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Table of Contents
Country Reports
Mozambique, Landmine Monitor Report 2006

Mozambique

Key developments since May 2005: The National Demining Institute’s problems with the recording and reporting of mine action data persisted in 2005 and early 2006. It claimed that humanitarian demining operators cleared 11.3 square kilometers of mined land in 2005; however, the operators reported clearance of only 3.9 square kilometers. Some humanitarian operators continued to re-survey suspected mined areas identified by the Landmine Impact Survey and further confirmed its deficiencies. Two deminers were killed and three others injured during demining in 2005. The Accelerated Demining Program closed for lack of funding. Two of the other three largest operators, Norwegian People’s Aid and HALO Trust, planned to close field operations in 2006 and 2007. A total of 57 new mine/UXO casualties in 23 incidents were reported in 2005, almost twice the casualties in 2004 and four times as many as in 2003. The approved Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper includes actions in favor of people with disabilities, including mine survivors.

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Mozambique signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified it on 25 August 1998 and became a State Party on 1 March 1999. No implementing legislation is in place. In May 2006, Mozambique stated that a draft law was still awaiting approval by the parliament.[1] It made the same statement in April 2005.[2]

Mozambique submitted its seventh annual Article 7 transparency report on 27 April 2006, covering calendar year 2005.[3] The report includes Form J, in which victim assistance is described as “one of the priorities of the Government” and “still the weakest component of the mine action program in the country, due to limitations of financial resources.”[4]

Mozambique participated in the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in Zagreb, Croatia in November-December 2005, where it made statements during the General Exchange of Views and the session on mine clearance, appealing for the continued support of donors.[5]

Mozambique attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in June 2005 and May 2006. During the May meeting it made a statement to the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies.

Mozambique has not engaged in the extensive discussions that States Parties have had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2 and 3, regarding joint military operations with non-States Parties, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and the permissible number of mines retained for training. However, during the June 2004 intersessional meetings, a Mozambique legal advisor told Landmine Monitor that Mozambique was generally supportive of the effort to reach common understanding on these issues.[6]

Production, Transfer and Use

Mozambique has never produced antipersonnel mines.[7] Throughout the civil war, antipersonnel mines were imported from many countries and used by different parties to the conflict.[8] There have been only a small number of isolated instances of use of antipersonnel mines since the conflict ended in 1992, such as by poachers or bandits. There were no incidents reported in 2005 or the first half of 2006.

In early 2005, the Tanzanian government submitted a written request to Mozambique asking for the transfer of 1,000 deactivated antipersonnel mines to be used for training by the internationally-funded Belgian APOPO research project on mine detecting rats. The request was turned down by the Mozambican Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the explanation that Mozambique had no mines in its possession.[9] There have been discussions about the possibility of acquiring the mines from demining organizations in Mozambique, which would store cleared mines for eventual transfer to APOPO in Tanzania with prior authorization from both Mozambican and Tanzanian authorities, in accordance with their Mine Ban Treaty obligations.[10] There is no mention of such transfers in Mozambique’s April 2006 Article 7 report.

Stockpile Destruction and Retained Mines

Mozambique completed destruction of its stockpile of 37,818 antipersonnel mines on 28 February 2003, one month ahead of its treaty-mandated deadline.[11]

Mozambique’s April 2006 Article 7 report indicates that it retained 1,319 antipersonnel mines at the end of 2005.[12] The mines were held by four demining entities: Mozambique Armed Defense Forces (900), HALO Trust (216), Handicap International (185) and RONCO (18).[13] The mines held by HALO are inert and free from explosives, detonators and boosters;[14] as such, they do not constitute antipersonnel mines under the terms of the Mine Ban Treaty.

The total retained is 151 fewer mines than reported the previous year. Those 151 mines belonged to the Accelerated Demining Program and were destroyed when it ended in June 2005. Mozambique did not consume (explode) any of its retained mines during training activities. The director of the National Demining Institute told Landmine Monitor in June 2005 that the training program had been suspended in 2004 due to logistical difficulties, but that he expected it to start later in 2005.[15]

Mozambique has yet to provide details on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines, as agreed by States Parties at the First Review Conference in December 2004. Mozambique did not utilize the new expanded Form D on retained mines agreed to by States Parties at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in December 2005.

Landmine and UXO Problem

Mozambique is affected by landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) as a result of nearly 30 years of conflict that ended in the early 1990s. From 1964 to 1975, the struggle for independence led to the laying of mine belts by the Portuguese colonial rulers along the Tanzanian border and sporadic mining on roads and paths by insurgents from the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, Frelimo).

From independence in 1975 until 1992, Frelimo, which became the ruling party after independence, was violently opposed by the Mozambique National Resistance (Resistência Nacional de Moçambique, Renamo), which was funded by Rhodesia and later South Africa. Frelimo used landmines extensively to protect economic infrastructure and Renamo used them to interdict roads and supply routes.[16] Both Frelimo and Renamo also placed antivehicle mines on roads, bridges and river crossings to inhibit troop movements and damage the economy.[17]

Estimates of the extent of mine and UXO contamination in Mozambique have fallen significantly in recent years. A Landmine Impact Survey (LIS)[18] completed in August 2001 found suspected mined areas (SMAs)[19] in all 10 provinces of Mozambique and in 123 of its 128 districts. It identified 1,374 SMAs, affecting 1,488,998 people in 791 communities. The survey scored 20 communities with a combined population of 36,254 as high-impact, 164 communities with a population of 393,406 scored as medium impact, and the remaining 607 communities with a population of over 1,058,930 were deemed low impact.[20]

The accuracy of the LIS was questioned from the outset. It produced an estimate of the areas affected that operators considered exaggerated (562 square kilometers), and also missed a significant number of mined areas.[21] New estimates produced by the National Demining Institute, based on the LIS results and taking into account subsequent re-surveys and mine clearance, indicated that, at the end of 2005, there were 353 suspected areas affecting approximately 578,000 people in 174 communities and covering an area of 149 square kilometers. Similar data is given in Mozambique’s Article 7 report for 2005.[22] This means that, compared to 2004, the number of affected communities has been reduced by 29, the number of affected areas by 98 and the estimated contaminated area by 23 square kilometers.[23]

However, this figure probably also overstates the real extent of contamination. Three clearance operators have re-surveyed areas identified by the LIS and, when extrapolating from the results of these surveys, the actual extent of affected areas is far lower. According to the UN Development Programme (UNDP) chief technical advisor, “given that since 2001, of the 423 square kilometers visited by operators in the 1,047 LIS-identified areas, only 17.5 square kilometers of land needed clearance, it can be assumed, with caution, that the remaining 149 square kilometers which need clearance may turn out to be only six square kilometers.”[24]

Despite indications that the country’s contamination is far less significant than originally believed, Mozambique still considers that antipersonnel mines have a serious humanitarian impact. In a statement at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties, the Mozambique delegation declared that, “while vast areas are now cleared and contribute to freedom of movement of people and goods – and thus to poverty reduction towards development – the severity with which mines have reached civilians, children and deminers illustrate the seriousness of the mine problem in Mozambique.”[25] However, a review of 10 years of mine action in Mozambique, conducted in 2005 by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), concluded that mine and UXO contamination no longer represents a humanitarian emergency in Mozambique, but is rather a constraint on reconstruction efforts and development.[26]

In 2006, the south of the country was reported to be the most affected with 72 percent of the affected areas, 48 percent of the affected communities and 64 percent of the affected population. Manica and Maputo are believed to be the most affected provinces in the country.[27] In 2005, however, it argued that the provinces of Maputo and Inhambane were the most affected.[28]

Mine Action Program

National Mine Action Authority: Formally, Mozambique does not have a national mine action authority. In practice, the Minister of Foreign Affairs assumes the role of interministerial coordination. The GICHD review stated that the minister “has played a respected and high profile role in the Ottawa process, but – understandably given the natural priorities of a foreign affairs portfolio – has had less influence on the domestic aspects of the mine action program.” The review also recommended that Mozambique establish a national mine action authority as part of efforts to strengthen the government’s management of the mine action program and to change its humanitarian focus to a development focus.[29]

Mine Action Center: The National Demining Institute (Instituto Nacional de Desminagem, IND), established by decree in 1999, is responsible for the coordination of all mine action, under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. IND replaced the National Demining Commission, created in 1995, which had lost the confidence of operators and donors.[30] IND is supported by a UNDP chief technical advisor, who was due to be joined in May 2006 by a technical advisor for operations.[31]

Coordination between IND/UNDP, operators and donors was reported to be poor in 2005; meetings did not include all the relevant stakeholders, such as the armed forces, which caused concern among both operators and donors.[32] Meetings in 2006 were expected to take place every two months; two formal meetings were held in the first quarter of 2006.[33] In March 2006, Ambassador Julio G. Braga replaced Gamiliel Munguambe as director of IND.

IND has two regional offices responsible for the collection of mine action data, as well as for coordination with local authorities and operators to identify clearance priorities; one is in Beira, Sofala province, covering the center of the country, and the other is in Nampula, covering the north. IND’s headquarters in Maputo oversees activities in the south.[34]

Mozambique uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database (version 3), which was installed in May 2001 as part of the LIS. As of May 2006, it was not certain whether version 4 would be installed, given that two major international operators planned to end operations in the country during 2006-2007.[35] In March 2006, UNDP had indicated that GICHD was expected to install the upgraded version of IMSMA in the third quarter of 2006.[36]

The main IMSMA database is located in Maputo, with databases in IND regional offices in Nampula and Beira. Operators send activity reports to the regional offices, which are sent every three months to the Maputo office for synchronization.

In previous years, Landmine Monitor has reported on the problems related to updating the clearance database.[37] The 10-year review by GICHD indicated that some progress had been made in reducing the data entry backlog for operators’ reports.[38] However, significant discrepancies between data reported by operators and data contained in the IND annual report for 2005 indicated that serious problems persist.[39] According to operators, the task list issued by IND has, on several occasions, included SMAs registered in LIS that were previously cleared and/or otherwise been discredited through survey, resulting in operators being tasked to deploy to areas previously cleared by other organizations.[40]

National mine action legislation and standards: On 10 June 1999, the Mozambican Council of Ministers approved Decree 37/99, which replaced the National Demining Commission with the IND and delineated the new institution’s responsibilities.[41] The same day, the Council of Ministers also adopted resolution 17/99, which formally “recognized” the Mine Ban Treaty and laid down a National Mine Action Policy, whose main objectives were to: ensure the government plays a leading role in demining; create a national capacity for demining; ensure that plans and proceedings are consistent with national, provincial, district and community priorities; establish a legal framework for the supervision of demining activities; and avoid any future use of landmines through the creation of supervision mechanisms.[42]

Mine action is regulated by national mine action standards, revised in 2002 to conform with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). The GICHD review reported that, in 2005, the national standards were not translated into Portuguese, despite the fact that operators (mostly Mozambican) are required to deliver detailed standing operating procedures in Portuguese to IND based on the national standards in order to be accredited.[43] Translation into Portuguese was expected to be completed at the end of May 2006.[44]


Strategic Planning and Progress

Based on the LIS results, the government drafted in November 2001 a National Mine Action Plan (NMAP) for 2002-2006 which had as its central objective the achievement of a “mine impact free” status by 2012, with all high and medium impact areas cleared by the end of 2006, all low impact areas surveyed and marked, fully operational national mine risk education and long-term victim assistance programs.[45] However, over the years, the initial goals have been modified in IND’s annual plans. In November 2004, Mozambique announced that it would comply with the Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline, and the IND’s annual plans of March 2005 and March 2006 modified the end-target, aiming to become mine-free by 2009.[46]

In 2005 and 2006, IND annual plans were based on information from provincial governments, as well as the LIS; IND reported this information as “completely changing, to an alarming degree,” the basis on which the NMAP was drafted.[47] The prioritization process for demining was changed to involve district and provincial authorities, who prepare annual priorities in consultation with operators before submitting them to IND, which then draws up the final plan.[48]

Mine action operators and provincial governments had very little confidence in the NMAP as a basis for planning and prioritization of mine action, because it was based on the LIS. Despite concerns expressed since the LIS was completed in 2001, the government was slow to acknowledge the extent of LIS inaccuracies.[49] By March 2006, however, IND acknowledged in its annual report for 2005 that determining the real extent of the mine problem constituted the biggest challenge for Mozambique and would need the efforts of all stakeholders, principally humanitarian operators, IND and local authorities.[50] The annual report included a table showing the discrepancies between the LIS results and the areas subsequently surveyed (or cancelled) by operators.[51] However, IND stated in its 2006 plan that, “although it has certain gaps, the LIS still constitutes the principal source of information to set priorities.”[52]

The GICHD review said that the NMAP was inadequate in terms of Mozambique’s current and future needs, and recommended that the mine action program be realigned to support the country’s development agenda.[53] In May 2006, UNDP Mozambique reported that IND would prepare a new strategy for 2007-2009.[54]

For 2005 and 2006, IND’s demining priorities were technical survey, clearance of high and medium impact areas, mine risk education and support for victim assistance programs. Operators were given 128 tasks,[55] determined by the need to clear land for resettlement or for social infrastructure. For 2006, 138 tasks were given to three operators in eight provinces (84 in the north, 41 in the center and 13 in the south).[56] In 2005 and 2006, IND’s institutional-building goals were reported to be: strengthening the planning process through better coordination with local authorities and operators; improving the quality of information received; consolidating the quality assurance teams and training them in survey; and furthering efforts to create a national demining capacity.[57]

In May 2006, the Council of Ministers approved Mozambique’s second Poverty Reduction Strategy (Plano de Acçãode Redução da Pobreza Absoluta, PARPA II), including mine action as a crosscutting issue and as a sectoral issue. PARPA II, which covers 2006-2010, recognizes the negative socioeconomic impact of landmines and plans for the clearance of affected regions in order to reduce or avoid the loss of human life, to allow for the implementation of economic projects and to increase the population’s mobility.[58] Under the heading of education, PARPA II calls for mine risk education to be carried out in schools in affected areas and for clearance needs to be included in school-expansion projects. Prior to 2005, mine action was not reflected in Mozambique’s initial PARPA, nor in the draft PARPA II presented in August 2005; mine action was included after concerted lobbying by IND, UNDP and the operators, Handicap International (HI) and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA).[59] It was claimed that the incorporation of mine action into PARPA II will encourage all development projects to include a demining component.[60]

PARPA II operationalizes the five-year government program (2005-2009), which aims to reduce absolute poverty and encourage development. The program, prepared every time a new government takes office, was established in May 2005 and included for the first time mine action as a crosscutting issue. Four mine action objectives were included: clearance of mined areas and destruction of identified antipersonnel mines and UXO, marking of suspected mined areas, implementation of assistance programs for mine victims and mine risk education.[61]

Based on the five-year program, the Council of Ministers, in collaboration with several other ministries, prepares annual economic and social plans.[62] The mine-related objectives of the 2006 Economic and Social Plan included continued clearance and survey of mine-affected areas, and development of national clearance capacity.[63]

Evaluations of Mine Action

GICHD’s 2005 review of Mozambique’s mine action program aimed to “look at the historical context of the program, outline the achievements, relate them to overarching development plans and most importantly analyze the tasks that lie ahead.” It was commissioned by the UNDP Country Office in Maputo, in collaboration with the government. It pointed to the need to better quantify the remaining humanitarian and development challenges (through re-survey and improvements in IMSMA updates and accuracy) and to make stronger links between mine action and development and reconstruction. The review suggested enhancing the policy framework by including government agencies not usually part of mine action and establishing two new, separate bodies, a national mine action authority and a national mine action center.[64] Reportedly, by the end of April 2006, IND had not discussed the GICHD recommendations of October 2005.[65]

Summary of Efforts to Comply with Article 5

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Mozambique is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but no later than 1 March 2009. At the Sixth Meeting of States Parties, Mozambique said that the withdrawal of donors and demining operators caused concern regarding accomplishment of the 2009 deadline, as it is not in a position to conduct the demining program by itself;[66] Mozambique has received 12 years of international support.

At the Standing Committee meetings in May 2006, Mozambique confirmed its “total commitment... in pursuit of compliance with its Article 5 obligations,” and stated again that it is dependent on external support. [67]

According to HALO, the four provinces in which they operate (Niassa, Nampula, Zambézia and Cabo Delgado) will be considered mine impact-free by the end of 2006. The GICHD review stated that, “IND data suggests that an average of over 5.5 million square meters has been cleared per year since 2000; meanwhile, an analysis of data from IND and deminers suggests the total contamination is far lower than had been feared.... From this perspective, the ‘mine impact free’ target is in sight, although some residual capacity for demining and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) will need to be sustained to deal with threats emerging from residual contamination.”[68] It should be noted that “mine impact-free” does not meet the Article 5 requirement that all mines in mined and mine-suspected areas should be destroyed (“mine-free”).

Demining

Six organizations conducted clearance in 2005, including HALO Trust in the four northern provinces (Niassa, Nampula, Zambézia and Cabo Delgado), Norwegian People’s Aid in the center (Tete, Sofala and Manica provinces), and the UN-sponsored Accelerated Demining Program and Handicap International in the south. Additional clearance capacity was provided in 2005 by a US-funded quick reaction demining force established in Mozambique and supervised by RONCO Consulting Corporation to tackle emergency clearance worldwide. When not deployed abroad, it is available to work on demining projects as requested by IND.[69] In 2005, operations were performed at Boquisso in Maputo province and at Chicamba in Manica province in the southern region, on the Mutara-Moatize railway line in Tete province and in Buzi, Muanza, in Sofala province.[70]

The Mozambique Armed Defense Force (Forças Armadas de Moçambique, FADM) also carried out some clearance in 2005. The US Department of State continued to fund demining in Mozambique in 2006. It provided funding and equipment for three FADM demining units; however, FADM’s operating budget does not support the operations of all three units.[71] IND considers RONCO and FADM to be humanitarian operators, given their access to international funding and humanitarian clearance priorities.[72]

During 2005, changes occurred in the mine action program and its implementation. In June 2005, the Accelerated Demining Program ceased operations due to lack of funding.[73] The Irish government and UNDP put forward US$700,000 to compensate deminers, partially covering the $1.8 million needed for redundancy payments to all staff; the balance was disbursed at the end of 2005 by the government.[74] In August 2005, former staff registered a new organization, Associated Demining Project; it received accreditation in October and was reported to be seeking funding in March 2006.[75] IND said the closure has left a serious lack of capacity in the south of Mozambique, as the limited capacities of FADM and HI operating there cannot meet the scale of mine/UXO contamination.[76]

IND reported that seven new operators received accreditation in 2005 and that, as of March 2006, there were 17 mine action operators (10 commercial companies and seven national NGOs).[77] However, only five operators ASM, EMD, JVD, REASeuro and MMA/Armorgroup were reported as having conducted clearance operations in 2005.[78] Landmine Monitor visited a local NGO operator, the Mozambican Association of Deminers (Associação de Sapadores Mozambicanos, ASM), which also reported conducting clearance in 2005 for a Chinese company and a governmental agency; as of December 2005, it lacked equipment and funding to continue carrying out operations.[79]

Two of Mozambique’s largest operators, HALO and NPA, planned to cease field operations in 2006-2007. NPA initially planned to finish the re-survey of Manica, Sofala and Tete provinces and to release all operational staff at the end of April 2006. However, after a positive response from its main donor, the Government of Norway, as well as IND, it offered to re-survey the southern provinces of Gaza and Maputo, retaining until September 2006 some staff to finalize database input, map production and IMSMA synchronization.[80] HALO had planned to withdraw in December 2006, following the completion of survey and clearance operations in the four northern provinces; this end-date has been revised to the first half of 2007.[81]

The departure of these major operators leaves a large number of trained human resources behind. However, no clear decision has been made by the government regarding its preferred solution to the need of a long-term national capacity.[82] NPA reports that of its recently released mine action staff, only one staff person was absorbed by a demining organization; all the remaining were faced with joining the Mozambican labor market with official unemployment rates of more than 20 percent. All staff released by NPA received compensation package entitlements and additional vocational training to facilitate employment in other sectors, as their demining skills could not, despite efforts, be used elsewhere under Mozambican management and funding.[83]

With the intention that it becomes the national residual mine action capacity for Mozambique, FADM presented a Humanitarian Mine Action Program to the IND/UNDP/operators/donors meeting in February 2006. As of April, the issue was said to be “in progress.”[84]

Identification of Mined Areas: Surveys and Assessments

The process of re-surveying SMAs identified by the LIS continued in 2005. According to IND, during 2005, HALO, NPA, HI and two IND quality assurance teams surveyed 1.9 square kilometers of mine-affected areas, cancelled 3.7 square kilometers and area-reduced more than 72 square kilometers, most of the latter the result of HALO’s work.[85] The operators report different data.[86]

For the first time, IND included in its 2005 annual report a detailed chart of the re-surveying carried out by March 2006 and the re-surveying remaining to be done. Of the 1,374 areas identified by the LIS, 1,074 have been visited since completion of the survey in August 2001 (representing 423,967,154 square meters); 517 of them were cancelled (48 percent; 283,597,651 square meters), 506 were cleared (47 percent; 122,906,629 square meters), and 52 areas remained to be addressed. An additional 215 mine-affected areas (2,369,384 square meters) not in the LIS were subsequently identified.[87]

HALO, NPA and HI consolidated their survey data and reported comparable results. Since October 2004, HALO has re-surveyed the four northern provinces, with the purpose of making them “mine impact-free” and to serve as the basis for withdrawing from Mozambique in 2007. In villages where a threat was identified, HALO proposed to investigate and, if necessary, clear the mines or UXO; where no threat existed, village representatives sign a declaration stating that it is impact-free.[88] As of April 2006, 10 teams of four personnel conducted this type of survey, which was completed in Cabo Delgado province (apart from two districts containing Portuguese mine belts) and was due to be completed in Niassa province by the end of May 2006. Zambézia and Nampula provinces, in addition to the two mine belts in Cabo Delgado, were expected to be completed in 2007. A basic post-clearance socioeconomic impact survey was also conducted on areas previously cleared by HALO [89]

By March 2006, HALO had assessed 558 SMAs; 356 (64 percent) were cancelled, 202 (36 percent) were confirmed and a further 147 new minefields not registered by the LIS were surveyed and cleared by HALO.[90] It is not clear if IND has accepted HALO’s claim that these provinces are or will be mine impact-free. In December 2005, IND reported that first, “they had to see if the provincial authorities are reporting different facts.” As of March 2006, quality assurance visits by IND had not been conducted. [91]

NPA, as part of its exit strategy, started in September 2005 a tailored survey to re-verify the 521 SMAs registered by the LIS in the provinces of Sofala, Manica and Tete. If an SMA is confirmed, its polygon is registered and a task impact assessment is conducted to facilitate priority setting of future mine action. NPA simultaneously carried out a post-clearance impact assessment on all areas where it had worked since starting operations in 1993. NPA had 10 teams of two or three people in 2005-2006. The re-survey and task impact assessment was initially planned for the three provinces, but was later enlarged to include the two southern provinces of Gaza and Maputo. Operations were expected to be completed in September 2006.[92]

By January 2006, NPA assessed a total of 137 SMAs registered by the LIS; 112 (82 percent) were cancelled due to lack of compelling evidence of any contamination, resulting in a reduction of 7,489,169 square meters of the estimated total contaminated area. The remaining 25 SMAs (18 percent) were confirmed and measured, and 22 additional areas not registered by the LIS were found, amounting to 5,563,895 square meters of additional SMA.[93]

HI adopted an “achievement strategy” in January 2005, in the provinces of Inhambane, Sofala and Manica; initially it aimed to clear or cancel by June 2006 all 250 suspected areas of under 15,000 square meters identified in the LIS, in 32 districts of the three provinces. HI anticipated reaching an “impact-controlled” stage in these provinces by June 2007, meaning that a maximum of existing SMAs would be cleared, the remaining ones would be marked and mine risk education would be conducted for local communities. As of April 2006, HI had operated in 22 districts and cleared or cancelled 585 SMAs, more than twice the original plan.[94]

HI consolidated survey results from the last two years. Preliminary data for Inhambane province indicated that of the 131 SMAs registered in the LIS, HI had cancelled 60 percent. HI also conducted tasks on an additional 145 SMAs identified from information collected at the local level and not registered in the LIS. Of these 145, 63 percent were cleared and 37 percent were cancelled.[95]

By March 2006, according to IND, 448 areas remained to be surveyed (125,236,573 square meters). An additional 215 new areas were identified, of which 110 needed further visits.[96]

Marking and Fencing

Marking or fencing of mined and mine-suspected areas is “rarely” conducted in Mozambique, according to UNDP.[97] HALO had not conducted any permanent fencing or marking and was unlikely to do so as it planned to clear all known mined areas in the northern provinces before ceasing operations.[98] NPA marks polygons with semi-permanent benchmarks and turning points of all areas re-surveyed. It also re-verifies the outer perimeters of previously cleared areas to ensure synchronization of IMSMA data held by IND.[99] HI planned to start marking as part of its activities, as of June 2006.[100]

Mine and UXO Clearance

IND reported that, in 2005, 11.3 square kilometers of land were cleared, destroying 36,613 mines and 299 UXO. HALO destroyed 99.4 percent of all mines destroyed in 2005, due to the high density Portuguese-laid mine belts in Cabo Delgado. IND estimated that the amount of land cleared more than doubled between 2004 and 2005, from 5,006,731 square meters in 2004 to 11,307,522 square meters in 2005.[101]

According to IND, this is the first year that clearance operations exceeded the goal set by Mozambique’s Five-Year Mine Action Plan 2002-2006 of 10 square kilometers per year. IND claimed that this is explained by RONCO’s increased clearance activities on the Sena railway line.[102] However, IND reported RONCO cleared 259,863 square meters in 2004 and RONCO itself reported clearing 518,232 square meters in 2005, indicating an increase of 258,369 square meters.[103]

IND reported that in 2005 FADM was tasked with areas allocated to, but not cleared by, the Accelerated Demining Program (ADP) and therefore increased its clearance substantially from 2004.[104] In addition, IND reported that commercial operators cleared or surveyed 19.1 square kilometers in 2005, which resulted in the discovery and destruction of eight mines and 17 UXO.[105]

However, the data reported by IND is significantly different than that reported by operators.[106] HI said that this issue was discussed with IND in one of the IND/UNDP/donors/operators meetings held in the first quarter of 2006. Since each operator has its own way of reporting data, IND is allegedly trying to accommodate every way of reporting. Also, it seems that IND does not consistently distinguish between EOD tasks and clearance.[107]

Clearance reported by HALO, NPA, HI and RONCO, and clearance which IND reported for FADM and ADP, total 3.9 square kilometers cleared in 2005, with 36,767 antipersonnel mines, three antivehicle mines and 1,063 UXO destroyed. This is a decrease from the area cleared by humanitarian operators in 2004 (4.9 square kilometers).[108]

Area (square meters) Cleared, Reduced/Cancelled and Surveyed, and Mines/UXO Destroyed in Mozambique in 2005[109]

Operator
Mine clearance
Antipersonnel mines
Antivehicle mines
Battle area clearance
UXO
Area reduced/ cancelled
Technical survey
664,478
69
0
0
15
8,326,268
108,450
HALO[111]
1,978,257
36,494
3
N/A
286
1,410,740
399,478
RONCO[112]
518,232
58
0
0
57
0
7,720,768
331,199
79
0
0
570
0
0
FADM
121,410
56
0
0
131
0
0
ADP
287,906
11
0
0
4
0
0
Humanitarian
3,901,482
36,767
3
0
1,063
0
8,228,696
ASM
1,032
6
0
0
0
0
0
EMD
13,902,324
2
0
0
17
0
0
JVD
65,427
0
0
0
0
0
0
MMA
N/A
0
0
0
0
0
0
REASeuro
5,133,200
0
0
0
0
0
0
Commercial
19,101,983
8
0
0
17
0
0
TOTAL
23,003,465
36,775
3
0
1,080
9,737,008
8,228,696

IND reported that 838 deminers were involved in operations in 2005; more than half were employed by HALO. Mozambique had 14 machines and a mine detection dog capacity of 34 dogs, in addition to 12 rats.[114] HALO, NPA and HI all used manual and mechanical techniques, and NPA and HI also used mine detection dogs. RONCO used manual and dog techniques. HALO stopped using dogs in January 2005, having concluded that they were unreliable.[115]

NPA reduced its human resource capacity in the second half of 2005, as part of its exit strategy, from 122 to 45 staff and transferred its dog capacity and mine resistant vehicles.[116]

IND reported having conducted 79 quality assurance (QA) visits in 2005.[117] Some operators reported that a lesser number of visits were made. HALO said that only 10 visits were made on their minefield tasks, in contrast to the 22 claimed by IND.[118] IND has three QA teams, based in each of the branches.[119] IND reported that, overall, national demining standards were respected by the operators; some aspects could be improved, particularly communication between teams, personal protective equipment and the “modalities” of deminers’ insurance.[120] A study of insurance policies was planned by IND for 2006.[121] Humanitarian operators also have their own internal quality control procedures.[122]

Humanitarian operators also conducted EOD in 2005. NPA conducted 27 EOD spot tasks in Sofala and Manica provinces, while conducting surveys, destroying 177 UXO, two mines and 148 pieces of small arms ammunition.[123] HALO reported that it destroyed 97 antipersonnel mines, one antivehicle mine and 218 UXO during EOD operations.[124]

After clearance operations are completed, land is normally handed over through a formal ceremony with the participation of the local government authority, community leaders and IND officials. UNDP reports that on rare occasions, no ceremony took place and the end-users began to use the land; no casualties were reported following the use of these areas.[125]

Deminer Safety: Three accidents involving five deminers occurred in 2005; four worked for HALO (two killed, two injured) and the fifth, who worked for NPA, was injured. HALO and IND conducted investigations, and extensive refresher training was implemented, but no changes were made to operating procedures.[126] NPA and IND investigated the third accident, revealing that the deminer was in breach of NPA’s standing operating procedures; refresher training was held.[127]

HI, HALO and NPA deminers are insured through international companies.[128] RONCO deminers are insured but details are not available.[129] FADM deminers are believed not to be insured.[130]

The GICHD review reported that high rates of long-term illnesses among demining teams have given cause for concern. A significant percentage of the staff of some operators were unable to work because of illnesses often associated with HIV/AIDS; GICHD cited NPA and ADP as having lost approximately eight percent of operational capacity due to AIDS-related diseases in 2003. The review concluded that, “there is every reason to fear that deminers serve as a vector of transmission, both to communities in mine-affected areas and to their wives or sexual partners at home.”[131] In 2004, the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) review encouraged IND, in close collaboration with all operators and the UN, to develop standard HIV/AIDS policies for all operators.[132] NPA and HALO have an HIV/AIDS personnel policy in place; RONCO does not.[133] HI reported that an HIV/AIDS policy at the program level was to be implemented shortly.[134]

In July 2005, the Ministry of Labor rejected an appeal by RONCO against a fine imposed for violating Mozambique’s ban on compulsory HIV tests.[135] RONCO appealed again; as of April 2006, no developments had been reported.[136] A similar case was brought against ArmorGroup/MMA for allegedly hiring deminers to work in Cyprus based on HIV results.[137] In May 2006, ArmorGroup/MMA reported that the case was being considered by its legal advisors.[138]

Research and Development

APOPO is a Belgian organization that has developed technology to detect landmines through the use of trained rats. Although the research, training of animals and analysis of results takes place in Tanzania, field trials and operations were conducted in Mozambique where APOPO worked in collaboration with HI. As of March 2006, APOPO had 200 rats in training and employed approximately 100 people. In 2005, APOPO had an annual budget for both the Tanzanian program and the Mozambican program of €1,559,170 ($1,941,011).[139]

APOPO was registered in Mozambique as an NGO and accredited by IND on 10 September 2003, and again on 10 December 2005. APOPO rats passed official licensing tests according to IMAS standards, under IND and GICHD supervision. Until June 2005, APOPO conducted operations with ADP in Vilanculos (Inhambane province). Since then, APOPO has worked with HI. Field operations were expected to start in May 2006 on demining tasks conducted in Inhambane.[140]

Mine Risk Education

In its Article 7 report for 2005 and in the IND’s 2005 report, Mozambique stressed the importance of mine risk education (MRE).[141] MRE was identified as one of the principal activities in the National Mine Action Plan 2002-2006; it was referred to as “civic education about the danger of landmines.”[142] However, little MRE took place in 2005 and in 2006 through to May.

During 2005, “basic MRE” was provided by IND to “a little over 7,800 people” in the districts of Gorongosa and Chibabava (Sofala province), to “a little over 4,000 people” in Cahora Bassa, Magoé and Chifunda districts (Tete province), and to 310 people including teachers, students and others in Manica district (Manica province).[143] IND appealed to provincial and district authorities to take responsibility for informing the population on the risk of mines. In December 2005, IND received $20,000 from South Korea, part of which was used to enable quality assurance teams in Gaza and Maputo provinces to also deliver MRE.[144]

IND had five MRE staff, two based in the Maputo headquarters, two in the Beira branch office and one in the Nampula office.[145] During 2005, IND’s MRE staff trained 49 deminers from HI and 81 governmental civic education officers from two districts, Manica (Manica province) and Chibabava (Sofala province).[146] Training covered delivering MRE and also data collection on mines/UXO and survivors.[147] HI printed a new series of MRE materials in 2005-2006.[148]

No substantial follow-up was reported on the MRE training of schoolteachers in Inhambane reported in last year’s Landmine Monitor report.[149]

There are different views on the need for MRE in Mozambique. At the Standing Committee meetings in May 2006, as well as in its Article 7 report and the IND reports for 2005 and 2006, Mozambique stresses the need for MRE, especially in view of the number of casualties.[150] However, the GICHD review in 2005 reported that, “Given the great progress in reducing landmine accidents and victims, stand-alone MRE projects seem no longer warranted, ... [but demining] operators should continue to provide MRE sessions to local residents when they move to a new vicinity.”[151] UNDP stated that stand-alone MRE is of limited value, unless marking or clearance/EOD will help the community to deal with the threat, but demining operators in Mozambique have done very limited, if any, MRE or community liaison. UNDP emphasizes that there has to be MRE where there is mine clearance.[152]

Funding and Assistance

Landmine Monitor identified total mine action funding for Mozambique of some $12.6 million in 2005, including government funds reported by IND. Twelve donor countries reported contributing a total of some $10 million to mine action in Mozambique in 2005. This was a substantial decrease from some $12 million donated by 14 countries and the European Commission (EC) in 2004.[153] Donor countries in 2005 were:

  • Austria: €364,690 ($454,003) to HI for demining;[154]
  • Canada: C$250,000 ($206,356) for demining;[155]
  • France: €570,000 ($709,593) for mine clearance;[156]
  • Germany: €179,406 ($223,342), consisting of €166,016 ($206,673) for mine clearance, and €13,390 ($16,669) to the German Red Cross for orthopedic and physiotherapeutic assistance to mine survivors;[157]
  • Italy: €200,000 ($248,980) to UNDP;[158]
  • Japan: ¥71,764,579 ($651,754) to HALO for mine clearance;[159]
  • Republic of Korea: $20,000 to UNDP;[160]
  • Netherlands: €584,024 ($727,051) to HALO for mine clearance and MRE;[161]
  • Norway: NOK8,500,000 ($1,319,630) to NPA for mine clearance;[162]
  • New Zealand: NZ$91,256 ($64,326) to UNDP for mine risk education;[163]
  • Switzerland: CHF852,000 ($683,843), consisting of CHF490,000 ($393,290) to HALO for mine clearance, CHF162,000 ($130,026) to HI for mine clearance, and CHF200,000 ($160,527) to HI for MRE;[164]
  • US: $4,688,264, consisting of $4,463,528 from the Department of State, including $2,127,528 for quick reaction demining force operations in Mozambique in support of IND, $1,666,000 for training and support to FADM, and $676,000 to HALO; and $224,736 from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to Landmine Survivors Network for victim assistance.[165]

In addition, Adopt-a-Minefield reported providing $258,273 to the Accelerated Demining Program for mine clearance, $35,001 to Landmine Survivors Network for survivor assistance and $50,003 to Mozambique Red Cross Society for survivor assistance.[166]

IND reported that the Mozambican government contributed 52.9 billion Meticais ($2,299,860) to mine action in 2005.[167] IND has reported wide fluctuations in government financial support to mine action from 2003-2005: 178 billion Meticais ($7.9 million) in 2004, and 18 billion Meticais ($818,181) in 2003.[168] The government contribution in 2005 was allocated to the process of closing ADP, paying customs excises on demining equipment and operating costs of IND.[169]

IND reported that 10 governments, the EC, UNDP, Association for Aid and Relief Japan/Tokyo Broadcasting System and HI contributed some $11.8 million in 2005.[170] This was a lesser amount than the $14.3 million reported for 2004.[171] Dispersed funding as reported by IND declined in both 2004 and 2005.[172]

Landmine and UXO Casualties

In 2005, IND reported 57 new mine/UXO casualties in 20 incidents and three demining accidents. Twenty-one civilians were killed and 31 injured, including 13 women and 15 children. Five deminers were involved in three accidents (two killed, three injured).[173] This is a significant increase both in casualties and incidents from 2004, when there were 30 new mine/UXO casualties (three killed, 27 injured) in 13 incidents/accidents. Compared with 2003, there were four times more casualties in 2005.[174] The 2005 casualty level is close to that of 1999, when 60 casualties were recorded.[175]

IND recorded casualties in the following provinces: Tete (19; four killed, 15 injured, including nine women and one child; six incidents); Sofala (17; eight killed, nine injured, including two women and 11 children; five incidents and one demining accident); Niassa (six; three killed, three injured, including three children; three incidents and one demining accident); Maputo (five; one killed, four injured; three incidents); Manica (four killed, including two women and one child; one incident); Cabo Delgado (three; two killed, one injured; one demining accident); Zambézia (two children killed in one incident); and Nampula (one man injured in one incident). IND recorded 70 percent of casualties in 56.6 percent of the incidents/accidents in the central part of the country. Women and children made up more than 50 percent of the civilian casualties (women 25 percent, children nearly 29 percent). Reportedly, the limited availability of MRE programs is reflected in the high number of children involved in landmine incidents.[176]

Casualties continued to be reported in 2006. As of 23 May 2006, IND recorded 14 new mine/UXO casualties in seven incidents/accidents. Six people were killed and eight injured; at least nine were children. Two deminers were injured while conducting clearance operations in Cabo Delgado. Most incidents occurred during agricultural activities, but many of the incidents with children were caused while playing with explosive devices.[177]

The number of reported casualties likely does not represent the total number of people killed or injured in mine incidents, as the ability to collect and record data is limited. Data is collected by the police, Mozambique Red Cross Society, hospitals, IND and others.[178] The government reported that it has made a greater effort to collect data on mine incidents to assist in the provision of healthcare, and to ensure survivor’s social and economic reintegration.[179]

The total number of mine casualties in Mozambique is not known; however, estimates are as high as 30,000. Between 1996 and 23 May 2006, 751 mine casualties were recorded. It is acknowledged that this figure does not represent the true situation in the country.[180] The most comprehensive collection of casualty data remains the nationwide Landmine Impact Survey, concluded in August 2001; it recorded 2,145 mine/UXO casualties.[181]

Survivor Assistance

At the First Review Conference, Mozambique was identified as one of 24 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors, and with “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing for the care, rehabilitation and reintegration of survivors.[182] Mozambique prepared its 2005-2009 objectives for the Sixth Meeting of State Parties in November-December 2005. The objectives included: expand rehabilitation services to all provinces and improve staff capacity, infrastructure, supplies, the information and referral system, transportation and coordination by 2009; enhance counseling services, disabled people’s organizations and inclusive education; and identify economic opportunities including income-generating activities. Objectives concerning data collection and emergency and ongoing medical care were not included.[183]

In June 2005, Mozambique participated in the workshop on advancing landmine victim assistance in Africa, which was hosted by the co-chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, to assist States Parties in developing a plan of action to meet the aims of the Nairobi Action Plan in relation to mine victim assistance.

At the Standing Committee meetings in May 2006, Mozambique did not make a statement on the progress made in achieving its 2005-2009 objectives.

Mozambique submitted voluntary Form J, providing information on victim assistance activities, with its annual Article 7 report on 27 April 2006, and reiterated that victim assistance is the “weakest component” of its mine action program due to limited financial resources.[184]

The National Mine Action Plan 2002-2006 affirmed IND’s coordinating role in mine victim assistance. However, IND’s role in victim assistance “appears to be limited to donor liaison and reporting for purposes of the Convention,” according to the GICHD review in 2005.[185]

Assistance programs for mine survivors face major difficulties due to lack of financial resources; the needs of survivors greatly exceed available assistance.[186] Responsibility for mine survivor assistance is shared by the Ministry of Health (Ministério da Saúde, MINSAU) and the Ministry for Women and Social Action ((Ministério da Mulher e da Acção Social, MMAS). MINSAU assisted 12 mine survivors in the provinces of Niassa, Cabo Delgado, Nampula and Zambézia in 2005.[187] MMAS supports various initiatives, including community-based rehabilitation activities.[188]

Mozambique’s healthcare infrastructure was severely damaged during almost 30 years of armed conflict, and in the floods of 2000. There is a lack of immediate first aid treatment as local health centers can only provide limited assistance and need to refer to rural and district hospitals for emergency and surgical care, whereas specialized care is only available at the provincial and central hospitals. Health services are also provided in private clinics and by international NGOs, bilateral cooperation and religious organizations. Traditional healers reportedly provide services to nearly 60 percent of the population. In rural areas, 72 percent of people live more than an hour from the nearest health center.[189] Mine casualties are usually assisted by relatives or other members of the community, and transported by bicycles, donkeys or other means to the nearest hospital; the average journey takes about eight hours. There are 10 hospitals capable of providing assistance to mine casualties, one in each province; however, trained surgeons, medical equipment and drugs are in short supply partly due to a lack of planning.[190]

Since 2001, the World Health Organization (WHO) has provided technical support to the Ministry of Health (MINSAU) and MMAS to strengthen capacities to respond to victims of violence and traumatic injuries, including landmine casualties. In 2005, a WHO-conducted situation assessment made recommendations for the development of a pre-hospital care system, improvement of emergency care services in Maputo and greater capacity for medical rehabilitation. WHO also contributed to the development of the National Plan of Action on Disability within the framework of the African Decade. WHO plans to concentrate on strengthening the injury surveillance system, improving the capacity of rehabilitation services and resource mobilization.[191]

In 2005, hospitals in Mozambique treated 1,038 people registered as disabled: 397 disabled people were newly registered, 106 had been registered before and 535 were outpatients.[192]

Reportedly, “rehabilitation services are available at all central, general, provincial and rural hospitals and health clinics with surgical facilities.”[193] However, at the national level there has been a lack of coordination between the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Women and Social Action and IND, and landmine survivors and their families have not been involved in policy-making and planning.[194] Mozambique has 10 orthopedic centers, 60 physiotherapy centers and 10 transit centers specifically designated to host people with disabilities undergoing treatment. The government, through MINSAU, operates nine orthopedic centers. All the government-run orthopedic centers are located in the provincial capitals, far from the mine-affected areas, making access difficult for people from rural areas. The Mozambique Red Cross Society runs the orthopedic center in Gaza. There is no orthopedic center in the province of Manica. According to the MINSAU Physical Therapy and Rehabilitation Program-Strategy 2005-2009, two new orthopedic centers will be opened in Xai-Xai and Chimoio, in Manica Province in the medium term, but a date is not specified.[195] In August 2005, the Vilankulo Orthopedic Center, in Inhambane province, was officially re-opened with support from the Rotary Club of Pretoria East, South Africa, in partnership with other Mozambican and South African organizations. The center was built after the conflict ended to assist disabled ex-combatants and civilian mine survivors.[196] All the centers provide services free of charge for war-injured, including mine survivors, funded by the state. However, access is limited because survivors are not well aware of the services available, face difficulties getting referrals, and cannot afford transport and accommodation. Devices are made by national technicians, including 19 prosthetic/orthotic technicians and 30 assistants, with the more experienced technicians providing on-the-job training to the less experienced ones. There are 140 physiotherapists and physiotherapy assistants.[197] According to MINSAU’s rehabilitation strategy, there are 86 technical personnel in the nine government-run centers and in the medium term this will be increased to 89. In the long-term, technical staff will be increased to 104 and research into new techniques will be conducted.[198] Most of the equipment is reportedly obsolete and not functioning. There are regular shortages of raw materials and, due to a lack of trained staff, there are long waiting lists for services.[199] MINSAU estimates the annual cost of rehabilitation services at the nine orthopedic centers as approximately $500,000; it has launched tenders for upgrading equipment.[200]

In 2005, the nine government orthopedic centers produced 409 prostheses, 722 orthoses, 84 wheelchairs, 3,061 assistive devices, 351 orthopedic shoes, and 422 other mobility accessories for people with disabilities. The centers also repaired 522 prostheses, 96 orthoses, 261 wheelchairs, and 119 orthopedic shoes. [201]

The Mozambique Red Cross Society operates the Jaipur Orthopedic Center in Gaza province, which produces and repairs prostheses and other mobility devices. A Jaipur Mobile Orthopedic Unit also operates free of charge throughout Gaza province. Referrals are made through the network of Red Cross volunteers, and by provincial and district departments of health and coordination of social action. In 2005, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD) started to support the center with orthopedic components, polypropylene materials and a training workshop.[202] The center has the capacity to assist about 240 people a year. In 2005, it assisted 210 people, including 81 landmine survivors, and produced 59 prostheses, 47 pairs of crutches and 104 other assistive devices. It was unable to assist more people due to the lack of orthopedic material, equipment and wheelchairs in Mozambique, and faced challenges improving the quality of prostheses and orthoses produced.[203] In the first quarter of 2006, the center assisted 80 people with disabilities, including 25 mine survivors. Two technicians took training courses at centers in other countries. The Red Cross also facilitated transport to the orthopedic centers and supported socioeconomic reintegration activities in the provinces of Gaza, Inhambane, Manica, Zambézia and Tete. In 2004, a pilot program was introduced to provide vocational training, disability awareness and social support; in 2005, training was provided in management of small projects; income-generating activities included agriculture and animal production, and families received local material for the construction of houses. Approximately 22 people have directly benefited from the project since 2004. From January to March 2006, four beneficiaries received fishing material and nine mine survivors (including four women) benefited from receiving goats. The project was sponsored by the Jaipur Limb Campaign until October 2005, and by Adopt-a-Minefield from October 2005 to April 2006.[204] The socioeconomic reintegration program has a waiting list due to a lack of funding, and activities were slowed down further by the high poverty and illiteracy level of the participants. The Jaipur Orthopedic Center also advocated and organized workshops for disabled people. Its annual budget is $150,000. In 2005, funding was provided by the German and Portuguese Red Cross Societies, Adopt-a-Minefield, Disability and Development Partners, and ICRC-SFD.[205]

In 2005, Handicap International implemented a project to support and coordinate sports activities for people with disabilities in Beira city and Sofala province. The project was supported by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[206] Approximately 20 people were trained in sports for the disabled and each headed a sports group. The project concluded in February 2006. HI has provided support to organizations working with people with disabilities, such as by donating used computers or by providing organizational assistance. In 2006, HI planned to recruit a disability officer to liaise with partners at the national level and reinforce HI’s activities in the field of disability.[207]

The Ministry for Women and Social Action coordinates psychosocial and socioeconomic reintegration activities, including the ABC program.[208] In Maputo Central Hospital and Beira Central Hospital, one staff member is trained in psychosocial support. The Ministry shares responsibility for providing orthopedic and physiotherapy services with MINSAU. Within that framework, it manages transit centers located near MINSAU orthopedic workshops in Maputo, Inhambane and Sofala.[209] In the transit centers, survivors receive accommodation during their rehabilitation, and there are social welfare technicians to provide psychosocial support. The technicians have not received formal training in psychosocial support; some of them are people with disabilities. Additionally, the ministry provides income-generating activities.[210] It organizes information sessions at the district level to create awareness, and guarantees free transportation for disabled people from their homes to the orthopedic center.[211]

Independent groups and the Association of People with Disabilities also provide peer-to-peer counseling. Inclusive education for children with disabilities is available, but there is a shortage of trained teachers.[212]

The government acknowledges that financial constraints limit the availability of programs to assist mine survivors and that more facilities are needed to promote their socioeconomic reintegration, particularly in rural areas. Limited activities are being undertaken and there are plans to provide food for work, to encourage the public and private sector to employ people with a disability, and to provide those who are unable to generate an income with a monthly allowance.[213] The government reported that in 2005, in coordination with partners, it assisted 320 landmine survivors, providing housing, medical assistance and vocational training.[214] The Institute of Labor and Professional Training promotes the inclusion of people with disabilities in special training courses at its eight vocational training centers. It also runs the Center for Training and Professional Rehabilitation of People with Disabilities in Chimoio in Manica province.[215]

Until the end of 2005, Landmine Survivors Network (LSN) was active in Zambézia province. LSN’s community-based outreach workers, who were amputees, worked with individual survivors to assess their needs, offer psychological and social support, and educate families about the effects of limb loss. LSN assisted survivors in accessing health, rehabilitation, and vocational training services, and offered material support if necessary. Advocacy work in the province raised awareness of the rights of people with disabilities. LSN provided grants to help mine survivors and other people with disabilities undertake small-scale commercial activities, and linked with programs of other NGOs to raise animals and establish self-help groups.[216] The program had some shortcomings, such as lack of sustainability of the small businesses due to a lack of management capacity.  In 2006, LSN decided to expand its work through partnerships with local and international actors in other provinces, because it “found that working as a stand-alone organization, although allowed high quality work, was too costly in financial and managerial point of view to be replicable.” New provinces were to be determined based on a study conducted from March to May 2006.[217]

The UK-based NGO POWER worked closely with Forum of Mozambican Disabled Persons Associations (FAMOD), the umbrella organization of disability associations and 13 other organizations for people with disabilities, to empower disabled people to take a fuller part in the life of the community and enjoy the same rights as others. In May 2004, POWER and its national partners designed and implemented a four-year program to raise awareness of disability issues through a network of radio clubs, especially in rural villages.[218]

In 2005, the Mine Victim Assistance Network (Rede para Assistencia a Victimas de Minas, RAVIM) was established to develop economic reintegration projects and advocate on rights of people with disabilities, with advisory support from IND and LSN.[219] Of several Mozambican disability organizations working on advocacy, two in particular, the Association of Disabled Mozambicans (ADEMO) and Association of Military and Paramilitary Disabled Servicemen of Mozambique (ADEMIMO), work to support the rights of landmine survivors.[220]

The Mozambican Federation of Disabled Sports was created in 2005, under the responsibility of the Ministry of Youth and Sports.[221]

Disability Policy and Practice

In June 1999, parliament enacted a national disability law, and the cabinet approved the first national policy on people with disabilities (Resolution no. 20/99).[222]

In 2005, FAMOD and other associations of people with disabilities lobbied parliament to approve a new draft law on the rights of the disabled.[223] FAMOD also advocated for the inclusion of specific actions in favor of people with disabilities in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Program 2006-2009, PARPA II, which was approved in March 2006. PARPA II aims to provide assistance to 400,000 people with disabilities at risk of social exclusion by 2009, and includes a budget to respond to the needs of targeted groups, through transit centers, public education and training. Specific objectives include: creating 22 community-based rehabilitation centers, developing income-generating projects for 12,500 people between 2006 and 2009, providing assistive devices to 15,000 people with disabilities in 2006, increasing production of mobility devices each year to reach 30,000 by 2009, building schools and stimulating inclusive education, creating awareness raising programs, and providing professional training to integrate people with disabilities into the labor market.[224]

In 2005, the government recorded a total of 7,081 people with disabilities.[225]

Mozambique was chosen as a pilot country for the African Decade for the Disabled. A National Plan of Action on Disability focusing on five priority areas (education, health, labor, self-sufficiency, and preventing and fighting HIV/AIDS) will be designed as well as an administrative structure. The Ministry for Women and Social Action will take leadership in the review and approval of this national action plan.[226]


[1] Interview with Mik Isabel Massango, Head of International Relations Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Geneva, 11 May 2006; Article 7 Report, Form A, 27 April 2006, states that, “the proposed law on this matter has been submitted to the Parliament for appraisal.”
[2] Article 7 Report, Form A, 25 April 2005, states, “The bill is awaiting approval by the Assembly of the Republic.”
[3] Previous reports were submitted on 30 March 2000, 30 October 2001, 2 July 2002, one with no submission date (covering 1 January 2002-1 March 2003), 23 April 2004 and 25 April 2005 (for calendar year 2004).
[4] Article 7 Report, Form J, 27 April 2006.
[5] Statement by Henrique Alberto Banze, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Zagreb, 28 November 2005; statement by Gamiliel Munguambe, Director, National Demining Institute (IND), Sixth Meeting of States Parties, Zagreb, 30 November 2005.
[6] Interview with Numibio Mambique, Legal Advisor, IND, Geneva, 29 June 2004. With regard to Article 2, he said Mozambique believes that the effect of mines should be taken into account, and that any mine that is capable of exploding from the contact of a person is prohibited by the treaty.
[7] Article 7 Report, Form E, 27 April 2006.
[8] Landmines produced in the following countries (and former countries) have been found in Mozambique: Austria, Belgium, Brazil, East Germany, China, Czechoslovakia, France, Italy, Portugal, Rhodesia, South Africa, UK, USSR and Yugoslavia. See Human Rights Watch, Still Killing: Landmines in Southern Africa, (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1997), pp. 74-75.
[9] Information provided by Frank Weetjens, Program Manager, APOPO, Mozambique, 18 August 2005. He received this information from the IND director, Gamiliel Munguambe, in May 2005.
[10] Information provided by Frank Weetjens, APOPO, Mozambique, 18 August 2005. He indicated the Tanzanian Ministry of Defense had drafted such a request and that he anticipated the request will be granted by Mozambique.
[11] For more details, see Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 580.
[12] Article 7 Report, Form D, 27 April 2006. Mozambique’s first three Article 7 reports, submitted in 2000, 2001 and 2002, stated that no antipersonnel mines would be retained for training or development purposes. The 2003 report indicated 1,427 mines would be kept, while the 2004 and 2005 reports both cite a figure of 1,470 antipersonnel mines retained for demining training.
[13] Article 7 Report, Form D, 27 April 2006.
[14] Email from Tim Turner, Programme Manager, HALO Mozambique, 3 October 2005.
[15] Landmine Monitor (Zambia) interview with Gamiliel Munguambe, IND, Geneva, 13 June 2005.
[16] See for more details Landmine Monitor 2005, p. 436.
[17] Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, “A Review of Mine Action in Mozambique,” Final Report, October 2005, p. 9.
[18] Implemented in accordance with the Survey Action Centre (SAC) LIS protocols; see www.sac.org.
[19] The Mozambique LIS used the term “suspected mined area.” However, the Survey Working Group adopted the terminology “suspected hazardous area” (SHA) when it adopted the LIS protocols, and SHA is the term used in the LIS reports from Bosnia, Afghanistan, Yemen and Eritrea. The LIS in Mozambique was conducted outside the Survey Working Group (SAC) protocols; email from Mike Kendellen, Director of Survey, SAC, 30 May 2006.
[20] Canadian International Demining Corps and Paul F. Wilkinson & Associates Inc., “Landmine Impact Survey,” August 2001.
[21] DANIDA, “Support to Humanitarian Mine Action in Mozambique,” April 2004, pp. 2-3; see also section Identification of Mined Areas: Surveys and Assessments in this report.
[22] Article 7 Report, Form C, 27 April 2006.
[23] At the end of 2004, it was estimated that there were 451 suspected areas affecting 204 communities with a population of more than 800,000 people and covering an area of 172 square kilometers. IND, “Relátorio Annual do Programa de Acção sobre Minas 2005 (Annual Report 2005),” Maputo, March 2006, pp. 13, 14.
[24] Email from Lutful Kabir, Chief Technical Advisor, UNDP Mozambique, 28 April 2006. Figures are based on a table contained in IND’s 2005 annual report which represents the results of the LIS and their evolution given subsequent clearance and re-surveys.
[25] Statement by Mozambique, Sixth Meeting of States Parties, Zagreb, 30 November 2005.
[26] GICHD, “A Review of Mine Action in Mozambique,” October 2005, p. 115.
[27] IND, “Plano Annual de Prioridades de Desminagem 2006 (Annual Plan of Demining Priorities 2006),” Maputo, March 2006, p. 3.
[28] IND, “Annual Report 2004,” Maputo, March 2005, p. 3.
[29] GICHD, “A Review of Mine Action in Mozambique,” October 2005, pp. iv, xxi. See section Evaluation of Mine Action in this report.
[30] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 437.
[31] Email from Lutful Kabir, UNDP Mozambique, 21 April 2006.
[32] Interviews with representatives of HI, HALO and NPA and main mine action donors (EC, Norway, Ireland, Netherlands, and the United States) between 15 December 2005 and 15 January 2006, Maputo, Mozambique.
[33] Email from Lutful Kabir, UNDP Mozambique, 25 May 2006.
[34] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 438.
[35] Interview with Jean Paul Rychener, IMSMA Regional Coordinator for Central and Southern Africa, GICHD, 11 May 2006.
[36] Email from Lutful Kabir, UNDP Mozambique, 10 March 2006.
[37] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 585.
[38] GICHD, “A Review of Mine Action in Mozambique,” October 2005, p. 133.
[39] See the section Demining in this report. Humanitarian operators also reported these concerns to Landmine Monitor. Email from Tim Turner, HALO Mozambique, 28 April 2006; email from Atle Karlsen, Resident Representative, NPA Mozambique, Maputo, 26 May 2006.
[40] Email from Atle Karlsen, NPA Mozambique, 26 May 2006.
[41] The GICHD review reported that actual divisions of authorities and responsibilities between the Minister and IND are very ambiguous in Decree 37/99. Essentially, all responsibilities are assigned to IND, but then IND reports to the Minister. GICHD, “A Review of Mine Action in Mozambique,” October 2005, p. iv.
[42] Article 7 Report, Form A, 30 March 2000.
[43] GICHD, “A Review of Mine Action in Mozambique,” October 2005, p. 39. International operators are said to have complied with this procedure. Email from Atle Karlsen, NPA Mozambique, 26 May 2006.
[44] Email from Lutful Kabir, UNDP Mozambique, 10 March 2006.
[45] IND, “Plano Nacional Quinquenal de Accão Sobre Minas 2002-2006 (National Mine Action Plan),” 19 November 2001, Maputo, p. 7.
[46] See Landmine Monitor 2005, p. 437.
[47] IND, “Annual Plan of Demining Priorities 2005,” Maputo, March 2005, p. 4; IND, “Annual Plan of Demining Priorities 2006,” Maputo, March 2006, p. 4.
[48] Ibid; Ibid, p. 6.
[49] GICHD, “A Review of Mine Action in Mozambique,” October 2005, p. 37.
[50] IND, “Annual Report 2005,” Maputo, March 2006, p. 24; see Landmine Monitor 2005, p. 438.
[51] “Pesquisa de Impacto e evolucao dos dados (Impact Survey and evolution of data),” in IND, “Annual Plan 2005,” Maputo, March 2006, p. 27.
[52] IND, “Annual Plan of Demining Priorities 2006,” Maputo, March 2006, p. 4. Translation by Landmine Monitor.
[53] GICHD, “A Review of Mine Action in Mozambique,” October 2005, p. 115.
[54] Email from Lutful Kabir, UNDP Mozambique, 23 May 2006.
[55] IND explains that, given the lack of technical surveys in the areas defined as priorities for 2006, it is not possible to determinate the dimension of these areas, which is why only the number of tasks to be conducted can be indicated; IND, “Annual Plan of Demining Priorities 2006,” Maputo, March 2006, p. 6.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Ibid, p. 8; IND, “Annual Plan of Demining Priorities 2006,” Maputo, March 2006, p. 7.
[58] PARPA II, Maputo, 2 May 2006, pp. 72, 90.
[59] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 438.
[60] IND, “Annual Report 2005,” Maputo, March 2006, p. 24.
[61] “Programa Quinquenal do Governo para 2005-2009 (Five-Year Government Program),” Boletin da República (official gazette), 11 May 2005, p. 143.
[62] Email from Lutful Kabir, UNDP Mozambique, 28 April 2006.
[63] IND, “Annual Plan of Demining Priorities 2006,” Maputo, March 2006, pp. 1-2.
[64] GICHD, “A Review of Mine Action in Mozambique,” October 2005, p. 123; see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 438.
[65] Email from Lutful Kabir, UNDP Mozambique, 28 April 2006.
[66] Statement by Mozambique, Sixth Meeting of States Parties, Zagreb, 30 November 2005.
[67] Statement by Mozambique, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 10 May 2006.
[68] GICHD, “A Review of Mine Action in Mozambique,” October 2005, p. vi.
[69] Email from H. Murphey McCloy Jr., Senior Demining Advisor, US Department of State, 16 September 2005.
[70] Email from Steve Brown, Director, RONCO Mozambique, 19 January 2006.
[71] Email from H. Murphey McCloy Jr., US Department of State, 7 July 2006.
[72] IND, “Annual Report 2005,” Maputo, March 2006, p. 5.
[73] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 441.
[74] Intervention by Gamiliel Munguambe, IND, IND/UNDP/donors/operators meeting, Maputo, 15 December 2005.
[75] Email from Lutful Kabir, UNDP Mozambique, 10 March 2006; see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 441.
[76] IND, “Annual Report 2005,” Maputo, March 2006, p. 10.
[77] IND includes national NGOs (as opposed to the international NGOs working in Mozambique, namely HI, NPA and HALO) in the category of commercial operators.
[78] IND, “Annual Report 2005,” Maputo, March 2006, pp. 11-12. ArmorGroup, a UK commercial company, is registered in Mozambique as MMA Limitada. See ArmorGroup, www.armorgroupmineaction.com, accessed 23 May 2006. MMA’s clearance numbers were reported to be “unavailable.” However, MMA/ArmorGroup indicated to Landmine Monitor that all its clearance figures were provided to IND in due time; email from Rob Hallam, ArmorGroup, 6 May 2006.
[79] Landmine Monitor visited a small local NGO called “Mozambique Association of Deminers.” Created in April 2004, it mostly consists of former military men. In 2005, it was contracted by a Chinese company to survey and clear a road, and by a government agency to access a hydroelectric station; interview with Victor Cigarro and Orlando Calisto, Associação de Sapadores Mozambicanos, Maputo, Mozambique, 19 December 2005.
[80] Email from Atle Karlsen, NPA Mozambique, 26 May 2006.
[81] Presentation by Tim Turner, HALO Mozambique, IND/UNDP/donors/operators meeting, 16 August 2005; email from Tim Turner, HALO Mozambique, 7 July 2006.
[82] GICHD, “A Review of Mine Action in Mozambique,” October 2005, p. 28; IND/UNDP/donors/operators meeting, 15 December 2005.
[83] Email from Atle Karlsen, NPA Mozambique, 26 May 2006.
[84] Emails from Lutful Kabir, UNDP Mozambique, 10 March and 28 April 2006.
[85] IND, “Annual Report 2005,” Maputo, March 2006, p. 6.
[86] HALO states that IND’s claim that HALO reduced 72 square kilometers in 2005, as stated in the 2005 annual report, is “plain wrong.” Email from Tim Turner, HALO Mozambique, 28 April 2006.
[87] IND, “Annual Report 2005,” March 2006, p. 27.
[88] Presentation by Tim Turner, HALO Mozambique, IND/UNDP/donors/operators meeting, 16 August 2005.
[89] Email from Tim Turner, HALO Mozambique, 28 April 2006; presentation to the IND/UNDP/donors/operators meeting, 16 August 2005.
[90] HALO reports that of the 202 SMA that were confirmed, 110 sites were previously identified by the survey they conducted with HI in 1994, and that, therefore, only 92 sites were not previously known to HALO. Email from Tim Turner, HALO Mozambique, 1 March 2006.
[91] Email from Tim Turner, HALO Mozambique, to HALO’s donors, 1 March 2006, and telephone interview, 14 March 2006.
[92] NPA, “Activity Plan 2006,” October 2005, p. 9; email from Atle Karlsen, NPA Mozambique, 26 May 2006.
[93] NPA, “Progress Report 2005,” 11 January 2006, p. 5. NPA reports that the area reduction figures are conservative as few of the SMAs from the LIS had estimated, let alone confirmed, measurements of the actual size of the suspected area. The figures reported therefore include only the difference between the few areas in the LIS that did have a size indication and the area that was actually found to be suspected through NPA surveys. This leaves the total area cancelled and no longer under suspicion far larger than reported. Email from Atle Karlsen, NPA Mozambique, 26 May 2006.
[94] Email from Gilles Delcourt, Program Manager, HI Mozambique, 24 April 2006.
[95] Ibid.
[96] IND, “Annual Report 2005,” March 2006, p. 27.
[97] Email from Lutful Kabir, UNDP Mozambique, 23 May 2006.
[98] Email from Tim Turner, HALO Mozambique, to HALO’s donors, 1 March 2006.
[99] Email from Atle Karlsen, NPA Mozambique, 26 May 2006.
[100] Email from Gilles Delcourt, HI Mozambique, 9 May 2006.
[101] IND, “Annual Report 2005,” Maputo, March 2006, pp. 8,10.
[102] Ibid, p. 8.
[103] See IND, “Annual Report 2004,” Maputo, March 2005, p. 6; email from Steve Brown, RONCO Mozambique, 24 February 2006.
[104] IND, “Annual Report 2005,” Maputo, March 2006, p. 9.
[105] Disaggregated numbers were not provided of what was cleared and surveyed. IND, “Annual Report 2005,” Maputo, March 2006, pp. 4, 12.
[106] In some cases, IND may include the area technically surveyed or otherwise cancelled in the reported clearance total. For example, IND stated that in 2005, RONCO cleared over eight square kilometers, whereas RONCO reported that it cleared 0.5 square kilometers and conducted technical survey on 7.72 square kilometers. Email from Steve Brown, RONCO Mozambique, 24 February 2006.
[107] Email from Gilles Delcourt, HI Mozambique, 9 May 2006.
[108] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 441. The total area cleared by humanitarian operators reported by Landmine Monitor 2004 did not include clearance by FADM, which cleared 15,886 square meters in 2004.
[109] Data for FADM, ADP, ASM, EMD, JVD, MMA and REASeuro from: IND, “Annual Report 2005,” Maputo, March 2006, p. 12.
[110] Email from Atle Karlsen, NPA Mozambique, 26 May 2006.
[111] Email from Tim Turner, HALO Mozambique, 1 March 2006. HALO’s clearance total includes 1,937,862 square meters cleared manually (destroying 35,389 antipersonnel mines and 68 UXO) and 40,395 square meters cleared mechanically (destroying 1,008 antipersonnel mines); an additional 97 antipersonnel mines and 218 UXO were destroyed through explosive ordnance disposal spot tasks. HALO considers some of the commercial area clearance figures in the IND report to be too high in relation to the assets of the companies performing the clearance tasks. Email from Tim Turner, HALO Mozambique, 7 July 2006.
[112] Email from Steve Brown, RONCO Mozambique, 24 February 2006.
[113] Email from Gilles Delcourt, HI Mozambique, 24 April 2006. HI’s clearance total includes 95,210 square meters cleared manually, 100,048 square meters cleared using dogs and 135,941 square meters cleared mechanically.
[114] IND, “Annual Report 2005,” Maputo, March 2006, p. 20.
[115] Email from Tim Turner, HALO Mozambique, 1 March 2006, and telephone interview, 14 March 2006; email from Gilles Delcourt, HI Mozambique, 24 April 2006; NPA, “Progress Report 2005,” 11 January 2006, p. 5; email from Steve Brown, RONCO Mozambique, 28 April 2006.
[116] NPA, “Progress Report 2005,” 11 January 2006, p. 8; email from Atle Karlsen, NPA Mozambique, 26 May 2006.
[117] IND, “Annual Report 2005,” Maputo, March 2006, p. 18.
[118] Email from Tim Turner, HALO Mozambique, to HALO’s donors, 1 March 2006; IND, “Annual Report 2005,” Maputo, March 2006, p. 18.
[119] GICHD, “A Review of Mine Action in Mozambique,” October 2005, p. 41; email from Noel Cook, Technical Advisor, EU, Maputo, 24 February 2006.
[120] IND, “Annual Report 2005,” Maputo, March 2006, p. 18.
[121] Email from Lutful Kabir, UNDP Mozambique, 25 May 2006.
[122] Email from Tim Turner, HALO Mozambique, 1 March 2006; email from Atle Karlsen, NPA Mozambique, 26 May 2006.
[123] NPA, “Progress Report 2005,” 11 January 2006, p. 5.
[124] Email from Tim Turner, HALO Mozambique, 1 March 2006.
[125] Email from Lutful Kabir, UNDP Mozambique, 25 May 2006.
[126] Email from Tim Turner, HALO Mozambique, to HALO’s donors, 11 December 2005, and email, 28 April 2006.
[127] “Mine accident information to the wider mine action community,” NPA Mozambique, 10 May 2005.
[128] Email from Tim Turner, HALO Mozambique, 28 April 2006.
[129] Email from Steve Brown, RONCO Mozambique, 28 April 2006.
[130] Email from Lutful Kabir, UNDP Mozambique, 28 April 2006.
[131] GICHD, “A Review of Mine Action in Mozambique,” October 2005, p. 25.
[132] DANIDA, “Support to Humanitarian Mine Action Mozambique,” April 2004, p. iii.
[133] Email from Tim Tuner, HALO Mozambique, 28 April 2006; email from Atle Karlsen, NPA Mozambique, 26 May 2006; email from Steve Brown, RONCO Mozambique, 28 April 2006.
[134] Email from Gilles Delcourt, HI Mozambique, 24 April 2006.
[135] See Landmine Monitor 2005, p. 443.
[136] Emails from Steve Brown, RONCO Mozambique, 28 April and 4 May 2006.
[137] “Mozambican sappers illegally recruited to Cyprus,” Agencia de informacão de Moçambique, 20 October 2005; email from Rob Hallam, ArmorGroup/MMA, 6 May 2006.
[138] Email from Rob Hallam, ArmorGroup/MMA, 6 May 2006.
[139] The Mozambican part of the program has been solely funded by the Flanders government, which contributed €905,960 ($1,127,830) to APOPO for 2005-2007. For 2003-2007, its funding to APOPO totaled €1,296,432 ($1,613,928), including €150,000 ($186,735) for 2004 not previously reported by Landmine Monitor. “Cooperation between Flanders and Mozambique,” (in Flemish) p. 2, Flanders Official website, http://docs.vlaanderen.be, accessed 3 June 2006.
[140] Interview with Frank Weetjens, APOPO, 12 January 2006, and email, 22 March 2006.
[141] Article 7 Report, Form I, 27 April 2006; IND, “Annual Report 2005,” Maputo, March 2006, pp. 12-13.
[142] IND, “Annual Report 2005,” Executive Summary, Maputo, March 2006. See also IND, “Plan of Demining Priorities for 2006,” Maputo, March 2006, p. 4.
[143] IND, “Annual Report 2005,” Maputo, March 2006, p. 13.
[144] Interview with Lutful Kabir, UNDP Mozambique, Maputo, 7 March 2006, and email, 26 May 2006.
[145] Email from Surengue Assane, MRE Coordinator, IND, 27 April 2006.
[146] IND, “Annual Report 2005,” Maputo, March 2006, pp. 12-13; email from Gilles Delcourt, HI Mozambique, 1 June 2006.
[147] Email from Surengue Assane, IND, 27 April 2006.
[148] Email from Gilles Delcourt, HI Mozambique, 1 June 2006.
[149] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 444.
[150] Statement by Mozambique, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 10 May 2006; IND, “Annual Report 2005,” Maputo, March 2006, p. 13; Article 7 Report, Form I, 27 April 2006.
[151] GICHD, “A Review of Mine Action in Mozambique,” October 2005, p. iv, 21.
[152] Interview with Lutful Kabir, UNDP Mozambique, Maputo, 7 March 2006, and telephone interview, 25 May 2006.
[153] See Landmine Monitor 2005, pp. 444-445.
[154] Austria Article 7 Report, Form J, 27 April 2006; email from Alexander Kmentt, Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 27 April 2006.
[155] Mine Action Investments database; email from Carly Volkes, DFAIT, 7 June 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1 = C$1.2115. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006.
[156] France Article 7 Report, Form J, 26 April 2006; CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form E, 6 October 2005. Average exchange rate for 2005: €1 = US$1.2449, used throughout this report. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006.
[157] Germany Article 7 Report, Form J, 27 April 2006; Mine Action Investments database.
[158] Emails from Manfredo Capozza, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 2006.
[159] Emails from Kitagawa Yasu, Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL), March-May 2006, with translated information received by JCBL from Multilateral Cooperation Department, 11 May 2005 and Non-proliferation and Science Department, 11 April 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1= ¥110.11. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006.
[160] UNDP, “Mine Action Contributions to UNDP’s Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery,” 20 April 2006; response to Landmine Monitor from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 9 May 2006.
[161] Email from Ellen Schut, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 April 2006; email from Brechtje Paardekooper, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 April 2006.
[162] Email from Annette A. Landell-Mills, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 June 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1 = NOK6.4412. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006.
[163] Email from Helen Fawthorpe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 June 2006; email from Megan McCoy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 June 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: NZ$1 = US$0.7049. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006.
[164] Email from Rémy Friedmann, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 April 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1 = CHF1.2459. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006.
[165] USG Historical Chart containing data for FY 2005, by email from Angela L. Jeffries, Financial Management Specialist, US Department of State, 8 June 2006; US Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety,” 6th Edition June 2006, p 14; email from H. Murphey McCloy Jr., US Department of State, 7 July 2006.
[166] Email from Zach Hudson, Program Manager, Adopt-A-Minefield, 2 June 2006.
[167] IND, “Annual Report 2005,” Maputo, March 2006, p. 21. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1 = MZM23001.40466, used throughout this report. Landmine Monitor estimate based on www.oanda.com.
[168] See Landmine Monitor 2005, pp. 444-446.
[169] IND, “Annual Report 2005,” Maputo, March 2006, p. 21. The government is reported to have disbursed $1.1 million in redundancy payments to ADP staff in 2005. Intervention by Gamiliel Munguambe, IND/UNDP/donors/operators meeting, Maputo, 15 December 2005.
[170] IND, “Annual Report 2005,” Maputo, March 2006, pp. 21-22. IND reported funding in 2005 not reported to Landmine Monitor by donors: $475,960 from Belgium to ADP; $216,244 from Denmark to IND; $204,697 from the EU to IND; $646,186 from Ireland ($292,218 to IND; and $353,968 to HALO). HALO Mozambique reported Ireland as one of its primary donors in 2005. Email from Tim Turner, HALO Mozambique, 7 July 2006. Ireland did not report funding to Mozambique in 2005. Emails from Therese Healy, Department of Foreign Affairs, May 2006; CCW Article 13 Report, Annex 1, 14 October 2005. IND also reported, for the first time, funding by investors in commercial demining, $2,277,114 in 2005, bringing the total dispersed funds in 2005 to some $14.5 million. These amounts are not included in the Landmine Monitor total for 2005.
[171] See Landmine Monitor 2005, pp. 444-446. Previously, IND has cautioned that in its reporting the “amounts disbursed cannot be accurately confirmed.” See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 591.
[172] See Landmine Monitor 2005, pp. 444-446.
[173] IND, “Annual Report 2005,” Maputo, March 2006, pp. 14-15.
[174] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 446; Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 592.
[175] Landmine Monitor analysis of “Accidentes de 96 a 2005” (“Accidents between 96 and 2005”), as of 5 June 2006, provided to Landmine Monitor by Surengue Assane, IND, 2 June 2006.
[176] IND, “Annual Report 2005,” Maputo, March 2006, pp. 13-15.
[177] Email from Lutful Kabir, UNDP Mozambique , Maputo, 2 June 2006; IND, “Accidentes com Minas e UXOs em 2006 (Accidents with mines and UXOs in 2006),” provided to Landmine Monitor by Surengue Assane, IND, Maputo, 2 June 2006.
[178] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 446.
[179] IND, “Annual Report 2005,” Maputo, March 2006, p. 14.
[180] Landmine Monitor analysis of “Accidents between 96 and 2005,” and “Accidentes com Minas e UXOs em 2006 (Accidents with Mines and UXO in 2006),” as of 5 June 2006, provided to Landmine Monitor by Surengue Assane, IND, Maputo, 2 June 2006.
[181] For details, see Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 593.
[182] UN, “Final Report, First Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,” Nairobi, 29 November-3 December 2004, APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, p. 33.
[183] “Final Report of the Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V, “Victim Assistance objectives of the States Parties that have the responsibility for significant number of landmine survivors,” Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, pp. 167-171.
[184] Article 7 Report, Form J, 27 April 2006.
[185] GICHD, “A Review of Mine Action in Mozambique,” October 2005, p. 22.
[186] For details, see Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 596; Article 7 Report, Form J, 27 April 2006; interview with Aurelio Faduc, Head, Department of Study, Planning and Information, IND, Maputo, 20 February 2006.
[187] Article 7 Report, Form J, 27 April 2006.
[188] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 447.
[189] WHO, “Health in Action Crisis: Mozambique,” September 2005.
[190] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 448; Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 593.
[191] WHO, “Injuries, violence and disabilities, Biennium 2004-2005,” Geneva, 2006, p. 59.
[192] Letter from Américo Assan, Head, Health Assistance Department, National Directorate of Health, Ministry of Health, 12 April 2006.
[193] “Final Report of the Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V, Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, pp. 168-169.
[194] Ibid, pp. 169-170.
[195] Ministry of Health, “Programa de Medicina Física e Reabilitação-Estrategia 2005-2009 (Physical Therapy and Rehabilitation Program-Strategy 2005-2009),” Maputo, 2005, p. 4.
[196] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, pp. 448-449.
[197] “Final Report of the Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V, Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, pp. 168-170.
[198] Ministry of Health, “Physical Therapy and Rehabilitation Program-Strategy 2005-2009,” Maputo, 2005, p. 3.
[199] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 448.
[200] Letter from Américo Assan, Ministry of Health, 12 April 2006.
[201] Ibid.
[202] ICRC, “Special Fund for the Disabled Annual Report 2005,” Geneva, 10 March 2006, p. 17.
[203] Response to Landmine Monitor VA questionnaire by Felipe Pedro Ussiva, Project Coordinator, Mozambique Red Cross Society, Maputo, 23 February 2006.
[204] Mozambique Red Cross Society, “Jaipur Orthopedic Center Social Program, Quarterly Report,” Manjacaze, April 2006, p. 3.
[205] Response to Landmine Monitor VA questionnaire by Felipe Pedro Ussiva, Mozambique Red Cross Society, Maputo, 23 February 2006.
[206] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 449.
[207] Interview with Gilles Delcourt, HI Mozambique, Maputo, 21 March 2006.
[208] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 449.
[209] Interview with Francisco Tembe, Head, Disability Department, Ministry of Women and Social Action, Maputo, 2 February 2006.
[210] “Final Report of the Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V, Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, p. 171.
[211] Interview with Francisco Tembe, Ministry of Women and Social Action, Maputo, 2 February 2006.
[212] “Final Report of the Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V, Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, p. 170.
[213] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 449.
[214] Government of Mozambique, “Balanco do Plano Economico e Social de 2005 (Evaluation of the Social and Economic Plan),” undated, p. 126.
[215] “Três centros para formação profissional (Three centers for vocational training),” Notícia (Maputo), 17 August 2005.
[216] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 449; Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 595.
[217] Email from Becky Jordan, Regional Coordinator for Africa, LSN, Maputo, 7 July 2006.
[218] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 450.
[219] Interview with Luis Wamusse, President of the Advisory Board, Mine Victim Assistance Network, Maputo, 1 March 2006.
[220] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 450.
[221] Interview with Francisco Tembe, Ministry of Women and Social Action, Maputo, 2 February 2006; “Desporto para deficientes terá federacao nacional (Sport for the disabled will have a national federation),” Notícia (Maputo), 10 September 2005.
[222] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 450.
[223] Ibid.
[224] Government of Mozambique, “PARPA II,” Maputo, 2 May 2006, pp. 9-10.
[225] Government of Mozambique, “Balanco de Plano Economico e Social de 2005 (Evaluation of the Social and Economic Plan 2005,” undated, p. 59.
[226] Interview with Francisco Tembe, Ministry of Women and Social Action, Maputo, 2 February 2006; African Decade of People with Disabilities, “Country Profile: Mozambique,” www.africandecade.org, accessed 28 February 2006.