Key developments since May 2005: Iraqi officials have continued to
express strong interest in joining the Mine Ban Treaty. Opposition forces have
continued to use improvised explosive devices in great numbers, as well as
antivehicle mines. Coalition forces have discovered many caches of
antipersonnel mines. Reduced international funding for Iraq (down by half from
2004) plus deteriorating security significantly hindered mine action in all but
the northern regions; some contracts and operations ended early. The National
Mine Action Authority reported a sharp drop in mine clearance in 2005. The
authority’s second director general in two years was replaced in October
2005. The Iraq Landmine Impact Survey completed surveying 13 of Iraq’s 18
governorates in April 2006, but suspended survey in Tikrit and Diyala due to
lack of security. As of May 2006, the survey had recorded 565 casualties in two
years (over 20 percent were children) and 7,631 less recent casualties. In
2005, there were at least 358 casualties, an increase from 2004, and likely an
underestimate as there is no effective casualty surveillance in Iraq.
Mine Ban Policy
The Republic of Iraq has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty.
Since 2004, government representatives have indicated on many occasions that
Iraq is favorably inclined toward the Mine Ban Treaty and is studying the issue
of accession.[1] In early 2006, the
Office of the Prime Minister provided the Iraq Campaign to Ban Landmines with an
unofficial draft law regarding accession to the
treaty.[2] In a 1 March 2006 meeting,
senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials assured Iraqi campaigners that Iraq
would join the treaty and that preparations were
underway.[3] In November 2005, Iraqi
officials attending the Sixth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty
told the ICBL that Iraq would join the treaty once there is a permanent
government.[4] In August 2005,
Iraq’s Foreign Minister wrote to Landmine Monitor, “The government
of Iraq is about to carefully study the joining of the
Convention.”[5] In June 2005,
an Iraqi delegation stated, “Iraqi officials announced on several
occasions that the Iraqi elected government will adhere to the conventions and
treaties concerning international humanitarian law such as the antipersonnel
mines convention. It is now under thorough study so that Iraq will be ready for
accession.”[6] Iraq
participated in a regional seminar in Algeria in May 2005 regarding
implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.
On 8 December 2005, Iraq voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution
60/80, calling for the universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban
Treaty. In 2004, Iraq voted for a similar UNGA resolution, the first time it
had been eligible to vote on the annual pro-ban UNGA resolution since 1996.
Officials from Iraq’s National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) attended as
observers the Mine Ban Treaty’s Sixth Meeting of States Parties in Zagreb,
Croatia in November-December 2005, but did not make any
statements.[7] Iraq attended the
treaty’s intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2005, but was
absent from the meetings in May 2006.
On 29 April 2006, the Iraqi Handicapped Society and other local NGOs,
supported by Mines Action Canada, hosted a training session for Iraqi youth on
the Mine Ban Treaty in Baghdad that opened with statements from representatives
of government ministries.[8]
Production, Stockpiling, and Transfer
Iraq produced antipersonnel mines in the past, including in the period
leading up to the 2003 invasion. All mine production facilities were destroyed
in the Coalition bombing campaign.[9] In 2005, Landmine Monitor removed Iraq from its list of countries
producing antipersonnel mines or reserving the right to produce them following
the destruction of Iraq’s production facilities and the government’s
statements in support of banning antipersonnel mines. Landmine Monitor remains
concerned that there have been no official statements regarding a prohibition on
production of antipersonnel mines.
Landmine Monitor is not aware of any mine transfers from Iraq since the
1990s, but the government has not made a statement regarding export of
antipersonnel mines. There is no export ban or moratorium in place.
The total size of Iraq’s mine stockpile is not known, and will likely
be difficult to determine. It is believed to contain mines manufactured by
Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Egypt, France, Italy, Romania, Singapore, the
former Soviet Union and the United States, in addition to Iraqi-manufactured
mines.[10] Mines, along with a full
range of ammunition, were dispersed to storage locations across the country and
subsequently abandoned as the Iraqi Army disintegrated after the March 2003
invasion.
Iraqi government and Coalition forces continue to find landmines in arms
caches across the country. On 30 May 2006, Multi-National Division-Baghdad
(MND-B) forces found 82 antipersonnel mines in northwest
Baghdad.[11] On 16 May 2006, the
506th Regimental Combat Team found 140 mines in the east of
Baghdad.[12] On 13 May 2006, the
Bulldog Troop found four antipersonnel
mines.[13] On 28 April 2006, MND-B
soldiers found 25 antipersonnel
mines.[14] On 26 April 2006, eight
antipersonnel mines were found in eastern Diyala
province.[15] On 20 April 2006, two
antipersonnel mines were found in a
cache.[16] On 19 February 2006, an
unknown quantity of antipersonnel mines was found near Al
Quratiyah.[17] On 14 February 2006,
the US Army Corps of Engineers stated that it had demolished over 248 tons of
stockpiled ammunitions including
landmines.[18]
On 8 November 2005, Kazakhstan Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Army experts
claimed to have destroyed over four million landmines and unexploded ordnance
(UXO).[19] On 11 October 2005, the
US Alaska Brigade found and destroyed a weapons cache in Rawah that included 10
landmines.[20] On 28 September
2005, a total of 46 antipersonnel mines were found in a cache in
Radwiniyah.[21] On 18 June 2005, 24
landmines were found southwest of
Baghdad.[22] At the beginning of
June 2005, Ukrainian peacekeepers in the province of Wasit found and destroyed
470 antitank and antipersonnel mines.[23]
Use
In the ongoing armed conflict, there have been no reports of new mine-laying
by Iraqi government military forces. Iraqi officials have been unable to inform
Landmine Monitor about the instructions Iraqi forces receive regarding the use
of antipersonnel mines.
There have been no confirmed reports of use of antipersonnel mines by any
Coalition forces. Most members of the Coalition, though not the United States,
are party to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty which prohibits them from using
antipersonnel mines in any circumstance and prohibits them from assisting in any
way the use, production, stockpiling or transfer of antipersonnel mines. In
October 2005, a US Department of State official affirmed that US forces did not
use antipersonnel mines during the invasion of Iraq and have not used them
during the ongoing conflict.[24]
The US and many Coalition members are party to Amended Protocol II of the
Convention on Conventional Weapons, which regulates the types of antipersonnel
mines that can be used and defines the circumstances of their use until either
their clearance or abandonment. The extent to which US and Coalition forces may
exercise control of or utilize existing mined areas for military benefit, and
therefore incur obligations under Amended Protocol II, is not
known.[25] Among those obligations
would be to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from those mined
areas.[26]
Non-State Armed Groups
In contrast to the many documented instances of discoveries and seizures of
antipersonnel mines in this reporting period (since May 2005), there have been
no specific, confirmed instances of new use of antipersonnel mines. There have
been a number of reports of use of antivehicle mines by insurgent forces.
Opposition forces have used improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in great
numbers. An IED that is victim-activated—that explodes from the contact
of a person—is considered an antipersonnel mine and prohibited under the
Mine Ban Treaty. An IED that is command-detonated—where the user decides
when to explode it—is not prohibited by the treaty, but use of such
devices in Iraq has often been in violation of international humanitarian law,
such as when civilians are directly targeted.
Armed non-state groups have used a wide variety of explosive devices to carry
out attacks. Media reports most often cite use of command-detonated bombs and
IEDs, but it appears victim-activated explosive devices have also been used,
including booby-traps. In June 2006, Iraqi insurgent forces reportedly placed
numerous IEDs in the area surrounding the bodies of two American soldiers who
had been kidnapped and killed, in order to inflict additional
casualties.[27] In November 2005,
four Georgian soldiers were reportedly wounded by a landmine explosion while on
patrol in Baquba, Iraq.[28] In
October 2005, a British soldier was killed when “he went forward on foot
ahead of his men’s Land Rovers to check for
booby-traps.”[29]
In November 2005, US General Michael Hagee characterized the threat of IEDs
as the “biggest tactical challenge” in
Iraq.[30] The commander of US
logistics efforts in Iraq said in August 2005 that there were approximately 30
IED attacks per week against supply convoys, a 100 percent increase from the
year before.[31] Between 1 January
and 31 May 2006, 137 US military personnel died as the result of IED attacks in
Iraq. In 2005, 445 US military personnel were killed by attacks involving IEDs,
a substanttial increase from 238 killed by IEDs in
2004.[32]
IEDs have also caused civilian casualties. In February 2006, seven civilians
were wounded by a roadside IED explosion near a US military patrol in
Baquba.[33] A roadside IED was
responsible for the injuries sustained by Bob Woodruff, an American journalist,
and his colleague Doug Vogt in January
2006.[34] Two South African members
of a DynCorp International security team were killed in November 2005 when their
vehicle was hit by an IED.[35] A
November 2005 IED explosion outside Baghdad resulted in the death of three Iraqi
civilians and injury to four others.[36]
An October 2005 Human Rights Watch report stated that since the March 2003
invasion, “armed opposition groups have purposefully killed thousands of
civilians—men, women and children. Across the country, insurgents have
used car bombs and suicide bombers ... to maximize the number of civilian
injuries and deaths.” It said, “Some insurgent groups have used
improvised explosive devices (roadside bombs), car bombs and gunmen to kill
Kurdish politicians and journalists.” The report also cited a US security
expert saying that insurgents pay up to US$200 to detonate an improvised
explosive device.[37]
Opposition forces have laid antivehicle mines on frequently traveled
roads.[38] In 2005, seven US
military personnel were reportedly killed by landmines, all of which appeared to
be antivehicle mines.[39] A US
soldier from the 2nd Marine Division, II Expeditionary Force, was killed near
Habbaniyah in November 2005 when his vehicle hit a
mine.[40] In October 2005, three
Ukrainian soldiers were wounded when a landmine exploded near their armored
personnel carrier.[41] In August
2005, 14 US marines were killed when their vehicle hit a roadside bomb made from
three landmines.[42] Insurgents
have also used antivehicle mine components as detonators in IEDs.
Reports have linked explosive materials used by Iraqi insurgents to the
government of Iran. During a March 2006 speech, US President George W. Bush
stated that “some of the most powerful IEDs we’re seeing in Iraq
today include components that came from
Iran.”[43] The US Director of
National Intelligence testified during a February 2006 US Congressional hearing
that Iran was supplying Shi’a militants with the technology to build more
effective IEDs.[44] In an October
2005 briefing, an anonymous British official stated that there was evidence that
a new device with the impact of three landmines was being channeled into Iraq
from Hizbullah in Lebanon via
Iran.[45]
Landmine and ERW Problem
Iraq ranks high among the countries most severely contaminated by landmines
and explosive remnants of war (ERW), a legacy of internal conflicts, the
1980-1988 war with Iran, the 1991 first Gulf War after Iraq’s invasion of
Kuwait, and the present conflict that began with the invasion of Iraq by US-led
Coalition forces in March 2003. In the aftermath of the 2003 conflict, Iraq was
affected by millions of
mines[46] and huge quantities of
abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) and unexploded ordnance
(UXO).[47] By June 2006, the
three-year old Coalition Munitions Clearance Program had destroyed more than
450,000 tons of stockpiled munitions and Coalition troops continued to find
substantial caches of weapons and
munitions.[48]
Iraq emplaced barrier and tactical minefields along its 1,400-kilometer
border with Iran. Its southern provinces bordering Iran sustained further
contamination by UXO during the Iran-Iraq war. Before the 2003 conflict,
additional minefields were laid on the border with Saudi Arabia and around
military positions. Extensive UXO contamination resulted from coalition air
strikes and ground engagements in 2003; according to data provided by Coalition
forces, this was most intense along main roads leading to Baghdad where most
communities in those areas are located. More recently, attacks using car bombs
and roadside IEDs indicate that huge amounts of AXO were left unsecured after
the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime and subsequently plundered, fuelling
the ongoing insurgency.[49]
A comment in 2006 summarizing the impact of this contamination observed that,
“not only are civilians at risk of losing their lives or a limb due to
mines and ERW, but contamination poses major challenges to the implementation of
relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development projects. Agricultural
land remains unused and at risk to farmers and livestock. Construction of roads
and residential areas must take into consideration the possible placement of
mines. Water systems have been contaminated by depleted uranium, posing
serious health threats for Iraqi civilians. ERW also hinders the safe
return of internally displaced people and refugees, which contributes to the
instability of individual lives and
communities.”[50]
The Iraq Landmine Impact Survey (ILIS), implemented by Vietnam Veterans of
America Foundation (VVAF), had completed work by the end of April 2006 in 13 of
Iraq’s 18 governorates and had found more than 3,548 suspected hazardous
areas (SHAs) containing mines and/or UXO affecting 1,579 communities, some
affected by multiple SHAs.[51] It
also recorded 565 recent casualties (within the two years leading up to the
survey), virtually all of them (99.3 percent) civilians and more than two-thirds
of them aged between five and 29
years.[52] It is believed that many
other casualties may have gone
unreported.[53] There is also
substantial contamination in areas that do not affect any community, and which
therefore do not feature in the
ILIS.[54]
Overall, landmines have proved the biggest cause of casualties, according to
survey data so far. They accounted for three-quarters of casualties in northern
Kurdish governorates and over half the recorded casualties in the
south.[55] However, the types of
contamination and their impact vary significantly between the regions. The
Kurdish governorates, one of the most contaminated areas of the world with 1,428
affected communities,[56] contend
with thousands of tactical minefields on the borders with Iran and Turkey and
further contamination along the Green Line, the former frontline between Kurdish
forces and Saddam Hussein’s army, as well as UXO across all three
governorates.[57]
Southern-central governorates bordering Iran are also contaminated by
minefields, but many communities near the border are abandoned and cluster
munitions used by Coalition forces in their 2003 advance towards Baghdad are the
main source of recent casualties. Similarly, unexploded Coalition ground and
air ordnance, including rockets and cluster munitions, together with huge
quantities of ordnance abandoned by the Iraqi army, have been the major cause of
most recent casualties in the southern governorates of Basra, Thi Qar and
Missan.[58]
The south also contends with old minefields along its borders with Iran and
some newer mines laid by Saddam Hussein’s army before the 2003 Coalition
invasion in al-Muthanna governorate along the border with Saudi Arabia.
Combined, they have caused half the total casualties recorded by the survey. In
contrast, the southernmost Al Fao peninsula is highly contaminated by mines but
communities there live by fishing, not by raising crops or herding livestock,
and have not sustained any recorded mine
casualties.[59]
Mine Action Program
National Mine Action Authority: The Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA) set up the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) in July 2003, exercising
its mandate under UN Resolution 1483 and positioning it within the Ministry of
Planning and Development Cooperation. The NMAA was given responsibility for
planning, coordinating and managing the budget for mine action and for donor
relations. It was also made responsible for setting national mine action
standards and maintaining a national database.
The NMAA has four main divisions: Administration, Public Affairs, Legal and
Technical (which includes departments for planning, operations, mine awareness,
victim assistance, computer and
training).[60] An interministerial
coordination and cooperation committee was set up including representatives of
the ministries of oil, industry, electricity, human rights, culture, education,
environment, health, interior and defense to ensure mine action was coordinated
with broader development priorities.[61] The committee had little scope to act, however, pending the formation of a
new government to set the policy direction. A technical coordination meeting
took place in June 2006; further monthly meetings were
planned.[62]
Political turbulence and the unpredictable security situation in Iraq have
constrained development of the NMAA and mine action. In this environment, mine
action has not been a government
priority.[63] The first director
general of the NMAA, Siraj Barzani, resigned in June 2004 and in July 2004 took
over as director of the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Center in Erbil. His
successor, Moaid Saber Al-Alatrakche, was reportedly dismissed by the government
in October 2005 and replaced by Hyder Al-Mosawi, its third director in little
more than two years.[64] In July
2006, Iraq’s Integrity Authority announced that the NMAA Director General
Al-Mosawi and Technical Director Hayder Al Wardi were under investigation for
corruption and that the former Director General Al-Alatrakche was “on the
run.”[65]
As of June 2006, Iraq’s new Minister of Planning and Development
Cooperation, Ali Khalib Baban, had ordered a review of the NMAA’s
structure and role.[66] Among the
options for the NMAA under discussion in 2006 were to keep it in the Ministry of
Planning but reporting directly to the minister rather than to the deputy
minister for technical affairs, or to move it to the Prime Minister’s
Office, the Ministry of Defense or the Ministry of
Interior.[67]
The NMAA is supported by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) through the UN
Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) and by the US Department of State’s
Humanitarian Mine Action in Counterinsurgency–Iraq (HMAC-I) Program. UNDP
support focuses on developing national management capacity and establishing
sustainable operational mine action capacity in
Iraq.[68] Deteriorating security
led UNDP to relocate its mine action support for Iraq from Baghdad to the
Jordanian capital Amman in 2003 and to Cyprus in 2005 before returning to Amman
in January 2006. Two Amman-based mine action advisors continue to provide
technical advice to the NMAA and the regional mine action centers (RMACs). UNDP
also provided the team leader for the ILIS through Vietnam Veterans of America
Foundation (VVAF). In March 2006, UNDP deployed a full-time national technical
advisor to Iraqi Kurdistan and as of June 2006 considered providing an
international policy advisor to the NMAA in
Baghdad.[69]
Under HMAC-I, RONCO Consulting Corporation, under contract to the US
Department of State (DoS), provided 13 technical advisors to Iraq in 2005, but
subsequently reduced the number as a result of funding constraints in the
DoS.[70] As of June 2006, four
RONCO staff were assigned to work with the NMAA in Baghdad. A senior technical
advisor was assigned to the NMAA’s Regional Mine Action Center-South.
RONCO’s three other technical advisors worked with the Iraq Mine UXO
Clearance Organization.[71]
Mine Action Centers: Three mine action centers were set up under the
NMAA: the Iraq Mine Action Center (IMAC) based in the capital and responsible
for overseeing mine action in the Baghdad area, a Regional Mine Action
Center-North, headquartered in Erbil, and another RMAC-South, based in Basra.
The RMACs’ responsibilities included coordinating mine action in their
operating areas, collecting and analyzing data, preparing plans and assigning
clearance tasks, and monitoring quality
assurance.[72]
In 2004, the Kurdish regional government took over responsibility for mine
action in the three Kurdish governorates of Erbil, Dohuk and Sulaymaniyah and
RMAC-North was reformed in November 2004 as the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action
Center (IKMAC) based in Erbil.[73] IKMAC took over management of mine action in Erbil and Dohuk governorates
and engaged many of the staff who had formerly worked in the mine action program
managed by the UN Office of Project Services (UNOPS) until November 2003 when it
was handed over to the CPA or four local NGOs that were active in
2004.[74] At the same time, Kurdish
authorities set up the General Directorate for Mine Action (GDMA) to manage mine
action in Sulaymaniyah
governorate.[75]
IMAC did not become operational because the previous director general decided
to merge the structure within the NMAA. Plans to establish two more RMACs in
Mosul, covering northern-central governorates, and in Hilla, covering the
southern-central governorates, were not implemented because of the high level of
insecurity in those areas.[76] RMAC-South was based in Basra covering the governorates of Basra,
al-Muthanna, Thi Qar and Missan; as of June 2006, it had a total staff of nine
including a senior technical advisor from RONCO, and was coordinating the
demining and EOD operators working in the
area.[77]
National mine action legislation and standards: The NMAA drafted a
concept law intended to provide a legal framework for mine action and submitted
it to the Planning Minister in 2005. The draft law clarified the roles of mine
action entities and provided for the establishment of an interministerial
council intended to strengthen the coordination of mine action with the work of
other government ministries. The draft law was reportedly under legal review
as of June 2006.[78]
The NMAA also drafted 29 national mine action standards based on
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) which, as of June 2006, were awaiting
ministerial approval.[79]
The Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation approved regulations
governing accreditation of mine action operators in 2005. Four organizations
received accreditation in 2005, but these were suspended “due to legal
requirements.” The NMAA started applying the new regulations in January
2006 but suspended them again pending the formation of a new government. In
mid-2006, the NMAA resumed reviewing applications for accreditation and as of
June was considering six
applications.[80]
Strategic Planning and Progress
The momentum developed in mine action in 2003-2004 with the creation of new
institutions and programs stalled in 2005. Further development of mine action
institutions and enabling regulations halted amid political uncertainty pending
the December 2005 election; the protracted formation of a new government and
deteriorating security severely constrained progress in clearing mines and
ERW.[81]
In October 2004, the NMAA adopted the Vision 2020 Strategic Plan for Mine
Action 2004-2020 that aimed to “effectively eliminate and control the
impact of landmines and UXO on Iraqi
society.”[82] By February
2006, the NMAA was no longer actively pursuing the
plan.[83]
In Vision 2020, the NMAA anticipated that mine action needed $355 million
funding for the period from 2004 to
2008,[84] but against the background
of political uncertainty and the insurgency the NMAA was able to spend only a
small proportion of the funds reportedly available from the national budget for
mine action. In 2005, the Iraqi government’s budget for demining was $20
million but most of the budget was returned to the Ministry of Finance
unused.[85] The government
earmarked 17 percent or $3 million of the budget for demining operations under
the Kurdish Regional Government.[86] Actual expenditure by the NMAA in that year was estimated at about $1
million.[87]
The NMAA reported that it had achieved about “five percent” of
its targets in 2005 as a result of constraints on mine action resulting from the
insurgency and the lack of legislation formalizing its
status.[88] Achievements included
capacity-building through attendance at training courses and workshops by some
NMAA staff and improved coordination with some ministries. Goals it had not
been able to achieve included increasing Iraq’s mine clearance and battle
area clearance capacity, accelerating the pace of demining, reducing
mine/UXO-related casualties, strengthening RMACs, putting in place a system for
destroying stockpiles and setting up training
centers.[89]
In 2006, the NMAA reported the budget available from the government had been
reduced to $15 million because it had not fulfilled the objectives of the
previous year. The NMAA identified its priorities in 2006 as: persuading the
government to enact legislation formalizing the NMAA’s status and role;
increasing coordination with other government departments and integrating mine
action into broader economic and social development planning; developing a
database for mine action; improving the skills of NMAA staff; increasing the
amount of land cleared of mines and UXO and returned to productive use; and
increasing public awareness of the dangers of mines and
UXO.[90]
The NMAA, however, had not formulated a plan of specific projects to be
implemented under the 2006 budget.[91] Government investigations into bureaucratic corruption and attempts to
regulate expenditure also appeared to inhibit the NMAA’s willingness to
authorize any expenditure, according to sources in the Iraqi demining
community.[92] A 2006 workplan was
drafted for the NMAA by UNDP with a mine action budget of $45.1 million, but due
to political uncertainties pending the formation of a new government the plan
was not activated. [93]
Iraq and Iran agreed to set up joint committees to work together on security
issues, including clearing mined areas on their common border, according to
Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani after talks in Tehran in July 2005 with
the Defense Minister in the Iraqi Transitional Government, Saadoun
al-Dulaimi.[94] The two countries
signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 12 December 2005 in which they agreed to
provide documentation and maps of contaminated areas, to set up a bilateral
committee to oversee demining activities (to involve the national capacities of
both countries and international capacities to implement clearance activities)
and to open border crossings.[95]
Demining
In 2005, most of Iraq’s mine and UXO clearance capacity continued to be
concentrated in northern Iraq. IKMAC managed, planned and coordinated demining
in the Kurdish governorates of Erbil and Dohuk, and by the end of 2005 also
employed nearly 800 operations staff in 61 mine action
teams.[96] In Sulaymaniyah
governorate, GDMA performed a management role, coordinating and tasking mine
action, including issuing contracts for clearance to commercial
companies.[97] Two international
NGOs were also engaged in mine action in the north: Mines Advisory Group, one of
the biggest demining operators in Iraq, works in all three Kurdish governorates
as well as Kirkuk and Ninewah, where it is the only demining agency active; and
Norwegian People’s Aid, present in the country since 1995, worked in
Sulaymaniyah and Khanqin district of Diyala, and is the only demining agency
working in that governorate.
In 2005, demining and EOD operations in central and southern Iraq were
severely restricted by donor funding shortages and by the deterioration in
security, which prompted some organizations to leave the country. As a result
of the conflict, no humanitarian demining took place in 2005 in the
northern-central governorate of Tikrit or the large western governorate of
Anbar.[98] Limited demining and EOD
took place in the southern governorates of Basra, al-Muthanna and Thi Qar.
Iraq Mine UXO Clearance Organization (IMCO), set up in 2003 as a national NGO
with financial support from the US Department of State and training from RONCO,
has operated in many parts of Iraq. It initially undertook humanitarian mine
clearance and EOD but in 2005, as security deteriorated, it shifted more to
clearance around infrastructure, operating with protection provided by the Iraqi
army.[99]
The German NGO HELP conducted EOD in Baghdad. The remaining NGOs active in
mine action, Danish Demining Group and INTERSOS, worked from the southern city
of Basra. INTERSOS, after a 17-month suspension of activities prompted by the
security situation, resumed operations in September 2005 in the southern
governorates of Basra, Nassiriya and Thi Qar, but ceased work again on 31 May
2006 because a minimum level of security did not exist for international
staff.[100]
MineTech International, present in Iraq since 2003, continued working in the
first half of 2005 on a project in which it had trained and equipped 15 national
EOD/battle area clearance teams. At that time, these represented half the
clearance capacity in the south. The project was terminated in June 2005 due to
lack of donor funding and the teams were laid off; efforts to find donor support
to revive these teams proved
unsuccessful.[101]
An Iraqi commercial company, Al Doha, also emerged as an operator in 2005
when it was awarded a contract by the Ministry of Industry and Minerals to clear
land near Fallujah, but the project was not completed because of the security
situation. No other Iraqi NGOs or commercial organizations were engaged in mine
or UXO clearance in central or southern Iraq in 2005 or the first half of
2006.[102]
RONCO, under a contract with the Multi-National Security Transition
Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), trained Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police Bomb Disposal Units
in EOD and IED disposal (IEDD), to respond to threats imposed by insurgents and
terrorists. In 2005, under RONCO’s first contract with MNSTC-I through
the US Department of State, the Bomb Disposal School graduated 350 students,
making up six Iraqi Army Bomb Disposal Companies, trained in EOD Levels 2 and 3.
RONCO employs IMCO instructors at the school, who were originally trained by
RONCO. In December 2005, RONCO augmented its training facilities and staff
under a new contract to conduct both EOD and IEDD, and also to conduct EOD/IEDD
instructor training at the
school.[103]
Destruction of abandoned ordnance and munitions stockpiles continued under
the three-year-old Coalition Munitions Clearance Program, managed by the US Army
Corps of Engineers and employing multiple contractors. These included
ArmorGroup, which supported stockpile destruction under a contract that ran from
July 2004 to the end of February 2006. It also undertook two contracts with
explosives dog detection teams providing site entry point security and response
services to potential EOD
threats.[104]
Mine and ERW Surveys
A number of surveys of mine/ERW contamination in Iraq were undertaken before
and since the start of the present conflict. These included a Mines Advisory
Group (MAG) impact and technical survey in all Kurdish areas above the green
line from 1992, an impact survey in the three Kurdish governorates by UNOPS in
2002, an emergency survey undertaken by VVAF, MAG and MineTech for UN Mine
Action Service (UNMAS) and UNOPS from June 2003 to February
2004.[105]
The Iraq Landmine Impact Survey, the first comprehensive national survey of
mine/UXO contamination, started in 2004, working from two regional bases in
Erbil in the north from June 2004, and Basra in the south from August
2004.[106] By the end of April
2006, the ILIS had completed surveying 13 of Iraq’s 18 governorates and it
expected to complete the remainder of Iraq by August 2006, with the exception of
areas that could not be accessed due to
insecurity.[107]
Eight Kurdish data collection teams completed surveys of Dohuk, Erbil and
Sulaymaniyah, four Kurdish and four Arab teams surveyed Kirkuk, and eight Arab
teams completed surveys of the four southernmost governorates (Basra,
al-Muthanna, Thi Qar and Missan) by the end of May 2005. Survey of the five
other governorates south of Baghdad (Karbala, Najaf, al-Qadisiyah, Hilla and
Wasit) was completed by April 2006. As of mid-May 2006, three Arab teams were
surveying Tikrit, three more were working in Diyala and recruitment was underway
of four Arab teams to survey Mosul. However, survey operations in the Sunni
areas were suspended in late May due to
insecurity.[108]
By the end of April 2006, the ILIS had documented 12,883 communities and
visited 12,003 of them, locating 4,270 SHAs and “spot” UXO hazards,
affecting an estimated 1,718 square kilometers of
land.[109] The survey identified
2,117 communities affected by landmines or ERW and recorded 577 recent
casualties. Of these, 244 affected communities were not surveyed as their only
SHAs were shared with other communities. Limited, visible UXO contamination was
recorded in spot UXO reports in 251 communities, some of which were also
surveyed, but not all.[110] According to the ILIS, the contamination it recorded understates the real
extent of the problem, especially in the south, because of inhabitants’
suspicion of surveyors and reluctance to disclose
information.[111]
In the three Kurdish governorates, the ILIS found the heaviest contamination
but the lowest level of casualties. It reported 3,024 SHAs and 1,126 affected
communities in these governorates, half of which were in Sulaymaniyah
governorate. They accounted for more than half the total number of affected
communities and 71 percent of the SHAs found in the 13 governorates surveyed so
far. Yet the number of recent casualties was recorded as 159 (including 60
people killed), little more than a quarter of total recorded casualties. The
total area covered by SHAs was estimated at 776 square
kilometers.[112]
Casualties were heaviest in the southern four governorates, where much of the
contamination was more recent and communities had less knowledge particularly of
the dangers posed by mines and ERW from the latest
conflict.[113] Although the
number of affected communities and SHAs was smaller in the south, at 335 and 399
respectively, they recorded 307 recent casualties (including 116 people killed),
more than half the total casualties so
far.[114] The contaminated area
was estimated at 854.5 square kilometers in the four southern governorates,
where 90 percent of SHAs blocked the use of
pasture.[115]
In the five south-central governorates, the ILIS identified 118 affected
communities and 125 SHAs, and recorded 99 recent victims, including 46 people
killed. The total contaminated area was estimated at 87.6 square
kilometers.[116]
The ILIS re-survey of the Kurdish governorates found 330 mine-affected
communities that were not in the IKMAC database, which was based on results of
the 2002 UNOPS survey. Many of these were along the Turkish border in areas
never previously visited by survey or mine action teams. Of 5,029 communities
visited by ILIS teams in the three governorates, 541 said they were no longer
contaminated, including 139 still reportedly listed as contaminated in the IKMAC
database. Another 88 communities reported as contaminated in the database were
found to be abandoned.[117]
Despite the hazardous environment created by the present conflict, by the end
of April 2006 ILIS teams had completed the survey of every district and
subdistrict of 13 governorates, except for two districts in Hilla governorate,
close to Baghdad, and 346 communities, where access was not possible due to lack
of security or because they were too remote. With these exceptions, the areas
completed constituted the entirety of three of the NMAA’s four mine action
regions, plus Kirkuk governorate, part of the fourth, northern-central region.
By June 2006, it was apparent the ILIS would not be able to complete the survey
of this region, which included Iraq’s most highly conflicted and
Sunni-dominated governorates of Tikrit, Diyala, Mosul and
Anbar.[118]
Working closely with local authorities and adapting their approach to local
environments, survey teams completed the first three governorates without
encountering specific threats to their security or sustaining injury. However,
in May 2006, an ILIS team leader working in Tikrit governorate was injured at a
roadblock set up by Coalition forces when an IED being defused by US soldiers
exploded. The survey of Tikrit and Diyala governorates was suspended in mid-May
2006. By then, ILIS teams had already visited nearly 100 villages in these
governorates. Although teams said the reception in every village was welcoming,
the survey determined that the travel required to conduct the survey was too
dangerous, as the roads were the main focus of conflict between Coalition forces
and insurgents. As of mid-June, the ILIS management remained committed to
surveying Tikrit, Diyala and Mosul if security permitted, but it was doubtful
that it would be possible to survey contaminated areas of
Anbar.[119]
Mine and ERW Clearance
Demining in Iraq in 2005 suffered disruption as a result of political
uncertainties and funding problems as well as from the hazardous security
environment outside the three Kurdish governorates. The NMAA reported that 24.2
square kilometers of land was cleared of mines and/or ERW in 2005, little more
than one-third of the 61.4 square kilometers it reported cleared in
2004.[120] Data compiled by
Landmine Monitor from information provided by operators showed a total of just
over 25 square kilometers cleared or area reduced.
Area (square meters) Cleared and Mines/ERW Destroyed in Iraq in
2005[121]
In northern Iraq, IKMAC operated 28 manual clearance teams, three EOD teams,
three survey teams, seven mine detection dog teams with two dogs each, and
mechanical assets that included an excavator and four Bozena mini-flails. It
also had 10 supervisors, six internal and eight external quality assurance
monitors and operated eight mine risk education teams. IKMAC began demining
operations at the end of May 2005, and in the remaining seven months cleared
533,273 square meters of land and cancelled 1,972,000 square meters. IKMAC
reported that casualties in the north are falling and as a result its clearance
priorities are now shifting from purely humanitarian tasks towards projects that
support economic growth. Accordingly, operations in 2005 mostly supported
Kurdish Regional Government development projects, including laying powerlines,
water and sanitation projects, building communications towers, irrigation
canals, and land needed for crops and tourist
sites.[124]
Demining operations in Sulaymaniyah tasked directly by GDMA started from 20
July when a new system of competitive tendering for clearance contracts came
into effect. By the end of 2005, it reported total clearance by contractors of
309,160 square meters, much of it mechanical clearance. GDMA, responding to
clearance requests from ministries, gave priority to infrastructure-related
tasks, followed by clearance of minefields identified by the database as having
the most impact on the population. Tasks are added to its priority list after
assessment by a general survey team, and then submitted for technical survey
prior to clearance.[125]
Among the contractors working for GDMA, Khabat Zangana, which was set up in
1998, designs and produces demining machines; it employs 79 people split between
two manual teams and four mechanical teams. These operate with a range of
clearance assets, including flails, an armored bulldozer, front-end loaders,
excavators and vibrating sifters. In 2005, Khabat started operations in August
and reported clearing 141,739 square meters of land by the end of the
year.[126]
Of the two international NGOs operating in northern Iraq, Mines Advisory
Group employed a 593 staff as of June 2006 (373 operational), with mechanical
assets and mine detection dogs.[127] In 2005, MAG deployed 21 multipurpose mine action teams, 12 based in
Sulaymaniyah and nine in Erbil, some of which worked part of the time in Dohuk.
The teams undertook manual, mechanical and battle area clearance, as well as
conducting survey and EOD. MAG also operated 10 combined community liaison and
mine risk education teams which undertook impact surveys and helped identify
clearance tasks. These were coordinated with IKMAC and
GDMA.[128]
MAG manually cleared 1,245,925 square meters of mined land in 2005, visually
checked a further 2,292,327 square meters, and mechanically verified 1,638,674
square meters. It also manually searched 484,300 square meters of battlefield
and visually checked 2,084,500 square meters. In the process, it destroyed
5,452 antipersonnel mines and 26,978 items of
UXO.[129]
MAG also undertook two training programs, in humanitarian demining and in
EOD. Under the first program, from March 2005, MAG trained 54 personnel from an
engineering company of the 4th Division, 2nd Brigade, Iraqi National Guard
engineering company, in humanitarian demining according to IMAS. This included
on-the-job training clearing mined land in Sulaymaniyah. Under the second
program, conducted from October 2005 to l March 2006, MAG provided EOD training
and equipment to personnel assigned by Dohuk governorate administration to set
up a regional unit to respond to EOD
tasks.[130]
Norwegian People’s Aid, which started work in northern Iraq in 1995,
had a total staff of 121, undertaking manual clearance supported by mechanical
assets, EOD and mine risk education. NPA’s teams were deployed mostly in
the Sharbazher and Halabja districts of northern Sulaymaniyah governorate but it
also had a 10-person team in Khanqin district of Diyala, where it was the only
demining agency active. In 2005, NPA cleared 11 minefields covering 262,915
square meters of land, destroying 1,241 mines (including two antivehicle mines)
and 513 items of UXO.[131]
In Baghdad, HELP undertook battle area clearance of UXO with a 43-person
Iraqi EOD team managed by two Amman-based international staff, working on tasks
received from the NMAA.[132]
IMCO had 13 teams equipped for manual mine clearance, battle area clearance
and EOD, and 11 dog teams trained in mine and submunition detection, which are
used for area reduction and quality assurance. It also had an operations team
undertaking reconnaissance, planning and setting up sites for clearance. IMCO
additionally runs training centers in Baghdad and Basra with 30 instructors
providing training in mine clearance and EOD to the Iraqi army and police and
Iraqi staff recruited by international
organizations.[133] From the
start of its operations in 2004 until 15 May 2006, IMCO reported having cleared
a total 10.5 square kilometers of land and over 137,000 mines and UXO. Its
tasks ranged from clearing 7,205 square meters of farmland to clearing a million
square meters of land around the Rumaila oilfields and 3,965,800 square meters
at Al-Zubair in Basra
governorate.[134]
In southern Iraq, Danish Demining Group, funded by the Danish government and
UNDP, operated in Basra governorate with five EOD teams, each with five
operators, and five battle area clearance teams of 10 operators each, with
support staff. Tasks, selected on the basis of information received from local
communities by DDG’s operations and mine risk education teams, have
concentrated on freeing agricultural
land.[135]
The Italian demining agency INTERSOS returned to southern Iraq in September
after a 17-month suspension to resume work building up local NGO capacity to
manage and implement an EOD program. INTERSOS was working with 32 staff in four
EOD teams in the area of Nassiriya (Thi-Qar
governorate).[136] No details of
its operating results were available.
MineTech International, working for UNOPS, trained 66 people in mine action,
including 15 team leaders, 36 EOD specialists and 15 medics. In the first half
of 2005, MineTech cleared 106,519 mines and UXO and recovered more than 6.5
million square meters of land before the project was terminated because of a
lack of donor funding.[137]
Demining Progress in 2006
Mine action increased momentum in northern Iraq in the first months of 2006
but in central and southern Iraq continued to be limited by the lack of
security; also, UNDP reported a lack of donor
support.[138] GDMA issued tenders
to clear 78 mined areas covering 1,649,677 square meters of
land.[139] In IKMAC’s area
of operations, demining operations started on 1 April and by the end of June had
completed clearance of five minefields on a total area of 116,092 square meters,
destroying 191 antipersonnel and antivehicle mines and 673 UXO. EOD/battle area
clearance teams checked a further 270,000 square meters of land, 18,588 square
meters were mechanically prepared and 3,400 square meters were permanently
marked.[140]
In 2006, MAG reconfigured its teams, deploying 10 teams in Sulaymaniyah, four
in Soran (Erbil governorate) and three in Dohuk, and attaching four smaller
teams to mechanical units to increase their operational flexibility. In the
first three months of the year, MAG manually cleared 202,554 square meters of
mined land and 483,600 square meters of battlefield. It also visually checked
36,408 square meters of mined land and 465,000 square meters of battle area.
Total items cleared included 370 antipersonnel mines and 2,676
UXO.[141] NPA also cleared 59,964
square meters of mined area and 6,300 square meters of battlefield area,
removing 111 antipersonnel mines and 177
UXO.[142]
In the south, DDG reorganized and strengthened its international team by
adding three more technical advisors. In the first six months of 2006, DDG
cleared 10,583,500 square meters of battle area and 43,370 items of UXO, more
than in the whole of 2005.[143] However, INTERSOS terminated its program at the end of May due to
insufficient security and the future of its four EOD teams remained
unclear.[144] Options under
discussion included transferring the teams to
DDG.[145]
In March 2006, the Coalition Munitions Clearance Program completed
destruction of 248 tons of munitions, its last major stockpile, including mines,
rocket-propelled grenades, hand grenades and larger
munitions.[146] However, in
January 2006 the US Corps of Engineers issued a three-year contract worth at
least $538.5 million to the US company, Tetra Tech ECI, to operate roving EOD
teams clearing surface and subsurface
UXO.[147]
Mine Risk Education
The NMAA is in charge of the overall coordination of mine risk education
(MRE) in Iraq. Organizations involved in 2005-2006 included the Iraqi Red
Crescent Society with support from the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) and local Iraqi NGOs such as the Iraqi Health and Social Care
Organization (IHSCO). Since January 2005, Mines Advisory Group, INTERSOS and
Danish Demining Group have been the only international NGOs implementing direct
MRE programming in Iraq, reaching a total of at least 85,000 people. UNICEF
Iraq continued technical and financial support through institutional
capacity-building on MRE, mine risk education in schools and communities, and
direct MRE for high-risk populations. It also initiated a victim surveillance
system.[148]
In 2006, UNICEF, in collaboration with the NMAA and the Geneva International
Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), organized a three-day workshop in
Amman (Jordan) on communicating MRE in Iraq. The workshop agreed upon a plan of
action for the remainder of 2006, elaborating the needs of the northern, central
and southern regions. Around 30 participants from the government, national and
international NGOs, and UN agencies
participated.[149] UNICEF planned
to recruit a consultant in June to review all the educational and training
materials used in Iraq, analyze gaps and relevance according to the needs of the
different target groups, and develop a complete package of MRE materials for
Iraq.
The NMAA ran a national media campaign, which included TV and radio spots.
The TV spots were broadcast on Sharquiyah, the national Iraqi television
station, and on the Arabic children’s channel; the radio spots were
awaiting broadcast on local
stations.[150]
In central Iraq, IHSCO provided MRE and data collection in six governorates
including Baghdad, Babel, Diyala, Karbala, Muthanna and Thiqar. IHSCO, whose
staff were trained by MAG and other organizations, provided MRE
training-of-trainers workshops to Ministry of Health officers who will then
train health workers from primary health care centers to provide MRE. IHSCO
regularly uses television and radio to disseminate safety messages. Its
activities are coordinated with MAG and
INTERSOS.[151]
In 2005, MAG made MRE presentations to over 43,000 people during over 3,700
visits. This included specific activities for targeted high-risk groups,
including nomads and shepherds, returning and static displaced people, refugees
and officials in refugee camps. MAG also conducted direct MRE for returnees to
heavily mined areas and, in the summer, to picnickers and those visiting family
members in mine-affected areas. It provided MRE training-of-trainers workshops
to teachers and international and national staff of various
organizations.[152]
MAG conducted community liaison and MRE in the north of Iraq with 10 teams of
two people (one male and one female). Six teams were based in the Erbil sector
(Erbil, Ninewah, Kirkuk and Dohuk governorates) and four are in Sulaymaniyah
sector (Sulaymaniyah, Diyala and Kirkuk
governorates).[153] The teams
collected information from villages about dangerous areas and their impact, and
forwarded the information for clearance operations. In 2006, this capacity was
cut to six teams to increase capacity for training and monitoring MRE programs
with the ministries of education and of religious affairs and
endowments.[154]
MAG continued erecting billboards informing of the dangers of mines and the
procedure for reporting suspected contaminated areas. In coordination with
local authorities, MAG has established reporting focal points in 22 locations
across the three northern governorates, and local authorities have been trained
to complete dangerous area forms. A village risk-taking form was piloted and
formally adopted by the NMAA in mid-2005 to provide more detailed information on
specific behavior, but also on mine/ERW
contamination.[155]
In 2005, MAG trained 1,500 teachers in 750 schools across the governorates of
Sulaymaniyah, Erbil, Dohuk and Diyala, reaching 22,000 pupils each year. The
MRE curriculum was updated and new exercises were introduced regarding safe
behavior and unusual items of UXO such as fuzes and capsules. In addition, 98
teacher trainers in five teacher training institutes in Sulaymaniyah and Diyala
were provided with the capacity to instruct trainees in MRE. In 2006, this
program was to be extended to Ninewah and Kirkuk for approximately 2,000
teachers from 1,000 schools, if security
permitted.[156]
MAG also trained members of the Women’s Union, 902 mullahs and 46
Christian clergy. A teaching aid based on verses from the Koran on personal
safety in general was developed in consultation with the Ministry of Religious
Affairs and Endowments, and distributed in Sorani and Arabic
languages.[157]
INTERSOS implemented two projects in the south, funded by UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and UNICEF. The project with UNHCR, which
started in 2003, continued in the transit center on the Iraq-Iran border and in
communities receiving most of the
returnees.[158] The INTERSOS team
(three women and one man) reached 2,242 returnees at the transit center, 758
spontaneous returnees at the Shalamshe border and 740 students from three
schools. Thirty-nine community volunteers (21 from Al Ammeryia area and 18 from
Bani Assad area) who had attended an MRE training-of- trainers spread MRE
messages to 2,700 people. Twenty-five members of the Civil Defense from 14
different locations provided MRE to another 6,000 to 7,000 people. INTERSOS
staff provided direct MRE sessions to an additional 3,000 people (farmers,
students and teachers) in mine/UXO-affected
villages.[159]
In November 2005, INTERSOS started a one-year MRE project supported by UNICEF
in three governorates of southern and central Iraq, which was expected to reach
10,000 women and children, establish a network of 160 MRE community volunteers,
and train 2,000 teachers in MRE in order to reach 300,000 primary and secondary
schoolchildren.[160] By April
2006, 28 local staff had been selected and trained, and three needs assessments
had been conducted.[161]
In 2005, ICRC continued its financial and technical support for the MRE
program of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society. MRE materials were distributed in
Fallujah and other areas affected by
violence.[162]
DDG performed MRE and community liaison with four three-member teams in
Al-Zubair district in Basra region, focusing on children. In 2005, 25,793
people (17,997 children and 7,796 adults) were reached in direct MRE sessions in
schools and house visits, with materials
distributed.[163]
Funding and Assistance
In 2005, a total of $27.8 million was donated by 14 countries for mine action
in Iraq, a decrease of over half from 2004 ($58.7 million donated by 13
countries).[164] The 2005 total
includes donations to NGOs and international agencies operating in Iraq, and
some in-kind contributions. Donors reporting funding in 2005 were:
Belgium: €490,180 ($610,225) to MAG for mine action in northern
Iraq;[165]
Denmark: DKK5 million ($833,987) to DDG for mine clearance and
MRE;[166]
Germany: €612,554 ($762,568) to HELP for demining and
capacity-building in Baghdad
region;[167]
Italy: €242,500 ($301,888) to UNDP for mine
action;[169]
Japan: ¥59,080,264 ($536,557) to UNMAS/UNDP for employment of Japanese
staff in mine action and for
capacity-building;[170]
Netherlands: €1,386,958 ($1,726,624), consisting of €386,958
($481,724) to HI for victim assistance, and €1 million ($1,244,900) to MAG
for mine clearance and
MRE;[171]
Norway: NOK6,500,000 ($1,009,129) to NPA for mine action in northern
Iraq;[172]
Slovakia: €4,882,000 ($6,077,602) as in-kind contribution of Slovak
Armed Forces for mine/UXO clearance with NATO in Operation Iraqi
Freedom;[173]
South Korea: $1 million to the UN Development Group (UNDG) Iraq Trust Fund
for demining operations;[174]
Spain: €129,000 ($160,592) for training Iraqi army in humanitarian
mine clearance;[175]
Sweden: SEK10 million ($1,338,509) to MAG for mine
clearance;[176]
Switzerland: CHF125,000 ($100,329) to NPA for mine
action;[177]
US: $11,840,000, consisting of $9 million through the Iraq Rehabilitation
and Relief Fund and $2,840,000 through the Department of
State.[178]
In addition, Adopt-A-Minefield reported funding of $54,002 to Assistance for
Marsh Arabs and Refugees (AMAR) to relocate essential staff to the Basra
Rehabilitation Clinic.[179]
VVAF provided NMAA with five technical advisors during 2005, including three
IMSMA technical advisors, through US Department of State and UNDP
funding.[180]
By far the most significant decrease in funding for 2005 was from the US,
which provided some $24 million less than in 2004 (a 67 percent reduction).
Other significant reductions came from Italy, which gave $3.4 million less (92
percent) than in 2004 and Denmark, which provided half of its 2004 donation. Of
the nine donor countries reporting funding for mine action in Iraq in both 2004
and 2005, seven countries provided less funding in 2005.
In February 2006, Greece contributed €1.9 million ($2,365,310) for mine
action in Iraq to the UNDG Iraq Trust Fund for demining operations through the
International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI); the funds had been
pledged in July 2005.[181]
Landmine/UXO Casualties
Landmine Monitor estimated, conservatively, that there were at least 358
landmine/UXO casualties in 2005, which is an increase compared to 2004
(estimated 261 casualties).[182] However, this is likely to be a considerable underestimate.
As of May 2006, there was no data collection mechanism for new mine/UXO/IED
casualties in Iraq. This was largely due to the security situation, a lack of
funds and capacity at the NMAA, frequent staff changes and the larger political
context in Iraq.[183] In
principle, the NMAA through the regional mine action centers is the collecting
and controlling body for landmine casualty data. A data-sharing system was
established in the second half of 2004 with all stakeholders, including the
Ministry of Health, and some information was handed over to the NMAA. However,
several sources told Landmine Monitor in 2006 that the system was not operating
and that there was very little coordination between authorities and
operators.[184] Although some
NMAA staff were trained in IMSMA and Epi.Info database software, the NMAA
did not have the capacity to collect data, or to enter, analyze and disseminate
data collected by others.[185] UNICEF, with facilitation from the US Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) organized several workshops with the aim of revitalizing data
collection efforts, which resulted in a draft unified common
“victim”
form.[186]
As of mid-2006, the only reliable information on casualties in Iraq was the
ILIS, but this does not reflect the total number of casualties, as it only
records casualties living in contaminated communities and does not record nomads
or displaced people.[187]
In Sulaymaniyah, the General Directorate for Mine Action receives casualty
data from mine action operators. GDMA reportedly records casualty data from its
14 first-aid posts, police stations, surgical centers and mine action operators.
GDMA worked on establishing a new casualty database and reviewing information on
previous casualties, as data was missed by UNOPS and lost in the data transfer.
GDMA has not collected data in IMSMA, using its own forms until the new form is
approved. In 2005, it recorded 34 new landmine casualties in Sulaymaniyah,
including five killed and 29 injured. All were civilians, including 10
children, 30 casualties were male and four female. However, this information
has not been exchanged between GDMA and the
NMAA.[188]
In Erbil and surrounding areas, 172 new mine/UXO casualties were reported to
IKMAC, mainly by the Diana Prosthetic Limbs Center (DPLC) in Erbil and the
Prosthetic Limbs and Rehabilitation Center (PLCD) in
Dohuk.[189]
During its operations in northern Iraq, MAG recorded 68 new mine/UXO
casualties in 2005, even though this is not the focus of their
activities.[190] This is a small
decrease compared to 72 new mine/UXO casualties reported by MAG in
2004.[191]
Until May 2005, the Italian NGO Emergency recorded the mine/UXO casualties
who came to their surgical centers in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah; in May the
hospitals were handed over to the Ministry of Health in Kurdish Iraq. From
January to April, the centers admitted 16 mine casualties and 43 UXO casualties
in Erbil, and 16 mine casualties and 47 UXO casualties in Sulaymaniyah as of the
end of April. In 2004, Emergency recorded 140 new mine/UXO casualties,
including 48 people killed and 92 injured, in 112 incidents in Erbil (30) and
Sulaymaniyah (82).[192] Statistics were not available after April 2005.
The Iraqi Health and Social Care Organization, founded in June 2004, set up a
war victim surveillance system in mid-2004, with technical support from external
experts.[193] Due to technical,
security and staff capacity issues, the information collected relating to 2005
was not considered to be “technically reliable enough” to use.
However, in the second half of 2005 staff were trained, the new uniform victim
form was adopted in February 2006, and the “new case” definition was
restricted to mine/UXO casualties after March 2003. The initial focus of IHSCO
casualty data collection was retroactive to fill the gap since March 2003 in six
governorates (Baghdad, Karbala, al-Muthanna, Babel, Thi Qar and Diyala) to
facilitate planning of mine action activities, including victim assistance.
IHSCO gathers information through 28 field officers and coordinating community
visits, Ministry of Health hospitals and rehabilitation centers. Between March
and May 2006, IHSCO gathered approximately 160 forms according to the new case
definition; around 90 records have been entered into the
database.[194] Preliminary
analysis of the 90 casualties recorded between March 2003 and May 2006 showed
that 56 people were killed and 32 were injured (2 unknown); 78 were male and 12
female. At least 16 casualties occurred in 2006 and eight in 2005. Eleven
casualties were caused by antipersonnel mines, one by an antivehicle mine, 75 by
cluster munitions and three unknown. Children between 10 and 19 years are the
largest casualty group (28 casualties; two girls and 26 boys), followed by
people between 20 and 29 years (24; four women and 20 men), and children between
one and nine years (12; two girls and 10 boys). Most casualties occurred in
Baghdad (26), Thi Qar (17), Karbala (16), al-Muthanna (15), Diyala (10) and
Babel (six). The major activities at the time of the incidents included
farming, herding, traveling on foot and playing; others were scrap trade,
military activity, self clearance and traveling in a
vehicle.[195]
In 2005, Landmine Monitor identified at least 115 new mine/UXO casualties
reported in the media, including 67 killed and 48 injured; most of the
casualties reported were foreign military and demining casualties (67) mainly
from the US, but also from the UK, Georgia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and South
Africa.[196] In 2005, seven US
soldiers were killed and at least 19 injured by mines in Iraq; four soldiers
were killed by UXO.[197] In 2005,
the CNN US Forces and Coalition Casualties database counted 12 soldiers killed
by landmines in Iraq. These figures are a large increase from 2004, when
landmines killed at least two US military personnel and injured
18.[198]
Landmine Monitor believes the actual number of mine/UXO casualties to be much
higher, as media reports do not accurately distinguish between landmine and IED
incidents and increasingly refer to IED casualties instead of mine/UXO
casualties. Media do not report on all the conflict casualties occurring daily
in Iraq, and focus on foreigners rather than on Iraqis. On 26 April, seven
family members, including one child, were injured when their car drove over a
landmine in Al-Dujayl. On 6 July, in Basra, two children aged four and six
years, were killed in a cluster bomblet
explosion.[199] Foreign civilians
have also suffered landmine casualties. In April, a Turkish truck driver was
killed by a roadside mine.[200] One engineer from the Philippines was killed and two of his compatriots
killed in August when their car drove over a landmine near
Baghdad.[201]
The Iraq Body Count identified 389 civilian UXO casualties in Iraq between
March 2003 and March 2005, the vast majority being unexploded cluster munitions,
killing mostly children.[202]
In Greece, on 4 April, an Iraqi migrant was injured by a mine in the Evros
minefields bordering
Turkey.[203]
Many more casualties resulted from IEDs, most of which appeared to be
command-detonated, but some of which were victim-activated and therefore de
facto antipersonnel mines. IEDs have been the main cause of death and
injury among US soldiers.[204] In
2005, 445 US military personnel were killed by attacks involving IEDs according
to US Department of Defense casualty reports. Of those, 32 were the result of
vehicle-born IED attacks.[205] Media reported that, as of the end of April 2006, there had been 781 fatal
IED casualties among US soldiers since the beginning of the war. Since
mid-2005, a monthly average of 40 fatal IED casualties per month was recorded.
Reportedly, IEDs are responsible for 57 percent of the 17,800 injuries suffered
by US soldiers. In 2005, the military counted 10,593 IED incidents (compared to
5,607 in 2004).[206] In December
2005, a Newsweek journalist was injured in an IED incident near
Fallujah.[207]
Casualties continued to be reported in 2006. GDMA in Sulaymaniyah recorded
12 casualties until 15 May 2006, including four killed and eight
injured.[208] MAG recorded 15 new
mine/UXO casualties until 22 May
2006.[209] In the southern and
central parts of Iraq, IHSCO recorded at least 16 casualties occurring by 1 May
2006.[210]
Media reports included a shepherd killed near Kirkuk in March, after stepping
on a cluster bomblet from the 2003
war.[211] In May 2006, an Indian
civilian was killed by a landmine on the Iraq-Kuwait
border.[212] On 28 April 2006, at
least four people, including one child, were killed and nine, including five
children, were injured in four separate IED
incidents.[213] Foreign military
personnel have suffered landmine casualties. In March, five US soldiers were
killed and two injured when their vehicle hit a landmine near
Habbaniyah.[214] In May, a marine
was killed when his vehicle hit a landmine south of
Fallujah.[215]
Between 1 January and 31 May 2006, seven US military personnel were killed in
vehicle-born IED incidents in Iraq; including these, 137 US military personnel
died as the result of IED attacks during this time
period.[216]
Based on the limited information available, it would appear that there has
been a considerable decrease in landmine/UXO casualties compared to 2003, when a
significant spike in casualties was reported in the aftermath of major
hostilities. At least 2,191 new mine/UXO casualties were recorded in 2003,
including at least 149 people killed and 1,089 injured; the status of 953
casualties was not
reported.[217] At the First Review Conference in November-December 2004, Iraq stated that
“tens of people per day get hurt because of mines; on top of that people
get hurt by mines used in terrorist
acts.”[218] This would
indicate more than 7,000 casualties per year. However, this information was not
deemed to be credible, as at least the Kurdish areas of Iraq have seen a
“massive reduction in casualties since 2003, this is due to a number of
reasons, such as increased knowledge of the local people, reduced access to
hazards, and reduced population
movements.”[219] Analysis
of limited data collected by MAG, IHSCO and from media, indicates that casualty
rates indeed seem significantly lower than the number recorded in 2003; however,
casualties seemed to be increasing in 2005 from 2004 levels.
The total number of mine casualties over the years in Iraq is not known. MAG
recorded at least 8,037 in northern Iraq since
1993.[220 ]
VVAF’s ongoing Iraq Landmine Impact Survey is expected to provide more
information than previously available. As of May 2006, the ILIS had recorded
565 “recent” casualties in the three northern governorates (159),
southern-central region (99), and four southern governorates (307); at least 217
people were killed and 348
injured.[221] Survey in the
northern-central region was ongoing in 2006 and is not included in the totals;
as of 1 May 2006, 43 recent casualties were recorded in this
region.[222]
Only four of the recent casualties were military (0.7 percent), 58 were
females (10.3 percent), most casualties were aged 15-29 years (258 or 45.7
percent) followed by children between five and 14 years (135 or 23.9 percent).
More than 80 percent of people were injured or killed while carrying out
livelihood activities (including 2.3 percent in the scrap metal trade), 50.3
percent were herding (284) and 109 farming (19.3 percent); playing caused 7.6
percent of casualties (43) and tampering 4.8 percent (27). Unemployment after
the incident was high at 44.2 percent. Families’ main income-earners made
up 43.9 percent of casualties.[223] Of the recent casualties, 51 percent were caused by mines, 17 percent by
cluster munitions and 24 percent by other
UXO/AXO.[224]
The ILIS also recorded 7,631 “less recent”
casualties.[225] In the southern
governorates, 1,929 less recent casualties were recorded, including 602 people
killed and 1,327 injured; the majority (362 killed and 1,136 injured) were
recorded in Basra.[226] In the
northern governorates, 5,552 were recorded, including 2,443 people killed and
3,109 injured; Sulaymaniyah recorded 3,964 casualties, Erbil (939 casualties)
and Dohuk (649).[227] In the
southern-central region, 150 less recent casualties were recorded (80 killed and
70 injured).[228]
Efforts were undertaken to revitalize and strengthen data collection capacity
in Iraq. UNICEF, in coordination with UNDP, ICRC and the World Health
Organization (WHO), has worked to establish a national casualty surveillance
system and database; WHO in collaboration with the Ministry of Health
worked to integrate the core questions on mine casualties in the disability and
the war injury surveillance systems.
The Ministry of Health has registered 43,600 war-injured with a disability of
60 percent or more prior to 2003, and approximately 80,000 amputees of whom some
75 to 85 percent reportedly were caused by mines or
UXO.[229] There is some ongoing
data collection of war casualties but this does not distinguish the device that
caused the casualty and includes people injured by IEDs and
bullets.[230]
Survivor Assistance
Iraq’s national mine action strategy to 2009 is said to include
survivor assistance.[231] The
NMAA’s victim assistance objectives were reported as: “assess
existing victim support capacities and develop additional capacity if
required” and “establish a nationwide victim surveillance system and
map existing victims.”[232] However, various actors repeat that Iraq does not have survivor
assistance activities in its national mine action program due to the political
and security context, even though the assistance program in the Kurdish part of
Iraq is functioning well “considering the
circumstances.”[233] At
central level, no money from the NMAA budget has been spent on victim assistance
in 2006.[234] Activities at the
NMAA have been delayed by possible staff changes in the wake of the December
2005 elections and uncertainty about whether the NMAA will remain under the
Ministry of Planning. Coordination between the Ministry of Health and the NMAA
has not progressed as planned; NMAA staff have not proactively engaged in victim
assistance planning.[235] There
are national victim assistance officers in Erbil (IKMAC), Sulaymaniyah (GDMA)
and Basra (RMAC), and one at the central level at the NMAA; however, only in the
north were assistance activities actually being
implemented.[236] In 2005-2006,
there was no coordination between the NMAA and the northern areas; additionally
the NMAA stated that it does not have executive authority, only a supervisory
capacity.[237]
The UN mine action strategy has focused on re-establishing cooperation
between mine action centers, capacity-building and technical advice to the NMAA
and the regional centers, which have the responsibility to coordinate survivor
assistance with implementing partners such as relevant ministries and NGOs. In
November 2005, a technical advisor filled the gap left by the previous advisor
in May 2005, but by May 2006 the position (funded by UNDP through VVAF) was
vacant again, with no immediate replacement
expected.[238]
Since the December 2005 elections and the subsequent unified government in
Kurdish Iraq, progress has been made in reinforcing government capacity to
provide survivor assistance. Shared responsibility between the Ministry of
Health and the Ministry of Social Affairs was agreed in principle to start in
2007. The Ministry of Health will support the medical and physical
rehabilitation components, whereas the Ministry of Social Affairs will be in
charge of the socioeconomic services provided in the nationalized rehabilitation
centers, as well as having overall financial responsibility. A body unifying
GDMA and IKMAC, preferably under the Council of Ministers will carry out
monitoring of the services, as well as advocacy for resource mobilization. In
March-April 2006, a mine action needs assessment including a small victim
assistance component was carried out in northern Iraq by a UNDP-contracted VVAF
staff member; this was expected to identify the training needs at IKMAC and
GDMA, and plan capacity-building. The results of this assessment have not been
released.[239]
The health system in Iraq was once among the best in the Middle East, but
more than a decade of economic sanctions and ongoing conflict reduced it to a
state of disrepair: poor quality services, lack of management capacity,
equipment and medicines, degraded or disrupted electricity supplies, sanitation
and communications, and particular neglect of rural and poor areas. The current
security situation in the central and southern regions prevents people from
reaching hospitals, with the result that people only go to the hospital in very
serious cases, mostly involving women, children and the
elderly.[240] Some health
personnel have left the country (although Iraq provides salary incentives to
keep skilled staff); those remaining are sometimes targeted in the conflict or
kidnapped.[241] The Ministry of
Health estimates that 25 percent of the 18,000 medical staff have left the
country, and approximately 250 staff have been killed since 2003; 65 doctors
were killed in 2005
alone.[242]
Many facilities were damaged and looted in the conflict, and have been forced
to close; newly constructed or renovated centers have been damaged and
reconstruction projects postponed for funding and security reasons. The
renovated Children’s Teaching Hospital in Baghdad was seriously damaged in
an attack in January 2006.[243] Reportedly, only four of the 180 health clinics that the US scheduled to
construct by the end of December 2005 have been completed and none have
opened.[244] Reconstruction
efforts funded by international donors have been delayed as security expenses
consume a significant proportion of the budget (up to 43 percent for the
US-sponsored projects and 35 percent for UK
projects).[245] The ongoing
conflict has also decreased the ability of Iraqis to afford medical and
rehabilitation services; an estimated 20 percent of people live below the
poverty line.[246]
The Ministry of Health is responsible for a relatively large network of
hospitals and primary health clinics, and some specialized services for people
with disabilities. There are also private hospitals, mostly in Baghdad. The
Shahid Adnan Karalla hospital in Baghdad specializes in complex war
surgery.[247] Also in Baghdad,
Al-Yarmouk medical complex has surgical capacity and al-Wasiti hospital provides
corrective surgery and medical
physiotherapy.[248]
The Ministry of Health developed a 2004-2007 Rehabilitation and Care for the
Disabled Strategy that aimed to ensure health and rehabilitation services for
all people with disabilities, to increase the rehabilitation centers in Iraq and
to carry out disability prevention activities. It planned to establish seven
rehabilitation centers, build five rehabilitation hospitals, conduct a needs
assessment and establish national criteria for disability services, coordinate
with other ministries, train specialized staff and participate in the
establishment of the Iraqi Authority for the Care of the
Disabled.[249] This strategy is
part-financed by the $25 million-Emergency Health Rehabilitation Project (EHRP)
of the World Bank Iraq Trust
Fund.[250]
In northern Iraq the healthcare situation is generally better than in other
regions, due to a better security situation and a relatively smooth handover of
NGO-operated health facilities to the regional Ministry of
Health.[251] However, according
to the ILIS, in three northern governorates 78.8 percent of mine-affected
communities do not have medical facilities, with the least facilities in Dohuk
(84.9 percent of communities lack
facilities).[252] In the four
southern governorates, the ILIS found that only 12.6 percent of mine-affected
communities had medical facilities, with more than 90 percent of communities
having no government-run health services; in Missan governorate only 2.6 percent
of surveyed communities had medical
facilities.[253] In the
southern-central area 90 percent of communities (106 out of 118) did not have
healthcare facilities.[254]
In 2005, ICRC continued activities on a limited scale due to the security
situation, with a team of about 300 national staff supported by 35 expatriates
based in neighboring countries, and with the help of the Iraqi Red Crescent
Society. ICRC reported that “it was able to carry out a wide range of
activities, albeit at a level far below the needs of those it sought to serve
and its own emergency response capacity and overall
objectives.”[255] The
health authorities assisted ICRC in providing supplies to 19 health facilities
with acute needs in Baghdad, Erbil, Haditha, Hilla and Tal Afar, for a total
value of CHF620,973 ($498,413). It also completed several renovation and
construction projects including primary healthcare centers in Basra and in
Qandil in Erbil governorate, al-Khalis General Hospital in Diyala governorate,
and a hospital in Tikrit. However, in January 2006 ICRC further downscaled its
operations for security reasons and canceled approximately 20 rehabilitation
projects. It focused on cooperation and capacity-building of the Iraqi Red
Crescent Society to better respond to emergency
situations.[256]
The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies’ renovation of the Baghdad surgical hospital and equipping of
Kut hospital was scheduled for completion in the second half of
2006.[257] The Iranian Red
Crescent Society also provided emergency medical supplies to
Iraq.[258]
The two surgical centers for civilian war victims in Sulaymaniyah and Erbil,
which Emergency handed over to the regional Ministry of Health in May 2005, were
reported to have continued functioning at the same capacity and with a
comparable quality of services, without waiting lists or shortages in medical
supplies.[259] Construction of a
third Emergency surgical center, Salaam, next to the al-Husayn Hospital in
Karbala, has remained on hold since November 2004 because of the security
situation.[260]
Other international NGOs and agencies providing medical relief and support to
casualties of conflict include the International Medical Corps, International
Rescue Committee, Médecins Sans Frontières and Merlin.
The Ministry of Health estimated that there are approximately 80,000 amputees
requiring prostheses in Iraq. There often are long waiting lists as
rehabilitation centers lack capacity, some have been damaged during the
conflict, and most centers cannot function to capacity due to security
constraints and a lack of trained staff and
components.[261]
In southern and central Iraq there are nine government-run rehabilitation
centers with the capacity to assist about 200 people per day; there are long
waiting lists due to a lack of materials and trained staff. As of February
2006, three centers (Thi Qar, al-Ghadir and al-Salam) were functioning at
limited capacity. There were not adequate rehabilitation services in Wasit,
Diyala, Najaf, Karbala, al-Qadisiyah, al-Muthanna and Missan. In some centers,
services are free of charge for people with a 60 percent or more disability
(determined by a government medical committee); for others, services cost $1-$5.
In other centers, some people (police, army, students, children and war victims)
receive treatment free of charge. Several specialized hospitals also provide
rehabilitation services, such as the Ibn al-Kuff Hospital (Baghdad), al-Kanat
Center for Medical Rehabilitation (Baghdad) and Dijlah Hospital (Tikrit, Salah
al-Din governorate); all three centers receive support from international
partners and function adequately. Services are free of charge apart from Dijlah
hospital, but costs never exceed $2; all centers lack supplies and staff needs
refresher training. Since January 2004, Ibn al-Kuff received more than 500
conflict-injured people. Limited rehabilitation services are provided by
al-Shumoukh City Medical Center and al-Dhura Medical Center; these centers have
a smaller capacity and serve those living in the government complex for people
with disabilities (150 families); both centers function well and provide social
and psychological rehabilitation.
[262]
In northern Iraq, rehabilitation services in Dohuk, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and
Halabja are run by national and international NGOs in cooperation with the
regional Ministry of Health; in general, the services are more accessible and of
higher quality than elsewhere.
There are eight government-run prosthetic and orthotic workshops in Baghdad,
Basra, Babylon, Najaf, Tikrit and Anbar; those in Babylon and Najaf were not
working to capacity in 2005-2006. The Iraqi Red Crescent Society has an
orthopedic workshop in Mosul but it is small in relation to the area’s
needs and lacks raw
materials.[263]
The Institute of Technical Medicine in Baghdad provides training for
prosthetic and orthopedic technicians, but also provides rehabilitation
services.
ICRC provided technical and material assistance to eight physical
rehabilitation centers, the Institute of Technical Medicine and the crutches
production unit of al-Salam center, with implementing partners including the
Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Higher Education and the Iraqi Red Crescent
Society. ICRC runs the Erbil center without partners. The centers are
monitored by ICRC expatriate staff from neighboring countries, but close
monitoring was impossible due to the security situation; several centers were
closed for some periods of time during 2005. The ICRC-supported centers
assisted more than 30,000 people in 2005, produced 2,529 prostheses (999 or 40
percent for mine survivors), 5,374 orthoses (132 or two percent for mine
survivors) and 515 pairs of crutches, and distributed seven
wheelchairs.[264]
Coalition forces set up a small prosthetics workshop, the al-Bidaya al-Jadida
Prosthetic and Rehabilitation Clinic, in the convention center in Baghdad. The
center uses the most advanced technology, such as computer-aided design and
manufacturing of prosthetics and components. As of April 2006, the center had
assisted approximately 275 people and produced 175 prostheses. Services are
open to everyone and free of charge, but access is limited because the center is
located in the green zone which most Iraqis cannot or prefer not to enter;
moving the center to another part of Baghdad was under
consideration.[265]
Emergency supports the Center for Rehabilitation, Prostheses and Social
Reintegration in Sulaymaniyah, which provides physical and social rehabilitation
programs, vocational training, and support to establish small businesses and
cooperative workshops. Employees include former patients. In 2005, the
Emergency-run Sulaymaniyah center provided 1,926 physiotherapy treatments,
fitted 486 prostheses and 34 orthoses, repaired 1,579 mobility devices,
distributed 135 crutches and 14 wheelchairs, and modified 15 houses of mine
survivors. In the first two months of 2006, 73 prostheses, one orthosis and 18
mobility devices were delivered; 140 devices were repaired. The cooperative
workshops were put on hold in the first five months of 2005, but between June
and December there were 60 direct and 226 indirect beneficiaries (including at
least six mine survivors). At the end of training, participants are assisted in
setting up cooperatives or
workshops.[266] The Ministry of
Health through GDMA allocated $350,000 to the center, Mercy Corps provided
$120,000 and Emergency covered remaining costs. It is estimated that five
percent of the new patients treated in Sulaymaniyah are new mine survivors, and
75 percent of the total number of people treated were mine/UXO survivors.
Approximately five percent of patients come from southern or central parts of
Iraq, fewer than in previous years due to the security
situation.[267]
The Diana Prosthetic Limbs Center (DPLC) in Erbil and the Prosthetic Limbs
and Rehabilitation Center (PLCD) in Dohuk are financed solely by the regional
Ministry of Health. They provide comprehensive physical and socioeconomic
reintegration services; PLCD receives a significant number of patients from
other governorates in the northern-central
region.[268] Following the
international handover to the Ministry of Health, the centers functioned without
paying salaries between January and March 2005, which were later repaid by the
ministry, but it could not retain all the staff and capacity reduced from 110
employees to 30 at DPLC; as a result only the orthopedic workshop continued
functioning. Also, government salaries are lower than those paid previously by
international organizations, so some staff sought employment elsewhere. DPLC
outreach posts in Sidakan and Choman were also closed due to lack of funds; the
Akre outreach post was handed over from DPLC to PLCD. In June 2006, DPLC
received raw materials (ordered in June 2005) for one year of
operations.[269] In 2005, DPLC
assisted 3,615 people including 934 mine
survivors.[270] DPLC and PLCD
together assisted 2,825 people with physical rehabilitation in 2005, produced
176 prostheses and 122
orthoses.[271]
The Kurdistan Organization for the Rehabilitation of the Disabled (KORD) runs
two orthopedic and rehabilitation centers in Sulaymaniyah and Halabja, started
by Handicap International in 1991. In December 2005, HI stopped technical and
material support to KORD, and handed over the three satellite units in Penjwen,
Kalar and Raniya; an HI desk officer provides some ad hoc support. An
external evaluation of KORD and the transition was carried out in May 2006.
KORD provides mobility devices and operates mobile teams to ensure adequate
follow-up in isolated villages. It also provides income generation projects,
home adaptation, support to disabled people’s organizations (DPOs), and
conducts awareness-raising and advocacy activities on disability rights. Social
workers are available to provide psychosocial support. In 2005, the centers
assisted 10,734 people including 30 mine survivors with 6,060 physiotherapy
sessions and produced 378 prostheses and 667 orthoses, repaired 2,302 devices,
and distributed 24 wheelchairs and 1,303 walking aids. KORD also translated
booklets on disability, participated in media events on disability and conducted
capacity-building workshops. The main challenges for KORD are human resources
management, the need for managerial and technical training, and resource
mobilization.[272] As of June
2006, it was estimated that KORD had sufficient funds to operate at full
capacity until mid-2007.[273] In
its strategic plan for 2006-2007, KORD sought ongoing funding to continue its
ongoing projects, to expand with an outreach post in Kirkuk and to conduct more
disability rights activities. Other goals were increased transparency and
managerial capacity.[274]
The Norwegian Red Cross (NRC), in cooperation with ICRC, supported two
prosthetic centers in the cities of Erbil and Mosul in northern Iraq. Due to
the security situation, a handover planned for 2003 has remained on hold
indefinitely. Due to difficult working conditions, especially in Mosul where a
military camp is located near the center, activities have been scaled down; only
Iraqis worked at the centers. ICRC provided supplies and regular technical
assistance through visits, follow-up and training by the ICRC delegation in
Erbil, Amman and Damascus. In Erbil, patients can stay on the premises during
the one-week fitting period. In 2005, ICRC trained local staff in the
adaptation and use of orthoses and provided appropriate materials; this enabled
the Erbil center to assist people with upper limb amputations for the first
time. During 2005, the number of patients assisted through these two centers
reduced considerably, from 85 per month in 2004 to 55 per month, mainly due to
deteriorating security. As a result, only 495 adaptations of prostheses and
orthoses were done in both centers during 2005. Between 50 and 60 percent of
people assisted were mine/UXO
survivors.[275]
In April 2005, Iceland allocated $1.5 million to the prosthetics company
Ossur Inc. for a project providing prosthetic feet, follow-up for 600 Iraqis,
and training for prosthetic and orthotic technicians. Ossur Inc. will run the
12-18 month project in cooperation with the Swedish prosthetic company
Skaraborgs Ortopedservice and Iraqi prosthetic specialists in Dohuk. This
financial contribution is the last part of Iceland’s pledge of $4 million
for emergency relief and reconstruction in
Iraq.[276]
Community-based rehabilitation programs have not been available in Iraq and
there was a lack of psychosocial support programs; only a small number of
psychiatrists were available in hospitals in Baghdad. There were very few
trained social workers, psychologists and nurses available to provide
psychological support to mine and other war
casualties.[277] The Iraqi Red
Crescent Society ran psychological support centers in Basra and Sulaymaniyah
governorates and in Baghdad city.[278] In July 2005, the Red Crescent developed a program assisting children
suffering from conflict-related trauma but the program had stopped by the end of
2005, due to lack of
funding.[279]
Unemployment of 30-40 percent and continuing conflict reduced the standard of
living, making socioeconomic reintegration for mine survivors and other people
with disabilities more difficult. In northern Iraq, it was anticipated that the
sharing of rehabilitation and reintegration responsibilities between the
Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Social Affairs would increase the funds
spent on socioeconomic reintegration from 2007. The government started the
Social Safety Net program in early 2006 to assist the growing number of poor
families; it replaced the earlier welfare system that was limited to war widows
and disabled. The Social Safety Net will provide higher monthly assistance to a
larger group of people; the government allocated approximately 500 billion Iraqi
dinars (some $330 million) to the project, but it cannot cope with the high
number of people who have already applied for the benefits (more than 241,000
families). However, most people have not received benefits and experienced
difficulties providing the necessary supporting
documents.[280] On 3 June 2006,
the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor and the World Bank signed an $8 million
grant agreement to reform the Social Safety Net to better assist poor and
vulnerable people. The World Bank estimated that the project should benefit up
to one million families, six times more than previously, and will cost $330
million per year.[281]
Mercy Corps projects addressed the needs of people with disabilities in three
southern governorates (Wasit, al-Qadisiyah and Missan) and two northern
governorates (Tameem and Salah
al-Din).[282] The main progress
in 2005 was the increased capacity to let people with disabilities, especially
women, talk about their disabilities, but security issues remained a serious
concern. [283] Mercy Corps also
established al-Jihad internet and resource center for people with disabilities
in Kut (Wasit governorate). In 2006, Mercy Corps started two new programs, a
small grants project and a peer empowerment training program, funded by USAID.
The Marla Ruzicka Iraqi War Victims Fund developed by the Campaign for
Innocent Victims in Conflict (CIVIC) aimed to alleviate suffering by
noncombatants as a result of the war through the repair of homes, medical care
and income-generating projects. On 9 June 2006, it received additional funding
of $5 million as part of the US administration’s emergency supplemental
funding bill providing a total of $50 million for humanitarian assistance in
Iraq. CIVIC also facilitates medical care and other services for children
injured in the conflict and who cannot receive adequate treatment in
Iraq.[284]
Rozh Society, which provided referrals to medical and rehabilitation
services, psychosocial support, socioeconomic reintegration and
awareness-raising in 12 branches, has been funded solely by the regional
Ministry of Health since the end of 2005, leading to reduced resources. It has
45,000-50,000 members. In April 2006, it put on a festival for people with
disabilities, including music, theater and
sports.[285]
The NGO Life for Relief and Development continued to provide emergency
support to Iraq, but did not focus on people with
disabilities.[286]
One mine survivor from Iraq participated in the
Sixth Meeting of States Parties in November-December 2005 and the Standing
Committee meetings in May 2006.
Disability Policy and Practice
The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs is responsible for issues relating
to people with disabilities. Facilities are also provided by the ministries of
health, defense and education. The 1980 Iraqi Social Welfare Law No. 126
recognized the right of all people with disabilities to rehabilitation services,
and other medical, educational and economic rights.
In 2006, the government expanded and increased its benefits
system.[287] In areas under the
control of the Kurdistan regional authorities, people with disabilities are
eligible for a monthly allowance of approximately $20, under Bill number 113,
dated 10 August 2003. In 2005, the government promised to improve accessibility
by making all new buildings accessible for disabled people; the next priorities
were creating income-generating and employment opportunities, and leisure
activities.[288] However, most
victim assistance actors and disability organizations stated that the government
has not made progress in accessibility of
buildings.[289]
[1] At the First Review Conference
of the Mine Ban Treaty in Nairobi in November-December 2004, Iraq’s
then-Deputy Minister of Planning expressed Iraq’s great interest in
joining the treaty. On 8 December 2004, then-Prime Minister Ayed Alawi told a
disability group associated with the ICBL that he is in favor of joining the
treaty, as soon as Iraq is legally eligible. In February and June 2004, Iraqi
diplomats attending the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in Geneva
informed the ICBL of their support for the treaty and desire for Iraq to accede.
See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 992; Landmine Monitor Report
2005, p. 734. [2] Email from Moaffak Tawfiq
al-Khafaji, Head, Iraqi Handicapped Society and Iraq Campaign to Ban Landmines
(Iraq CBL), 26 May 2006. Landmine Monitor has a copy of the draft document. [3] Email from Moaffak Tawfiq
al-Khafaji, Iraqi Handicapped Society and ICBL, 2 March 2006. [4] Email from Ayman Sorour,
Director, Protection, and member of the ICBL Advisory Board, 16 June 2006. The
Council of Representatives approval of the selection of most of the cabinet
ministers on 20 May 2006 marked the transition from the Iraqi Transitional
Government to Iraq’s full-term government. However, the Iraqi
Transitional Government, which replaced the Iraqi Interim Government on 3 May
2005, had the power to enter into international treaties and agreements. The
Coalition Provisional Authority, which temporarily administered Iraq after the
invasion, transferred authority on 28 June 2004 to the Iraqi Interim Government.
Iraq's permanent constitution was approved in a 15 October 2005 constitutional
referendum. An election under the constitution for a 275-member Council of
Representatives was held in December 2005, with the Shi’a-led United Iraqi
Alliance winning most of the seats. [5] Letter from Hoshyar Zebari,
Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Stephen Goose, Landmine Monitor Ban Policy
Coordinator, Human Rights Watch (HRW), 11 August 2005. [6] Statement by Jafar Hameed,
Diplomatic Attaché, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Standing Committee on
General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 13 June 2005. [7] Iraq participated in the Mine
Ban Treaty Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in February and June 2004, and
the First Review Conference in Nairobi in November-December 2004. [8] Email to ICBL from Moaffaq
Tawfiq al-Khafaji, Iraqi Handicapped Society and Iraq CBL, 29 April 2006. [9] Landmine Monitor (HRW)
interview with Mowafak Ayoub, Director, Disarmament Division, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Geneva, 10 February 2004. Confidential Iraqi and American
sources indicated that the Aloa’oa’a and Hutten factories in
Alexandria, and Aloudisie factory in Al Youssfiz were destroyed. Iraq
previously manufactured a copy of the Italian Valmara 69 bounding antipersonnel
mine, at least one antipersonnel mine developed with Yugoslav assistance, one
former Soviet model and two older Italian mine designs. [10] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2000, p. 931. [11] “MND-B Soldiers
Discover Weapons Caches,” Department of Defense Documents-Army News
Service, 1 June 2006. [12] “IPs, MND-B Soldiers
discover, destroy large weapons cache,” Department of Defense
Documents-Army News Service, 16 May 2006. [13] “Terrorist Kill Iraqi
Civilians; Coalition Kills, Detains more Terrorists,” US Fed News,
14 May 2006. [14] “Iraqi, MND-B Soldiers
Discover Weapons Cache in Remote Village,” US Fed News, 28 April
2006. [15] “Caches seized in
North Central Iraq,” US Fed News, 27 April 2006. [16] “Suspected Insurgents
Caught Red-Handed,” US Fed News, 20 April 2006. [17] “U.S. Soldiers Unearth
Thousands of Munitions in Al Anbar Province, Iraq,” US Fed News, 21
February 2006. [18] Andrea Takash, “Corps
of Engineers completes last demolition in Iraq,” ARNEWS, 16 March
2006. [19] “Press Release of the
Kazakh Defense Ministry on Performance of a Bomb Disposal Squad in Iraq,”
WPS: Defense and Security, 11 November 2005. [20] Tataboline Brant,
“Alaska brigade finds weapons cache,” Anchorage Daily News,
15 October 2005. [21] “Iraqi Citizen Tip
Leads U.S. Soldiers to Weapons Cache,” Department of Defense
Documents-Army News Service, 30 September 2005. [22] “U.S. Soldiers detain
25 suspected insurgents and seize weapons southwest of Baghdad,”
Associated Press, 26 June 2005. [23] “Ukrainian
Peacekeepers Destroy Arms Cache of Hussein’s Former Army in Iraq,”
Ukrainian News, 29 July 2005. [24] Email to Landmine Monitor
(MAC) from H. Murphey McCloy Jr., Senior Demining Advisor, US Department of
State, 4 October 2005. One press article reported interviews with Iraqi
citizens claiming that US personnel have laid mines near civilian homes. Dahr
Jamail and Arkan Hamed, “A Town Becomes a Prison,” Inter Press
News Service (Siniyah), 20 January 2006. [25] The US has never reported in
its annual national reports submitted under CCW Amended Protocol II any measures
to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from known mined areas under its
jurisdiction or control during combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Protective minefields from the Soviet era are incorporated into the perimeter
defense at locations US forces occupy in Afghanistan. [26] Media reports of Coalition
units engaged in operations along Iraq’s border with Iran frequently
highlight the visible threat presented by antipersonnel and antivehicle mines in
border minefields, but do not mention any effort to secure, mark, fence or
provide education to civilian populations. In November 2004, it was noted that
the positions of South Korean troops stationed in Erbil in northern Iraq were
ringed by 680 explosives devices, but the unit “is known to have removed
only one land mine so far.” “Zaytan Beefs Up Security Following
Emergency Declaration in Iraq,” Korea Times, 9 November 2004. [27] “Missing U.S. soldiers
killed,” St. Petersburg Times (Florida), 21 June 2006. A military
statement said, “Coalition forces had to carefully maneuver their way
through numerous improvised explosive devices leading up to and around the
site.” [28] “Four Georgian
soldiers wounded in Iraq,” Agence France-Presse (Tbilisi), 9
November 2005. From the account, it is not possible to be certain if the device
was victim-activated, and if so, when it was planted. [29] Michael Georgy and Ian
Bruce, “Arab envoy opens Iraq peace quest; First post-war visit aims to
reconcile rival communities,” The Herald (Glasgow), 21 October
2005. [30] Michael Bruno, “IEDS
to be hallmark of future, Marine commandant says,” Aerospace Daily
& Defense Report, Vol. 216, No. 27, 8 November 2005. [31] US Department of Defense,
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), News Transcript,
“Special DoD Press Briefing: Brigadier General Yves J. Fontaine,
Commander, 1st Corps Support Command, Multinational Corps-Iraq,” 12 August
2005. [32] Figures derived from an
examination of official US Department of Defense casualty reports, posted at
www.defenselink.mil. [33] “U.S., Iraqi security
forces peppered by attacks,” CNN.com (Baghdad), 15 February
2006. [34] Robert H. Reid, “U.S.
news anchor, cameraman victims of one of insurgents’ deadliest
weapons,” Associated Press (Baghdad), 30 January 2006. [35] “Two Security Officers
Killed and Two Seriously Injured in Iraq,” Business Wire (Irving,
Texas), 14 November 2005. [36] “Three foreigners
killed in Baghdad, eyewitnesses say,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur
(Baghdad), 14 November 2005. [37] HRW, “A Face and a
Name: Civilian Victims of Insurgent Groups in Iraq,” Vol. 17, No. 9
(E), October 2005, p. 19. [38] “U.S. Soldiers Foil
Seven Bomb Attacks, Nab Eights Suspects,” U.S. Fed News, 12 August
2005. [39] Figures derived from an
examination of official US Department of Defense casualty reports, posted at
www.defenselink.mil. [40] “Four Servicemembers
Die; Terror Suspects, Weapons Found,” American Forces Information
Service News Articles (Washington), 5 November 2005. [41] “Three Ukrainian
peacekeepers wounded in Iraq,” Interfax-Ukraine (Kiev), 27 October
2005. [42] Will Dunham, “U.S.
escalates effort to counter Iraqi rebel bombs,” Reuters (Washington
DC), 3 November 2005. [43] Speech delivered by George
W. Bush at George Washington University, hosted by the Foundation for Defense of
Democracies, defenddemocracy.org, 13 March 2006. [44] Statement by John
Negroponte, US Director of National Intelligence, Senate Select Intelligence
Committee, Washington DC, 2 February 2006. [45] David Williams, “Iran
‘Behind Murders of at Least Eight UK Soldiers,’” Daily Mail
(UK), 6 October 2005. [46] Iraqi Mine UXO Clearance
Organization, “Introduction,” presentation, undated but 2006. [47] Under Protocol V of the
Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war (ERW) are defined
as unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Mines are explicitly
excluded from the definition. [48] “Army Corps ID’s
contractors killed in Iraq by bomb,” Huntsville Times, 15 June
2006. [49] ILIS, “Distribution of
Impact and Contamination in Iraq’s Southern Governorates,” pp. 1, 4,
in email from John C. Brown, ILIS Survey Team Leader, Vietnam Veterans of
America Foundation (VVAF), 23 May 2006. [50] Staffan de Mistura, Deputy
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and
UNDP Resident Representative, cited in UNDP, “Peril and progress: mine
action awareness day in Iraq,” 4 April 2006. [51] ILIS, “Monthly
Activities Report– April 2006,” p. 2, in email from John C. Brown,
VVAF, 26 May 2006; email from William Barron, Director, Information Management
and Mine Action Programs, VVAF, 21 July 2006. [52] ILIS summary tables,
received by email from John C. Brown, VVAF, 27 May 2006; email from William
Barron, VVAF, 21 July 2006. [53] UNDP, “Peril and
progress: mine awareness day in Iraq,” 4 April 2006. [54] “Distribution of
Impact and Contamination in Iraq’s Southern Governorates,” p. 1, in
email from John C. Brown, VVAF, 23 May 2006. [55] “The causes of death
and injury in Iraq due to ERW,” in email from John C. Brown, VVAF, 17 May
2006. [56] ILIS, “Monthly
Activities Report–April 2006,” pp. 9-15. The figure includes 1,126
communities which the ILIS teams surveyed, 68 communities with limited, visible
UXO contamination and 234 communities that shared an SHA with one or more other
communities. [57] ILIS, “The causes of
death and injury in Iraq due to ERW,” in email from John C. Brown, VVAF,
17 May 2006. [58] Ibid. [59] The ILIS found that in the
Al Fao district of Basra governorate, 46 of 138 communities (33 percent) are
impacted by 70 recorded SHAs, but had no recent victims. In contrast,
al-Muthanna governorate’s Al Salman district on the Saudi border, where
nine of 40 communities (23 percent) are impacted by 12 recorded SHAs (all new
mined areas), 30 recent victims were recorded. ILIS, “The causes of death
and injury in Iraq due to ERW,” in email from John C. Brown, VVAF, 17 May
2006; telephone interview with John C. Brown, VVAF, 8 June 2006. [60] Interview with Hyder
Al-Mosawi, Director General, NMAA, Baghdad, 15 June 2006. [61] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 739. [62] Email from Salomon
Schreuder, Senior Mine Action Advisor, UNDP Iraq, 20 July 2006. [63] Mine Action Support Group,
“MASG Newsletter-First Quarter of 2006,” Washington DC, 1 May 2006.
[64] Email from Salomon
Schreuder, UNDP, 27 June 2006. [65] “Three senior
officials referred to prosecution for corruption,” Kuwait News Agency
(Kuwait), 9 July 2006 [66] Email from Salomon
Schreuder, UNDP, 30 June 2006. [67] Email from Chris Tierney,
Chief of Party-Iraq and Senior Advisor to RONCO/NMAA, 15 June 2006. [68] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 739. [69] Emails from Salomon
Schreuder, UNDP, 30 June and 20 July 2006. [70] Email from Lance J. Malin,
Operations Advisor, RONCO/NMAA, 2 June 2005. [71] Email from Stacy Smith,
Communications Manager, RONCO, 23 June 2006. [72] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 739. [73] Ibid. [74] Email from Niazi Khalid,
General Director of Technical Affairs, IKMAC, 2 May 2006. The four local NGOs
were Tiroj Demining Organization, Pirmam Demining Organization, Bawaji Demining
Organization and Aras Demining Organization. The NGOs were set up in 2004
funded by the US Department of State but ceased operating when funding ceased at
the end of 2004. [75] Interview with Dlear Yacoub,
Technical Advisor, RONCO, Amman, 11 April 2006. [76] NMAA Letter No. 3/5/278, 27
April 2006; email from Chris Tierney, RONCO/NMAA, 14 April 2006. [77] Interview with Hyder
Al-Mosawi, NMAA, 15 June 2006. [78] Email from Chris Tierney,
RONCO/NMAA, 15 June 2006. [79] Ibid. [80] Ibid [81] Interviews with Salomon
Schreuder and Kent Paulusson, Mine Action Advisors, UNDP, Amman, 10 and 11 April
2006; telephone interview with Salomon Schreuder, UNDP, 7 June 2006. [82] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, pp. 741-742. [83] Interview with Salomon
Schreuder, UNDP, Amman, 10 April 2006. [84] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 742. [85] NMAA Letter No. 3/5/278, 27
April 2006. [86] Interview with Hyder
Al-Mosawi, NMAA, Baghdad, 15 June 2006. [87] Interviews with Salomon
Schreuder and Kent Paulusson, UNDP, Amman, 10 and 11 April 2006. [88] NMAA Letter No. 3/5/21, 28
March 2006. [89] NMAA Letter No. 3/5/278, 27
April 2006. [90] Ibid. [91] Interviews with Salomon
Schreuder, UNDP, Amman, 10 and 11 April 2006. [92] Interviews with officials of
mine action organizations working in Iraq, speaking on condition of anonymity,
April and June 2006. [93] UNDP, “2006 Annual
Plan for the Iraqi National Mine Action Authority,” (draft); interviews
with Kent Paulusson, UNDP, Amman (Jordan), 10 and 11 April 2006. [94] “Iran-Iraq to
cooperate in military, anti-terror fields,” Xinhuanet, 8 July 2005.
[95] “Iran, Iraq ink deal
to remove landmines,” Iranian News Agency, 12 December 2005; IRMAC,
www.irmac.ir. [96] Email from Niazi Khalid,
IKMAC, 2 May 2006. [97] Email from Twanna Bashir,
Operations Manager, GDMA, 20 April 2006. [98] Interview with Hyder
Al-Mosawi, NMAA, Baghdad, 15 June 2006. [99] Interview with Mike
Hartling, Task Leader, IMCO/RONCO, Amman, 10 April 2006. [100] Emails from Pia Cantini,
MRE officer, INTERSOS, Kuwait, 6 May and 19 June 2006. [101] Email from Salomon
Schreuder, UNDP, 29 June 2006. [102] Email from Chris Tierney,
RONCO/NMAA, 25 April 2006. [103] Email from Stacy Smith,
RONCO, 23 June 2006. [104] Emails from Pippa Norman,
Operations Coordinator, ArmorGroup, 15 and 16 June 2006. [105] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 743; email from Tim Carstairs, Director of Policy, MAG, 20
July 2006. [106] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 743-744. [107] ILIS presentation, UNICEF
MRE workshop, Amman, 13 March 2006. [108] Emails from John C.
Brown, VVAF, 11 April and 8 June 2006. [109] ILIS, “Monthly
Activities Report–April 2006,” p. 2; ILIS summary tables, in email
from John C. Brown, VVAF, 27 May 2006. [110] ILIS, “Monthly
Activities Report–April 2006,” p. 2; [111] ILIS presentation, UNICEF
MRE workshop, Amman, 13 March 2006. [112] ILIS, “Monthly
Activities Report–April 2006,” pp. 15, 16, 38. [113] Email from John C. Brown,
VVAF, 27 May 2006. [114] ILIS summary tables, in
email from John C. Brown, VVAF, 27 May 2006. [115] ILIS, “Distribution
of Impact and Contamination in Iraq’s Southern Governorates,” in
email from John C. Brown, 23 May 2006. [116] ILIS summary tables, in
email from John C. Brown, VVAF, 27 May 2006. [117] ILIS, “Monthly
Activities Report–April 2006,” pp. 10-14; telephone interview with
John C. Brown, VVAF, 8 June 2006. [118] ILIS, “Monthly
Activities Report–April 2006,” p. 2. [119] Emails from John C.
Brown, VVAF, 8 and 16 June 2006. [120] NMAA Letter No. 3/5/278,
27 April 2006; see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 745. The NMAA
identified 12 demining/EOD organizations operating in Iraq in 2005, but reported
the area cleared by only seven, totaling 18.4 square kilometers. [121] The table was compiled by
Landmine Monitor from data provided by operators. Operators: Iraqi Kurdish Mine
Action Center (IKMAC), General Directorate for Mine Action (GDMA), Mine Advisory
Group (MAG), Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), Iraq Mine UXO Clearance
Organization (IMCO), and Danish Demining Group (DDG).
[122] This includes suspected
mined areas that were visually checked (2,292,327 square meters), visually
checked by EOD teams (3,272,157 square meters) and checked by mine detection
dogs (141,616 square meters).
[123] Results for 12 months
through 1 March 2006. [124] Email from Niazi Khalid,
IKMAC, 2 May 2006. [125] Email from Twanna Bashir,
GDMA, 20 April 2006. [126] Email from Khabat
Zangana, Manager, Khabat Zangana Company, 24 April 2006. [127] Email from Llewelyn
Jones, Middle East Project Coordinator, MAG, 16 June 2006; MAG, “Iraq
Programme Donor Update,” May 2006. [128] Email from Mark Buswell,
Technical Operations Manager, MAG, 24 April 2006; email from Llewelyn Jones,
MAG, 16 June 2006. [129] Emails from Mark Buswell,
MAG, 24 April and 2 July 2006. [130] MAG, “Iraq
Programme Donor Updates,” March and April 2006; email from Llewelyn Jones,
MAG, 16 June 2006. [131] Emails from Sherko
Rashid, Program Manager, NPA, Iraq, 12 April and 15 June 2006. [132] Fax from Frank McAreavey,
Program Manager, EOD Team, HELP, 15 June 2006. [133] IMCO briefing document,
received by email from Mike Hartling, Task Leader, IMCO/RONCO, 6 June 2006. [134] “Operation
achievement,” email from Mike Hartling, IMCO/RONCO, 6 June 2006. [135] Email from Brian Nelson
Smith, Program Manager, DDG, Iraq, 13 April 2006. [136] Email from Pia Cantini,
INTERSOS, Kuwait, 12 May 2006. [137] “Second six-month
report on activities implemented under the UNDG Trust Fund of the International
Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq,” 30 November 2005, p. 5. [138] Email from Salomon
Schreuder, UNDP, 30 June 2006. [139] Email from Twanna Bashir,
GDMA, 20 April 2006. [140] Email from Niazi Khalid,
IKMAC, 11 July 2006. [141] Emails from Mark Buswell,
MAG, 24 April and 2 July 2006. [142] Email from Sherko Rashid,
NPA, 12 April 2006. [143] Telephone interview with
Brian Nelson Smith, DDG, Iraq, 18 June 2006, and email, 1 July 2006. [144] Email from Pia Cantini,
INTERSOS, Kuwait, 19 June 2006. [145] Telephone interview with
Brian Nelson Smith, DDG, Iraq, 25 June 2006. [146] Andrea Takash,
“Corps of Engineers completes last demolition in Iraq,” Army News
Service, 16 March 2006. [147] Press release, US Army
Corps of Engineers, Engineering and Support Center, 3 January 2006. The
contract was subject to availability of funds which the Corps had not yet
received. [148] Mine Action Support
Group, “MASG Newsletter-First Quarter of 2006,” Washington DC, 1 May
2006. [149] Ibid. [150] Information provided to
Landmine Monitor by the NMAA, Baghdad, 31 May 2005. [151] Email from Marion
Libertucci, HI, 31 May 2006; email from Yasser Al-Najar, Technical and Data
Manager, IHSCO, 18 July 2006. [152] Email from David
Horrocks, Program Manager, MAG Iraq, forwarded by Tim Carstairs, MAG, 16 May
2006. [153] Email from Matt Willson,
MAG, 20 June 2005; email from David Horrocks, MAG Iraq, forwarded by Tim
Carstairs, MAG, 16 May 2006. [154] Email from David
Horrocks, MAG Iraq, forwarded by Tim Carstairs, MAG, 16 May 2006. [155] Ibid. [156] Ibid. [157] Ibid. [158] See also Pia Cantini and
Valentina Crini, “INTERSOS: Thinking Over and Practicing MRE in
Iraq,” Journal of Mine Action, No. 9.1. [159] Email from Pia Cantini,
INTERSOS, 12 May 2006. [160] Mine Action Support
Group, “MASG Newsletter-First Quarter of 2006,” Washington DC, 1 May
2006. [161] Email from Pia Cantini,
INTERSOS, 12 May 2006. [162] ICRC, “Special
Report - Mine Action 2005,” Geneva, May 2006, p. 17; ICRC, “ICRC
Annual Report 2005,” Geneva, 2006, p. 310. [163] Response to Landmine
Monitor MRE Questionnaire by Brian Nelson Smith, DDG, Iraq, 14 June 2006. [164] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 754. [165] Belgium Article 7 Report,
Form J, 26 April 2006; email from Dominique Jones, Conseiller, Ministry of
Defence, 17 May 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: €1 = US$1.2449,
used throughout this report. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates
(Annual),” 3 January 2006. [166] Mine Action Investments
database; email from Rita Helmich-Olesen, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 March
2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1 = DKK5.9953. US Federal Reserve,
“List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006. [167] Germany Article 7 Report,
Form J, 27 April 2006; Mine Action Investments database. [168] Embassy of Iceland,
Washington DC, “Iceland Contributes 1.5 Millon USD to a Prosthetics
Project in Northern Iraq,” (Information Sheet 08/05), 28 April 2005. [169] Emails from Manfredo
Capozza, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 2006. [170] Emails from Kitagawa
Yasu, Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL), March-May 2006, with translated
information received by JCBL from the Multilateral Cooperation Department, 11
May 2005 and Non-proliferation and Science Department, 11 April 2006. Average
exchange rate for 2005: US$1= ¥110.11. US Federal Reserve, “List of
Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006. [171] Email from Ellen
Schut, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 April 2006; email from Brechtje
Paardekooper, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 April 2006. [172] Email from Annette A.
Landell-Mills, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 June 2006. Average exchange rate
for 2005: US$1 = NOK6.4412. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates
(Annual),” 3 January 2006. [173] Slovakia Article 7
Report, Form J, 4 May 2006; email from Henrik Markus, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 16 May 2006. [174] Response to Landmine
Monitor from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 9 May
2006; UN Development Group Iraq Trust Fund (UNDG ITF), “Newsletter,”
January 2006, p. 1. [175] Spain Article 7 Report,
Form J, 27 April 2006; email from Luis Gómez Nogueira, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, 25 April 2006. [176] Sweden Article 7 Report,
Form J, 2 May 2006; emails from Sara Brandt-Hansen, Ministry for Foreign
Affairs, March-May 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1 = SEK7.4710. US
Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January
2006. [177] Email from Rémy
Friedmann, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 April 2006. Average exchange
rate for 2005: US$1 = CHF1.2459, used throughout this report. US Federal
Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006. [178]USG Historical Chart
containing data for FY 2005, by email from Angela L. Jeffries, Financial
Management Specialist, US Department of State, 8 June 2006. [179] Email from Zach Hudson,
Program Manager, Adopt-A-Minefield, 2 June 2006. [180] Email from William
Barron, VVAF, 21 July 2006. [181] IRFFI, “Pledges
made to IRFFI and Iraqi reconstruction at the Expanded Donor Meeting of
IRFFI,” 18 July 2005; UNDG ITF, “Newsletter,” January
2006, p. 1. [182] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, pp. 755-756. [183] Telephone interview with
Ibrahim Baba-Ali Ismaeel, Program Specialist, Mine Action, UNDP, 21 June 2006;
email from Soran Majeed, Mine Victim Assistance Coordinator, GDMA, Sulaymaniyah,
3 April 2006; email from Chris Tierney, RONCO/NMAA, 6 June 2006; email from
Jennifer Reeves, Advisor to IHSCO, MAG, Jordan, 21 March 2006. [184] Telephone interview with
Ibrahim Baba-Ali Ismaeel, UNDP, 21 June 2006; email from Soran Majeed, RMAC,
Sulaymaniyah, 3 April 2006; email from Chris Tierney, RONCO/NMAA, 6 June 2006;
email from Jennifer Reeves, MAG, Jordan, 21 March 2006; telephone interview with
Dr. Oleg Bilukha, Medical Epidemiologist, International Emergency and Refugee
Health Branch, CDC, Atlanta, 25 April 2006. [185] Email from Shanti Kaphle,
MRE Officer, UNICEF, 2 March 2006; telephone interview with Dr. Oleg Bilukha,
CDC, Atlanta, 25 April 2006. [186] Email from Shanti Kaphle,
UNICEF, 22 March 2006. [187] Email from Ibrahim
Baba-Ali Ismaeel, UNDP, 12 April 2006. [188] Email from Soran Majeed,
GDMA, 3 April 2006. [189] Information provided by
Siraj Barzani, IKMAC, Erbil, 2 March 2006. [190] Email from Daniel
Sissling, MAG, 22 August 2005. [191] Email from Tim Carstairs,
MAG, 23 June 2006. MAG’s data was transferred into IMSMA and handed to
RMAC for distribution. MAG only collects data it encounters during other
activities and does not collect data from the Emergency Surgical Hospital in
Sulaymaniyah. MAG recorded 40 casualties in Erbil, but these statistics have
not been included in the total of new casualties in 2004. [192] Email from Giorgio
Raineri, Coordinator Humanitarian Office, Emergency, 11 August 2005. [193] “Final Report of
the Iraqi Health and Social Care Organization Year 2004,” undated, pp. 1,
7. [194] Email from Ahmed
al-Zubaidi, Director, IHSCO, 9 May 2006. [195] Landmine Monitor (HI)
analysis of information from Ahmed al-Zubaidi, IHSCO, 9 May 2006. [196] Landmine Monitor media
analysis from 1 January 2005 until 31 December 2005, incidents identified as IED
or roadside bomb incidents were excluded, but this analysis is not comprehensive
due to the large number of articles reporting various conflict-related
casualties in Iraq. [197] Figures derived from an
examination of US Department of Defense casualty reports for 2005, www.defenselink.mil, accessed 5 May
2006. [198] US Department of Defense
casualty reports. [199] Email from Ibrahim
Baba-Ali Ismaeel, UNDP, 11 August 2005. [200] “Turkish truck
driver killed by land mine in Iraq,” NTV television (Istanbul), 16
April 2005. [201] “OFW slain in
ambush in outskirts of Baghdad,” Manila Standard, 26 August
2005. [202] Iraq Body Count, “A
dossier of civilian casualties 2003-2005,” 2005, pp. 14-15; the document
contains information from 20 March 2003 to 19 March 2005 as gathered from 152
mainly English-language online news media, on 14 June 2005, reports.iraqbodycount.org, accessed
25 June 2006. [203] “Illegal immigrants
killed in Greece-Turkey border minefield,” Associated Press, 4
April 2005. [204] “IEDs Still Main
Killer of Troops,” Charlotte Observer, 12 June 2005. [205] This figure is accurate
as of 7 June 2006; figures derived from an examination of US Department of
Defense casualty reports. [206] Mark Walker,
“Marines push for solution to roadside bombs in Iraq,” North
County Times (Twenty Nine Palms), 30 April 2006; David Zucchino, “War
brings Advances in Protection and Care,” Los Angeles Times
(Baghdad), 3 April 2006; Landmine Monitor analysis of US Department of
Defense army casualty reports between 1 January 2006 and 30 April 2006. [207] Laurent van der Stockt,
“Ambushed: How an IED almost cost a photographer his left arm, A personal
account,” Newsweek, 19 March 2006. [208] Email from Soran Majeed,
GDMA, 15 May 2006. [209] Email from Tim Carstairs,
MAG, 23 May 2006. [210] Landmine Monitor (HI)
analysis of information from Ahmed al-Zubaidi, IHSCO, 9 May 2006. [211] “12 die as
pilgrimage gets under way,” Gulf Times (Doha), 20 March 2006. [212] “Blast
victim’s body to be brought tomorrow (Iraq),” The Hindu
(India), 3 May 2006. [213] “Quatre
tués, dont un enfant, et onze blessés dans des attaques en
Irak,” Agence France-Presse (Baghdad), 28 April 2006. [214] “US Death Looms in
Iraq,” Prensa Latina (Baghdad), 29 March 2006. [215] Mike Kalil, “Salem
Marine dies in Iraq,” Union Leader (Salem), 4 May 2006. [216] Figures derived from an
examination of US Department of Defense casualty reports. [217] For more information see
Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 1005-1007. [218] Statement by Behnam
Puttrus, Ministry of Planning, First Review Conference, Nairobi, 2 December
2004. [219] Email from Mark Buswell,
MAG, 17 March 2006. [220 ] MAG data was: 1,278
casualties in 1993; 1,205 in 1994; 1,061 in 1995; 755 in 1996; 702 in 1997; 474
in 1998; 451 in 1999; 324 in 2000; 211 in 2001; 224 in 2002; 1,197 in 2003; 72
in 2004; 68 in 2005 and 15 in 2006. Information provided by Tim Carstairs, MAG,
23 May and 23 June 2006. Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1007 and
Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 757 reported that MAG collected data on
13,672 casualties until the end of 2003. [221] Information provided by
John C. Brown, VVAF, 27 May 2006. “Recent” casualties normally
refer to incidents in the 24 months prior to the survey, but in this case from
September 2002 to end-2005. [222] Information provided by
John C. Brown, VVAF, 18 May 2006. [223] Information provided by
John C. Brown, VVAF, 27 May 2006. [224] Information provided by
John C. Brown, VVAF, 18 May 2006. [225] “Less recent”
casualties refer to incidents more than 24 months prior to the survey.
Information provided by John C. Brown, VVAF, 18 and 27 May 2006. [226] Information provided by
John C. Brown, VVAF, 18 and 27 May 2006. [227] Email from John C. Brown,
VVAF, 1 May 2006. [228] Information provided by
John C. Brown, VVAF, 18 and 27 May 2006. [229] Information provided by
Hyder Al-Mosawi, NMAA, 27 April 2006. [230] Email from Muna Saffar,
Advisor, VVAF, Baghdad, 16 May 2006. [231] Statement by Behnam
Puttrus, Ministry of Planning, First Review Conference, Nairobi, 2 December
2004. [232] UN, “2006 Portfolio
of Mine Action Projects,” New York, 2005, p. 202. [233] Telephone interview with
Ibrahim Baba-Ali Ismaeel, UNDP, 21 June 2006. [234] Email from Chris Tierney,
RONCO/NMAA, 6 June 2006. [235] Observations made by
several victim assistance and mine action actors throughout 2006. [236] Email from Jilan Salem
Mohammed, MRE Officer, RMAC South, 23 March 2006; email from Soran Majeed, GDMA,
3 April 2006; telephone interview with Ibrahim Baba-Ali Ismaeel, UNDP, 21 June
2006. [237] Information provided by
Hyder Al-Mosawi, NMAA, 27 April 2006; email from Soran Majeed, GDMA, 3 April
2006. [238] Email from Chris Tierney,
RONCO/NMAA, 6 June 2006; email from Muna Saffar, VVAF, 2 May 2006; telephone
interview with Ibrahim Baba-Ali Ismaeel, UNDP, 21 June 2006. [239] Email from Ibrahim
Baba-Ali Ismaeel, UNDP, 29 June 2006. [240] “Baghdadis say
curfew prevents access to medical care,” IRIN (Baghdad), 17 April
2006. [241] “Higher education
ministry tempts professionals with security, salaries,” IRIN
(Baghdad), 31 January 2006. [242] Kingston Reif,
“Iraq Health Update, Conflict fuels Iraqi Health Crisis,” Medact,
London, 3 April 2006, p. 5, www.medact.org. [243] “Children’s
hospital struggling in the wake of bombing,” IRIN (Baghdad), 24
January 2006. [244] Kingston Reif,
“Iraq Health Update, Conflict fuels Iraqi Health Crisis,” Medact,
London, 3 April 2006, p. 8. [245] Tom Yates, “Iraq
Health Update,” Medact, London, 26 July 2005, p. 2. [246] Wa’d Ibrahim,
“New welfare system overwhelmed,” Iraqi Crisis Report, Institute
for War and Peace Reporting, No. 174, 26 April 2006. [247] Interview with Moaffaq
Tawfiq al-Khafaji, Iraqi Handicapped Society and the Iraq CBL, Geneva, 15 June
2005. [248] HI, “Broad
Assessment Iraq,” (final report, internal document), Lyon, February 2006,
p. 24. [249] Information provided by
Hyder Al-Mosawi, NMAA, Baghdad, 27 April 2006. [250] Information provided by
Moaffaq Tawfiq al-Khafaji, Iraqi Handicapped Society and the Iraq CBL, Geneva,
10 May 2006. [251] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 759. [252] ILIS, “Monthly
Activities Report –April 2006,” p. 26, in email from John C. Brown,
VVAF, 5 May 2006. [253] ILIS, “Distribution
of Impact and Contamination in Iraq’s Southern Governorates,” in
email from John C. Brown, VVAF, 24 May 2006. [254] ILIS, “Distribution
of Impact and Contamination in Iraq’s South-Central Governorates,”
in email from John C. Brown, VVAF, 18 May 2006. [255] ICRC, “Annual
Report 2005,” Geneva, June 2006, p. 307. [256] Ibid, pp. 306-310. [257] International Federation
of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Society, “Operations Update-Iraq:
Humanitarian Emergency,” 14 June 2006, p. 6. [258] Iranian Red Crescent
Society, “Humanitarian Assistance to Iraq,” 18 October 2005,
www.rcs.ir. [259] Telephone interview with
Ibrahim Baba-Ali Ismaeel, UNDP, 21 June 2006; the program specialist had visited
the hospital in Erbil on 20 June 2006. [260] Email from Giorgio
Raineri, Emergency, 16 March 2006. [261] ICRC, “Physical
Rehabilitation Programme - Annual Report 2005,” Geneva, July 2006, p. 43;
telephone interview with Ibrahim Baba-Ali Ismaeel, UNDP, 21 June 2006;
information provided by Hyder Al-Mosawi, NMAA, Baghdad, 27 April 2006. [262] HI, “Broad
Assessment Iraq,” (final report, internal document), Lyon, February 2006,
pp. 16-20. [263] Ibid, pp. 23-29. [264] ICRC, “Physical
Rehabilitation Programme - Annual Report 2005,” Geneva, July 2006, p. 43;
ICRC, “Annual Report 2005,” Geneva, June 2006, p. 309. [265] Email from David Larres,
Christian Peacemakers Team, 19 April 2006. [266] Information provided by
Giorgio Raineri, Emergency, 16 March 2006. [267] Telephone interview with
Ibrahim Baba-Ali Ismaeel, UNDP, 21 June 2006. [268] Ibid. [269] Response to Landmine
Monitor Questionnaire by Hamid M. Tahir, Director, PLCD, 28 July 2005; email
from Salomon Schreuder, UNDP, 3 October 2005; telephone interview with Ibrahim
Baba-Ali Ismaeel, UNDP, 21 June 2006, and email, 29 June 2006; see Landmine
Monitor Report 2004, p. 1009. [270] Response to Landmine
Monitor Questionnaire by Majid A. Dawoud, Director, DPLC, 8 May 2006. [271] Information provided by
Siraj Barzani, IKMAC, 2 March 2006. [272] Response to Landmine
Monitor Questionnaire by Sardar Sdeak Abdulkareem, Executive Director, KORD,
Sulaymaniyah, 6 April 2006. [273] Telephone interview with
Ibrahim Baba-Ali Ismaeel, UNDP, 21 June 2006. [274] “KORD Strategic
Plan for 2006 & 2007,” (internal document) provided by Sardar Sdeak
Abdulkareem, KORD, 17 May 2006. [275] Response to Landmine
Monitor VA Questionnaire by Mette Bucholz, Regional Coordinator Middle East and
North Africa, Norwegian Red Cross, Oslo, 9 May 2006. The 2005 statistics for
these two centers are included in the total ICRC statistics for Iraq. [276] Embassy of Iceland,
Washington DC, “Iceland Contributes 1.5 Millon USD to a Prosthetics
Project in Northern Iraq,” Information Sheet 08/05, 28 April 2005. [277] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 760. [278] International Federation
of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Society, “Operations Update-Iraq:
Humanitarian Emergency,” 14 June 2006, p. 6. [279] “Children’s
mental health affected by insecurity, say specialists,” IRIN
(Baghdad), 7 February 2006. [280] Wa’d Ibrahim,
“New welfare system overwhelmed,” Iraqi Crisis Report, Institute
for War and Peace Reporting, No. 174, 26 April 2006. Average exchange rate
for 2005: US$1 = IQD1500.59058. Landmine Monitor estimate based on www.oanda.com. [281] World Bank, “Iraq:
World Bank Approves Grant for Social Protection,” Washington DC, 9 June
2006. [282] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 763. [283] Response to Landmine
Monitor VA questionnaire by Karen Saba, Program Manager for People with
Disabilities, Iraq, 16 April 2006. [284] CIVIC,
“Humanitarian funding in Iraq,” www.civicworldwide.org,
accessed 29 June 2006. [285] Interview with Noori
Sheikh Razza Koyek, Director, Rozh Society, 3 April 2006. [286] Life for Relief and
Development, Life Link Newsletter, Spring 2006, pp. 4-5. [287] Wa’d Ibrahim,
“New welfare system overwhelmed,” Iraqi Crisis Report, Institute
for War and Peace Reporting, No. 174, 26 April 2006. [288] Email from Sardasht
Abdulrahman, Assistant to the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs,
Sulaymaniyah, 16 August 2005. [289] Email from Jonathan
Eischen, Rotary International World Peace Scholar, Bradford University (UK), 30
May 2006.
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