] Sri Lanka and Thailand are
new additions to the top five; last year Ethiopia and Laos held those spots. [66] States Parties reporting on
MRE in 2005 included Afghanistan, Albania, Chile, Colombia, DR Congo, Croatia,
Ecuador, Guatemala, Jordan, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal,
Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen and
Zimbabwe. [67 ] MRE that is too basic does
not go beyond lecture-style approaches and in many countries does not include
school-based MRE. [68] Honduras, although
self-declared mine-free, had one mine victim in 2005. For this reason it
reappears on the list. Suriname, after a mine clearance operation including
community liaison, is considered mine-free and was removed from the list. [69] National NGOs operated in
Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burma,
Burundi, Cambodia, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Georgia, India,
Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Nepal, Pakistan, Peru, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine and Yemen, as well as in Chechnya,
Somaliland and Western Sahara. [70] International NGOs operated
in Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad,
Croatia, DR Congo, Georgia, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia,
Mauritania, Mozambique, Nepal, Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
Thailand, Uganda, and Vietnam, as well as in Abkhazia, Chechnya,
Nagorno-Karabakh and Somaliland. [71] The ICRC stated that it
supported preventive mine action activities in 27 countries, but did not list
them all. ICRC, “Special Report Mine Action 2006,” Geneva, May
2006, p. 8. Landmine Monitor has information on MRE activities by national
societies, usually with technical and financial support from ICRC, and at times
by ICRC itself, in 24 countries: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burma/Myanmar, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Ethiopia,
India, Iran, Iraq, Israel/OPT, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua,
Russia (Northern Caucasus), Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo), Sudan, Syria and
Tajikistan. [72] UNICEF supported mine action
activities in: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DR Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Georgia/Abkhazia, Indonesia (advocacy), Iraq, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Mauritania,
Nepal, Nicaragua, Russia (Northern Caucasus), Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria,
Tajikistan, Thailand, and Vietnam, as well as Palestine and Somaliland. [73] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 40. [74] Many entities providing
security training incorporate landmine and ERW safety into their briefing
packages, including military training centers for peacekeeping troops, UN
Department of Safety and Security, World Food Program, UN High Commissioner for
Refugees, and the NGO training organization RedR-IHE. [75] Joanne Durham, “From
Interventions to Integration: Mine Risk Education and Community Liaison,”
Journal of Mine Action, Issue 9.2, February 2006. [76] States Parties with
community-based MRE programs include Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Nicaragua,
Senegal, Sudan, Thailand and Uganda. Non-States Parties with community-based
MRE include Azerbaijan, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
There were community-based MRE activities in Chechnya, Kosovo, Palestine and
Somaliland. [77] Ruth Bottomley,
“Evaluation Report for Handicap International France, Strengthening and
Promoting Associations and Community Networks for Sustainable Mine Risk
Education [in Angola],” Lyon, May 2005, p. 6. [78] UNICEF/GICHD, “A Study
of Scrap Metal Collection in Lao PDR,” Geneva, September 2005, pp.
5-6. [79] UNICEF/GICHD, “An
Evaluation of UNICEF-supported UXO Risk Education Projects in Lao PDR,”
Geneva, October 2005, p. 5. The four key recommendations were: initiate a
multi-province UXO risk education needs assessment; engage in a strategic
planning process for the overall program with all relevant stakeholders based on
that assessment; establish a national victim surveillance system that fully
covers risk education needs; and continue to support development of an MRE
coordination mechanism. [80] Ruth Bottomley,
“Community Participation in Mine Action, A Review and Conceptual
Framework,” Norwegian People’s Aid, December 2005, pp. 30-35.
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